G.R. No.

L-2154

April 26, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO OTADORA, ET AL., defendants.
HILARIA CARREON, appellant.
Victorino C. Teleron for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
In August, 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Antonio Otadora and Hilaria Carreon were charged with the
murder of the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon. Otadora pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Denying her guilt, Hilaria Carreon was tried, found guilty and sentenced to death and other accessory
penalties. The court declared that with promises of monetary reward, she had induced Antonio Otadora to do the
killing. Motive for the instigation was the grudge she bore against the deceased spouse on account of disputes with
them over inherited property. This woman convict appealed in due time.
Her attorney filed here a voluminous brief wherein he attempted painstakingly to break down the position of the
prosecution and to expound the theory that Antonio Otadora is the only person responsible for the slaying, and that
Hilaria Carreon is just "the unfortunate victim of a vicious frame-up concocted against her." She necessarily had to
offer a satisfactory explanation for the conduct of Otadora, who has pleaded guilty and has declared for the
prosecution against her, explaining the circumstances under which she had promised to him compensation for
liquidating the unfortunate couple.
There is no question about these facts:
Early in the morning of June 16, 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon were shot dead in their house in the
City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of June 21, 1947, Antonio Otadora was arrested in Ormoc City while preparing to
escape to Camotes Island, Cebu. The next day he confessed in an extra-judicial statement (Exhibit 1) wherein he
implicated the herein accused and appellant Hilaria Carreon asserting that, with offers of pecuniary gain, the latter had
induced him to commit the crime. On June 25, 1947, a complaint for double murder was filed against both defendants
in the justice of the peace court of Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary investigation was waived and the record was forwarded
to the court of first instance, where on September 3, 1947, Otadora pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel.
Hilaria Carreon pleaded not guilty, and asked for a separate trial, which was immediately held, with Otadora as the
first witness for the prosecution.
The evidence presented on behalf of the People proved that:
(1) Apolonia Carreon was the sister of Hilaria. Due to a family quarrel, Apolonia filed in August, 1946, a criminal
complaint for serious threats against Hilaria and her husband Francisco Galos (Exhibit P-1). These were arrested and
had to file a bond. The case was later withdrawn by Apolonia upon the advice of friendly mediators.
In December of 1946, Leon Castro as guardian ad litem of some minors surnamed Carreon filed a civil complaint for
partition of real property and damages against Hilaria Carreon. This suit was set for hearing on June 24, 1947.
(2) Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April, 1947, through Amando Garbo. Thereafter they converse on
several occasions. In the early part of May, 1947, she saw him going to barrio Matica-a and then she told him that if he
would liquidate the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon she would give him P3,000. He did not agree. In the last
week of May he was invited to Hilaria's house. The proposal was renewed, better conditions being offered. (1/3 of
P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.) He must have demurred alleging that he had no adequate weapon, Hilaria is
reported to have engaged to supply it.
(3) Around the first week of June, 1947, Hilaria Carreon sent for Otadora. She gave him the revolver Exhibit A; but the
revolver turned out to be defective so he handed it back to Hilaria. The latter ordered it repaired by Benigno Baltonado
who had previously sold it to her. Three days later, Baltonado returned the gun in good condition with more than ten
bullets, and appellant in turn delivered the weapon to Otadora who was then in her house, advising him at the same
time to carry out soon their plan so that Leon Castro may not attend the hearing of the civil case. Appellant also gave
Otadora the bolo Exhibit B, a pair of trousers of her husband Francisco Galos (Exhibit C), a hat Exhibit D and a
flashlight Exhibit E.
(4) Otadora set out to do his part in the morning of June 16; but Apolonia was not in her residence. He reported to
appellant the next day and the latter urged him to execute it that day, giving him P6.50 for transportation. That night,
at about one o'clock, Antonio climbed up the house of the Castros, passing through the window. He saw them sleeping
side by side. He opened the door to the kitchen to prepare his exit. Returning to the place where the couple lay, he
stumbled on Leon Castro, who exclaimed, "who are you?". Otadora replied, "I am" "I don't have any purpose except

you, get up and fight." As Castro was about to stand up, Otadora fired. Apolonia was awakened, and embraced her
husband who meantime had fallen. Otadora shot her too. The couple died immediately of shock and hemorrhage.
(5) After committing the murders, Otadora returned to barrio Matica-a intending to go to Hilaria's home; but as he was
nearing the kitchen, Francisco Galos signalled him to go away. (He was seen, crossing the cornfield near Hilaria
Carreon's house by Juanita Garbo, who so testified in court.) Otadora went to his home in Sitio Hubas. On June 20, at a
dance, he received word from Hilaria through her husband Galos, that he was wanted by the police, and that he should
decamp. the next morning he passed by the residence of Hilaria, and the latter gave him P5, plus two packages of
cigarettes, adding that he should not attempt to visit her further, because she was being watched. The next day, she
again sent him P45 through Amando Garbo, who delivered the money at the back of the house of Menes Tahur in
Canangca-an. After receiving the money, Otadora prepared to escape to Camotes Islands. But he was caught before he
could run away.
The above statement of principal facts is a condensation of the testimonies of Antonio Otadora, Benigno Baltonado,
Amando Garbo, Alejandro Bensig, Macario Bensig, Juanita Garbo, and others. It is substantially in accord with the
findings of His Honor, the trial judge. Of course it is founded mainly upon the declarations of Antonio Otadora that
necessarily are persuasive inasmuch as he himself admits his direct participation and his assertions are fully
corroborated by a series of circumstances competently established.
Hilaria denied connection with the assassination. And naturally the defense exerted effort to discredit Otadora's
version, by submitting the following theory:
Antonio Otadora planned a revenge upon Castro because the latter as a spy caused the death of his father Sergio
Otadora at the hands of the Japanese. He, however, found himself in the necessity of eliminating Apolonia Carreon
because the latter was a witness to his deed. On the other hand, Antonio Otadora (and the other witnesses who are his
relatives) also desire to take revenge upon Hilaria Carreon because the latter, during the Japanese occupation, saved
Leon Castro from death at the hands of the guerrillas. The defense says that to those who had been prejudiced by the
espionage activities of Leon Castro, Hilaria Carreon appears to be just as responsible as Leon Castro.
The theory can not be lawfully accepted. Firstly, Otadora denies that his father died at the hands of the Japanese.
Secondly, the alleged "saving" of Leon Castro was not sufficiently established. Loreto Micabel, the superior officer of
the guerrillas, who ordered the release of Leon Castro, did not mention Hilaria as one of those who interceded for the
prisoner (p. 286, stenographic notes). Thirdly, nobody in his right senses holds Pedro criminally responsible for the
crime of Juan simply because a few days before the crime Pedro saved Juan from drowning.
On the other hand, the grudge which Otadora supposedly held against Castro, readily explains why for a consideration
he undertook to kill. It is likewise probable that knowing such desire for vengeance, Hilaria selected him to carry out
the dangerous and delicate job. And if it is true that Hilaria saved Leon Castro during the Japanese occupation, it is
very likely that she hated her "ungrateful" brother-in-law and sister, (who on two subsequent occasions brought her to
court), so much that she hired Otadora to eliminate them.
The assertions of Otadora are decisively ratified by Benigno Baltonado who swore that it was Hilaria who had
purchased the murderous gun from him for P55, and who ordered him to fix it; that on the third day he returned the
gun to her in her home with rounds of ammunition; and that Otadora was there on that occasion. The remarks and
arguments of counsel on pages 87-92 of his brief do not, in our opinion, destroy Baltonado's credibility.
Then there is the witness Amando Garbo, whose brother Esteban is married to the sister of Hilaria, and whose sister
married a younger brother of Hilaria. Amando Garbo declared that he was on friendly terms with Hilaria, taking care of
her fighting cock; that in December, 1946 in the fiesta of Palompon, she tried to persuade him to kill the spouses
Castro; that he declined; that she asked him to look for another for another whom she could hire; that he introduced
Hilaria to Antonio Otadora; that it was he who, at the request of Hilaria, secretly delivered P45 in paper bills of different
denominations to Antonio Otadora after the crime was committed.
And Juanita Garbo, niece of Hilaria Carreon, confirmed the various meetings of Otadora and Hilaria in the latter's
house. And there is the witness Macario Bensig who swore that in May, 1947, at Tabogocon, Ormoc City, during the
wedding of his brother Benito with Luisa Pilapil in May, 1947, Hilaria Carreon told him that if he would kill Leon Castro
and Apolonia Carreon he would be given money as a reward.
Again there is the witness Sgt. Tomada who said that when the accused Hilaria Carreon was arrested on June 25, 1947,
she was committed to his custody because there was no adequate place in the municipal jail for her; that she
requested him confidentially to get a lock of hair of Antonio Otadora explaining to him that if that hair is burned
Otadora would become insane, and therefore would not be able to declare against her.
Further corroboration of appellant's criminal connection with the bloody affair is the undisputed possession by Otadora
of the pants of Francisco Galos (Exhibit C) and his hat Exhibit D. It appears that when Francisco Galos denied
ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on; and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly. This incident gave
the defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional protection against self-incrimination had been

erroneously disregarded. But we discover in the record no timely objection upon that specific ground. And it is to be
doubted whether the accused could benefit from the error, if any. Furthermore, and this is conclusive, "measuring or
photographing the party is not within the privilege" (against self-incrimination). "Nor is the removal or replacement of
his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done."
(Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 878, quoted in Beltran vs. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil., 570, 576).
In conclusion, we are fully satisfied from a reading of the whole expediente that the appellant induced Antonio Otadora
to commit the double murder, and furnished him with the deadly firearm. She is just as guilty as if she herself had
perpetrated the murderous assaults. The slaying is qualified by the circumstance of treachery. It is aggravated by
evident premeditation; but for lack of sufficient votes the appellant is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment for each
murder, (not exceeding 40 years, art. 70, Rev. Penal Code), and to indemnify the heirs of the Castros in the sum of
P4,000. The appealed judgment will be thus modified.

G.R. No. L-25018

May 26, 1969

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Pedro A.
Ramirez for respondent-appellant.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for intervenors-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause, 1 whenever appropriately invoked, has been accorded
due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution. 2 Bermudez v. Castillo,3 decided in 1937, was
quite categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under
consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad
interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The
provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the
individual intended to be served." 4
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan,5where it was held
that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness
stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court
in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded
against in an administrative charge for malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It
was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case 7 for alleged immorality, counsel for
complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent
in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on
the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board of
Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12,
1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners
was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against selfincrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being
quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually
restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his readiness or his
willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of
prohibition.
On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board
commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial
disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount of P500.00.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to the witness
stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the affirmative defenses interposed,
stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board,
therefore, denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in the
administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be allowed to file an answer as
intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on March 23, 1965
sustaining the power of respondent Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be
distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that
the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be wellfounded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the
complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence this appeal both by respondent
Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for the petitioner-appellee.
1. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us in Cabal v.
Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that an
administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act, 9the
complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which
request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against
him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We
found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse,
not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an a administrative
charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or
employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there is clearly the
imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or
penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the
forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American Supreme Court
opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as
to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the
deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a
proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.
2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenors-appellants that
the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions
the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a
right, to follow the language of another American decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the
witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that
might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted.lawphi1.et
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare:
"The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." 12Only
last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is
the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an
individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren,
"the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens." 14
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is
predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion
places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth

Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." 16 In the light of the
above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of
the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel
the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-29169

August 19, 1968

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY
JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.
Estanislao E. Fernandez and Fausto Arce for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court
is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted
in his conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. There is his
prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said
court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.
The indictment in the court below the third amended information upon which the judgment of conviction herein
challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-143003,
with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22,200.00. Accused were the following:
Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias"Ging" Pascual,
Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie
Doe and Paul Doe.2
Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon City, the
accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok
y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not
guilty.1wph1.t
On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Quezon City.

The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this case, is here reproduced:.
COURT:
The parties may proceed.
FISCAL GRECIA:
Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].
ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]:
I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with this move of the Fiscal in presenting him
as his witness. I object.
COURT:
On what ground, counsel? .
ATTY. CARBON:
On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at this stage, without my being notified by
the Fiscal, my client is being presented as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that it is only at this
very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the prosecution.
COURT (To the Fiscal):
You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by making [him a] state witness?.
FISCAL GRECIA:
I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor.
I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.
ATTY. CARBON:
As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.
COURT:
The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to confer and explain to his client about the
giving of his testimony.
xxx

xxx

xxx

COURT: [after the recess]

Are the parties ready? .
FISCAL:
We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.
ATTY. CARBON:
As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to confer with my client.
I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution this morning after I have
explained to him the consequences of what will transpire.
COURT:
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the
court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate
him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witnessstand.

ATTY. CARBON:
I submit.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: .

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the prosecution is something so sudden that has
come to the knowledge of this counsel.
This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever testimony this witness will bring
about. I therefore move for postponement of today's hearing.
COURT:
The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination of this witness.
ATTY. CRUZ:
I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal case are those only listed in the
information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the prosecution.
COURT:
That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will give them time within which to
prepare for their cross-examination of this witness.
The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.
Call the witness to the witness stand.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at the Manila Police Department
headquarters, after being duly sworn according to law, declared as follows:
ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:
WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:
This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.
The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:
'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.'
COURT:
That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know what the prosecution
eventsto establish by calling this witness to the witness stand.
ATTY. IBASCO:
I submit.
COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.3
And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia".
Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as found by the court below may be briefly
narrated as follows:
A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With
Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez

asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Then, on
November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he
had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for
P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis Asistio, who
he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on
the same Buick car. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was to
capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was
selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it,
sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of
Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. 1wph1.t
In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the
afternoon. Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the
interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the
purchase price (P21.000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was
registered. Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez for the drafting of the
deed of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor,
and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto.
As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to
that place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee.
At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater.
Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he
requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. 4
Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table to pose for pictures with
some fans and come back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of
buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the
Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the
NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00
cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of
the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in
Caloocan.
From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part by Asistio, may be condensed as follows:
In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station. The latter informed him that there
was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could
be held for him with a down payment of P10,000.00.
To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of a certain Nena Hernaez de los Reyes who
wrote out a check for P5,000.00 as a loan to Sumilang. That check was exhibited in court. Sumilang and Chavez then
went to Pasay City to see a certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay City Mayor, and Narsing Cailles, Chief of the
Fire Department. Sumilang asked the two for a P10,000-loan backed up by the P5,000.00-check aforesaid on condition
that it should not be cashed immediately as there were not enough funds therefor. Baltazar and Cailles agreed to give
the money the nextday as long as the check would be left with them and Sumilang would sign a promissory note for
P10,000.00. Baltazar later informed Sumilang that Chavez picked up the money the next day. Four or five days
afterwards, Chavez returned P4,000.00 to Sumilang because P6,000.00 was enough for the deposit. And so, Sumilang
gave back the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.
About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked Sumilang for another P3,000.00. Sumilang
sent Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles, with a note requesting that they accommodate him once more. He also sent a
check, again without funds. Baltazar gave the money after verifying the authenticity of the note.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car was ready if Sumilang was ready
with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He
immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery. It was then that
Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.
The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee was P21,000.00, plus P500.00 agents
commission at the expense of the buyer. Sumilang told Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez.

At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated. There, Sumilang, also saw a friend,
"Ging" Pascual. In the course of their conversation at the bar, Sumilang mentioned the proposed transaction thru
Chavez. Pascual warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his
money. A certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt
already signed by Chavez. Sumilang requested Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. And they did. This
receipt was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.
When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to him the deed of sale, the registration papers
and the keys to the car. After shaking hands with Lee, Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at the wheel.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a film shooting at Bulacan. He saw
Asistio with many companions. Asistio liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered to buy it from him for
P22,500.00. As the offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his friends' reputation for always getting what they
wanted, Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to
pay the next day after negotiating with some financing company. Before said balance could be paid, the car was
impounded.
The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations, that he
paid good money for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere
buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted.
As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory".
The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of
fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 5 The trial court
branded him "a self-confessed culprit".6 The court further continued:
It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger Chavez tried to drag his co-accused down
with him by coloring his story with fabrications which he expected would easily stick together what with the newspaper
notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. But Roger Chavez'accusations of Asistio's participation is
utterly uncorroborated. And coming, as it does, from a man who has had at least two convictions for acts not very
different from those charged in this information, the Court would be too gullible if it were to give full credence to his
words even if they concerned a man no less notorious than himself. 7
The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for his car, he had no one but Roger
Chavez to blame.
The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
not less than ten (10) years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The
Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who was directed to
return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the
contract price for the car.
The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez, counsel for Roger Chavez, to show cause
within ten days from notice why Chavez' appeal should not be considered abandoned and dismissed. Reason for this is
that said lawyer received notice to file brief on December 28, 1967 and the period for the filing thereof lapsed on
January 27, 1968 without any brief having been filed.
On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. She also stated that if she were allowed to
file appellant's brief she would go along with the factual findings of the court below but will show however that its
conclusion is erroneous.8
On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation, resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to
reconsider was unavailing. For, on June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to
maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by
virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending
execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.

Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral arguments, we now come to grips with the main
problem presented.
We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's assertion that he was compelled to
testify against himself. For indeed if this one question is resolved in the affirmative, we need not reach the others; in
which case, these should not be pursued here.
1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his right constitutionally
entrenched against self-incrimination. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his
conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," 9 fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where,
in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself." .
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the fundamentals of a republican
government"; 10 that [i]t may suit the purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political
liberty and personal freedom."11 Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background of this constitutional
inhibition, thus: " "The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and
manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and,
until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the
protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even in England. While the
admissions of confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of
incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under
investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to
press, the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into
fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas
Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total
abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no
judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted,
it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the
ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with one accord, made a
denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England
was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment."
(Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819, 821)." 12 Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us
that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack." 13 An
old Philippine case [1904] 14 speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United
States"; as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person"; and as
having been adopted in the Philippines "to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring
accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were
charged."
So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the
court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; 15 it is fundamental to our scheme of
justice. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29, 1968), speaking thru Mr. Justice
Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the
innocent and foresighted." 16
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is
mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Taada and Fernando (Constitution of the
Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, pp. 583-584) take note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra, which reaffirms the rule that the
constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy because it would
place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a
confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. 17
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may
a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of
the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony,
to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free,
genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational
choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to
force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." 18
2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was
called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof.

Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement thathe
will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the
prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense counsel
"could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that accusedpetitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing
situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness
may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer is shot at him, 19 and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all
questions. 20 For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate
him. 21 The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint
trial.23
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish
evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse." 24 Thus it is, that it
was undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the
court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate
him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand.
Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I, 208, 244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p.
355, 25 While a defendant's knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from
thence, and he is exposed" to conviction.
The judge's words heretofore quoted "But surely counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness
stand" wielded authority. By those words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will
to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness stand.
Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a witness for the People is at once
apparent. The record discloses that by leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement given
to the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26 And this statement detailed the plan and
execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he
himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case. 27
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the People was built primarily around
the admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution". Indeed,
the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution witness and of
course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. There are the unequivocal statements in the decision that "even accused
Chavez" identified "the very same Thunderbird that Johnson Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez "testimony as
witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that Chavez is "a self-confessed
culprit". 1wph1.t
4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full
breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed
the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being
accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is
not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before
a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape
testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right
then and thereon the first day of the trial.
It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became fruitless, no objections to
questions propounded to him were made. Here involve is not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a defendant's

constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself. And the objection made at the beginning is a
continuing one. 1wph1.t
There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal,
andintelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully
accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain
evidence." 28 The teaching in Johnson vs. Zerbst 29 is this: "It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege." Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For
the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection - even to the guilty. 30
5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. 31 It is traditionally considered
as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's
constitutional rights are disregarded. 32 Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction 33 and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. 34 That void
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. 35 This
writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. 36Thus, failure by the
accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. 37 The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, 39 the writ of habeas corpus as an
extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect 40 so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The
propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of Counsel, compliance
with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's authority. When this right
is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary element of the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to
conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented by Counsel and has not competently and
intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction
and sentence depriving him of his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of
the proceedings" due to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for
an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose
life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to proceed.The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and
one imprisoned thereundermay obtain release of habeas corpus. 41
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture
of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise
expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... " 42
6. Respondents' return 43 shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid judgment of conviction for another
offense. We should guard against the improvident issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from confinement. The
position we take here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect to Criminal
Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was prosecuted and convicted.
Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent Warden of the City Jail of
Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311, entitled "People of the
Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et al., accused," to discharge said Roger Chavez from custody,unless he is
held, kept in custody or detained for any cause or reason other than the said judgment in said Criminal Case Q-5311 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the discharge herein directed shall be effected
when such other cause or reason ceases to exist.
No costs. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 149276. September 27, 2002]

JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON
CHAM, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalties for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for
being violative of the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment enshrined under the Constitution.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs, follow.
In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks, namely, Metrobank check
no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992 in the amount of P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated January 22,
1992 in the amount of P429,000. Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against
insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon request of petitioners who promised to
replace the dishonored check.
When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no. 464728, the private respondent filed a
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charging petitioner spouses with the crime
of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818.
On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against petitioners and
recommending the filing of an information for estafa with no bail recommended. On the same day, an information for
the crime of estafa was filed with Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against petitioners. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-101574. Thereafter, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein
petitioners, thus:
It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting affidavit of the complaining witness and its annexes
that probable cause exists, that the crime charged was committed and accused is probably guilty thereof, let a
warrant for the arrest of the accused be issued.
No Bail Recommended.
SO ORDERED.[1]
On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest which was denied by
the trial court. Likewise, petitioners motion for bail filed on July 24, 2001 was denied by the trial court on the same
day. Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the trial court and was detained
at the Quezon City Jail. However, petitioner Teresita Lim remained at large.
On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the lower court and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional
provisions on due process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the petition of Jovencio Lim to post bail pursuant to
Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated November 6, 2001 which amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving
estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d), and qualified theft. Said Circular specifically provides as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2 (a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide,
multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00; Provided,
however, that the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00.
In view of the aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning bail shall no longer be discussed. Thus, this decision
will focus on whether or not PD 818 violates Sections 1 and 19 of Article III of the Constitution, which respectively
provide:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx
Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x.
We shall deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted in contravention of Section 19 of Article III of the
Constitution. In this regard, the impugned provision of PD 818 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall
in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termedreclusion perpetua;
2nd. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos.
3rd. The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos; and
4th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.
Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized
with reclusion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. This penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe and
disproportionate to the crime they committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the
Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of
the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.[2] Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled
contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and
degrading.
In People vs. Tongko,[3] this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for
instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law
unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.
Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed under Article 315, par.
2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not increase the amounts corresponding to the said new penalties. Thus, the
original amounts provided for in the Revised Penal Code have remained the same notwithstanding that they have
become negligible and insignificant compared to the present value of the peso.
This argument is without merit. The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and categorically stated in the
following:
WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling) cases committed by means of bouncing
checks;

WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the peoples confidence in the use of negotiable
instruments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and commerce
and the undermining of the banking system of the country;
WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing
penalties provided therefor.
Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely,
to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the countrys commercial and economic growth, and to serve as
a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not increase the
amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and inconsequential. What the
law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account
the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article
III of the Constitution.
Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.
[4]
The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed to
present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.
With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, petitioners claim
that PD 818 is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution as it was not published in the Official Gazette.This
claim is incorrect and must be rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due process, is imperative to the
validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders. [5] PD 818 was published in the Official Gazette on December
1, 1975.[6]
With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152895

June 15, 2004

OFELIA V. ARCETA, petitioner,

vs.
The Honorable MA. CELESTINA C. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Navotas, Metro Manila, respondent.
x--------------------------x
G.R. No. 153151 June 15, 2004
GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable EDWIN B. RAMIZO, Presiding Judge, Branch 53, Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan
City,respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution are two consolidated1 petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with prayers for a temporary restraining order. Both assail the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks
Law, also known as Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
In G.R. No. 152895, petitioner Ofelia V. Arceta prays that we order the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Navotas,
Metro Manila, Branch 54, to cease and desist from hearing Criminal Case No. 1599-CR for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and
then dismiss the case against her. In G.R. No. 153151, petitioner Gloria S. Dy also prays that this Court order the MeTC
of Caloocan City to cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 212183, and subsequently dismiss the
case against her. In fine, however, we find that what both petitioners seek is that the Court should revisit and abandon
the doctrine laid down in Lozano v. Martinez,2 which upheld the validity of the Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts of these cases are not in dispute.

1. G.R. No. 152895

The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1599-CR. The accusatory portion of said Information reads:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to OSCAR R. CASTRO, to apply on account or for value the check described below:
Check No.:

00082270

Drawn Against:

The Region Bank

In the Amount of:

P740,000.00

Date:

December 21, 1998

Payable to:

Cash

said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue Ofelia V. Arceta did not have sufficient funds or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason "DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS," and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg.
22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be an
exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing
jurisprudence.
On October 21, 2002,4 Arceta was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. However, she manifested that her
arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend
proceedings in the trial court.
Arceta then filed the instant petition.
2. G.R. No. 153151
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law, docketed by the MeTC of Caloocan City as Criminal Case No. 212183. Dy allegedly committed the offense
in this wise:
That on or about the month of January 2000 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue
Check No. 0000329230 drawn against PRUDENTIAL BANK in the amount ofP2,500,000.00 dated January 19, 2000 to
apply for value in favor of ANITA CHUA well knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was subsequently
dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and with intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said
complainant the amount of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check has been
dishonored and had not been paid.
Contrary to Law.5
Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional.
Dy likewise believed that any move on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges on said ground
would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition with this Court invoking its power of judicial review
to have the said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.
Both Arceta and Dy raise the following identical issues for our resolution:
[a] Does section 1 really penalize the act of issuing a check subsequently dishonored by the bank for lack of funds?
[b] What is the effect if the dishonored check is not paid pursuant to section 2 of BP 22?
[c] What is the effect if it is so paid?

[d] Does section 2 make BP 22 a debt collecting law under threat of imprisonment?
[e] Does BP 22 violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for non-payment of debt?
[f] Is BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power of the state? 6
After minute scrutiny of petitioners submissions, we find that the basic issue being raised in these special civil actions
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus concern the unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise put,
the petitions constitute an oblique attack on the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, a matter already passed
upon by the Court through Justice (later Chief Justice) Pedro Yap almost two decades ago. Petitioners add, however,
among the pertinent issues one based on the observable but worrisome transformation of certain metropolitan trial
courts into seeming collection agencies of creditors whose complaints now clog the court dockets.
But let us return to basics. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established
doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an
actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.7 Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court
assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to
counsels spirited advocacy in both cases, we are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites have been adequately
met.
Perusal of these petitions reveals that they are primarily anchored on Rule 65, Section 1 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. In a special civil action of certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 9 Yet nowhere in these petitions is there
any allegation that the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is manifested. 10
Noteworthy, the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any attachments or annexes in the form of a copy of an
order, decision, or resolution issued by the respondent judges so as to place them understandably within the ambit of
Rule 65. What are appended to the petitions are only copies of the Informations in the respective cases, nothing else.
Evidently, these petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and
appropriate cases contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this Courts power of judicial
review. For as the petitions clearly show on their faces petitioners have not come to us with sufficient cause of action.
Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart before the horse, figuratively speaking. Simply
put, they have ignored the hierarchy of courts outlined in Rule 65, Section 4 11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court.
Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been
immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the
separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of
unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the proceedings
below. Needless to emphasize, this Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue
was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued. 12 Taking into account the early stage of the trial
proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature.
Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 13 We have
examined the contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in
its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of petitioner Dy that the present
economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves
but scant consideration. As we stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most
compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy
confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial
communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks
cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of
dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156558

June 14, 2004

GEORGE VINCOY,1 petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated December 20, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
243162 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 268, in Criminal Case No. 112432 finding petitioner
George Vincoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information reads:

On or about March 14, 1996, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, by means of
deceit and false pretenses executed to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Lizah C. Cimafranca and Rolando Flores, in the following manner, to wit:
the said accused represented that he could mobilize thirty (30) dump trucks and two (2) payloaders for use of the
complainant[s] subject to the payment of P600,000.00 mobilization fund and, believing this representation to be true,
the said complainants paid and delivered the said amount to the accused at Banco de Oro Bank, Pasig City Branch,
which representation accused knew well to be false and fraudulent and were (sic) only made to induce the
complainants to give and deliver as in fact they gave and delivered the said amount of P600,000.00 to the respondent
(sic), and accused once in possession of said amount, misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants, Lizah C. Cimafranca and Rolando Flores, in
the amount ofP600,000.00.
Pasig City, May 28, 1997.3
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Hence, trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence established that private complainants Rolando Flores and Lizah Cimafranca are business
partners and contractors. They approached petitioner George Vincoy, proprietor of Delco Industries Phils., Inc., in
March 1996 for dump trucks and payloaders which they needed to haul silica in Bulacan. Petitioner represented that he
could mobilize thirty (30) dump trucks and two (2) payloaders upon payment of a P600,000.00 mobilization fund by
complainants at P20,000.00 per dump truck. Pursuant to their verbal agreement, private complainants paid an
initial P200,000.00 cash to the petitioner on March 9 or 10, 1996 for which they were issued a receipt by the petitioner.
To pay the balance of P400,000.00, complainant Rolando Flores, with the help of his wife Carolina, borrowed from a
client of Banco de Oro, Pasig City Branch, of which his wife was the Manager. Carolina personally guaranteed the loan.
For the purpose, Rolando bought a managers check from Banco de Oro which issued to him Managers Check No.
011543 for P400,000.00. On March 14, 1996, Rolando, Lizah, and petitioner went to the bank to encash the check.
After Rolando encashed the check, Carolina Flores personally handed over the proceeds to petitioner. Petitioner issued
Official Receipt No. 085 but wrote therein the amount of P600,000.00, not P400,000.00, to include the P200,000.00
which he previously received from the complainants. The previous receipt for theP200,000.00 was thus cancelled.
Despite the payment, only one (1) dump truck was delivered in the evening of March 14, 1996. Private complainants
demanded the return of their money but they were either ignored or refused entry at petitioners office premises. After
some time, petitioner offered to complainants PCIBank Check No. 022170A as reimbursement. The check was
for P715,000.00 issued by one Luzviminda Hernandez payable to cash and/or to Delco Industries. It was understood
that the difference would be turned over to petitioner. Eager to have their money back and pay their obligation to their
creditor, private complainants accepted the check and returned Official Receipt No. 085 which petitioner requested.
The check, however, was dishonored upon presentment for payment. Private complainants again demanded the return
of their money but petitioner could no longer be contacted. As a result, Carolina Flores was terminated from her job as
Manager of Banco de Oro, Pasig City Branch, for guaranteeing her husbands loan.
In May 1996, Lizah Cimafranca filed a complaint for estafa against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasay City docketed as I.S. No. 96-1946. It was, however, dismissed in a Resolution dated August 21, 1996 on the
ground that petitioners obligation was purely civil in nature and for complainants failure to attend the hearings. 4 On
October 8, 1996, Lizah Cimafranca, joined by Rolando Flores, re-filed the complaint charging the same offense against
petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City which filed the corresponding information in court, root of
the present petition.
Petitioner denied that he received P600,000.00 from the private complainants. He alleged that he was only given a
Banco de Oro Managers Check for P400,000.00 which was not even issued in his name. Failing to notice that the
check was not in his name, he issued Official Receipt No. 085 5 for P600,000.00, not P400,000.00, to include the
overprice for complainants commission in the amount of P200,000.00. When he noticed that the check was issued in
the name of complainant Rolando Flores, he arranged for his driver to return the check to complainants for
encashment and to take back O.R. No. 085. As a result, his transaction with the private complainants was cancelled
because they did not turn over the proceeds of the check to him.
The trial court sustained the version of the prosecution. The trial judge found incredible petitioners averment that he
failed to notice that the check in question was not issued in his name. Petitioner was a seasoned businessman. A
judgment of conviction was rendered on February 23, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GEORGE VINGCOY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of ESTAFA defined and penalized under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
of Reclusion Temporal in its medium and maximum period (sic) and to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P600,000.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.6

Accused appealed to the Court of Appeals to no avail. 7 Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner insists that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He contends that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that he received payment from the private complainants considering that Official
Receipt No. 085 was admittedly returned to him and marked "cancelled" while PCIBank Check No. 022170A
for P715,000.00 was not presented and marked as an exhibit and was only surreptitiously included as Exh. "B" during
the prosecutions formal offer of evidence. He also argues that his identity was not even established since his
pictures,8 although presented and marked as Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-2," were not included in the prosecutions formal
offer of evidence. Further, he points out that the dismissal of the previous complaint for estafa filed by Lizah
Cimafranca by the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay City supports his acquittal.
Petitioners contentions are not well-taken. The fact that his pictures were not formally offered as evidence although
they were presented and marked as exhibits, is not fatal to the prosecutions cause. There is no question as to
petitioners identity as the accused. He himself admitted that he transacted with the private complainants although
the transaction was cancelled for failure of complainants to pay the mobilization fund. This admission that he
personally dealt with the complainants in regard to the transaction in question renders his identification a non-issue.
The dismissal of a similar complaint for estafa filed by Lizah Cimafranca before the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay
City will not exculpate the petitioner. The case cannot bar petitioners prosecution. It is settled that the dismissal of a
case during its preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy 9 since a preliminary investigation is not
part of the trial and is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence but only such as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and accused is probably guilty thereof. 10For
this reason, it cannot be considered equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, petitioner was properly
charged before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City which is not bound by the determination made by the
Pasay City Prosecutor who may have had before him a different or incomplete set of evidence than that subsequently
presented before the Pasig City Prosecutor.
Lastly, whether or not petitioner indeed received payment from private complainants is a question of fact best left to
the determination of the trial court. We quote with approval the following observations of the trial court, viz:
xxx

xxx

xxx

That payment was indeed received by accused can not (sic) be denied as he himself issued a receipt to evidence such
receipt of payment. The receipt, a xerox copy of which, was marked as evidence by accused (Exhibit "4") indicated
that the payment, as explained by the witness Ms. Carolina Flores (TSN, May 7, 1998, pp. 18-20) was actually received
in cash as the amount written in the receipt is P600,000.00 and notP400,000.00. That the number of the Managers
(sic) check which was for P400,000.00 was written on the receipt by way of reference only. This Court gives full
credence to the testimony of Ms. Flores who was eventually terminated from the bank where she worked by reason of
her guaranteeing Mr. Flores loan from a customer of the bank. It is clear that cash was actually paid out and the
contention of the accused that he was only given a managers (sic) check which, according to him, he eventually
returned can not (sic) be sustained. For why would he issue a receipt in his own handwriting if he did not receive the
cash. The receipt is a unilateral admission of a party that he got paid. The receipt, as admitted by accused Mr. Vincoy
was issued by him (TSN, May 7, 1999, pp. 7-8) when he received the cashiers (sic) check. That he had the cashiers
(sic) check returned for encashment as it was not made payable to his company. Being a businessman, he would have
immediately noticed the fact that the managers (sic) check was made out in the name of Rolando Flores and
immediately returned the check without issuing a receipt or he could have issued a provisional receipt if indeed what
was used as payment was a check. It is highly inconceivable that he would receive the check, issue a receipt then
realize that the check is not made payable to his company. Furthermore, two different copies of the same receipts were
presented. Prosecution presented a copy of Official Receipt 085 without the marking "cancelled" while accused
presented a copy of the same Official Receipt with "cancelled" written on its face.
As testified to by complainant, he returned the original of the Official Receipt upon receipt of a check endorsed by
accused. Thus it is not improbable that the word cancelled was written on said official receipt by the accused only
upon its return to him. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses as to the cronology (sic) of events are more credible
and is thus given more weight by this Court because mere denial of the accused can not prevail over the positive
testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses. Moreover, private complainant clearly explained that accused came into
possession of the original official receipt when accused Vingcoy endorsed and turned over to him a check made
payable to cash and or Delco Industries by one Luzviminda Hernandez for P715,000.00. However, when said check was
presented for payment it was dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED."
xxx

xxx

xxx

This factual finding of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner indeed received payment from
the private complainants in the form of the mobilization fund, deserves great weight and respect.

Moreover, the fact that PCIBank Check No. 022170A for P715,000.00 was not presented and marked as an exhibit
during the trial, hence, could not have been formally offered as evidence, 11 is not fatal to the prosecutions cause. As
well pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), petitioner was prosecuted not for issuing a worthless
check, but for deceiving complainants into parting with their P600,000.00 on the promise that he would provide them
dump trucks and payloaders.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The questioned Decision dated December 20, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24316 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 268, in Criminal Case No.
112432, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XI and FRANCISCO GAPAY y MALLARES, respondents.

RESOLUTION
RELOVA, J:
This is a petition to review the order, dated November 17, 1972, of the City Court of Manila, Branch XI, dismissing the
information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against private respondent, Francisco Gapay y Mallares, in
Criminal Case No. E-505633 on the ground of double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the private respondent
having been previously tried and convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death
of the victim would place the accused in double jeopardy.
The question presented in this case is whether a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if
the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered.
In Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, this Court held that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at a
time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
second offense." However, the trial court held that the doctrine of Melo vs. People does not apply in the case at bar in
view of this Court's ruling in People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, that Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent
state of mind and not the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of
negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different resulting injury.
In the case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following day, October 18, an information for
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On the
same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died.
On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, and commenced
serving sentence.
On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent.
On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent, issued an order dismissing the
homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charge again with the same or
Identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. However, as held in the case of Melo vs.
People, supra, the rule of Identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. "Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and
after conviction, the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy." Stated differently, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a
new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
As stated above, the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on the day the information was filed, and the accused was arraigned
two (2) days after, or on October 20, 1972. When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was,
therefore, filed on October 24, 1972, the accused-private respondent was already in jeopardy.
In his memorandum, the Solicitor General made mention of the fact that on October 21, 1972, the City Fiscal filed an
Urgent Motion asking that the "hearing and arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is information that
the victim, Diolito dela Cruz died, and the information would have to be amended." Be that as it may, the fact remains
that the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on October 18 "one (1) day after the accident and the arrest of the respondent
Gapay" (P. 103, Rollo) and that on October 20, 1972, the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced
accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the
accused.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the lower court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:
I am constrained to concur because the records are inadequate to show that the arraignment, while hasty and
surrounded by seemingly suspicious circumstances, was tainted by fraud, collusion, or other form of chicanery

sufficient to sustain a finding that the State was denied due process (Cf. Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, 82
SCRA 10).
The incident happened on October 17, 1972. The information for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
was filed on October 18, 1972. The victim of the accident died on the same day.
Knowing the volume of the case load in the City Court of Manila and the inevitably slow pace of work even when
urgency is dictated by the nature of cases with the Fiscal or before the various salas, it is most surprising that the
accused could have been arraigned on October 20, 1972 for the charge of serious physical injuries only three days
after the incident, two days after the filing of the information, and two days after the death of the victim. The accused
does not appear to have been a detention prisoner necessitating his immediate arraingment right after the filing of the
information. The only sensible conclusion to draw from the above circumstances is that the accused was hastily made
to plead guilty to serious physical injuries to foreclose a charge for homicide even before it could be filed. In such a
case, there would be a trifling with the processes of justice and a collusive effort amounting to fraud or deceit to
deprive the State of its authority to prosecute an accused for the correct offense. While this conclusion is most likely, it
remains speculative, however, because we have a criminal case before us. The records fail to show what were the
results of an investigation, if any was conducted to ascertain why the assistant city fiscal's suspicions were not
aroused when the case was hurriedly set for arraignment, contrary to the usual procedures in the Manila City Court.
Either the assistant city fiscal was naively new to the job, or he was hopelessly negligent, or he connived with the
accused, in which case remedial measures are called for. At any rate, I concur in the affirmance of the order of
dismissal in line with the many protections that the Constitution and the laws give to the accused in criminal
prosecutions.
Vasquez, J., I join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr.

G.R. No. 73996 August 28, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO TAGLE, alias "Danny Tagle," accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Guillermo M. Pasion for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The Court is not convinced that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
has failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prisoner must be acquitted.
The accused was a 35-year old man with a wife and four children at the time of the alleged offense. The complaining
witness was 19 years old and unmarried when she claims she was raped by Danilo Tagle.
As found by the trial court 1 on the basis of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the crime was committed on
October 29, 1982, at about ten o'clock in the evening, in a wooded area in Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte.
On October 18, 1982, Iluminada Damo went to the house of Tagle to consult him about her cough. Tagle is a herb
doctor or "arbularyo." According to Iluminada, the accused ask her her to come back with a maiden 18 years or older
to pick the needed herbs with him.
Accordingly, she went back to Tagle's house on October 29, 1982, at about four o'clock in the afternoon, bringing
Arcelie with her.
Tagle began treating his patient by pressing a glass of water on her breasts. This treatment continued for some time.
Later in the evening, Tagle asked Arcelie to go with him so they could pick the herbs. He stressed that it was necessary
to do this at that time as otherwise the herbs would have no healing power. The presence of Arcelie was also
indispensable, for the same reason.
Arcelie said she hesitated because of the late hour. Nevertheless, she finally consented, to accommodate her ailing
sister-in-law. She even donned a skirt because the accused had asked her not to wear pants. After walking for some
three kilometers, she and the accused stopped at a spot near the seashore where there were many trees. There she
started to pick some herbs as indicated by Tagle.
While she was doing so, Tagle suddenly grabbed her arm and warned her not to cry out. Sensing his intentions, she
remonstrated and said, "Do not do this to me, Manong." He pointed a knife at her neck to stop her resistance. Not
satisfied with the threat, he boxed her in the abdomen and rendered her unconscious.
When she recovered, she found she had been deflowered. She still ached from the blow to her stomach. Her exposed
vagina was painful and a warm fluid was oozing from it. Tagle was standing before her, also naked from the waist
down. He handed her panty which she put on. They then started to walk back to his house.
She was crying all the way but stopped when they reached his residence because he had threatened to kill her if she
said anything about her rape. She proceeded upstairs and stayed near the place where Tagle's wife and children were
sleeping. She was restless the whole night.
The complainant, declared that she left early the following morning, and in the afternoon of the same day, told her
brother about her rape. She underwent two medical examinations, first on October 31, 1982, and the second on
November 3,1982. The report thereon, issued on November 1 5, 1982, reads as follows:
General Condition-Patient is about 4'10" in height with a very good built. She is shy and hardly speak,
Physical Examinations:
No visible external physical injuries, on the face, body and extremities.
Breasts conical firm, nipples are small.

Internal Examination:
Labia-Majora firm and well rounded
Labia-Minora soft, pinkish and not in close apposition with one another.
Hymen healed laceration at 6 o'clock and 12 o'clock with rounded non-coaptible borders.
Examination of vagina Smear (Microscopic) negative of spermatozoa. 2
Iluminada Damo corroborated Arcelie's testimony up to the point where she left with the accused to pick the medicinal
herbs. She also testified on the girl's conduct upon her return. This witness added that the accused admitted to her in
the evening of October 30, 1982, after Arcelie had left, that he had raped the complainant.
The trial court noted in its decision that after the filing of the information against the accused, his father, Fernandico
Tagle, approached the complainant's family for a possible settlement out of court. But he was rebuffed by Arcelie.
Tagle's defense was that he and Arcelie were in fact lovers. Although this explanation is often enough rejected by the
Court, there are some circumstances in this case that give it some credence.
Tagle testified that he met Arcelie sometime in 1979 and courted her for two years until she accepted his love on
December 13,1981, when he gave a birthday party at the beach. They exchanged rings in token of their troth. (He
submitted in evidence the one he says Arcelie gave him.) 3 On October 10, 1982, when his wife and children were
away, Arcelie stayed with him in his house all night. They had sex twice, once before they slept and once again at
dawn.
The accused stated that he did not rape Arcelie on October 29, 1982, and that they did not even have voluntary sexual
intercourse then. Arcelie wanted it, but he claimed he was ailing with influenza at the time and had gone out only
because he had to pick the herbs for Iluminada. He admitted that Arcelie had come along but not because he had
asked her; in fact, she had insisted on accompanying him against his will.
Although Arcelie denies this, Tagle said that the two of them were together at a benefit dance on October 30,1982, the
night following the alleged rape. He even bought then her "social box" for P100.00 for the privilege of dancing with her.
It was while they were dancing that Arcelie slapped him and accused him of lying to her about his wife and children.
Tagle said that Arcelie warned him then that she would file a case against him.
Fernando Pia testified for his "barkada," as he described Tagle. He confirmed the story of Tagle's birthday party at the
beach. He particularly remembered the night of October 10, 1982, when he visited Tagle in his house to borrow money
and came upon his friend in bed with Arcelie. He also said that in the evening of October 29, 1982, he was in Tagle's
house and saw Arcelie follow the accused when he went out to get the herbs. Upon her return, Arcelie joined them in
singing and appeared to be in good spirits. The following morning, he and Arcelie went out to pick some orchids and
later had breakfast in Tagle's house.
What the Court finds especially intriguing and revealing is the testimony of Dr. Rogelio Balbag, who conducted the
medical examination of Arcelie and rendered the report thereon. We find the following disturbing exchange in the
transcript of his testimony:
COURT:
Q Doctor, in your medico-legal certificate marked Exhibit C, there is an entry here which says "laceration at six o'clock
and twelve o'clock with rounded coaptible border," could you tell us what this means?
A May I see it your Honor. As I read . . . I compared . . . I noticed there are some erasures that I found at the part of the
hymen healed laceration. The word "healed' was erased on that, your Honor.
Q Do you have the duplicate copy?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So, now you would want to say there is a word "healed" ?
A I wish to inform the court that excited me; that could be tampered.
Q I will show you again Exhibit C, will you find out if there is the erasure?
A There is something applied in this part, your Honor.
Q You did not erase that before you signed it, Doctor?
A No, your Honor. There is the duplicate of the one I issued.

Q So, you want to impress the court that regarding Exhibit C it should be healed laceration?
A It should be healed laceration, your Honor.

As for the length of the healing period, the doctor testified as follows:
COURT:
Q When did you examine the patient?
A October 31, 1982, your Honor.
Q What was the nature of the wound, the laceration wound at six o'clock and twelve o'clock according to you at the
time you examined the patient?
A It is healed laceration, your Honor.
Q Freshly healed?
A Newly healed.
Q In your opinion, when were those lacerations inflicted?
A It can be one or two weeks before. I can't say, your Honor, one or two weeks before.
COURT:
Any more questions, Fiscal.
FISCAL ALEJANDRO:
Q You said, Doctor, that the laceration of the hymen was newly healed. Could it be two days before when you
examined that woman?
A That would be very hard because two days that would be fresh laceration.
COURT:
Q Normally, the laceration of the hymen, what is the healing period?
A Five days. It depends from the environment of the wound, your Honor.
Q Now, after five days the laceration is healed?
A That is my opinion, your Honor.
Q And you say as newly healed?
A Yes, your Honor, but the wound could not heal within two days. It cannot completely heal within two days. That
would be very hard because if it is inflicted within two days, it would be mere fresh laceration.
COURT: Continue.
FISCAL ALEJANDRO:
Q You said, Doctor, that the healing period of the laceration of the hymen may differ on some factors?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would it be possible by the natural power of the victim could cause the healing of the wound inflicted?
A What do you mean by "natural power"?
Q On your own human capacity, would the healing be possible cause immediate healing of the wound?
A In my opinion, a wound inflicted two days will not heal immediately.
Q At any rate, Doctor, is it not a fact that you also requested the victim to come to your office ... I withdraw the
question. That is all, your Honor. 5
It is significant that although Arcelie said she was examined twice, Dr. Balbag said the second one was more of a
mental examination. 6 The medical examination itself was concluded on October 31, 1982.

The trial judge dismissed the matter of the ruptured hymen and noted that virginity is not an essential element of the
crime of rape. Citing jurisprudence, he said even prostitutes could be raped. That is true enough. But what he failed to
consider is that the physical evidence of the healed laceration reflected on Arcelie's credibility, especially in her
narration of her claimed violation.
Asked if she had any previous sexual experience, she said none 7 That would mean she was deflowered on October 29,
1982. This was only two days before her medical examination, which revealed that the laceration of her hymen had
already healed. Her recuperation was truly amazing if wonders are to be believed.
In the light of this undeniable physical evidence of the miraculously healed maiden head, the Court is more inclined to
accept Tagle's testimony that he and Arcelie were lovers and had sex twice on October 10, 1982. Her hymen must
have been ruptured then, or perhaps later, but not as late as October 29, 1982, when she claims Tagle forced himself
upon her.
In fact, it is not even certain that she had sexual intercourse that night, as there was no showing of this in the medical
report. No trace of spermatozoa was found in her vagina. The panty and skirt she wore, both of which she said she
used for wiping the red and white fluid oozing from her groin, 8 were not presented at the trial.
It is true that there are flaws in the evidence of the defense that invite disbelief. Tagle clearly proclaimed himself a liar
when he confessed his deception in concealing from Arcelie the fact that he had a wife and children. Also, there is no
corroboration of his testimony that he and Arcelie were together at a benefit dance the night after the alleged rape.
The slapping incident he narrated could surely have been witnessed by many persons who were at that social
gathering, but none of them came forward at the trial.
As for Pia, the impression of the Court is that he was testifying more out of loyalty for his friend than in the interest of
truth. It is not easy to accept, for example, that although he said he had gone several times to Tagle's house to borrow
money, the only date he could remember having done so, conveniently enough, was October 10, 1982. The other
dates are a blur. And, interestingly, although he claimed the accused was a close friend of his and lived only twenty
meters away from his own house, this witness did not know that Tagle was married and had four children. 9
But in a criminal action, the conviction of the accused depends not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength
of the prosecution. 10 Even if it be supposed that the defense in the case at bar is weak, the prosecution, as it happens,
is even weaker. The Office of the Solicitor General seems to think so too, if the half-hearted appellee's brief it
submitted is any indication.
The Court finds it hard to accept that a young maiden like Arcelie would go out late at night with a man she had met
only six hours before to a wooded and secluded place where her only possible protection against his temptation would
be his own forbearance. Unsophisticated girls may be naive to a certain degree but they cannot be that trusting.
Arcelie says she hesitated when Tagle asked her to come with him. However, she changed her mind later for the
benefit of her sister-in-law. Iluminada seems also to have completely trusted Tagle even if she herself had met him only
once before, on October 18, 1982. And it is also curious that she did not even inquire why, as she said she noticed,
Arcelie was silent and apparently under stress when she returned from her nocturnal trip. This witness was apparently
not much interested either when Arcelie left her early the next morning without any explanation, Iluminada did not
bother to ask.
The strangest piece in this puzzle is Tagle's nameless wife and children who were either conveniently absent or
unobtrusive even when present. Tagle says they were in Nueva Ecija when he gave his birthday party at the beach and
won Arcelie and on October 10, 1982, when Arcelie slept with him in his house. But October 29, 1982, was different.
The wife was there but did not object when Tagle and Arcelie went out into the night together. She was not heard to
say anything either when the two returned hours later from whatever they might have been doing in the dark. She
accepted Arcelie back into her house and even slept in the same place with her, presumably with complete peace of
mind. There was not one ounce of jealousy in her.
But that is another story.
In the case before us, we feel that the prosecution has failed to establish the necessary quantum of evidence to justify
the conviction of the accused-appellant. To repeat, the Court regards as especially significant the physical evidence of
the healed hymen, which suggests that Arcelie was not telling the truth about her alleged violation on the night in
question. Her innocence was ruptured, but not on that night of October 29, 1982.
It looks to us that Arcelie has acted out of spite over her discovery that she had been deceived by her married lover
and she is now using this case to wreak her vengeance. Our finding is that Arcelie was not a violated virgin but a
betrayed and resentful sweetheart bent on the revenge of a woman scorned.
Let it not be supposed from this decision that the constitutional presumption of innocence commands the exoneration
of the guilty. The presumption is certainly not conclusive and may yield to positive proof that the crime has been

committed by the prisoner on the dock as charged. But that proof, if it is to prevail, must be strong enough to dispel all
doubt and sustain the defendant's conviction. It is absolutely indispensable that it be convincing enough to warrant his
punishment, not the least of which, along with the loss of his liberty or property, is the stain upon his honor.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of the
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8
November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia on
the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light
System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises
of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel
Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the
necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" 1owned
by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed
purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric
[ice and cold storage] plant." 2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement
that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric
meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this
ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or
imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." 4 This information reads
as follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d)
and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and
penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper
authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of
electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unathorized
installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged and
prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16)
Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the
City Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to
dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil

indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order
dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing
that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it
appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense
charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power
under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This information read as follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft, defined and penalized by
Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba,
Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government of Batangas, in the
aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II.
Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he
had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was
violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge
granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the
following paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion
to quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution "accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of
violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to
the City Government of Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis supplied). The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of illegal
electrical connections. It also covered an amount of P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to
defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it could
have alleged illegal connections which were done at one instance on a particular date between November, 1974, to
February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-named accused with intent to defraud the
City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper
authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings
and devices, etc." (Emphasis supplied), it was meant to include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect,
defrauded the city government. The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975,
he had daily committed unlawful installations.
When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City Court, he had already been exposed, or
he felt he was exposed to consequences of what allegedly happened between November 1974 to February 21, 1975
which had allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16. (Emphases and
parentheses in the original)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the petitioner was denied by the respondent Judge in
an Order dated 18 November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal
of Batangas City on behalf of the People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection
against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the first information
filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and
devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas. Only two elements are
needed to constitute an offense under this City Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no authority
therefor had been obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the District Engineer.
The petitioner urges that the relevant terms of the City Ordinance which read as follows:
Section 3.-Connection and Installation
(a) x x x

(b) The work and installation in the houses and building and their connection with the Electrical System shall be done
either by the employee of the system duly authorized by its Superintendent or by persons adept in the matter duly
authorized by the District Engineer. Applicants for electrical service permitting the works of installation or connection
with the system to be undertaken by the persons not duly authorized therefor shall be considered guilty of violation of
the ordinance.
would show that:
The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that electrical installations on residences or buildings be
done by persons duly authorized or adept in the matter, to avoid fires and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It
is primarily a regulatory measure and not intended to punish or curb theft of electric fluid which is already covered by
the Revised Penal Code. 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument continues, is the installing of electric wiring
and devices without authority from the proper officials of the city government. To constitute an offense under the city
ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the part of the offender generally speaking, nor, more
specifically, an intent to appropriate and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code filed before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential elements. These elements
are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can be effected even without illegal or
unauthorized installations of any kind by, for instance, any of the following means:
1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not register the actual electrical consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the rotation of the same.

The petitioner concludes that:

The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity
[under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first inforrnation 8
The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the
constitutional provision involved which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
(Emphasis supplied; Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) 9
and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined,
not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon
the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition:
the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal
Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap
vs. Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, with
violation of Article 14 of Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1954, of the City of

Iloilo. The information charged him with having "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an
automobile "recklessly and without reasonable caution thereby endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing
in said street." Three months later, Yap was again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal Court,
this time with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The information charged him with violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as amended by Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving and operating an
automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate
pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the second information upon the ground that it placed him twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. This motion was denied by the respondent municipal judge. Meantime, another
municipal judge had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No. 16054. Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside the order of the respondent municipal judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo
having reversed the respondent municipal judge and having directed him to desist from continuing with Criminal Case
No. 16443, the respondent Judge brought the case to the Supreme Court for review on appeal. In affirming the decision
appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy was available to petitioner Yap,
then Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:
To begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless driving with which Diaz stood charged in the court
of first instance is a violation of the Revised Penal Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile Law (Act
No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act No. 587). Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a violation of the same law.
Secondly, reckless driving and certain crimes committed through reckless driving are punishable under different
provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence from the view point of Criminal Law, as distinguished from political or
Constitutional Law they constitute, strictly, different offenses, although under certain conditions, one offense may
include the other, and, accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as
regards the other, as in the Diaz case. (Emphases in the original)
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article
III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
(Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus,
the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is
not included in or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the
law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. 12 Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has
attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the information in case No. 16443, petitioner
could if he failed to plead double jeopardy be convicted of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in which he
has already been acquitted. The information in case No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the place
therein stated, petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated "recklessly and without
reasonable caution" an automobile described in said information. Upon the other hand, the information in case No.
16443, similarly states that, on the same date and in the same place, petitioner drove and operated the
aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as amended by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances." Thus, if
the theories mentioned in the second information were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted
in case No. 16443 of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No. 16054, unless he pleaded
double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred eventually sustaining the theory of petitioner herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by
different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses
charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a
statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are
alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so
long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts
which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of the same
statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under
a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy

provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal
ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the
same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities though one be subordinate to the other
and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention
show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the
two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved.
The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and
a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space.
When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be
reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and
the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as
an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal
ordinance and a national statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the same act or sets of acts that
is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The additional technical element of serious physical injuries
related to the physical consequences of the operation of the automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the
automobile upon the body of the offended party. Clearly, such consequence occurred in the same occasion that the
accused operated the automobile (recklessly). The moral element of negligence permeated the acts of the accused
throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975.
During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices
in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused
conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power
bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The
immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice
plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current
was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses
that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same
offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense
or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional
plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in
the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by
multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras
cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it seems elementary that an
accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an
unlawful act or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to
imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting
essential elements. Under the theory of appellant, the crime of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by
merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88
Phil. at 53; emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent
or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce
as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor
can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas
City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of
that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total
extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 15

It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. It is difficult to
summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the community.
Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise
chose to file an information for an offense which he should have known had already prescribed. We are, however,
compelled by the fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the
private respondent in this case.
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of the right to file a separate civil
action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both before the City Court of Batangas City and the
Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double
jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case, as
we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen electric
current through the installation and use of unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded
not guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power. However, there is
no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the
criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which
dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have appealed 17) before trial could begin. Accordingly,
the related civil action which has not been waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and
converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of judgment conformably with such evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related civil liability be
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated above. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-61079-81 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIA LOREN QUIZADA, appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
It is the interesting combination of double jeopardy and defamation that has brought this case all the way up and
directly to this Court.
In three separate complaints filed with the office of the provincial fiscal of Surigao del Sur, Cipriana B. Tranquilan
accused Maria L. Quizada of having spoken of her, on the occasions therein mentioned, as follows:
Si Nanie ka eyat, boring, bardot, kabiga-on kabit sa akong bana," which words when translated into English mean:
"Nanie is a woman of ill repute, she has a love relationship with my husband, she has taken from me my husband that
is the reason why she did not get married because she is a woman of bad reputation. 1
Si Nanie boring, bardal ka eyat, biga-on, dili na naminggo, nagtan-an sa sine, gikumot and iyang totoy sa akong bana,"
which words when translated into English mean: "Nanie is a woman of ill repute, she will not get married, she went to
the show and her nipples had been squeezed by my husband. 2
Si Nanie boring, bardal ka eyat, biga-on dill na naminggo, nagtan-an sa sine, gikumot ang iyang totoy sa akong bana,"
which words when translated into English mean: "Nanie is a woman of ill repute, she will not get married, she went to
the show and her nipples had been squeezed by my husband. 3
On the basis of these complaints, and after preliminary investigation, the assistant provincial fiscal filed in the Court of
First Instance of Surigao del Sur, on September 14,1981, three separate informations for grave oral defamation against
Quizada for having disparaged Tranquilan in the following language:
Si Nanie ka eyat, boring, bardot, kabiga-on, kabit sa akong bana, nangilog sa aking bana ugsa wala na naminggo kay
hugaw na babae," which words when translated into the English language mean: "Nanie is a flirt, a prostitute, a whore,
a paramour of my husband, she grabbed my husband from me, that's why she is not married because she is a dirty
woman. 4
Si Nanie boring, bardot, ka eyat, dili na maningyo, nagtan-an sa sine, gikumot ang iyong totoy sa akong bana," which
words when translated into English mean: "Nanie is a prostitute, whore, flirt, she will not get married anymore, she
went to the movies and her nipples were touched and squeezed by my husband. 5
Si Nanie, boring, bardot, ka eyat, biga-on dili na namingyot, nagtan-an sa sine, gikumot ang iyang totoy sa akong
bana," which words when translated into English mean: "Nanie is a prostitute, whore, flirt, she will not get married
anymore, she went to the movies and her nipples were touched and squeezed by my husband. 6
Upon arraignment on February 18, 1982, the accused pleaded not guilty to all the three informations. 7 Thereafter, she
moved to quash the same on the ground that the charges should have been initiated not by the fiscal but upon
complaint of the offended party herself. 8
The argument of the accused was that the remarks allegedly made by her imputed to the complaining witness the
crime of adultery, a private crime. Under Rule 110, Section 4 (now Section 5), of the Rules of Court and Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code, no criminal action for defamation imputing such offense "shall be brought except at the
instance of and upon complaint filed by the offended party."
The trial judge * agreed and granted the motion. 9 The charges were dismissed and the motion for reconsideration filed
by the prosecution was denied. 10
The prosecution then came to this Court to challenge the dismissal, and that is how double jeopardy entered the
picture. The private respondent now claims that reversal of the dismissal and reinstatement of the cases would violate
her rights under Article IV, Section 22 (now Article III, Section 21) of the Constitution.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argued that the crime imputed by the alleged remarks was prostitution, a
public offense. As such, it could be the basis of a prosecution for defamation through an information filed by the
fiscal. 11
That is doubtless true. However, the Court notes that in addition to allegedly calling the complainant a whore the
private respondent is also charged in one information with having described the former as "a paramour of my
husband," which is a clear imputation of adultery. A paramour is "one who loves or is loved illicitly. One taking the
place without the legal rights of a husband or wife. A mistress; called also lover." 12 Accordingly, that imputation was
covered by the aforecited Rule 110.
It is not denied that the charges were made through the informations filed by the assistant provincial fiscal and not
formally commenced in court by the offended party. Nevertheless, it is also clear that these informations were based

on the three criminal complaints earlier filed by Tranquilan with the fiscal's office, which conducted the corresponding
preliminary investigation litigation thereon.
Conformably to the procedural rules then in force, 13 the complaints and the records of the preliminary investigation
were transmitted to the trial court upon the filing of the corresponding informations. Hence, although the charges were
not initiated through complaint of the offended party and the informations did not state that they were based on her
complaint, such circumstances did not deprive the respondent court of jurisdiction petition.
A similar situation arose in People v. Rondina,

14

where the Court held:

Under the rule prevailing at the time this case was commenced and tried in 1977, the complaint was considered part
of the record at the preliminary investigation and had to be transmitted to the trial court upon the filing of the
corresponding charge. Such complaint was in fact transmitted as required and could therefore be judicially noticed by
the trial judge without the necessity of its formal introduction as evidence of the prosecution. This conclusion is in
keeping with the doctrine embodied in People v. Perido, decided by the Court of Appeals through Justice Montemayor
(later a member of this Court), who declared in part as follows:
The complaint in the case at bar was duly signed by the mother of the offended party, but the prosecuting attorney
during the trial, failed to introduce such complaint as part of the evidence of the prosecution. Subsequently, however,
said complaint, which is part of the record of the justice of the peace court before whom the case was filed, was sent
up to form part of the record in the appeal. This cured the deficiency in the evidence. Although not introduced in
evidence, the complaint may be regarded as part of the record in the appellate court which can and does take judicial
notice thereof. (Moran's Law of Evidence, p. 343 and Francisco's Evidence, p. 46, both citing the case of People v.
Bautista, G.R. No. 40621 [unpublished]).' (Emphasis supplied.)
We note further that apart from the fact that the offended party's sworn complaint was among the papers elevated to
the Court of First Instance that subsequently tried and decided the case, the information itself expressly stated that it
was being filed 'upon a sworn complaint signed and filed by the offended woman.
Parenthetically, it is worth observing that the original Rule 112, Section 12, of the Rules of Court, provided that upon
the conclusion of the pre investigation the judge or corresponding officer shall transmit without delay to the clerk of
the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the offense the records of the case . . .' By contrast, it is now provided
in Section 8 of the same rule, as revised in 1985, that 'the record of the preliminary investigation whether conducted
by a judge or a fiscall shalll not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court'
The allegation of double jeopardy is plainly without merit. As we have repeatedly stressed, double jeopardy will attach
if (a) a valid complaint or information (b) is filed before a competent court or tribunal, and (c) after the accused shall
have been arraigned and entered a plea, (d) he is acquitted or convicted or the case is dismissed without his express
consent. 15
The first three requisites are present in the case at bar but the fourth is not. It was the petitioner herself who moved to
quash the charges against her on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction. The dismissal was made not only
with her express consent but, indeed, upon her own motion.
There are only two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss the case is made by the
accused himself. The first is when the ground is insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution, and the second is
when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to a speedy trial. 16 None of these
exceptions is present here.
We hold in sum that the criminal informations were validly filed under the procedural rules in force at the time of such
filing; that their dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous; and that their reinstatement willl not violate the
prohibition against double jeopardy.
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the respondent judge dated March 31, 1982, and March 24,
1982, are SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 942, 943 and 944 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37837 August 24, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGOL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Br. IV, and EDGARDO
CABALLAS, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Leovigilio L. Cerilla for respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:
This case commenced on December 27, 1971 in the Municipal Court of Lopez, Quezon where a criminal complaint was
filed against herein private respondent Edgardo Caballas for Serious Physical Injuries allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1971, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening at Magsaysay District,
municipality of Lopez, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
stab one Ernesto Sandoval with unidentified knife thus causing upon the latter physical injuries to wit: 1. Wound,
stabbed, 1 long, penetrating and perforating abdominal cavity, 1 cm to right side of the Xyphoid process, noninvolvement of the internal organs; 2. Wound, stabbed, 3 cm. long, penetrating and perforating posterior abdominal
wall, cutting the terminal portion of the l0th rib, along the posterior axillary line, left which physical injuries will require
medical treatment for a period of more than thirty (30) days and will incapacitate the said Ernesto Sandoval from the
performance of his customary labors for the same period of time. 1
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1972, the accused Cabanas pleaded not guilty. 2 Before the presentation of evidence,
the private prosecutor on February 23, 1972 filed an "Urgent Motion to Amend the Complaint" to charge the offense of
Frustrated Murder, contending that a perusal of the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution patently shows that
in the commission of the act complained of, the accused had the manifest intention to kill the offended party. 3 The
defense, on the other hand, in its Memorandum argued that since the accused had already entered his plea, the Court
could no longer entertain the Motion for amendment of the complaint, the intended amendment being a substantial
one for a grave offense with a higher penalty, citing Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. 4 The Motion
was denied in an Order of the Municipal Court dated April 6, 1972 stating that:
Of course the law just pointed out, the facts of this case as well as the ground raised by the prosecution (that of not
having charged in the complaint the proper offense) do not absolutely rule out the legal propriety of allowing
amendment of the complaint so as to charge the proper offense. Reason, however, exists for a denial of the motion. In
the first place all that is before the Court for its appreciation at this stage of the proceedings is the same evidence
disclosed during the preliminary examination of this case and during that examination the investigating officer had
before him a complaint for Serious Physical Injuries and was limited in his task to determining whether or not the
evidence presented supports a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed as alleged
in the complaint.
In the absence of a clear showing that there is no merit in the charge being investigated because the of the complaint
for a graver offense is warranted by the evidence or unless what was found by the investigating officer to have been
committed is manifestly different from the offense charged there would be no lawful sanction to the investigating
officer's making a declaration that the complaint be amended to charge what may be the proper offense. 5
The case, thereafter, proceeded to trial. Both parties rested their evidence and the case was submitted for
decision.6 No decision on the merits was rendered, however, for in an Order dated November 29, 1972, the. Municipal
Court ruled as follows:
While considering the evidence of this case the court realized that the evidence on the injuries sustained by the
accused and the circumstances surrounding the infliction thereof overwhelmingly point to the conclusion that the
intention of the assailant was to inflict more than just injuries. Hence, the court is restricted by what it considers a
legal obstacle to the validity of whatever judgement it renders, because whether it be one of acquittal or conviction
it shall have so ordered on a case outside its jurisdiction.
The evidence is positive and uncontradicted that the person who inflicted the stab wounds on Ernesto Sandoval had
evidently not by accident but by design, walked with the victim from a certain point on Real Street up to some 400
meters therefrom which is another spot on a quite unfrequented side street; that it was in that spot where the victim

was stabbed four times, two of which hit the victim one, on the abdominal region and another "penetrating and
perforating the posterior abdominal wall cutting the terminal portion of the 10th rib"; that this was at about 7:00
o'clock in the evening of December 1971, at which time it must have been dark already; that the victim was alone, and
that the attack was sudden and treacherous.
It has also been shown that the knife used by the assonant measures about 6 inches in length; that the victim was not
able to walk by himself after having been stabbed but that he had to be carried to the hospital and that while there,
the victim almost lost consciousness. By the medical certificate issued by a physician of the hospital (Magsaysay
Memorial Hospital, Lopez, Quezon) the duration of treatment has been placed at 30 days.
The Court believes that the foregoing evidence would support prima facie a complaint for the crime of frustrated
murder and, as stated, prevents it from rendering judgment in this case. It cannot even rule that the parties have
waived the question of jurisdiction having proceeded with the trial of the case up to its termination as this would be
legally erroneous.
The proceedings in the case, however, may not be considered to have been rendered useless because by it more than
by a mere preliminary investigation, the court has arrived at a better supported finding that the proper complaint
should have been for frustrated murder; that the crime of frustrated murder has been committed and that there is
reason to believe that the accused Edgardo Caballas might have been the one who had committed the same.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed to give way to the filing of a complaint for frustrated
murder. Since the proceedings from the preliminary examination up to the conclusion of the trial hereof has amounted
to a compliance with the requirements of a preliminary investigation first and second stage, let the records hereof be
forwarded to the Court of First Instance at Calauag, Quezon, under the jurisdiction of which court the case for
frustrated murder pertains, through the office of the Provincial Fiscal so that the latter may act on this case and file the
corresponding complaint as above-recommended. 7
In compliance with the foregoing Order, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon on June 6, 1973 filed with the respondent Court,
the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV, an Information for frustrated murder against the same accused
Edgardo Caballas, which alleges:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1971, in the Municipality of Lopez, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Edgardo Caballas, armed with a knife, with intent to
kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab with the said knife one ERNESTO SANDOVAL, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:
1. Wound, stabbed, 1 cm. long, penetrating and perforating abdominal cavity, 1 cm. to right side of the xyphoid
process, non-involvement of the internal organs.
2. Wound, stabbed, 3 cm. long, penetrating and perforating posterior abdominal wall, cutting the terminal portion of
the 10th rib, along the posterior axillary line, left.
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able
medical attendance rendered to said Ernesto Sandoval which prevented his death. 8
On October 22, 1973, the accused moved to quash the above-quoted Information on the ground of double jeopardy.
The Motion was granted by respondent Court ruling that the "Information for Frustrated Murder is essentially barred by
the rules on double jeopardy as defined in Rule 117, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Court," for the reason that:
... accused Edgardo Caballas had been placed in full jeopardy for the crime of Serious Physical Injuries under the
Complaint marked as Exhibit "1" previously filed before the Municipal Court of Lopez, Quezon which was dismissed and
otherwise terminated by the Presiding Judge of said Court after the accused had actually been arraigned and after the
evidence by the prosecution and the defense have all been submitted to the Court and at a time when the parties
have submitted the case for decision. Such being the case a new prosecution of the accused Edgardo Caballas under
the present information for Frustrated Murder which necessarily includes the crime of Serious Physical Injuries as held
by the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, would inevitably place the accused Edgardo Caballas in second
jeopardy for an offense for which he had been previously jeopardized. 9
The foregoing Order is now sought to be reviewed by the instant Petition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.
The sole issue raised is whether or not the dismissal by the Municipal Court of Lopez, Quezon, of the complaint for
serious physical injuries against the accused Edgardo Caballas is a dismissal which bars the filing of the information for
frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance against the same accused on the ground of double jeopardy.
The principle, founded upon reason, justice and conscience, that memo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto is embodied in
the Philippine Constitution as one of the basic rights of the citizens. 10 It is ordained in the Bill of Rights, Article IV, of
the 1973 Constitution that:

Sec. 22. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The same provision is found in Article III, Section 1 (20) of the Constitution of 1935. This constitutional mandate is
restated in Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 9. Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. When a defendant shall have beenconvicted or acquitted,
or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied.)
Commenting on the double jeopardy protection embodied in the Rules of Court, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in
his book "The Bill of Rights", makes the following significant commentary and We quote: " It is to be noted that the
Rules of Court in providing for a motion to quash, did extend further the reach of the double jeopardy protection. If the
literal language of the constitutional provision were followed, either a previous acquittal or conviction is necessary
before such a plea would lie. As already noted, the Rules adopted an expensive view with the mention of the
termination or dismissal of the prosecution without the express consent of the defendant, a stage short of either
acquittal or conviction. In specifying the grounds of a motion to quash, it was explicitly set forth therein that even prior
to such a disposition of the case as above indicated, once jeopardy has attached, a motion to quash would lie."11
In the mind of the Court, the resolution of the instant Petition depends on the correct and proper interpretation and
application of the phrase "dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant" in Section
9, Rule 117, Rules of Court.
The Solicitor General, in his Memorandum for the Petitioner, contends that the aforementioned provision contemplates
a dismissal which finally terminates and definitely disposes of a case, not a provisional or conditional dismissal such as
that order by the Municipal Court in the case at bar. The Government counsel argues that while the Municipal Court
dismissed the complaint for serious physical injuries, the very Order of dismissal shows that it was to be without
prejudice, "to give way to the filing of a complaint for frustrated murder" in the Court of First Instance. Such a
dismissal, it is submitted, is not within the purview of the double jeopardy provision hereinabove cited. The Solicitor
General concludes that the Order of the Court of First Instance in question granting the Motion to quash filed by the
defense is erroneous, invalid, and a nullity, for it deprived the State of its day in court and its duty to prosecute the
accused Edgardo Caballas. 12
On the other hand, the thrust of private respondent's arguments is that the literal language of the subject provision
should be made to prevail, i.e., it is the absence of the express consent of the defendant to the dismissal or
termination of the original criminal case which bars a subsequent prosecution, and wanting such express consent,
jeopardy immediately and irrevocably attaches regardless of the nature or character of the dismissal or termination of
the case. Private respondent contends that if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise than upon the merits at any stage
before judgment without the express consent of the defendant, assuming that all the other requisites of Section 9,
Rule 117 are present, the dismissal of the case shall be definite and a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
Thus, it is argued that although the Municipal Court dismissed the first case for serious physical injuries "to give way to
the filing of a complaint for frustrated murder" in the Court of First Instance, said dismissal was nevertheless definite
and unconditional in law because it was ordered without the express consent of the accused.13
A review of jurisprudence defining double jeopardy is necessary to resolve the legal issue.
In the case of Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452 (1950), this Court held that:
... the dismissal contemplated in the above-quoted section of the rule (referring to Section 9. Rule 113 of the old Rules
of Court, now Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court) is a definite or unconditional dismissal which
terminates the case, and not a dismissal without prejudice as in the present case. In the absence of any statutory
provision to the contrary, we find no reason why the court may not, in the interest of justice, dismiss a criminal case
provisionally, i.e., without prejudice to reinstating it before the order become final or to the subsequent filing of a new
information for the same offense. (Page 454.)
The Jaca ruling was reiterated in People vs. Manlapas et al., L-17993, August 24, 1962, 5 SCRA 883, 887; Republic vs.
Agoncillo, et al., L-27257, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 579, 587; and People vs. Hon. Surtida, et al., L-24420, January 26,
1972, 43 SCRA 29, 37. Moreover, as stated in the aforementioned case of Republic vs. Agoncillo, et al.(supra, p. 588):
... the authoritative pronouncement in the ... case of People vs. Obsania
(L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249), with Justice Castro as ponente, had made clear beyond doubt that for
dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause of the Constitution, it must have the effect of an acquittal Thus: "The

appealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminate the action on the merits, whereas
in Cloribel and in the other related cases the dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to prosecute
presupposed that the Government did not have a case against the accused, who in the first place, is presumed
innocent."
There can be no question, as indeed it is quite clear, that in the case at bar, the Order of dismissal issued by the
Municipal Court did not actually terminate or put an end to the prosecution against herein private respondent for the
felonious act he was alleged to have committed. On the contrary, the dispositive portion of said Order expressly
directed that the records of the case be forwarded to the Court of First Instance so that the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal could file a complaint for frustrated murder.
Private respondent, however, insists that the dismissal must be considered in legal contemplation as a judgment of
acquittal, calling attention to the statement of the Municipal Court in its dismissal Order that "there is reason to believe
that the accused Edgardo Caballas might have been the one who committed the same" (underscoring supplied by
private respondent). This declaration, according to private respondent, gives rise to the inference that the evidence
presented by the prosecution as to the Identity of the offender fell short of proof beyond reasonable doubt and,
therefore, he, as the accused, was entitled as a matter of right to a judgment of acquittal. 14 The inference is baseless
and contrary to the express language of the subject Order. It is evident from a perusal of the Order of dismissal that
the Municipal Court found private respondent guilty of the crime of frustrated murder but refrained from rendering a
judgment of conviction on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense proved by the evidence presented. It was
precisely on the basis of this finding of guilt that the Municipal Court directed that a complaint for frustrated murder be
filed against private respondent in the Court of First Instance.
In a number of cases, this Court has held a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal on the merits, and consequently, a bar
to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint, but in said cases, the dismissal had been predicated either on the failure
of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, 15 or on the right of the accused to a
speedy trial. 16 In the instant case, the right of private respondent as an accused to a speedy trial had never been
invoked. Nor did the Municipal Court find that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of private respondent beyond
reasonable doubt for in fact said Court in effect stated that private respondent was guilty, not only of the crime
charged of serious physical. injuries, but of the graver offense of frustrated murder. There is, therefore, no reason why
the dismissal Order of the Municipal Court should be deemed as a judgment of acquittal of the charge for serious
physical injuries.
The fundamental question then in the case at bar is: Was the dismissal Order terminating the case before respondent
Judge legal and valid? The answer is No. We hold and rule that respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case for
serious physical injuries "to give way to the filing of a complaint for frustrated murder." For it is the duty of the
respondent Judge to render the decision as the evidence presented warrant under the information as filed for serious
physical injuries, and not dismiss the case on his Idea or belief that there was evidence of intent to kill the intended
victim. The Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction thereby rendering his Order
of November 29, 1972 null and void.
In the case of People vs. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121, the trial court dismissed the complaint or information on the ground that
the facts alleged in the information filed in the case do not constitute perjury or a violation of the provisions of Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code. The solicitor General appealed from the Order of dismissal. The Supreme Court, in
setting aside the Order appealed from and declared of no value, the case remanded to the court of origin for an orderly
determination of the case in the manner provided by law, said:
Although not within the express language, there are many known exceptions to the jeopardy rule that have from time
to time been declared by the court. Had the occasion arisen, it is just as reasonable to suppose that an exception to
the rule would have been declared from an unlawful action of the court as it would for the existence of an exception in
case of the insanity of the judge. The accused is no more harmed in the one case than in the other.
Even if following the Ylagan case we should ultimately hold that the accused was placed in jeopardy by her plea we
must hold that the proceedings have not been terminated, as the action of the trial court was without authority and
therefore null and void.
Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null and void, the proceedings before the Municipal
Court have not been lawfully terminated, Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no double
jeopardy. A continuation of the proceedings against the accused for serious physical injuries is in order for as the
Supreme Court said in Flores, Jr. vs. Enrile, 115 SCRA 236:
The constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect
the accused from going through a trial a second time . But, since the first proceedings has not yet been terminated,
there is no second proceeding to speak of, and, therefore, no double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Order of respondent Judge dated
October 25, 1973 quashing the information for frustrated murder is hereby AFFIRMED. The case is, however,
REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Lopez, Quezon for the proper and orderly decision on the charge for serious
physical injuries. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 147814-15. September 16, 2003]

RAUL ZAPATOS Y LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Since the olden times, no impulse has been proven so powerful than that of self-preservation. Thus, the law, out of
tenderness for humanity, permits the taking of life of another in defense of ones person in times of necessity. In the
words of the Romans of ancient history: Quod quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure suo fecisse existimetur.[1]
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[2] dated March 27, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Cases Nos. 17015 and 17016 finding Raul Zapatos, petitioner herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, under Criminal Case No. 17015, the accused RAUL ZAPATOS, is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248, Revised Penal Code and,
considering the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance with no generic aggravating circumstance, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the late
Mayor Leonardo Cortez in the amount of P50,000.00;
Under Criminal Case No. 17016, the same accused, RAUL ZAPATOS, is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, considering the presence of one (1) ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
which is not offset by any generic aggravating circumstance, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of from Six (6) Years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to Twelve (12)
Years and One (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) Months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify SOCRATES PLATERO in the amount of P25,000.00 by way of civil indemnity.
The accused shall pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (Emphases supplied)
In two separate Informations, Special Prosecution Officer Gualberto J. Dela Llana charged both petitioner and Victoriano
Vidal[3] with murder and frustrated murder, committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 17015 (Murder)

That on or about January 14, 1990, at Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public officers, being then an employee and Community
Environment Natural Resources Officer, respectively of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
assigned at Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill and with the use of firearm, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot Leonardo Cortez, Municipal Mayor of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur,
hitting him at the vital parts of his body and inflicting upon said Leonardo Cortez mortal wounds which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the victims heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 17016 (Frustrated Murder)
That on or about January 14, 1990, at Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public officers, being then an employee and Community
Environment Natural Resources Officer, respectively of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
assigned at Bayugan, Agusan del Sur and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, with
intent to kill and with the use of firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot
one Socrates Platero, hitting him at his left leg and inflicting upon said Socrates Platero mortal wound which could
have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical assistance given him to the damage and prejudice of said
victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.[5] Forthwith, trial ensued.[6]
The case for the prosecution is woven basically on the testimony of Socrates Platero as follows: On January 14, 1990,
at 8:00 oclock in the evening, witness Platero and Mayor Leonardo Cortez of Bayugan, Agusan Del Sur were on their
way home from Butuan City.[7] En route, the patrol car they were riding ran out of gasoline, prompting them to stop at
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Monitoring Station, Barangay Maygatasan, Bayugan. With no gasoline to spare,
Station Guard Pfc. Michael Gatillo accompanied them to the nearby Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) checkpoint.[8] There, they found Pacheco Tan. Pfc. Gatillo approached Tan and requested for extra
gasoline. Suddenly, Tan ran towards the guardhouse.[9] After a few seconds, Platero heard a gunshot originating
therefrom. The bullet hit Mayor Cortez, causing him to collapse to the ground. [10] Thereupon, Platero saw petitioner
Raul Zapatos, holding an armalite in a firing position. Platero immediately retaliated and an exchange of gunfire
ensued. During this time, Platero tried to pull Mayor Cortez away from the crossfire. Plateros foot was hit.[11] He did not
see who shot him.[12] He then took cover on the other side of the highway.
Pfc. Gatillo testified that he was the policeman assigned at the BIR Monitoring Station on January 14,1990. [13] At about
8:00 oclock in the evening, he accompanied Platero and Mayor Cortez to the DENR checkpoint to ask for some
gasoline.[14] Upon seeing Tan, he asked him about petitioners whereabouts. Tan replied that petitioner was
sleeping inside the guardhouse.[15] Mayor Cortez also inquired from Tan where petitioner was. Tan merely
reiterated his answer.[16] Then Tan walked towards the guardhouse and in a matter of seconds, he (witness Gatillo)
saw petitioner firing his gun at Mayor Cortez.[17] Mayor Cortez fell to the ground with blood oozing from his mouth.
[18]
Platero attempted to pull Mayor Cortez but another shot was fired and this time, the Mayor was hit on the leg. While
running across the highway to take cover, Platero was also hit on the leg. [19] When the shooting stopped, he (Gatillo)
brought Platero and Mayor Cortez to Bayugan Community Hospital. [20]
Dr. Romeo Cedeo, Chief of the Bayugan Community Hospital, declared that when he attended to Mayor Cortez on
January 14, 1990,[21] the latter was already dead. He did not conduct an autopsy or examine the wounds. He merely
conducted a superficial examination which showed that four (4) wounds had been inflicted upon Mayor Cortez one in
the vicinity of the left nipple, one on the right axillary region, one on the right knee, and another on the left iliac
region.[22]
Building his case on the justifying circumstance of self-defense, petitioner presented a different version. He testified
that he was the Team Leader of the DENR Sentro Striking Force whose primary duty is to seize illegally-cut forest
products.[23] He held office at the DENR checkpoint, Barangay Maygatasan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. On January 14,
1990, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, he instructed Pacheco Tan, his co-worker, to man the checkpoint as he was
sleepy. He also directed Tan to wake him up should there be any problem.[24] While sleeping, a burst of
gunshots awakened him. He saw that the guardhouse was being riddled with bullets, [25] piercing the walls and hitting
some objects inside. Immediately he dropped to the floor and took the armalite rifle from the locker located under his
bed.[26] Hiding behind a barricade, he fired at his attackers. Thereafter, fearing for his life, he broke the flooring of the
guardhouse and crawled through the hollow portion underneath to reach its back door. [27] He walked away until he
reached Nilo Libres' house where he stayed overnight.[28] The next day, he heard the news that Mayor Cortez was
killed.[29] He immediately surrendered himself and his armalite rifle to Sgt. Benjamin Amorio of the Philippine Army
Brigade, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.[30]

Pacheco Tan corroborated petitioners testimony. On the same date and time, petitioner, who was about to sleep,
instructed Tan to take the first shift. While petitioner was sleeping, Pfc. Gatillo, Mayor Cortez and Platero arrived.
[31]
Pfc. Gatillo approached Tan and inquired where petitioner was. He replied that petitioner was sleeping
inside the guardhouse.[32] Pfc. Gatillo returned to the parked patrol car where Mayor Cortez and Platero were
waiting. Tan noticed that there were other policemen within the vicinity.[33] Then, Mayor Cortez and Platero,
each carrying an M-16 rifle, alighted from the vehicle and approached the guardhouse. Again, Mayor Cortez asked
Tan where petitioner was. Again Tan gave him the same answer.[34] Mayor Cortez reacted in disbelief,
saying ah. Suddenly, Tan heard a burst of gunshots directed at the guardhouse. He immediately ducked on the ground
and then ran towards the pasillo leading to the back of the guardhouse.[35] Seized by fear, he was not able to wake
petitioner.[36] He ran away and, upon reaching a banana plantation, stayed there until morning. [37] The next day, he
went to the Chief of Police of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur. [38] He was brought to the Bayugan Police Station so that he could
give a statement regarding the incident. But he refused to sign the typewritten statement prepared by the Bayugan
Police because it pinpoints to petitioner as the killer of Mayor Cortez. He was against such statement because he did
not see petitioner shot Mayor Cortez. [39]
NBI Agent Virgilio Decasa testified that upon inspecting the DENR checkpoint at Maygatasan, Bayugan, he observed
that it was riddled with bullets.[40] The locations of the bullet holes showed that those responsible surrounded the
building.[41] From his investigation, it was Mayor Cortez, together with Platero and Pfc. Gatillo, who approached the
DENR checkpoint. They were followed by several policemen who were instructed by Mayor Cortez to prepare for any
eventuality.[42] He was not able to collect the guns and have them tested by the NBIs ballistic technician because the
policemen refused to submit themselves to an investigation. [43] He recommended that the cases filed against petitioner
be reviewed and/or investigated to prevent injustice. [44]
Lazarito Estorque recounted that on January 14, 1990, at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, he and Mayor Cortez
were having a drinking session at the house of his compadre Bong Kadao. Mayor Cortez, together with his three (3)
policemen, left Kadaos house at 7:00 o clock in the evening. [45]
Consequently, two Informations for frustrated murder and murder, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 414 and 415, were
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch VII, Bayugan Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to this Courts Resolution dated
August 2, 1990, the venue was transferred to the RTC, Branch V, Butuan City where the cases were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 4194 and 4195. Before petitioner could be arraigned, the private prosecutor filed with the RTC a
motion to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in an Order dated March 11, 1991. [46] Petitioner
was then arraigned and pleaded not guilty to both charges.[47]
The private prosecutor filed with this Court a petition for certiorari questioning the order of the RTC, but the same was
dismissed.[48] This time, the public prosecutor filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss [49] on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. On August 9, 1991, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order [50] granting the motion and dismissing Criminal
Cases Nos. 4194 and 4195. This prompted Special Prosecution Officer Dela Llana to file with the Sandiganbayan the
two Informations quoted above.
In this petition, petitioner ascribes to the Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS
ALREADY ATTACHED AND THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES;
B. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED DESPITE OVERWHELMING ABSENCE OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT;
C. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO THE FINDINGS
OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE TESTIMONY OF NBI INVESTIGATING AGENT
VIRGILIO M. DECASA;
D. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
CONTRADICTING TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES SOCRATES PLATERO AND MICHAEL GATILLO;
E. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED;
F. GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING LIABILITY FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED, THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE; AND
G. GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF TREACHERY.
The People counters that since petitioner was on a 24-hour duty as Team Leader of the DENR Sentro Striking Force
when the crimes took place, it follows that his acts were committed in relation to his office. Necessarily, the previous

dismissal of his cases by the RTC could not result in double jeopardy. [51] The presentation of petitioners weapon or the
autopsy report is immaterial considering that both Pfc. Gatillo and Platero positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
[52]
Moreover, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not in any manner affect their
credibility for they merely involve immaterial matters.[53] Lastly, petitioners plea of self-defense cannot be sustained
because of the absence of all its requisites.[54]
The petition is impressed with merit.
First, we shall resolve the issues of jurisdiction and double jeopardy. Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over his cases on the ground that the crimes imputed to him were not committed in relation to his
office.
Well-settled is the principle that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action. [55] Here, the applicable law is Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, [56] as amended by
P.D. No. 1861.[57] Section 4, paragraph (a) thereof provides:
SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In a catena of cases decided under the aegis of P.D. No. 1606, such as Aguinaldo vs. Domagas,[58] Sanchez vs.
Demetriou,[59] Natividad vs. Felix,[60] and Republic vs. Asuncion,[61] we ruled that two requirements must concur under
Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: (1) the offense committed by the
public officer must be in relation to his office; and (2) the penalty prescribed must be higher than prision
correccionalor imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. Obviously, the first requirement is the present
cause of discord between petitioner and the People.
An offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the accuseds office when such office is an element of the
crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official
function of the accused.[62] In Cunanan vs. Arceo,[63] we held:
In Sanchez vs. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term offense
committed in relation to [an accused's] office by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla vs. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People vs. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla vs. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to
the accused's office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a constituent
element of the crime x x x. In People vs. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said
that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a
particular case may show that x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the
accused's] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper
or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime
and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. . . .
The Informations filed with the Sandiganbayan allege that petitioner, then a public officer, committed the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder in relation to his office, i.e., as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of
the DENR.[64] It is apparent from this allegation that the offenses charged are intimately connected with petitioners
office and were perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. In its Resolution[65] dated August
25, 1992, the Sandiganbayan held that petitioner was on duty during the incident; that the DENR Checkpoint was put
up in order to prevent incursions into the forest and wooded area; and that petitioner, as a guard, was precisely
furnished with a firearm in order to resist entry by force or intimidation. Indeed, if petitioner was not on duty at the
DENR checkpoint on January 14, 1990, he would not have had the bloody encounter with Mayor Cortez and his
men.[66] Thus, based on the allegations in the Informations, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
cases.
Significantly, while petitioner had already pleaded not guilty before the RTC, jeopardy did not attach as it did not
acquire jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in court that had no
jurisdiction.[67]
We now go to the substantial merits of the case.

After considering the records very closely, we are constrained to reject the evidence for the prosecution. Jurisprudence
is settled that whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes
incredible and lies outside judicial cognizance. Consistently, we ruled that evidence, to be believed, must proceed not
only from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the
knowledge and common experience of mankind.[68] Here, the prosecution witnesses, Platero and Pfc. Gatillo, are not
credible. Indeed, their testimonies bear the earmarks of falsehood.
First, Plateros tale that Pacheco Tan, who was then on first shift at the DENR checkpoint that day, suddenly ran towards
the DENR Checkpoint when Pfc. Gatillo asked him for some gasoline simply does not make sense. Why would a person
run away with fear for such a simple request? Even former Sandiganbayan Justice Regino Hermosisima, Jr. [69] was
mystified by such a reaction, constraining him to delve deeper into the matter, thus:
Q And you want the Court to understand that immediately after Gatillo asked for gasoline, Pacheco Tan
ran towards inside the BFD monitoring center?
A Yes, he ran away, ran inside.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Look, a person would not run away in fear without any reason why he did. Tell me now why did Pacheco
Tan run away?
A I do not know.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Will you tell me whether Cael or you pointed your guns at Pacheco Tan?
A No.
Q You did not. You cannot tell me why Pacheco Tan ran inside, why was he scared?
A I do not know.[70]
Surely, we cannot accept a story that defies reason and leaves much to the imagination. Plateros failure to lend a
touch of realism to his tale leads us to the conclusion that he was either withholding an incriminating information or
was not telling the truth. As it turned out, Tan rushed towards the back of the guardhouse because of the sudden burst
of gunfire directed at that place. In short, he fled for his life.
Second, it is highly doubtful that obtaining some gasoline was the real object of Mayor Cortez, Platero and Pfc. Gatillo
in going to the DENR checkpoint. Strangely, their conduct, upon arriving at that place, showed their concern
more on the whereabouts of petitioner than whether there was gasoline to spare. Pfc. Gatillo, testifying for
the prosecution, admitted during cross-examination that he did not hear Mayor Cortez and Platero ask for gasoline. All
that he heard was Mayor Cortez inquiry regarding petitioners whereabouts, thus:
Q You said that Pacheco Tan went inside to get Raul Zapatos, is it not a fact that when Mayor Cortez
arrived at the DENR monitoring station, he asked Pacheco Tan where Raul Zapatos was?
A Yes, sir.
Q And precisely Pacheco Tan told Mayor Cortez that Raul Zapatos is inside the room sleeping?
A Yes sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q But you did not hear at any time the conversation between Pacheco Tan and the late Mayor Cortez,
with Mayor Cortez asking Pacheco Tan for gasoline, is that right?
A No, more Sir.
Q And at any time before the shooting incident you did not hear Socrates Platero asking Pacheco Tan for
gasoline, is that right?
A No, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing you heard in reference to the accused Raul Zapatos was that Mayor
Cortez was looking for Zapatos because he wanted to talk with Zapatos, is that right?

A Yes, sir.[71]
The above testimony strongly confirms Tans narration that Pfc. Gatillo and Mayor Cortez only asked him where
petitioner was.[72] Nothing was ever mentioned about the gasoline. Notably, Platero, in his Affidavit executed the
day after the incident, stated that he and the Mayor went to the DENR checkpoint because Mayor Cortez wanted to
see Raul Zapatos because he is the team leader of the DENR Monitoring Station. Again, the gasoline was not alluded
to.
Corollarily, this brings us into a quandary what could have been the reason why Mayor Cortez, Platero and Pfc. Gatillo
were looking for petitioner on the night of January 14, 1990? The records bear out that the relationship between Mayor
Cortez and petitioner was not friendly. There were several occasions when their interests clashed Mayor Cortez, as the
owner of a sawmill, and petitioner, as a forest law enforcer. In his Sworn Statement[73] dated March 17, 1990, petitioner
declared, among others, that previously, he apprehended the Mayors men several times for illegally cutting and
transporting flitches belonging to the Mayor and his family, thus:
Q 20: After realizing that Mayor CORTEZ was the one who led the attack of the DENR CENTRO Strike Force
Headquarters, what could be the reason why the Mayor and his men attacked your headquarters?
A 20: I believe that Mayor CORTEZ became angry with me because of the previous apprehensions of
illegally cut and transported flitches which belonged to them, I mean, to that of Mayor CORTEZ family.
Q 21: Why, did the then Mayor also engaged (sic) in logging?
A 21: In one instance, we apprehended a truckload of illegally transported flitches and the document
presented showed that they were consigned to the CORTEZ sawmill in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur.
Q 22: Are there instances also that the mayor intervened in any way in the apprehensions of these
illegally cut and transported logs?
A 22: Sometime in September, 1989, when we apprehended a truck load of illegally cut and transported
flitches, Mayor CORTEZ requested that the truck carrying the flitches be turned over to his custody which
truck was the regular carrier of flitches consigned to their sawmill. The request was granted by CENRO
VIDAL and the proper documents for the turn over of custody were properly made. After that, during the
month of October, 1989, we again apprehended the same truck previously turned over to the custody of
Mayor again carrying illegally cut and transported flitches which I believe angered the Mayor.
Also, three (3) days before the incident at the CENRO Strike Force Headquarters in Maygatasan, I also had a
confrontation with an Army soldier acting as Security of Mayor CORTEZ, one named DANNY GESTA.
Q 23: Will you narrate what that confrontation was all about?
A 23: On January 11, 1990, while I was outside of the DENR CENRO Strike Force Headquarters repairing my motorcycle,
a truck loaded with illegally cut flitches just passed our Headquarters without stopping at our headquarters for
inspection so when the truck came back, I stopped the same truck and called the driver and asked him who is the
owner of the flitches. The driver told me that the flitches belonged to DANNY GESTA and when I asked him
where he took the flitches, he told me that he took the flitches to the sawmill of the CORTEZ. When I asked
him who escorted it, the driver told me that it was one named NONO so I told the driver to tell NONO to come to our
Headquarters so we could talk. On the following day, when I went to a shop owned by MAWE RABUYA for consultation
of my motorcycle, DANNY GESTA was there. I requested MAWE RABUYA to take a look of my motorcycle for any defect
and it was at this instance that DANNY GESTA approached me and told me and to quote: UNSA MANG KA NGA IMO
MANG KONG IPAREPORT-REPORT SA IMO. WALA MANG GANI MAKAPA-REPORT ANG CORONEL SA AKO. I then told and
explained to DANNY GESTA that it was not him whom I wanted to talk and report to me but NONO. DANNY GESTA
suddenly stood up and told me and to quote: PUTANG INA KA! BUK-ON NAKO NANG ULO NIMO. To avoid further
argument, I told MAWE that I better go and I left.
Q 24: What did you do after that confrontation with DANNY GESTA?
A 24: Because of what DANNY GESTA told me, I stayed at the Headquarters at Maygatasan, Bayugan until the incident
on January 14, 1990 when our Headquarters was attacked.
Even NBI Agents Atty. Decasa and Ali C. Vargas found that Mayor Cortez had an ulterior motive of revenge against
petitioner, thus:
x x x The investigating agents are inclined to believe that the late Mayor Cortez must have some ulterior
motive of revenge in going to the headquarters at that late hour of the night, armed with high-powered
guns, together with policemen and bodyguards, and under the influence of liquor, especially so that it is
of public knowledge that he had been harboring hatred towards ZAPATOS who had exhibited antagonism
to his illegal activities.[74]

Third, the account of Pfc. Gatillo and Platero that petitioner suddenly came out of the guardhouse and shot Mayor
Cortez a matter of seconds after Tan ran towards the place is incredible.[75] For one, both the prosecution and the
defense witnesses testified that petitioner was sleeping inside the guardhouse. For another, Tan did not
have the chance to wake petitioner prior to the shoot-out. The prosecution witnesses admitted this fact.
Even before Tan could enter the guardhouse, he already heard the burst of gunfire coming from outside of the
checkpoint, prompting him to immediately run towards the backside of the guardhouse. Now, to say that petitioner
suddenly sprang from his slumber and shot Mayor Cortez without any reason is certainly at odds with
common experience.
Contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, the totality of the contradictions, inconsistencies and flaws in the
declarations of Platero and Pfc. Gatillo does not simply refer to minor or inconsequential details which may be
justifiably overlooked, nor are they honest lapses which do not affect or impair the intrinsic value of their
testimony. They relate instead to points material and essential to establish petitioners culpability. The obliquity that
pervades the prosecutions account of the incident creates the impression that it was rehearsed and concocted.
In contrast, the consistent testimonies of the defense witnesses, as well as the existing physical evidence, lend strong
support to petitioners plea of self-defense.
It is basic that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be unlawful aggression
by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there
was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. [76]
All the aforestated requisites are present in this case. That there was unlawful aggression is clearly shown by the
bullet-riddled guardhouse. It speaks eloquently than a hundred witnesses.[77] We are convinced that Mayor Cortez,
Platero and Pfc. Gatillo insisted to know petitioners whereabouts and that upon learning that he was sleeping,
executed the tyrannical attack. That they went to the DENR checkpoint with ready police back-up for any
eventuality was proven not only by Pacheco Tan, but also by Lazarito Estorque and NBI Agent Decasa. Clearly, they
proceeded to the checkpoint not on a mission of peace.
Taking into consideration the number of the aggressors, the nature and quality of their weapons, and the manner of
the assault and the fact that petitioner was alone, we believe that petitioners use of an armalite rifle to defend himself
is reasonable.
Finally, that there was lack of sufficient provocation on petitioners part is evidenced by the testimonies of the defense
witnesses that he was sleeping inside the guardhouse prior to the initial shooting. Significantly, no evidence
whatsoever was presented showing that he assaulted or provoked his aggressors into attacking him.
Petitioners act of surrendering himself and his weapon to the authorities immediately the day after the incident
dissipates any conjecture that he had a criminal mind when he fired his gun upon the victims. His courage to face his
accuser, in spite of the opportunity to flee, indicates his innocence.
Thus, while it is true that the "factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are even conclusive
and binding to this Court, this principle does not apply here. The findings of facts of the Sandiganbayan are not
sufficiently established by evidence, leaving serious doubts in our minds regarding the culpability of petitioner.
In sum, we find that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of herein petitioner
for murder and frustrated murder. What is apparent is that Mayor Cortez and his men were the aggressors.Petitioner,
who was just awakened by the gunfire, was justified in firing back at them. His act is in accordance with mans natural
instinct to save his life from impending danger. We cannot expect him to simply retreat or wait for the bullet to hit and
kill him.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 27, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED and petitioner is ACQUITTED of
the crimes of murder and frustrated murder.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to cause the release of petitioner unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another crime and to inform this Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133036

January 22, 2003

JOY LEE RECUERDO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before us for review is the July 16, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 20577 affirming that rendered
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City which in turn affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67 convicting Joy Lee Recuerdo (petitioner) for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The
Bouncing Checks Law) on 5 counts.
From the evidence of the prosecution, the following facts are established:
Sometime in the first week of December 1993, Yolanda Floro (Yolanda) who is engaged in jewelry business sold a 3karat loose diamond stone valued at P420,000.00 to petitioner who gave a downpayment of P40,000.00. In settlement
of the balance of the purchase price, petitioner issued 9 postdated checks, 8 of which in the amount of P40,000.00,
and 1 in the amount of P20,000.00, all drawn against her account at the Prudential Bank. 1
When Yolanda deposited 8 of the 10 checks to her depository bank, Liberty Savings and Loan Association, only 3, those
dated December 25, 1993, January 25, 1994, and February 25, 1994, were cleared. The remaining 5 were dishonored
due to the closure of petitioners account.2
Yolanda thus went to petitioners dental clinic and advised her to change the dishonored checks to cash. Petitioner
promised alright but she welshed on it.3
A demand letter4 was thereupon sent to petitioner for her to settle her obligation but she failed to heed the
same,5hence, the filing of 5 informations6 against her for violation of B. P. 22 at the Makati MeTC, the accusatory
portion of the first of which reads:
That sometime in the first week of December, 1993, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make out, drawn (sic) and issue to YOLANDA G. FLORO to apply on account or for value the check described
below:
Check No.

008789

Drawn
Against

Prudential
Bank

In the
Amount of

P40,000.00

Postdated/da July 25,

ted
1994
Payable to

Cash

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said account did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee
the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receiving
said notice."
Except for the check numbers and dates of maturity, the four other informations are similarly worded.
After trial, Branch 67 of the Makati MeTC convicted petitioner in a Joint Decision 7 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 on five (5) counts and therefore sentences the accused to suffer an imprisonment of 30 days for

each count and to restitute the amount of P 200,000.00 to Miss Yolanda G. Floro, which is the total amount of the five
(5) checks, and to pay her also the amount of P20,000.00 as damages to compensate the payment of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.8
As stated early on, the RTC, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the MeTC. 9 And the Court of Appeals10 affirmed that of
the RTC.
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioner proffers as follows:
"1. Petitioner was convicted by an invalid law which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for being an unconstitutional law.
2. Petitioner was denied her constitutional right to due process for failure of the courts a quo to uphold her
presumption of innocence and for convicting her even if the prosecution evidence does not prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
3. The findings of fact of the courts a quo, primarily the Court of Appeals, are based on surmises, conjectures and
speculations.
4. The Court of Appeals was biased against petitioner when it denied the petition moto propio (sic) without the
comment of the Office of the Solicitor General."11
Petitioner contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentment of dishonored checks as they impose a
penalty for each, only creditors/payees are unduly favored by the law; that the law "is in essence a resurrected form of
19th century imprisonment for debt" since the drawer is coerced to pay his debt on threat of imprisonment even if his
failure to pay does not arise from malice or fraud or from any criminal intent to cause damage; 12 and that the law is a
bill of attainder13 as it does not leave much room for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having already
been decided by the legislature.14
These matters subject of petitioners contention have long been settled in the landmark case of Lozano v.
Martinez15 where this Court upheld the constitutionality of B. P. 22:
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.16 (Emphasis supplied)
The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment without trial and the essence of which
is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt, 17 fails. For under B. P. 22, every element of the
crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction for violation thereof.
Reinforcing her thesis, petitioner cites the speech made by now Vice-President Teofisto Guingona delivered before the
Philippine Bar Association wherein he stressed the need to review the law since it has not prevented the proliferation
of bouncing checks.18
As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, however, while due deference is given to the opinion of the VicePresident, the same should properly be addressed to the legislature which is in a better position to review the
effectiveness and usefulness of the law.19 As held in the case of Lozano,20 it is not for the Court to question the wisdom
or policy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between the means and the end.
Petitioner further claims that the dishonored checks were not issued for deposit and encashment, 21 nor was there
consideration therefor, in support of which she cites her alleged agreement with Yolanda that she could have the
stone appraised to determine the purchase price,22 and since she found out that it is only worth P160,000.00, 23there
was no longer any need to fund the remaining checks which should be returned to her. 24 Yolanda, however, so
petitioner adds, could no longer be reached.25 Petitioner thus concludes that she had already paid in full the purchase
price of the stone, she having paid P40,000.00 cash plus the P120,000.00 proceeds of the three cleared checks. 26
Petitioners submission does not lie. Such alleged agreement does not inspire belief. The terms and conditions
surrounding the issuance of the checks are irrelevant.27
"A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any
other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that "any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently dishonored x x x shall be punished by
imprisonment."28 (Emphasis supplied.)

"BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its
primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes
for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued,
or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be
made."29 (Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, petitioner argues that as no bank representative testified as to "whether the questioned checks were
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds (sic)," such element was not clearly and convincingly proven, 30 hence, the trial
court failed to uphold her right to presumption of innocence when she was convicted based on the sole testimony of
Yolanda.
Whether the checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, or "Account Closed" as alleged in the informations
and testified on by Yolanda,31 petitioners argument is untenable.
"It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee banks representative as a
witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as
it did in this case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged. She is
competent and qualified witness to testify that she deposited the checks to her account in a bank; that she
subsequently received from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation drawn against insufficient funds
stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly
given to the complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or make arrangements
for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the
drawee bank."32 (Emphasis supplied)
Yolandas testimony that when she deposited the checks to her depository bank they were dishonored due to "Account
Closed"33 thus sufficed. In fact, even petitioners counsel during trial admitted the dishonor, and on that ground. 34
Finally, petitioner imputes bias on the part of the appellate court when it decided her petition for review without the
comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.
The rendition of the decision by the appellate court without the comment of the People-Appellee is not by itself proof of
bias. In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General gave its comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of
the appellate courts decision.
In fine, the affirmance of petitioners conviction is in order.
Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not be imposed on those found guilty of violating B.P.
Blg. 22. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 issued on February 14, 2001 vests in the courts the discretion to
determine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, whether the imposition of fine alone
would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise contrary to the imperatives of justice. 35
In the case at bar, this Court notes that no proof, nay allegation, was proffered that petitioner was not a first time
offender. Considering this and the correctness of the case, it would best serve the interests of justice if petitioner is
just fined to enable her to continue her dental practice so as not to deprive her of her income, thus insuring the early
settlement of the civil aspect of the case, not to mention the FINE.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO guilty of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
In lieu of imprisonment, accused-herein petitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO, is ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to double
the amount of each dishonored check subject of the five cases at bar. And she is also ordered to pay private
complainant, Yolanda Floro, the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos representing the total amount
of the dishonored checks.
SO ORDERED.