Sales v Sandiganbayan

Facts:
The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos
Norte, shot the former mayor and his political rival Atty.
Benemerito. After the shooting, he surrendered himself
and hence the police inspector and wife of the victim filed
a criminal complaint for murder against him. The judge
after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for
brevity) foundprobable cause and issued a warrant of
arrest. Also after conducting the preliminary investigation
(p.i. for brevity), he issued a resolution forwarding the
case to the prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner
received
a
subpoena
directing
him
to file his
counter affidavit, affidavit of
witnesses
and
other
supporting documents. He did it the following day. While
proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null
and void because the judge who issued it was a relative
by affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the
p.i. were illegal and irregular as the judge doesnt have
jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the petition
holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd
degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he
conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The
proceeding now consists only of one stage. He conducted
the requisite investigation prior to the issuance of warrant
of arrest. Moreover he did not complete it. He only
examined the witness of the complainant. But the
prosecution
instead
of
conducting
p.i.
of
his
own forwarded the records to the Ombudsman (OMB for
brevity) for the latter to conduct the same. The OMB
directed the petitioner to submit his counter affidavit, but
he did not comply with it finding the same superfluous.
The graft investigator recommended the filing of
information for murder which the OMB approved.

Petitioner received a copy of the resolution but prevented

seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion
to defer issuance of warrant of arrest pending the
determination of probable cause. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion. This is now a petition for review on the
decision
of
the
Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in
conducting
preliminary
investigation.
(2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity
to be heard and to submit controverting evidence.
Ruling: The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation was not followed because of the following
reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation was
conducted by 3 different investigators, none of whom
completed the preliminary investigation There was not
one continuous proceeding but rather, cases of passing
the buck, the last one being the OMB throwing the buck to
the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of murder is a
non bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone
should have merited a deeper and more thorough
preliminary investigation. The OMB did nothing of the sort
but wallowed the resolution of the graft investigator. He
did a worse job than the judge, by actually adopting the
resolution of the graft investigator without doing anything
and threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for
evaluation. Thirdly, a
person
under preliminary
investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for
reconsideration, as maintained by the Rules of Procedure
by the OMB. The filing of the motion for reconsideration is
an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper.
The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of the right

itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone

renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case
incomplete. And lastly, it was patent error for the
Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the OMBs
certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts
of the case much more so in the face of the latters flawed
report
and
one
side
factual
findings.
The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayans assertion of
having foundprobable cause on its own, considering the
OMBs defective report and findings, which merely rekied
on the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
and disregarded the evidence for the defense.
Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash the
warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for completion
of the preliminary investigation.

Crespo

vs.

Mogul

the

Court.

Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions

either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by
private
persons.

In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he

recommended that the petition be given due course.

FACTS:

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.

Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review
reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate
dismissal of the information filed against the accused.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with

the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information
for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal
Court
of
Lucena
City.
When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed
a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there
was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary
of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal
for
the
filing
of
the
information.
In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His
Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion
for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of
August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to
August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate
the
matter
to
the
appellate
court.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in
the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the
Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding
with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of

On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of

Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the
judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment
of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice
shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed

by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of
Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978
the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition
thereto.
On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and
set the arraignment, stating that the motions trust being
to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the
accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced
before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not
only disregards the requirements of due process but also
erodes the Courts independence and integrity.
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary
restraining
order
in
the
Court
of
Appeals.

On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the

Court of Appeals against the threatened act of
arraignment of the accused until further orders from the
Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining
order
of
January
23,
1979.
A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the
accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980.
Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner
and private respondent filed their respective briefs while
the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief
reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be
ordered
to
dismiss
the
information.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to
dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case
was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion
and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?
RULING: YES. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the

arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed

after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court,
the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

NO PEOPLE V YECYEC DIGEST

Paderanga vs. Drilon

Facts: On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple
murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City,
against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito
Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe,
for the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife
Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II.
Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City
per Administrative Matter 87- 2-244. Only Felipe Galarion
was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the
accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however,
escaped from detention and has not been apprehended
since then. In an amended information filed on 6 October
1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and
"Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused.
Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed, among others, an
Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of
Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on 14 October 1988.
The trial court in an order dated 9 January 1989, denied
the omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to
conduct
another
preliminary
investigation
or
reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the
opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in
support of his defense."
In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a
signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated Atty.
Paderanga in the commission of the crime charged. The
City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself
from further conducting the preliminary investigation
against Paderanga at the instance of the latter's counsel,
per his resolution dated 7 July 1989. In his first

indorsement to the Department of Justice, dated 24 July

1989, said city prosecutor requested the Department of
Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the
preliminary investigation against Paderanga. In a
resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State Prosecutor
Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with
the conduct of the preliminary investigation against
Paderanga, directed the amendment of the previously
amended information to include and implead Paderanga
as one of the accused therein.
Paderanga moved for reconsideration, contending that the
preliminary investigation was not yet completed when
said resolution was promulgated, and that he was
deprived of his right to present a corresponding counteraffidavit and additional evidence crucial to the
determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime
charged. The motion was, however, denied by Gingoyon
in his order dated 29 January 1990.
From the aforesaid resolution and order, Paderanga filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of Justice.
Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with
Memorandum, and then a Supplemental Memorandum
with
Additional
Exculpatory/Exonerating
Evidence
Annexed, attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated 20
June 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit
of 30 March 1990 wherein he implicated Paderanga. On
10 August 1990, the Department of Justice, through
Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution 648
dismissing the said petition for review. His motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, Paderanga
then filed the petition for mandamus and prohibition
before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether there is no prima facie evidence, or

probable cause, or sufficient justification to hold
Paderangato a tedious and prolonged public trial.
Ruling: A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry
or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum
of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is
such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded
belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
well grounded belief that an offense has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is
often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal
to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person
against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the
fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.
Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be
granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The case of
Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several exceptions to
the rule, to wit: (a) To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When necessary

for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid

oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a
prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (d) When the acts
of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e)
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance
or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false
and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (j) When
there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. A
careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the
present case, however, will readily show that the same
does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions.

PEOPLE v CA & CERBO

FACTS:
Private Respondent Jonathan Cerbo shot, at pointblank
range, Rosalinda Dy in the presence and at the office of
his father private respondent Billy Cerbo. - An information
for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. - The
daughter of the victim executed an affidavitcomplaint
charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in
the killing. - Accordingly, the prosecution filed an
amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder
case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued. - Billy
Cerbo filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing
that the same was issued without probable cause. - The
respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case
against Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant for his arrest.
- The Court of Appeals debunked the petitioners assertion
that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion
and that the evidence presented thus far did not
substantiate the charge.. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in finding that no probable
cause exists to merit the filing of charges against private
respondent Billy Cerbo
RULING: YES. The petition is meritorious. The
determination of probable cause during preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor. It is an executive function. The public
prosecutor has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to
free respondent from the inconvenience, expense,
ignominy, and stress of defending himself/herself in the
course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of

his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a

competent office designated by law for that purpose.
Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the
state from the burden of the unnecessary expense of an
effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials
arising from false, frivolous, or groundless charges.
The determination of probable cause to hold a person for
trial must be distinguished from the determination of
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a
judicial function. A judge cannot be compelled to issue a
warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no
probable cause for doing so. Corrollarily, the judge should
not override the public prosecutors determination of
probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground
that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance
of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present
case. Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, and
there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion and prejudice on the part of the public
prosecutor, the trial court should respect such
determination. Dispositive Reversed

NO CO V REPUBLIC DIGEST

BALTAZAR VS. CHUA G.R. NO. 177583

FACTS: Jaime and Jovito were charged before the RTC
Manila with the crimes of homicide and frustrated
homicide for the death of Ildefonso Baltazar and the
wounding of Edison Baltazar. Petitioners Lourdes Baltazar
(Lourdes) and Edison Baltazar (Edison), through counsel,
filed a motion for reinvestigation of the cases, praying
that Jaime and Jovito be charged with the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder, instead of homicide and
frustrated homicide.
The City Prosecutors Office, upon reinvestigation, found
that the appropriate charges against Jaime and Jovito
were murder and frustrated murder. Jaime and Jovito
appealed to the DOJ. The Secretary of the DOJ, modified
the resolution of the City Prosecutor by directing the latter
to amend the Informations for Murder and Frustrated
Murder to Homicide and Frustrated Homicide against
Jovito and to drop Jaime from the charges.
Lourdes and Edison filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. In obedience to the directive of the Secretary
of the DOJ, the City Prosecutor filed with the RTC a
Manifestation and Motion for the Withdrawal of the
Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder and for the
Admission of New Informations for Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide. Judge Cruz granted the said
manifestation.
Lourdes and Edison moved for reconsideration. Lourdes
and Edison filed before Judge Cruz a Motion to Maintain
the Amended Informations for Murder and Frustrated
Murder which was denied on the ground that the same
was, in effect, a second motion for reconsideration. Judge
Hidalgo, after making his own assessment granted the

motion and ordered the reinstatement of the informations

for murder and frustrated murder.
Jaime and Jovito filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge
Hidalgo denied the said motion. Jaime then filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals granted Jaimes petition and nullified
the Order of Judge Hidalgo, ruling that the same were
issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction. Aggrieved, Lourdes and Edison filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Hidalgo may review the finding of
the Secretary of Justice on the existence or nonexistence
of probable cause sufficient to hold Jaime for trial and
substitute his judgment for that of the Secretary of
Justice.
RULING: YES. The rule is that once an information is filed
in court, any disposition of the case, be it dismissal,
conviction, or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound
discretion of the court. Reliance on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice alone is considered an abdication of
the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts. The trial court is
not bound by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but
must evaluate it before proceeding with the trial.
Considering that the trial court has the power and duty to
look into the propriety of the prosecutions motion to
dismiss, with much more reason is it for the trial court to
evaluate and to make its own appreciation and
conclusion, whether the modification of the charges and
the dropping of one of the accused in the information, as
recommended by the Justice Secretary, is substantiated
by evidence. This should be the state of affairs, since the

disposition of the case -- such as its continuation or

dismissal or exclusion of an accused -- is reposed in the
sound discretion of the trial court.

Alcaraz vs. Gonzalez

Doctrine
CA may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC on the
ground that the latter committed grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Rule
43 is not the proper remedy in such case.
Facts:
He was armed with a .38 caliber pistol. Since Alcaraz
intended to use the Skyway, he signaled, and proceeded
to the right-most lane which was reserved for vehicles
taking the Skyway. Gonzalez, who was driving his Nissan
Cefiro car on the right-most lane, was forced to swerve his
car to the right to avoid colliding with Alcaraz's vehicle
and nearly hit the concrete island. Nonplussed, Gonzalez
chased after Alcaraz, opened his windows and shouted at
Alcaraz. Alcaraz argued back. Gonzalez reproved Alcaraz
and drove on. Alcaraz raised his pistol towards Gonzalez,
fired twice and immediately drove away from the scene,
but he was intercepted by the PNCC guards at the Skyway
toll gate. Gonzalez reported the matter to the Paraaque
City Police Station and filed a criminal complaint for
attempted homicide against Alcaraz.
A preliminary investigation was conducted, but Justice
Secretary Gonzalez held it failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Alcaraz had intended to kill him.
Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration only for it to
be denied.
Gonzales then filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of
ROC before the CA, seeking the reversal of the Justice
Secretary's Resolution. Alcaraz commented on the
petition, averring that the Justice Secretary is not a quasi-

judicial officer under Rule 43 whose resolutions may thus

be reviewed by the CA. He pointed out that the CA was
without power to substitute its own judgment for that of
the Justice Secretary Nevertheless CA granted the petition
and reversed the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice. Alcaraz filed a motion for the reconsideration but
it was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for review under Rule 43 of
the ROC was the proper remedy of Gonzalez
Ruling:
No. The petition is meritorious. Gonzales resorted to an
improper remedy when he filed a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the ROC instead of filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to
appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of control and
supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who
may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such
prosecutor. Thus, while the CA may review the resolution
of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on
the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
The Resolution of the Justice Secretary affirming,
modifying or reversing the resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor is final. Under the 1993 Revised Rules on
Appeals (now the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules
on Appeals), resolutions in preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations from the Justice Secretary's resolution,

except the aggrieved party, has no more remedy of

appeal to file a motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution of such motion if it is denied by the said
Secretary. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC since there
is no more appeal or other remedy available in the
ordinary course of law.
In the present case, respondent filed a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the ROC. Instead of dismissing the
petition, however, the CA gave due course to it and
thereafter granted the petition. Patently, the ruling of the
CA is incorrect.

LINO BROCKA vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

FACTS:
Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned
Transport Organization (ACTO) a demonstration held in
sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed a
petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers
Jan 28 85
Petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in
3 crim cases filed before RTC QC. All petitioners released
on bail P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben
Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et
al.), who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal
Assembly for whom no bail was recommended
Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC a daily
hearings held between Feb.1-7 85 a On Feb. 7 or 9 85,
RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka,
et als provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000
each a Brocka, et al filed respective bail bonds but despite
service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in
detention a respondents-police officers invoked Preventive
Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka, et
al on Jan. 28 85. Neither original nor certified true copy of
this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al.
Feb 11 85 Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition
in 3 crim cases; hasty and spurious filing of this second
offense as follows: a) 10:30 AM counsel informed by
phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the QC
Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons a another phone
call subsequently received informing counsel that
appearance of Brocka, et al was to be at 2:00PM; b)
2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal a

complainants affidavits had not yet been received; c)

3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged
statements of complainants against Brocka, et al for
alleged inciting to sedition; d) 3:15PM counsel inquired
from Records Custodian when the charges against Brocka,
et al had been officially received a informed that said
charges were never coursed through the Records Office.
Also, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition
under RPC142 are, almost verbatim, the same utterances
which are the subject of the crim cases for Illegal
Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased
on bail as a matter of Constitutional right a appears that
respondents have conspired to deprive Brocka, et al of the
right to bail. Panel of assistant fiscals demanded that
Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their rights under RPC125 as
a condition for the grant of the counsels request that they
be given 7 days within which counsel may confer with
their clients a no such requirement required under the
rules
Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 85 on
orders of then Pres. Marcos a release narrated in Courts
resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey
Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al: In Return of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already
been released a four on Feb15 85 and one on Feb.8 85
Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has
not become moot and academic because the accused
continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid
charge of inciting to sedition.
Hence, this petition. Brocka, et al contend: a) bad faith
and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their
criminal prosecution; b) second offense of Inciting to

Sedition manifestly illegal premised on one and the

same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike a
matter of defense in sedition charge
ISSUE: Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may
be enjoined YES
RULING: We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their
criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to
sedition.
GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or
stayed by injunction, preliminary or final
EXCEPTIONS:
1.
To
afford
adequate
protection
to
the
constitutional rights of the accused
2.
When necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions
3.
When there is no prejudicial question which is
subjudice
4.
When the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority
5.
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation
6.
When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
7.
When the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense
8.
Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution
9.
Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by lust for vengeance
10.
When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground had been denied

11.

Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC

to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners

In the case at bar, criminal proceedings had become a

case of persecution, have been undertaken by state
officials in bad faith. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA
in refusing Brocka, et als release from detention BUT this
PDA was issued on Jan.28 85 and invoked only on Feb.9
85 upon receipt of TCs order of release a violates
guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in Metro,
Manila or 48 hours outside Metro, Manila. Despite
subpoenas for PDAs production, prosecution merely
presented a purported xeerox copy of it a violates Court
pronouncement that individuals against whom PDAs
have been issued should be furnished with the original,
and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued
by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the
time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile). SolGens
manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to
quash the information instead of a petition for Habeas
Corpus
The Court agreed with the contention of the SolGen.
However, it noted that such course of action would have
been a futile move, considering the circumstances then
prevailing:
1. Spurious and inoperational PDA
2. Sham and hasty Preliminary Investigation
Clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep
Brocka, et al in detention until the second offense could
be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a
warrant of arrest anew

Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to

general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution.
If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing
of criminal charges (as in this case where petitioners were
barred from enjoying provisional release until such time

that charges were filed) and where a sham preliminary

investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that
are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner
with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.