GREGORY FARNAW A.

CLAVER
1986-36026
Feb. 27, 2014
Philo 160
Submitted to: Prof. Samuel Vera Cruz

1. Explain and evaluate Hempels logical reconstruction of theory testing. In what

sense does Bayesian approach to theory testing conforms to, and improves on
Hempels views regarding the confirmation of scientific theories.
Bayesianism is a doctrine about how a persons degree of belief in a hypothesis should change in
the light of evidence. It therefore reflects a subjectivist approach to probability. Bayesianism is
said, by its keenest supporters, to show:
(a) how inductive practices can be rational;
(b) how inductive practices can lead to the truth;
(c) how various problems in the philosophy of science can be solved; and
(d) what the underlying structure of actual scientific reasoning is.
Bayesianisms tool in this daunting task is surprisingly modest. In its simplest form Bayes
theorem is where p(h) is the probability of the hypothesis h, p(e) is the probability of the
evidence e, p(e/h) is the probability of the evidence, when the hypothesis is taken as given, and
p(h/e) is the probability of the hypothesis, when the evidence is taken as given. These are all
subjective probabilitiesthat is, the degrees of belief we attach to the relevant propositions. The
idea is that if we put values on p(h), p(e), and p(e/h) then there is only one value we can
rationally put on p(h/e), i.e. the value computed by the theorem. Say we do this, and then we
carry out an experiment to test h. The experiment yields e as the result. According to Bayesians
we should now change our degree of belief in h from p(h) to the value we computed for p(h/e).
The idea is that if we were rationally committed to putting a value k on the probability of the
hypothesis, when the evidence e is considered as given, now the evidence e actually is given (by
the experiment) we ought now to change the probability we attach to h to k, i.e.
pafter(h)=pbefore(h/e). This is known as
conditionalization.
We can see that Bayes theorem has intuitive plausibility. It says that the probability of a
hypothesis, given some evidence is:
(a) proportional to the probability of the hypothesis prior to obtaining the evidence;
(b) proportional to the probability of the evidence, taking the hypothesis as given; and

(c) inversely proportional to the probability of the evidence itself prior to the test.
These relationships in turn explain the following facts about inference:
(a) If we think a hypothesis is in itself likely in the light of background knowledge, then this will
be taken in its favour when assessing its probability after a test.
(b) The degree to which the evidence supports a hypothesis depends on how closely linked they
are. If on the assumption that the hypothesis is true it would be very likely that we get the
evidence, then so much the better for the hypothesis if we do.
(c) If the evidence is not itself very likely, then it is significant when it does turn up.
Surprising evidence is good evidence.
It is perhaps best to see (b) and (c) togetherthat is, as the ratio of p(e/h) to p(e). This
ratio is the measure of how much more likely the evidence is given the hypothesis than it
is independent of the hypothesis. If this ratio is around 1, then Pafter(h)=Pbefbre(h), i.e. no
change is the degree of belief. This is the case where the hypothesis gives us no special
reason to expect the evidence or to think it unlikely. On the other hand, if p(e/h)>p(e),
then pafter(h)>Pbefore(h). We increase our degree of belief because the evidence we
obtained is more likely given the hypothesis than we would otherwise have thought. The
third case is p(e/h)<p(e), so that Pafter(h)<Pbefore(h). This is the case of negative evidence.
Here the evidence is supposed, according to the hypothesis, to be more unlikely than we
thought on the basis of background knowledge alone. But we obtained it nonetheless, and
accordingly we reduce the strength of our belief in the hypothesis. Imagine I have a
patient who has three symptoms: very low pulse, dilated pupils, and chest pains. I suspect
a certain virus. People infected with this virus very often have dilated pupils, more
frequently than the average patient. So this evidence favours my hypothesis. On the other
hand, we would expect someone with the virus to have a very high pulse. So the
occurrence of the low pulse, to which we would attach a low probability conditional on
the hypothesis, is contrary evidence. As regards the chest pains, there is no reason to
expect these in an infected subject. But nor is infection any reason to think chest pains
would not occur. So the chest pains are neutral as regards the hypothesis.
These very straightforward features of scientific reasoning are neatly accounted for by
Bayes theorem. Note what Bayes theorem gives us. Bayesian conditionalization tells us
how to change our degrees of belief in the light of new evidence. If conditionalization is
a priori then we have an a priori rule of inductive inference. Not surprisingly
Bayesianism has many enthusiastic supporters. However, it also has its detractors. We do
not have the space to look at all the criticisms of Bayesianism in depth, but a flavour of
the objections is given by the following considerations.
(a) Conditionalization could not be a priori because it tells us that a degree of belief at
one time (after the experiment) should depend on degree of belief at another time
(before the experiment). But a priori rules cannot be diachronic (across time), they
must be synchronic (concerning the same time).
(b) The probability we attach to a universal generalization should be no more than the
product of the probabilities of the infinitely many independent propositions it entails.
As most of these have a probability less than 1, this product is zero. Because p(h) is
zero, p(h/e) will also be zero; hence Bayes theorem is useless.

(c) Bayesianism does not tell us what probabilities to attach to p(h) and p(e). So, even
with the same evidence, two researchers could have widely differing degrees of belief
in a theory.
(d) As Bayesianism is subjectivist it cannot tell us whether a theory that is well supported
by the evidence is thereby more likely to be true. It only tells us that it is more rational
to believe it to be true. This, as we have seen with Strawson, is insufficient to resolve
Humes problem.
(e) Scientists may sometimes use Bayes theorem, but on the whole they do not. Indeed,
for many theories they would be hard pressed to put any value on the priors p(h) and
p(e), and even p(e/h).
Bayesians like to think they have good answers to these criticisms. Again we do not have
the space to look at all of them in detail. But let us start with one where the Bayesian
certainly has the upper handcriticism (b) which comes from Popper. Popper argues that
the prior probability of a theory being correct is equal to the product of the probabilities
of the individual, independent basic statements it entails. In general, an infinite number of
these will remain untested. Each of these must have a prior probability of being true of
less than 1, for otherwise we could be certain of their truth in advance of testing. But as
these probabilities are less than 1 their infinite product is equal to zero, and so the prior
probability of any generalization being true is zero.
The response to this is to point out that Popper has misapplied the relevant rule of
probability. He is using a generalized version of the following truth: if C entails both A
and B, and the probabilities of A and B are independent, then p(C)<p(A)p(B). The
important condition at work here is that the probabilities of A and B are independent
the truth of one has no bearing on the truth of the other. A might be I had jam for tea
and B might be Aldehydes are oxidized to acids by Tollens reagent. Those two
propositions are clearly unrelated. But the propositions entailed by a general hypothesis
may very well be related. The hypothesis that bats have large ears entails the two
propositions that Horace has large ears and that Hildegard, his sister, has large ears. It
would be foolish to assume that these are probabilistically independent. There are many
conceivable reasons why the fact that Horace has large ears might be relevant to the
probability of Hildegard having the same feature. For instance, one might think it
plausible that siblings share many anatomical characteristics. This is a general claim and
Popper might argue that its probability of being true is therefore equal to zero, and so
cannot be used to establish a probabilistic connection between Horace and Hildegard. But
as Poppers argument is intended to establish the conclusion that general propositions
have zero priors, it is he who cannot make use of that claim in his argument. It seems
that, by independent, Popper understands not probabilistically independent but
logically independent. It is true that Horace has large ears and Horaces sister
Hildegard has large ears are logically independent. But the logical independence of A
and B does not entitle one to use the inequality p(C)<p(A)p(B) (where C entails both A
and B). To gain that entitlement Popper would have to show that probabilistic
independence and logical independence are the same thing. But, as the example shows, to
do that would require assuming that general propositions have zero prior probabilities.
Let us now look at objection (c). The Bayesian response is taken by many Bayesians
to show the power of Bayesianism. But I think this also shows up some weaknesses of

Bayesianism. The objection is this. Say you and I both agree that a piece of possible
evidence e has a certain probability assuming the hypothesis h which we are
investigating. We agree that p(e/h) is 0.8. But you think that the hypothesis is as likely as
not (p(h)=0.5), while I am more sceptical (p(h)=0.3). You think the evidence is mildly
surprising (p(e)=0.4), while I think it mundane (p(h)=0.6). What do we now think about
the probability of the hypothesis? We both think it is more likely, but you attach a
probability of 0.875 to it, while my adjusted degree of belief is 0.35. So after
consideration of the same piece of evidence, you think the hypothesis really quite
probable while I am still sceptical. This is because the prior probabilities we each attach
to h are different. But as Bayes theorem does not tell us how to fix our priors it cannot be
used to say which hypothesis a person should adopt given the evidence.
The Bayesian has the following response. As the number of tests increases, opinion
will convergeand will converge on the correct hypothesis. Let us look at an illustration.
You, Lucy, and I are investigating a coin that we think might be biased. We can describe
the bias by attaching a probability to it falling heads up. For an unbiased coin this
probability is 0.5. We have different initial views on whether it is biased. You think it is
biased towards tails, Lucy thinks it is unbiased, and I think it is biased towards heads.
view of a hypothesis in the light of evidence. Whether one rejects or accepts this depends
on whether one agrees or disagrees that structural features of a hypothesis, such as
simplicity, explanatory unity, and integration with other hypotheses, can be part of the
rational evaluation of a hypothesis. I have argued that they should be, and thus that
Bayesianism is incomplete. On the other hand, Bayesians may accept that Bayesian
conditionalization is open to supplementationfor instance by a theory of how structural
features should contribute to the evaluation of the prior probability of a hypothesis. In
contrast, Inference to the Best Explanation as I have described it does give a role to the
structural features left unaccounted for by Bayesianism, and so in that regard at least
provides a better understanding of the rationality of scientific inference.
Lastly, it should not be forgotten that, as a theory of subjective probability,
Bayesianism has little to say about the propensity of inductive practices to lead to the
truth. We may well agree that someone who adjusts the credence they give to a
hypothesis in accordance with Bayesian conditionalization is thereby behaving rationally.
But nothing in Bayesianism can show that such a person is also more likely to end up
with true hypotheses than someone who infers differently. In this way, whatever the
merits of Bayesianism as either an explanatory description of our inductive practices or
an account of inductive rationality, it is in the same boat as Strawsons account when it
comes to finding an answer to Humes problem. Neither shows whether rationality has a
propensity for success. Consequently, neither tells us whether inductive knowledge is
possible.
2. Defend or reject the views of Popper:
a. Criterion of demarcation between science and non-science

Poppers criterion of science is a statement or theorys falsifiability/refutability/testability.

Hence statements, claims or theories can be categorized only as scientific if they pass this test.
Otherwise these discarded claims properly belong to non-science or pseudo-science.
I think this Popperian test is at present necessary and can be tentatively accepted as the criterion
for screening and criticising claims and statements. This testability is not only practicable to
scientists, but also to ordinary people who are too busy to analyse and criticize volume of
information, propaganda and advertisements from multi-media especially from TV and internet.
Take for example the proliferation of herbal preparations or food supplements which claims it
can prevent and cure all kinds of diseases, from cancer to almost all illnesses imaginable. The
sale of extracts from Guyabano, mushrooms, algae etc. are making big money in the Philippines,
by posing as an alternative to established medicine which is often very expensive. Thus their
appeal come from affordability and promise as a cure-all medicine.
To one who is not familiar with Poppers falsifiability criterion, one would readily accept these
kinds of cure-all claims by many herbal preparations which are insinuated as similarly
scientific especially when advertised by known personalities who have confirmed their potency
and effectiveness. But using Poppers testability as a criterion for science, it is very easy to find
out that these are re-packaged myths masquerading as scientific solutions to human diseases. I
therefore support the idea of Popper because it is a practical and effective measure to discern
which ideas and claims are to be believed as reliable and scientific.
b. Falsification as the essence of scientific method
In so far as falsifiability or refutability defines what belongs to science, it is but logical that for
Popper that falsification is the essence of scientific method.
I agree with Popper that falsification is the essence of scientific method. The scientific method
that we are accustomed of, that we have known since elementary grade states that scientific
method begins with observation of facts and these observations are stated in general terms which

becomes our intelligent guess or hypothesis. This hypothesis is further confirmed and verified
by testing, either again by observation or laboratory controlled experiments until it becomes a
scientific theory.
The traditional scientific method is basically verificationist or relies on confirmation. The more
instances of confirmation, the stronger the theory is. One more thing, it always begins with
observation of facts.
On the other hand, Poppers falsification as a method does not distinguish whether a hypothesis
or conjecture starts from observation, it is more important for Popper to evaluate this conjecture
on the basis of its testability. The method of falsification is the essence of scientific method
which we can say that it is the method itself. The shift in the method from verification to
refutation is the kernel or essence of the scientific method which I also think as more reliable
than pure verification.

c. Scientific reasoning never involves induction

For Popper, deduction has replaced induction as the true scientific method. Scientific reasoning
does not need the involvement of induction because of the limitation of verification and endless
confirmation can never establish the truth and scientific-ness of a claim or theory. Since
induction is the logic of verification and confirmation, so is deduction the logic of science
because it is open to refutation.
Scientific reasoning is therefore scientific if it involves deduction which can establish the
certainty of conclusions based on the evaluation of premises while on the other hand, induction
can only lead to inference with a more or less degree of probability which can be easily
discarded in the light of refutation.
d. Scientific objectivity, as conceived by sociologists of knowledge, is mistaken

The sociology of knowledge argues that scientific thought, and especially thought on social and
political matters, does not proceed in a vacuum, but in a socially conditioned atmosphere. It is
influenced largely by unconscious or subconscious elements. These elements remain hidden
from the thinkers observing eye because they form, as it were, the very place which he inhabits,
his social habitat. The social habitat of the thinker determines a whole system of opinions and
theories which appear to him as unquestionably true or self-evident.
Each of these different socially determined systems of assumptions is called by the sociologists
of knowledge a total ideology.
For Popper, these sociologists of knowledge fail to understand the social aspect of knowledge,
of scientific method. It looks upon science or knowledge as a process in the mind or
consciousness of the individual scientist, scientific objectivity is founded upon the individual
scientists impartiality or objectivity.
I agree with Popper that scientific objectivity is not similar to the domain of social sciences
which we can be home to different individual opinions without conflict in order to arrive at the
truth. Other disciplines outside of science lets say anthropology which studies diverging
cultures, anthropologists can be influenced by the culture they are studying such that it forms
their individual prejudices, their socially determined systems of assumptions. Unlike in science,
the seeming stability of the object of science especially natural science makes it more
independent of the prejudices of the scientist.
e. Scientific objectivity as a function of the public character of the scientific method
Unlike the sociologists of knowledge who fall into the pit of individualism, Poppers Scientific
objectivity is not a result of individual scientist to be objective but from the friendly-hostile
cooperation of many scientists, the inter-subjectivity of scientific method.
The great difference can be gleaned from the individual to the scientific community. Ideas and
theories must be subjected to test not only by the individual but of the whole scientific

community in order to cast away the prejudice of the individual scientist, to attain the level of
scientific objectivity through the method of public scrutiny.
The public character of scientific method the openness to free criticism and the employment of
experience as the impartial arbiter of controversies, everyone who has learned the technique of
understanding and testing scientific theories can repeat the experiment and judge for himself.
This public character of scientific method ensures that subjectivity is reconciled with scientific
objectivity.

f. Scientific progress and truth as a goal of scientific enterprise

I agree with Popper that scientific progress and the eternal quest for truth is the goal of scientific
enterprise. Since theories are eternally subjected to refutation and those that can not stand it are
rejected or revised is a guarantee that we are moving towards the attainment of greater
knowledge. This trend is getting us towards scientific progress.
However, scientists do not live in a vacuum. Societies they belong to greatly determine and limit
the goal of scientific inquiry and the application of these scientific discoveries is more or less
influenced by the state of technological level in a certain country. Scientist are more often than
not contracted by big businesses either as researchers or employees. This beclouds scientific
objectivity and the scientific activity is subsumed under the lead of business and profit. The
problem here as encountered by the scientist is not about truth and scientific progress but the
goal and to whose interest would science serve. It is under the backdrop of conflicting interest
that science would be under a dilemma, the ideology of science, especially under circumstances
where such scientific activity would be turned against society. This is true to the development of
the atom bomb, the production and reproduction of genetically-modified organisms etc.
This situation forms a great barrier to the unity of science, of the scientific community, which
must serve humanity, into speaking a common language as Popper puts it.

While Practice is not the enemy of theoretical knowledge but the most valuable incentive to it,
not only be scientists, states and businesses determine the object and direction of science, but
society too as a whole, the recipient and beneficiary of scientific progress must also be involved
to ensure that science proceeds to address the short-term and long term needs of humanity.
3. Defend or reject the following views propounded by Thomas Kuhn:
a. Paradigm as the basis of well-developed or mature science
Kuhn defines paradigm as the background set of assumptions and methods. A paradigm is
developed once a general consensus among a particular scientific community had been reached,
and commonly clustered around a key text or scientist.
For me, I strongly agree with Kuhn that the development of paradigm is a sign that science has
attained a higher level, a mature level. The early days of science, if it is already proper to be
called so, individual scientists worked on their own thats why many discoveries and theories
have been worked on simultaneously in different countries without the benefit of sharing
between and among them. During this infantile era of science, scientific community was not yet
fully developed, the community of scientists were not that developed and individual endeavour
was the rule of the game.
This completely changed as the world trade and international relations between and among
nations was developed. It was also during this era that individual discovery yielded to
innovation and reformulation of scientific theories that paved the way to the formation of a truly
scientific community, of the interconnection of scientists worldwide, not only working as
individuals but teams and groups under a more or less defined theoretical persuasion.
Thus, the development of a paradigm is not only a symptom but already became the basis of a
mature science.
b. Dogmatism is useful in scientific research

Kuhn calls dogmatism the strongly held convictions of scientists prior to research which he sees
as a precondition for success in the sciences. Dogmatism is a commitment to further research in
order to confirm and preserve normal science.
Although I disagree with Kuhn when he calls this commitment as dogmatism, I agree with him
that such commitment is necessary in scientific research whether such commitment. For me,
dogmatism is committed when there is no scientific basis but mere belief based on religious or
otherwise irrational source.
Anyway, paradigm articulation done by the scientist impelled by his commitment or dogmatism
will necessarily advance research and science itself. Given this impetus, a scientist will try his
might to extend the boundaries of his new theory or paradigm. This will eventually result to the
acknowledgement of his theorys boundaries and limits or the extent of its validity. It may yet
result to the discovery of conflicting instances or incompatible application which may result to
its demolition by another paradigm.
c. Normal science is mainly puzzle-solving
Once a paradigm is established, it becomes a normal science not anymore concerned on
controversial discoveries but in extending paradigm as far as possible. The dogmatism or
commitment of the scientist will drive him to seek for the unknown or blind side of the theory.
Whatever is not yet explored using this theory will be a vast arena for experimentation and those
blind spots are like puzzles awaiting the scientist to solve it using the accepted paradigm.
I think this is tenable because a paradigm can not be generally accepted by a certain scientific
community however small without appealing to or even appearing to be greater than its
predecessor which was previously abandoned due to its contradiction with newly discovered
phenomena. This new scientific perspective that guides research which will become the new
theory in a dominant position will try to solve all mysteries and unknowns in its path. Once it
has illuminated such blind spots, it has entrenched itself as a strong scientific theory that can
withstand great criticism from its opponents.

d. Competing paradigms are incommensurable

Old and new or competing paradigms are incommensurable according to Kuhn.
They cannot be compared or measured. The old paradigm cannot be simply improved but must
be replaced based on a new foundation or set of assumptions, assumptions that cannot be
accommodated in the old paradigm without contradicting itself.
I think this incommensurability comes mainly from the incapacity of the old paradigm to
accommodate revisions without crumbling on its very foundation. The old paradigm is not only
insufficient but basically flawed and unable to explain or guide the explication of phenomena
that are anomalous. There is no chance of revising or modifying the paradigm in the light of
anomalous circumstances, and there is no choice left but to abandon it and be replaced by a more
dynamic and coherent paradigm, a paradigm that can shed light on these anomalous phenomena
and founded on a firmer basis.
e. Normal science always leads to crisis which in turn leads to scientific revolutions
Once a scientific system or paradigm is established and becomes the dominant one, replacing the
old one which is already abandoned and discarded, there will come a point in time where
anomalies or contradictory phenomenon will appear which can not anymore be accommodated.
The process and cycle of emergence, dominance, abandonment and replacement of one paradigm
to another will be repeated. Kuhn attributes this revolutionary situation as a result of
accumulated anomalies which brings about a crisis situation where normal science will be
replaced by revolutionary science and so on and so forth.
It think this Kuhns analysis of the history of the philosophy of science is similar to the historical
materialism as excerpted by Karl Marx in his studies of the development of societies, of social
revolution as a result of the insoluble conflict of diametrically opposed class interests of
economic classes.

Normal science while it can be dominant for a long time, there will come a time that it will cease
to be the guiding light in scientific endeavours. Just as societies evolve and gearing towards
progress, so is normal science.
f. Scientific revolutions are paradigm shifts, not governed by impartial, theoryindependent evidences, and neither by rational and objective rules
Far from gradual rational progress, science advanced through radical and violent upheavals or
paradigm shifts. Out of the crisis that normal science undergoes, an alternative paradigm springs
up to shed light on new phenomena never known encountered before.
It can be gleaned from the terminology of Kuhn that scientific revolutions are paradigm shifts or
abandoning the old paradigm and adopting a new one. Why not an evolutionary one? Because
changes in science does not proceed in a linear and gradual process but rather from leaps and
bounds. Paradigm shifts are characterized by the defeat of the old and the emergence of a more
stable and consistent theory, a fruit of the struggle of ideas and disentanglement of the old one
from its confusions and inconsistency.

g. Scientific objectivity is a myth

According to Kuhn, scientific objectivity is untenable because a scientist is always preoccupied
with his paradigm, a way of viewing things, that beclouds his search for the truth. Normal
science is largely paradigm-articulation and the tendency of the commitment of a scientist to his
paradigm is loyalty to it. Objectivity is therefore determined by a paradigm hence such
objectivity is a myth.