AUTHORIAL INTENT AND THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

Gordon James Klingenschmitt, RTCH 751, Dr. Twelftree, Interpreting Scripture

The purpose of is paper is to explain the history and meaning of authorial intent and its related
theories of languages and communication, as they relate to our proper interpretation of the Bible.
1. Authorial Intent
Also known as Authorial Discourse Interpretation, the notion of Authorial Intent is simply a
term to describe our most common method of discerning the meaning behind someones words.
Interpreters of the Bible, or the U.S. Constitution, or any other historical document frequently
ponder such questions as, Well yes, thats what the author wrote, but what did he or she really
mean? And how can we know for sure?
Authorial Discourse Interpretation involves a study of linguistics, grammar, lexical analysis, and
basic laws of human behavioral interaction, in the attempt to discern not only what the speaker
spoke or the writer wrote, but what meaning they intended to communicate to us, the listener or
student.
As Nicholas P. Wolterstorff writes, Authorial Discourse Interpretation is what we all do when we
read history books, scientific texts, legal documents, and instructions for the repair of home
appliances. The special contribution that this way of understanding makes to biblical
interpretation is that it offers a way to grasp how it can be that God speaks. 1
Paul Ricoeur studied hermeneutics of authorial intent and summarized a textual problem
interpreters must overcome: Writing renders the text autonomous with respect to the intention of
the author. Since the author isnt available to answer clarifying questions, the text is limited, and
What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant. 2
In his essay entitled What is Text? Ricoeur continued, The reader is absent from the act of
writing; the writer is absent from the act of reading. The text thus produces a double eclipse of
the reader and the writer. It thereby replaces the relation of dialogue, which directly connects the
voice of one to the hearing of the other.3
Certainly it could be much easier if the writers of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John were available
for questions and interviews, or if God were present in human form for daily conversation
without mystery, and yet God requires we seek His hidden face and prayerfully study the text, to
discern his intention for our lives.
What precise message then, does God intend for us to hear and understand? Our role as
interpreters is to learn what God intends, the original meaning behind His words, as those words
were inscribed perhaps thousands of years ago. We must determine the authors intent.
1

Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Authorial Discourse Intention, Dictionary of Theological Interpretation of the Bible,
(ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House Company, 2005), p. 79. [Hereafter referred to as
Dictionary.]
2

Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p.
139, cited in Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan,
1992), p. 56.
3
Ibid.

2. Speaking is different than Inspiring/Revealing

Does God literally speak, or does he merely inspire and reveal himself to men, by means other
than literal speech? When evangelicals understand the Bible to be the Word of God we
generally assume these scriptures were written by men who, by some means, interacted with God
and wrote His words, or mingled His words with their own words, or sometimes spoke on their
own without claiming divine authority, or sometimes proclaimed Thus saith the Lord as His
very authoritative mouthpiece.
While we generally trust that All scripture is given by inspiration of God... 4 and that no
prophecy of the scripture is of any private interpretation. For the prophecy came not in old time
by the will of man: but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, 5
we also trust the writers of scripture held certain autonomy of their own, as agents of Gods
kingdom, sent by God to speak their own mind at times, such as when Paul distinguished his own
authority from Christs authority when teaching: But to the rest I say, not the Lord, that if any
brother has a wife... 6
3. Double Agency
The related notion of Double Agency Discourse can help interpreters assimilate how God may be
speaking through a man, even when God is not physically audible or visibly present in the
mystical sense of observable, sensory, supernatural manifestation.
Wolterstorff explains how God may be visibly represented by humans, even when otherwise
invisible: One of the most common forms of such double agency discourse in ordinary life
occurs when one person gives to another the right of attorney....it also occurred when a head of
state commissioned someone to be his ambassador. It seems clear that this is how the biblical
writers understood the relation of God to the prophet. The prophet spoke on behalf of God....by
hearing the prophet speak [in the name of God], human beings heard God speak to them there and
thendouble agency discourse.7
4. The Anthropomorphism of God
Wolterstorff explains another source of tension when men attribute speech to God: The other
reason theologians have given remarkably little attention to Gods speech as such is that it has
been thought that to attribute speech to God is to speak anthropomorphically, just as when one
attributes eyes and arms to God.8
It may be easier for some, therefore, to explain Gods speech in terms of inspiration or revelation,
instead of speech, or even as a simple means to distinguish Gods inaudible voice from those rare
times He chooses to speak audibly. The principle of expressibility can help us overcome the need
for such a distinction.

5. The Principle of Expressibility

4

2 Tim 3:16 (KJV)

2 Pet 1:20-21 (KJV)
6
1 Cor 7:12 (NASB)
7
Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Authorial Discourse Intention, Dictionary, p. 79.
8
Ibid.
5

In his 1969 essay Speech Acts about the philosophy of language, John Searle articulated the
principle of expressibility which postulated that a speaker must be able to communicate in the
same language understood by the listener, or meaning would be lost. For example, if I read this
paper in the Japanese language, it may be a brilliant paper, but how many would understand?
Various elements of communication, then, include not only the speech act (the basic unit of
communication), but also what the speaker means, what the sentence uttered means, what the
speaker intended to mean, what the hearer understood, and the rules of language. Each of these
elements is different, and if any is missing, efficient communication cannot take place. 9
If I were to apply this principle to Gods communication toward man, it may logically follow, that
although God is not anthropomorphic, and doesnt have vocal cords, and doesnt limit himself to
speaking English (for example), that he may still assume some form while speaking to man, that
communicates through physical vibrations of sound waves to the mans ears in the English
language. He does so, not because God has literally become an English-speaking human, but
because if he did otherwise the English-listening human may fail to understand Gods words and
meaning. His speech must be expressible in our language, or its meaning is lost.
6. Speech-Act Theory
J. L. Austin developed the Speech-Act Theory of language in his 1955 lectures at Harvard,
which refuted the earlier notion that language is fundamentally concerned with the stating of facts
and representing the states of affairs of things about which we communicate. He proposed
instead, that our words are really forceful actions intended to bring about results, by one of five
categories: assertions, directions, commissions, expressions, or declarations. 10
John Searle furthered Austins research, further developing distinctions between descriptive
language and performative speech-acts. In Speech Acts, Searle outlined various rules of
language that help researchers articulate and analyze the rules and elements of human intention.
For example, when a speaker communicates a promise to another hearer, 9 rules of language
likely are involved, including the utterance of words, the description of the future act promised,
the preference to perform that future act, the intention to actually carry it out, the obligation
created by the promise, the benefit received in exchange for the promise, and other human rules
of behavioral interaction generally understood by both speaker and hearer.11
7. Locution vs. Illocutionary Actions
Locution is the simple uttering of words or sentences. Illocutionary action is more, its the
intended or asserted or desired outcome (or action) achieved by the communication of those
words, for example warning, asking, commanding, or asserting. J. L. Austin theorized that for
proper interpretation of anothers sentences, we must try to discern the intended desire or action
our outcome behind the speakers meaning, not merely what their words said. Human
miscommunication, or barriers and ambiguities in language, or error on the part of the listener,
could construe a sentence entirely different than what the speaker originally intended for us to
understand.12
9

John Searle, Speech Acts, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 19-21.
Richard S. Briggs, Speech-Act Theory, Dictionary, p. 763.
11
Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 57-61.
12
Wolterstorff, Authorial Discourse Intention, Dictionary, p. 79.
10

As an example, analyze the statement, Its hot in here. As a simple utterance, this represents
locution. But its meaning could infer several illocutions, or several intended acts. This could be
an informative statement, a complaint about the heating, a request to open the window, or have a
multi-layered intention. Richard Briggs postulates that most locutions are multilayered in some
way, and will often admit of unintended illocutions when approached from angles or agendas not
envisaged by the speaker.13
Briggs further illustrates by analyzing the controversial scripture in 1 Tim 2:12 (NRSV), where
Paul writes: I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over a man. As a simple
utterance, or locution, we cannot automatically assume to know what Paul intended. But as
illocutory acts, many possible intentions may be (rightly or wrongly) inferred. Did Paul intend
this as a local assertion only intended for those churches under his own care at the time, or as a
universal command to be applied by all churches throughout the world for the rest of time
eternal? It has been argued that Pauls words should not be interpreted beyond their illocutory
act potential and should thus be rendered as simply a statement about Pauls personal practice, I
permit no... without stretching the meaning beyond the limit of its own self-stated intent. 14
8. Perlocutionary Acts
A third category of speech is Perlocutionary Acts as comparatively defined by J. L. Austin:
Thus we distinguished the locutionary act...which has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has
a certain force in saying something; the perlocutionary act which is the achieving of certain
effects by saying something. Examples to distinguish illocution from perlocution may include
statements like: In saying x I was joking, or By saying I would shoot him, I alarmed him.
The perlocutionary act is the outcome, or effect, of the intended or unintended speech, (i.e. the
joke or the alarm caused by the speech.) 15
Anthony C. Thiselton extends Searles linguistic analysis toward scriptural interpretation. This
distinction [between locution, illocution, and perlocution] is constructive for understanding the
central issue...about hermeneutical theory and biblical texts....Searles distinction sheds light on
the logical fallacy reflected in the overworn dualism of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Bultmann
between, on the one hand, description, objectification, report, and proposition, and on the other
hand, address, promise, understanding and self-involvement. Biblical texts frequently address
the reader as warnings, commands, invitations, judgments, promises, or pledges of love.16 In
other words, they are intended to communicate forcefully, and provoke a response in us.
Thiselton extends this to analyze several verses of scripture, by comparing the key linguistic
difference between promises and assertions: As we saw in our discussion of Christological
texts, whether the [promise] utterance your sins are forgiven you (Matt. 9:2) actually changes
anything depends on the authority and institutional status of the speaker outside language, among
other things. On the other hand, the declaration that a particular state of affairs is true (Christ
was buried, and was raised on the third day, 1 Cor 15:4) has an assertive force, in which the

13

Richard S. Briggs, Speech-Act Theory, Dictionary, p. 764.

W. Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), cited by
Briggs, Speech-Act Theory, Dictionary, 764.
15
J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp.
121-123.
16
Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1992), p. 294.
14

state of affairs to be reported determines the word that is spoken. Characteristically promise
shapes world-to-word, assertion shapes word-to-world.17
Yet even by simply describing simple locutions, or simple observations of fact, such as Christs
resurrection from the dead, the scripture may at times be inherently prescriptive and require (or
cause) our suggested response: We thus have a duty to believe Christ is raised from the dead.
9. Intention/Intentional Fallacy
In 1946 William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley wrote The Intentional Fallacy which criticized
others for overemphasizing the psychology or biographical details of the writer, instead of
analyzing the text and direct statements of the author.18 When reading the Bible, for example,
interpreters could get too enmeshed in the question about who is Paul, and what in his personal
history might have colored his views about the doctrine of salvation? Too much emphasis on
Pauls personhood could cause us to ignore the plain meaning of Romans 6,7,8 which detail what
Paul actually did believe about the doctrine of salvation. To ignore the text by placing too much
emphasis on the authors intention is to commit the intentional fallacy.
E. D. Hirsh wrote Validity in Interpretation in 1967 which led a discussion about authorial intent,
with the premise: the sensible view is that a text means what its author meant. 19 Or conversely,
as my beloved Greek professor Dr. J. Lyle Story once told me, the scripture can never mean
what its author never intended it to mean. This view of course underscores the importance for
interpreters to maintain a humble position, without imposing our wishes or views on the text, but
to learn from its originally intended meaning.
In this vein Augustine believed anyone who understands in the Scriptures something other than
that intended by them is deceived. 20 Also from this humble approach John Calvin wrote in the
preface to his Commentary on Romans, It is the first business of an interpreter to let his author
say what he does say, instead of attributing to him what we think he ought to say. 21
And yet Calvin acknowledged the dual nature of interpreting the words of the prophet, as
distinguished from the words of God spoken through the prophet, in Calvins interpretation of
Psalm 87: We must consider the intention of the prophet, or rather the object of the Spirit of
God, speaking by the mouth of the prophet. 22 By understanding the prophets motive, we can
likely discern Gods intention also, provided the prophets heart agrees with Gods.
Vanhoozer concludes his evaluation of the Intention/Intentional Fallacy with an application
toward Divine Authorial Intention. Proper interpretation of scripture, he claims, calls for
recognition of dual authorship where the divine intention appropriates, superintends, or
supervenes on the human intention. God speaks in Scripture by way of human discourse, but not
by outshouting the human authors. 23
10. Ambiguity

17

Thiselton, New Horizons, p. 298.

Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Intention/Intentional Fallacy, Dictionary, p. 327.
19
Vanhoozer, Dictionary, 328.
20
Augustine, Doctr. chr. 1.36.41., cited in Vanhoozer, Dictionary, 328.
21
John Calvin, cited in Vanhoozer, Dictionary, 328.
22
John Calvin, cited in Vanhoozer, Dictionary, 328.
23
Vanhoozer, Dictionary, 329.
18

Israel Sheffler has studied the concept of ambiguity, and proposed many different categories for
linguistic interpreters, but for the purpose of this paper allow me to discuss lexical and
grammatical ambiguity.
When an author in question selects a word that could render multiple meanings, interpreters are
left to ponder which meaning the author intended. For example, examining the word caravan,
Sheffler suggests two possible definitions: A) A group of travelers journeying together through
desert or hostile regions, or B) a group of vehicles traveling together in a file. If the context of a
given sentence using caravan is insufficient to clarify the written authors intent, and hes not
available for personal interview, his written meaning may be lost to history forever, as too
ambiguous to be recovered.24
Comparing Bible translations may illustrate one problem of ambiguity. Which translation best
renders the English definition of the Greek word Paredthee (paredo,qh) in Luke 10:22?
Amplified: All things have been given over into My power by My Father.
New American Standard: All things have been handed over to Me by My Father.
King James: All things are delivered to me of my Father.
Even within the King James Version, the root paradidomi is translated nine different ways:
betray, bring forth, cast, commit, deliver (up), give (over, up), hazard, put in prison, recommend.
The most common translation (40 of 89 times in the gospels) is betrayed.
Isnt it possible Luke actually meant this? All things have been betrayed to me by My Father.
Yet no modern translation uses this English word, perhaps because betrayal appears ungodly.
Hence lexical ambiguity can work both ways---English words can have double meanings, and
Greek words can have double meanings, rendering 4 possible translations, 3 of which the original
author may not have intended. Ultimately we cannot conclude with 100% certainty the author
intended delivered, betrayed, handed over, given over we can only safely conclude he meant
paredo,qh.
Grammatical ambiguity can be another problem, as demonstrated by the following newspaper
headlines, which might hold double meanings, even in English. What was the authors intent?
A) Miners Refuse to Work after Death.
B) Juvenile Court to Try Shooting Defendant.
C) Red Tape Holds Up New Bridges.
D) Astronaut Takes Blame for Gas in Spacecraft.
E) Kids Make Nutritious Snacks.
F) Local High School Dropouts Cut in Half.
G) Hospitals are Sued by 7 Foot Doctors.
In any case, greater care for lexical and grammatical precision must be taken by authors, if they
wish to clearly communicate their authorial intent to future generations.
11. Application and Conclusion
24

Israel Sheffler, Beyond the Letter, A Philosophical Inquiry into Ambiguity, Vagueness, and Metaphor in
Language, (London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 11-13.

Having studied ten key elements of the doctrine of authorial intent we may take greater concern
for our responsibility as interpreters, to avoid casually assigning our own meaning to the text, and
instead try to discern what the author originally meant. We are students of Gods Word, but more
broadly we are theologians, who study God himself, as He has revealed Himself through His
personal interaction with our forebears. To know the intent of the prophets, we must not only
study their statements, but dig deeper to discern the intention and motive for communication,
their personal (and internally inspired) reasons for making those statements to us. By
comprehending their intentions, and not merely their words, perhaps we can internalize their
spirit within us, and become morally like them, knowing the originally communicated intentions
of the God they knew, not merely as we wish to know God, but as God intends for us to know
Him. As the Author of creation, His Intentions deserve to be known. [END.]

Bibliography
Alston, W., Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
Augustine, Doctr. chr. 1.36.41.
Austin, J. L., How to Do Things With Words, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962).
Briggs, Richard S., Speech-Act Theory, Dictionary of Theological Interpretation of the Bible, (ed. Kevin J.
Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House Company, 2005).

Calvin, John, Commentary on Romans, Psalms.

Ricoeur, Paul, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Searle, John, Speech Acts, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
Sheffler, Israel, Beyond the Letter, A Philosophical Inquiry into Ambiguity, Vagueness, and Metaphor in
Language, (London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1979).
Thiselton, Anthony C., New Horizons in Hermeneutics, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1992).
Vanhoozer, Kevin J., Intention/Intentional Fallacy, Dictionary of Theological Interpretation of the Bible, (ed.
Kevin J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House Company, 2005).

Wolterstorff, Nicholas P., Authorial Discourse Intention, Dictionary of Theological Interpretation of the Bible, (ed.
Kevin J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House Company, 2005).