Libya: Tribes, Militias, Interests and Intervention

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Editorial Comment:
This article is an outsiders view of the situation in Libya. He has made an effort to unravel the complex threads,
but confuses revolutionaries with counter-revolutionaries, calls the NATO war an uprising and cannot understand
many details of inter-tribal politics, let alone how each tribe views the 4 governments. Perhaps these errors
are due to his sources being mainstream media and pentagon reports.
The tribes, the Libyan people and the resistance are better, more reliable sources.
Although he misses this fact, there is no doubt that LIFG, al Qaeda, Daesh, are different brand names for the
same Gladio terror network.
The most important lesson to learn from this article is that Libyas situation is vastly complex, worthy of careful
scrutiny. And indeed, it is to our own peril if we neglect to learn these details and lessons. The war theater will
only expand and become ever more labyrinthine. Anything that is understood here will become generalized
knowledge that will serve us well, both in the present and the future.
Jamahiriya News Agency
It is something that had never happened in any country since the formation of the United Nations. The UN has,
without an election, created unilaterally its own government for a country, and then immediately recognized it.
The Government of National Accord, the GNA for Libya is a government based in exile and not elected but
chosen by the International Community.
By Richard Galustian
A concerted effort over Easter for the GNA in exile in Tunis to take power in Tripoli failed completely despite the
spin and false optimism of the UN and the U.S. and UK in particular.
Lets rewind a little.
The recent United Nations plan to bring peace to Libya and eliminate ISIS was/is a two stage process fraught
with great risk, uncertainty and is poorly thought out.
First is to persuade Libyas factions to unite under a Government, the GNA while it is in exile. Second, to provide
weapons, training and air support for a newly united Libyan army to attack ISIS.
These are totally unrealistic expectations that will never happen.
The background needs to be understood. The critical fact being that Libyas main factions are divided into two
very loose camps.
One camp supports the elected parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk. The other is made up
of the previous parliament, the General National Congress (GNC) and supports Libya Dawn, an Islamist-led
coalition of militias that include the extremist elements of the Muslim Brotherhood and former Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) counter-revolutionaries [JNA ed]. The LIFG is an al-Qaeda offshoot.
Civil war began in July 2014 when Libya Dawn seized Tripoli by force after the elections saw sharp losses for
the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies including notably former leader of the LIFG, the infamous Abdel

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Hakim Belhadj, currently suing in the London Courts the then Foreign Minister and MI-6.
The HoR won international recognition straight after the UN announced its election was free and fair, but under
intimidation (thats when Islamists destroyed Tripoli International Airport etc) from militias, the HoR fled east to
Tobruk.
To further complicate the situation one must realize that within these two camps are a lattice work of rivalries and
tribal divisions.
Libya has no third force of police or army acceptable to all sides. The militias are the third force! Essentially they
represents guns for hire. The army and police are first and second.
The problem for the international community is while destroying ISIS is their stated priority, both Libyas rival
camps see each other as the greater threat. ISIS is a threat, but neither camp believes it is an existential threat,
so the priority for both camps is fighting each other.

Map of Libya

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Oil and gas locations

1 ISIS in Libya
Bases: Derna, Sirte, Sabratha; Strength: 6,000 (Pentagon estimate)
1.1 In Derna
ISIS arrived in Libya in the summer of 2014 and established control of the eastern town of Derna, aided by a
Yemeni preacher and a group of 200-300 ISIS fighters, many of them Libyan, includes many of the Al Badr
Brigade, which had fought in Syria and Ansar Al Sharia whom some credit for killing the US Ambassador and
three other Americans in Benghazi.
In June 2015 a mixed force of regular army and an Al Qaida affiliated militia, Omar Mukhtar Brigade, pushed
ISIS out of the town to its base in the forested green mountains to the south, the only high ground in the East.
Rumors that Qatari backed, Abdel Hakim Belhadj is linked to ISIS have never been proven. His LIFG was by the
way designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S.
1.2 In Sirte

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The ISIS headquarter in Libya is in Sirte, Muammar Gaddafis birthplace and the site of his capture and
execution at the end of the 2011 war in October.
Since establishing itself there in 2014, ISIS has pushed outwards, and now holds 150 miles of the Mediterranean
coast either side of the town facing Europe. It has also pushed south, raiding production units in Sirte Basin,
Libyas largest collection of oil fields.
In December 2015 it attacked Libyas principle oil ports, Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, east of Sirte, setting storage
tanks ablaze. In March 2016 it attacked Sarir, the largest remaining oil field still in production, 200 miles south
east of Sirte.
The Pentagon estimates ISIS has 6,000 fighters and anecdotal reports suggest more are arriving hiding among
migrant streams crossing Libyas southern border. The majority of ISIS fighters in Libya are foreign, with
contingents from Tunisia, Chad, Yemen, Syria, Mali, Niger and most recently Senegal. Other estimates put ISIS
numbers closer to 10,000 and in future that number will undoubtedly grow.
1.3 In Sabratha
The main ISIS base in western Libya was at Sabratha, 30 miles west of Tripoli. Remnants still remain there.
In February U.S. air strikes successfully struck an ISIS compound killing 41 fighters, the bulk of them, according
to ID cards recovered, were from Tunisia. Subsequently ISIS units overran the town, beheading 12 police
officers in the police headquarters.
In early March ISIS units briefly captured areas of the Tunisian border town of Ben Gardan, before succumbing to
government troops in fighting that left 50 dead. The U.S. strikes and subsequent fighting exposed links between
the towns Libya Dawn leadership and ISIS, who were able to use private houses leased by townspeople.
2 Tobruk (HoR) Government Forces
Regular army and militias from eastern Libya, militias south and west Libya. Strength estimates for full and part
time fighters: 15,000-30,000. Between 12 and 30 fighter bombers + helicopters.
2.1 Regular forces
Tobruks most powerful force is the regular army. It is based in eastern Libya and has recently captured the bulk
of Benghazi from Islamist militias and ISIS. It is led by Tobruk commander-in-chief Khalifa Haftar, [CIA asset JNA
ed.] probably the most polarizing figure in Libya. He is more popular than Western media portrays. He has
vowed to destroy Islamist forces which he brands terrorists, and is supported and hated in equal measure.
The otherwise most popular soldier in the East is the enigmatic much respected Col. Wanis Bukhamada.
The armys key units are the Saiqa and Zawiya-Martyrs brigades based in Benghazi and the 204 tank brigade.
These units have some characteristics of militias, in that their personnel are not interchangeable and
commanders decide in advance if they will perform various actions. But they cooperate and have ability to
coordinate combined attacks with limited supporting artillery.
The air force is commanded by Haftars close aid Gen. Saqr al-Jerushi and has grown to more than 16 planes
and helicopters. It has the capacity to launch accurate strikes on shipping attempting to bring weapons to Islamist
units in Benghazi. In early March it broadcast footage showing the aftermath of an air strike on three ships that
had been bringing weapons to Islamists in Benghazi from Misrata. Air force senior Officers say better training,
pilots and planes, have given them the ability to spot and hit targets, even at night, at sea, and at least half a
dozen similar strikes have taken place since October.
2.2 Petroleum Facilities Guard
Officially a defense ministry formation, the PFG is a tribal militia led by a charismatic and unpredictable yet
important warlord, Ibrahim Jidran and his brothers who control four principle eastern Libyan oil ports.

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When attacked by Libya Dawn in 2014 and ISIS in 2015 it defended the ports and cooperated with Haftar in
clearing Islamists from the nearby town of Ajbaiya. But Jidran remains emotionally unstable, and has in the past
suggested switching support to Libya Dawn. He has signaled support for the GNA though that could change!
This is a fairly typical trait, to switch allegiances regularly which makes analyzing the situation on the ground so
difficult.
2.3 Zintan + Warshefa militias
The most powerful pro-government [JNA ed which government?] militia in western Libya is from Zintan, 90 km
south west of Tripoli. It formed in the 2011 uprising, and at that time united with the rebel militia of Misrata to
capture Tripoli. When Misrata joined Libya Dawn to capture the city in 2014, Zintan militia, who were until then
the main pro government unit, quit the town and left the international airport after a six week battle. They
returned to their almost impregnable mountainous region.
Importantly Zintan holds Saif Gaddafi.
Since 2014 Zintan has allied with militias from the Warshefani tribal belt, a crescent south of the capital. They
have an integrated command center in Zintan with numbered brigades and their units cooperate well in offensive
operations. Zintans best equipped unit is SAWAC, which deploys American uniforms and helmets and UAE
manufactured armored cars. Its component parts dissolved in the 2014 fighting and joined other Zintan brigades
but have since reformed.
Zintan now cooperates with Haftar, but, typically for Libyans, from time to time declines to take orders from him.
Its operations are usually coordinated with air force bombers commanded by General Saqr Jerushi operating
from the giant Wattiya desert air base north of Zintan. In December U.S. special forces were photographed at the
airbase, reportedly engaged in reconnaissance of the Sabratha ISIS base 30 km north which American jets
struck in February.
3 Libya Dawn
Militia led forces holding Tripoli, the western coastal belt and districts of eastern city of Benghazi. Strength
estimates full and part time fighters 15,000-40,000. 3-6 fighter bombers operating out of Misrata and from
Tripolis Mitiga Air Base which doubles as a civilian airport following Tripoli International Airports destruction.
Libya Dawn militias are broadly speaking divided between Islamist and tribal. The strongest and most important
tribal militias are primarily from Misrata, as well as western coastal Libyan towns, reviving an ancient coastalinterior tribal fault line. The new UN-backed GNA has split Libya Dawn, probably permanently, with some militias
in favor, others not, and consequential clashes in Tripoli between the two.
Libya Dawn was formed in July 2014 after Islamist and Misrata allies suffered defeat at the ballot boxes, in
elections for the House of Representatives parliament, which was to replace the former General National
Congress (GNC) parliament in which Islamists had enjoyed a narrow majority. Libya Dawn militias captured
Tripoli in six weeks fighting that saw most embassies leave for Tunis or Malta and, as stated earlier, the
International airport (TIP) completely destroyed.
Dawn then proclaimed support for a rump of the former GNC, composed of approximately 30 Islamist and
Misrata former MPs. The exact number is not verified because the rump GNC holds sessions in secret. This
newly constituted version of the GNC appointed a government led by a prime minister and cabinet called the
National Salvation Government (NSG).
After a disputed Supreme Court judgement in November the rump GNC insisted it was the real parliament. The
elected HoR now residing in Tobruk denounced the judgement, saying the Supreme Court judges were
intimidated, in fear of their lives when they were forced to make their deliberations and when they were physically
surrounded by Dawn militias.
Also as stated earlier, the UNs GNA plan has divided Libya Dawn militias, some in favor, some against although
the process is fluid and dynamic and ever changing.

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3.1 Libya Dawn Pro GNA militias

3.1.1 Rada, or Special Deterrence Force
Formerly Nawasi, a Salafist formation, led by Abdul Rauf Kara. It is the self appointed religious police in Tripoli,
ensuring womens dress codes and closing shops displaying female garments. It clashes regularly with drug
suppliers and usually summarily executes them on the spot.
It operates from Mitiga Airport, the city center Libya airport, formerly only an AF air base. Its units are well
equipped, with imported tan colored Toyotas with armor plating. To be fair Rada has brought a degree of security
and stability to central Tripoli. Rada is expected to become the key security force for the GNA if it ever enters
Tripoli. It has over 3,000 personnel.
3.1.2 Misrata: Halboos, Central Shield, Al Majoub, 166 Brigade
Halbous is an armored brigade, nicknamed the Black Brigade in the 2011 war because it painted its vehicles this
color to differentiate from tan-colored Gaddafi forces for NATO jets. Founded by two engineer brothers both
killed in the counter-revolution, its units have held back from militia fighting and diplomats regard Halboos as
having, as a result, good relations with both Tripoli and Zintan.
Halboos and Zintan negotiated a ceasefire in October 2015 which is holding. Optimistic plans call for Rada,
Halboos and Zintan units to jointly patrol Tripoli to protect the GNA. This is an unlikely coalition. Some Zintan and
Misrata commanders say they are reluctant, fearing increased firefights leading to mostly civilian casualties.
Privately, each expresses fears that less disciplined militias from their towns will take the opportunity to enter
Tripoli, with family/tribal connections obliging regular units to avoid confronting them. Misratas Al Majoub Brigade
and Central Shield militias, which have also refrained from gangsterism, also support GNA. Misratas 166
brigade is the lead formation battling ISIS on the Sirte front. It supports the GNA and UK and French special
forces are reportedly advising it prior to an inevitable planned assault on Sirte.
3.2 Libya Dawn Anti-GNA militias
3.2.1 Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR)
The LROR is a Salafist brigade formed as the headquarters of Libya Shield, a Muslim Brotherhood parallel
army set up by the former General National Congress (GNC) in 2013 as counterweight to the regular army.
In reaction to the military uprising against Morsis Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt in the summer of
2013, LROR and Shield units deployed around Tripoli and were paid, bribed, whatever you like to call it, 900
million dinars on orders of GNC president Nuri Abu Sahmain.
In October that year LROR kidnapped then prime minister Ali Zeidan from a Tripoli hotel. Since then, LROR, like
most Tripoli militias, has seen membership rise and fall as fighters join and leave other units and return; and
endless cycle of defections. Its leadership has declared it will fight any attempt by the GNA to control Tripoli.
3.2.2 Haitham Tajouri
A young maverick, not very smart even by the standards of Libyan militia leaders, he opposed LROR in 2013,
claiming false credit for freeing Zeidan.
Since then his militia from Tajoura in south west Tripoli has fought alongside and against LROR in a continually
changing alliances. Politically he has been outflanked by Rada which has UN approval, and is opposed to the
GNA though he could change his mind in a heart beat. In March his units captured Gaddafis former Hall of the
People to deny it to the GNA as a possible base. That said the two most favored locations in order of preference
for the GNA would be the former UN base by the Med adjacent to the futuristic Palm City.
A most important figure who maintains a very low profile is Hisham Bishr; a man to watch in future; an intelligent

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thoughtful former librarian.

3.2.3 Al-Samoud Front
Al Samoud is an amalgamation of 12 militias led by Misrata Islamist politician Saleh Badi, who led the most
powerful Libya Dawn force in its 2014 capture of Tripoli, capturing and then burning Tripoli International Airport.
Badi formed the front from the most politically reliable units from both Misrata, eastern Tripoli and the coastal
towns of Zawiya and Sabratha in reaction to gains made in 2015 fighting by Zintan. Badi is adamantly opposed
to the GNA. To be frank, he is considered by many to be a thug, pure and simple.
3.2.4 Benghazi Shura Council
The complexity of Libyas inter-twined tribal and Islamist conflict is highest in Benghazi.
After the 2011 uprising the Muslim Brotherhood GNC installed three Libya Shield brigades in the city: February
17 Martyrs, Rafallah al Sahati (commanded my Muhammad al-Ghariani) and Libya Shield 1 (commanded by
Wissam bin Ahmaid) All three were MB in orientation, and advised by Ismail Salabi, brother of Libyas key
Muslim Brotherhood preacher Ali Salabi, based now in Turkey, Erdogan being the world champion of the
Brothers as they are known.
Qatars wish that the three brigades should support Libyas 2012 elections saw a breakaway group, Ansar al
Sharia, formed. Washington accuses Ansar of the attack on the US cluster of buildings, wrongly called a
consulate, which was protected by a small force from February 17, that killed in Benghazi ambassador Chris
Stevens in September 2012.
However, there was overlap between the Brotherhood brigades, Ansar and other terror formations. After a
massacre of 30 civilians in June 2013, Libya Shield 1s headquarters was overrun. IEDs and a makeshift jail
created in the former toilet block were discovered. Former Shield militiamen recalled that the bulk of Shield 1
were local teenagers, paid to guard the compound. Within the compound was a forbidden area of several sand
colored buildings where foreign Arabs worked. Shield militiamen were forbidden to talk to them and surmised
they were operating a terror campaign in Benghazi.
Through 2012 and 2013 Islamist units launched terror attacks, mostly assassinations, against military and police
officers, judges and civil rights activists to intimidate and control the population. They culminated in the slaying of
two young activists and the killing of one of Libyas most prominent activist, Salwa Bughagis, who photographed
the militia unit that killed her.
In May 2014 Gen. Khalifa Haftar, then a retired general (who had lived the previous two decades in Virginia
USA), launched Operation Dignity, with a mixed army and militia force attacking both Brotherhood and Ansar
militias.
In February this year, according to Le Monde aided by French special forces, army units overran most Islamist
positions in the town. By then, Islamist units had morphed into two parallel structures.
Brotherhood militias, severely depleted, had merged with Ansar al Sharia to form the Benghazi Shura Council. It
was supported politically and with deliveries of weapons and fighters from Misrata and Tripoli and financed by
the Central Bank of Libya.
Fighting both in competition and alongside were units of ISIS, which grew quickly among Shura areas, imposing
harsh discipline. The Islamists were based in districts populated by people from western Libya suspicious of the
eastern tribal majority.
4 Prospect of a Divided Country
Until 1934 Libya did not exist as a country, and was divided into three regions created by Ottoman rulers.
Cyrenaica, in the east, Tripolitania in the west and Fezzan in the south. Italian colonizers displaced the
Ottomans after World War One, invented the name Libya and united the three provinces.

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Of the three provinces, the only homogeneous one is Cyrenaica (East Libya), where tribal leaders have well
established rules for mediating conflict. For instance, when the Ajdabiya units of the PFG refused to allow Haftar
units, from tribes further east, to enter the town to battle ISIS, Hafar demurred. Negotiations followed, the
balance tipped by the strength of the regular army, and after tribal leaders agreed, army units entered the town.
Tripolitania (West Libya) and Fezzan (South Libya) are split, with local squabbles taking precedence over rivalry
with other provinces.
Tripolitania is home to four million Libyans with a tribal divide separating the coast from the interior. Fezzan is
split between ethnic conflict between gangs from Arab, Tobu and Tuareg peoples, some aligning with Tobruk,
others with Tripoli in ever-changing loyalties.
5 Deployment of International Military Forces
5.1 Aviation
5.1.1. U.S.
The U.S. has struck militant positions in Libya in June and November 2015 and in February this year. It uses
bombers based in both the UK and Italy. U.S. Marines are based in Italy and Spain for use to extract downed
pilots. U.S. drones operate over Libya from both Italy and Niger.
In addition, several aircraft, including a Dornier and Beechcraft, used by U.S. Special Operations Command
operated most days of March off the Libyan coast, visible because they use flight transponders when in
international airspace.
In December 2015 20 U.S. servicemen in civilian clothes were rather embarrassingly photographed among dune
buggies and a USSOC Dornier at Al Wattiya base near Zintan. The Pentagon says it has special forces in Libya
seeking alliances with militias to attack ISIS. Meanwhile Barack Obama has said the U.S. will continue to launch
air strikes on militant targets of opportunity in Libya.
5.1.2 France
France has an aircraft carrier, Charles De Gaulle exercising with the Egyptian navy in the Mediterranean as of
March 18, after it returned from deployment in the Persian Gulf.
Additionally, France has a force of 3,000 deployed in Niger and other parts of the Magreb, Operation Barkhane,
which intercepts suspected jihadist convoys entering and leaving Libya. Guided by U.S. drones, the interceptions
have seen several battles. However, the forces say they are unable to distinguish ISIS jihadist recruits moving
across the border unarmed, from the tens of thousands of migrants making the same journey. The migrants are
actually a Trojan horse for ISIS.
Le Monde reported French special forces and intelligence personnel have been operating from Benghazis
Benina airport in support of Gen.Khalifa Haftar. Photographs of their alleged compound have been circulated on
social media. Though this was denied by the much respected and popular other military officer, the head of SF in
Benghazi, Col. Wanis Bukhamada.
5.1.3 UK
Britain has fighter bombers, unarmed drones and reconnaissance aircraft in Cyprus.
In February the UK announced a 20-strong unit was advising Tunisia on protection of its border against ISIS
incursions. Germany has also announced advisors deployed for the same purpose.
5.2 Troop deployments
5.2.1 Training

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Detailed plans have not been released for deployment. Italy has said 3,000 troops may be provided, the UK up to
1,000. France, Germany and Spain may join. It is likely training would be concentrated in Libya Dawn areas. In
Tripoli, training would take place in several disused army bases on the south-east of the city in Tajura district.
Zliten police college to the east will probably not be used after it was devastated by an IS truck bomb. Other
deployments run the risk of obstruction or violence. Southern cities are considered too unsafe by continuing
factional war. Benghazi would prove too controversial, but Tobruk would offer security. There is a thin line when
describing trainers and combat troops. The head of the British Parliaments All Party Foreign Affairs Committee,
Crispin Blunt MP, himself a former soldier, voiced the strongest opposition to the UK deploying any troops
describing his Committees actions actions against the British Governments plan as I hope we put a bullet in that
plan.
5.2.2 UN
The UN Security Council has heard a recommendation from experts that an armed UN security force of
thousands is necessary before the mission can return.
5.2.3 EU
A report leaked to Reuters written by the famously incompetent former communist, the EU foreign policy chief
Frederica Mogherini, recommends an armed security force to protect EU advisors. The EU wants to send in
more than 100 advisors from the European Border Assistance Mission, who evacuated the capital in the 2014
fighting. A hundred can achieve nothing. They also want to hand over 100m to the GNA. That would come in
use to bribe militias, well initially anyway.
6 Divisions among Outside Powers
Libya is a strategic asset. It holds the largest oil reserves in Africa and has more than $100 billion in foreign
assets and cash. The oil is light and sweet, placing it in the top four percent of world premium oil. It remains a
strategic prize. Libya has also many other minerals that have yet to be exploited.
Libya Dawns Muslim Brotherhood component has seen it attract support and weapons from principally Turkey
while Egypt and UAE do the same for the House of Representatives (HoR) and its rather maverick but popular
commander Gen. Khalifa Haftar. This popularity is understated by the mainstream western media.
The GNA plan is led less by the UN than by the U.S. State Department and the UK Foreign Office. Both believe it
is strategically important to ensure the Brotherhood retains a position in North Africa, after it Morsi and Co
was replaced by force in Egypt as well as losing elections in Tunisia. The American and the British, this author
maintains, are mistaken and that it is a gross error on both their parts.
Never forget that Turkey is the worlds only Muslim Brotherhood governed country.
The MB is unwilling to accept a place in parliament commensurate with its 14-17 percent electoral support,
fearing, possibly correctly, that it will be persecuted. Instead, it is demanding a guaranteed chunk of power,
policed by its own force, with control of at least part of Tripoli and at least part of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL).
An important fact that needs to be acknowledged is that pitted against MB influenced Libya Dawn is
nevertheless the legitimate parliament in Tobruk consisting of all the other parties and factions, forming a
nebulous chaotic whole without a recognizable ruling group and with opposing group factions within it.
Parliament has never managed to hold a session with more than 140 of its 188 MPs present and recent sessions
have fallen below 100.
The position of foreign powers remains mixed.
France is more lukewarm in its support for the MB, but is united with Britain and the U.S. in wanting a rapid end
to the civil war and the destruction of ISIS. Its special forces reportedly helped Haftar capture most of Benghazi.
The fall of Benghazi, assuming it is completed, will represent the most strategic shift in the civil war since it
began in July 2014, handing Tobruk the east, the bulk of the oil, and the upper hand. If truth be know, France

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would like the South of Libya (Fezzan) for a variety of obvious reasons associated with controlling Libyas
southern neighbors.
Italy has, to all intent and purposes, sided with Libya Dawn, in part because Dawn controls ENI assets and the
important Melitah terminal of the Greenstream gas pipeline to Europe west of Tripoli. An Italian deployment to
Tripoli is seen by both camps as a decisive gesture in support of Libya Dawn.
Germany and other European states follow the lead of the most prominent three western powers on the UN
Security Council.
Russia remains the enigma. It has joined with Egypt in proposing a UNSC resolution to lift the arms embargo for
the regular army which will benefit Haftar. There is speculation in Libya that as Britain and the US move closer to
the Muslim Brotherhood in Tripoli, Russia will increase her support for Tobruk.
On March 14 Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said any western military intervention in Libya must have
UN Security Council approval. Legally speaking the move is unnecessary as UNSC Resolution 1970 from 2011
remains in force.
However, the statement is seen as a clear break with western powers. If intervention were to go ahead without
Russian agreement, there is the possibility Russia, with Egypts help, will deploy in eastern Libya.
One other danger of the GNA is that its existence causes Libya to split because of the nature, the make up, of the
so called government. While a majority of the 9-strong presidency council are non Islamist, they are obliged to
meet in Tripoli under control of the MB, the Libya Dawn Islamist and Misratan units who control the city and its
institutions at present. They (the presidency council) have been threatened with arrest should they enter Tripoli.
Without eastern or southern forces, it is likely eastern and possibly southern presidency members will either
boycott the GNA or stay away for fear of immediate kidnap.
In this case, the GNA if it succeeds to get to Tripoli, will operate under the same intimidation, extended to the
Central Bank and other ministries, that the GNC now operates under, effectively the GNA will become a Libya
Dawn mark 2.
In this, the UK and U.S. may feel they have met their apparent objective of securing the Muslim Brotherhood in
Libya, because international recognition status will have switched from the Tobruk parliament to the GNA. A mad
idea by anybodys measure.
In effect, under this scenario, the division of Libya remains the same, but recognition status switches from the
eastern government to the GNA which as explained will fast become Libya Dawn mark 2. Such a scenario
carries with it the possibly of split recognition. Egypt, UAE and possibly Russia will likely not agree to switch
recognition to the GNA and maintain its ties to the HoR in the East.
7 Military Training
Italy has offered 3,000 soldiers and the UK has suggested up to 1,000, to train a GNA army. The UK as
explained earlier is highly unlikely to do this.
Most of these forces will be engaged in support and force protection. Diplomats say the deployment is also and
primarily aimed at providing foreign troops on the ground to strengthen the control of the GNA, while not
acknowledging this publicly.
However, the deployment carries risks. A former training initiative, agreed at the 2013 G6 summit in Lock Earne
saw the UK, U.S., Italy, Turkey and Jordan agree to train Libyan forces, but outside Libya because of security
concerns.
The U.S. training plan for 5,000 Libyans in Bulgaria was abandoned. Britain abandoned after some months the
training of 300 recruits in Cambridgeshire after several were jailed for various offenses including male rape.
Jordan curtailed its training after a group of recruits rioted in their dorms in Amman. Italy trained more than 200

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without incident. Turkeys training was compromised by its support for Libya Dawn. Remember that Turkey is
headed by the worlds only Muslim Brotherhood government.
Libyan loyalties are to the tribe and family. Tribes trump religion is a popular saying by some. As in Lebanon
and Iraq, units formed by recruits from different tribes and groups have low cohesion. Tribal and Islamist units
have high cohesion, but are self-governing, refusing orders from higher commanders.
The risk for foreign trainers is that they train militias backed by the GNA, creating a fresh fighting division in
Libya. This is like putting wood on a fire.
A second risk is that a proportion of equipment delivered to these formations will be illicitly sold to other militias
and ISIS.
A third risk is force protection. As in Iraq, ISIS deploys trucks laden with explosive driven by suicide bombers.
Such bombs are guaranteed to destroy the outer guard post of a base. Western troops will initially rely on Libyan
militias to control outer security. But attacks by ISIS may see the militias reluctant to do so. Killing of foreign
troops will raise political problems in the West. Politicians will criticize not just the deployment, but also the
likelihood that if the deployment continues, there will be further casualties. The bottom line is; from where will
these forces be recruited, who will lead them, against whom and with what legal protections? Unless the state
enjoys a monopoly on force, few Libyans will likely join a foreign backed army for a government in exile that has
no organic legitimacy, traction or policy for the State beyond combating ISIS.
However, Pentagon planners favor a more direct approach than their civilian counterparts. In January the U.S.
Defense Department said its special forces are in Libya seeking to partner with local militias in the fight against
ISIS.
Such partnerships would be short term and ad hoc. They would see special forces support ground attacks and
direct air strikes, in what would be a repeat of the NATO bombing of Gaddafi forces in 2011.
This strategy also carries risks. ISIS in Sirte are in a built up area, and western forces will not want to be blamed
for civilian casualties.
Also, the bombing of Sabratha exposed the ties some Libya Dawn factions, in this case the city leadership, have
with ISIS.
8 Other Factors
8.1 Sanctions UN option to stop and search ships and planes
While Tobruk forces get weapons and ammunition, mostly Russian made, across Egypts border, Libya Dawn
rely on ship and plane transport from Turkey, according to the UNSC Panel of Experts report of March 2015. But
many ask how and why when Turkey is part of NATO? A seemingly unanswerable question, well one no one in
the West has the balls to ask.
A proportion of the Libya Dawn supplies and fighters go to ISIS. Cutting sea and air routes would cut ISIS
supplies but also those of Dawn. By contrast, the UN has no means of enforcing an arms embargo on the
Egyptian border, without Cairos agreement. Thus, enforcing the embargo will see the Tobruk-Dawn military head
to head change to the advantage of Tobruk.
8.2 Muslim Brotherhood
Britains and the U.S.s security and intelligence communities are allegedly concerned about the overlap
between the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS. Part of the reason that British and American politicians have for
supporting the MB is the hope that they think it represents a non-violent outlet for jihadists who might over while
be encouraged to join more extreme terrorist organizations. These are echoes of the ridiculous debate about
good and bad terrorists in Syria.

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But the Brotherhoods decision to rebel against the elected Tobruk parliament has cast doubt over this
assessment. Some Dawn units are interchangeable with some ISIS units, although many are not. And many of
Tripolis ostensibly Islamist units are closer in character to armed criminal gangs. The MB enjoys little support in
what is a tribal society, winning between 13 and 17 percent in elections and the few authoritative opinion polls
since the revolution. Its success in winning the 2012 election was attributed by critics to it inserting MB
candidates posing as independents, notably religious figures. The MB has an extensive network in the U.S.
whose leadership enjoys access directly to the White House.
8.3 Libyan Institutions
Libyas overseas assets and oil income are controlled by the Central Bank, National Oil Corporation and Libya
Investment Authority. The chairmen of all three were replaced by the HoR in late 2014, but refused to leave,
staying in office in Tripoli. Officially they declare they are independent of both Dawn and the HoR, but the UNSC
panel of experts reports that intimidation and political links ensure all three work with Dawn.
The Libya political agreement (LPA) calls for the HoR chairs to be dismissed, leaving the Tripoli chairs in charge,
and, for opponents, giving Dawn access to Libya revenues.
Without resolution, this may see a break, as the east refuses to export oil from eastern ports if the income
returns to a Libya Dawn controlled Tripoli.
If Egypt, UAE and Russia continue to recognize Tobruk and the HoR which includes the Al Thinni government,
then Libya will see the complicated reality of the east able to sell oil, and receive income, from those three states
while the GNA in Tripoli sells to certain favored western powers.
An added complication is allegations recently made publicly by both the UK ambassador Peter Millett and the
UNSC panel of experts claiming the Tripoli central bank (CBL) is paying militias. The UNSC says it also has
evidence that the CBL is paying Ansar al Sharia directly, who are listed by the UN and the U.S. as a terrorist
organization.
Central bank governor El Sedik al Kabir, now a resident of Malta, has denied the reports, but evidence that he is
paying armed groups, militias and possibly terrorists may see foreign oil buyers withhold payments, fearing in
particular prosecution by the United States.
8.4 Benghazi
The fate of Benghazi is the hinge on which the Libya civil war turns. If the army complete Benghazis capture,
eastern Libya will be free of Islamist units and able to exploit oil fields holding two thirds of Libyan production.
It will be de facto independent of Tripoli and able to resist the GNA. The Muslim Brotherhood and some Islamist
brigades in Tripoli say they will support the GNA only if the UN can ensure a supply corridor to preserve their
garrison in Benghazi.
UN envoy Martin Kobler has tried to facilitate this through, amongst other ways, a Qatar backed Swiss charity,
pushing for it to be allowed access to Shura Council areas of Benghazi. Success will allow a regular supply
pipeline and will cement the front lines, denying Haftar control of the city.
For this reason Tobruk forces are likely to resist the move. Koblers decision to back the charity has brought back
echoes of the controversy of his predecessors Bernadino Leon departure to live and work for the UAE
government. In October last year Leon emails were revealed showing him accepting a job from the UAE and
offering them inside information on the peace process. At best described as a conflict of interest.
Paradoxically, a de facto division is already underway. Most Benghazi residents from western tribes have fled, as
have many non-Dawn citizens from Tripoli and its environs. The UN says half a million of Libyas six million
population are displaced by war. In Benghazi, eastern tribes say that if residents from western tribes are allowed
back, Islamist militias will reform among them.

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Conclusion
The international community, if possible in an ideal world, including Russia, should forget Libyas internal rivalries
for now and, using overwhelming force focus only on ISIS, by air sea assets and boots on the ground, and once
and for all eradicate ISIS in Libya, which some Pentagon sources privately say is possible within as little as a
two week period.
If not this, then there are no easy policy options for Western forces in Libya.
Doing nothing means risking the civil war getting worse, Libya tipping into humanitarian crisis and ISIS
expanding to dominate the country.
Options for striking ISIS fall into three choices.
1 Do nothing.
This is likely to see ISIS grow as the civil war worsens. For the moment ISIS is not a mass movement among
Libyans. However, growing numbers of foreign fighters are joining its ranks particularly those fleeing Syria and
Iraq. They arrive in Libya courtesy of assistance by a NATO ally, Turkey. Go figure!
2- Air Strikes Lite.
Air strikes without government permission are technically legal, as they are covered by the UNSC Resolution
1973 in 2011. However, they are politically difficult for western governments, notably Great Britain and France.
The Pentagon war lite plan for air strikes backed by ad hoc alliances with local militias may fail if they cannot
achieve quick results.
3 Unity government which then can be followed by Western air strikes.
Accept Western air strikes have already occurred without that need; witness the bombing of Sabratha by the
Americans.
The UN plan, engineered principally by the U.S. State Department and UK Foreign Office, relies for success on
the acceptance of a unity government, the UN picked GNA.
Talks on this broke down late last year, with the elected parliament, the HoR, was unwilling to give Libya Dawn
more power than its voter share entitled it to. The HoR wants the ballot box votes to prevail over guns.
Instead, led by U.S. and UK diplomats, who provide the impetus and expertise for Kobler, the GNA has been
literally forced through.
Its legitimacy is built on very shaky ground. The GNA was rejected by both the GNC in Tripoli and the HoR in
Tobruk, albeit with chaos in both so called parliaments and significant factions in both for and against it.
The GNA is built around the Libya political agreement. This calls for a prime minister, Fayez Seraj, a low profile
Tripoli politician and businessman to rule as part of a 9 strong presidential council. None chosen by Libyans but
by the UN!
The HoR leadership disrupted attempts to have a vote, however a suspiciously looking dubious letter was signed
by allegedly up to 100 MPs declaring they supported the GNA but some say they were prevented from voting.
How many MPs signed it is unclear with several complaining they were absent. The letter, if genuine, is not
enough for the political agreement underpinning the GNA to come into effect. Crucially, this agreement calls for
international recognition, and control of oil income, to pass to the GNA.
There is further controversy because the heads of all three key state institutions the Central Bank of Libya (CBL),
National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Libya Investment Authority (LIA) were replaced by Tobruk in late 2014.

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The political agreement cancels those replacements, with power reverting back to the three pro-Dawn chairmen
who, despite being sacked, remained in control of the institutions in Tripoli. The UK, UN Libya Dawn and the
institutions themselves insist they are independent of both sides which is poppycock according my observations.
In fact the UN Panel of Experts has actually reported that the Tripoli branches are controlled by Libya Dawn
militias, often through violence and intimidation.
Plans call for Libya Dawns Rada and assorted Misrata brigades to provide security, carrying the risk that the
GNA will assume the position that the GNC now enjoy. The difference for practical purposes is that international
recognition of supporting powers will switch from Tobruk to Tripoli. However, Egypt, UAE and Russia may
continue recognizing Tobruk, which will institutionalize, and quite possibly accelerate, the civil war.
Never forget, what comes with international recognition is the potential of unfrozen cash and assets representing
tens of billions of dollars to the GNA who are currently just a government in exile.
To get a sense of proportion of anyone trying to govern Libya, to pay off all the Militias and tribes as former PM
Ali Zeidan did, would cost around $30B a year alone! The annual budget average in last 5 years has been
around $70B in total for 6 million people.
If the GNA can get to Tripoli to govern, this will leave western military forces, if deployed, likely to be embedded
among Libya Dawn units, and facing attack from ISIS but opposition from the regular army. An unenviable
situation to say the least.
An international meeting to discuss military training deployment and air strikes was held in Rome on March 18
with up to 30 nations invited. However, problems with the GNA entering Tripoli, and fears it could trigger worse
fighting in the capital, saw no decisions reached.
The UK also has a new obstacle. On March 16 the UK Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which is investigating
UK policy in Libya, and indeed PM David Cameron himself, demanded the government seek permission for any
Libya deployment from parliament. The UK, which had been expected to take a lead in air strikes, military
training, logistics and security in Tripoli has had to put its plans on ice. The British government then promptly
announced it had no plans for deployments, and promised parliament to announce such plans if they developed.
A volte face.
This has been a blow to its coalition allies but prime minister David Cameron is wary of having another Syriastyle debate on military action against ISIS in Libya. U.S. policy on Libya is also uncertain, because the
Republicans, who may win the presidency in November, are hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose
organization in the States has regular access directly to President Obama.
At time of writing the GNA has committed itself to moving from Tunis to Tripoli within days. That was over two
weeks ago. They talk boldly of moving within days where wiser heads say it will take weeks and months.
Legally, because it is recognized by the U.S., UK and France, it can request foreign air strikes in Libya and
control overseas funds from Tunis. However, for presentational reasons, each foreign government wants a
military assistance request to come only once it, the GNA, is installed in Tripoli not while it is in exile.
The GNA process is on a clock, because special forces and air assets were committed in December and
January. Western military planners say these forces cannot stay in theater or primed indefinitely. They must
either be used, or withdrawn and the operation cancelled for several months. With ISIS growing and the migrant
season beginning with the arrival of spring weather, Western diplomats fear political pressure if they contemplate
an extended military delay.
This author emphatically believes the West, certainly Europe, has no more time if we are to stop ISIS
strengthening its position in Libya which would represent a real and imminent threat to the very existence of the
EU.
For the UN plan to work, the GNA must go to Tripoli, which itself is very doubtful since it cannot be secured there
even if embedded in Palm City with the UN Headquarters next door, much like a more concentrated (but more

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isolated) Green Zone like that that originally existed in Baghdad in 2003.
But in so doing, it would certainly spark a more intense round of the civil war, leaving only ISIS as the winners of
the spoils of such an internal conflict. One outcome if that happens is that certainly East Libya would declare
unilaterally independence and become a new country, as happened to South Sudan. The second consequence
much more dire and important than the split of Libya is that ISIS will eventually destroy Europe as we know it.

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