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Contents
Recall: A-B-C Behaviour Model
HRA Techniques Definition, Characteristics &
Application
Technique for Human Error Rate
Prediction (THERP) (covered in Chapter
7)
Human Error Assessment and Reduction
Technique (HEART)
Human HAZOP
A Technique for Human Error Analysis
(ATHEANA)
A-B-C Model
Antecedents
(trigger behavior)
Behaviour
(human performance)
Consequences
(either reinforce or punish behaviour)
3
CONSEQUENCES
(as consequences)
http://www.hrtwarming.com/his-mistake-cost-the-company-250k-in-repairs-his-bosss-responsewas-gold/#
4
d.
Operators
close valve
2
D. Operators
fail to close
valve 2
Probability
0.01
0.5
Probability
0.001
0.1
0.2
*Williams, J.C., HEART A Proposed Method for Assessing and Reducing Human Error, 1986
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HEART
Based upon the principle that every time a task is performed there is a
possibility of failure and that the probability of this is affected by one or more
error producing condition (EPC) to varying degrees
EPC: distraction, tiredness, cramped conditions etc.
Factors which have a significant effect on performance/task are of greatest
interest.
The method essentially takes into consideration a range of important factors
which may negatively affect human performance of a task.
Each of these factors is then independently quantified to obtain an overall
HEP, depending on each of the factors.
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HEART Methodology
1. The first stage of the process is to identify the full range of sub-tasks that
a system operator would be required to complete within a given task.
2. Once this task description has been constructed a nominal human
unreliability score for the particular task is then determined, usually by
consulting local experts. Based around this calculated point, a 5th 95th
percentile confidence range is established.
3. The EPCs, which are potentially relevant for the given situation, are then
considered and the extent to which each EPC applies to the task in
question is discussed and agreed, again with local experts.
4. A final estimate of the HEP is then calculated using the EPC scores.
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HEART Methodology
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HEART Methodology
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HEARTAnalysis
EPC
AssessedEffect EPC/Tot
Inexperience
1.80
0.02
OppositeTechnique
6.00
0.07
Riskperception
3.40
0.04
ConflictofObjcetives
2.24
0.02
LowMorale
1.12
0.01
TotEPC
92.12
0.16
%
12.36
41.21
23.35
15.38
7.69
100.00
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AssessedEffect
EPC/Tot
Inexperience
1.80
0.02
18.83
OppositeTechnique
1.00
0.01
10.46
Riskperception
3.40
0.04
35.56
ConflictofObjcetives
2.24
0.02
23.43
LowMorale
1.12
0.01
11.72
TotEPC
15.35
0.10
100.00
TaskType=F=
Assessedhumanerrorprobability=FxTotEPC=
Change 6 (max) to 1
(min) for the
opposite technique
will give the greatest
impact
0.003
0.046062
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Human HAZOP
In a conventional process HAZOP - usually working from a design
represented in P&IDs, backed up by equipment datasheets,
instrumentation cause and effect diagrams, layouts, chemical data
etc possible malfunction of a process plant before setting up of
equipment in the design stages was recognized/identified
The intention usually describes process conditions such as flows,
temperatures, pressures, levels and the like.
It is from these that we derive the usual HAZOP parameters.
Traditional HAZOP will identify much human error potential but could
be modified to direct the technique more closely to identify human
performance problems.
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Human HAZOP
Conventional HAZOP technique (most of the time) wont be able to
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Omission
Action too much
Action too little
Action in wrong direction
Wrong action on right
object
Right action on wrong
object
Wrong action on wrong
object
Extraneous act
Action too late
Action in wrong order
Action repeated
Unclear information
transmitted / recorded
Information not sought /
obtained
Information not
transmitted / recorded
Incomplete information
transmitted / recorded
Incorrect information
transmitted / recorded
Action too long
Action too short
Action too early
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Prompt
NO / NONE
MORE / LESS
REVERSE
SOONER / LATER
PART OF
Partially completed
OTHER THAN
AS WELL AS
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More
Less
Not loaded
No packages available
Not running belt
Loads faster
Packages larger
Belt running faster
Loads slower
Smaller packages
Belt running slower
Reverse
Part of
As well as
Other than
Sooner
Later
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Human HAZOP
Resources required/Information requirements:
Team made up of personnel experienced in operating or maintaining the
system under scrutiny, human factors specialist, HAZOP chair and scribe.
Details of operating procedures, task analysis, system design.
Output:
Comprehensive and systematic analysis record detailing identified hazards
associated with human error, likelihood of occurrence, existing and
proposed controls.
Advantages
Systematic way of ensuring all aspects of a task are analysed
Produces proposed solutions as part of the study
Disadvantages
Time-consuming
Requires a team of analysts (resource intensive)
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i.
ii. conditions of plant that give rise to the need for actions and create the
operational causes for human-system interactions (e .g. misleading
indications, equipment unavailability, and other unusual configurations or
operational circumstances).
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Thank you
THERP
HEART
ATHEANA
Human HAZOP
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More
Less
Not loaded
No packages available
Not running belt
Loads faster
Packages larger
Belt running faster
Loads slower
Smaller packages
Belt running slower
Reverse
Part of
As well as
Other than
Sooner
Later
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Human HAZOP
Resources required/Information requirements:
Team made up of personnel experienced in operating or maintaining the
system under scrutiny, human factors specialist, HAZOP chair and scribe.
Details of operating procedures, task analysis, system design.
Output:
Comprehensive and systematic analysis record detailing identified hazards
associated with human error, likelihood of occurrence, existing and
proposed controls.
Advantages
Systematic way of ensuring all aspects of a task are analysed
Produces proposed solutions as part of the study
Disadvantages
Time-consuming
Requires a team of analysts (resource intensive)
Presentation Title (acronym) HRA Techniques;
Division Name/OPU/HCU/BU (acronym) - Chem Eng Dept. UTP
Name of Presenter Azizul b Buang
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i.
ii.
conditions of plant that give rise to the need for actions and create the
operational causes for human-system interactions (e .g. misleading
indications, equipment unavailability, and other unusual configurations or
operational circumstances).
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ATHEANA Mythology
There are seven basic steps to the ATHEANA mythology
1. Define and interpret the issue under consideration
2. Detail the required scope of analysis
3. Describe the Base case scenario including the norm of
operations within the environment, considering actions and
procedures.
4. Define Human Failure Events (HFEs) and/or unsafe actions
(UAs) which may affect the task in question
5. Following the identification of the HFEs, they should be
further categorised into two primary groups, safe and unsafe
actions (UAs). An unsafe action is an action in which the
human operator concerned may fail to carry out a task or
does so incorrectly and this consequently results in the
unsafe operation of the system.
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ATHEANA Mythology
6. Search for deviations from the base case scenario in terms of
any probable divergence in the normal environmental
operating behaviour in the context of the situational
scenario.
7. Preparation for applying ATHEANA
In recognition that the environment and the surrounding
context may affect the human operators behaviour, the next
stage of the ATHEANA methodology is to take account of
what are known as error-forcing contexts (EFCs), which are
then combined with performance shaping factors (PSFs), as
identified in the figure provided below [2].
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Thank you
THERP
HEART
ATHEANA
Human HAZOP