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Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
16th ASEAN Summit: An
Assessment
Carlyle A. Thayer
April 16, 2010
[client name deleted]:
1. How do you assess the result of the 16th ASEAN Summit which has just been held
in Hanoi, in the year of Vietnam's presidency? In your view, which is the most
remarkable point in the ASEAN joint declaration?
ANSWER: The recently held 16th ASEAN Summit is the first of two summits that
Vietnam will host this year. The 16th summit was an exclusively all‐ASEAN affair
under the motto of moving from vision to action. The most significant developments
at the summit related to the next steps ASEAN will take to achieve its goal of
creating an ASEAN Community by 2015. In this respect the adoption of the Protocol
on the Dispute Settlement Mechanism was potentially the most far reaching. ASEAN
is now poised to become a rules‐based organization with mechanism for compliance.
This must be tested in practice however.
2. One of this year ASEAN president's priorities is to seek and promote the
consensus within ASEAN on East Sea issue, whose expected goal is a bounder
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC). According to you, is this
goal too abstract?
ANSWER: In 2002, when ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea. ASEAN declared that this was the first step towards a
code of conduct. The following year, when ASEAN adopted the Bali Concord II
Declaration (2003), ASEAN once again declared its support for a Code of Conduct on
the South China Sea. It is disappointing to read in the chairman’s statement that
“Ministers and senior officials [agreed] to enhance the utilization of ASEAN’s existing
tools and mechanisms such as … the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC), … to ensure regional peace and security.” This indicates that after
eight years ASEAN has not reached consensus to push for a code of conduct and it
further indicates that not all ASEAN members agree on the urgency of the matter.
The cause of this disagreement may be found in differences of national interest and
Chinese diplomatic pressure to keep territorial disputes in the South China Sea a
bilateral matter.
3. Can the implementation of DOC, which is not legally bound, possibly work
effectively in maintaining peace and security on East Sea?
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ANSWER: The DOC was listed among the documents to be used by ASEAN in its goal
of creating a Political‐Security Community, one of the three pillars serving as the
foundation of an ASEAN Community by 2015. The DOC is not a legally binding
document. It does not include the Paracel islands. It does not define which rocks and
other features comprise the Spratly islands. The DOC was the best ASEAN could get
after seven years of negotiations with China. The DOC has not prevented China from
undertaking unilateral activities at variance with the spirit of the document. The DOC
has imperfections and peace and security in the East Sea can only be reached
through more binding agreements and joint cooperation by the parties concerned.
4. One of the obstacles for the attempts of internationalization of the East Sea
disputes is the ASEAN's failure in getting a consensus on the issue and the
differences in members' level of priority. In your view, which is a good approach for
Vietnam to win the ASEAN consensus? Is there another chance for Vietnam to put
the issue on the table again in its year of ASEAN presidency?
ANSWER: Only four of ASEAN’s ten members are directly involved in disputes over
territory I the South China Sea – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
China has succeeded in preventing Vietnam and the Philippines from showing a
united front. Both countries protested last year when Malaysia and Vietnam jointly
made a claim for an extended continental shelf in the southern area of the South
China Sea. Vietnam must redouble its diplomacy with the Philippines. The meeting
between Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is
only an initial step. She will be replaced when the Philippines holds its next elections.
Further, Vietnam must lobby the six other ASEAN members who are not parties to
the South China Sea dispute to support Vietnam and demonstrate unity. This will be
difficult because Thailand is in disarray, China is building influence in Cambodia and
Laos and Myanmar is unlikely to antagonize China. Vietnam only has a short time
before the 17th ASEAN Summit later this year when ASEAN leaders will meet with
China. This is the opportunity to present a united front. Vietnam must forge
consensus on the basis of cooperating with China for peace and not confront China.
The fact that Indonesia is taking over as ASEAN Chair next year is a good
development as Indonesia will be more proactive than Brunei.
5. Vietnam is trying to make its hallmark in the year of ASEAN presidency. Observing
the ASEAN conferences and summits, how do you initially assess this attempt?
ANSWER: Vietnam has already demonstrated that it is a reliable international
partner through its two‐year non‐permanent membership on the UN Security
Council. Vietnam has hosted ASEAN summits in the past. This year as the ASEAN
Charter begins to be implemented Vietnam has an especially heavy responsibility.
The Protocol on ASEAN’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the joint statements
on sustainable development and climate change are important indicators of
Vietnam’s diplomatic success.
6. Some observers appreciate Vietnam's role in dealing with Myanmar issue. How do
you personally think of it?
ANSWER: It is clear on the Myanmar issue that Vietnam is capable of flexible
diplomacy to reflect the consensus within ASEAN. As a country victimized by foreign
intervention, Vietnam upholds non‐interference in internal affairs and has some
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sympathy for Myanmar. On the other hand, Vietnam is now part of the ASEAN
Community building process which recognizes that the internal problems of one
state can spill over and affect others. In the case of Myanmar, ASEAN as a regional
organization can be affected if the United States and European Union adopt tougher
policies towards Myanmar over the election issue. Prime Minister Dung clearly
reflected ASEAN consensus when he spoke about inclusive elections in Myanmar.
The past role of former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet on the eve of the ASEM Summit
in Hanoi was valued. The diplomatic effort of Prime Minister Dung in visiting
Myanmar prior to the 16th ASEAN Summit was likewise valued.
7. ASEAN is struggling to get back its central role in regional connections, by inviting
EU into TAC, or indicating an invitation for Russia and USA to join Eastern Asia
structure. In your view, can these attempts succeed? Is there any potential obstacles
from the powers? How will its supposed success mean for the development of
ASEAN?
ANSWER: The EU is already a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Because
Europe promotes a common foreign policy it is a positive step on ASEAN’s part to let
the EU accede to the TAC. This will bind the United Kingdom and France, both
permanent members of the Security Council, to the TAC’s norm.
When the East Asian Summit (EAS) was first established the Russian Federation
sought membership. This was a difficult question that was left unresolved. The Bush
Administration expressed concern about the EAS duplicating the responsibilities of
other regional organizations. The Bush Administration concluded that the EAS did no
harm to regional security and the U.S. would watch its development. The Obama
Administration advanced the standing of the United States in Southeast Asia by
acceding to the TAC. It also announced that it would study membership in the EAS.
There were reports that some members of the EAS opposed admitting the U.S.
because it was not an East Asian country. The statement by the ASEAN Chair
indicates that EAS members have reached consensus and made a “win‐win” decision
to encourage both Russia and the United States to join. The EAS will undoubtedly
experience some strains when these two Great Powers are admitted. ASEAN will
want to remain central to the EAS; but ASEAN disarray will make this difficult. And it
is likely on some issues that the Great Powers will active more assertively and even
unilaterally when their national interests dictate this.
8. In the context of China's rise and increasing steps to demonstrate its affluence in
the region, meanwhile some key members of ASEAN are having problems, such as
Thailand being drowned in crisis and Indonesia recovering slowly, what do you think
should ASEAN do to deal with the power shift in the region?
ANSWER: China’s rise has several dimensions – economic, political, military and
cultural. China and ASEAN have already signed a Free Trade Agreement; this took
effect for the advanced ASEAN economies at the start of 2010. ASEAN has to
consolidate and build its own free trade area in order to strengthen itself in dealing
with China economically. The economic dimension is well mapped out. There is a
positive framework for the cultural dimension in ASEAN‐China relations.
But the political and military dimensions are more difficult because instability in any
ASEAN members makes it more difficult to forge unity on political and security
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issues. ASEAN should work to prevent any one Great Power from achieving
overwhelming political and/or military influence. ASEAN needs to encourage the
involvement of all Great Powers in building Southeast Asia as a region of “peace,
cooperation and development.” One example is to build on the U.S. initiative to
assist the countries in the Lower Mekong Basin to develop this sub‐region.
9. Can Vietnam have a greater role in ASEAN?
ANSWER: As long as Vietnam remains politically stable and its economy continues to
grow it will play an increasingly more important role as one of the leaders of ASEAN.
Of the ten ASEAN countries Indonesia and Vietnam appear to be the two key leaders
with wide regional appeal. Policy initiatives that Vietnam promotes this year as
ASEAN Chair will be carried out by Indonesia. This is an important partnership.
Vietnam will host the first meeting of the ASEAN Defence Ministers. This is an
important opportunity to forge greater regional security cooperation and set the
foundation for the future. Since Vietnam is one of world’s ten countries most likely
to be negatively affected by climate change, leadership on this issue will benefit all
of Southeast Asia. Vietnam will be able to play a greater role in ASEAN when it links
its national interests to regional interests and is proactive diplomatically.
Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Vietnam, China and the
Paracel Islands
Carlyle A. Thayer
April 26, 2010
[client name deleted]
QUESTION: Can Vietnam really do any more than grumble about the repeated
arrests of its fisherman trying to fish around the Paracels?
ANSWER: In the short‐run Vietnam can only use diplomatic means, verbal protests
etc., when its fishermen are arrested. This issue can also be raised at senior official
and high‐level. Vietnam could also take steps to keep its fishermen out of sensitive
areas. One General proposed grouping the fishing fleet for protection. There has
been talk in the National Assembly of creating an armed militia at sea.
China uses very modern Fishery Administration vessels (with armed crews) and not
naval warships to patrol its maritime area around the Paracels. Vietnam would only
escalate matters if it sent our naval escorts.
But in the longer term Vietnam is engaging in 'self‐help' by building up its naval‐air
forces to protect sovereignty claims.
Vietnam will not get much diplomatic support from its ASEAN mates because the
Paracels are generally views at China's territory ('possession being nine tenths of the
law'). The Spratlys are a different matter.
Question: Does the power asymmetry between China and Vietnam itself fuel the
nationalist paranoia you mention?
ANSWER: Yes, the weaker state is always extremely sensitive to actions by the larger
state. Given 'conspiracy or cock up' weaker states always go for conspiracy.