You are on page 1of 5
 
373 U.S. 68383 S.Ct. 140510 L.Ed.2d 632
Josephine GOSS et al., Petitioners,v.The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OFKNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, et al.
 No. 217. Argued March 20 and 21, 1963. Decided June 3, 1963.
Jack Greenberg, New York City, for petitioners.Harlan Dodson, Nashville, Tenn., and S. Frank Fowler, Knoxville, Tenn.,for respondents.Burke Marshall, Washington, D.C., for the United States, as amicuscuriae.Jack Petree, Memphis, Tenn., for Board of Education of Memphis CitySchools, as amicus curiae.Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.1We granted certiorari (371 U.S. 811, 83 S.Ct. 38, 9 L.Ed.2d 53) limited to thequestion whether petitioners, Negro school children seeking desegregation of the public school systems of Knoxville, Tennessee (the Goss case), andDavidson County, Tennessee, an area adjacent to Nashville (the Maxwell case),are deprived of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The question centersaround substantially similar transfer provisions incorporated in formaldesegregation plans adopted by the respective local school boards pursuant tocourt orders. The claim is that the transfer programs are invalid because theyare based solely on race and tend to perpetuate the pre-existing raciallysegregated school system. Under the overall desegregation plans presented tothe trial courts, school districts would be rezoned without reference to race.However, by the terms of the transfer provisions, a student, upon request,
 
I.would be permitted, solely on the basis of his own race and the racialcomposition of the school to which he has been assigned by virtue of rezoning,to transfer from such school, where he would be in the racial minority, back tohis former segregated school where his race would be in the majority. Theappropriate District Courts and the Court of Appeals approved the transfer  plans. 301 F.2d 164, 301 F.2d 828. The transfer plans being based solely onracial factors which, under their terms, inevitably lead toward segregation of the students by race, we conclude that they run counter to the admonition of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756,99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955), wherein the District Courts were directed to 'consider the adequacy of any plans' proposed by school authorities 'to effectuate a * * *racially nondiscriminatory school system.' Our conclusion here leads to areversal of the judgments of the Court of Appeals to the extent they approve thetransfer provisions of respondent boards in each of the cases. The only questionwith which we are here concerned relates solely to the transfer provisions, andwe are not called upon either to discuss or to pass on the other provisions of thedesegregation plans.
1
2These cases were brought by Negro public school pupils and their parents asclass actions against the respective school authorities. They challenged, amongother points in the desegregation plans not here relevant, the transfer provisionswhich permitted a pupil to transfer, upon request, from the zone of his residenceto another school. The transfer plans are essentially the same, each containing,in addition to the provisions at issue here, general provisions providing for transfers on a showing of 'good cause.'
2
 The crucial provisions, however, present in somewhat the same form in each plan, is examplified by § 6 of theKnoxville plan:3'6. The following will be regarded as some of the valid conditions to supportrequests for transfer:4'a. When a white student would otherwise be required to attend a school previously serving colored students only;5'b. When a colored student would otherwise be required to attend a school previously serving white students only;6'c. When a student would otherwise be required to attend a school where themajority of students of that school or in his or her grade are of a different race.'
 
II.III.7This provision is attacked as providing recial factors as valid conditions tosupport transfers which by design and operation would perpetuate racialsegregation. It is also said that no showing is made that the transfer provisionsare essential to effectuation of desegregation and that other procedures areavailable.8It is readily apparent that the transfer system proposed lends itself to perpetuation of segregation. Indeed, the provisions can work only toward thatend. While transfer are available to those who choose to attend school wheretheir race is in the majority, there is no provision whereby a student mighttransfer upon request to a school in which his race is in a minority, unless hequalifies for a 'good cause' transfer. As the Superintendent of DavidsonCounty's schools agreed, the effect of the racial transfer plan was 'to permit tochild (or his parents) to choose segregation outside of his zone but not to chooseintegration outside of his zone.' Here the right of transfer, which operates solelyon the basis of a racial classification, is a one-way ticket leading to but onedestination, i.e., the majority race of the transferee and continued segregation.This Court has decided that state-imposed separation in public schools isinherently unequal and results in discrimination in violation of the FourteenthAmendment. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct.686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). Our task then is to decide whether these transfer  provisions are likewise unconstitutional. In doing so, we note that if the transfer  provisions were made available to all students regardless of their race andregardless as well of the racial composition of the school to which he requestedtransfer we would have an entirely different case. Pupils could then at their option (or that of their parents) choose, entirely free of any imposed racialconsiderations, to remain in the school of their zone or to transfer to another.9Classifications based on race for purposes of transfers between public schools,as here, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Asthe Court said in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203, 65S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944), racial classifications are 'obviously irrelevantand invidious.' The cases of this Court reflect a variety of instances in whichracial classifications have been held to he invalid, e.g., public parks and playgrounds, Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 83 S.Ct. 1314 (1963);trespass convictions, where local segregation ordinances preempt privatechoice, Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 83 S.Ct. 1119 (1963);seating in courtrooms, Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 83 S.Ct. 1053 (1963);

Reward Your Curiosity

Everything you want to read.
Anytime. Anywhere. Any device.
No Commitment. Cancel anytime.
576648e32a3d8b82ca71961b7a986505