The Meanings of Aisthesis in Ancient Esthoicism

The Meaning(s) of in Ancient Stoicism
Author(s): Scott M. Rubarth

Source: Phoenix, Vol. 58, No. 3/4 (Autumn - Winter, 2004), pp. 319-344
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
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THE MEANING(S) OF AIEOHEIXIN ANCIENT STOICISM

SCOTT M. RUBARTH
A CCORDING TO DIOGENES LAERTIUS,
the Stoicsgavefirstplace
to the investigation of cti'aOrlat;and 4axvrcaciac.'The reason for(7pot'tZtv)

prioritizing
these two topics seems to be that in Stoic epistemologyall thinkingand awareness
ultimatelyarisesfrom particularsense experience.Knowledgeis possible in so far
as there exists a reliablemechanismcapableof producingcognitive presentations
tKa t votaaiat).
(KxTQ'9orlz
Although both alalolat; and OaxvtaLiashare this primacyin the Stoic curriculum,contemporaryscholarsclearlyexpressa favoritismtowardthe X4avTaaia
as a philosophical subject. This should be no surprise. The 4avraaiat lies at
the heart of most of the major controversiesin Stoic epistemology and logic.
As a result of this philosophicalpreference,a'iaOrlatg,the epistemologicalsister
of the 4ovratia, is frequentlyignored, underemphasized,and sometimes even
conflated with Tvztacia. In a way,
t is a sort of philosophicalwall
ct'(aOrlaO to
flower whom few notice or think attractive
enough engage in conversation.
The term is customarilyassumed to evoke a simple concept that requireslittle
comment. In this articleI will show that this is not the case. The meaningof the
term lot'aOrlotis far from simple and its relationto the all important ovzaaoia
is more complex than ordinarilyassumed. In fact, there are few terms in Stoic
I shall arguethat
philosophythat have as many senses and meaningsas ltaOrloat;.
the term rarely,if ever, means sensationand that philosophicallythere is much at
stake in correctlyunderstandingthe range of meanings implied by it, especially
in regardsto how these variousmeanings relate to the 4avaotiax. In short, this
study seeks to clarifythis importantand neglected2philosophicalterm by asking
it to dance.
I.
THE PROBLEM
The termsc'Ial8oatSand oavTaoiatdefine and limit each other. If the domain

and lexical range of one term is misidentified, the correspondingconcept is
likewise thrown off balance.Considerthe following claim fromJeffreyBarnouw's
I would like to expressmy thanks to Brad Inwood, John Rist, Lloyd Gerson, and Doug Hutchinson
for readingand commenting on a much earlierversionof this paper.
to mean"prefix"
or "placein
1Diog. Laert.7.49 = SVF2.52. Kerferd(1978)takesicpoTdtr6ctv
front." This suggests that the study of these epistemologicalconcepts "precede[s]the treatmentof
dialecticratherthan form part of it" (251).
2 The most
thorough scholarlydiscussionsof the role of arlacrt; in Stoicismwere writtenover a
centuryago: see Stein 1888: 133-154; Bonhoffer 1890: 122-125; Chaignet 1889 vol. 2; and Ganther
1894. There have been no comparabletreatmentsof the subjectin the twentieth century.
319
VOL.58 (2004)3-4
PHOENIX,

320
PHOENIX
recent book, PropositionalPerception:Phantasia,Predication,and Sign in Plato,

Aristotleand the Stoics.He states:
not "impression,"
The Stoicsuse the termphantasiato meanwhatwe call"perception,"
Thesestandard
let
alone
or
"imagination."
"representation""appearance,"
"presentation,"
all suggestsomethingpresentto the mindwhichtakesa furthermentalactin
translations
orderto positor affirman externalreality.This is the senseof the strategicScepticuseof
Butthe Stoicsheldthat
whichis directedagainstthe Stoics(andEpicureans).
phantasia,
the assertionof realityis intrinsicto phantasia.
(149)
If Barnouw is correct, most of what has been written on Stoic epistemology is
suggests a form
seriouslyflawed. These translations(especially"representation")
of indirect realism. Barnouw'sposition moreoverdoes seem to have a certain
frequentlyhas content that asserts something
degree of merit. The
?avtacia
There does not seem to be an additional step "to
about the externalworld.3
posit or affirm an externalreality"(that the cavwaaia also "affirmsthe reality"
is less persuasive). Barnouw is also correct that the Sceptic argumentrelies on
and
or "appearance"
the possibility of discrepanciesbetween a "representation"
the externalobject of perception,though Sceptics may have chosen this strategy
becausethe Stoics did in fact subscribeto a versionof indirectrealism.
I have selected the Barnouw example since it effectively illustrates how a
philological analysis of adia0ratc has importantphilosophicalconsequences. I
hope to demonstratethat once the conceptualand lexical range of aC'ia lat; is
evaluated,therewill be good reasonto rejectBarnouw'sproposal.Translatingthe
term 4avrtakia as "perception"is as problematicas, or even more so than, the
competing translations(presentation,impression,etc.) since it blursan important
distinction in Stoic epistemology, namely between (a) perceptionas a successful
apprehensionof the externalworld and (b) the content of awareness(of any kind)
whether received via the perceptualapparatus(aixa0IrtcKa)or not (cf. Diog.
Laert. 7.51). If Barnouwidentifies the Oavraoia with "perception,"what then
is the role of a'ia0rlat;? Although acknowledgingsome multivocityof the term
(189-190), he sees the primarilyepistemologicalsense to be that of "sensation."
areintrinsically
3On a strongreadingof thispassage,theauthorseemsto besayingthat4avTaacitt
the
book:
the
title
of
world.
Hence
the
external
or
Propositional
regarding
propositional predicative
On aweakerreadingtheyareonlytypically
(acharitable
propositional
readingof "intrinsic").
Perception.
contentand
In eithercaseit is usefulhereto distinguishbetweena mentalstatehavingintentional
content(or
Intentional
in
rational
a
of
which
entail
content
animals).
(both
propositional
1KrT6vitsintentional
intentional
states)needonlybe aboutsomething,
objectscan
object.Intentional
namely
state(coffeebeingthe intentional
be realbut neednot be. Desiringa cupof coffeeis an intentional
statesarewishing,
object).So is desiringto climba goldenmountain.Otherexamplesof intentional
statessuchas seeing,believing,and
hoping,fearing,imagining,loving,as well as propositional
contentsuggestsa beliefthatsomethingis the case. See Audi 1998: 153.
knowing.Propositional
to propositional
statesandnot includethe widerangeof intentional
To limit 4xvracia exclusively
of
the
wide
statesis problematic
variety #avTaoiatthatthe Stoicsdocument.SeeInwood1985:
given
If avtracyiaappliesto both, it seemsunwiseto translateit as
56-57 on the phantasiahormetike.
content.
1990
on perceptual
see
Also, Sorabji
"perception."

AlXOHEIEIN ANCIENT STOICISM
321
It is the "sensingof qualities"in contrastto the apprehensionof facts and events

will discourage
(3-4). Again, a careful analysisof the multivocityof
a'gOrljta
this interpretation. After analysing the surviving evidence,
we shall see that
there are at least eight differentsenses of, or perhapsmore accurately,thingssaid
of the term a'09tc0 1;. These can be reduced to three basic meanings which
conceptuallyframeor nest the concept of the ? avzaociawithout infringingon its
logical, epistemic, or experientialfeatures. None of the meanings of aoeorlot;
can be identified with any sense of the term aXvzafia nor do any correspond
to "sensation"as a phenomenal state or sense datum. In the final analysis,the
English word "perception,"which has its own ambiguities,does not neatly map
onto any single term or concept in Stoic epistemology.
II.
AIXOHXIEAND
ANTADA
and4avztaciais well establishedin preThe distinctionbetweenataOinlo;t

Stoic thought. Indeed, neglectingthis distinctionwould be as disastrousto
of Stoic psychologyand epistemologyas ignoringthe
a correctunderstanding
we
distinctionbetweenthe sametermsin PlatoorAristotle.In Plato'sTheaetetus
seeexactlywhathappenswhenthetwoconceptsareconflated.In 152cTheaetetus
i
This admission
i a0aiO0l t ziT6bv.4
&p K
acceptsthe premisethat acvTaoc(ia
Kct
In
and
the
fails.
the
undermines
his
eventually
position
argument
SophistSocrates
and Theaetetus seem to have learnedfrom the discussionof the previousday and
hence 4xxavtaciatis distinguishedfrom ataOiarlt;,being defined as a mixtureof
ati'olaot; and 566a(263d-e). This distinction proves more productivethan the
previousconflation and consequentlySocratesand Theaetetus are able to submit
a solution to the problemof how false discourseis possible.
Aristotle, likewise, follows Plato in insisting on a clear distinction between
aYor0ot;cand (Xavatciat.He statesemphatically,
uvztaaia yy&p T&povKait
o Kcoi
how theseconceptsdifferin
Failingto understand
aoei0loew
6toavooia.5
wouldhinderan adequateunderstanding
PlatoandAristotle
of either;the same
of courseappliesto Stoicism.It shouldalsobe notedthatthe veryfactthatboth
Plato andAristotleexplicitlyarguedthat the two conceptsdiffersuggeststhat
Greek
thereexistedsomelevelof confusionaboutthesetwoconceptsin ordinary
discourse.
andOavtaaiain thecaseof the

4Theinitiallyacceptedpremiseaffirmstheidentityof cYaOiaotc
to includeopinionsandthoughts.The dialogue
sensationof heatandlikethings.Laterit is expanded
of thisadmission.
bearswitnessto the absurdity
are
and?(XavTrtia
5Arist.De an. 3.3, 427b14.Accordingto Aristotlewe knowthataTlorlyotc
but not
differentbecausethey do not alwayscoincideand becausesome animalshaveacXloeostq
'Ct6, nrattv
4oavrtaoc6' oui. Ci6 tj vepycitqtob
cvT(aiOt: itta
&tv6el ndtpsar, (428a8-10). Furthermore,
theirepistemological
av 6viSXotto
torl
a'Yo0Tot.
Olprot;
#lavraoiafv indtpXvsv
arefalse(428a11-12).The
credibilitydiffer:caloi~elostarealwaystruewhereasmost 4avcmtoiat
Stoicsmakea similarclaimbasedon a verydifferentconceptionof afarlo t;cand
jxxvaia.

PHOENIX
322
That the Stoics also drew a cleardistinctionbetweena'loiaot; and (avcaaia

can be seen in a numberof ways. First, a'iaOilrat;and xavracia are treatedand
defined individuallyand sequentiallyin the handbook tradition.6In Diodes of
Magnesia's account, preservedby Diogenes Laertius,4avaoaia is defined and
outlinedfirst(7.50-51); this is followedby a discussionanddefinitionofa'icorOlat;
(7.52.1-10), concluding with a brief discussion of v6lati; and zT voo6vteva
(7.52.10-53.14). The author sums up this introductorydiscussion by saying,
5otd6c rivc Kai epi ~avtiaocia KWai
al0oil00c Kai voil&om; 6Soyplazitouat.
In Aetius separate sections are also devoted to the definition of a'ioerlat;
and alOarlzd (4.8) and xavTaaoiaand related concepts (4.11). In the two
sections where acairlat; and xavtaaia aretreatedtogethertheir differencesare
highlighted (4.10-11).
The concepts of a'iarlcna and cavzaaia are also demarcatedby the distinct
epistemologicalrange attributedto each. Again, accordingto Adtius the Stoics
taught that a ia iaeti are true, while in contrast,4avtaacact are both true and
false.7 In addition to being true we are told that everya'ioOrlat;is an assent,s
while the xavzTaia is the objectof assent.
Finally, aicrloat; has a wider lexical rangethan 4avTzaixa.While there may
be severaldescriptionsand definitionsof the OavTaoia,and thereforesome level
of lexical ambiguity,it is clearthat all the definitions are attemptsto articulatea
single cognitive faculty or state. However, the term a'io0alot;, as we shall see,
has at least eight different senses. Each communicatesimportantinformation
regardingthe featuresof at least one of three clearlydistinctgeneralmeaningsof
the term. In other words, the multivocityof the a'iCooeat;resultsfrom the fact
that the same term refersto differentthings. With 4avTacia, on the other hand,
the variousdescriptionsand definitionsall referto the same entity. The different
accountsof avTzaoia are for the most part strategicattemptsto safeguardStoic
epistemologyfrom philosophicalobjections.This is not the case with a'yio0lat;.
III.
THE AMBIGUITYOF AIIOHXIE
The primaryobstacle to understandingthe Stoic theory of a'iaOerlt is the

fact that the word a'ictaqat3 is itself ambiguous.This should not be surprising:
6The evidencefor our knowledgeof earlyStoicismis drawnfrom a numberof sources.Fragments
are direct citations of representativesof the Stoic school. Doxographicalreports are testimonies
reportinga Stoic view by a third party. Some of these doxographicalreportsare hostile or polemical,
such as those of Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Cicero. Other reports have survived in the
form of handbooks or textbooks reporting and often comparingdoctrines and opinions of various
schools. Aetius (preservedin ps.-Plutarch,Stobaeus,Nemesius, Theodoretus, et al.) and Diodes of
Magnesia (preservedin the text of Diogenes Laertius)are the primaryrepresentativesof this form of
doxographicalevidence. See Mansfeld and Runia 1997.
7"The Stoics say that aiaoe?alet are true, but regarding4avraaiat, some are true and some are
false"(Aetius Placita4.9.4 = SVF 2.78). All translationsare mine unlessotherwisestated.
8"The Stoics say that everya'aOiin; is an assent and a Kcad11hWi1"(Aetius 4.8.12 = SVF 2.72).

AIE?H)I IN ANCIENTSTOICISM
323
according to Chrysippus"everyword is naturallyambiguous."9The study and

identification of ambiguity (d&j4p4tpo
tia)10 was a central component of Stoic
dialectic.
In the introductorydiscussion in Diocles of Magnesia's summary of Stoic
philosophy we find one of our most important texts indicating the ambiguous
natureof aioOrlo0Ct:1
6~ XycscXtKCcXtt&
o6T' '"
vs1 a
A'xoOicrlaot;
toiC XotKobci)T
lystovtIKOu
Tcplt KatUOKSUT),
0lojast; tijKov Kci jl 6t OUtA)vKat yQXlt?1 Ka 7rpi
atiO
Ptaittippx
1jv -tVCS;
7Tnpoi yivovtatt. Kai ?1Evi~pycta
ixtat.12
a'alota; ca
T&; aiotL dt\

KXO0
Diocles' reportpresentsfour distinct but relatedmeaningsof the term a'o0lloti;:

from the commanding faculty to the senses; (2) a
(1)
inveiga extending
through the senses; (3) i" xtepi zT aiOrlitipta Kazaot cul; and
Kazd
trllt;
The ambiguousnatureof the termis emphasizedby the fact
(4) theEv6pyeta.Y13
that Diodes seems unable to define the term without using it as in (1) and (2).
This, however, is not the only list emphasizing the lexical complexity of
actOrlOot;in a doxographicaltradition. Our second majorsourceof information
concerning the many meanings of the term comes from Aitius. Here again the
is emphasized:14
multivocityofc
atorltc;
T7v a'"o
Oi To0tKo%
6pitovvat oij"oTc
aortvyd
<St'> aiO0rlzrIrlotv" a'fo09ri.
vx',rlXtt
v
.
icy ;- aitE y&ap
U
t; KULi 66vcatCt
c
K'
Kai
pfou 71j1gt6I
noXXayJC8;& ystat #j a
f1 &vEpyeac KCi l
vtTaocX
tjt
xt1tKil
6t' aiOrltrpiou
o
yivovxat
Kai
atb
zb
9Chrysippusait omneverbumambiguumnaturaesse,quoniamex eodemduo velplura accipipossunt

(Gell. N.A. 2.12.1). See Atherton 1993: 298-310.
10The term &4tgtpokiais used by the Stoics in a more general sense than in Aristotle. Aristotle
makes importantdistinctions between homonymy (6jt'ovu?ia), equivocation
and mul(&pt9npokfoa),
Aristotle's view on the specific meanings of these
terms is far from
tivocity (7cokkax(0;
~,yEvOat).
clear: cf. Hintikka 1973 and Irwin 1981. The Stoic understandingof d&t3poxia seems to have
included homonymy and multivocity.In addition,whereas tdftpokia in Aristotle (at least in the De
sophisticiselenchis)is specific to an expression,the Stoics applied it to either a term or an expression.
An agtjtpokia is a X&4tcwhich the Stoics defined as "anarticulatevocal sound"(Diog. Laert. 7.56).
According to Atherton, a hXtic is any articulatesequenceof lettersor sounds (the two areisomorphic
in Stoicism) that may or may not express anything and includes words and expressions. Atherton
1993: 136-139.
1 See below for a discussionof meaning and definition in Stoicism.
12"And accordingto the Stoics, aYoCloSat;
signifies the invEutlaextending from the commanding
a'iipta
faculty to the senses and the Katbairlt; through them and fi nepi Td alo
Kataaorcuil,in
7.52 = SVF
Laert.
which some become maimed. And the &vcpyctais also called alOrOatc"
(Diog.
2.71).
13 It is essentialthat we leave the individualmeaningsof aYa0rlon untranslatedfor the time being.
The natureof the Stoic theory of perceptionwill be largelydeterminedby how we understandthese
terms and expressions.
14A word should be said about the context of the passage. Adtius is a collection of terse
doxographicalreportstopicallyarranged.The heading for the abovepassageis "flpi aiaO0elauo;Kac
See Diels 1879: 114. The Stoic position is followed by the views of Epicurus,Plato, and
aiorlzov."
the Atomists (Leucippusand Democritus).

324
PHOENIX
VOspdaXT tOTG
flyEtOV1K6V,*6#0'o6 XdnXtViGaObjlptayst
XCYtct*
X( TcVEuXtJICCx
TUlyEgOVtKOU
i d iSpytava
teracgvca.15
Unfortunately,this passagewhich seeks to sort out the ambiguitiesof acIotaotlc

is itself ambiguousand textuallyproblematic.The text cited aboveis from Diels's
DoxographiGraeciand exhibits several interpretativejudgments which may be
responsiblefor some of the confusionbetweena 9ioeiat; and xXvzwo{a. The first
is the punctuation.There aretwo generalstrategiesthat editorshavetakento make
sense of this text. The first is to follow Diels and take 4avXaia
aYctatlKttXqt1rii
and "theiyc?povuc6vitself' as two additionalmeaningsofalo0rlotc. This can be
accomplishedsimply by not inserting punctuationafter&vppyeta.Later editors,
however, as we shall see, insert either a semi-colon or a period here which
significantlyaltersthe meaning of the text.
There are severaladvantagesto Diels's reading.First, the mainverb,yivovzat,
need not be changed (as it will be in later editions) since it would have a plural
The second advantage,and
subject (namely, all the meanings of
aoiloat;).
more
is
the
that
the
resultingreadingwould offer a meaning
persuasive,
perhaps
of acco0Iotcnthat seems to be verifiedby a number of texts that the alternative
readingwould make little sense of. This additionalmeaningof axoda otc is "the
sy~lPovtK6v itself."
There are three texts that supportthe idea that the term aoeIott; could be
used to signify the commandingfacultyof the soul. The firstcomes from Cicero's
Academicapriora. Here we read: mensenim ipsa,quaesensuumfonsest atqueetiam
ipsa sensusest, naturalemvim habetquamintenditad ea quibusmovetur.16Since
this text portraysthe Stoic position as seen through the eyes of the Academic
Antiochus we should be cautious in accepting it. Antiochus, however, often
does provide us with important evidence for later Stoic positions and therefore
the passage may representa genuine Stoic view. Alone this would be on shaky
ground;fortunatelysimilarclaims can be found in other sources.
The Cicero passagebearsan interestingsimilarityto our second text, Seneca's
Epistulae morales113.23. In this text Cleanthes and Chrysippus reportedly
disagree regardingthe definition of walking: Cleanthes arguedthat walking is
spiritum... a principali usquein pedespermissumwhereas Chrysippusdeclared
15Aetius4.8.1 = ps.-Plut.899d1-7(= SVF2.850).The textcitedhereis Diels's(1879:393-394).
Thereareseveraldifficultiesin the text,the mostseriousof whichDielsflagswith asterisks.I will
in a more
editionof thistextresolvesthesedifficulties
arguebelow(326)thatMau'sandLachenaud's
coherentmannerthanthereadingsproposedbyDiels,Meineke,orvonArnim.
16"Forthe minditself,whichis the fountof the sensesandevensenseitself,possessesa natural
a
forcethatstretchesto thosethingsbywhichit is moved"
(Acad.
pr.2.30).Thetermmensis probably
Ka
is
identified
the
which
with
translation
commanding
faculty:
repeatedly
pou6ovrat 618&
of86tdvota,
c t(v te y&p aia'eaOdveoat ~kt taora
r?v iv Ptv
(ov &va
aTb iyelysovtK6bv
jfpoc
Ku
t
ug0lv
8 86 Kct;Etat8tdtvota(Stob.Ed. 2.65.1-3 = SVF3.306).Also see SVF 1.202,2.840, and
a6UtTI,
3.305.

AIO?HEII IN ANCIENTSTOICISM
325
that it is ipsumprincipale.17Whereas the claim reportedin the Cicero passage

merits caution since it is attributedto Antiochus'vision of Stoicism, which does
not alwayscorrespondto the earlyStoic views, the Senecapassageis assignedto
Chrysippusand thus cannot be so easily dismissed. If walking can be identified
as the commanding facultyitself, it would not be out of place to make the same
claim regarding
in support of Diels's reading comes from Arius Didymus.
The third text
aG0aot,.'18
souls to the world soul Arius Didymus states:
individual
Comparing
ei; fKEiVIV.
Evtot6icr7lvPiLvro6u,0ou &itov, tt I:
oua lyvuaoctt i~ni
EXEtvS6n^(TCatv UXilV7lY~LOVIK6V
Zt
&V
rceuj Ka
&,otunt 7
0
1 &(
aOUZ,ij1Cuola
( KOL&i}a
6p;i.19
tG
It seemsclearthatthereis somesensein whichaoaloat; canbe identifiedwith

the 9yecsovtoc6v.
However,this is a ratherweakidentification.The point of
all these passagesseemsto be that the commandingfacultyis responsiblefor
as it is for life andimpulse.We mayassumethen thatfor the Stoics
ac Orlaot;
itself to the same degree that life, impulse,

a'oerlotc signifies the 'YeCjovtK6v
or even walking can be identified with the commanding faculty of the soul.
Nevertheless,the fact that these texts state this ratherodd identificationsupports
Diels's edition of Adtius.
There are nonetheless several drawbacksto Diels's text of Aetius. First,
although there may be passages that can be used to identify (at some level)
; with the iysPovtK6v,it is not so easyto finda textor argumentthat
acYOIato
would identifyctYaloo
t; with the KaT(zr
tlnzntC 4xavratoia.An oat'orlot; is
but a KaTzd1cI&
Nt is not the sameas a KatctzaXrttKl tvracia.
a
arzd~rlytq,
is an assentto a iatzh~
Rather,a
cavzaoiacjust asalolrlotai
ncttt1i
,arzdtrlVt;
absenceof any text supporting
to an aio0rlztlci'4avacia.ic. The
is an assent
of aYaorlotcwith KaXarlntXrctKl
the identification
4avoXrciaweighsagainstthis
reading.
Secondly,Diels's readingfails to resolvethe fundamentaldifficultyin the
the text and
text. Even afterhis correctionDiels is still forcedto "dagger"
estquidpost&4"'
state:namplaneobscurum
(55). Moreover,Diels's
o0 interciderit
text is awkward,moreso thanthe alternative
readingsby von Arnim,Mau, or
andhis pupilChrysippus
did not agreeon whatwalkingis. Cleanthessaidit was
17"Cleanthes
thatit wasthe commanding
breathextendingfromthe commanding
facultyto the feet,Chrysippus
facultyitself"(Sen.Epist.mor.113.23;LongandSedley1987:tr.53L).
18Seepreviousnote.Alsocf.Aetius4.23.1= SVF2.854.
19"Butsome[say]thatthe [soul]of thewholeis eternal,buttherest[ofthesouls]aremixedatthe
endwiththe former.And everysoulhasa commanding
facultyin itself,whichis life,aloaloatc,and
impulse"(Euseb.Praep.ev. 15.20.5;DDG fr. 39, p. 471 = SVF2.821).Also cf. Scholiain Lucianum
89 rOvKaaXlrttKto)Vr&C rcovaalo0rTlpitov
Vit.auct.21.127:
Kci taT Cs?IV
aoiaOltc&
EhXyov
t ytvosfvac 6tiv
.
aloilos(X SkT; 86 rati KcTarItTUKati; KiartaTXipX
aaOwrlotKta;q
aoyCTzaOeMM
ractt
8
KaT'
Oe
Kait
Kd
rp6lnov
T6
Tv
T'o
Kaila
b
XyWao0att iato0rlvIC
6lyE&OViKV
alortilptov
mitXXov (FDS332a).
KicaOdnep
clTWptv
YElyLOVtKOu ailoroi Koard

326
PHOENIX
Lachenaud.Aitius is usuallyknown for his clearand concise style;his sentences

are usuallybrief and the syntaxsimple. Diel's text is anythingbut that.
The alternativeto Diels is to place a breakin the text. Mau and Lachenaud
place a period and von Arnim a semi-colon aftertvi~pyetasuggestingthat the list
of the meanings of a'ierlot; ends there. I arguethat Mau and Lachenaud(both
reconstructthe text identically)offer the most coherentreadingof this text:
Oi
6piovt1
riyv
"o
t; <t1'> caioOncrl,vTzrl'X
It
oittoc
ZT(oCKOi
aOilon0tv"
OrloYrttv
j tEEyp
fj
& X
t
T,
piou i1 KcdtXX
KCCtY
8'ti: ycat
toXa&~(.
66vou&tC,
TO
(rl)t.."
tiCarlotrc-.
t' aiOqltrqlTpiou
Kai l1 CvFpystQo.
KicLil cavTotXcLaflIl Ka'TaCLTXltrLKTIK
yiVsTtL KC(TCL
voCpL rb
fjYE'OVtK6v.&6' ou [auviotctrt]
rdt6(tv [8'] otlo0rlXripta
,ystait xvc6taxa
i rt& 6
CT?va.20
ToGTflJYOVtKOtCtSpYOvC
The text emended in this way has the following sense: a'o0rloat; is an apprehension or cognition through an aGlo0T
1ilptov; a'itclot; has many meanings,
The 4avztaia
l also arisesthrough an
(Ct/, 686va?it,tvpyeta).
KaxtrlacrtKi
aloOrziliptov. The text then proceeds to define aalotrTilpta. The progression
reads naturallyand is grammaticallyplausible. Following the Mau/Lachenaud
correctionand punctuationwe then have an obviousstructuralsimilaritybetween
the Diocles text and the Adtius text. In the Diodes text, after a'ioeroatt is
defined as an &vipycta, the passage continues: Ti
6)K8a'tdXrlt9Wy; v ctat Kat
i
in
Adtius
is
also identifiedwith Cv&pyEta,
Similarly,
aco'lot;
aiUTob OG0Jiloct.
and immediatelyfollowing the authoradds,KaL'ti 4 tvTaoai 1 KXTrAx7CTl1Kit'
piou yives;Tt.
aloOtCYrlT
There are, however, also a numberof drawbackswith this strategy. First, by
addinga full stop, the editorsareforcedto changethe y{vovrat to yivezat in order
to agree with its presumed singularsubject. Secondly, the text still encounters
troublewith the 4'' o0. Mau and LachenaudsuggestinsertingauvioXTzaxtafter
6&4'o0. However, a coherent sense and translationis possible without further
emendation to the text if we allow 4&' ou to be translatedsomewhat atypically
as "for this reason."21This is how von Arnim seems to read the text since he
does not see the necessity of insertingaouviozaTat(2.850). If this concession is
granted,a coherentreadingcan be found with verylittle emendation:
is an apprehension
or
in the followingmanner: Acrlo i;tC
The Stoicsdefine
cai0el;tc
And alorloat; has severalmeanings:[It refersto]
cognitionthroughan adolOxiiptov.
is produced
Moreoverthe cognitivepresentation
the Evtz,the86vqagtt,andthe&vxpyeta.
of
means
of
an
On
account
in the commanding
this,
[theterm]
facultyby
airlTrilptov.
from
to the
breath
the
to
refers
commanding
faculty
intelligent
stretching
aicoOrltipta
organs.
20Mau 1971: 119. All futurereferencesto ps.-Plutarchwill referto Mau'sexcellentedition which
is identical in this passageto Lachenaud's.
21According to LSJ (1968: 192), &tn6is frequentlyused to indicate cause or origin; cf. Smyth
1920:374, "byreasonof."

AIEHEIE IN ANCIENTSTOICISM
327
For these reasonsI suggestthatwe adopteitherthe von Arnim orMau/Lachenaud

texts (the difference is negligible) of the Adtius 4.8. This means that the
will not be taken as meanings
CK(ta7lrtK-il
1JYCLovttKvitself and the 4tavtaoia
of a'iaOrlotcon the basis of the Aatius text. Moreover, since the other evidence
suggested a very weak and nonspecific identificationwith atioOrlat, I will not
itself as one of the meanings of the term. Finally, by
include the flYEPovtWK6v
we
are less likely to conflate a'ioloat; with
Diel's
reading
rejecting
0avaotia
since there now exists no text which identifies ca'iolot; with a 4vczaaia of any
kind.
IV.
THE MULTIVOCITY OF AIO?HEIX
With the task of isolating and evaluatingthe main texts about the ambiguity
of the term a'ierlotc behind us, we are now ready to examine the individual
definitions. Our two main texts emphasizingthe multivocityof a'iaOrlot;(Diog.
Laert.7.52 andAetius4.8) possess both notable similaritiesand differences.Both
passages acknowledgethat the term a'io0rlaot has severalmeanings. For clarity
we shall summarizethe meanings as follows:
Diodes of Magnesia
Aftius(ps.-Plutarch)
C6
i
dVTXkriyt 68t"'oXiaOrlrlptiou
KtAXkrlltC
615tKOV
rtvcUgoax
f7 asp\i
j6V(ptt
"t aiarltOilptatKdtQaYKSEUi
Fv&pystca
EvEpysta
Only two meanings are explicitlyfound in both lists: KacrzdkytX

t and 'vipy~ta.
There is also a similaritybetween Diodes' first meaning of ax'iceOrlotand the
definition of aieorljtiptov which immediately follows Aitius' definition. The
similarities,however, seem to end here.
One notable difference between these two accounts is that Adtius seems to
make a distinction between the first listed meaning and other senses of the term.
The doxographerbegins by sayingthat the Stoics "defined"(6pirov'at) the term
then immediatelystates
65t' aotarlYrpouo il
'ioetrlot?as vtiktrltYt;
KatTdjrlt,
that the term can be said in many ways (nokkXayj
O
t fi a'irlotic). It
6
8& Xycqa,
is the primarydefinition
is possible to infer from this that the first expression
and that the latter terms are secondarysenses. In that case, we would still have
four meanings of the term in the passage, though the first would have some
sort of special status or possibly be its "focalmeaning."22An alternativeway to
22Owen (1960) describeswhat he means focal
by
meaning:"Awordsuch as 'medical,'he [Aristotle]
says, is not univocal-it has variousdefinitions answeringto its varioussenses, but one of these senses
is primary,in that its definition reappearsas a component in each of the other definitions. If to be a
medical man is to be XY, to be a medicalknife is to be of the sort used by a man who is XY"'(169).

328
PHOENIX
this textis thatthereis butone definitionof the term,andthe latter

understand
sensesarethe threewaysin whichthe termcanbe applied.I arguethatneither
of theseoptionsis a satisfactory
explanation.
First,it is unlikelythatthe Stoicsheldthatone of the meaningsof aiarloat;
is priorin anywayto the others;this mayhavebeenhowAetiusunderstoodthe
Thereis
withthe Stoicviewof ambiguity.
matter,butsuchwouldbe inconsistent
and
between
Stoics
primary secondary
distinguished
simplyno evidencethatthe
Indeed,CatherineAthertonarguesthatthe Stoicshad
meaningsin anambiguity.
to Aristotle'snotionof "focalmeaning."23Secondly,
no conceptcorresponding
does not
t (andh&vrtX9lWt;),
the firstmeaningin the Adtiuspassage,KarZdt6X.rT
four
the
havethe sameprivilegedstatusin Diocles'definitionwhere
meaningsof
a'icrlat; aretreatedas equals.
Why then is the first meaningof a'(ierlot; in Adtiusset apartfrom the
followingmeanings? It may be becauseAdtius'first meaningmore closely
resemblesthe formof a definitionor a completedefinitionthanthe subsequent
meanings.The factthat the DiogenesLaertiustext presentsfourmeaningsof
the termdoterlot; in a differentorderandwithoutprioritybeinggivento any
meaningsupportsthisconclusion.
particular
Littledetailsurviveson the Stoictheoryof definition.24
Althoughwe know
and
thatthe Stoicswerenotoriousforcoiningnewwords,identifying
ambiguities,
criterion
the
evidence
little
is
there
concerning specific
very
refiningdefinitions,
back
as "rendering
defineda definition
of a good definition.Chrysippus
(gpoo) offersa different
to a term (i6tou &t660Coat).25Antipater
what is distinctive"
for the
definitionof "po;: a definitionis "anaccountstatedcomprehensively
of
an
analysis"
(X6yo;
EK4cp6pvo0).26
purpose
&vdhootv
definitionof ipo;
K(a'
Neitherdefinitionis particularly
Chrysippus'
helpful.In fact,&taprtt6vrzo;
standards.It does
wouldprobablynot be considereda definitionby Antipater's
back
The
not appearto be sufficiently
rendering
comprehensive
(&aprt(6vzqo).
definition.
a
than
other
to
refer
can
or
distinctive
of something
things
special
Nevertheless,eitherof thesedefinitionsof 6Spo;couldjustifyAdtius'distinction
betweenthe formerandlattermeaningsof aolrlOtc;.ForAdtius'firstdefinition
andis statedmore
of a'ioealot;is both a betteri8iou &r66oSoot;
x7Foaprt6vTzo
thanthe lattermeanings.
The
definitions
of
abbreviated
The Stoics also made use
(6ioypaooi).
in
the
that
introduces
account
as
"an
definitionis defined
abbreviated
irpd,ytoao
23Atherton 1993: 103: "Noris it strangethat they [the Stoics] do not reportthe kind of sifting of
the philosophicaltradition,using ambiguity(or somethinglike it) as one of the tools of analysis,which
is a distinctivelyAristotelianmethod. It is ratherthe almost complete absencefromwhat is known of
Stoic theorizing of any interesteven in formulatingrulesas to how significationsof ambiguousterms
may be systematicallyinterrelated... which is so striking."
24See Rieth 1933: 36-54. Cf. Atherton 1993: 92-128.
25Schol.in Dionys. Thrac.107.1-21; Hilgard (ed.) (= SVF 226.1)
26Diog. Laert. 7.60 (SVF 2.226.2)

AIEOHXIEIN ANCIENTSTOICISM
329
outline form or a definition supplyingthe force of the [complete] definition in a

simpler form."27It is quite possible that severalof the definitions that we have
been examining are in fact 6inToypaai'.
A definition, full or abbreviated,is not the only way to disambiguatea term
or expression. Other common methods for showing different applicationsof an
ambiguousterm are division (Staipcatc) and partition(gcptago6). These consist
of dividing or classifying a term according to genus and species.28 Although
6taipcatc and pptapi6; were commonly used by Stoics, the passageswhich we
are examining are clearlynot instancesof either.
The final way to shed light on an ambiguousterm is simply to cite instances
of the various meanings of the term. Sextus Empiricus gives an example of
this using the word "dog."29 He states that the word may signify a barking
animal, the marine animal (sea lion), the dog star, and the Cynic philosopher.
He states that these are cases or instances (nrz6at) of signification. Sextus also
says that these have "nothing in common," which is surely false. There is no
in this sense. However, the
evidence that the Stoics ever used the word
nzraot,;
an ambiguityis a very common
practice of citing instances of a term to clarify
way to indicate the meaning of a term. This is preciselywhat Socratesobjected
to in Plato's Meno.30 Citing the denotations of a term is no substitute for
a definition. It is, however, all that is requiredto take the sting out of an
ambiguity.
I suggest that our chief texts on the meanings of a'icoelaoi; include definitions and/or abbreviated definitions (such as aioloai
Baozrtv&vzTDtiNyt;
<6t'> aioa0lTrpi/ou i' Kczdcrl(Iyt;) as well as instances of the denotation of
the word (7nokkXa~a
o a86oyriat
6
(tolo l
lt . zIT ydp Et; Kai jl 6vq
cVal Kaii
This explainsAdtius'distinctionbetween 6pi'ovrat and noXaX&c;

kyetoat. Maintaining a rigid distinctionbetween definitions,abbreviateddefinitions, meanings, and instances of the term would requirecontinual qualification
and would accomplishlittle. I will continue, therefore,to referto these texts as
the various senses, meanings, or even definitions of the term without implying
that they are definitions in any strict sense.
There is one final meaning of a'ioOrlot; that needs to be mentioned before
in evpyeta).
concludingthis section. I referto the claim that an a'ioOat; is an assent

(oauyK0czcsotc). This assertionis found in severaltexts.31 Keepingthis in
mind,we can now producea list of the variousmeaningsof a'icoeolat;.If all of
these meaningsarecollectedtogether,removingduplications
and excludingthe
e
ti1v toU
eiy
ct anpdaytcrat, ij po; &nrXo6ascpov
276noypafl U8~ n X6yoCTunm6SocEiayov
Laert.
7.60).
(Diog.
5pouo 6vactyvnpooevlveyjitvo;
28See Ierodiakonou1993: 61-68.
29Sextus
EmpiricusMath. 11.28-29.
30Plato72a6-8.Cf. Grim1962:7-9.
31Stob.Ed. 1.474.18-19= SVF2.72;Cic.Acad.pr.2.108 = SVF2.73;Porph.DeAnima2.349in
Stob. Ed. 1.349.25-26 = SVF 2.74.

330
PHOENIX
itself,
lYEsCIovtK6v
we have the following list of meanings or uses of the term
1cto0rlot;:32
1. anextending
7rve6pa
i
2.
il7jpi
r& a'a0IlaOtilptaKattoKeul
3. fviCpyeta
4. l5i;
5. 86vaCpt;
6. Katzdh~
yt; throughthe senses
7. &vrit'Xyt;
throughthe senses
8. auyKarzdt~0ot
In the remainder
of this articleI shallshowhowaiao0ojt;canmeanso many
and
still
a
be
usefulphilosophicalterm. We shallsee that theseeight
things
itemscanbe reducedto threegeneralcategories,thatbothA&tius'
andDiodes'
definitionscontainallthreecomponents,andthatanycomprehensive
accountof
the meaningof a'ioerlot;mustincludeallthree.The threegeneralmeaningsof
the terma'ialolOt;are:(1) the sensoryapparatus;
(2) theactivityof the apparatus;
the
event
astheassentto a certain
identified
(3) culminating
(successful)
cognitive
kindof 4avzaoia.
V.
THE MEANINGS OF THE MEANINGS
The firstthree meaningson the list emphasizedifferentfeaturesof the physical

apparatusof perception. That the term c'a0orlqat signifiesan extendingportion
of nvc6ica is confirmedby Chrysippus'definitionsof the individualsenses in his
De anima. He states that each of the five senses is tnve6ia extending from the
commanding faculty to the organ of perception. Hence vision, also called the
optical aea0ioatc, is the rvceuia extendingfrom the commandingfacultyto the
eyes; hearing, the nve6pa extending from the commandingfaculty to the ears;
and so on.33
Chrysippus'definition of the individual senses is also clearlyrelated to the
expression 1'jep\ tIr aotaortilpta KaTaoaKrni. This expression, however, emphasizes not the anve6ia betweenthe commanding faculty and the organs but
the remote structuresthemselves. Scholarshave translatedthis passagein various
ways: Hicks translatesthe expressionas "the apparatusof the sense organs,"34
Long and Sedleyas "their[the instrumentsof cognition] surroundingstructure,"35
32Bonh6ffer(1890: 122), as a resultof workingfromDiels'stext, identifiessix meaningsfor
itself,and
KW\
4t; 86vCattc,vdpyeta, 0avtcaoft KCrlNXliTrflKl
a&o0rloatc:
tiysoVtKK
aiarltirTK,
anvsCpa voep6v.
usesthe term
33Gal. PHP 3.1.10-15= SVF2.885. Chrysippus
in placeof Adtius'5paatc.
eytt;
= SVF 2.836.
Otherwise the definitionsare identicalin substance.See Adtius 4.21.1-4
34Hicks1925:161.
35Long and Sedley 1987: 248.

AIOHEII IN ANCIENTSTOICISM
331
Inwood and Gerson as "theequipmentof the sense-organs,"36

and Annas as "the
of
the
One
rule
out
of
the
above translacannot
any
make-up
sense-organs.""'
tions on lexical grounds alone; for the term KazrtaaKlul can signify apparatus,
is a general term for
structure,equipment, or make-up. The word KcaraoaKSU1
In
or
it
is
used
to
Thucydides
equipment gear.
signify military and domestic
and
the
sense
of readiness.It can also mean
implements (1.97.25, 8.5.2)
suggests
a structureor state of something that accounts for its readinessor preparation
(Diog. Laert. 7.108). Aristotle uses the term for publicbuildings (Eth. Nic. 4.11,
1122b20). Tools, weapons, and buildings are all structuresor objects ready to
be used. Calcidius compares the sensory apparatusto the threads of a spider's
web and the commanding faculty to the spider who sits in the center with a
leg on each thread. The thread, tensed and sensitive to any disturbance,lies in
readiness.38
The prepositionncEpiused with the accusativecase may signifyeither a general
relation("of' or "relatingto")or location ("surrounding"
or "inthe generalvicinity
of'). Some Stoics describedthe location of the commandingfaculty of the soul
in the nvseCpa"aroundthe heart" (nCp'irV Kap6iav).39 Elsewhere sleep is
described as a loosening of the sensory tension "aroundthe commanding fac'
6vou jnT
To
ulty"(r6yv6& vov yivsoOut i&'uoopvou T06aiaOeljto
npi 6b yEptovtK6v).40
Diodes qualifiedthe expressionby addingthe statement,KaO'ijv ttvs; irlpol
yivovrat. The phrase "in respect to which some become maimed"suggests that
the expressionas a whole is referringto the externalor remote elements of the
sensoryapparatusthroughwhich externalinformationentersthe body, in contrast
to the inveupcaextending through the body from the commandingfacultywhich
transmitsthe information.Nor shouldwe be surprisedby the fact that the Stoics
used
in this way. Aristotle also referredto the distal structuresof sense
aoaOrloatperception as the ail0etie .41 Therefore, we may conclude that (xtal at;, in
so far as it is identified as Il ncEpizTa&io9i
pX
ue, emphasizes the
ptta TKatoKaa
structureand readinessof the part of the sensory apparatusthat interfaceswith
the externalworld.
The second basicclass of meaningsforaoaoriat; is the activityof the apparatus
that produces the 4avztaaia. Aetius' claim that cXalo0at; is an &vipysta,
E"tg;,
and 56vaCpt;seems to point not to the the physical structureof the apparatus
but rather to its activity or operational features. All three terms were also
technical terms used by Aristotle. Might Adtius be using these terms in an
36Inwood and Gerson 1997: 113.
37Annas 1992: 71.
38CalcidiusAd Timaeum220 = SVF 2.879. Likewise, the externalsense-organsare structuresof
the body that await in readinessto be used in conjunctionwith the extendingnve6pCt.
39Adtius4.5.6 = SVF 2.838.
4Diog. Laert. 7.158 = SVF 2.766.
41Cf. Arist. De an. 3.1 425a10.

332
PHOENIX
Aristotelian sense? This is unlikely.42The Aristotelian sense of vgpycta and

61vagt;, as actuality/potentialityis completely foreign to the Stoic approachto
physics, ontology, and psychology. In Aristotle'stheory of sense perceptionthe
sense-organsare not just faculties (that is, something capableof acting) but also
true potentialities.43 By "true potentialities"I mean that they are constituted
of substanceswhich in themselves are potentially the form of the sense object
without the matter.
It is more likely that 66vagt,; and &v&pyxtahave the less technicalmeanings
of faculty and the exercise of the faculty. These are the ordinaryuses of the
terms and the most reasonableway to read the Adtius passage.44This ordinary
usage of Fv6pycta can also be naturallycontrastedwith 56vacgt, as can be seen
by Galen's usage of these two terms in De naturalibusfacultatibus:
6v&pyctatv6c
Here the
adtariyv
Kcxi
T1v 6pwtcrtK'IV 6voCldO) KLvvl(tV
trv
6vajitv.45
0tlaut;
is describedin terms of motion and
relationshipbetween&vEpyetaand v6vaCgt;
cause. If we read the Aetius text in this non-Aristoteliansense, a'ioalot; is both
the process or motion that occurs in the act of perceptionas well as that which
makes the activitypossible, namely,the power intrinsicto the sensoryapparatus.
It is clear then that these two terms captureoperativefeaturesof the Stoic
theory. According to Calcidius, Stoics comparedthe perceptualacquisition to
a king who sends out messengerswho report back after receivinginformation.
This analogy simultaneouslydescribesthe sensory apparatusand the activity of
the apparatus(as did Chrysippus'definitionof the individualsenses).In a related
analogy previouslymentioned, the sensory apparatuswas comparedto a spider
sitting on a web waiting for an insect. In both casesthe apparatushas a 86vaCt; in
so faras it has a capacityto receiveinformationand transmitit to the commanding
faculty. The stimulationprovokesa responsein the apparatusand this response,
42Both Rist (1969) and Menn (1994) agree that tvipysta in its earliestappearancesin Aristotle
simply meant activity. It is probablythis vague sense (which is not unique to Aristotle) to which
Aetius refers. I am arguingabove the weakerclaim that the termgv&pyetain the Adtius text should
not be confused with Aristotle'stechnical sense of actualityor &vtXceta. Cf. Polansky 1992: 214,
arguing that "'vepyctateverywhereshould receive the same translation,preferably'actuality'."Blair
(1995: 579) concludesthe exactopposite:"Ifmy view is correct,the ivipyEta does not mean and never
meant 'actuality,'but it meansjust what those who used it afterAristotlethought it meant, '(internal)
of Aristotleon the earlyStoics.
activity'."See Sandbach1985 on the problemof the influence
'
43"ct65' taiaitttKcbV 6uvd'pt aot'ivoTovtb cdiaOrlv
iJ
Eppprrtw.xdoayet
vt'8Ka1OetEpq,
! AEKCVO"
6v,
(Arist.De an. 2.5, 418a 3-6).
6' bChoiotr
otov 1,
tpv o0v obY
Ki: oattv
o6totov
nItnovObc,
arguesthat there are two senses of vtpycta: "diealoaOentcist in
44Bonh6ffer (1890: 123-124)
eine
des
doppeltem Sinn
Hegemonikon, erstens als Akt der einfachen Sinnesauffassung,
Thitigkeit
welche, wenn sie durch nichts gehindertwar, einen getreuenAbdruck(t6maot;) des Objektes,d. h.
im Hegemonikon hervorbringt;zweitens als Akt der Zustimmungzu
eine 4cvractia
dieser durch dieKaCLrXTLTtKlt
Sinnesauffassunggewirkten kateleptischenVorstellung."The first sense deals with
sensory contact, transmission,and reception. Bonh6ffer'ssecond sense is the commandingfaculty's
responseto the cav-rtaca.
45"Now vtpyECtais the name I give to the active change or motion and the cause of this I call a
(De nat.fac. 1.2.7).
66vcatc."

AIEOHEIEIN ANCIENT STOICISM
333
I suggest, is the `v6pyet(a. Plotinus describesthis &vipyeta as the transmission

through the body. Thus the capacity to see (the faculty of sight) will be the
condition or cause that enables sight (i.e., nveiscgaand the sense-organs); the
activity of seeing would be the motion of the rnvegca. According to Adtius:
c
v
oi EtroKol C6vzaa
yd~p.46Thus there is a clear
T ('0tta
aota(tXatKl 7cCaCa
"
can be said to be the capacityor
sense in which the apparatusof sense perception
power to perceivesince it is the causeand necessarycondition for the activity.
of the commanding
AYlaOotraas a 86va'cpt refersto the power of the nvEC6ica
The
the
external
senses.
idea of a faculty
that
the
and
body
faculty
pervades
or capacity
can also be seen in the Diogenes Laertiuspassage in the
(86vatcit)
i discussed above.47 A rcazoKxuil is
phrase 1 nep'i rt aalo0prilptaKctaaroKu
an implement ready to be used, and is thus a capacity.The activityor tv&pycta
would be the term used for the sensoryapparatusin the processof functioningor
transmitting.Therefore,86vcapt; and&vipycturemaincomplementaryconcepts
in the Stoic sense as they are in Aristotle.
In addition to being the exercise of a capacity that detects and transmits
information, aiCo0laot;is an activity in two additionalways which help us see
its relation to the 4avzraia. (1) AYoOrlaotis the activityof the apparatusthat
imprintsthe informationon the commandingfaculty(or "alters"the commanding
faculty) thereby producing the 4avraoia; and (2) al0rlot; is an activityin so
far as it is an assent and therefore a response to the 4avzaoia. In both cases
the 4avaacia is an object (the object produced and the intentional object of
the assent) and has a passive nature in contrast to the active/motive nature of
cacIo
ratc.
This contrastbetweenataOiat~; as an activityand the essentiallypassivenature
of the
as an object becomes evident if we examine the descriptions
oavtccaia
or definitions
of 4avzracia. Zeno reportedlycalled the 4avraia an imprint
(zr6coat;) in the soul, whereasCleanthesreportedlyheld that the imprintentailed
a literal, pictorialrepresentationlike the imprint that a signet ring makes in wax
with all the contoursof the externalobject. Cicero emphasizesthe passivityof the
its formationby means of an externalimpact (impulsione,
ia
4oxvzar by stressing
Acad. post. 11.40). Chrysippus preferred to call the 4avzaoia an affection
in the commandingfaculty.
(ndB;)48 or alteration(ztepoioat; or &
ot1ooat)49
to
According Sextus, the Stoics distinguishedthe cavraaia from other, more
46"The Stoics say that all causesare corporeal;for they arenvs6cpaa" (Adtius 1.2.5; SVF 2.340).
47Diog. Laert. 7.52. Cf. Calcidius'instruendosensibus(CalcidiusAd Timaeum220, 232.21-233.3;

SVF 2.879).
48Aetius 4.12 = SVF 2.54. Pohlenz (1970: 1.55) declaresthat da0iealo, like 4avTacia, is an
affection of the soul. This, I shall argue, is false. The term
is nevercalled an affection in
either of the Stoic definitions or elsewherein the survivingevidence.
alaIoln, Claims such as this have led to
the misconception that the relationshipbetween
and 4avtaoia is similarto that between
sensationand perceptionin English.
aco0rlatc,
49Chrysippusis reportedto have been dissatisfiedwith the literal image of the stamping analogy
and proposed the less literal "alteration."The evidence conflictswhether the term which Chrysippus

334
PHOENIX
active alterationsof the soul such as cognition, impulse, and assent,by qualifying
the alterationwith the expression"byway of passivity"(Tb
icaoz& rtsoat;,Math.
7.239). Hence, the 4avaacia is also describedas a state (8td6 atc;)and a passivity
as
(ne'ati). This passivityof the 4avzacia stands in clearcontrastto alYOrlocn
an activity.
The relationand the inseparabilityof activity/passivityplaysan importantrole
in Stoicism.Just as God and matterareconceptuallydistinctyet neverseparate,so
c'caOrlat;and cavraaia are mutuallydependent.The parallelis limited though;
whereaseveryc&aoioat;producesa 4avctcia, not every atvztaoiacomes directly
from an a'iaCrlo
at. <DavTaciat may also be produced by the mind, drawing
on concepts and memories of former 4wavacaxit.s5Whether the ayvtaaia is
produced/imprinted/alteredby the c'iaOlatc;or by the mind (8td6vota)or reason
(X6yoc),it is the passiveeffect or the resultingstate (8td6aotG).
A6vapt; andcvepycta arejoined by a thirdterm:&t;. Sincewe have seen that
the4cavzctiais a 6tdaEot;,we shouldnotbe surprised
to seect'tarlaotasaetc;.
However,we needto be carefulnot to confusethe Stoicuseof thesetermswith

Aristotle's.Accordingto Aristotlea E~t;is a kindof quality,namelyan enduring
in that the latteris
state.51Aristotleaddsthat a E5t;differsfroma
moretransientandless stable.Examplesof &t; for6Std0otq
Aristotleareknowledgeand
virtues,whereasexamplesof 8td60caet;areheat,cold, or the extensionof one's
arm.It seemsthatif Adtiuswantedto use anAristotelian
termfor&(oaelat;as a
state
he
have
been
better
advised
to
the term
choose
might
perceptual
6tdOcatt;;
foranac'o0locn;is immediateandtransient.52
The identification
of aco0rlnatq;
as a i;gt becomesclearif we understand
the
termas the Stoicsusedit. Accordingto Simplicius,the Stoicsdistinguished
⁢
and
on differentgroundsthanAristotle:
60td0ot;
t 6v6c~tro
t0ac v.
6&tov 6z, ai lv
Ta xT KaT
oTv0KVCstUV v divvyotsp'i
rc EVcO1K)t
ooti Ztatv &vdTatyXtv
ilv
o0KoGoIt
Z^ 'AptoZroTZ&Xt
8Ztd0sotv
ydtp
fiysEiotat.53
zi;c Fo;si.ov-
tguOtopav
bothto Chrysippus:
Sextusattributes
usedwasCUpoiooCor &XXoiooS;.
tsTpooaiO;in Math.7.230
in Math.7.400.DiogenesLaertius(7.50)usestheterm&kXoioaStq.
and372, and
50Diog.Laert.
7.51-52. Ultimatelyall avtaaiaktaredependentuponthe activityofa'iclotc.
koiotc.
Sensory(aia0rlnitK) gtvraoiat are directlydependent,non-sensoryavrcialat are indirectly
dependent.Cf. Adtius4.11.1-4= SVF2.83.
51Arist.Cat.8.9a-14;cf. Metaph.
5.20, 1022b4-14.
52Thatthe Stoicsheld that sensoryexperiencewas immediateand transientcan be seen in
this one color;another,
Calcidius:"eachsenseperceivessomeone ingredientin the composition;
and
roughness
sound;andwhilethatone discernsthe flavorof fluids,thisonebytouchdistinguishes
whatis pastor
withwhatis present;forno senseremembers
smoothness.And all this is concerned
220 = SVF2.879).In fact,Aristotlenevercalls(to
Ad Timaeum
whatis future"
(Calcidius
apprehends
myknowledge)
ataorlatqa94tc,thoughhe doescallmemory(Mem.450a30,451a16-27,451b3)and
bodilyconditions(Resp.474a26,477b15-18,478al)iEic..
53"Itis worthwhileto understand
the Stoic'susagein regardsto theseterms.In the opinionof
some people, they reverseAristotle by taking character[6td0t8at;]to be more stablethan tenor [tg]"
(Simpl. In. Aristot.Cat. 237.25-27 = SVF 2.393; Long and Sedley 1987: trans. 47S). Simpliciusalso

AIE?HEIEIN ANCIENTSTOICISM
335
He claims that the use of't;? over t&0deotq

is determinednot on the basis of the
of
as
character
the
state
Aristotle
but instead,
enduring
proposesin the Categories,
on the basis of whether the state can be intensified
and relaxed
(&ntTzivcao0t)
(d&vicoaat):
r6 86 W&opJilV
AWvjXt i^; tota trlr; unovoioxq,o ~gVto KtX b ,LOVILZwtspov
ifClil nxpaphtoit; zotKORT
'eTrlr~TaTt6tacopdt, tXX Kart' 5i a;q6ta0'ot;
roo6cov
Kai y&p t; p7v CTst ; 'tri(vgo0ai ~ctaov 56vato0otXKt 3viso0cat,
6~:
ta0& oct;t
rz
Ivnt)zdtouS 1EtV K\ iVV
TViOUg.54
Simplicius then gives two examples of what the Stoics mean by a &td60oti
(in contrast to Aristotle): straightnessand virtue.ss55
According to the Stoics
is
either
it
or
is
and a person is either
(crooked)
something
straight
non-straight
virtuous or he is non-virtuous (base).56 Thus virtue cannot be a
because
t;g
there cannot be degrees of virtue.57If a virtueis relaxed,it is no longer a virtue;
thusvirtueis a &&6Oeot;.Simplicius,on the otherhand,givesexpertise(z6ivrl)
and healthas examplesof EEt;. Both canbe intensifiedand relaxed,whichis

the characteristic
activityof a 6et;.58 Otherexamplesof the Stoicuse of 't; (in
a physicalobject
othertexts)areknowledge,geometry,pursuits(intzrqe66jUmiat),
and
characterized
by cohesion, natureitself.59
Do theseotherexamplesof E?t;giveus anyideaof howa'ioriot; mightbe a
E5t;in the Stoicsense?Let us look at thesegEtc morecarefully.Geometrycan
eitheras a formor branchof knowledge,a pursuit,or a
probablybe reclassified
in
Stobaeus
as one of
fact,
gives"theloveof geometry"
Tz6xv;
(?tooysotgezpiav)
his examplesof a pursuit;elsewherewe findthe geometer
offeredas an example
This showsus thatknowledge,T'vrl, and
of someonewho possessa t6Xvr.o60
are
connected.
closely
pursuits
andaxCtc in the samepassage(notcited).SeeRieth1933:120-127andElorduy
FiAt;
distinguishes
1936:113-116.
54"What
betweenthesetermsinvirtueof
givesriseto suchanopinionis not,however,a difference
overcharacters.
Fortheysaythattenor[]tc] can
differingstability,in Stoicdoctrine,buta difference
orrelaxed,butcharacters
be intensified
arenotsusceptible
to intensification
orrelaxation"
[8tsaOeatc]
(Simpl.In.Aristot.Cat.237.27-31= SVF2.393;LongandSedley1987:tr.47S).
55Cf.Stob.Ed. 2.70.21-71.6= SVF3.104,andDiog.Laert.7.98 = SVF3.105.
5T C riv tarati, ivOtt
't a6'oa
56See Diog. Laert.7.127 = SVF 3.536: 'Ap~iCKt
Kit
KinaKu;X,
ov
apTEi;
ic4A&pxperc KatKiL Etq
hey6vrToWTv tpoKon-ilv rj
eptnctrrtKjrCov
y&p
ivva
Tta
a(nv if 6pObvcivctt 6Xov i~

oT 56 tKatt6Tepov
oizoc if 6irKatovi &t61Kov,
o'"
8ivv
oapsp,6v,
Also
E
t
Kca't
t6tcc~repov, rn'iv iXvov 60ofro;.Diogenesusesthe sametwoexamplesas Simplicius.
cf. Stob.Ed. 2.91.3-7 (notin SVF).
57See Stob.Ed. 2.70.21= SVF3.104andDiog.Laert.7.98 = SVF3.105.
T58A; 4Ev ydp a gsta
6iK ta6( (t r&; ieI
KvcarTadcsaO XapacrlpipEOat,
ac7TintCrjTOt;Kc
In.Aristot.Cat.238.10-12= SVF2.393).
CauTCOv
(Simpl.
Evepyatc,;
59Knowledge,
forexample,is definedas a6st; in receivingOavcrao(Ya
thatcannotbe unseatedby
in Hultschiana
reason(SVF2.68, 2.93). Forgeometry,seeAnonymi
variaecollectiones
mathematicae
Heronisgeometricorum
et stereometricorum
editione275 = SVF 1.70; for pursuits,Stob. Ed.
2.73.1-13= SVF3.111;fornature,seeDiog.Laert.7.148;SVF2.1132.
60PhiloLeg.alleg.1.56;SVF3.202;Cic.Acad.prior.2.22.

336
PHOENIX
This leavesus with six examplesof 't;: health, expertise,knowledge,pursuits,

objects with cohesion, and nature. The fact that we find so many different
things called E4t; is not surprisingconsidering that we have several different
Stoic descriptionsor definitions of ilt;. I am able to discernat least two general
accounts of Egt;: (a) a physical state that implies variationof degree, and (b) a
physical state that producescohesion as the result of the motion of nvseCpaback
and forth.
These two definitions overlap in that both describe fluctuation. In (a) the
fluctuationis in quality,intensity, and time. Thus one can be healthyeven though
one's health may fluctuatebetween periods of great vitality and generalfatigue.
Pursuits such as a love of horses (4dtinntia)and a love of music (4tkoLouaot))
can also fluctuate in interest or activity with time. In (b) the fluctuationis a
continuous and simultaneousflow of nve&cpaback and forth. It is somewhat
paradoxicalthat an object'scohesion and stabilityis based on such a fluctuation
of internal motion. Nature is a igt; in both of the senses above (one might
say the same of health as well). For nature is not only characterizedby the
internal two-way motion or fluctuationof nxvcCpawhich is responsiblefor the
cohesion of the cosmos, it is also periodicallyfluctuatingbetween states of order
and disorder, between unity and plurality, and between moist Xdco;and fiery
CKlnpooat;.61 Thus nature tenses and relaxes,continuouslyproducingcohesion
in the cosmos and cyclicallythrough time. Hence, these two senses of 't; are
complementary.
But how is Tz6vrlor knowledge a t;4? If a'io0rlotc is a form of knowledge
might this not be the meaning of the Aetius passage?Before we answerthis we
need to distinguish zT6vriand knowledge. First, there are two general senses
of T'vril that have correspondingdefinitions. According to Zeno a rzvil is
ct K Ka(taTlIXeyov
aUtrorLa
stp6; zTttzho;
sciXplaoovzTiv
vv
auyyevsuCJLvaoIvo
ev t
pi~p62 and a Rt;
Cleanthes defined
T'evrl as t
5
6)6
6OotllttKil.63
&v6oou.oca.6Zeno's first sense indicates a collection of information;the
dtvrOt
others suggest a methodical activity. It is this latter sense that is called a &Ntr.
Likewise, this latter definition brings to mind the definition of natureas a ii6p
zsXVtKOV608C P6Xiov Ei; ygVEttV.65
Knowledge is also defined as a &"t;. Knowledgeis similarto TXvil in that it

is a collection of informationand also a i;. Stobaeusidentifies four senses of
knowledge or mntozit :
c y t4xCxv
c rTTOOv U6iXb6you. aS
tV
Kafi
sEvat 68&
TIto5rijVV
,pcav
(XitS
~
iIntozilrlKvr1tW'TtV
otov
jiCpo;XoytKj
orl4otLa
xntcrzltv toto6Tomv, iCt ov KodLt
Cv zT
whereas
aretheresultof looseorrelaxed
61TheStoicsheldthatmoist,coolsubstances
tension,
fireisnvectapossessing
thehighest
oftension.
degree
62Olymp.
InPlat.Gorg.
p.53 = SVF1.73.
inDionys.
63 Schol.
Thrac.p.663.16= SVF1.72.
64Olymp. In Plat. Gorg.p. 53 = SVF 1.490.
95= SVF2.1133andClem.Al.Strom.
5.14=SVF2.1134.
65Gal.Defin.medicae

337
I abUroG
XT
a 64nttTcrll
iv v XVtKiOv
EXovbO
otou86aip
6Xrlv86
UpaXOuoTC.
a96ollrU
a
sXtI
S6
o)v
P3P~atov,cxovoUvait
6cxXivt'vtaot
v
6ib
ECKtrilV
cptrac.
X6you, fjv.o
&.Estacaino'rov
ztvd 4aotv &v
T6vpqKcait8UVdlgt K'tOOQitt.66
The sense of knowledgethat concernsus here is the last. The otherdefinitions of knowledgedo not appearto permitchangeof degreeor intensity. The final sense of knowledgeis a i4t; possessinga receptivityfor receiving4avaciatt.67 What does this mean? Receptivity
suggests
(KTEtKil) Here
a tendencyor a state that promotesthe acquisitionof something.68
"4t; comes very close to the idea of 86vIapt;.69Presumably,callingknowledge a Et; suggeststhat a personwho has knowledgehas a soul whose tensionalstate somehowfacilitatesthe receptionof 4avacfiat. Thus knowledge
is not just a collectionof KTaratC
iCyt; but alsoa dispositionfor receivingOavThis receptivityis alsosaidto restin the T6vo;and86votgt;.If ourprevious
claimthat86vajtt;signifiesthe powerto exercisethe facultyof senseperception
(in contrastto the activityof the facultyor the facultyitself)we can say that
a personwho has knowledgemustalsohavea certainfacultyfor knowing(the
commandingfaculty)andthat the facultymusthavea certaindegreeof tension
vt;. In short,knowledgemaybe a E"t;in so faras it is reducibleto a stateof
the commanding
facultyof the soulwhichis characterized
by a E"t;-motionand
whichpromotesa cognition.
We now come to the last of the threegeneralmeaningsof at(oriaot;,an
assent(ouYKlczrd
true
Eaot). The claimthatat'aorlot;is an assentis necessarily
if
is also a Kazdarlyt; for the KCaTd~hrlyt;
is by definitionan assent.
xiOrlaot; to
Before
getting this, it is necessaryto makesenseof a less Stoic-lookingterm,
thus:
&vzTirl/yt;. We recallthat Aftius states, "the Stoics define a'YaOiiot;
is
an
or
bt)
apprehension
cognition(Kazdt~hrl
ao'orlat
(&vti'rl
tq) through
66"[The Stoics say] scientific knowledge [intaril~tl] is a cognition [K(ardXrlWit;] which is secure
and unchangeableby reason. It is secondly a system of such
like the rationalcognition of
tti4TICLat,
here = science] is thirdlya system
particularswhich exists in the virtuousman. It [scientificknowledge
of expertintrTrilait, which has intrinsicstability,just as the virtuesdo. Fourthly,it is a tenor for the
reception of impressionswhich is unchangeableby reason, and consisting, they say, in tension and
power"(Stob. Ecl. 2.73.16-74.3 = SVF 3.112; Long and Sedley 1987: tr. 41H).
67This position was held by Herillus according to Diogenes Laertius (7.165). It is likely that
Chrysippus eventually rejected this view on account of his view that EStc suggests a range or
degree.
68This is reminiscentof Democritus'warning that if we associatewith bad people a dispositon
(EC't;)towards wickedness will grow (D.K. fr. B 184). Also see ps.-Pl. Defin. 411c9:
i9t;
8talcprCPttl~
hOdItA W.
"Ovtc.
69Bonhoffer (1890) holds that the distinctions between 9i5t;, 86vagtc, and
are conv~vpyta
trived and are thus of "keinem wissenschaftlichenWerte" (123). I argue that there
is an important difference between 86vaQpt;and tas;even though both may eventually refer to the sensory
is what enablesthe activity, whereas the degree of tension in the 't;c
apparatus;for a
The denotation is probably the same, though the connotation is subtly
86tvatS.
promotesthe activity.
different.

338
PHOENIX
the sense-organs." In Diodes' definition of cCaOlcrna

preservedby Diogenes
Laertius there is no mention of
instead he simply states that the
&vrikrlytgt;
term aot'Orloatsignifies "the KaTd~h
yt; through the senses." The absence of
the term &vzWXlayt;
in Diodes' definition is suspicious. The omission coupled
with the relative rarity of the term in genuine Stoic fragments should raise
doubt as to whether the term accuratelyrepresentsthe actuallanguageused in
the early Stoa. Sextus Empiricus frequentlyuses the term while talking about
the Stoics, but again he unflinchinglyattributes
to the Presocratics.
Katz&rlWt;
Did the Stoics actually say that aioOrltcq is an
or is this Adtius'
&vwiXrltit;
to
assist
readers
who
be
unfamiliar
with
the
more
attempt
might
specializedterm
KIazdtrlyt?70
The noun &vztknyt; comes from the verb&vrtkap3pdcvo

which literallymeans
receive
instead
or
in
"to grasp something turn." It can signify any form
"to
of'
of grasping or reception but often carriesthe connotation of reciprocity.71In
a philosophical context the term came to signify dialecticalreciprocity. Plato
and Xenophon use the noun to signify an objection or rejoinderto something
asserted.72Hence, any response to an argumentor claim, especiallyone which
is criticalor polemical, is an avzti'Xlryt.73The term avztri`myt;does not appear
in the extant corpus of Aristotle.74 It is, however, used in the writings of
Theophrastus. In De causisplantarumTheophrastusutilizes the term both to
signifythe roots of fruittrees takinghold (3.6.6) and the activityof a vine clinging
to a fence (2.18.2).
At some point the noun vzhrlyXit;beganto be used to referto apprehensionor
awareness.One might suppose that the prefixsuggestsa reflectiveconsciousness.
This, however, would be unjustified;the basic meaning of the prefix is simply
70TheArabictranslator
ofAtius seemsto havebeenbaffledbytheterm
Consequently,
rTdhtX1tl;S.
he translated
with the Arabictermintibawhichis an imprint
or impression(Daiber:
KcTarrlYtC
see Daiber1980:
probablyassumingthe termto be similarin meaningto
Einpritgung),
196-197.The assumption
buta formof
wasincorrect:
a KCTazdrrlYt
is not an imprintor
zT6tooc.s;
impression
assent.
71Thetermis alsousedin a medicalcontext.Thucydides
(1.120.2)usedthe termto signifythe
treatisesDe naturahominis2.22.17andDe
graspof a diseaseon a body. Also see the Hippocratic
medici9.18.
officina
72InPlatothenounavriTkrlTt;
Phd.87a6,Hp.
response:
alwaysrefersto anobjectionordialectical
mai.287a6,Sph.241b5.The nounis usedsimilarly
in Xenophon:
Hist.Graec.
3.5.5.Theverb,on the
otherhand,is usedmorelooselyto signifythe actof graspingor layingholdof anyphysicalobject
(La.183e2-184al,Prt.317d8,335d1,Ti.44e4),to objectto a claim(Phd.84c7,Grg.506a2,Hp.mai.
287a4-8,Rep.505al, Tht.189c11,Sph.239d1),andin onecaseto graspa concept(Sph.251b6).
73Thisis how the term is definedin the Souda:"&vriTkl',t. &vt rto inihkR1t.
HXlad-Tov
'Avrttittzop 8c 6'&vtT.atl3pav6setvo."
in the
worksof Plato
The noun nevercarriesthe senseof awarenessor apprehension
we find:65Kvo;uyiiln6vovW
(inps.-Pl.Definitions
genuine
8resiaavtXrln~nctK
as"ableto check"forthispassage.
6plsii?).LSJtranslate
&vtZXl7qrtt1CK
a numberof times.
thenoun
doesnotappearinAristotle's
corpus,theverbdoesappear
74Although
breath)or seizing
However,it is alwaysusedin the physicalsenseof recovering
something(property,
of cognitionorperception.
something(thereinsof a horse);it doesnotappearin anydiscussion

339
"over against, opposite, facing."75 This is exactly the sense that we see in
Plato's usage. An objection opposes or stands over and against the initial
assertion.The cognitive sense of &vTzitXryt
can also be seen as somethingviewed
over and against something, especiallywhen viewed from the perspectiveof a
representationaltheory of perception.
The earliest uses of &vrikrlyt; having the sense of apprehensionor a grasp
of the mind are found in the doxographicalaccounts of the Stoics and the
Epicureans.76 This, however, does not imply that the Stoics or Epicureans
themselvesused the term. The texts must be examinedindividuallyto determine
if the term belongs to those who arereportingthe theory (laterdoxographersand
commentators)or those who held the theory (the early Stoics). I argue that in
every case, with the possible exception of the text of Adtius under consideration
(4.8), the term is not used by a Stoic but by the person reportingthe theory.77
Moreover, even if the term is Stoic, its force is neutral,and it simply emphasizes
the reception of the content of the xvTvraacia.The two final meanings of
atxoerlat; will show that in so far as it is the receptionof the content, acotIcrt?
has a specific sourceand very specificepistemiccharacter.
We are now left with the final two claims:that a'tOrlat; is a KaXdrlWjt;and
an assent. In English we call both the act of receiving sensorycontent and the
acceptanceof the content as being about the world as "perception."When then
the content is not accepted as true or accuratewe say that we are hallucinating,
misperceiving, observing an illusion, etc. For this reason perception is both
the activity of receiving sensory information and the acceptancewhich follows.
Julia Annas sums this up nicely: "In any perception, there will be not only an
appearance,but some kind of acceptanceby the person'smind of the propositional
content of the appearance."78
This is why the content (whetherit makes a claim
or not) should not be confused with perception. Our perceptionshave content
(both logical and phenomenal)but are not identicalwith the content. When we
accept the content as being representativeof the world, then we say we perceive
something. This acceptance is a sort of belief. And likewise, belief (doxa),
accordingto the Stoics is a "weakassent."
If the list of meanings ended here we would have a relativelygood match
for the English term "perception"in a'iorloatc;.However, the final claims make
too specificin termsof epistemologicalvaluesand exclusiveorigin. For
a0ioerlztu;
75LSJ 1968: 153.
76LSJlist Aitius' definition as one such instance.
77The same applies to Epicurus. LSJ list Epicurusfr. 250 (Usener) as the first use of the term
meaning "graspingwith the mind, apprehension."This text is actuallyPlutarchsummarizingColotes'
view (Plut. Adv. Col. 5.1109d). The term does not appearin the extant writings of Epicurus. We
find a similarsituationwhen consulting Bonitz's index of Aristotle. Bonitz lists a single occurrenceof
in Aristotle, fr. 202 (Rose). This turns out to be a passagein Simplicius'commentaryon
avriklXit
De
caelowhere Simpliciusis describingDemocritus'view. Diels-Kranzlist the same passagein their
index under Democritus. Clearlythe term belongs to Simplicius.
78Annas 1990: 186.

340
PHOENIX
atYco0lct;is not only an assent, it is also a KCaTdclh1t;and more specifically,a

ixt;
KCazdTr
A'ao0eitc,
through the sense-organs (6t' aiaOlTipiou):
"
6E
yszta Ktard roTbo

ET otKobc ... fISt' itzlov KGttlXTlNJt.79
Oi IEotKol 6piPovtrat oijrzo

Tlv cOcrlotv &a0iaelloC"
ortnv&vt('Xi~utSt' al(To0T1piou
7 KCTQ(X'1Jgt.80
i
1V UyKtct&0CtGtV
K0 KarcTllWtV.81
7t
cC(I tV VCtt
ETCOKO'GCTvCtV
id ipsumsensumappellabat.82
Quodautemeratsensucomprensum,
Oi
%t g~
Qc
C V
Oi ZTotKot
10yc,
ctaiOtirct.
wfu6Ci.83
t&zc
8f
4ctvtat&)v
rk gEv titcici, k 86,
This finaluse of aOirot; is thereforemorestrictor narrowthanthe meaning

in English,whichmayor maynot suggestepistemicsuccessin
of "perception"
relationto theperceptual
content.An aYaOirot;
is a Kazdtkrlt; receivedthrough
the sense-organs and Kcazdch~tWti
is an assent to a XCata7Trl7tK'l
.84
(vzaoia
While it is true that properlyspeaking assent is to the proposition,
one cannot
legitimatelyisolatethe 4avzaCia fromthe propositionorXFKz6v.The proposition
subsistswith the tavzacia, not with the mind. Subsistenceis not the same thing
as causal production. The ctvraota does not produce the proposition in the
mind; the propositionis an incorporealfeatureof the 4avzaaioa. Therefore,the
Stoics can freelyspeakof assentingto a 4avzaoia since the propositionalcontent
of the 4avzaoia is an inseparablefeatureof it. In short, it is the logical structure
of the physicalimpression.Thus the two claims, that a'oe0qot; is an assent and
is a
the claimthatccrOicrot;
are,in fact,sayingthe samething.
Kttcdyqt;
Does this meanthatthe termsalt'CoeotS
andKaticclqWtrj,
then, aresynonymous?No. An ao0ioaot; is a speciesof KwTadXlWtc..
Thuseveryalaloqat; (in so
faraswe arereferingto ourthirdclassof meaning)is a
butnot every
KozXTCr1Wt;
catdqnWt;is anaot'c0ict;.Theydifferin scope.Bothareassentsbutcaio0aot;
is an assentto a morerestrictedclassofoavtoaatfct.lDavraoiatcanbe classified
79Diog.Laert.7.52 = SVF2.71.
80Aetius4.8.1 = SVF2.850.
81Atius 4.8.12= SVF2.72.
82Cic.Acad.post.1.41= SVF1.60.
83Adtius4.9.4 = SVF2.78.
84BaronReedin an articleattemptingto showthatChrysippus
andthe laterStoicssubscribed
to a formof directperceptual
realismarguedthat one does not assentto a catvtcafiabut to the
contentor Xecr6vsubsistingwith a rational xvtraaifa. This is importantto his
propositional
thedirect
itselfas an intermediate
argumentforif one assentsto the4xxvzTaoa
objectof perception,
He thereforearguesthatthe textswhichexplicitlystatethatassentis
realismoptionis undermined.
to the #avTatafcaresimplycasesof "loosetalk."He states(2002:168-169):"So,ratherthansaying
the impression
hasthecontentto whichthemindmustthenassent,we maysaythatthemindhasthe
contentin thoughtdirectly.The impression
is nowcharacterized
asno morethana partof the causal
a proposition),
it enablesthe mindto havea content(i.e.,to entertain
processinvolvedin perception;
butit doesnot,in the strictestsense,havethecontentitself."

AIEOHEI IN ANCIENTSTOICISM
341
in a numberof differentways. One way is to distinguishthem accordingto their

source. Diogenes Laertiusstates:
lo01fttXK6,016'
& <avTMuOV
TOwV
( gV c
KT7'
uvTOttv
KiG-tV
Xoitv
v i 6t8t
Oi.
6i6ot0TitK01t
xit TS ;8tavofaq,
aiaor0lTrlpoui~ aio0rllTpiyv hXcP4av6istvoat, OUKciao0rlttKal8i
T 0iov
T1
KlOdU7Cp
iOWv
oCTaI0d(TOV
K0i
0Tv
<ai gcv>
iv
K
v 6y7(
qaClpvo7 vov. iv&IiYiOnt2t
s
b inrapX6vTov tEdt EtS(OC
Kt
(o; yivovotat.85
oaUvyKtt0Xc
The claimthatnot all4avtaofat aresensoryorcomethroughthe sensesdoes

of the senses.Rather
not meanthatthe non-sensorycavztaiat areindependent
are
not
the
senses.
Laertius
also saysthat
they
Diogenes
directlyproducedby
someof thesesensory Xavzaoiatcomefroman existingobjectwithyieldingand
assent.This tellsus thatnot allsensoryOavatoiatwillsucceedin the production
of a'io
arlOtq.
If we classify4avTaFi'atnot accordingto theirsourcebut accordingto their
valuewe get a differentdivisionof 0avztaaoit. Davzaoiatt
epistemological
can also be classifiedas KataX
K or
l. A
rltnt
n17rtrzt
non-K,:at(za
KaattrlnXftul
four
to
has
characteristics:
(1) it mustbe froman
Oavztaia,according Sextus,
with the existingobject;(3) it mustbe well
existingobject;(2) it is in accordance
An assent
it
must
not
be froma non-existentobject.86
or
stamped imprinted;(4)
Thusana'iolotq is an assentto
to sucha Oavraaiaconstitutesa Kc'tdclUNyt;.
a 4~vzacciatthatis bothailoOrlztali(origin)andKaatXrtnTtKi
(epistemological
status).Onlyin thiswaycanwe makesenseof the claimthatall aioeilost; are
true.
sensewe canavoidthe problem

By understanding
a'io0laot;in this narrower
whichRist(1969:135)wrestledwith:
At thispointin thetheoryweareupagainst
a terminological
Ontheonehand
difficulty.
therearetextswhichsaythatallaiaOilost;aretrue;on theotherhandwe havetexts
whichsaythateveryco0-lot;is an assentandanactof recognition
(rKard~hXl
tQ).If
everya'io0lot; is anassent,it wouldfollowthat,ifcl'(oliot;means"perception,"
every
inthesphere
assentandrecognition
ofperception
mustalsobe"true"--which
wouldgofar
towards
ofbeingmistaken
aboutperception.
Thatis obviously
incapable
making
everyone
un-Stoic.
It is only obviouslyun-Stoicif we ignorehow the Stoicsdefine
and
aa0lotq
if we fail to distinguisha'ioioat; fromthe
I arguethat
the claims
aWvztia.
whichtroubleRistarein factboth trueandperfectly
consistent.All aioe~lact?
aretruesinceaYao0rlo
; is definedas a KaztdtXh throughthe sensesandsince
t;
to themamong tavraotatsomearesensoryandsomenot.Sensoryarethosewhich
85"According
orsense-organs,
we receivethrougha sense-organ
butnon-sensory
arethosewhichwereceivethrough
themind,forexamplethoseof incorporeals
andof theotherthingsreceived
byreason.Amongsensory
*avraaiat, someareproducedfromrealthingswithyieldingandassent"(Diog.Laert.7.51 = SVF
2.61)
86Sext.Emp.Math.9.182-183(= SVF2.97)

PHOENIX
342
all KcataX'iwigtare necessarilytrue.87 The problem is not so much with the

Stoics, but with our attempt to map the English term "perception"onto Stoic
epistemology.
The confusion also ariseswhen we conflatea'aOeroat;as an activityproducing
the avraaia (which may or may not be epistemicallysuccessful),and
ai'a9ott;
As an
as a KazdtXrlyt;or veridical assent produced by means of the senses.
transmitted
in
information
is
which
to
event
refers
by
any
activity,
the sensoryapparatusproducingthe propositionalphenomenon of the
means ofa'ololnat;
Xavrtaia. Thus aCaOrlat;as an activitycan producemisperceptions.However,
as an epistemologicalapprehensionthe Stoics use the term ax'aOiiat;far more
discriminately,emphasizing the origin and success. A'kiOrlat;in this sense is
reservedspecificallyfor the successfulapprehensionof the sense-objectthrough
the sensoryapparatus.Thus ca'aOrlat;is not the properterm for generalsensory
experienceor sensationas Barnouwsuggests.
VI.
CONCLUSION
The basic assumption of this article is that carefulwork in the history of

philosophy requiresa cleargraspof the rangeand use of technicalvocabulary.In
cases in which significantterms areused in variousways, a knowledgeof the scope
and lexicalrangeof the term is importantand therebycan contributeto important
philosophical debates. In this article I have arguedthat there are at least eight
meanings or senses of the term ctaOeqat;and that these can be categorizedunder
three generalsenses:the sensoryapparatus,the activityproducingthe 4avTaaia,
and the culminating successful apprehension(KlTdt&XrlWg)
of and assent to a
found in both the
can
be
these
All
three
of
kind
of
meanings
specific
avzTaCia.
and
Diodes
of
definitions
A&tius.
I have also
In addition to sorting out the meanings of the term cdaO0rlatY;,
or
a
is
not.
It
is
not
what
shown
genericperceptualexperience sensation;
a'i'aOloat;
indeed, the qualia or experientialaspect of perceptionis notably absent in the
Stoic definitions.Furthermore,by analysingthe multivocityofalt'arjoat;we have
seen more clearlythe precise role of the 4avraoaX in the act of perception. It
but the content of perception.The
was shown that aWtvzaiais not "perception"
a'laOioat;framesperceptualexperienceand content. It representsthe apparatus
that receives and transmits perceptualinformation including its structureand
readiness;it refersto the activityof this apparatusincludingthe transmissionof
and the assentor acceptance
sensoryinformation,the formationof the TxvzToacta,
has
of the oavzaoia as being representativeof the world; finally,the oCaOrlat;
a normative sense limiting the assent to the veridical czaTarltztKlcl avWzacia
;, the apparatusof perceptionand the activity,are
87The other two general meanings of ado0rlaO
t. Some arguethat Oavraatct are also
of aYoarlaO
the
truth-value
the
to
claim regarding
appropriate
not applicableto the claims of true and false;however,4avaialat maybe representationalof an object
is one of the meaningsof "true"
or not and this
(&.1ri(;).

AIE?HEIE IN ANCIENT STOICISM
343
produced by means of the senses. In this waywe can understand how all aitoeilact;
are true. In closing, it should now be clear that the term aIota0iat; is far from
being simple or unimportant. It is a central term in Stoic epistemology. Hence
it looks as though the neglected and spurned epistemological sister of ~avzwaota
should have been asked to dance long ago.
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
ROLLINSCOLLEGE
PARK, FL 32789-4499
U.S.A
WINTER
srubarth@rollins.edu
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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The Meanings of Aisthesis in Ancient Esthoicism

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The Meaning(s) of in Ancient Stoicism

Author(s): Scott M. Rubarth

This content downloaded from 131.220.250.55 on Sat, 14 Sep 2013 16:19:33 PM

THE MEANING(S) OF AIEOHEIXIN ANCIENT STOICISM

A CCORDING TO DIOGENES LAERTIUS,

to the investigation of cti'aOrlat;and 4axvrcaciac.'The reason for(7pot'tZtv)

The termsc'Ial8oatSand oavTaoiatdefine and limit each other. If the domain

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recent book, PropositionalPerception:Phantasia,Predication,and Sign in Plato,

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AlXOHEIEIN ANCIENT STOICISM

It is the "sensingof qualities"in contrastto the apprehensionof facts and events

and4avztaciais well establishedin preThe distinctionbetweenataOinlo;t

andOavtaaiain thecaseof the

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That the Stoics also drew a cleardistinctionbetweena'loiaot; and (avcaaia

THE AMBIGUITYOF AIIOHXIE

The primaryobstacle to understandingthe Stoic theory of a'iaOerlt is the

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according to Chrysippus"everyword is naturallyambiguous."9The study and

T&; aiotL dt\

Diocles' reportpresentsfour distinct but relatedmeaningsof the term a'o0lloti;:

9Chrysippusait omneverbumambiguumnaturaesse,quoniamex eodemduo velplura accipipossunt

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Unfortunately,this passagewhich seeks to sort out the ambiguitiesof acIotaotlc

This content downloaded from 131.220.250.55 on Sat, 14 Sep 2013 16:19:33 PM

that it is ipsumprincipale.17Whereas the claim reportedin the Cicero passage

It seemsclearthatthereis somesensein whichaoaloat; canbe identifiedwith

itself to the same degree that life, impulse,

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Lachenaud.Aitius is usuallyknown for his clearand concise style;his sentences

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For these reasonsI suggestthatwe adopteitherthe von Arnim orMau/Lachenaud

THE MULTIVOCITY OF AIO?HEIX

Only two meanings are explicitlyfound in both lists: KacrzdkytX

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this textis thatthereis butone definitionof the term,andthe latter

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outline form or a definition supplyingthe force of the [complete] definition in a

This explainsAdtius'distinctionbetween 6pi'ovrat and noXaX&c;

concludingthis section. I referto the claim that an a'ioOat; is an assent

Stob. Ed. 1.349.25-26 = SVF 2.74.

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we have the following list of meanings or uses of the term

THE MEANINGS OF THE MEANINGS

The firstthree meaningson the list emphasizedifferentfeaturesof the physical

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Inwood and Gerson as "theequipmentof the sense-organs,"36

This content downloaded from 131.220.250.55 on Sat, 14 Sep 2013 16:19:33 PM

Aristotelian sense? This is unlikely.42The Aristotelian sense of vgpycta and

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AIEOHEIEIN ANCIENT STOICISM

I suggest, is the `v6pyet(a. Plotinus describesthis &vipyeta as the transmission

47Diog. Laert. 7.52. Cf. Calcidius'instruendosensibus(CalcidiusAd Timaeum220, 232.21-233.3;

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However,we needto be carefulnot to confusethe Stoicuseof thesetermswith

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He claims that the use of't;? over t&0deotq

and healthas examplesof EEt;. Both canbe intensifiedand relaxed,whichis

a(nv if 6pObvcivctt 6Xov i~

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This leavesus with six examplesof 't;: health, expertise,knowledge,pursuits,

pi~p62 and a Rt;

zsXVtKOV608C P6Xiov Ei; ygVEttV.65