2013 UPDATES IN CRIMINAL LAW

& SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

by:

OSCAR B. PIMENTEL
Judge (Ret.) / Professor
Ateneo Law School
University of Faculty Law
Arellano Law School

PEOPLE vs. REY MONTICALVO Y MAGNO

G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013

MENTAL RETARDATION OF THE VICTIM

NEED NOT BE ALLEGED IN RAPE AS
LONG AS THERE IS A FINDING IN THE
RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS ATTACHED
TO THE INFORMATION.
x x x In People v. Rosare, the information did not allege that the victim was a
mental retardate which is an essential element of the crime of statutory rape. This
Court however sustained the trial courts judgment of conviction holding that the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor which formed the basis of the information,
a copy of which is attached thereto, stated that the offended party is suffering from
mental retardation. It ruled that there was substantial compliance with the mandate
that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Thus:
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of statutory rape because the fact
that the victim was a mental retardate was never alleged in the information and,
absent this element, the acts charged negate the commission of the offense for
which he was convicted by the lower court.
Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, we have decided to motu
proprio take cognizance of the resolution issued by the investigating prosecutor in
I.S. No. 92-0197 dated June 2, 1992, which formed the basis of and a copy of
which was attached to the information for rape filed against herein appellant.
Therein, it is clearly stated that the offended party is suffering from mental
retardation. We hold, therefore, that this should be deemed a substantial
compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the
nature of the charge against him x x x (citation omitted). [Emphasis supplied].
In this case, both the Complaint and the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of
Northern Samar, which formed the basis of the Information and copies of which
were attached in the records, stated that AAA is suffering from mental
abnormalities she looked like a retardate and her focus is not normal. Even, the
Resolution of the Acting Provincial Prosecutor concurred with the aforesaid findings.
From the aforesaid, it can be gleaned that AAAs mental disorder or mental
disability is that of being a mentally retarded and not demented. Thus, there was
substantial compliance with the mandate to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation. More so, as discussed hereunder, the prosecution was able to prove

that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate. Even the appellant affirmed the said
mental condition of the victim.

WHAT
COMPRISES
REASON IN RAPE?

DEPRIVED

OF

To repeat, the term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass those
suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation. Hence, carnal
knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under subparagraph (b) not subparagraph
(d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
PENALTY FOR RAPE OF A RETARDATE
As to penalty. Under Article 266-B in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. However,
when rape is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of the victims mental
retardation, the penalty is increased to death. But this circumstance must be
alleged in the information being a qualifying circumstance which increases the
penalty to death and changes the nature of the offense from simple to qualified
rape. In the case at bench, while appellant categorically admitted that he knew
AAA to be suffering from mental abnormalities, the prosecution failed to allege this
fact in the information. As such, even if it was proved, it cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance. Thus, appellants conviction is only for simple rape for
which he should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Nonetheless, a reasonable ground exists in this case that calls for the modification
of the penaltyof reclusion perpetua imposed by both lower courts upon the
appellant.
This Court finds merit in appellants assertion that he was a minor during the
commission of the crime charged. During trial, upon order of the trial court, the
Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar, brought before it their office
records, particularly appellants Certificate of Live
Birth containing the fact of birth of the latter. Appellants Certificate of Live Birth
shows that he was born on 23 February 1985. Indeed, at the time of the
commission of the crime charged on 9 December 2002, appellant was only 17 years
old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which
specifically states that:
ART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.
When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming

under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE UNDER RA 9344, AS AMENDED
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in
the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. [Emphasis supplied].
However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 provides that suspension of
sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the
said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds
that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for
execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child
in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. [Emphasis supplied].
At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the trial court
was promulgated prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344. Therefore, the
application of Sections 38 and 40 of the said law is already moot and academic.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act No. 9344,
the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even
to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long as he/she committed
the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No.
9344 in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a

productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law
at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What
matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender
age. The appellant, therefore, shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of
convicted children as follows:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other
Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.

PEOPLE VS. BENJAMIN PETELUNA, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013
WHERE OLD AGE (57 YEARS OLD) IS A
CIRCUMSTANCE
AMOUNTING
TO
TREACHERY IF ATTACHED.
Records would show that Pablo was fifty-seven (57) years old at the time of his
death. Admittedly, ones thought processes and reflexes slow with age that Pablo
did not readily understand the intentions of the appellants. The attack was,
therefore, clearly sudden and unexpected.
In the case of People v. Sinda, the Court had the occasion to further illustrate the
attendance of treachery in a situation where the defenseless victims had already
fallen to the ground and there was no risk to the assailant against any attack from
the victims thereby facilitating the execution of the commission of the crime. Thus:
The appellants, in waylaying the victims, obviously employed a mode of attack
which was deliberately designed to insure the death of their victims without any risk
they could have made against them. Felix and Rogelio were both unarmed at the
time the appellants pelted the two with stones. It must be stressed that when the
victims fell on the ground after the appellants threw stones at them, there was no
danger on the part of the appellants of any attack from the victims. The victims
were not in a position to defend themselves at the time appellant Gaspar hacked
them on their necks. In other words, the method employed by the accused insured
his safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victims.
(Emphasis supplied)
WHEN EVIDENT PREMEDITATION IS PRESENT

We agree with the appellants, however, that the prosecution failed to establish the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. Such could only
be appreciated if there was evidence to show the following:
(1) the time when the offender [was] determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself
time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
PEOPLE VS. RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA,"
G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013
STABBING A VICTIM WHILE CYCLING IS
TREACHERY
Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellants act of suddenly
stabbing Florendo while he was innocently cycling along Sampaguita Street,
Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constituted the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Here, appellant surprised Florendo when he suddenly and swiftly attacked and
stabbed him in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless to
protect himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without risk to his own
person. Thus, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime.

RAUL B. ESCALANTE, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

THEHONORABLECOURTOF APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL TWENTIETH DIVISION
and EIGHTEENTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS,
CEBU CITY,
G.R No. 192727, January 9, 2013
WHEN ERRONEOUS PENALTY CANNOT
BE CHANGED.
Nevertheless, considering that the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision and March 4, 2009
Resolution had already attained finality on account of the petitioners failure to
timely file a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the Court may no
longer modify the penalty imposed by the lower courts no matter how obvious the
error may be. "Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of

judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,
and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court
that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.MELBA L. ESPIRITU, PRIMITIVA M. SERASPE,

SIMPRESUETA M. SERASPE, a.k.a. "Aileen,"
G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013

THE MEANING OF INSTIGATION

"Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no
intention to commit, in order to prosecute him." It differs from entrapment which is
the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a criminal. In
instigation, the criminal intent to commit an offense originates from the inducer and
not from the accused who had no intention to commit and would not have
committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In entrapment, the
criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law enforcers merely
facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes. 45 Instigation
results in the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment may lead to prosecution
and conviction.

NELSON VALLENO y LUCITO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R No. 192050, January 9, 2013
WHEN NON-COMPLIANCE OF SEC. 21 OF
RA 9165 DOES NOT AFFECT THE
INTEGRITY OF EVIDENCE
Petitioner highlights the following acts of non-compliance with the aforementioned
rule: 1) there was failure to present the alleged photographs of the seized
substance in court; 2) there were no representatives from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) during the conduct of the inventory of the seized
items; 3) there was a major contradiction from among prosecution witnesses on
who actually brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory; and 4) the
manner of conducting the physical inventory of the alleged drugs taken from

petitioners house appeared to be irregular as the seized items were allowed to be

handled by persons not authorized to do so.
The Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9165 offer some flexibility when a
proviso added that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."
In People v. Concepcion, this Court ruled that the failure to submit in evidence the
required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph, as well as the
absence of a member of media or the DOJ, pursuant to Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the instant case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not broken.
The prosecution established that PO3 Edrano recovered the white plastic sachets,
later on confirmed positive for traces of shabu. PO3 Edrano handed them over to
PO3 Villano, who made markings on the seized items and prepared an inventory of
the same while inside petitioners house. It was also shown that PO3 Villano
brought the seized illegal drugs to the police station where he himself prepared the
inventory. While he presented the same to a certain PO3 Molina, it was still PO3
Villano and SPO4 Fabiano who first brought the seized illegal drugs to the court,
who in turn ordered him to bring it to the PNP Crime Laboratory. In the letter
request addressed to the forensic chemist, it was PO3 Villano who signed as the
requesting party. Clearly therefore, the recovery and handling of the seized illegal
drugs were more than satisfactorily established in this case.
MEANING OF THE TWO (2) WITNESSES
RULE IN SEARCH OF PREMISES, ETC. (I
DISAGREE)
Finally, there was nothing irregular in the conduct of search of petitioners house.
There were variations in the witnesses testimonies as to whether petitioner was
inside the house during the search. One witness testified that petitioner was coming
in and out of the house during the search while the other witnesses claimed that
petitioner was waiting just outside the house. Assuming that petitioner was indeed
outside the house, it does not taint the regularity of the search. Section 8, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court allows the absence of the lawful occupant provided that two
witnesses are present.
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family

or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.
The presence of the two barangay officials was not disputed by petitioner.
elucidated by the appellate court:

As

As correctly found by the trial court, accused-appellant and his wife were not
prevented from entering their house to observe the search conducted therein. This
is bolstered by the testimonies of police officers. Thus, PO3 Villano testified on
cross-examination that the wife of the accused was inside, watching x x x. Likewise,
P/C Insp. Perfecto de Lima, Jr. Testified that the accused-appellant and his wife
went in and out of their house while the team was conducting a search inside said
house: that Valleno and his wife stood outside and sometimes, came in while the
search was being conducted; and that before the search the Valleno spouses were
requested not to go inside the house but during the search they kept going in and
out of said house. In addition, the search was conducted in the presence of two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, in the
persons of Brgy. Kgd. Reynaldo Brito and Chief Tanod Wilfredo Brito. Resultantly,
the seized items cannot, therefore, be considered as "fruits of the poisonous tree."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. PEDRO BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO,

G.R. No. 170634, January 8, 2013

HOW TO ESTABLISH AGE OF MINOR

VICTIM OR AS AN ELEMENT OF CRIME
OR AS QUALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCE
To establish the age of the minor victim, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance, the Court has set the guidelines in People v. Pruna, as
follows:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases,
we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth
of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity

or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree

such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of
the victim.
In Criminal Case No. 912-V-99, the amended information alleged that AAA
was only ten years old when the rape was committed in April 1999 and
that she was the daughter of the accused. During the trial, however, the
Prosecution adduced no evidence to establish her minority save her
testimony and that of her mothers. In the absence of proof of AAAs
minority in accordance with the guidelines set in People v. Pruna, we
concur with the CAs conclusion that he could not be properly found guilty
of qualified rape. Indeed, his substantial right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him would be nullified otherwise.
Accordingly, the CA correctly prescribed reclusion perpetua as the penalty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HONG YENG E
and TSIEN TSIEN CHUA,
G.R. No. 181826, January 9, 2013

FAILURE TO OBSERVE INVENTORY,

PHOTOGRAPHING OF DRUGS IS NOT
FATA TO THE PROSECUTION.

10

Three. As to the accuseds argument that the NBI operatives failed to observe the
chain of custody rule in dangerous drugs cases, we do not agree. The alleged
failure of the apprehending team to inventory and photograph the confiscated items
immediately after the operation, is not fatal to the prosecutions cause. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be used in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Here, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs had been preserved as there is evidence to account for the crucial links in the
chain of custody of the seized shabu, starting from its confiscation to its
presentation as evidence in the RTC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FLORENCIO AGACER,* EDDIE AGACER,
ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and ERIC*** AGACER,
G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013

MINOR
ENTITLED
TO
PRIVILEGE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
As a Minor, Franklin is Entitled to the Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority.
Nevertheless, we agree with appellants that Franklin is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority. Franklins Certificate of Live Birth shows that
he was born on December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime on April 2, 1998. He is therefore entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the
Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and
under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed on the accused but always in the proper period. The rationale of the law in
extending such leniency and compassion is that because of his age, the accused is
presumed to have acted with less discernment. This is regardless of the fact that
his minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was
belatedly presented for our consideration, since to rule accordingly will not
adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.
DEATH ESTINGUISHES CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL LIABILITY
The Death of Florencio Prior to Our Final Judgment Extinguishes His Criminal
Liability and Civil Liability Ex Delicto.
On the effect of the death of appellant Florencio on his criminal liability, Article
89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished.

11

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
It is also settled that "upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."
While Florencio died way back on February 7, 2007, the said information was not
timely relayed to the Court, such that we were unaware of the same when we
rendered our December 14, 2011 Decision. It was only later that we were informed
of Florencios death through the June 8, 2012 letter of the Officer-in- Charge of the
New Bilibid Prison. Due to this development, it therefore becomes necessary for us
to declare Florencio 's criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to have
been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment. The judgment or conviction
is thus set aside insofar as Florencio is concerned.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LINDA ALVIZ y YATCO and ELIZABETH DE LA

VEGA y BAUTISTA,
G.R. No. 177158, February 6, 2013

DUTY OF APPREHENDING TEAM AFTER

SEIZURE OF DRUGS
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof. (Emphases supplied.)
The above rule is implemented by Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations which expounds on how it is to be applied, and notably, also provides
for a saving mechanism in case the procedure laid down in the law was not strictly
complied with:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any

12

elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said item. (Emphasis ours).

CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF DRUGS DEFINED.

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
NEW CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF SEIZED DRUGS IS ESTABLISHED
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same. (Citations omitted.)
In several cases, the Court found that the chain of custody of the seized drugs in a
buy-bust operation had been sufficiently established when there was proof of the
following: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
FAILURE
OF
POLICE
TO
MAKE
INVENTORY REPORT AND PHOTOGRAPH

13

THE
SEIZED
DRUGS,
AUTOMATICALLY FATAL.

NOT

Given the law, rules, and jurisprudence, the failure of the police officers to make an
inventory report and to photograph the drugs seized from Linda and Elizabeth, as
required by Article II, Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not
automatically fatal to the prosecution's case, as it was able to trace and prove the
chain of custody of the same: after arresting Linda and Elizabeth during the buybust operation, the police officers brought the two women to the police station; at
the police station, P02 lbasco, who acted as the poseur-buyer, marked the sachet of
suspected shabu he received from Linda and Elizabeth during the buy-bust with his
initials "EV -LA" and turned over the same to P/Insp. Villanueva; P/Insp. Villanueva
prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the sachet; P02
Ibasco delivered the Request for Laboratory Examination and the sachet of
suspected shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory, CPDCLO, Quezon City, where the
Request and specimen were received by P02 Piau; the contents of the sachet were
examined by Forensic Analyst Jabonillo, who prepared Chemistry Report No. D-1982003, confirming that the specimen tested positive for shabu28 and lastly, during
the trial, the marked sachet of shabu, as well as the marked money used in
purchasing the same, were presented as evidence and identified by P02 Ibasco and
SP04 Reburiano.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. NOEL BARTOLOME y BAJO,

G.R. No. 191726, February 06, 2013
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSTIGATION
AND ENTRAPMENT.
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the
employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a
lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce,
instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would
otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of
the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the
criminal by employing ruses and schemes.
CASES WHERE COURT RECOGNIZED
INSTIGATION AS A VALID DEFENSE
People v. Doria enumerated the instances when this Court recognized instigation as
a valid defense, and an instance when it was not applicable:

14

In United States v. Phelps, we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking
opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually
induced him to commit the crime in order to persecute him. Smith, the BIR agent,
testified that Phelps apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say
that he like smoking opium on some occasions. Smiths testimony was disregarded.
We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused
three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could
smoke this drug. The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most
reprehensible." In People v. Abella, we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling
explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who
pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very
high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found there was
inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside
of his testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused.
In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and
agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offenders, which is made difficult by the secrecy with which
drug-related offenses are conducted and the many devices and subterfuges
employed by offenders to avoid detection. On the other hand, the Court has taken
judicial notice of the ugly reality that in cases involving illegal drugs, corrupt law
enforcers have been known to prey upon weak, hapless and innocent persons. The
distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be crucial. The
balance needs to be struck between the individual rights and the presumption of
innocence on one hand, and ensuring the arrest of those engaged in the illegal
traffic of narcotics on the other.
WHEN INFORMANT SHOULD TESTIFY.
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as a witness is not regarded as
indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule,
the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to
protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts.
Thereby, the confidentiality of the informants identity is protected in deference to
his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the
informant is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit
should the need to protect his security be disregarded.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 21 OF RA
9165 MUST BE QUESTIONED AT THE
TRIAL, OTHERWISE WAIVED.
Although it appears that the buy-bust team did not literally observe all the
requirements, like photographing the confiscated drugs in the presence of the
accused, of a representative from the media and from the Department of Justice,
and of any elected public official who should be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of it, whatever justification the members of the buybust team had to render in order to explain their non-observance of all the

15

requirements would remain unrevealed because the accused did not assail such
non-compliance during the trial. He raised the matter for the first time only in the
CA. As such, the Court cannot now dwell on the matter because to do so would be
against the tenets of fair play and equity. That is what the Court said in People v.
Sta. Maria, to wit:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation
in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant
did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed,
the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165
were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on
appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were
lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and
evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal.
We point out that the non-adherence to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 was not a serious flaw that would make the arrest of the accused illegal or
that would render the shabu subject of the sale by him inadmissible as evidence
against him. What was crucial was the proper preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized shabu, inasmuch as that would be significant in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ

and EDWIN VALDEZ,
G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013

MERE ALLEGATIONS OF TREACHERY IN

INFORMATION IS NOT ENOUGH
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
did x x x assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victims "by then
and there shooting them with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of their bodies
"which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths" did not sufficiently set
forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person
by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the
crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the
defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to
kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the
same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient

16

averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not
an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting
treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the
informations.
x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare his defense. This requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in
his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts
stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands
charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and
with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.

DESPITE
FINALITY
OF
DECISION,
ACCUSED WHO WITHDREW APPEAL MAY
BENEFIT FOR DECISION OF FAVORABLE
TO HIM
On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the
downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite
the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his
appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to
him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal
responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two
accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims,
warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.
We grant Edwins plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,
which relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. (a) An appeal taken by
one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.
xxxx
In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that the
benefits of this provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they
appealed or not, to wit:
As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of
Guingguings acquittal, petitioner should likewise be acquitted, based on Rule 122,

17

Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which

states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter.
Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to
petitioner inasmuch as he appealed from his conviction, and the provision states
that a favorable judgment shall be applicable only to those who did not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private
respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the provision.
It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to
defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his
co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases
rendered by the Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to the filing
or non-filing of an appeal by a coaccused, so long as the judgment was favorable to
him.
In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguezs co-accused to
him despite the withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and
considering that the evidence against both are inextricably linked, to wit:
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the wellestablished rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case
open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The
records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons.
However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "an appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and applicable to
the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both
appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellants acquittal, which
is favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.
In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of homicide.
Such verdict was applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso, who was previously
found guilty by the trial court of robbery with homicide, despite the fact that
Precioso appealed but failed to file an appellants brief. The Court also modified
Preciosos civil liability although the additional monetary award imposed on
Arondain was not extended to Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he did
not pursue the appeal before the Court.

18

In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several coaccused, were found
by the trial court guilty of forcible abduction. During pendency of the review before
the Court, Villas withdrew his appeal, hence his conviction became final and
executory. Thereafter, the Court found Villas co-accused guilty only of grave
coercion. Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court also found Villas guilty of the
lesser offense of grave coercion since it is beneficial to him.
In People v. Escao, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen
Escao, praying that the Courts Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting his coaccused Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95-936 for
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, be applied
to him. Escao originally filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court but later
withdrew the same.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARK JOSEPH ZAPUIZ Y RAMOS @ "JAYMART",

G.R. No. 199713, February 20, 2013

SHOOTING A VICTIM AT THE BACK OF

THE HEAD IS TREACHERY
Third, the killing of Emmanuel was attended by treachery. The law provides that an
offender acts with treachery when he "commits any of the crimes against a person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make." Thus, there is treachery when the
attack against an unarmed victim is so sudden that he had clearly no inkling of
what the assailant was about to do. In this case, Emmanuel was sitting down
before a table, busily writing, when Jaymart came up behind him and, without
warning, shot him at the back of the head. Evidently, Emmanuel, who was unarmed
and unaware, had no opportunity at all to defend himself.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. TOMASTEODORO y ANGELES,

G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013

CARNAL KNOWLEDGE IN STATUTORY RAPE

In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated
statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of the female. The Court has
clarified in People v. Campuhan that the mere touching of the external genitalia by

19

a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal

knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the
penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact
with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is
consummated once the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual
act touches eitherlabia of the pudendum. As the Court has explained in People v.
Bali-Balita, the touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal
contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis
on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect
penis touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are
physically situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the
penis to touch either of them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface of the female genitalia. It is required, however, that this manner of touching
of the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly established.

RULE ON RECANTATION IN CASE OF RAPE

BBB was then rearing four young children by Teodoro (the youngest being born
when he was already detained), as well as AAA and her five siblings that BBB had
from an earlier relationship. She unabashedly needed the material support of
Teodoro; hence, she prevailed on AAA to withdraw her charges against him. But a
recantation under such insincere circumstances was unacceptable.
As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of her
testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and
secondly because there is always the possibility that such recantation may later be
repudiated. Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply because
the witness recants it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary
considerations may have caused the recantation. Court proceedings, in which
testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be truthful under all
circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the recanted
testimony was given is made a mockery, and the investigation is placed at the
mercy of an unscrupulous witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the
court must not be too willing to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial
with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected to crossexamine
the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the
motivations for it. The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test
of credibility based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the
recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons
necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that the trial court is in a better

20

position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOSE ALEX SECRETO y VILLANUEVA,

G.R. No. 198115, February 22, 2013

WHEN
THERE
ARE
LAPSES
IN
COMPLYING WITH CHAIN OF CUSTODY
OF DRUGS.
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly
specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to
ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected
to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police
station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items to truly
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the
presence
of
the
apprehended
violator
(2)
immediately
upon
confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from
dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending
officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and
on allegations of robbery or theft.44 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; Citations
omitted)
It is also clear from the foregoing that aside from the markings that PO2 Lagmay
alleged to have been made in the presence of PO1 Llanderal, who did not testify on
this point, the buy-bust team did not observe the procedures laid down in Section
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165. 45 They did not
conduct a physical inventory and no photograph of the confiscated item was taken
in the presence of the accused-appellant, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official. In fact, the prosecution failed to present an accomplished
Certificate of Inventory.
In People v. Ancheta, where the sole procedural lapse revolved on the failure to
conduct the required physical inventory and the taking of photograph in the
presence of the representatives and public officials enumerated in the law despite
the fact that the accused had been under surveillance and his name already on the
drugs watch list, we ruled:
x x x We further note that, before the saving clause provided under it can be
invoked, Section 21(a) of the IRR requires the prosecution to prove the twin
conditions of (a) existence of justifiable grounds and (b) preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. In this case, the arresting

21

officers neither presented nor explained justifiable grounds for their failure to (1)
make a physical inventory of the seized items; (2) take photographs of the items;
and (3) establish that a representative each from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official had been contacted and were present
during the marking of the items. These errors were exacerbated by the fact that the
officers had ample time to comply with these legal requirements, as they had
already monitored and put accused-appellants on their watch list. The totality of
these circumstances has led us to conclude that the apprehending officers
deliberately disregarded the legal procedure under R.A. 9165. "These lapses
effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of
thecorpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up" Accusedappellants would thereby be discharged from the crimes of which they were
convicted. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the circumstances obtaining from the time the buy-bust team was organized
until the chain of custody commenced were riddled with procedural lapses and
inconsistencies between the testimony and the documents presented as evidence in
court so much so that even assuming, that the physical inventory contemplated in
R.A. 9165 subsumes the marking of the items itself, the belated marking of the
seized items at the police station sans the required presence of the accused and the
witnesses enumerated under Sec. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. 9165, and, absent a justifiable ground to stand on, cannot be considered a
minor deviation from the procedures prescribed by the law. There being a "gross,
systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards" the presumption
of regularity m the performance of official duties is overturned.

SIMON A. FLORES, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013

WHERE REASONABLE NECESSITY OF

MEANS EMPLOYED IN SELF-DEFENSE IS
NOT PRESENT
x x x. The difference in the location of the entry and exit points of this bullet wound
was about two to three inches. From the entry point of the bullet, the shooting
could not have taken place when accused and his victim were standing and facing
each other. Another bullet entered through the medial portion of the victim's
buttocks and exited through his abdominal cavity. A third bullet entered through the
left hypogastric region and exited at the upper right quadrant of the victim's
abdomen. The respective trajectory of these wounds are consistent with the
testimony of prosecution witnesses Elisa B. Avenido and Arvin B. Aveniclo that the
accused shot Jesus Avenido while the latter was already lying on the ground.
Moreover, according to Arvin Avenido, the first shot hit his father on the right
shoulder making him fall to the ground. Hence, even on the assumption that
unlawful aggression initially existed, the same had effectively ceased after the

22

victim was first shot and fell to the ground. There was no more reason for the
accused to pull the trigger, at least three times more, and continue shooting at the
victim. (Emphasis in the original)
The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to
the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In this case, the
continuous shooting by Flores which caused the fatal gunshot wounds were not
necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed unlawful aggression from Jesus as
the latter was already lying flat on the ground after he was first shot on the
shoulder.

ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013

ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED THEFT, (Book II, Art. 316)

The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles
308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal
property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with
intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310
of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
COMPUTATION
OF
PENALTY
FOR
QUALIFIED THEFT, (Book II, Art. 310)
To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel beams, which
is P2,269,731.69. Based on Article 309 of the RPC, since the value of the items
exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, to be imposed in the maximum period, which is eight years, eight months
and one day to 10 years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct P22,000.00
from P2,269,731.69, which gives usP2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should
then be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less thanP10,000.00. We
now have 224 years that should be added to the basic penalty. However, the
imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of 20 years. Therefore,
had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion
temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the correct
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI

23

G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013

CRIM. PRO. WARRANTLESS ARREST
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.19 On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for
its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the appellant had committed it.
In both instances, the officers personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of
an offense is absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses
the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.
ILLEGAL ARREST RESULTING TO ACQUITTAL. (RA 9165)
In fine, appellants acts of walking along the street and holding something in his
hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal
charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest
under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such

24

facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellants case.
Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable
discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the
decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent
purpose of suspending his liberty, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised
without unduly compromising a citizens constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty.
As the Court succinctly explained in the case of People v. Tudtud:
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or
rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We
cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving
of full protection.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly
seized from appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal
liability.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. GILBERT PENILLA y FRANCIA,

G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013

PHYSICAL RESISTANCE NEED NOT BE

ESTABLISHED
IF
THERE
IS
INTIMIDATION (Book II, Article 266-A)
Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation
are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear.
Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victims
submission to the perpetrators lust. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole
test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an
accused; it is not an essential element of rape.
Rape victims react differently. Some may offer strong resistance while others may
be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is
strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with
a knife, much more poking it at her, as in this case, is sufficient to bring her into

25

submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the
burden of proving resistance.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ARNEL NOCUM,* REY JOHNNY RAMOS,
CARLOS JUN POSADAS, PANDAO POLING PANGANDAG (all at large), REYNALDO
MALLARI,
G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013

SPL CARNAPPING RA 6539, as

amended by RA 7659
Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The
crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable under Section 14 of the said law,
as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove the special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." Thus, the prosecution in this case has the burden of proving that:
(1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original criminal design was carnapping;
(3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. WELVIN DIU y KOTSESA,
and DENNIS DAYAON y TUPIT,
G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013

WHEN THERE IS ROBBERY

HOMICIDE. (Book II, Article 295)

WITH

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to

commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The
homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes
or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the
victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons

26

are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or
usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime.
Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the
felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on
the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the
felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated
into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful
taking of personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established
beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the property
subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may
have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by
the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the
property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the
actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive
for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the
single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually
take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent
the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the
robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those
who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such
crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a
criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no
longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.
INSTANCES WHEN THERE IS ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if,
for instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the
commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the
homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the
robbery. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. GERRY OCTAVIO Y FLORENDO and REYNALDO

CARIO Y MARTIR,

27

G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013

BREAK IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY
MUST BE RAISED DURING THE TRIAL,
NOT ON APPEAL, OTHERWISE WAIVED.
Finally, we note and agree with the observation of the CA that the issue regarding
the break in the chain of custody of evidence was raised belatedly and only for the
first time on appeal. In People v. Mateo, this Court brushed aside the accused's
belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person was
inadmissible because the arresting officers failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165. Whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because accused did not question
during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without
such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ALBERTO GONZALES y SANTOS, also known

as TAKYO,
G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013
WHEN THERE IS A BREAK IN THE CHAIN
OF CUSTODY (R 9165)
By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state that the noncompliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily
invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were
justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the
evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved. But the non-compliance with the
procedures, to be excusable, must have to be justified by the States agents
themselves. Considering that PO1 Dimla tendered no justification in court for the
non-compliance with the procedures, the exception did not apply herein. The
absolution of Gonzales should then follow, for we cannot deny that the observance
of the chain of custody as defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his
incrimination for the very serious crime had been legitimate and insulated from
either invention or malice. In this connection, the Court states that the unexplained
non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by
the lower courts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LOLITA QUESIDO y BADARANG,

G.R. No. 189351, April 10, 2013

28

WHEN
PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENT
UNDER RA 9165
SEC. 21 AND IRR NOT APPLIED WITH
BUT INTEGRITY OF EVIDENCE INTACT
In People v. Remigio, we restated the enumeration of the different links that the
prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust
operation, namely:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court.
In the case at bar, we find that the procedural guidelines laid out in Section 21(1),
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 were not strictly complied with. In spite of this,
we can still conclude that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs
used in evidence in this case were duly preserved in consonance with the chain of
custody rule.

JAIME ONG y ONG, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 190475, April 10, 2013
WHEN ACCUSED SHOULD KNOW OR
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT GOODS
WERE STOLEN (PD 1612, SPL)
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to
another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong,
who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24)
years, ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an
unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13)

29

tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. The entire
transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one
day. His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the
legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact
with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13)
tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC, this Court had enunciated that:
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer
that the object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or
theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which
may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and
condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in
the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and
therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5
of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of
value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing" a presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable
for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of . . .
possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx.
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires.
Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the
buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in
the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering
the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining
clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in
this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who
should have exercised prudence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOT
G.R. No. 189280, April 17, 2013
GRANDUNCLE NOT RELATIVE WITHIN
4TH CIVIL DEGREE (BOOK II, ART. 266-A
We agree with the modification of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, we note that
even if the correct blood relationship of being AAAs granduncle was alleged in the
Information, and the age of AAA was proven by sufficient evidence, accusedappellant would still be liable for simple rape. The granduncle, or more specifically
the brother of the victims grandfather, is a relative of the victim in the fourth civil
degree, and is thus not covered by Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1).

30

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARILYN AGUILAR y MANZANILLO

G.R. No. 191396, April 17, 2013
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
PERFECT (RA 9165)

NEED

NOT

BE

While a testimony about a perfect and unbroken chain is ideal, such is not always
the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. A
perusal of the law reveals, however, that failure to strictly comply with the
procedure in Section 21 will not render the arrest illegal or the items seized
inadmissible in evidence, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of such
items are preserved since they will be used in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Despite the failure of the apprehending officers to make an inventory of and to
photograph the items seized from Aguilar, they were nevertheless able to prove that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence had been preserved, the chain of
custody of such items, having been adequately established in the case at bar.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. REGGIE BERNARDO
G.R. No. 198789, June 3, 2013

WHEN TREACHERY IS PRESENT:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and
specially to insure its execution eliminating the risk to himself, arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.24 The presence of two conditions is
necessary to constitute treachery, to wit: (1) that the victim was not in the position
to defend himself at the time of the attack; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.25 The prosecution established that Reah and
Efren were unarmed aboard a motorcycle when another motorcycle suddenly
appeared and shot them several times. This clearly showed that Reah and Efren
were totally defenseless when they were fired upon by Bernardo.
IN COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER WITH ATTEMPTED MURDER IF
INFORMATION STATES THAT THE ACCUSED SHOT ONLY THE VICTIM BUT
DOES NOT ALLEGE SEVERAL TIMES, THERE COULD BE NO TWO SEPARATE
CRIMES.
Nonetheless, he may be convicted
attempted murder, not of the two
murder. To be sure, Reah Calumags
father several times shows that the

only of the complex crime of murder with

separate crimes of murder and attempted
testimony that the accused shot her and her
he was actuated by more than one criminal

31

impulse, ruling out the application of the concept of complex crime. The evidence
however, does not conform to the Information, which contains no allegation that the
accused was so actuated. In fact, the Information merely alleges that the accused
shot the victim, but it does not allege that he did so several times. In the absence
of such a clear statement in the Information, the accused may be convicted only of
the complex crime of murder with attempted murder. Afterall, the concept of
complex crimes is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty
irrespective of the number of crimes committed.
To rule that the accused should be convicted of two separate offenses of murder
and attempted murder pursuant to the evidence presented but contrary to the
allegations in the Information is to violate the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is well-settled that an
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged
or necessarily included in the complaint or information. 28 (Citations omitted)
A complex crime is only one crime. Although two or more crimes are actually
committed, there is only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the
conscience of the offender when it comes to complex crimes. Hence, there is only
one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime. 29
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), when a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. In this case, the most serious crime
committed was Murder and Article 248 of the RPC provides for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death. Meanwhile, Article 63 of the RPC provides that if the
penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible penalties and there is an
aggravating circumstance, the higher penalty should be imposed. As previously
discussed, treachery was proven and correctly appreciated to have attended the
commission of the crime, qualifying the killing to the highest penalty, which is
death. In view, however, of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, 30 which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty for crime should,
therefore, be reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Thus, the
R TC was correct m imposing, and the CA, in affirming, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RICARDO PAMINTUAN y SAHAGUN
G.R. No. 192239, June 5, 2013

FULL PENETRATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF RAPE,

NEITHER IS LACERATION OF HYMEN
The Court has often held that "full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an
essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary, to conclude that
carnal knowledge took place; the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis

32

that is capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal

knowledge."28We also said in People v. Opong29 that:
In People v. Capt. Llanto, citing People v. Aguinaldo, we likewise affirmed the
conviction of the accused for rape despite the absence of laceration on the victims
hymen since medical findings suggest that it is possible for the victims hymen to
remain intact despite repeated sexual intercourse. We elucidated that the strength
and dilatability of the hymen varies from one woman to another, such that it may
be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse; on the other hand,
it may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse can
ensue.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PIOSANG
G.R. No. 200329, June 5, 2013

WHEN STATUTORY RAPE IS COMMITTED:

Rape under paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned article is termed statutory rape as
it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age.1wphi1Thus, the only
subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took
place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own
on account of her tender years. x x x. (Citations omitted.)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO LOMAQUE.

G.R. No. 189297, June 5, 2013
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP IF WRONGLY
INTERPRETED, AS THE ACCUSED IS NOT A STEPFATHER BECAUSE THE
MARRIAGE HAS NOT BEEN PROVED, ACCUSED SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF
SIMPLE RAPE.
Based on our meticulous review, we find that the courts below erred in finding
appellant guilty of rape in its qualified form. Indeed, the subject Informations
clearly aver the special qualifying circumstances of minority of "AAA" and her
filiation (stepdaughter) to the appellant. While the prosecution was able to
sufficiently prove "AAAs" minority through the latters testimony during the trial
and by the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth 30showing that she was born
on September 15, 1985, it however, failed to prove the fact of relationship between
her and the appellant (stepfather-stepdaughter). Notably, said alleged relationship
was not even made the subject of stipulation of facts during the pre-trial. 31 As held
in People v. Hermocilla,32 "a stepdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by previous
marriage, while a stepfather is the husband of ones mother by virtue of a marriage

33

subsequent to that of which the person spoken is the offspring." The allegation that
"AAA" is the stepdaughter of appellant requires competent proof and should not be
easily accepted as factually true. The bare testimony of appellant that he was
married to "BBB" ("AAAs" mother) is not enough. Neither does "AAAs" reference to
appellant as her stepfather during her testimony would suffice. As ruled in People v.
Agustin,33 "the relationship of the accused to the victim cannot be established by
mere testimony or even by the accuseds very own admission of such relationship."
In this case, save for the testimony of appellant that he was married to "BBB," the
record is bereft of any evidence to show that appellant and "BBB" were indeed
legally married. The prosecution could have presented the marriage contract, the
best evidence to prove the fact of marriage but it did not. As aptly observed in
People v. Abello:34
This modifying circumstance, however, was not duly proven in the present case due
to the prosecutions failure to present the marriage contract between Abello and
AAAs mother. If the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was via an
admission by Abello of his marriage to AAAs mother. This admission, however, is
inconclusive evidence to prove the marriage to AAAs mother, as the marriage
contract still remains the best evidence to prove the fact of marriage. This stricter
requirement is only proper as relationship is an aggravating circumstance that
increases the imposable penalty and hence must be proven by competent evidence.
Following Abello, "AAA" cannot be considered as appellants stepdaughter and
conversely, appellant as "AAAs" stepfather. Appellant, therefore, should only be
convicted of simple rape in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q-00-96394, Q-0096395, Q-00-96397, Q-00-96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-00-96401 where the proper
penalty for the same under Article 266-B 35 of the RPC is reclusion perpetua.
Incidentally, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is the same penalty which would
have been imposable even if he were guilty of qualified rape pursuant to RA 9346.
WHEN ACCUSED MAY BE CONVICTED OF ANOTHER CRIME NOT ALLEGED IN
THE INFORMATION IF HE FAILS TO OBJECT TO THE ALLEGATION IN THE
INFORMATION.
However, in Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392, we observe that the courts below
overlooked a glaring variance between what was alleged in the Information and
what was proven during trial respecting the mode of committing the offense. While
the Information in this case clearly states that the crime was committed by
appellants insertion of his penis inside "AAAs" vagina, the latter solemnly testified
on the witness stand that appellant merely put his penis in her mouth.
Nevertheless, appellant failed to register any objection that the Information alleged
a different mode of the commission of the crime of rape. As ruled in People v.
Abello38 and People v. Corpuz,39 a variance in the mode of commission of the
offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that
the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. Thus,
appellants conviction for rape by sexual assault must be sustained, the variance
notwithstanding.

34

DEFINITION OF LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT

Lascivious conduct is defined under Section 2(H) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 7610 as "a crime committed through the intentional touching,
either directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh or buttocks with the intention to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, among others." 40 In this case, it is
undisputed that appellant committed lascivious conduct when he smelled "AAAs"
genital area and inserted his finger inside her vagina to gratify or arouse his sexual
desire. At the time this happened on May 8, 1993, "AAA" was barely eight years old
as established through her birth certificate. Without a doubt, all the afore-stated
elements are obtaining in this case. We thus likewise sustain the finding that
appellant is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness as defined and penalized under Article
336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ERNESTO GANI y TUPAS

G.R. No. 195523, June 5, 2013
WHEN QUALIFIED RAPE IS PRESENT
Given the foregoing, the CA correctly affirmed appellants conviction for qualified
rape. Both the minority of the victim and her relationship to appellant were
sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution. Such offense
was punishable by death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and the
trial court correctly imposed such penalty. However, in view of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346), which became effective on June 30, 2006 after
the promulgation of the RTC Decision and which prohibits the imposition of death
penalty, the CA correctly modified the judgment of the RTC by imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The CA, nonetheless, should have indicated that appellant is
not eligible for parole, in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 37 of RA 9346.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MOISES CAOILE

G.R. No. 203041, June 5, 2013

MEANING OF THE TERM DEMENTED AND DEPRIVED OF REASON

Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person
under paragraph 1(d). The term demented17 refers to a person who has dementia,

35

which is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from

the individuals former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or
insanity.18 On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b)
has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency,
or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate,
can be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who
is "demented."
CARNAL KNOWLEDGE OF A MENTAL RETARDATE AMOUNTS TO RAPE
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a
mentally deficient person is automatically considered incapable of giving consent to
a sexual act. Thus, what needs to be proven are the facts of sexual intercourse
between the accused and the victim, and the victims mental retardation. 31
Verily, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental
retardate. Anent the fact of sexual congress, it is worthy to note that aside from the
prosecutions own testimonial and documentary evidence, Caoile never denied
being physically intimate with AAA. In fact, he has confirmed such fact, and even
claimed that he and AAA often had sex, they being sweethearts.
In rape committed by means of duress, the victims will is nullified or destroyed.
Hence, the necessity of proving real and constant resistance on the part of the
woman to establish that the act was committed against her will. On the other hand,
in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will.
The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may
exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also
when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In
that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant
resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in
intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape. Where the offended
woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is
rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was
incapable of giving any rational consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is
enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual
intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape. But a deafmute is not
necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances must be proven. Intercourse
with a deafmute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof
that she is an imbecile. Viada says that the rape under par. 2 may be committed
when the offended woman is deprived of reason due to any cause such as when she
is asleep, or due to lethargy produced by sickness or narcotics administered to her
by the accused. x x x.
Consequently, the mere fact that Caoile had sexual intercourse with AAA, a mental
retardate, makes him liable for rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

36

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARIEL CALARA y ABALOS

G.R. No. 197039, June 5, 2013
TREACHERY BY STABBING VICTIM AT THE BACK
The courts below correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery.1wphi1 The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting
victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend
himself or repel the aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim. 27 The post-mortem
findings indicate that Francisco sustained a fatal wound on his back chest. The
position of the fatal wound is more than clear indication that the victim was stabbed
from behind leaving him in a defenseless state.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MYLENE TORRES y CRUZ

G.R. No. 191730, June 5, 2013
THE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21 OF RA 9165 MUST BE RAISED
DURING THE TRIAL, OTHERWISE IT IS DEEMED WAIVED.
We note that nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show the "justifiable
ground" which may excuse the police operatives involved in the buy-bust operation
in the case at bar from complying with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165,
particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs and
drug paraphernalia confiscated and/or seized. However, such omission shall not
render accused-appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
as inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Naelga [G.R. No. 171018, 11 September
2009, 599 SCRA 477], We have explained that what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items because
the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
It must be stressed that said "justifiable ground" will remain unknown in the light of
the apparent failure of the accused-appellant to challenge the custody and
safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the subject drugs and
drug paraphernalia before the RTC. x x x.
It is also worth stressing that appellant raised the buy-bust teams alleged noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 only on appeal.
Failure to raise this issue during trial is fatal to the case of appellant, as this Court
had succinctly explained in People v. Sta. Maria: 41
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation
in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant

37

did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed,
the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165
were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on
appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were
lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and
evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIA JENNY REA y GUEVARRA and

ESTRELLITA TENDENILLA
G.R. No. 197049, June 10, 2013
WHEN ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE
TANTAMOUNT TO ECONOMIC SABOTAGE.

SCALE

IS

COMMITTED

The crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed upon concurrence of

these (3) elements, namely: (1) the offenders undertake any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the offenders have no
valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the offenders commit the acts
against three or more persons, individually or as a group.17
Recruitment and placement is defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code as "any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
worker; and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA CALUMBRES y AUDITOR

G.R. No. 194382, June 10, 2013
WHEN APPREHENDING OFFICER BROKE ALL RULES UNDER SECTION 21 OF
RA 9165. ACQUITTED
SPO1 Dela Victorias claim that the sachet of shabu presented in court was the
same one confiscated from Calumbres, cannot be taken at its face value, solely on
the presumption of regularity of ones performance of duty. SPO1 Dela Victoria
blatantly broke all the rules established by law to safeguard the identity of a corpus
delicti. To allow this to happen is to abandon everything that has been said about
the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of custody of the corpus delicti.1wphi1

38

We reiterate that this Court will never waver in ensuring that the prescribed
procedures in the handling of the seized drugs should be observed. In People v.
Salonga,8 we acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to inventory and
photograph the confiscated items. We also reversed a conviction in People v.
Gutierrez,9 for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and photograph the
seized items without justifiable grounds. People v. Cantalejo 10 also resulted in an
acquittal because no inventory or photograph was ever made by the police.
We reached the same conclusions in the recent cases of People v. Capuno, 11 People
v. Lorena,12 and People v. Martinez,13 all in obedience to the basic and elementary
precept that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution
which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. At the base, of course, is the constitutional presumption of innocence
unless and until the contrary is shown.

CHRISTIAN CABALLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH A 17 YEAR OLD GIRL BY A 23 YEAR OLD MAN
ON CERTAIN PROMISE SUCH AS MARRYING HER AS USE OF WITHDRAWAL
METHOD IS CHILD ABUSE UNDER RA 7610
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to
engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way
that deprives a person of free will and substitutes anothers objective." 29 Meanwhile,
"coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the
wishes of one who wields it."30
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballos actuations may be
classified as "coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAAs minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only
17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a
child under the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the import of her actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the
cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases
involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that
AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely
instructive on this point:

39

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases
under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to
sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because
of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be
infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should
protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual
behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to
adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy
under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation
and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or
even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.)
In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. x x x x 32 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Second, coupled with AAAs minority is Caballos seniority. Records indicate that
Caballo was 23 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and
therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between an adult
and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to
force his will upon the latter.
Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence.
Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even,
promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get
pregnant since he would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety. Irrefragably,
these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually
give into having sex with him, with which he succeeded.

40

Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual encounter, it is observed
that the brash and unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room
and pressed on her to have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a certain
extent, a position of duress.. An important factor is that AAA refused Caballo's
incipient advances and in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually
yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a situation deprived of the
benefit of clear thought and choice. In any case, the Court observes that any other
choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA's minority as abovediscussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence" within
the context of the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or
lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a "child
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of
the subject offense exists.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA and

BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused. BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ
IBANEZ, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013
HOW IS OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION CONDUCTED:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru
show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time
of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of
any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
[italics and emphasis supplied]
In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified
the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of
Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took place; how this line-up had been
conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if there were
indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined
to persons of the same height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not
indicate who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there
had been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on
Zaldy regarding the appearance of the appellants.

41

To our mind, Linos failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is
a glaring omission that renders unreliable Zaldys out-ofcourt identification. No way
exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility
and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies
our strict treatment and assessment of Linos testimony.
MEANING OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the
authorities when he executed the alleged written confession. "A custodial
investigation is understood x x x as x x x any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to
focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense.20
In People v. Rapeza,21 we explained that the lawyer called to be present during
custodial investigations should, as far as reasonably possible, be the choice of the
individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for the
accused, it is important that the lawyer should be competent, independent and
prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished
from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless
recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas confession was not made
with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty.
Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas behalf, were provided by the very
same agency investigating Nabilgas the NBI itself; she was assigned the task
despite Nabilgas open declaration to the agencys investigators that he already had
a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this
fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client
made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose
that she was a lawyer when she was called to assist him; she merely represented
herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the
records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas confession was made
voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence of his
extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.
To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial
investigation. "An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires
that the lawyer be present and be able to advise and assist his client from the time
the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the

42

signing of the extrajudicial confession."22 In addition, the extrajudicial confession of

Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written
confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present
Atty. Go at the witness stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial
that she would be presented.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABEL DIAZ

G.R. No. 200882, June 13, 2013
TIME RUNS SLOWLY TO A WOMEN BEING RAPED BY MEANS OF FORCE OR
VIOLENCE.
We also affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that Maras credibility was not
eroded by her testimony that the accused-appellant tarried for two hours in her
room. The Court of Appeals said it well: when one is being raped, forcibly held,
weak and in great pain, and in shock, she cannot be reasonably expected to keep a
precise track of the passage of time down to the last minute. 25 Indeed, for a woman
undergoing the ordeal that Mara underwent in the hands of the accused-appellant,
every moment is like an eternity of hell and the transit of time is a painfully slow
crawl that she would rather forget. In addition, the precise duration of the rape is
not material to and does not negate the commission of the felony. Rape has no
regard for time and place.26 It has been committed in all manner of situations and
in circumstances thought to be inconceivable.

ABELARDO JANDUSAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 185129, June 17, 2013
ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
The courts a quo were correct in convicting the petitioner of estafa.1wphi1 Under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa with abuse of
confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by
the offended party to the offender.11 As correctly found by the CA:
In the case at bar, the aforementioned elements have been sufficiently established
by the prosecution. It cannot be denied that accused-appellant, as Treasurer of
CALAPUPATODA, received and held money for administration and in trust for the
association. He was thus under an obligation to turnover the same upon conclusion
of his term as Treasurer. Instead, however, he misappropriated the same to the

43

prejudice of the association and, despite demand, failed to account for or return
them. Such failure to account, upon demand, of funds or property held in trust is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.12 (Citation omitted)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA

COLLADO Y SENICA, MARK CIPRIANO Y ROCERO, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO Y
ENRIQUE,* AND REYNALDO RANADA Y ALAS**
G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013
ACCESSORIES ARE NOT LIABLE UNDER RA 9165
Since violation of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of mala prohibita, the
degree of participation of the offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated the
prohibited act are penalized to the same extent. There is no principal or accomplice
or accessory to consider. In short, the degree of participation of the offenders does
not affect their liability, and the penalty on all of them are the same whether they
are principals or merely accomplices or accessories. 44
In addition, Section 98 of RA 9165 specifically provides that "[n]otwithstanding any
law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act
No. 3814), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the
case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion
perpetua to death." It is therefore clear that the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly Article 19 on Accessories, cannot be applied in determining the
degree of participation and criminal liability of Ranadas co-accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENEDICT HOMAKY LUCIO

G.R. No. 191391, June 19, 2013
PRIOR SURVEILLANCE IS NOT NECESSARY IN BUY-BUST OPERATION
It must be stressed that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment operation. This issue in the prosecution of illegal drugs cases, again,
has long been settled by this Court. We have been consistent in our ruling that prior
surveillance is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust
team is accompanied to the target area by their informant.63
In People v. Eugenio,64 the Court held that there is no requirement that prior
surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust operation can be undertaken
especially when the policemen are accompanied to the scene by their civilian
informant. Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment
or a buy-bust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting
one. When time is of essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior

44

surveillance. The buy-bust operation conducted by PO1 Castro and the rest of them,
together with their civilian informant is justified by the urgency of the situation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL MORES

G.R. No. 189846, June 26, 2013
THROWING A GRENADE AT A DANCE FLOOR WHERE THERE ARE MANY
PEOPLE IS TREACHERY.
We agree with the appellate court that the manner by which appellant deliberately
rolled the grenade on the ground towards the dance floor packed with unsuspecting
revelers, leaving one dead and scores wounded in the aftermath of the sudden blast
was accompanied with treachery. Appellants unexpected action which was
immediately followed by the grenades lethal explosion left the victims with utterly
no chance to escape the blast area nor to find protective cover. Though appellant
stood a short distance away, he knowingly positioned himself safely from the reach
of the grenades destructive force. From the foregoing, we can confidently conclude
that treachery, as correctly pointed out by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, was present in the commission of the crime charged.

VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES,

LTD., and WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
JUDGE RAMON S. CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74,
Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND
G.R. No. 178947, June 26, 2013
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE MAY BE EITHER EXECUTIVE OR
JUDICIAL.
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.
The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where
he is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the
purpose of filing a criminal information in court. Whether or not that function has
been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has
made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. 47
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy
himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge,

45

therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant.48 Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused
immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause becomes a mere superfluity,49 if not a deliberate
attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence
without a full-blown trial.
In the case of Co v. Republic,50 the Court emphasized the settled distinction
between an executive and a judicial determination of probable cause, viz: 51
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it
is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the
information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is
executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.1wphi1 The second kind of
preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is
judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.
On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the
public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself
ascertain from the latters findings and supporting documents whether probable
cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. This prerogative is
granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce."52
While a judges determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited
purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), 53 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, 54 viz:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint
or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

46

WHEN IT IS PROPER FOR A JUDGE TO DISMISS CASE AFTER INFORMATION

IS FILED.
Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that when a perceived
gap in the evidence leads to a "neither this nor that" conclusion, a purposeful
resolution of the ambiguity is preferable over a doubtful dismissal of the case.
Verily, a judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the
information in court is appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause
can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not when its existence is
simply doubtful. After all, it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the
information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence
necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the objective of a previouslyconducted preliminary investigation being merely to determine whether there is
sufficient ground, to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial.59 In this light, given that the lack of probable cause had not been clearly
established in this case, the CA erred, and the RTC gravely abused its discretion, by
ruling to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004. Indeed, these cases
must stand the muster of a full-blown trial where the parties could be given, as
they should be given, the opportunity to ventilate their respective claims and
defenses, on the basis of which the court a quo can properly resolve the factual
disputes therein.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DATU NOT ABDUL

G.R. No. 186137, June 26, 2013
MEANING OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE, WHEN THE SAME IS NOT
FOLLOWED RESULTING TO ACQUITTAL
The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the
corpus delicti presented in court is shown to be one and the same as that which
was retrieved from the accused or from the crime scene. 39 This rule, when applied
to drug cases, requires a more stringent application, because the corpus delicti
the narcotic substance is not readily identifiable and must be subjected to
scientific analysis to determine its composition and nature. 40 Malillin v.
People41 explains this rigorous standard when it comes to the chain of custody of
narcotic substances:
xxx the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered into evidence,
in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the

47

witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, every link in the chain of custody must not show any possibility of
tampering, alteration or substitution. 42However, it is accepted that a perfect chain is
not the standard.43 Nonetheless, two crucial links must be complied with. First, the
seized illegal drug must be marked in the presence of the accused and immediately
upon confiscation. This marking must be supported by details on how, when, and
where the marking was done, as well as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the
turnover of the seized drugs at every stage from confiscation from the accused,
transportation to the police station, conveyance to the chemistry lab, and
presentation to the court must be shown and substantiated
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
WHEN RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS AVAILABLE.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to
remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. 19 In the present case,
while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are
clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but
merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither
arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the
questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation
and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his
written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to
counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to
those made in an administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter,
the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission: 21
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only
to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.22

48

Here, petitioners written statement was given during an administrative inquiry

conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly
committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to
the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to
petitioners written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.
Petitioners written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
FALSIFICATION AS A NECESSARY MEANS TO COMMIT ESTAFA
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit
another crime like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex
crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two classes of a complex crime. A
complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In Domingo v. People,36 we held:
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of
committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage
or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of
public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification
has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the
falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit estafa.
"Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation." 37 Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his
legal injury."38
The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan
requested him to process purported loans on the latters behalf, petitioner
counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the cashiers checks. Through
these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from the bank. Once in
possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan
Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the
money, misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and
these resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount of about P43
million.

49

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMAN ZAFRA y SERRANO

G.R. No. 197363, June 26, 2013
DEFENSE OF RETRACTION IS NOT FAVORED.
Courts look upon retractions with considerable disfavor because they are generally
unreliable. To explain the rationale for rejecting recantations, this Court, in People
v. Alejo,41 quoting Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, held:
Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony or statement, if credible. The general rule
is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court. x x x. The reason is because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured
from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that they will later be
repudiated and there would never be an end to criminal litigation. It would also be a
dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of
justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their
minds for one reason or another. This would make solemn trials a mockery and
place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Further propounding on retractions, usually contained in affidavits of desistance, we
said in People v. Alcazar42:
We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are
looked upon with disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document
is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the process
of having the [appellant] arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the
person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her
private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her
anguish, [the rape victim] would suddenly turn around and declare that after a
careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or
warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should
not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on
changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial
a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded
such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. (Citation omitted.)

50

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEMARIE JALBONIAN alias "Budo"

G.R. No. 180281, July 01, 2013
WHEN TREACHERY IS PRESENT
The killing committed in this case is neither parricide nor infanticide and the same
was attended with treachery. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make."42 "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and
in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." 43
In this case, treachery is evident from the fact that the victim could not have been
aware of the imminent peril to his life. He was unprepared for the sudden,
unexpected and unprovoked attack on his person when appellant stabbed his back
with a knife then swiftly run away. Clearly, appellants execution of the killing left
the victim with no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.

MAJOR JOEL G. CANTOS, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184908, July 3, 2013
MALVERSATION MAY BE COMMITTED EITHER INTENTIONALLY OR BY
NEGLIGENCE
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the
culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony.
Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.20 All that is necessary for
conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds,
that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and
that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of
personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the
accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts. 21 To our mind,
the evidence in this case is thoroughly inconsistent with petitioner's claim of
innocence. Thus, we sustain the Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioner's guilt has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-07-A/R-0008 convicting Major Joel G.
Cantos of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH

INOCENCIO1 y PAULINO,
G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013
WHEN THREAT AMOUNTS TO UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong,
positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It "presupposes actual,
sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely threatening and intimidating
action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat
to ones life."
WHEN LOSS OF EARNING MAY BE PROVEN WITHOUT DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite
the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line of work no documentary
evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. 37 (Citations and
emphasis omitted.)
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE WHETHER QUALIFYING OR ORDINARY
ENTITLES OFFENDED PARTY TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to
be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary
but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of
an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to
the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the
civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages
within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 39 (Emphasis
omitted.)

52

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROMEO ONIZA Y ONG

AND MERCY ONIZA Y CABARLE,
G.R. No. 202709, July 3, 2013
WHEN POLICE OFFICERS FAILED TO JUSTIFY THEIR FAILURE
INVENTORY THE DRUGS AND TO PHOTOGRAPH THEM, IT IS FATAL.

TO

Yet, the police officers did not bother to offer any sort of reason or justification for
their failure to make an inventory and take pictures of the drugs immediately after
their seizure in the presence of the accused and the other persons designated by
the law. Both the RTC and the CA misapprehended the significance of such
omission. It is imperative for the prosecution to establish a justifiable cause for
non-compliance with the procedural requirements set by law.22 The procedures
outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 are not merely empty formalitiesthese are
safeguards against abuse,23 the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LITO HATSERO

G.R. No. 192179, July 3, 2013
ESSENCE OF TREACHERY
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done
in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." 23 The manner Mamerto Gravo
was stabbed by accused-appellant has treachery written all over it. We cannot think
of any other reason accused-appellant would make the friendly gesture of offering a
drink to a person he intended to kill, other than to intentionally lure the latter into a
false sense of security.

FERNANDO M. ESPINO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013

CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE BODY OF INFORMATION AND CAPTION

(CRIMPRO)
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be
deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the designation of the offense given by
the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense,
by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is
not controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime

53

charged are the facts alleged in the information. The Courts ruling in U.S. v. Lim
San is instructive:
x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we
believe that we ought to say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the
fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the
facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the
defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this
doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord
with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice x x x. (Emphases
supplied)32
Clearly, the fiscals statement in the Informations specifying the charges as estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, 33 did not bind the trial court insofar
as the characterization of the nature of the accusation was concerned. The
statement never limited the RTCs discretion to read the Information in the context
of the facts alleged. The Court further explains the rationale behind this discretion
in this manner:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in
no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result
is to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of
justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of
the information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in
the caption of the information. That to which his attention should be directed, and
in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged.
The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in
the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime
which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of
the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of
law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real
interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not
know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the
protection of his substantial rights... If he performed the acts alleged, in the
manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the
penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or
what it is named x x x. (Emphases supplied)34
Any doubt regarding the matter should end with the Courts conclusion:
Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the mode of commission of the
estafa as alleged in the Information (which states that petitioners committed estafa
under Article 315), or as claimed by the People in their Comment (that petitioners
committed estafa under Article 318) and the absence of the words "fraud" or
"deceit" in the Information, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan and the RTC

54

that the factual allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts
constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa
in general committed through the offense of falsification of public document. As the
Sandiganbayan correctly held:
Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint
or information by making reference to the definition and the essentials of the
specific crimes. This is so in order to fully apprise the accused of the charge against
him and for him to suitably prepare his defense since he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. It is not necessary,
however, that the imputations be in the language of the statute. What is important
is that the crime is described in intelligible and reasonable certainty. (Emphasis
supplied)
CAN AN ACCUSED BE CONVICTED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315 PAR. 2(a)
WHEN THE CHARGE IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315 PAR. 1 (b)
Thus, the only important question left to be answered is whether the facts in the
Information do indeed constitute the crime of which the accused was convicted. In
other words, was the RTC correct in convicting him of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) instead of paragraph 1(b)? The answer to this question, however,
requires further reflection.
The crime charged was estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code. Its elements are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal
properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that
there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.37
However, the crime the accused was convicted of was estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a). The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) that there is a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means is made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (3) that the offended party relies on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he is induced to part with his
money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Are the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(a) present in the above-quoted
Information? Arguably so, because the accused represented to the injured party
that he would be delivering the commission to Mr. Banaag; and because of this
representation, KN Inc. turned over checks payable to Mr. Banaag to the accused.
In turn, the accused rediscounted the checks for money, to the detriment of both

55

Mr. Banaag and KN Inc. However, this set of facts seems to miss the precision
required of a criminal conviction. Estafa under paragraph 2(a) is swindling by
means of false pretense, and the words of the law bear this out:
Article 315.
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits. x x x.
In this case, there was no use of a fictitious name, or a false pretense of power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business. At the most, the
situation could be likened to an imaginary transaction, although the accused was
already trusted with the authority to deliver commissions to Mr. Banaag. The
pretense was in representing to the injured party that there was a deliverable
commission to Mr. Banaag, when in fact there was none.
Instead of unduly stretching this point, the Court deems it wiser to give the offense
its true, formal name that of estafa through abuse of confidence under paragraph
1(b).
Paragraph 1(b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or
converting to the prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or
by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This at least, is
very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Informations.
First, personal property in the form of the checks was received by the offender in
trust or on commission, with the duty to deliver it to Mr. Banaag. Even though the
accused misrepresented the existence of a deliverable commission, it is a fact that
he was obliged by KN Inc., the injured party, to deliver the check and account for it.
Second, the accused rediscounted the checks to his aunt-in-law. Third, this
rediscounting resulted in the wrongful encashment of the checks by someone who
was not the payee and therefore not lawfully authorized to do so. Finally, this
wrongful encashment prejudiced KN Inc., which lost the proceeds of the check.
When accounting was demanded from the accused, he could not conjure any
justifiable excuse. His series of acts precisely constitutes estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b).

56

Nevertheless, this Court need not make such a detailed and narrow analysis. In
llagan v. Court of Appeals, it stated that estafa can be committed by means of both
modes of commission in the following way:
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the Information in this case may
be interpreted as charging the accused with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and
estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law
that one act can give rise to two offenses, 41 all the more when a single offense has
multiple modes of commission. Hence, the present Petition cannot withstand the
tests for review as provided by jurisprudential precedent. While the designation of
the circumstances attending the conviction for estafa could have been more precise,
there is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and
the trial courts agree on the facts. We therefore adopt the factual findings of the
lower courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their appreciation of
the evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RONALD CREDO aka "ONTOG," RANDY CREDO
and ROLANDO CREDO y SAN BUENA VENTURA,
G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013
WHEN THERE IS A CONCERTED CONSPIRACY
While no evidence was presented to show that appellants met beforehand and came
to an agreement to harm Joseph, their concerted acts before, during and after the
incident all point to a unity of purpose and design. Indeed, "proof of a previous
agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential but the fact that the
malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices." 45 Such proof
"may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest."46
Abuse of superior strength attended
the commission of the crime
There is abuse of superior strength when the perpetrators of a crime deliberately
used excessive force, thereby rendering the victim incapable of defending
himself.47 "The notorious inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage for the
aggressor."48
Here, there can be no denying that appellants took advantage of their superior
strength to ensure the successful execution of their crime. This is evident from the
fact that there were three of them against the victim who was alone. More
importantly, their victim was unarmed while the three of them were each armed
with a bolo.

57

WHEN THERE IS CONSPIRACY

"Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not
essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be
indicated that there is a common purpose to commit the crime."

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY

TISMO-CAPILI,
G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
THERE IS BIGAMY EVEN IF THE FIRST MARRIAGE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ANNULLED
IF THE MARRIAGE TOOK PLACE DURING THE EXISTENCE OF FIRST MARRIAGE.
(ART. 349, BIGAMY)
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent
was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3,
1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the
second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent
judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not
bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged
with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the
second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling
that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void,
viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or

58

guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and
ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It
further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOSEPH BARRA,

G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013
WHEN THERE IS ATTEMPTED ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the
victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown
to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant can
only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable under
Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals
found appellant's crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. REGIE LABIAGA,

G.R. No. 202867, July 15, 2013
DISTINCTION BETWEEN FRUSTRATED AND ATTEMPTED FELONY
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted
felony in this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an

59

attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a

felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the
crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other
hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime
is a cause or accident other than the offenders own spontaneous
desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have
been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. 21 If the evidence fails to
convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victims death
without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde
was mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after
the shooting incident:

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, vs. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN

G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013

MOTION TO QUASH, MEANING

As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him
for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the
face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined
by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be
considered.27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the
information which is evident on its fact. 28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the
defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order
that another complaint or information be filed30 except when the information is
quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
WHEN A PERSON COMMITS BIGAMY
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. 39 Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity

60

of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow
respondents line of defense and the CAs ratiocination, a person who commits
bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is
rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. VICTORINO REYES,

G.R. No. 173307, July 17, 2013
WHEN RAPE IS CONSUMMATED
More specifically, the presence of the swelling in AAAs labia majora was an
indication of the penetration by the erect penis of the labia majora of the accused.
As such, there was sufficient factual foundation for finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape,24 for, as the Court explains in People v. Teodoro:25
In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated
statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of the female. The Court has
clarified in People v. Campuhan26 that the mere touching of the external genitalia by
a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the
penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact
with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is
consummated once the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual
act touches either labia of the pudendum. As the Court has explained in People v.
Bali-balita,27 the touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal
contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis
on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect
penis touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are
physically situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the
penis to touch either of them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface of the female genitalia. It is required, however, that this manner of touching
of the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly established. (Emphasis supplied)

61

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARVIN CRUZ

G.R. No. 201728, July 17, 2013
THE NATURE OF SWEETHEART DEFENSE
As to the "sweetheart defense", it is said that love is not a license for lust. "A love
affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject
his beloved to his carnal desires against her will." 25 In this case, Cruzs argument
that they are lovers may be true; however, the sexual incidents between him and
AAA on November 6, 2007 have not been proven to be consensual.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS

G.R. No. 181539, July 24, 2013
DEAF-MUTE IS A COMPETENT WITNESS
The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a
witness. The rule is that "all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses."26 A deaf-mute may not be
able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of sight,
remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her
environment and experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deafmute from communicating orally with others but he/she may still communicate with
others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case, sketches. Thus,
a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make
observations and he/she can make those observations known to others. As this
Court held in People v. Tuangco27:
A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deafmutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the
sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3)
can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter. Thus, in People vs. De
Leon and People vs. Sasota, the accused was convicted on the basis of the
testimony of a deaf-mute. x x x. (Citations omitted.)

ANTONIO B. SANCHEZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013

62

ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) of RA 3019

Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 provides:
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. x x x.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.26 (Emphasis supplied)
Uriarte v. People27 further elaborates thus:
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused
acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as when the accused
committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there
is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or selfinterest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons
may be affected. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEN SEC. 3 (e) OF RA 3019 FOR CAUSING UNDUE INJURY IS PRESENT
Petitioner cannot hide behind the Arias doctrine, because it is not on all fours with
his case. In Arias, six people comprising heads of offices and their subordinates

63

were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The accused therein
allegedly conspired with one another in causing, allowing, and/or approving the
illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds. In acquitting the
two heads of offices, the Court ruled that they could not be held liable for the acts
of their dishonest or negligent subordinates because they failed to personally
examine each detail of a transaction before affixing their signatures in good faith.
In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is being held liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in
performing the duties primarily vested in him by law, resulting in undue injury to
private complainant. The good faith of heads of offices in signing a document will
only be appreciated if they, with trust and confidence, have relied on their
subordinates in whom the duty is primarily lodged.29
Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was established.
The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done
without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost income from the sale of the
palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The damage to
private complainant did not end with the canals construction. Informal settlers
dirtied her private property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory,
washroom, and waste disposal site.

HUR TIN YANG, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 195117, August 14, 2013
WHEN EXECUTION OF TRUST RECEIPT IS A LOAN AND NOT TRUST RECEIPT
TRANSACTION
In the instant case, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts reveal that
the dealing between petitioner and Metrobank was not a trust receipt transaction
but one of simple loan. Petitioners admissionthat he signed the trust receipts on
behalf of Supermax, which failed to pay the loan or turn over the proceeds of the
sale or the goods to Metrobank upon demanddoes not conclusively prove that the
transaction was, indeed, a trust receipts transaction. In contrast to the
nomenclature of the transaction, the parties really intended a contract of loan. This
Courtin Ng v. People14 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Perez,15 cases which
are in all four corners the same as the instant caseruled that the fact that the
entruster bank knew even before the execution of the trust receipt agreements that
the construction materials covered were never intended by the entrustee for resale
or for the manufacture of items to be sold is sufficient to prove that the transaction
was a simple loan and not a trust receipts transaction.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A TRUST RECEIPTS TRANSACTION

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A trust receipt transaction, within the meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by
and between a person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and another
person referred to in this Decree as entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or
holds absolute title or security interests over certain specified goods, documents or
instruments, releases the same to the possession of the entrustee upon the latters
execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document called a "trust receipt"
wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods, documents or
instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods,
documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the
proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears
in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or instruments themselves if they are
unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions
specified in the trust receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent to any
of the following:
1. In the case of goods or documents: (a) to sell the goods or procure their
sale; or (b) to manufacture or process the goods with the purpose of ultimate
sale: Provided, That, in the case of goods delivered under trust receipt for
the purpose of manufacturing or processing before its ultimate sale, the
entruster shall retain its title over the goods whether in its original or
processed form until the entrustee has complied full with his obligation under
the trust receipt; or (c) to load, unload, ship or transship or otherwise deal
with them in a manner preliminary or necessary to their sale; or
2. In the case of instruments: (a) to sell or procure their sale or exchange; or
(b) to deliver them to a principal; or (c) to effect the consummation of some
transactions involving delivery to a depository or register; or (d) to effect
their presentation, collection or renewal.
Simply stated, a trust receipt transaction is one where the entrustee has the
obligation to deliver to the entruster the price of the sale, or if the merchandise is
not sold, to return the merchandise to the entruster. There are, therefore, two
obligations in a trust receipt transaction: the first refers to money received under
the obligation involving the duty to turn it over (entregarla) to the owner of the
merchandise sold, while the second refers to the merchandise received under the
obligation to "return" it (devolvera) to the owner.16 A violation of any of these
undertakings constitutes Estafa defined under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC, as
provided in Sec. 13 of PD 115, viz:
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF TRUST RECEIPT
The true nature of a trust receipt transaction can be found in the "whereas" clause
of PD 115 which states that a trust receipt is to be utilized "as a convenient
business device to assist importers and merchants solve their financing problems."
Obviously, the State, in enacting the law, sought to find a way to assist importers
and merchants in their financing in order to encourage commerce in the Philippines.

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[A] trust receipt is considered a security transaction intended to aid in financing

importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to
finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to
acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported
or purchased. Similarly, American Jurisprudence demonstrates that trust receipt
transactions always refer to a method of "financing importations or financing sales."
The principle is of course not limited in its application to financing importations,
since the principle is equally applicable to domestic transactions. Regardless of
whether the transaction is foreign or domestic, it is important to note that the
transactions discussed in relation to trust receipts mainly involved sales.
INSTANCE WHERE VIOLATIONS OF TRUST RECEIPT IS NOT PRESENT
Further, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Perez, the respondents were officers of
Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC), a corporation engaged in
the construction business. On several occasions, respondents executed in favor of
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) trust receipts to secure the purchase of
construction materials that they will need in their construction projects. When the
trust receipts matured, ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the
construction projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts.
After several demands went unheeded, LBP filed a complaint for Estafa or violation
of Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC, in relation to PD 115, against the respondent
officers of ACDC. This Court, like in Ng, acquitted all the respondents on the
postulate that the parties really intended a simple contract of loan and not a trust
receipts transaction, viz:
When both parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of the goods
subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the part of the
trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Section 13 of P.D. 115;
the only obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the return of the
proceeds of the sale transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the
borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the
goods.
PRACTICE OF BANKS IN REQUIRING BORROWERS TO SIGN TRUST
RECEIPTS TO FACILITATE COLLECTION OF LOANS ARE UNJUST AND
REPREHENSIBLE
The Courts ruling in Colinares v. Court of Appeals21 is very apt, thus:
The practice of banks of making borrowers sign trust receipts to facilitate collection
of loans and place them under the threats of criminal prosecution should they be
unable to pay it may be unjust and inequitable. if not reprehensible. Such
agreements are contracts of adhesion which borrowers have no option but to sign
lest their loan be disapproved. The resort to this scheme leaves poor and hapless
borrowers at the mercy of banks and is prone to misinterpretation x x x.

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Unfortunately, what happened in Colinares is exactly the situation in the instant

case. This reprehensible bank practice described in Colinares should be stopped and
discouraged. For this Court to give life to the constitutional provision of nonimprisonment for nonpayment of debts,22 it is imperative that petitioner be
acquitted of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) ofthe RPC, in relation to
PD 115.

FELY Y. YALONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCILA C. YLAGAN

G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013
WHEN THERE IS A TRANSITORY OR CONTINUING CRIME
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalongs appeal still
remains dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of BP 22
cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts
material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some
occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crimes essential and
material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed.36 Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may
be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred in particular, the
place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored. 37
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and
delivered in Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and
encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its
dishonor.38 As such, the MTCC correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414
as it had the territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this light, the
denial of the present petition remains warranted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIA JARDINEL PEPINO-CONSULTA

G.R. No. 191071, August 28, 2013
AN EXAMPLE OF NON-COMPLIANCE OF SECTION 21, OF RA 9165, AFFECTS
INTEGRITY OF EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE FATAL
We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates
under varied conditions, many of them far from ideal, and cannot at all times
attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.
The participation of a representative from the DOJ, the media or an elected official

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alone can be problematic. For this reason, the last sentence of the implementing
rules provides that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." Thus, non-compliance with
the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution's case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may
still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be
recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.
Here, we find that the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized
were not shown to have been preserved. Contrarily, the records of the case bear
out the glaring fact that the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was broken
even at the very first link thereof.
To recall, the testimonial evidence of the prosecution established that the poseurbuyer in the buy-bust operation was the confidential informant who tipped the
police about the drug peddling activities of accused-appellant. Thus, it was the
poseur-buyer who supposedly received the suspected illegal drugs from accusedappellant, which allegedly consisted of five plastic sachets of shabu. PO2 Dizon and
PO3 Tiongco did not participate at all in this transaction. They merely witnessed the
exchange while they were seated inside a vehicle parked across the road eight to
ten meters away from where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were
situated. Even more damning was PO2 Dizons admission that he did not in fact see
the item(s) handed by accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer. His testimony during
cross-examination pertinently stated thus:
Clearly, PO2 Dizon was not in a position to say whether the objects handed by
accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer were in fact sachets of illegal drugs. Equally
vague was the actual number thereof, i.e., if in fact five sachets were handed to the
poseur-buyer, not four or three or any other number. PO3 Tiongcos testimony was
also silent on this aspect. The police officers had no personal knowledge whether
the alleged transaction between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer indeed
involved illegal drugs.
Moreover, the suspected drugs subject of the sale were left for some time in the
custody of the informant. PO3 Tiongco testified that while they were arresting
accused-appellant, the informant distanced himself from them. The police officers
first boarded accused-appellant into their vehicle that was parked on the other side
of the road and it was only after that that PO3 Tiongco went back to the informant
to retrieve the plastic sachets. Thus, from the time accused-appellant was arrested
until the plastic sachets were retrieved by PO3 Tiongco, the suspected drugs were
unaccounted for. That the informant may have tampered with, contaminated,
substituted, added to or pilfered a portion of the plastic sachets are distinct
possibilities that could not be ruled out. Undoubtedly, only the informant who acted
as the poseur-buyer could possibly state for certain that accused-appellant indeed

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handed to him five sachets of suspected shabu. Unfortunately, the informant was
not presented in court to testify on this matter.
WHERE THERE ARE SEVERAL BROKEN LINKS IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY
OF DRUGS
Be that as it may, although testimony about a perfect chain does not always have
to be the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken
chain of custody indeed becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is a narcotic substance. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances
such as shabu is that they are not distinctive and are not readily identifiable as in
fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and
nature. And because they cannot be readily and properly distinguished visually from
other substances of the same physical and/or chemical nature, they are susceptible
to alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and exchangewhether the
alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and exchange be inadvertent or
otherwise not. It is by reason of this distinctive quality that the condition of the
exhibit at the time of testing and trial is critical. Hence, in authenticating narcotic
specimens, a standard more stringent than that applied to objects which are readily
identifiable must be applieda more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that
the original item has either been exchanged with another or contaminated or
tampered with. (Citations omitted.)
In this case, one broken link was that of the turnover of the seized items from the
buy-bust team to the police investigator, SPO1 Doria. PO2 Dizon testified that after
he placed the marking on the five sachets of suspected shabu, he turned them over
to SPO1 Doria and the specimens were submitted to the crime laboratory for
examination.42 However, SPO1 Doria did not testify before the trial court so as to
shed light on this matter. The Court finds this unfortunate as the prosecution even
chose to dispense with his testimony.
Still another broken link was that involving the transfer of the drug specimens from
SPO1 Doria to the crime laboratory. P/Sr. Insp. Perez testified that the request for
laboratory examination and drug specimens were first received by PO2 Bagaoisan,
the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then called her to physically receive the
same.43However, P/Sr. Insp. Perez stated that she did not actually see if it was
SPO1 Doria who transmitted the specimens. She merely relied on the stamp of PO2
Bagaoisan.44 Furthermore, PO2 Bagaoisan was not presented in court to prove that
it was indeed SPO1 Doria who delivered the drug specimens to the crime
laboratory.
In view of the evident breaks in the chain of custody, very serious doubts arise as
to the identity of the seized illegal drugs in this case. Apparently, there can be no
absolute certainty if the sachets of shabu seized from the informant were the very
same drugs handed by accused-appellant, or, later on, the same drugs transmitted
to the crime laboratory and eventually presented before the trial court.

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These breaks in the chain of custody go into the very elements of the crime of
illegal sale of drugs that was charged against accused-appellant. Specifically, the
elements of the identity of the object of the illegal sale of drugs and the delivery of
the thing sold were not proven in this case beyond reasonable doubt.
As regards the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty that the
RTC and the Court of Appeals heavily relied upon, we clarified in People v.
Caete45 that:
"[W]hile the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by
itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellant's conviction because "First, the presumption is precisely just that
- a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it]
cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt." x x x.
(Citations omitted.)
In this case, the above presumption was undoubtedly overcome by evidence that
the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation committed lapses in the
seizure and handling of the allegedly seized plastic sachets of shabu. Even if
accused-appellant failed to present evidence with respect to her defense of denial
or the ill motive that impelled the police officers to falsely impute upon her the
crime charged, the same is of no moment. The well-entrenched dictum in criminal
law is that "[t]he evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense." 46 If the
prosecution cannot, to begin with, establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt, the defense is not even required to adduce evidence. Thus, the
presumption of innocence on the part of accused-appellant in this case must be
upheld.
On a final note, the Court cannot emphasize enough that zealousness on the part of
law enforcement agencies in the pursuit of drug peddlers is indeed laudable.
However, it is of paramount importance that the procedures laid down by law be
complied with, especially those that involve the chain of custody of the illegal
drugs. This is necessary in order to dispel even the most infinitesimal of doubts on
the outcome of arrests and buy-bust operations, so as not to render naught the
efforts and the resources put forth in the apprehension and prosecution of violators
of our drug laws.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. APOLINARIO MANALILI y JOSE

G.R. No. 191253, August 28, 2013

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THE VICTIM OF STATUTORY RAPE IS ENTITLED TO CIVIL INDEMNITY

Pursuant to recent jurisprudence,40 there is no longer any debate that the victim in
statutory rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of P50,000.00, moral damages
of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages of P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity
of P50,000.00 is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. Similarly, the
award of moral damages of P50,000.00 is mandatory, and made without need of
allegation and proof other than that of the fact of rape, for it is logically assumed
that the victim suffered moral injuries from her ordeal. In addition, exemplary
damages of P30,000.00 are justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set an
example for the public good and to serve as deterrent to those who abuse the
young.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO Y BROCA

G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013
EFFECT OF DEATH OF ACCUSED DURING THE PENDENCY OF APPEAL
In People v. Bayotas,18 the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior
to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act
or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a

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separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. (Citations omitted.)
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.
Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
case.19
Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by
the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal
before the Court was still pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistosos
appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death.1wphi1
Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts Decision dated January
9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual.
Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still has the
jurisdiction to set it aside.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRION, JOJIE SUANSING

G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013
IN RAPE OF A RETARDATE, ONLY THE FACT OF SEXUAL CONGRESS AND
MENTAL RETARDATION NEEDS TO BE PROVEN (ART. 266-A)
"[F]or the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, or
when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under
12 years of age or was demented."20 From these requisites, it can thus be deduced
that rape is committed the moment the offender has sexual intercourse with a
person suffering from mental retardation. "[C]arnal knowledge of a woman who is a
mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of retardation deprives the
complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and

72

womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak
to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already
constitutes rape[,] without requiring proof that the accused used force and
intimidation in committing the act."21 Only the facts of sexual congress between the
accused and the victim and the latters mental retardation need to be proved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FREDDY SALONGA Y AFIADO

G.R. No. 194948, September 2, 2013
MARKING DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ACCUSED, NO PHOTOGRAPHS, NO
CERTIFICATE OF INVENTORY, FATAL TO THE CASE UNDER RA 9165
In People v. Salonga,30 we held that it is essential for the prosecution to prove that
the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same
substance offered in court as an exhibit. This Court, however, finds reasonable
doubt on the evidence presented to prove an unbroken chain of custody.
First, it is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in the
police station, was made in the presence of the accused or his representative.
Although we have previously ruled that the marking upon "immediate" confiscation
of the prohibited items contemplates even that which was done at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team, 31 the same must always be done
in the presence of the accused or his representative. Thus, there is already a gap in
determining whether the specimens that entered into the chain were actually the
ones examined and offered in evidence.
"Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contrabands are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves
to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of
at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting, or contamination
of evidence."32
Second, the prosecution failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to
take photos of the seized items pursuant to the above-stated provision. There is
nothing in the records that would show at least an attempt to comply with this
procedural safeguard; neither was there any justifiable reason propounded for
failing to do so.
Third, we find conflicting testimony and glaring inconsistencies that would cast
doubt on the integrity of the handling of the seized drugs. The material
inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the Crime Laboratory

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creates a cloud of doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items were preserved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO ESPENILLA

G.R. No. 192253, September 18, 2013
WHEN RECANTATION IN RAPE CASES IS WORTHLESS
Indeed, jurisprudence is replete with instances where the recantation of testimony
by the rape victim herself was not accepted by the Court when her previous
testimony appeared more trustworthy and believable.20
In People v. Bulagao,21 we reiterated the rationale for upholding a rape victims
original testimony over that of her subsequent recantation in this wise:
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainants testimony. By the
very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to
testify for herself. When a rape victims testimony is straightforward and marked
with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence
and cannot be discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to
establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it,
notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness
does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may
later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the
test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the
demeanor of the witness on the stand. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, with more reason, we cannot ascribe any weight to the recantation of the
charges by the victims father when the victims own categorical testimony remains
on record. Alternatively put, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence,
BBBs recantation cannot prevail over the positive declaration of rape made by AAA.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARVIN CAYANAN

G.R. No. 200080, September 18, 2013
WHEN RAPE ABSORBS FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape
in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of

74

rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. 10 In this case,
circumstances show that the victims abduction was with the purpose of raping her.
Thus, after Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several places
until they reached his sisters house where he raped her inside the bedroom. Under
these circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARY ALINAO

G.R. No. 191256, September 18, 2013
WHEN EVIDENT PREMIDITATION EXISTS

For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be

proved: a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and, c)
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 49 The essence of evident premeditation is
that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carryout the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.50
In the case at bar, accused-appellant, in razing Antonio Ardets house in order to
drive him out and shooting him the moment he appears at his front door, clearly
had a previously and carefully crafted plan to kill his victim. We are convinced that
the time it took accused-appellant and his son to device their plan, plot where the
gasoline should be poured, and procure the gasoline and the firearms, as well as
the time it took to go to Antonio Ardets house, and even the time when they
waited for Antonio Ardet to come out of the house, all afforded accused-appellant
sufficient opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of his act to kill his brotherin-law and his determination to commit the cold-blooded deed from the time of its
conception until it was carried out.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RYAN FRIAS y GALANG a.k.a. "TAGALOG"

G.R. No. 203068, September 18, 2013
FORCE IN CASES OF RAPE NEED NOT BE IRRESISTIBLE
In People v. Sgt. Bayani,22 the Court explained that:
It must be emphasized that force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; it
need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all
considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. So
must it likewise be for intimidation which is addressed to the mind of the victim and
is therefore subjective. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victims

75

perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any
hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produces fear fear that if the
victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would
happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with
death if she reports the incident.
Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl with
a knife or pistol. And where such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into
submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be
extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all her
might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of continuing
intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to
make the victims participation in the sexual act voluntary.23(Emphasis ours)
That the accused-appellant held a knife against AAA undoubtedly produced fear in
the latters mind that the former would kill her if she would not submit to his sexual
design. The act of holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of force or, at
least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring a
woman into submission.24 It would thus be unreasonable, to say the least, to
require AAA to establish that she indeed forcibly resisted the accused-appellants
sexual aggression.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 ALFREDO ALAWIG

G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013
WHEN CONSPIRACY IS PRESENT
"Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code [RPC], there is conspiracy if two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. It must be proven during
trial with the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the agreement of
the parties either by direct or circumstantial evidence of the conspirators conduct
before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design
or purpose."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DE LOS REYES

G.R. No. 197550, September 25, 2013
MECHANICS OF CHAIN REQUIREMENT IN CHAIN OF CUSTODY UNDER RA
9165
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would
ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the

76

prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession,
the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in
a buy-bust situation:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.37
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is
true only when "(i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved."38 Thus, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified
and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an
irregularity, a red flag, that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus
delicti.
In the case at bar, not only was there no justifiable ground offered for the noncompliance with the chain of custody requirement, there was an apparent failure to
properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure
the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation
in court.39 In other words, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain
that would have shown that the sachets of shabu presented in court were the very
same items seized from Enriquez.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON PLACER

G.R. No. 181753, October 9, 2013
WHEN TREACHERY IS PRESENT
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting
victim.

77

Hence, treachery is absent when the victim was placed on his guard, like when a
heated argument has preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to
face with his assailants.
The fatal stabbing of Rosalino by Ramon was immediately preceded by two
altercations between Ramon and Virgilio, on one hand, and Rosalino, on the other.
The first altercation occurred right after the near-collision of the tricycles, 25 while
the other happened shortly after Ramon and Virgilio had blocked Rosalinos
tricycle.26 During the second altercation, Rosalino stood face to face with Ramon
and Virgilio. It was then when Ramon stabbed the victim twice, 27 the sequential
method of attack being borne out in the necropsy report showing that Rosalino had
sustained two fatal stab wounds in the chest and abdomen. 28 Under the
circumstances, Rosalino was rendered completely aware of the imminent danger to
himself from Ramon and Virgilio, rendering their assault far from sudden and
unexpected as to put Rosalino off his guard against any deadly assault. To stress,
treachery cannot be appreciated if the victim was forewarned of an impending
danger and could have foreseen the aggression of the accused.
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Voluntary surrender is a circumstance that reduces the penalty for the offense. Its
requisites as a mitigating circumstance are that: (1) the accused has not been
actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the
latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.
DESPITE HIS NON-APPEAL, VIRGILIOS CRIMINAL LIABILITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED
The revised characterization of the crime committed as homicide necessarily favors
Virgilio despite his non-appeal. As an accomplice in murder, he was prescribed the
indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
14 years, ten months and 20 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, but he
should now instead be found guilty conformably with this decision as an accomplice
in homicide, a result definitely favorable to him as an accused. Pursuant to Article
52, Revised Penal Code, the accomplice is imposed the penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. He is entitled to the
benefits of the lighter sentence.
As such, Virgilios penalty should be within the medium period of prision mayor, the
penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal, to be imposed in the medium
period due to the absence of any modifying circumstances. The duration of the
penalty is from eight years and one day to ten years. 36 Considering that the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
taken from prision correccional, the penalty next lower in degree to prision mayor,
which ranges from six months and one day to six years, his sentence is modified to
an indeterminate penalty of two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOVI PORNILLOS Y HALLARE

G.R. No. 201109, October 2, 2013
WHEN WEIGHT OF DRUGS AFFECTS INTEGRITY OF EVIDENCE
But the CA is in error in one important point. It said that the chain of custody of the
seized drugs does not appear to be unbroken. But the PDEA report to the Provincial
Prosecutors Office,15 the booking sheet and arrest report, 16 the Certificate of
Inventory,17 and the laboratory examination request18 all put down the seized shabu
as weighing 0.4 gram. The forensic chemist reported and testified, however, that
the police actually submitted only 0.2204 gram of shabu for laboratory testing,
short by 0.1796 gram from what the police inventoried.
In People v. Aneslag,19 the Information alleged that the accused sold 240 grams of
shabu but the forensic test showed that the drugs weighed only 230 grams, short
by 10 grams. The prosecution offered a sound explanation for the 4.16% loss. The
trial court ordered two separate tests of the subject shabu packs. As a consequence
the two chemists took out separate samples from each of the seized packs of
shabu, resulting in the weight loss.
Here, however, the percentage of loss was not that small. The content of the sachet
was inventoried at 0.4 gram but yielded only 0.2204 gram during the laboratory
test, short by 0.1796 gram. It suffered a loss of 45% or nearly half of the original
weight. The prosecution has three theories: only two chemists served the entire
region giving rise to possible error; the police and the crime laboratory used
different weighing scales; and the failure of the laboratory to take into account the
weight of the sachet container.20 But these are mere speculations since none of
those involved was willing to admit having committed weighing error. Speculations
cannot overcome the concrete evidence that what was seized was not what was
forensically tested. This implies tampering with the prosecution evidence. The Court
cannot affirm the conviction of Pornillos on compromised evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTERO GAMEZ y BALTAZAR
G.R. No. 202847, October 23, 2013
WHEN UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION CEASES, ASSAULT UPON THE PREVIOUS
AGGRESSOR IS NOT SELF-DEFENSE
Hence, the accused-appellant was no longer acting in self-defense, when he,
despite having already disarmed Apolinario, ran after the latter for about 20 m and
then stabbed him. The accused-appellants claim of self-defense is further negated
by the fatal incision on Apolinarios neck that almost decapitated his head, a
physical evidence which corroborates Mauras testimony that after stabbing
Apolinario with the bolo, the accused-appellant pulled out the scythe on his waist
and used the same to slash Apolinarios neck. The use of a weapon different from

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that seized from the victim and the nature of the injury inflicted show the accusedappellants determined resolve to kill Apolinario.
When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to
kill or wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense
but in retaliation against the original aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as selfdefense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already
ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense the aggression still

existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARYZALDY GUZON

G.R. No. 199901, October 9, 2013
RA 9165, RE: SEC. 21 ACQUITTAL
"A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by
law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors." 41 As in all drugs cases,
compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that follows
such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction.42 The rule is imperative, as it is essential that
the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a
finding of guilt.43
To eliminate doubt, and even abuse, in the handling of seized substances, some
safeguards for compliance by law enforcement officers are established by law and
jurisprudence. For one, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, upon which Guzon anchors his
appeal, reads in part:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official

80

who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, particularly
Section 21 thereof, further provides the following guidelines in the custody and
control of confiscated drugs:
xxxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable , in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items;
LAPSES IN HANDLING OF EVIDENCE, RA 9165, SEC. 21
The rule includes the proviso that procedural lapses in the handling of the seized
drugs are not ipso facto fatal to the prosecutions cause, provided that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved. In each case, courts
are nonetheless reminded to thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that
constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic,
or deliberate disregard of the safeguards that are drawn by the law 44 for the
protection of the corpus delicti. The strict demands and significant value of the
chain of custody rule were emphasized in the oft-cited Malillin v. People 45 wherein
the Court held:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there

81

had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical,
or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise
obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the
same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule.46(Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
As Guzon correctly pointed out in his Supplemental Brief, there were several lapses
in the law enforcers handling of the seized item which, when taken collectively,
render the standards of chain of custody seriously breached. In a line of cases, the
Court explained that the failure to comply with the indispensable requirement of
corpus delicti happens not only when it is missing, but also where there are
substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs which raise doubts on
the authenticity of the evidence presented in court. 47 Upon review, the Court has
determined that such lapses and doubt mar the instant case.
First, the police officers who took part in the buy-bust operation failed to mark the
seized item immediately after its confiscation from Guzon. The Court explained in
People v. Coreche48 the importance in the chain of custody of the immediate
marking of an item that is seized from an accused, to wit:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens
will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate
the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from
the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of
evidence.49 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Here, instead of immediately marking the subject drug upon its confiscation, PO2
Tuzon marked it with his initials "EAT" only upon arrival at the police station. 50 While
the failure of arresting officers to mark the seized items at the place of arrest does
not, by itself, impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated
items inadmissible in evidence,51 such circumstance, when taken in light of the
several other lapses in the chain of custody that attend the present case, forms part
of a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards that are drawn by
the law,52 sufficient to create reasonable doubt as to the culpability of the accused.

82

The Court has determined that although a physical inventory of the items seized
during the buy-bust operation forms part of the case records, the buy-bust team
failed to fully comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for
its preparation and execution. Under the law, the inventory must be made "in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom the items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof." These
requirements are reiterated in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165. Non-compliant
with such rules, however, the Certification/Inventory of Seized/Confiscated
Items53 in this case only bears the signatures of PO3 Manuel and PO2 Tuzon as
apprehending officers. Although the Certification indicates the name of Guzon under
the section "With Conformity", it includes neither his signature nor of any other
person who is allowed by law to witness the required inventory. There is also no
proof that a copy of the inventory was received by any of the persons enumerated
under the law.
Besides these deficiencies in the preparation of the inventory, no photograph of the
seized item, which is also required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, forms part of
the case records.
The saving clause in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165 fails to remedy the lapses
and save the prosecutions case. We have emphasized in People v. Garcia 54 that the
saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses,
and thereafter cited justifiable grounds. 55 Failure to follow the procedure mandated
under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained. 56 Equally important,
the prosecution must establish that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized item are properly preserved. The prosecution failed in this regard. Taking
into account the several rules and requirements that were not followed by the law
enforcers, there was an evident disregard on their part of the established legal
requirements. Their breach of the chain of custody rule, magnified by the
prosecutions failure to explain the deficiencies during the trial, casts doubt on
whether the item claimed to have been sold by Guzon to the police asset was the
same item that was brought for examination by the police crime laboratory and
eventually presented in court as evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y

USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI,
THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A
LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013
PLEA OF GUILTY TO HEINEOUS CRIMES PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED BY
THE JUDGE.

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Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct
a "searching inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be
observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of
physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judges intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea
of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he
admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the
accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty
carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of
the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the
court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed
of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due
process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood
by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or
furnish its missing details.

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EVEN IF PLEA IS IMPROVIDENT, COURT MAY STILL CONVICT

Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenians, were improvidently made, this
Court will still not set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court
judges shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-appellants
culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of
judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving
the commission of the offense charged. 45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is
made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction
can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the
accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants assertions, they were convicted by the trial court,
not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court. 47 The
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their degrees
of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
ARTICLE 8
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has
been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest
on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the
parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. 53 The
testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accusedappellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end.
There were testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accusedappellants kept coming back to the victims house; (2) during the kidnapping,
accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused
appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered and when
the rescue operation was conducted.
ACCOMPLICE, ARTICLE 18
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18
of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice,
namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design
of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2)
that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an

85

efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE UP TO 21 YEARS OLD ONLY

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the
aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344, 67 the suspension of
sentence can be availed of only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to
pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an
accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled that
death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of
the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 68 the penalty
imposed by law on accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for
ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than what the
principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that
as to Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed
by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower than the maximum
imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision Correccional; and the
maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any
aggravating circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the
Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of
Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor,
as maximum.
SECTION 51 OF RA 9344 EXPLAINED
As regards Perpenians possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other
training facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in
People v. Jacinto70 that the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court, however,
finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenians
actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For
such reason, she may be immediately released from detention.

APPORTIONMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITIES OF SEVERAL ACCUSED

The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros 76 is instructive on the
apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire
amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated
in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective
responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each principal accused-appellant

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should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than
Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them
shall be liable for the total amount of P300,000.00 divided among the principals
who shall be liable for P288,000.00 (or P32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall
be liable for P12,000.00. This is broken down into P10,666.67 civil
indemnity, P10,666.67 moral damages and P10,666.67 exemplary damages for
each principal; and P4,000.00 civil indemnity, P4,000.00 moral damages
and P4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL ESPERA y CUYACOT

G.R. No. 202868, October 2, 2013
PENALTY OF SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH THE USE OF WEAPON. ART. 266-B
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever rape by
sexual assault is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be
prision mayor to reclusion temporal, or a duration of 6 years and 1 day to 20 years.
As there was no attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the imposable
penalty is the medium period of the said duration, that is, from 10 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 15 years and 4 months, pursuant to Articles 64 and 65 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term shall be within prision correccional (which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to
six years), the penalty next lower to prision mayor, and the maximum term shall be
within the imposable penalty stated above. Hence, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed on the appellant the indeterminate sentence of 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum and 14 years, 8 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum for the crime of rape by sexual assault
committed against Ana with the use of a hand gun, a deadly weapon.
PENALTY OF RAPE WITH DEADLY WEAPON
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever rape by
sexual intercourse is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death. As there was no attendant aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in
sentencing the appellant to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENTINO GALAGAR, JR.,
G.R. No. 202842, October 9, 2013
USE OF DEADLY WEAPON IS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN RAPE.

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For one (1) to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one (1) of the
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, must be alleged in the Information and duly proved
during the trial. In the case at bar, appellant used a sharp- pointed bolo locally
known as sundang in consummating the salacious act. This circumstance was
alleged in the Information and duly proved during trial. Being in the nature of a
qualifying circumstance, "use of a deadly weapon" increases the penalties by
degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance
which affects only the period of the penalty. This so-called qualified form of rape
committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death. As such, the presence of generic aggravating and mitigating
circumstances will determine whether the lesser or higher penalty shall be imposed.
When, as in this case, neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime, the minimum penalty,i.e., reclusion perpetua, should be
the penalty imposable pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, both
trial and appellate courts properly imposed on appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA

G.R. No. 191263, October 16, 2013
AIRPORT FRISKING IS AN AUTHORIZED FORM OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
On a final note, we held that airport frisking is an authorized form of search and
seizure. As held in similar cases of People v Johnson 73 and People v Canton,74 this
Court affirmed the conviction or the accused Leila Reyes Johnson and Susan Canton
for violation of drugs law when they were found to be in hiding in their body illegal
drugs upon airport frisking. The Court in both cases explained the rationale for the
validity of airport frisking thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure or
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to hoard an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors: their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest
the presence of suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are. There is little question that such searches arc reasonable,
given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity or the safety interests involved, and
the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed. travellers
are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that the are subject to search and. if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would he subject to seizure. These announcements

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place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against

warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

FE ABELLA y PERPETUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013
WHERE INTENT TO KILL IS PRESENT.
In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the
body. The attending physician certified that the injury would require medical
attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged from the
hospital the following day.
In Benignos case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck
and a 4-cm long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used
by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have complications
resulting from these injuries because the wounds were extensive and they were big
and they were open wounds, so there is a possibility of infections resulting from
these kinds of wounds, and the instrument used was not a sterile instrument
contaminated with other things."48 No complications developed from Benignos
wounds which could have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for
a period of 17 days from September 6, 1998 to September 23, 1998.
From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use
of a scythe against Benignos neck was determinative of the petitioners homicidal
intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to
figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be
enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead. While no complications actually
developed from the gaping wounds in Benignos neck and left hand, it perplexes
logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal
considering the period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury
would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO VELASCO

G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013
ART. 266-A RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
We likewise conclude that the lower courts imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each charge of rape was proper, notwithstanding the mention in the
Informations of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. As the
Court of Appeals noted, the appellants relationship to the victim, as her stepfather,
was not proven since there was no evidence of a valid marriage between appellant
and the victims mother.

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Anent the charge of one count of acts of lasciviousness, we declare that the
prosecution was able to sufficiently prove that appellant did commit the same.
The elements of this crime under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the
offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) it is done under any of
the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended party is another
person of either sex.26Furthermore, there is jurisprudence which says that in case of
acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is
sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a. "Bogarts,"

G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013
ESSENCE OF TREACHERY
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make." 13 "The essence of treachery is that
the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape."14 Otherwise stated, an unexpected and sudden attack which
renders the victim unable and unprepared to put up a defense is the essence of
treachery. In this case, the victim Labando was totally unaware of the threat. He
was merely sitting on the bench in front of a sari-sari store eating bananas when
appellant, without any provocation or prior argument, suddenly stabbed him on his
chest, piercing the right ventricle of his heart thus causing his instantaneous death.
The stabbing was deliberate, unexpected, swift and sudden which foreclosed any
escape, resistance or defense coming from the victim. This is a classic example of
treachery.
DAMAGES THAT MAY BE AWARDED DUE TO A CRIME
"When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages."17 Both the RTC and the CA properly awarded civil indemnity to the heirs
of the victim but the same must be increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.18 The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to moral damages
which the trial court and the CA properly awarded in the amount of P50,000.00.
The award of exemplary damages in view of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is likewise correct however the same must be increased to P30,000.00 in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.19 "Moreover, while actual damages cannot be
awarded since there was no evidence of actual expenses incurred for the death of

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the victim, in lieu thereof, the sum of P25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby
granted, by way of temperate damages as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved." 20In
addition) all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARILYN SANTOS and ARLENE VALERA

G.R. No. 193190, November 13, 2013
SECTION 21, RA 9165 / APPEAL OPENS EVERYTHING TO REVIEW
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation
in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant
did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed,
the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165
were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on
appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were
lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and
evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN NIEGAS y FALLORE

G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013
ELEMENTS OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ART. 267
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender is
a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives
the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
(d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present:
(1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed
by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim under
any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent

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of the accused to effect the same. There must be a purposeful or knowing action by
the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. (Citations omitted.)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JONAS GUILLEN y ATIENZA

G.R. No. 191756, November 25, 2013
HEALED HYMENAL LACERATION DOES NOT NEGATE RAPE.
Anent appellants contention that "AAAs" healed hymenal laceration does not prove
rape, we find the same irrelevant and immaterial. Hymenal laceration, whether
fresh or healed, is not an element of the crime of rape. Even a medical examination
is not necessary as it is merely corroborative. As we mentioned before, the fact of
rape in this case was satisfactorily established by the testimony of "AAA" alone.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMENIGILDO MAGLENTE y MEDINA

alias "JUN MAGLENTE" and ROLANDO VELASQUEZ y GUEVARRA alias
"RANDY," Accused-Appellants. DAN MAGSIPOC CANCELER and PABLO INEZ
alias "KA JAY," Accused.
G.R. No. 201445, November 27, 2013
CONSPIRACY, ARTICLE 8
Such mode and manner in which the offense was committed likewise evinces a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent, all showing that
appellants conspired with one another. Indeed, direct proof of previous agreement
to commit a crime is not necessary since conspiracy may be inferred from the acts
of the accused before, during and after the crime, which are indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Significantly, where
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all. 32(Citations omitted)
Maglente also assails the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. He
insists that there is no evidence showing that the perpetrators deliberately and
consciously adopted means in order to ensure their safety from any defense that
could be put up by the victims.
TREACHERY, ARTICLE 14
"The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on
unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victims." 34 Two conditions must concur for
treachery to exist, namely:

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(a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted.35
The established facts easily demonstrate the existence of treachery in this case.
The perpetrators waited for the victims van in ambush, with Maglente standing at
the corner with his gun drawn. Thereafter, a car blocked the vans path and the
perpetrators started shooting at the van and its passengers. The means employed
by the perpetrators show that it was employed to discount any possibility of
retaliation or escape, and that such means or method was deliberately employed.
As found by the CA:
[A]ppellants attack came unexpectedly when appellants suddenly blocked the way
of the victims who were unsuspecting of appellants plan to attack. At a spur of a
moment [sic], appellants, armed with firearms, positioned themselves in front of
the van of the helpless, unarmed and surprised victims, and began shooting at
them. From the legal standpoint, treachery was attendant as the manner of the
attack and the means employed by appellants obviously manifested the intention of
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to them and to deprive the
victims of any real chance to defend themselves.
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION WHEN ABSENT. ARTICLE 14
Moreover, the CA correctly deviated from the RTCs finding regarding the existence
of evident premeditation. According to the CA, the records did not show sufficient
evidence to support the existence of the "time when appellants determined to
commit the crime and that sufficient lapse of time existed between such
determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the circumstances of
their act."37 To properly appreciate evident premeditation as an aggravating
circumstance, it is indispensable that the fact of planning the crime be established.
Particularly, evidence must show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how
much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Absent such proof, evident
premeditation cannot prosper. In this case, the records are bereft of evidence
proving how and when the plan to attack the victims was hatched up.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAVIER CAAVERAS

G.R. No. 193839, November 27, 2013
WHEN TREACHERY IS NOT PRESENT. ARTICLE 14
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense that the offended party might make. 66 Treachery is appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance when the following elements are shown: a) the malefactor
employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the person attacked no

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opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the means, method, or manner of

execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. Treachery
involves not only the swiftness, surprise, or suddenness of an attack upon an
unsuspecting victim,67 rendering the victim defenseless. It should also be shown
that the mode of attack has knowingly been intended to accomplish the wicked
intent.68
Thus, the second element is the subjective aspect of treachery.69 It means that the
accused must have made some preparation to kill the deceased in a manner that
would insure the execution of the crime or render it impossible or hard for the
person attacked to resort to self-defense or retaliation. The mode of attack,
therefore, must have been planned by the offender and must not have sprung from
an unexpected turn of events.70
We have had occasion to rule that treachery is not present when the killing is not
premeditated,71 or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately
adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as
a result of a provocative act of the victim, 72 or when the killing is done at the spur
of the moment.73
In this case, there was no time for appellant and his companions to plan and agree
to deliberately adopt a particular means to kill Claro. The first query of Claro was
regarded as innocent enough and was given no attention. It was the second query
that was considered impertinent, and witnesses testified that appellant and his
companions went after Claro immediately after it was uttered. Even the choice of
weapon, a beer bottle readily available and within grabbing range at the table as
appellant followed outside, shows that the intent to harm came about
spontaneously. We also find that the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.
WHEN SUPERIORITY IN NUMBER IS NOT ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to the qualifying circumstance
of taking advantage of superior strength. 74 It must be shown that the aggressors
combined forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority in
strength.75 When appreciating this qualifying circumstance, it must be proven that
the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. 76 Indeed, when assailants
attack a victim alternately, they cannot be said to have taken advantage of their
superior strength.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be
selected from the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal, with
the minimum penalty selected from the range of prision mayor. Thus, we
impose the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to 4 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
tempora as maximum. As to the award of damages to Claro' s heirs, we

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find that the award granted by the R TC is in keeping with prevailing

jurisprudence on homicide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO GARCIA y PADIERNOS

G.R. No. 206095, November 25, 2013
WHEN THERE IS SEXUAL ASSAULT
In the absence of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed by Garcia is
Simple Rape by Sexual Assault and the penalty should be prision mayor as provided
in Art. 266-B par. 7 of the RPC. Considering that there is neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period
pursuant to Article 64(l)27 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Garcia should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which
should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed
by law for the offense, that is, prision correccional (6 months and 1 day to 6 years)
and the maximum of which should be within the range of prision mayor in its
medium period (8 years and 1 day to 10 years). Accordingly, the Court imposes the
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NATALIO HILARION y LALIAG

G.R. No. 201105, November 25, 2013
GUIDELINES IN APPRECIATING THE VICTIMS AGE. (RA 7610/ ART. 266-A)
In People v. Buado Jr.,9 the Court reiterated the guidelines in appreciating the
victim's age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance,
thus:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases,
we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth
of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity

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or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree

such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victim s mother or relatives concerning the victim s age, the
complainant s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of
the victim.
In the present case, the records are completely devoid of evidence that the
certificates recognized by law have been lost or destroyed or were otherwise
unavailable. The mother simply testified without prior proof of the unavailability of
the recognized primary evidence. Thus, proof of the victim s age cannot be
recognized, following the rule that all doubts should be interpreted in favor of the
accused.
Accordingly, as the Court did in Buado we can only sustain the accused s conviction
for simple rape,10 as the victim s and her mother s testimonies to prove the victim s
minority are insufficient:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASIR GANI y ALIH

and NORMINA GANI y GALOS
G.R. No. 198318, November 27, 2013
RA 9165, SECTION 21
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that the failure of the buybust team to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon seizure and at the
site of accused-appellants apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory of

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the same in the presence of all the persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165, are not fatal and did not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence
given that the prosecution was able to trace and establish each and every link in
the chain of custody of the seized drugs and, hence, the identity and integrity of the
said drugs had been duly preserved. For the same reasons, it was not imperative
for the prosecution to present as witnesses before the RTC the two barangay
officials who witnessed the conduct of the inventory. At best, the testimonies of
these two barangay officials will only be corroborative, and would have no
significant impact on the identity and integrity of the seized drugs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL ALCOBER

G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013
GUIDELINES IN ESTABLISHING AGE, EITHER AS ELEMENT OF THE CRIME
ON QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
In People v. Pruna,33 the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either
as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth
of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the

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complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly

admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim. (Emphases supplied, citation omitted.)
WHEN AGE
NECESSARY

IS

ADMITTED

BY

ACCUSED,

PROOF

THEREOF

IS

NOT

Furthermore, BBB categorically testified that AAA was 13 years old at the time
material to this case.1wphi1 To be sure, there is no disparity between the evidence
for the prosecution and the defense on the point that the accused had carnal
knowledge of AAA when she was only 13 years old. Taking into account that the
minority of the victim and accused-appellants being the common-law spouse of the
victims mother, this Court finds it proper to appreciate this qualifying circumstance
under the fifth paragraph, item number 1, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DONEY GADUYON y TAPISPISAN

G.R. No. 181473, November 11, 2013
RA 7610
The Information in Criminal Case No. 6573 against appellant was for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, which pertinently provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is

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under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x
x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In paragraph (b), the following requisites must concur: (1) the accused commits
the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child,
whether male or female is below eighteen (18) years of age. 66 This paragraph
"punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in
prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only
a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through
coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct."
SMILE OF VICTIM WHEN IDENTIFYING FATHER AS THE CULPRIT IS NOT
SIGNIFICANT (ART. 266-A)
On the other hand, neither should the smile of "AAA" while identifying her father in
court be given any malicious significance. While appellant puts much importance to
said smile, which could be a way of concealing her nervousness, he ignored the fact
that "AAA" cried while testifying on the details of the incidents. In fact, during her
testimony, she categorically stated that she was afraid and ashamed. The candid
and straightforward narration of how she was abused and the tears that
accompanied her story are earmarks of credibility and must be given full faith and
credit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAY MONTEVIRGEN y OZARAGA
G.R. No. 189840, December 11, 2013
RA 9165, SECTION 21
Failure to physically inventory and photograph the shabu seized from an accused in
the manner prescribed by law do not invalidate his arrest or render said drug
inadmissible in evidence if its integrity and evidentiary value remain intact. It could
still be utilized in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Failure to Physically Inventory and
Photograph the Shabu After Seizure
and Confiscation is Not Fatal.
Appellant draws attention to the failure of the apprehending police officers to
comply with Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA 9165 regarding the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. This
provision reads as follows:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom

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such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a

representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items.
In other words, the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and take photograph of the objects
confiscated does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized.
There is a proviso in the implementing rules stating that when it is shown that there
exist justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence have been preserved, the seized items can still be used in determining the
guilt or innocence of the accused.21
Here, the absence of evidence that the buy-bust team made an inventory and took
photographs of the drugs seized from appellant was not fatal since the prosecution
was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu. PO3 Ruiz, the
poseur-buyer and apprehending officer, marked the seized items in front of
appellant, the barangay captain and other members of the buy-bust team,
immediately after the consummation of the drug transaction. He then delivered the
seized items to the duty investigator, who in turn sent the same to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination on the same day. During trial, PO3 Ruiz was able to
identify the said markings and explain how they were made.
Clearly, there was no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation, handling, custody and
examination of the shabu.1wphi1The illegal drugs that were confiscated from
appellant, taken to the police headquarters, subjected to qualitative examination at
the crime laboratory, and finally introduced in evidence against appellant were the
same illegal drugs that were confiscated from him when he was caught in flagrante
delicto selling and possessing the same.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERDINAND BAUTISTA y SINAON

G.R. No. 198113, December 11, 2013

HOW TO PROVE CORPUS DELICTI IN RA 9165, RE: SECTION 5 AND 11

To prove the corpus delicti, the prosecution must show that the dangerous drugs
seized from the accused and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same

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dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence to prove his guilt. 10 To ensure that
this is done right and that the integrity of the evidence of the dangerous drugs is
safeguarded, Congress outlined in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 the mandatory procedure
that law enforcers must observe following the seizure of such substance:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;
Also, Sec. 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. 9165 provides the following:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items;
Clearly, the Congress and the Executive Department demand strict compliance with
the above. It is only by such strict compliance that the grave mischiefs of planting
evidence or substituting it may be eradicated. Such strict compliance is also
consistent with the doctrine that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.11
The first stage after seizure is the taking of inventory of the dangerous drugs seized
from the suspect. It begins with the marking of the seized objects to fix its identity.
Such marking should be made as far as practicable in the presence of the suspect
immediately upon his arrest. 12 Of course, the failure to mark the seized items at the
place of arrest does not of itself impair the integrity of the chain of custody and
render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.13 Marking upon "immediate"
confiscation can reasonably cover marking done at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team, 14 especially when the place of seizure is volatile
and could draw unpredictable reactions from its surroundings.
Here, however, PO1 Viesca marked the sachets of suspected substance seized from
Ma. Rocel right where he arrested her. This shows that such marking was feasible.

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In contrast, PO1 Tadeo marked the substance he seized from Bautista after the
police returned to their station. This unexplained digression from what ought to
have been done creates a doubt regarding the integrity of the evidence against
Bautista.
Two. The law requires the apprehending officer or team to conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and take photograph of the same in the presence of
the accused, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given copies of the same.
PO1 Tadeo categorically admitted that no elected official was present when the
police made the arrest and when they conducted their investigation. PO1 Viesca
admitted that no representative from the media or the DOJ were present during the
inventory of the seized items.
Further, although the prosecution witnesses averred that the physical inventory of
the seized items was recorded in the police blotter, it did not bother to present a
copy of the same with the required signatures or submit some valid justification for
the omission.
What is more, both PO1 Tadeo and PO1 Viesca were uncertain regarding whether
they photographed the seized items.1wphi1 In fact, they failed to produce any
such photograph. This is either sloppy police work or utter refusal to comply with
what is required of them. The prosecution should not have filed the case absent
proof of compliance with what the law requires.
The Court has of course held that non-compliance with the procedural safeguards
provided in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not necessarily void the seizure
and custody of the dangerous drugs for as long as there is a justifiable ground for it
and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. Here, however, the buybust team did not bother to show that they
"intended to comply with the procedure but where thwarted by some justifiable
reason or consideration."16 Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, this Court stresses that the step-by-step procedure
outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.17
Due to the gross disregard of the buy-bust team of the procedural safeguards
mandated by Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR and its failure to give justifiable
reasons for it, this Court is led to conclude that the integrity and identity of
the corpus delicti have been compromised.

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013

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RA 9165 AND RULE WITHOUT A WARRANT. ARREST

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante
delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified
men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a
crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to
the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol
car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but
the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help
from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the
house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its
partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus,
PO1 Cabutihan testified:
RA 9165, ARREST ILLEGAL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ILLEGAL
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the abovementioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia
that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible,
having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no
choice but to acquit the accused.17
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest
by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION &

THIRD DIVISION, HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO
and ERNEST ESCALER, G.R. No. 188165
December 11, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION,
HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO SALVADOR PEREZ, ERNEST DE LEON
ESCALER and RAMON CASTILLO ARCEO, JR., G.R. No. 189063

MEANING OF SECTION 3, RA 3019

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"It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
Neither was it a transactionbecause this term must be construed as analogous to
the terms which precedes it. A transaction like a contract, is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element
(consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the above construction of the Supreme Court in the case at bench,
the Court believes and so holds that the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B.
Perez "from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target
personalities involved in the plunder case against former President Joseph Erap
Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark Jimenez for
admission into the WPP of the government", cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered as"contract" or "transaction" as defined within the ambit
of the fourth element of the offense under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 because
no "monetary consideration" as in credit transaction is involved.
The Court finds untenable the prosecutions contention that the execution by Mark
Jimenez of the affidavits in connection with his pending application for admission in
the WPP (and not the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez from
pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities
involved in the plunder case against President Estrada) is the very contract or
transaction required by the offense charged in this case; and that all the elements
of a contract contemplated therein are present as there is allegedly consent
between the government and Mark Jimenez, object or subject matter which is the
execution of affidavits in connection with his application for admission in the WPP,
and a cause or consideration which consists of security and monetary benefits to be
given by the government to Mark Jimenez in exchange for his participation as a
witness under the WPP.
For even assuming for the sake of argument that the pending application of Mark
Jimenez for admission in the WPP can be considered as a contract or transaction, it
bears stressing that the principal consideration for the said application of Mark
Jimenez is the latters obligation to testify as a witness under the WPP on one hand
and his entitlement to the protection granted to a witness in the WPP on the other
hand and as such, does not entail any money consideration. Certainly, this is not
the (monetary) consideration which is essential or involved in credit transactions.
Any pecuniary or monetary expense that may be incurred by the Government as a
result of the implementation of the program in favour of Mark Jimenez is purely
incidental. Such alleged monetary benefit is definitely not the reason that impelled
Mark Jimenez to allegedly avail of the WPP of the government.
More precisely, however, what appears as the main consideration of the alleged
demand or receipt of accused Hernando B. Perez of the sum of US$2,000,000.00
from Mark Jimenez is the formers alleged desistance from pressuring the latter to
execute affidavits implicating targeted personalities in the plunder case against
former President Estrada. In the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Soriano
vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, such alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez

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(and even the application of Mark Jimenez for admission into the WPP as argued by
the prosecution) can hardly be considered as a "contract" or "transaction" that is
contemplated in Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended.
Moreover, the Court takes note of the admission made by the prosecution in its
Memorandum that the transaction involving Mark Jimenezs execution of affidavits
for his admission to the WPP is not yet a perfected contract between the
Government and Mark Jimenez since it is still in its "negotiation phase" because of
the refusal of Mark Jimenez to execute the affidavits against certain individuals.
This admission is another indication that there is indeed no contract or transaction
to speak of that is covered under the fourth element of the offense of violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019.
Finally, it may be argued that while the material allegations in the subject
information may not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019,
as amended, the same material/factual allegations nevertheless constitute Direct
Bribery or another felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged
herein so that the subject information in this case should not be quashed. It is
believed, however, that the filing of the Information charging the accused with
Robbery in SB-08-CRM-00266 pending before the Second Division of this Court on
the basis of the same acts complained of in this case, constitutes a bar against the
information for said lesser felony as it would result into two differently charged
felonies from a single act and thus, would unnecessarily or unjustifiably expose the
accused to the danger of suffering two penalties for a single offense if the subject
information is not quashed. If a single act results into two or more offenses, they
should not be charged and/or punished separately unless the other offense with
different elements is penalized under a special law. To do so would violate, if not
the principle of double jeopardy, the rule against splitting a single act into various
charges. It is settled that a defendant should not be harassed with various
prosecutions upon the same act by splitting the same into various charges, all
emanating from the same law violated, when the prosecution could easily and well
embody them in a single information because such splitting of the action would
work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice in general and to
the accused in particular, for it would require the presentation of substantially the
same evidence before different courts.
All told, with the absence of the fourth element, the Court finds that the
factual/material allegations in the subject Information do not constitute the offense
of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended, and therefore, It is
constrained to quash the said Information. In this regard, the Court deems it
unnecessary to discuss/resolve the other issues raised in the subject motions for
reconsideration of the herein accused and/or disturb the other findings contained in
the Resolution sought to be reconsidered.

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