HR|17Nov15|1

G.R. No. 96681

December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture &
Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO,
HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER,
respondents.
NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor
General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by
a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court
of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take
cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed
by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and
adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the
same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially
correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together
with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the
record, are hereunder set forth.
1.
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among
them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time
and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990
without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had
elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from
their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary
of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS
officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more
teachers joining in the days that followed. 3

Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein,
teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political
demands of the MPSTA. 4
2.
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the
charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807"
and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3.
In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants
Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named
respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for
suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for
suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also
denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents
led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case
eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation
of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy
and del Castillo. 8
4.
In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went
to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged
violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No.
95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No.
95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named
individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public
school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."
5.
In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27,
1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass
actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6.
Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all
numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection
therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary
Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11

HR|17Nov15|2

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the
subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and
Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the
complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without
formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances
which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR
complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and
making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and
resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their
wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High
School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990
at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to
assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of
complainants' evidence.
xxx

xxx

been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and
while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from
those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint
Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of
petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's
joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to
try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1)
whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the
imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2)
whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and)
with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.

xxx

7.
Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file
a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as
grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over
the case." 14
8.
Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the
"striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a)
The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082,
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b)
The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing
the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the
Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie
lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants,
preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
9.
In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to
dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days
. . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without
respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . .
they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education,
Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on
said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take
over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22

HR|17Nov15|3

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on
Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it
succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the
effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1)
Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights;
(2)
Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3)
Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4)

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical
sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research
on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official
inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5)
Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6)
Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7)
rights;

It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power
pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under
its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct
of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26

Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human

(8)
Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9)
Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10)

Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11)

Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out
by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the
parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the
Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted

HR|17Nov15|4

actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether
or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue
those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or
are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

SO ORDERED.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education,
being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also,
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and
resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the
Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in
disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the
proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil
and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for
reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may
be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business
intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It
has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the
questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers'
strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases
against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its
investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no
power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil
Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that
Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for
assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE,
and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited
"to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

HR|17Nov15|5

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.

xxx

VITUG, J.:

4.
that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business
entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants
are indeed, vendors;

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into
focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No.
90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the
officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the
"People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along
North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued
an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as
CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition
of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990,
ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private
respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again
directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would
lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred,
among other things, that:
1.
this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency
Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the
dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;

xxx

xxx

3.
. . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to
moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

5.
that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner
North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6.
that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether
or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon
City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to
dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they
would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights,
(but) their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the
contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by
petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of
P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental
motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper
tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial

HR|17Nov15|6

body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines . . . ." It added:

(1)
Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights;

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these
brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the
basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically
scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of
Man's inhumanity to man.

(2)
Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3)
Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
(4)

Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated,
however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order,
directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17

(5)
Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6)
Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a)
to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b)

to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c)

to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for
public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its
Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque
Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,
20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to

(7)
rights;

Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human

(8)
Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9)
Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10)

Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11)

Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of
the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view,
however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the
Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the
first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment,"
but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

HR|17Nov15|7

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy
and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it,
albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on
human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the
questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all
parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or
Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the
press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights,
such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and
engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25

accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent
and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional
Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the
martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental
law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments
expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil
liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights
expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial
Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became
subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years,
without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to
petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes.
Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought
with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure,
except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation and were
dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by
international bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be
recognized and protected by it. 26

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human
rights and also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants
and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights
and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact
and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 27

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth,
right, innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests
that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article
on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right
or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA.
Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human
rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of
articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are

HR|17Nov15|8

very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments
as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.

defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are
other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx

xxx

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of
rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials;
4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the
religious.

xxx
xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that
the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this
moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters
which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of
governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or
prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to
safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is,
perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral
parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by
human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the
past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the

xxx

xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the
proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion.
The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this
morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal
Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights
contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human
rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there
are rights specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it

HR|17Nov15|9

would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the
rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil
and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give
the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion
later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner
Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt
must be envisioned initially by this provision freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of
torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and
collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political
rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or
the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.

xxx

xxx

xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on
how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients
who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases
involved are very delicate torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and
the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots.
Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino,
the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on
civil and political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go
again and we will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to
those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human
Rights.

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants,
and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may
also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social
rights.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant
contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et
cetera.

Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right
of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
34

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the
Gentlemen has specified.

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe
cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair
and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

HR|17Nov15|10

effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set.
In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation
of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that
"Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of
the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35

principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no
other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is
planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of
Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent
danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant.
Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in
this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the
vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack
of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter
lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any
person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the
procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt
could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold
relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The
"order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export
Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through Madame
Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution
or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from
proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of
any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot
and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the
matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the
doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.
38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 901580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely
doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00
fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

HR|17Nov15|11

G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make
different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices
that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because
they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core
value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect
for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of
morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically
opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is
moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes,
however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than
intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live
together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background

registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that
the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate
and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends
religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into
that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in
their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves
that recompense of their error which was meet.

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and
December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed
Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond
bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of
those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do
mischief" (29:30).

HR|17Nov15|12

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F:
Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence,
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to
be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are
inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of
prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment
and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing
such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those
which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders,
decrees and edicts.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for
not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or
failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment
that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in
the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of
the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to
protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T.
Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking
for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has
properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed
sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its
constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race.
But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate
tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a
tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations only
that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under
representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations
and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are
offensive to morals.

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not
recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x
Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right,

HR|17Nov15|13

and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or
legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no
denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female
protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is
there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted
as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religiousbased, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and
these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications
and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is
clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who
are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men
Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the
Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions
and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the
issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously
announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of
COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the
OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.12
Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.13 Thus, in
order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own
comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.15

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12,
2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the
denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was granted on
February 2, 2010.19
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners
application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined
that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the
COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom
of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no
restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also
argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and
RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence
contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941

HR|17Nov15|14

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the
sectors in the enumeration.

Boys Legion Metro Manila

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
RA 7941.

Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila

Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)

Cebu Pride Cebu City

Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it
had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon
verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner
does not exist in almost all provinces in the country."21

Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it
said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious,
considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC
prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated
afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due
process.

Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial
petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged
that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it
had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates
around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"

Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila

Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City

Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City

Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila

Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI

Abra Gay Association

Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
PUP LAKAN
Albay Gay Association
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila

HR|17Nov15|15

San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan

Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr.
Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public
order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if
government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and
morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The nonbelievers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief,
i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions
upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1

Tayabas Gay Association Quezon

Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City23
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise
that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are
to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal
place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation
of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines
in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for
is "government neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the nonestablishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead,
on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:26

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is
"detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in
public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After
all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a
compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions
of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular
purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of
the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion
clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government
must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided
it does not offend compelling state interests.27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct
may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC
argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of
the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector
which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is
a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society
without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.28

HR|17Nov15|16

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind
this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation,
even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that
the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally
accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even
the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have
committed or are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more
than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between
thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would
have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not
the intendment of the law.31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters
concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should
continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance
advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of
morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from
our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a
civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly
needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration
on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the

inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition
on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons."33 The equal
protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,36 we
declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have
followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution."37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as
immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately
for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize
homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to
assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is,
moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit
the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same
interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated.
State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar
as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the
OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized

HR|17Nov15|17

under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted
and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society
of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that deeply held
convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square.
Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has
access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers
of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access
to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which
convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally
designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this
democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law,
the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median
groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies
including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a majority,
however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises
not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent
any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It
follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political
association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that
homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European
and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and
equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.42
To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face
here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on
Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech
doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint."43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant
human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political
party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and
democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by
peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of
association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the
population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate
controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.45 Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall
outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and
their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the
same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express
that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral
views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the
community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be
that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this
Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at
its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt
nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on
Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has
been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply
exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to
participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx

HR|17Nov15|18

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take
part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to
vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

include "sexual orientation."48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.49
The UDHR provides:

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang
Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its
members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. x x x47

Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list
system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of
COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal
basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has,
indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2
and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human
rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world
order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support,
international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic
legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights.
In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is
not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR
Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is
elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs
and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of
public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever
form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the
rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people
and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that
persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election,
such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise
eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such
as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer
discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should

HR|17Nov15|19

indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective
office.50
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to
the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea
for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),51 which petitioner
declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are
not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.52
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to
or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much
broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that
international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human
rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer
controversial.1avvphi1
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated
by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the
"soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation,
harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires,
without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion.
This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution
and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our
democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated
November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

HR|17Nov15|20

G.R. No. 162994

September 17, 2004

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,

vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional overtones, involving the validity
of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any
competitor company.

In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of
interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would
resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because
he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsys employer, was planning to merge with
Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered
by Astra. With Bettsys separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated.
At the same time, they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated May 19, 2003 and the Resolution
dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62434.2

In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In September 1999, Tecson
applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the
potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos "leastmovement-possible" policy.

Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as
medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation.

In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area.
Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to
study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship
by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.

Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance
Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to
comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.

The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform
management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with the company, the management
and the employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking
position" or preparation for employment outside the company after six months.

During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued
samples of products which were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not
included in product conferences regarding such products.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals3 (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay. She
supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the
conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson
married Bettsy in September 1998.

Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter
for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half () month pay for every year of
service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships
between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to
transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the
ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxos policy
prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a
valid exercise of its management prerogatives.4

HR|17Nov15|21

Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts Decision, but the motion was denied by
the appellate court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004.5
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
NCMBs finding that the Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of a
competitor company is valid; and (ii) the Court of Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was
constructively dismissed when he was transferred to a new sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity
to attend products seminars and training sessions.6
Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among
employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees right to marry.7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the following circumstances: (1) he
was transferred from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales
area, (2) he suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars and training
sessions for medical representatives, and (4) he was prohibited from promoting respondents products
which were competing with Astras products.8
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having
a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecsons
reassignment from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and
Agusan del Sur sales area does not amount to constructive dismissal.9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a
genuine interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict
with their responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having personal or family
interests in any competitor company which may influence their actions and decisions and consequently
deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from
gaining access to its secrets, procedures and policies.10
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes existing or future
relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection
clause. It maintains that considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds.11
According to Glaxo, Tecsons marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a real and potential conflict
of interest. Astras products were in direct competition with 67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence,
Glaxos enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecsons case was a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives.12 In any case, Tecson was given several months to remedy the situation, and was even
encouraged not to resign but to ask his wife to resign form Astra instead.13

Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when he
signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein. In said contract,
he also agreed to resign from respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an employee of
a competitor company would be detrimental to the interests of Glaxo.14
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecsons reassignment to another sales area and his exclusion from seminars
regarding respondents new products did not amount to constructive dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecsons refusal to resign, he was relocated from the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area. Glaxo asserts that in
effecting the reassignment, it also considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Since Tecsons hometown was
in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from the
Bicol region to the Butuan City sales area would be favorable to him and his family as he would be
relocating to a familiar territory and minimizing his travel expenses.15
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecsons exclusion from the seminar concerning the new anti-asthma drug
was due to the fact that said product was in direct competition with a drug which was soon to be sold by
Astra, and hence, would pose a potential conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecsons receipt of
his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-up created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan City sales
area (his paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area instead of Naga City because the supplier
thought he already transferred to Butuan).16
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not
holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was
constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecsons contract of employment with Glaxo being questioned by petitioners provides:

10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future relationship you may have, either by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. Should it pose a
possible conflict of interest in management discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from the Company as
a matter of Company policy.
17
The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by the existing company rules of Glaxo, and
to study and become acquainted with such policies.18 In this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo
expressly informs its employees of its rules regarding conflict of interest:

HR|17Nov15|22

1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest that may run counter to the
responsibilities which they owe Glaxo Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or otherwise, in any competitor supplier or other
businesses which may consciously or unconsciously influence their actions or decisions and thus deprive
Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or knowledge of Company plans to advance their
outside personal interests, that of their relatives, friends and other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income which would impair their effective job
performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships that may lead to conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees of
competing drug companies are expected to disclose such relationship to the Management. If management
perceives a conflict or potential conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together by management and
the employee, to arrive at a solution within six (6) months, either by transfer to another department in a
non-counter checking position, or by career preparation toward outside employment after Glaxo Wellcome.
Employees must be prepared for possible resignation within six (6) months, if no other solution is
feasible.19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxos policy prohibiting an
employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies
in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxos employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and
procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.20 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to
give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every
labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,22 it is a legitimate business practice to guard business confidentiality
and protect a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or
employees who are married to a competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that
discharged an employee who was married to an employee of an active competitor did not violate Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23 The Court pointed out that the policy was applied to men and women
equally, and noted that the employers business was highly competitive and that gaining inside information
would constitute a competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as
petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause
are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority.24 Corollarily, it has been held in
a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.25 The only exception occurs when the state29
in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful
private conduct.27 Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the company
actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the
application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of
the employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is
clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and
those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of
their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee
and the company that may arise out of such relationships. As succinctly explained by the appellate court,
thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the company remains free to
marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that
belongs only to the individual. However, an employees personal decision does not detract the employer
from exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success. . .28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms part of
respondents Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by
Tescon, was made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction
when he signed his employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson

HR|17Nov15|23

knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have
the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith."29 He is therefore
estopped from questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that Tescon was constructively dismissed when he was
transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan
del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the companys seminar on new products
which were directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is
defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes
impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a
clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.30 None
of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tescon was demoted or
unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly
exercised its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioners transfer to another place of assignment was merely in keeping with the policy
of the company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus validNote that [Tecsons] wife holds a
sensitive supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company which requires her to work
in close coordination with District Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties include monitoring
sales of Astra products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering relationship with customers,
collection, monitoring and managing Astras inventoryshe therefore takes an active participation in the
market war characterized as it is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this
is significant, petitioners sales territory covers Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is
supervising a branch of her employer in Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all in the same
Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest not only possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the
others market strategies in the region would be inevitable. [Managements] appreciation of a conflict of
interest is therefore not merely illusory and wanting in factual basis31
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 which involved a complaint
filed by a medical representative against his employer drug company for illegal dismissal for allegedly
terminating his employment when he refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld
the right of the drug company to transfer or reassign its employee in accordance with its operational
demands and requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted hereunder, also finds application in the
instant case:
By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical representative is expected to travel. He
should anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their business. It would be a poor drug
corporation which cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to new markets calling for opening
or expansion or to areas where the need for pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments
are part of the employment contract.33
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a
long period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to

eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was
still in its initial stage, Tecsons supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him about its effects on his
employment with the company and on the companys interests. After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave
him time to resolve the conflict by either resigning from the company or asking his wife to resign from Astra.
Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance and
suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated
requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after
several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that
handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only
reassigned him to another area where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting
Tecsons transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any
suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

HR|17Nov15|24

G.R. No. 164774

April 12, 2006

STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA, Petitioners,

vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the employer banning spouses
from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor
Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 3, 2004 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which
affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading principally of paper
products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while
Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia
(Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the company.1
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the
company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that
should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in
1995,2 viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of
relationship, already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed a friendly
relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should
resign to preserve the policy stated above.3

Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners stated
that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her
services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.6
The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated therein that they have
no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any claim or
demand of whatever nature.7
Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign
voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella,
she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a married but
separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed
her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an
accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days.
She returned to work on December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She
was denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a
memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to
sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a
chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the
explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later
submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.8
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and
attorneys fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136
of the Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their union membership.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, viz.:
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation perceived as
management prerogative. This management prerogative is quite broad and encompassing for it covers
hiring, work assignment, working method, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to
be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of
workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Except as provided for or limited by special law,
an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment all the aspects of
employment.9 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on January 11, 2002. 10

Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.4

Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she
married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must
resign should they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.5

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution11 dated
August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent court via Petition for Certiorari.
In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision, viz.:

HR|17Nov15|25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic)12 Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows:

the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners dismissal from employment and ordering private respondents to
reinstate petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the
time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and

Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
safety and decent living for the laborer.

(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the award and the
cost of this suit.13
On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
1. x x x the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the
family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code; and
2. x x x respondents resignations were far from voluntary.14
We affirm.
The 1987 Constitution15 states our policy towards the protection of labor under the following provisions,
viz.:
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.
xxx
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers, recognizing
the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns
on investments, and to expansion and growth.
The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to

The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. The case at bar involves
Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners allege that its policy "may
appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code" but it assumes a new meaning if read together with
the first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to resign. The employee
spouses have the right to choose who between them should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons
other than co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is being
discriminated. It is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-within-the-third-degree-policy
which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of management.16
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same company takes
the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of
unqualified persons based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability.17 These policies
focus upon the potential employment problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards
relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting employment policies specifically
prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. We note that two types of employment policies
involve spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse
employment policies), and those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working
in the same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).18
Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital discrimination,19 there are twenty
state statutes20 in the United States prohibiting marital discrimination. Some state courts21 have been
confronted with the issue of whether no-spouse policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital status
and sex discrimination.
In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants utilize two theories
of employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate
treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. Nospouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are

HR|17Nov15|26

facially discriminatory. For example, an employment policy prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of
male employees, but not husbands of female employees, is discriminatory on its face.22
On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy
has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. For example, although most employment policies do not
expressly indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company, the policy often
disproportionately affects one sex.23
The state courts rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of marital status
discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights acts. Though they agree that the term
"marital status" encompasses discrimination based on a person's status as either married, single, divorced,
or widowed, they are divided on whether the term has a broader meaning. Thus, their decisions vary.24
The courts narrowly25 interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status as married, single,
divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader definition it would have either chosen
different language or specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than
to whom one is married. They construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a person is
single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the "identity, occupation, and place of employment of one's
spouse." These courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled that they did not violate the marital
status discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.
The courts that have broadly26 construed the term "marital status" rule that it encompassed the identity,
occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike down the no-spouse employment policies based
on the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy
violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present
employees without regard to the actual effect on the individual's qualifications or work performance.27
These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any
evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the same workplace
might adversely affect the business.28 They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational
qualification29 invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the
other spouse in the same office.30 Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the reasonable
demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or
acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate
against an employee based on the identity of the employees spouse.31 This is known as the bona fide
occupational qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an employers no-spouse
rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state courts. There must be a compelling
business necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice.32 To justify a bona
fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform
the duties of the job.33

The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our jurisdiction. We employ the
standard of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational
qualification requirement. In the recent case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro
Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,34 we passed on the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical
company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company. We held that
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. We considered the prohibition against personal or
marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees reasonable under
the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying
down the assailed company policy, we recognized that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.35
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a valid
exercise of management prerogative was also at issue in the 1997 case of Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company v. NLRC.36 In said case, the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioners
policy of disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage. We held that the company
policy violates the right against discrimination afforded all women workers under Article 136 of the Labor
Code, but established a permissible exception, viz.:
[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide
occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same,
but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A
requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance.37 (Emphases supplied.)
The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly
established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the
existence of a reasonable business necessity. The burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but not
in PT&T.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its employees
related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity"38 is lame. That the second paragraph
was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule39 is evidently not the valid reasonable
business necessity required by the law.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job,
but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of
Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section,
could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will
happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married

HR|17Nov15|27

Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid
justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at
the expense of an employees right to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they
are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article
136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the
only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit
disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.40

Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrellas
dismissal is declared illegal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 dated August 3, 2004
is AFFIRMED.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.

Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit
the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot
prudently draw inferences from the legislatures silence41 that married persons are not protected under our
Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to
present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an
invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and
Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.
As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on the singular fact that her
resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. Both ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus
valid. The respondent court failed to categorically rule whether Estrella voluntarily resigned but ordered that
she be reinstated along with Simbol and Comia.
Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because she was in dire need of
money. We examined the records of the case and find Estrellas contention to be more in accord with the
evidence. While findings of fact by administrative tribunals like the NLRC are generally given not only
respect but, at times, finality, this rule admits of exceptions,42 as in the case at bar.
Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was dismissed due to her alleged
immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign the termination papers but she was forced to tender her
resignation letter in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she got impregnated by a
married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked about as immoral43 is incredulous. If
she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all.
Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in
voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from
employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment. 44 Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
G.R. No. 168081

October 17, 2008

HR|17Nov15|28

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of
losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his
off-duty status was retained.

DECISION

On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to
check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from
his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to reduce weight in a letter addressed to
Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:

REYES, R.T., J.:

THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his
failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

Dear Sir:

He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To
buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2)
continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification;
and (3) he was discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being
disciplined.

I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today
until 31 Dec. 1989.

After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of dismissal.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based
on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.

Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will set for my
weight check.

The Facts

F/S Armando Yrasuegui4

Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL).
He stands five feet and eight inches (58") with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his
height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by
the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until
such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every
two weeks for weight checks.

The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended
vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently,
petitioner failed to meet the companys weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March
5, 1985 to November 1985.

Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the
weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded
that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.5

After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioners weight problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company
policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to
trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may
avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will
be evaluated on July 3, 1989.2

From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal
weight is achieved.

Respectfully Yours,

Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for
processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would
be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates.6 Again, petitioner ignored the
directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his
refusal to undergo weight checks.7

HR|17Nov15|29

When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way
over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on
the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5,
1992.

The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his
weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.16 Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred
to other positions where his weight would not be a negative factor.17 Notably, other overweight employees,
i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.18
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).19

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within
which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.8

On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.20

On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.9 Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What
he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since "no action has
been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated
against him because "the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly
situated."

On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution22 of PAL.

On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing
a weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.10

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by
our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning
complainants entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainants entitlement to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply
backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined
to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or through
payroll within ten (10) days from notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainants
reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall accordingly be issued by the
Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.25

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight,
"and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost
five (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately."11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,12 petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against PAL.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled13 that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The
dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the complainants
dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or substantially
equivalent one, and to pay him:
a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for
purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998 at P651,000.00;

On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.23
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the following tenor:

According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of
food intake, is a disease in itself."26 As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious
misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.27
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as
unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as
flight steward despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have limited
himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance
of the weight standards of PAL.28
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA)
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.30

b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.

By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed31 the NLRC:
SO ORDERED.14

HR|17Nov15|30

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is
declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondents complaint is hereby
DISMISSED. No costs.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER
OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;

SO ORDERED.32

IV.

The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it "looked at
wrong and irrelevant considerations"33 in evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC
ruling, the weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employees position.34
The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee
under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the
NLRC seemed to suggest.35 Said the CA, "the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an
irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally proper."36 In other
words, "the relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and
whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard."37

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE
PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring supplied)

Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable.38
Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight
standards.39 It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of
escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.40
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its earlier ruling,
the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of
violation, "justifies an employees separation from the service."42
Issues

Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) 44 of the Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the
CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the
"prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in
the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employees
position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose
express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet
the employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d)
and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."

In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE
LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired.
They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order
to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on
the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an
employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed
simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was
willful or intentional. x x x45

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL
QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
III.

Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a "physical abnormality
and/or illness."46 Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,47 he says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific causes
enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says
that Naduras illness occasional attacks of asthma is a cause analogous to them.

HR|17Nov15|31

Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that, as
the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination."
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly enumerated
in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Naduras illness could be
considered as "analogous" to any of them is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense
that the same was contracted through his own voluntary act.48
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the case
at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act
(RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply
here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e.,
asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not
dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to
separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his
failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process.
Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with the
weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease.
That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing
on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal
weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now."49
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of expenses."50 However, petitioner has
only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the
advice of PAL.51 He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to
undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence
of willpower rather than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals,52 decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from
1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd
Center that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record.
Even respondent admitted that her performance met the Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook
re-applied for a similar position. At that time, "she stood 52" tall and weighed over 320 pounds."
Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her ability to evacuate patients in
case of emergency and it also put her at greater risk of serious diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This
was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,53 which incorporates the
remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid

obesity could never constitute a handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others,
obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant
disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and
that respondent discriminated against Cook based on "perceived" disability. The evidence included expert
testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic
system and the neurological appetite suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse
effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that
"mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing from a given
impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those conditions that an individual can easily and quickly
reverse by behavioral alteration."
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the District of
Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 "at least one hundred pounds more than what is
considered appropriate of her height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in
1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his
ideal weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the
service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
"[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article
282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article
282(a), (c), and (d)."54
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing
the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).55 In the United States,
there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an
employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on
a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise.56
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for
it.57 Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.58
Both arguments must fail.

HR|17Nov15|32

First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No. 727761 or the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons62 contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia
Government and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU),63 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the socalled "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the
employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of
the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary65 to the
accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is
reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper
Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1)
the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2)
that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be
unable to properly perform the duties of the job.67
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ.68 BFOQ
is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."69
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,70 the Court did not
hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying
employees of a rival company. It was held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its
purpose is the protection of the interests of the company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade
secrets and procedures.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too,
the Labor Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to
observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports.74 It is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.75
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to
hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon
it by law by virtue of being a common carrier.

farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on
their safety records. People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies
transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is
unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and
caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of
passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the
core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength
to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the
stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in
case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the
arguments of respondent that "[w]hether the airlines flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct
relation to its mission of transporting passengers to their destination"; and that the weight standards "has
nothing to do with airworthiness of respondents airlines," must fail.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case. What
was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineers upon
reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline
company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not the same. The case of
overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and narrow aisles and
emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would certainly have difficulty
navigating the cramped cabin area.
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obese cabin
attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially
recognize without introduction of evidence.77 It would also be absurd to require airline companies to
reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin
attendants like petitioner.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers.
In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck
crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict
norms of discipline upon its employees.

The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from
evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to
speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility.
Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three
lost seconds can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied
cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote.

In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight
safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire
passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not

Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to
him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times.78
In fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight.

HR|17Nov15|33

Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung
ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and body frame
for both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant
cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any
possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL.

To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty86 of the
Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts
of private individuals.88 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment,89 which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal
protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private actions,
no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.91

III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.

IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.

Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against
him.79 We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he element of
discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to
escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance
position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable
standard and the private respondents failure to comply."80 It is a basic rule in evidence that each party
must prove his affirmative allegation.81

As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been mooted.
He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, "from the time he was illegally dismissed" up to the
time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA.92

Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to
prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of
discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin
attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and
why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of
his situation with other employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner
miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they
were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating
treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of
discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of
discrimination to meet."82
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
are accorded respect, even finality.83 The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters
within their specific and specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only
applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that
administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the
contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do
not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.85
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.

At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as
the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a
bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a
writ of execution,93 the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the
employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun" to frustrate his "immediate
return to his previous position,"94 there is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a
substantially equivalent position in accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter.95 In fact, petitioner duly
received the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his signature.96
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case97 that "[t]he unjustified refusal
of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from
the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution"98 and ""even if the
order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer
to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court."99 He failed to prove that he complied with the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on
record that he actually rendered services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on
the payment of his full backwages.
In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in effect wants to
render the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again,
the Court ruled that the law does not exact compliance with the impossible.100

HR|17Nov15|34

V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.

Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the
language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this
is not an ironclad rule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act "social justice,"101 or
based on "equity."102 In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct;
and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.103
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of
service.104 It should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving.105 We are not blind
to the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his
moral character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that
petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2)
months pay for every year of service, which should include his regular allowances.
SO ORDERED.