G.R. No.

179878

December 24, 2008

NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION,

INC. (NOPA), petitioner,
vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52, BACOLOD CITY,
and ANICETO MANOJO CAMPOS, respondents.

On 1 August 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the 30 June 2006 Order. On 5
January 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying
NOPAs Motion for Reconsideration.
On 2 April 2007, NOPA filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 30 June
2006 and 5 January 2007.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking
the reversal of the Resolutions1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August 2007,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651 outrightly
dismissing the Petition forCertiorari filed by
petitioner Negros Oriental Planters Association,
Inc. (NOPA) against private respondent Aniceto
Manojo Campos (Campos).
On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for
Breach of Contract with Damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-10773, against NOPA before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental,
Bacolod City. According to the Complaint, Campos
and NOPA entered into two separate contracts
denominated as Molasses Sales Agreement.
Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the
Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but was only
able to receive a partial delivery of the molasses
because of a disagreement as to the quality of
the products being delivered.
On 17 August 2005, more than six years after
NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of
Campos to file the correct filing fee. According to
NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his
Complaint the exact amount of actual damages
by opting to estimate the value of the
unwithdrawn molasses in order to escape the
payment of the proper docket fees.
On 30 June 2006, the RTC issued an Order
denying the Motion to Dismiss. NOPA received
this Order on 17 July 2006.

On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the

first assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari on the following grounds:
1. Failure of the Petitioner to state in its
Verification that the allegations in the
petition are "based on authentic records",
in violation of Section 4, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended
by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000),
which provides:
" x x x - A pleading is verified by
an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge
or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified
which contains a verification based
on "information and belief," or
lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading."
2. Failure of the petitioner to append to
the petition relevant pleadings and
documents, which would aid in the
resolution of the instant petition, in
violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, such as:
a. Ex-parte Motion to Set the Case
for Pre-Trial dated July 27, 1999;
b. Notice of Pre-Trial;
c. Motion for Leave to File Third
Party Complaint;
d. Orders dated July 31, 2000,
March 20 2001, November 17,

2004, and May 17, 2005,

respectively;
e. Motion to Suspend the
Proceedings dated August 10,
2003;
f. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute; and
g. Motion for Reconsideration to the
Order dated May 12, 2005.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
provides:
"When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied
by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46."
3. Failure of petitioners counsel to
indicate in the petition his current IBP
Official Receipt Number, in violation of Bar
Matter No. 1132 and/or A.M. No. 287,
which reads as follows:

"The Court resolved, upon

recommendation of the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to GRANT the
request of the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte to
require all lawyers to indicate their
Roll of Attorneys Number in all
papers or pleadings submitted to
the various judicial or quasi-judicial
bodies in addition to the
requirement of indicating the
current Professional Tax Receipt
(PTR) and the IBP Official Receipt or
Lifetime Member Number."2
On 22 June 2007, NOPA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above Resolution,
attaching thereto an Amended Petition
for Certiorari in compliance with the requirements
of the Court of Appeals deemed to have been
violated by NOPA. The Court of Appeals denied
the said Motion in the second assailed Resolution
dated 16 August 2007.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari,
where NOPA raises the following issue and
arguments:
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS
NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS WHEN
PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS
VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS
THEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON
AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND FAILURE TO
ATTACH THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON
ITS PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION
1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.3

ARGUMENTS
1. The requirement that a pleading be
verified is merely formal and not

jurisdictional. The court may give due

course to an unverified pleading where the
material facts alleged are a matter of
record and the questions raised are mainly
of law such as in a petition for certiorari.4
2. Petitioner had attached to its Petition
for Certiorari clearly legible and duplicate
original or a certified true copy of the
judgment or final order or resolution of the
court a quo and the requisite number of
plain copies thereof and such material
portions of the record as would support
the petition.5
3. Substantial compliance of the rules,
which was further supplied by the
petitioners subsequent full compliance
demonstrates its good faith to abide by
the procedural requirements.6
4. The resolution of the important
jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner
before the PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA would
justify a relaxation of the rules.7
The original Verification in the original Petition
for Certiorari filed by NOPA states as follows:
1. That I am the President and Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Negros Oriental
Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA), the
petitioner in this case, a domestic
corporation duly organized under
Philippine Laws, with principal place of
business at Central Bais, Bais City,
Philippines; that I am duly authorized by
the Board of NOPA (Secretarys Certificate
attached as Annex "A") to cause the
preparation of the foregoing petition; and
that I hereby affirm and confirm that all
the allegations contained herein are true
and correct to my own knowledge and
belief;8
NOPA claims that this Court has in several cases
allowed pleadings with a Verification that contains
the allegation "to the best of my knowledge" and
the allegation "are true and correct," without the
words "of his own knowledge," citing Decano v.
Edu,9 and Quimpo v. De la Victoria.10 NOPA claims
that the allegations in these cases constitute

substantial compliance with the Rules of Court,

and should likewise apply to the case at bar.
NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated
before 1 May 2000, when Section 4 of Rule 7 was
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10. Before the
amendment, said Section 4 stated:
SEC. 4. Verification.Except when
otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and
correct of his knowledge and belief.
As amended, said Section 4 now states:
SEC. 4. Verification.Except when
otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
Clearly, the amendment was introduced in order
to make the verification requirement stricter,
such that the party cannot now merely state
under oath that he believes the statements made
in the pleading. He cannot even merely state
under oath that he has knowledge that such
statements are true and correct. His knowledge
must be specifically alleged under oath to be
either personal knowledge or at least based on
authentic records.
Unlike, however, the requirement for a
Certification against Forum Shopping in Section 5,
wherein failure to comply with the requirements
is not curable by amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading,11 Section 4 of Rule 7, as
amended, states that the effect of the failure to
properly verify a pleading is that the pleading
shall be treated as unsigned:
A pleading required to be verified
which contains a verification based on

"information and belief," orupon

"knowledge, information and
belief," or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
Unsigned pleadings are discussed in the
immediately preceding section of Rule 7:
SEC. 3. Signature and address. x x x.
xxxx
An unsigned pleading produces no legal
effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be
remedied if it shall appear that the same
was due to mere inadvertence and not
intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or
signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or
alleges scandalous or indecent matter
therein, or fails to promptly report to the
court a change of his address, shall be
subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
(5a)
A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is
merely based on the partys knowledge and
belief produces no legal effect, subject to
the discretion of the court to allow the
deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar,
the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of this
discretion, refused to allow the deficiency in the
Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPAs
Motion for Reconsideration with attached
Amended Petition for Certiorari.
May an appellate court reverse the exercise of
discretion by a lower court? The old case of Lino
Luna v. Arcenas12states that it can, but only in
exceptional cases when there is grave abuse of
this discretion or adverse effect on the
substantial rights of a litigant:
Discretionary power is generally exercised
by trial judges in furtherance of the
convenience of the courts and the
litigants, the expedition of business, and in
the decision of interlocutory matters on
conflicting facts where one tribunal could
not easily prescribe to another the
appropriate rule of procedure.

The general rule, therefore, and indeed

one of the fundamental principles of
appellate procedure is that decisions of
a trial court which "lie in discretion"
will not be reviewed on appeal,
whether the case be civil or criminal
at law or in equity.
We have seen that where such rulings
have to do with minor matters, not
affecting the substantial rights of the
parties, the prohibition of review in
appellate proceedings is made absolute by
the express terms of the statute; but it
would be a monstrous travesty on
justice to declare that where the
exercise of discretionary power by an
inferior court affects adversely the
substantial legal rights of a litigant, it
is not subject to review on appeal in
any case wherein a clear and
affirmative showing is made of an
abuse of discretion, or of a total lack
of its exercise, or of conduct
amounting to an abuse of discretion,
such as its improper exercise under a
misapprehension of the law applicable to
the facts upon which the ruling is based.
In its very nature, the discretionary control
conferred upon the trial judge over the
proceedings had before him implies the
absence of any hard-and-fast rule by
which it is to be exercised, and in
accordance with which it may be
reviewed. But the discretion conferred
upon the courts is not a willful,
arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled
discretion. It is a sound, judicial
discretion which should always be
exercised with due regard to the
rights of the parties and the demands
of equity and justice. As was said in the
case of The Styria vs. Morgan (186 U. S.,
1, 9): "The establishment of a clearly
defined rule of action would be the end of
discretion, and yet discretion should not
be a word for arbitrary will or
inconsiderate action." So in the case of
Goodwin vs. Prime (92 Me., 355), it was
said that "discretion implies that in the
absence of positive law or fixed rule the
judge is to decide by his view of

expediency or by the demands of equity

and justice."
There being no "positive law or fixed rule"
to guide the judge in the court below in
such cases, there is no "positive law or
fixed rule" to guide a court of appeal in
reviewing his action in the premises, and
such courts will not therefore attempt to
control the exercise of discretion by the
court below unless it plainly appears that
there was "inconsiderate action" or the
exercise of mere "arbitrary will," or in
other words that his action in the premises
amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But
the right of an appellate court to review
judicial acts which lie in the discretion of
inferior courts may properly be invoked
upon a showing of a strong and clear case
of abuse of power to the prejudice of the
appellant, or that the ruling objected to
rested on an erroneous principle of law not
vested in discretion.13
The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which
there is no effect on the substantial rights of a
litigant. NOPAs Petition for Certiorari is seeking
the reversal of the Orders of the RTC denying
NOPAs Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure
to pay the proper docket fees. The alleged
deficiency in the payment of docket fees by
Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the
benefit of NOPA.
There is therefore no substantive right that will be
prejudiced by the Court of Appeals exercise of
discretion in the case at bar. While the payment
of docket fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless
unmistakably also a technicality. Ironically, in
seeking the leniency of this Court on the basis of
substantial justice, NOPA is ultimately praying for
a Writ of Certiorari enjoining the action for breach
of contract from being decided on the merits.
Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to
comply with the technical rules of procedure
while, at the same time, hoping for the relaxation
of the technicalities in its favor.
There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Court of Appeals warranting
this Courts reversal of the exercise of discretion
by the former. However, even if we decide to

brush aside the lapses in technicalities on the

part of NOPA in its Petition for Certiorari, we
nevertheless find that such Petition would still
fail.
NOPA seeks in its Petition for Certiorari for the
application of this Courts ruling in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,14 wherein we ruled that the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amount sought in the amended pleading.
In denying15 NOPAs Motion to Dismiss, the RTC
cited Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v.
Asuncion,16 wherein we modified our ruling in
Manchester and decreed that where the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by the payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in
no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was
made on the justification that, unlike
inManchester, the private respondent in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees required. NOPA claims that
Sun is not applicable to the case at bar, since
Campos deliberately concealed his claim for
damages in the prayer.
In United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont
Bank) v. Ros,17 we discussed how Manchester was
not applicable to said case in view of the lack of
deliberate intent to defraud manifested in the
latter:
This Court wonders how the petitioner
could possibly arrive at the conclusion that
the private respondent was moved by
fraudulent intent in omitting the amount of
damages claimed in its Second Amended
Complaint, thus placing itself on the same
footing as the complainant in Manchester,
when it is clear that the factual milieu of
the instant case is far from that
of Manchester.
First, the complainant
in Manchester paid the docket fee

only in the amount of P410.00,

notwithstanding its claim for
damages in the amount
of P78,750,000.00, while in the
present case, the private respondent
paid P42,000.00 as docket fees upon
filing of the original complaint.
Second, complainant's counsel
in Manchester claimed, in the body of the
complaint, damages in the amount
of P78,750.00 but omitted the same in its
prayer in order to evade the payment of
docket fees. Such fraud-defining
circumstance is absent in the instant
petition.
Finally, when the court took
cognizance of the issue of nonpayment of docket fees
in Manchester, the complainant
therein filed an amended complaint,
this time omitting all mention of the
amount of damages being claimed in
the body of the complaint; and when
directed by the court to specify the
amount of damages in such amended
complaint, it reduced the same
from P78,750,000.00
toP10,000,000.00, obviously to avoid
payment of the required docket
fee. Again, this patent fraudulent scheme
is wanting in the case at bar.
This Court is not inclined to adopt the
petitioner's piecemeal construction of our
rulings in Manchester andSun Insurance.
Its attempt to strip the said landmark
cases of one or two lines and use them to
bolster its arguments and clothe its
position with jurisprudential blessing must
be struck down by this Court.
All told, the rule is clear and simple. In
case where the party does not
deliberately intend to defraud the
court in payment of docket fees, and
manifests its willingness to abide by
the rules by paying additional docket
fees when required by the court, the
liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insuranceand not the strict

regulations set in Manchester will

apply.
In the case at bar, Campos filed an amount
of P54,898.50 as docket fee, based on the
amounts of P10,000,000.00 representing the
value of unwithdrawn molasses, P100,00.00 as
storage fee, P200,00.00 as moral
damages,P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P500,000.00 as attorneys fees. The total
amount considered in computing the docket fee
was P10,900,000.00. NOPA alleges that Campos
deliberately omitted a claim for unrealized profit
of P100,000.00 and an excess amount of storage
fee in the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer
and, hence, the amount that should have been
considered in the payment of docket fees
is P11,502,875.98. The amount allegedly
deliberately omitted was therefore
only P602,875.98 out of P11,502,875.98, or
merely 5.2% of said alleged total. Camposs
pleadings furthermore evince his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket
fees when required by the Court.
Since the circumstances of this case clearly show
that there was no deliberate intent to defraud the
Court in the payment of docket fees, the case
of Sun should be applied, and the Motion to
Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August 2007,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651, outrightly
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioner Negros Oriental Planters Association,
Inc. against private respondent Aniceto Manojo
Campos, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 150798. March 31, 2005]

RUDECON
MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. SISENANDO
S.
SINGSON, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of

the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rudecon
Management Corporation seeks the reversal of
the two (2) Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 64281. The first resolution
denied petitioners omnibus motion to dismiss CAG.R. CV No. 64281, while the second denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
The spouses Pablo and Ma. Theresa P.
Tolentino were the owners of a condominium unit
(Room 302) in the Tempus Place I Condominium
located at Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon City,
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT)
No. 8876. In 1993, Rudecon Management
Corporation (RMC) executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale[2] in favor of the spouses Tolentino over its
condominium unit, Room 404, at the same
Tempus Place I Condominium covered by CCT No.
3295 forP600,000.00. Sisenando S. Singson, on
the other hand, was the owner of two
condominium units in the Tempus Place II
Condominium, Unit A covered by CCT No. 5013,
and Unit B covered by CCT No. 5014.
On April 18, 1997, the spouses Tolentino and
Sisenando Singson executed a Deed of
Exchange[3] in which the latter deeded his
condominium units (Units A and B) to the spouses
Tolentino in exchange for Rooms 302 and 404,
which the spouses Tolentino deeded to Singson.
On or about September 15, 1987, RMC filed a
complaint against Ramon Veluz for unlawful
detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (MeTC), Branch 41. RMC sought the
eviction of Ramon Veluz from Room 404, which
the latter leased from Singson on August 7, 1995.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
18436.
The decision of the MeTC was appealed to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), docketed as Civil
Case No. 35326.
On September 3, 1998, Singson filed a
complaint against the RMC for the reconveyance
of Room 404 covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title (CCT) No. 3295 with damages. Singson
alleged, inter alia, that Pablo Tolentino acquired
ownership over the unit based on the deed of

absolute sale executed by RMC covering the said

unit; he acquired ownership over the same based
on the unit-swapping arrangement between him
and the spouses Tolentino; he later leased the
unit to Veluz; despite its knowledge of his
ownership over the unit and that he had leased
the same to Veluz, RMC, nevertheless, filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against his
lessee; and despite demands, RMC refused to
turn over to him CCT No. 3295 to enable him to
register the title over the unit in his name.
Singson prayed that judgment be rendered in
his favor for damages and that
the Defendant be ordered to reconvey to the
Plaintiff Condominium Certificate of Title No. 3295
over the subject property issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of the
Defendant in order that the Plaintiff may register
the same under his name and for this purpose,
that the Defendant be ordered to execute the
duly notarized deed of absolute sale thereover in
favor of Pablo C. Tolentino and/or the Plaintiff by
virtue of the swapping arrangement between the
latter. [4]
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9835444. Singson appended to his complaint the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by RMC in favor
of the spouses Tolentino.
Singson, thereafter, filed an amended
complaint wherein he alleged the following:
3. That the Plaintiff is the actual owner of a
condominium unit designated as Unit 404, with
an area of sixty point two square meters (60.2 sq.
m.) in the Tempus I Condominium located at 21
Matalino Street, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, by virtue of a unit-swapping arrangement
between the latter and one Pablo C.
Tolentino; That on April 18, 1997, a deed of
exchange, hereto marked Annex A, was executed
by the parties to formalize the swapping
arrangement previously entered by the parties; of
which swapping arrangement, defendant
Rudecon Management Corporation, through its
president Rudegelio Tacorda has full knowledge
per its letter dated March 5, 1997 advising Pablo
Tolentino and Petitioner to formalize the same,
copy of which letter is marked as Annex B; That
said Pablo C. Tolentino was the owner of said Unit

404 as his share in the joint construction venture

with defendant, under an unnotarized deed of
absolute sale, valid between the parties,
executed by the Defendant Rudecon
Management Corporation in his favor dated
February 1993, a copy of which is attached and
made an integral part hereof as Annexes C and C1; That the subject unit is covered by one
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 3295 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the
name of the Defendant, a copy of which is
attached hereto and made an integral part hereof
as Annex D, and that said condominium
certificate of title was never transferred by the
Defendant to Pablo C. Tolentino and to this day
still remains in the name of Defendant despite
the latters execution of a deed of absolute sale in
favor of the former;
8. That it likewise appears that defendant through
its president Rudegelio Tacorda maliciously and
falsely claiming ownership over subject
condominium unit mortgaged the same to Allied
Banking Corporation for a reported sum of not
less than P2,000,000.00 as per attached letter
dated February 14, 1997 marked Annex H to the
great prejudice and damage, representing actual,
moral and exemplary damages, of herein plaintiff
in the sum of not less than P2,000,000.00.[5]
Singson prayed that judgment be rendered in
his favor, thus:
Upon the additional cause of action alleged in
paragraph 8 of this Amended Complaint, it is
further prayed that defendant be adjudged to pay
the plaintiff the sum of not less
[than] P2,000,000.00 by way of actual, moral and
exemplary damages.
It is also respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that the Defendant be ordered to liquidate
its mortgage indebtedness with the Allied
Banking Corporation upon subject unit and
thereafter to reconvey to the Plaintiff
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 3295 over
the subject property issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City in the name of the
Defendant free from any liens or
encumbrances in order that the Plaintiff may
register the same in his name and for this
purpose, that the Defendant be ordered to
execute the duly notarized deed of absolute sale

over subject condominium unit in favor of the

Plaintiff as transferee from the former owner
Pablo Tolentino by virtue of the swapping
arrangement and deed of exchange between the
parties.
Other relief as may be just and equitable under
the circumstances are likewise prayed for. [6]
Singson also executed a Verification and
Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping, wherein he
stated that
That if I should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to
report such fact within five (5) days therefrom to
this Honorable Court. [7]
RMC filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint on the following grounds:
I.
PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION (SECTION 1[g], RULE 16)
BECAUSE, UNDER ART. 1311 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE IN RELATION TO SECTION 28, RULE 130,
DEFENDANT IS NOT BOUND BY EITHER THE
ALLEGED DEED OF EXCHANGE (ANNEX A,
COMPLAINT) OR THE ALLEGED VERBAL SWAPPING
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND PABLO
TOLENTINO CONSIDERING THAT DEFENDANT IS
NOT A PARTY OR PRIVY TO SAID DEED OR
AGREEMENT AND FURTHER CONSIDERING THAT
THE DEED OF EXCHANGE IS SIMULATED AND
FORGED.
II.
PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF, NOT
BEING A REAL PARTY- IN-INTEREST, DOES NOT
HAVE THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE FOR THE
PERFORMANCE OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE
UNNOTARIZED DEED OF SALE (ANNEX C,
COMPLAINT) BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND PABLO
TOLENTINO TO WHICH PLAINTIFF IS ADMITTEDLY
NOT A PARTY OR PRIVY.
III.

PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES NO

CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS
ADMITTEDLY NOT TRANSFERRED OWNERSHIP OF
CCT NOS. 1503 (SIC) AND 1504 (SIC) TO PABLO
TOLENTINO AND INSTEAD PLAINTIFF HOLDS ON
TO SAID TITLES AND CONTINUES TO OCCUPY THE
CONDOMINIUM UNITS THEREOF THEREBY
PRECLUDING AND BELYING THE DAMAGE
SUPPOSEDLY SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFF.
MOREOVER, THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS BUT
PLAINTIFFS MALICIOUS ATTEMPT AT UNJUST
ENRICHMENT AT DEFENDANTS EXPENSE.
IV.
PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AS THE RELIEF OF
RECONVEYANCE SOUGHT BY HIM IS NOT A
PROPER REMEDY AND CANNOT BE GRANTED BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT BECAUSE ADMITTEDLY
CCT NO. 3295 IS VALID AND GENUINE AND THERE
IS NO WRONGFUL OR ERRONEOUS REGISTRATION
THEREOF IN DEFENDANTS NAME THAT WOULD
WARRANT RECONVEYANCE AS A LEGAL REMEDY.[8]
RMC averred that it was not a party to the
deed of exchange executed by Singson and the
spouses Tolentino; hence, it could not be
compelled to reconvey the subject unit to
Singson. And since it was not a party to the said
deed of exchange, Singson had no right to
enforce the same against it. Hence, despite the
deed of exchange, Singson continued to occupy
Units A and B and failed to transfer the same to
the spouses Tolentino.
RMC maintained that Singson was not
entitled to the reconveyance of the unit since
there was no allegation in the complaint that it
had been erroneously or fraudulently registered
in the name of another person.[9]
On April 7, 1999, the trial court issued an
Order[10] granting the motion and dismissing the
complaint. Singson then filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the Order and for the inhibition
of the Presiding Judge of the court. On June 30,
1999, the trial court issued an Order [11] denying
the motion for reconsideration, but granted the
motion for inhibition. Hence, Singson appealed
the April 7, 1999 Order of the trial court to the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64281.

In the meantime, Singson filed another

complaint with the RTC of Quezon City, this time
against Allied Banking Corporation and the
Sheriffs Office of Quezon City, for the annulment
of the Sheriffs Sale at Public Auction of Room 302
(covered by CCT No. 8876) in favor of the said
bank. He alleged, inter alia, that as early as June
1995, he became the owner of Room 302 and
Room 404 based on his verbal agreement with
the
spouses
Tolentino
which
was
contextualized viatheir deed of exchange. Allied
Banking Corporation had been informed of his
ownership and occupancy of Room 302 as early
as 1995. He then offered Unit A (covered by CCT
No. 5013) for Room 302, as substitute collateral
for the payment of the loan of Pablo Tolentino
which the latter endorsed to the bank. Singson
also alleged that the extrajudicial sheriffs
foreclosure of the mortgage and the subsequent
sale was illegal for want of notice and publication,
including for the following reasons:
[T]he defendant bank employed deceptive and
fraudulent scheme to consummate the Sheriffs
Auction Sale to the prejudice of the plaintiff.
17. Defendant bank confused and misled the
plaintiff by accepting Condominium Unit No. 302
with CCT No. 8876 and allowed it to be used as a
collateral to secure a loan of P2 Million and the
Bank is fully aware that said condominium unit is
owned and occupied by the plaintiff and
thereafter foreclosed it without notice to the
plaintiff. Defendant bank is fully aware that
plaintiff exercises rights of possession and
ownership on the said property since defendant
bank was duly informed by plaintiffs about the
physical possession thereof and the Deed of
Exchange.[12]
Singson prayed that judgment be rendered in
his favor as follows:
ON
THE
ISSUANCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND
RESTRAINING ORDER

OF

TEMPORARY

1. A temporary restraining Order be issued ex

parte restraining/preventing defendant or any of
its agents to consolidate/repossess the Real
Estate property identified as Condo Unit No. 302

with CCT No. 8876 of the Register of Deeds of

Quezon City and after due hearing, the Temporary
Restraining Order be made permanent.
ON THE MAIN CAUSE
OF ACTION
2. An order be issued declaring the foreclosure
sale and the Sheriffs sale of condominium unit
No. 302 with CCT No. 8876 as null and void.
3. An Order be issued declaring defendant bank
liable for moral damages in the amount of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), exemplary
damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
and ordering the defendant bank to pay the
attorneys fees in the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) and appearance
fee of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) per
hearing.
4. Plus cost of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the
premises are likewise prayed for.[13]
Singson signed his Affidavit of Non-Forum
Shopping in this manner:
VERIFICATION
AFFIDAVIT OF

AND

NON-FORUM
SHOPPING
I, SISENANDO S. SINGSON, subscribing under
oath do hereby depose and say that:
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case;
2. I caused the preparation of the foregoing
Complaint For Annulment of Sheriffs
Foreclosure/Certificate of Sale and Damages with
Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order;
3. Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, I hereby certify that plaintiff
has not therefore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency, and to the best of my
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is

pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of

Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, and if I
should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any
other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom;
4. I have read and understood the contents
thereof and the allegations contained therein are
true and correct of my own personal knowledge.
(Sgd.) SISENANDO SINGSON
AFFIANT[14]
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q00-39794.
Meanwhile, RMC filed an Omnibus Motion in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64281 praying for the dismissal of
Singsons appeal in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 on
the ground of forum shopping. They also prayed
that Singson and his counsel be cited for indirect
contempt for their failure to comply with the
undertaking in the Verification and Affidavit of
Non-Forum Shopping embodied in his amended
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794, that is, to
inform the trial court of the filing of the complaint
within fifteen (15) days thereof. RMC averred that
as gleaned from the averments of the amended
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444, and the
allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. Q00-39794, the two cases involved the same
issues. RMC averred that Singson had also
submitted a false certificate of non-forum
shopping in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794, where he
stated that he had not commenced any action or
proceeding involving the same issue.
On July 31, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution
denying the Omnibus Motion of RMC on the
ground that:
1. There is no identity of parties and
cause of action between Civil
Cases Nos. Q-98-35444 and Q-0039794;
2. The subject matter in the former is
CCT No. 3295, whereas that of the
latter is CCT No. 8876;

3. The reliefs sought in the two actions

are vastly different.[15]
Upon the appellate courts denial of its motion
for reconsideration of the said resolution, RMC
filed
the
present
petition
for
review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
contending that:
I.

IN THE LATTER CASE THE PENDENCY OF THE

FORMER CASE SUCH THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENT AND ATTY. CAMACHO TO SO
REPORT AND DISCLOSE ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF
FORUM SHOPPING UNDER SC ADM. CIRCULAR NO.
04-94.
III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN

DENYING PETITIONERS OMNIBUS MOTION (ANNEX
K HEREOF), RESOLVED SAID OMNIBUS MOTION
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO
FORUM SHOPPING HEREIN BECAUSE THE
ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE NOT PRESENT IN
PATENT ARBITRARY DISREGARD OF, AND DESPITE,
THE FACT THAT PETITIONER NEVER INVOKED SAID
SPECIE OF FORUM SHOPPING GROUNDED ON RES
JUDICATA AND HAS INSTEAD SPECIFICALLY
INVOKED IN SAID OMNIBUS MOTION TWO (2)
OTHER SPECIES OR FORMS OF FORUM SHOPPING,
NAMELY, (a.) RESPONDENTS DELIBERATE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH HIS UNDERTAKING TO REPORT
THE PENDENCY OF ANOTHER SIMILAR ACTION
INVOLVING THE SAME ISSUES; AND (b.)
RESPONDENTS [WILLFUL] SUBMISSION OF FALSE
CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING AS
PENALIZED UNDER PARAGRAPH 2, SC ADM.
CIRCULAR NO. 04-94.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

GRAVELY ERRED AND DEPARTED FROM
APPLICABLE LAWS AND SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO
IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION BETWEEN CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-98-35444 AND CIVIL CASE NO. Q-0039794 IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF, AND
DESPITE, THE FACT THAT THERE IS SUCH
IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION BECAUSE BOTH
AFORESAID CASES, EVEN IF DIFFERENT IN FORMS
OR NATURE, INVOLVED THE SAME ANTECEDENT
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SAME
EVIDENCE AND ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT,
NAMELY, THE DEED OF EXCHANGE DATED APRIL
18, 1997 (ANNEX D HEREOF) WHOSE VALIDITY
AND ENFORCEABILITY MUST PRIORLY BE
RESOLVED AS THE RESOLUTION THEREOF
IS DETERMINATIVEOF ANY FURTHER
ADJUDICATIONS IN SAID TWO (2) CASES
(MANGOMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 241 SCRA
25; VDA. DE CRUZO VS. CARRIAGA, 174 SCRA
330; BANGKO SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT BANK VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 1140480
[SIC], JUNE 29, 2001)

II.

IV.

COROLLARY TO THE ABOVE, WHETHER OR NOT

THE ANTECEDENT ISSUES OF VALIDITY AND
ENFORCEABILITY OF HEREIN DEED OF EXCHANGE
(ANNEX D HEREOF) EXPRESSLY RAISED BY
RESPONDENT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-98-35444 (CAG.R. CV NO. 64281) AND ALSO IMPLICITLY
POSITED BY RESPONDENT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q00-39794 CAN BE CONSIDERED AS SIMILAR
ISSUES AS CONTEMPLATED IN PARAGRAPH 1, SC
ADM. CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 THEREBY OBLIGATING
RESPONDENT: (a.) TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH HIS
UNDERTAKING TO REPORT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q98-35444 (CA-G.R. CV NO. 64281) THE PENDENCY
OF CIVIL CASE NO. Q-00-39794, AND VICEVERSA AND (b.) TO DISCLOSE IN HIS
CERTIFICATIONS ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING IN
BOTH THE ORIGINAL AND AMENDED COMPLAINTS

COROLLARY TO ALL THE FOREGOING, WHETHER

OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
(a.) IN NOT DISMISSING CA-G.R. CV NO. 62481
GROUNDED ON THE DELIBERATE AND WILFUL
(SIC) COMMISSION BY RESPONDENT SINGSON
AND ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO OF THE
AFORESAID TWO (2) SPECIES OF FORUM
SHOPPING; AND (b.) IN NOT HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT SINGSON AND ATTY. MANUEL
CAMACHO ARE GUILTY OF MULTIPLE AND
DELIBERATE FORUM SHOPPING AND SHOULD
THEREFORE BE CITED IN CONTEMPT UNDER
SUPREME COURT ADM. CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 AND
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE (BUAN VS. LOPEZ,
145 SCRA 34).[16]

In his comment on the petition, the

respondent
asserts
that
the
petitioners
procedural recourse to this Court under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court is flawed. He argues
that the resolutions of the CA subject of this
petition for review are interlocutory; hence, not
appealable under Section 1, Rule 45. He also
argues that the Court may not even treat the
present recourse as a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 since there is nary an allegation or proof
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion.
In its reply, the petitioner adamantly insists
that the questioned resolutions of the CA are final
in character and, therefore, appealable. It argues
that a violation SC Adm. Cir. No. 04-94 is unlike
those grounds under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules
of Court, where when a motion to dismiss is
denied, the proper procedure to be followed by
the dissatisfied movant is not to appeal from the
order of denial but to answer, go to trial, and if
the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment.
We agree with respondent that the mode of
appeal resorted to by the petitioner is improper.
Indubitably, the Resolution of the CA dated
July 31, 2001 denying the petitioners omnibus
motion
is
interlocutory
in
nature.
The
word interlocutory refers
to
something
intervening between the commencement and the
end of a suit which decides some point or matter
but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy.[17] The Court distinguished a final
order or resolution from an interlocutory one
in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[18] as
follows:
A final judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be
done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are and which party is in the right; or
a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court
is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to
be done by the Court except to await the parties

next move (which among others, may consist of

the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and
ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of
the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the
established and more distinctive term, final and
executory.
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose
of the case, and does not end the Court's task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other
things remain to be done by the Court, is
interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a
motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or
authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or
denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things,
etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an
interlocutory order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment
rendered in the case.
The rule is founded on considerations of
orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals
and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing
party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when all such orders
may be contested in a single appeal.
The reason of the law in permitting appeal only
from a final order or judgment, and not from
interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which
must necessarily suspend the hearing and
decision on the merits of the case during the
pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were
allowed the trial on the merits of the case should
necessarily be delayed for a considerable length
of time, and compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses; for one of the parties may
interpose as many appeals as incidental
questions may be raised by him and interlocutory
orders rendered or issued by the lower court.[19]
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, only final judgments, orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals or
Sandiganbayan may be assailed therein. The

remedy is a mode of appeal on questions of law

only.[20]
In the case at bar, the CA merely denied the
petitioners omnibus motion to dismiss based on
forum shopping, on its finding that there was
no litis pendentia between the parties. The
motion is only an incident in CA-G.R. CV No.
64281, which is a continuation of Civil Case No.
Q-98-35444 for damages and reconveyance
instituted by the respondent against the
petitioner. The appellate court had yet to resolve
the appeal on its merits. Being interlocutory, the
resolution is not appealable[21] but may be
assailed in this Court only under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court grounded on grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction committed by the CA. However, the
petitioner opted to file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Even on the merits, the petition must be
denied.
The petitioner avers that there are three (3)
species of forum shopping: (1) forum shopping
grounded either on res judicata or litis pendentia;
(2) forum shopping for non-compliance to report
the pendency of another action or proceeding
involving the same issues; and (3) forum
shopping based on the submission of a false
certification on non-forum shopping by not
disclosing the pendency of another action or
proceedings involving the same issues as
provided in paragraph 2 of SC Adm. Cir. No. 0494. To violate SC Adm. Cir. No. 04-94, it maintains,
similarity of issues between the first and the
second case is enough.
The petitioner faults the CA for denying its
omnibus motion based on its so-called first
species of forum shopping. It argues that what it
invoked therein were the other two (2) species,
not the first one. It avers that respondent and his
counsel violated SC Adm. Cir. No. 04-94 because:
a.) Respondent Singson and Atty. Camacho
did not report in CA-G.R. CV No. 64281
(Civil Case No. Q-98-35444) the
pendency of Civil Case No. Q-00-39794
filed by respondent himself on January
26, 2000 and which case involves the

same principal issues of validity and

enforceability of the same deed of
exchange dated April 18, 1997.
b.) Vice-versa, respondent and Atty.
Camacho did not report in Civil Case
No. Q-00-39794 the pendency of CAG.R. CV No. 64281 (Civil Case No. Q-9835444);
c.) Respondent Singson submitted a false
certification on non-forum shopping in
the original complaint in Civil Case Q00-39794 by wilful (sic) non-disclosure
of the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No.
64281 (Civil Case No. Q-98-35444);
d.) Corollary to the above, respondent
Singson and Atty. Camacho submitted a
false certification on non-forum
shopping in the amended complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 by wilful (sic)
non-disclosure of the pendency of CAG.R. CV No. 64281 (Civil Case No. Q-9835444).[22]
We are not swayed.
The rule on forum shopping was first included
in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
issued by this Court on January 11, 1983, which
imposed a sanction in this wise: A violation of the
rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall
be a cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions, without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel or party
concerned. Thereafter, the Court restated the rule
in Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Adm. Cir. No.
04-94.The rule is now embodied in Section 5, Rule
7 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 5. Certification against forum shopping.
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the

present status thereof; and (c) if he should

thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements
shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a
false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause, on the gamble that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition.[23]
What is pivotal in determining whether forum
shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the
courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks
different courts and/or administrative agencies to
rule on the same or related causes and/or grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process
creating
possibility
of
conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different courts
and/or administrative agencies upon the same
issues.[24]
In Ayala Land, Inc. v. Valisno,[25] the Court
explained the concept of forum shopping, to wit
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicatain another
(Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 536,
554 [1998]; Philippine Womans Christian
Temperance Union, Inc. v. Abiertas House of
Friendship, Inc., 292 SCRA 785, 794 [1998]). Litis

pendentia requires the concurrence of the

following requisites:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as
those representing the same interests in
both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount
to res adjudicata in the other case.
(Philippine Womans Christian Temperance
Union, Inc. v. Abiertas House of Friendship,
Inc., supra, at 791; citations omitted.)
As explained by this Court in First Philippine
International Bank v. Court of Appeals (252 SCRA
259 [1996]), forum-shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present, and
where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum
shopping when, between an action pending
before this Court and another one, there exist: a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions, b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts, and c)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the other
action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration; said requisites also
constitutive of the requisites for auter action
pendant or lis pendens. Another case elucidates
the consequence of forum shopping: [W]here a
litigant sues the same party against whom
another action or actions for the alleged violation
of the same right and the enforcement of the
same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis
pendentia in one case is a bar to the others; and,
a final judgment in one would constitute res
judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of
the rest. (Prubankers Association v. Prudential
Bank & Trust Company, 302 SCRA 74, 83-84
[1999].)

We agree with the contention of the

petitioner that, under Section 5, Rule 7, of the
Revised Rules of Court, a complaint may be
dismissed for failure of the plaintiff therein to
inform the court of the filing of the same or
similar complaint within five (5) days from such
filing. The same or similar complaint referred to in
the rule refers to a complaint wherein the parties,
causes of action, issues and reliefs prayed for, are
identical to those in the first complaint. The
plaintiff may also be declared in indirect
contempt of court if he submits a false
certification.
But the respondent cannot be faulted for
stating in his Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping in
Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 that he had not
commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the CA or in any
other tribunal; nor can he be charged with
executing a falsified certification in Civil Case No.
Q-00-39794 for stating that he had not
commenced before any other tribunal any
initiatory pleading involving the same issues.

said case are the same or similar to those in Civil

Case No. Q-00-39794.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ZOSIMO
GODINEZ, ELIZABETH G.R. No. 15
GODINEZ and EDWIN GODINEZ,
Petitioners,
Promulgated
- versus
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. February 15,
OSCAR G. TIROL in his capacity As
Presiding
Judge,
Regional
Trial
Court, Branch 1, Tagum City, Davao
del Norte, and DELFINA VILLAGE
SUBDIVISION
HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION,
Respondents.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The petitioner was not mandated to inform

the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 and
Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 and of CA-G.R. CV No.
64281. This is so because, as admitted by the
petitioner, there is no identity of the causes of
action, the parties, issues and reliefs prayed for in
the two complaints. The subject matter of the suit
in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 is Room 302, while
that in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 is Room 404.
The principal issue raised in Civil Case No. Q-0039794 is whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage over Room 404 and the
sale thereof to Allied Banking Corporation are null
and void, while the principal issue in Civil Case
No. Q-98-35444 is whether or not the petitioner
as defendant therein is obliged to convey to the
respondent Room 404.
While it is true that in his Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444, the
respondent sought to compel the petitioner to
execute a deed of sale over Room 404 free from
any liens or encumbrances arising from the real
estate mortgage over the said unit as security for
a loan of P2,000,000.00 secured by the petitioner
from Allied Banking Corporation, it cannot
thereby be concluded that the issues raised in the

For our resolution is the instant Petition for

Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on February 22, 2002 in CAG.R. SP No. 65445.
The facts are:
On August 30, 2000, Delfina Village Subdivision
Homeowners Association (DVSHA), respondent,
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Tagum City,
Davao del Norte, an amended complaint for
injunction and damages against spouses Zosimo
and Elizabeth Godinez and their son Edwin,
petitioners,

docketed

as

Special

Case

No.

383. The complaint alleges that petitioners were

operating a mineral processing plant in the annex
of

their

residential

within Delfina Village. The

house
village

located
has

been

classified by Municipal Ordinance No. 63, s. 1993

as a medium-density residential district.

On September 13, 2000, petitioners filed their

to

ensure

respondents

answer raising the following affirmative defenses:

procedural rules.

compliance

with

the

motion

for

a) the complaint states no cause of action; b)

respondent DVSHA has no capacity to sue; c) it is

Petitioners

timely

filed

their

[2]

not a real party in interest; d) the complaint fails

reconsideration, but in its Resolution

dated June

to implead the real parties in interest; and e)

26, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the same.

respondent failed to refer the case for conciliation

to the barangay before filing its complaint.

Hence, this recourse.

The only issue for our resolution is whether the

On April 3, 2001, the trial court issued an Order

Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial

directing respondent to amend its complaint and

courts April 3, 2001 Order directing respondent to

attach thereto proofs showing that it is a juridical

amend its complaint in Special Case No. 383.

person with capacity to sue and that it is the real

party in interest.

In resolving this issue, we are guided by two

On April 16, 2001, respondent submitted its

principles. First, there is nothing sacred about

amended complaint impleading, as additional

processes

plaintiffs, its officers and members, and attaching

contents, their sole purpose being to facilitate the

thereto its Certificate of Registration with the

application of justice to the rival claims of

Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation, as

contending parties.[3] Hence, pleadings as well as

well as its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws.

procedural rules should be construed liberally.

[4]

or

pleadings

and

their

forms

or

Second, the judicial attitude has always been

On April 27, 2001, petitioners filed a motion for

favorable and liberal in allowing amendments to a

reconsideration

Order

pleading in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and

dated April 3, 2001, but it was denied on May 21,

so that the real controversies between the parties

2001, prompting them to file a petition for

are presented, their rights determined, and the

certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as

case decided on the merits without unnecessary

CA-G.R. SP No. 65445.

delay.[5]

On February 22, 2002, the Court of Appeals

Here, we find no reason to deviate from the

rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the

foregoing dicta. It is on record that in its first

petition for certiorari.

amended complaint, respondent DVSHA alleged

of

the

trial

courts

that it is a registered association. However, it

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did

failed to attach to its complaint the supporting

not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting

certificate of registration, as well as its articles of

to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing

incorporation

respondent to amend its complaint. The purpose

petitioners promptly assailed respondents lack of

of the trial court was to determine whether

personality to sue. The trial court, desiring to

respondent is a juridical person and whether it is

determine if indeed respondent has the capacity

a real party in interest. In sum, its intention was

to

sue,

and

directed

by-laws. In

respondent

their

to

answer,

amend

its

complaint

anew

by

attaching

thereto

the

necessary documents.

attaching

the

required

supporting

documents, such amendment did not change

its

Sections 1 and 4, Rule 10 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:

cause

of

action. Nor

was

its

action

intended to prejudice petitioners. Verily, the

Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the RTC did
not gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered

SEC. 1. Amendments in general.

Pleadings may be amended by
adding
or
striking
out
an
allegation or the name of any
party, or by correcting a mistake
in the name of a party or a
mistaken or inadequate allegation
or description in any other
respect, so that the actual merits
of the controversy may speedily
be determined without regard to
technicalities, and in the most
expeditious
and
inexpensive
manner.

the amendment of the complaint.

Anent petitioners contention that respondent is
not a real party in interest, the same is without
merit. Section 2, Rule 3 of the same Rules defines
a real party in interest as the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of a suit. In
its complaint, respondent alleged that it will be
prejudiced by petitioners act complained of. Even

SEC. 4. Formal amendments. A

defect in the designation of
the parties and other clearly
clerical or typographical errors
may be summarily corrected by
the court at any stage of the
action, at its initiative or on
motion, provided no prejudice
is caused thereby to the
adverse party.

assuming it will not suffer an injury from the

alleged unlawful act of petitioners, its members
or homeowners may sustain such injury. In this
jurisdiction, an association has a standing to file
suit for its members despite lack of interest if its
members are directly affected by the action.[6]

Here, the amendment of respondents complaint

WHEREFORE,

at the instance of the trial court merely involves

and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals

the

in CA-G.R. SP No. 65445. Costs against the

designation

of

respondent

as

proper

party, i.e., whether it has a juridical personality

we DENY the

petitioners.

and, therefore, can sue or be sued. We note that

when respondent amended its complaint by

SO ORDERED.

petition