Maceda vs. Vasquez [G.R. No.

102781, April 22, 1993]

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified
his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for
a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in
fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of
service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held: COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES MUST BE REFERRED FIRST TO THE SUPREME COURT BY
VIRTUE OF THE COURTS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER THEM. Petitioner also contends that
the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan,
since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control
and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap
that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies
his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal
Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them
if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution,
for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory
powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of
the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has
the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of
the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as
suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us
is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him,
report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less
resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the
resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative

duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination
whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

Raquiza vs Castaneda Jr. [A.M. No. 1312-CFI, January 31, 1978]

Facts: The Petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No.
6824 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Testate Estate of the
late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from the sala of respondent judge, Hon.
Mariano Castaeda to another branch and administrative complaint
against the same judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-Graft Law; (2)
rendering decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal (3) extortion by
means of oppression; and (4) bribery. The court refers the
administrative complaint to Justice Bautista of CA for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Issue: WON the petition and complaint against the Respondent will
prosper?
Held: IN ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES AGAINST JUDGES THE
REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IS PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
The court reviewed the records, testimonies of the Witnesses,
and other evidences submitted to the parties and find the
recommendation of the investigator as fully supported with enough
evidence to merit the dismissal of the complaint against the
respondent Judge. The court held that a ground for removal of a
Judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt most
especially if it involves misconduct, corruption and incompetence.
The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the
respondent Judge should disciplined for grave misconduct of any
graver offense, the evidence presented against him should be
competend and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to which
respondent belong no less demands that before its member could be
faulted, it should be only after due investigation and based on
competent proofs, no less. This all the more so when as in this case
the charges are penal in nature.
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established
beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on
which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges
against the respondent be dismissed for lack of merit.

Kilosbayan vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007]

Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the
Supreme Court.
Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring
one a natural-born citizen is not binding upon the courts when there
are circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings.
F ACTS:
This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed
by Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the
President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners
contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25,
1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were
granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth, his father was
finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization that, by itself,
would not make respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part,
respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and
presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
declaring him to be such.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
RULING:
xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial
court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized
along with his father. The series of events and long string of alleged
changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by various
births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to
be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the
existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence
would haveto show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother,
was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of
this Court.
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged
ancestral tree as wellas his citizenship under the time-line of three
Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an

appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the

Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from
doing so.

Dulay vs. JBC [G. R. No. 202143, July 3, 2012]

Facts:This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, filed by petitioner Famela R. Dulay against the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
Petitioner claims that the President of the Republic of the Philippines
cannot legitimately, validly, and constitutionally appoint the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, because the 1987 Constitution only empowers him to
appoint members or Justices but not the Chief Justice. She adds that the
Chief Justice should be replaced and designated exclusively from among
their peers. Petitioner also contends that the JBC cannot be validly, legally
and constitutionally headed by a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, because the Constitution specifically provides that it be headed by
the incumbent Chief Justice and no other.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the constitutional
power to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and
(2) Whether or not the JBC can validly be headed by a person other than
the incumbent Chief Justice.
Held: Petition is dismissed.
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides for the
appointment of Justices and Judges, to wit:
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
In interpreting the above-stated constitutional provision, petitioner
considers only the Associate Justices as the "members of the Supreme
Court" thereby excluding the Chief Justice from the President's appointing
power. Said interpretation is baseless.
A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial
Department in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly shows that the
phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" and the words "Members" and
"Member" are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme
Court without distinction whether he be the Chief Justice or any of the
Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices.
Section 4 (l), Article VIII thereof defines the composition of the Supreme
Court, namely, "a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices" who may
sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members; Section 4 (2) and (3) describe the manner of conducting

business in the Court whether it be En Banc or in division; Section 7

(1) enumerates the qualifications of the Members of the Court and the
other members of the Judiciary; Section 11 provides for the security of
tenure in the Judiciary; Section 12 states the prohibition on non-judicial
assignments of the Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts;
and Section 13 lays down the process of decision-making. In all of these
provisions, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" was repeatedly
used to refer not only to the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court but
includes the Chief Justice. Thus, in Section 9 of the same Article VIII on the
appointment of Justices and Judges, the phrase "Members of the Supreme
Court" clearly refers to the fifteen Justices of the Court - one Chief Justice
and fourteen (14) Associate Justices - who are within the appointing power
of the President. Although decided under a different Constitution, we
reiterate the Court's pronouncement in Vargas v. Rilloraza that "there can
be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required x x x to
compose the Supreme Court are the regular members of the Court."
We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner that the JBC can only be
headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and no other. Petitioner, in effect,
argues that the JBC cannot perform its task without an incumbent Chief
Justice. To follow this logic would lead to an eventuality where a vacancy in
the Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy occurs in the JBC. We can
likewise infer from this argument that if the Office of the Chief Justice is
vacated, the same will not be filled because there will be no "incumbent
Chief Justice" to act as Chairman of the JBC.
We definitely cannot sustain these arguments. The principal function
of the JBC is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary. For every vacancy,
the JBC submits to the President a list of at least three nominees and the
President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list. Any vacancy in
the Supreme Court is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90
days from the occurrence thereof. This 90-day period is mandatory. It
cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the constitutionallynamed Chairman could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable
if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to
perform its mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the
President even if the constitutionally-named ex-officio Chairman does not
sit in the JBC.
Considering, however, that complete membership in the JBC is
preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power over the JBC, this Court
should not be deprived of representation. The most Senior Justice of this
Court who is not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice should
participate in the deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said
vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the
constitutionally-named Ex-Officio Chairman, pursuant to Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, to wit:

Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief Justice. - In case of

vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office,
they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief
Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply
to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief
Justice. (Emphasis supplied.)

Chavez vs JBC (G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)

Facts:
The unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29,
2012 and the nomination of the former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez, as his potential successor, triggered the filing of the case. The
petitioner assails the validity of the composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) because in 1994 the composition the JBC was substantially
altered. Instead of having only 7 members, the eight member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC (one
from the Senate and one from the House of Representatives) with each
having of a vote. Then the JBC en banc decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and House of Representatives one full vote
each. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition,
setting forth that the framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned and
decided on a JBC composed of only 7 members.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judicial or Bar Council should be composed of 8
members.
Whether or not the Congress should have 2 representatives to the JBC.
Resolution:
The framers of our Constitution intended to create JBC as an innovative
solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in
the appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial
independence, the adopted the holistic approach and hoped that in
creating the a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of the
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of
the members of the judiciary. Therefore to allow the Legislature to have
more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice
speak, whether with one full vote of one-half a vote each, would as one
former congressmen and member of the JBC put it, negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in
the Constitution.
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter a preceding
representative of the Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the member of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate
only one representative to the JBC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The current numerical composition
of the JBC is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The JBC is hereby enjoined
to reconstitute itself so that only one member of Congress will sit as

representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Sec. 8(1), Article VIII

of the 1987 Constitution.

-FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief
Justice following Renato Coronas departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all
the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the
JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio
members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having onehalf (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman
Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral
legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase,
however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the
Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were
made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would
have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house
of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the
principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the
JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification
of legal blunders.
Issue: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held: No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of
the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a
well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase,
a representative of Congress, the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the
JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC,
the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be
given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified
or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but
that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no
need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court
should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from
the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying
reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that
Congress, in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there
are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the
case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination
of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one
voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other
members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter

what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and
much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous
to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is
immediately executory.

Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987]
Facts:
The petitioners who are duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over RTC
branches in the National Capital Judicial Region, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of
the SC, from making any deduction or withholding taxes from their salaries. They
submit that any tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provisions of Sec. 10, Art. VIII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the deduction of taxes from the compensation of the judicial officers
constitute a diminution of their salaries which is in turn a violation of the Constitution.
Resolution:
Salaries of Justices and Judges subject to income taxation and the ruling in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Endencia vs. David are hereby discarded.
The Court en banc had re-affirmed the Chief Justices directive as follows: RE:
Question of exemption from income taxation. - The Court re-affirmed the Chief Justices
previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this
Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of
Justices of the SC as well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.
The clear intent of the of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed
express grant of exemption from payment in income tax to members of the judiciary, so
as to give substance to equality among the three branches of the government. The
salaries of the members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax
applied to all taxpayers.
The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject
to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of
such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
-SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY ARE SUBJECT TO TAX. Besides,
construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again
reproduced hereunder:
"The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased." (Emphasis
supplied).
It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they
are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those
appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the
provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must
be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the
people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of
Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and
should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

People vs. Gacott, Jr. [G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995]
Facts: Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 of the court a quo,
complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z.
Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated
April 26, 1995.
The decision of the court shall be recorded on the respondents personal record. Gacott filed a motion for reconsideration
that the case not be recorded on his personal record for doing so will foreclose any chance for him to aspire for promotion
in the judiciary in the future. Gacott contended as well that under Section 11, Article VII, administrative cases shall be
decided by Supreme Court en banc in disciplining a judge.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to administratively discipline
respondent judge.
Ruling: NOT ALL DISCIPLINARY ACTION PROCEEDINGS NEED TO BE HEARD EN BANC. At any rate, the very text
of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first
clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a
declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the
Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the
whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first
by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this
instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a
Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. In the Matter of the Amendment and/or
Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a
fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of
the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in
the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action
by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of
authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven members.
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be
decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges
against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year
or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies
that:
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least
three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
That guideline or rule in the referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a division thereof rests on the same
rationale and applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.
Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter deal with situations like the one subject of
this resolution with more perspicacity and circumspection.
The basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the case at bar are hereby DENIED.

De la Llana vs. Alba [G.R. No. 57883, March 12, 1982]

FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the
Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any
action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established
by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for
under the Constitution.
RULING: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their
services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is
the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law,
the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

DISSOLUTION OF OFFICE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE

SUPREME COURT OVER JUDGES. Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing Inferior Courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the
Constitution. There was a similar provision the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on
this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is empowered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be, distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense
that from the stand-point of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the Judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded, the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that
this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved.
If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in
issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the

conceded power of reorganizing the Inferior Courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in
this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to
avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.

Zandueta v. Dela Costa [November 28, 1938 G.R. No. L-46267]

NATURE: This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the
Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally
occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial
District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office
in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said respondent
FACTS: Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City
of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad
interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly-On November 7, 1936, the date on which
Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner
received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this
time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and
Palawan-The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad
interim appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner,
pursuant to which he took a new oath-After his appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts-On May 19,
1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim
appointment of said petitioner-On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein
respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to
preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of
Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments
ISSUE: WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to repossess
the office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed statute
HELD: When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district
by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the
same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new
judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the
discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office
and cannot claim to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new
appointment has been issued.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an
appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible with the one
formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath,
and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized
office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was
occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par.
121;id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment
may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies.
In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No.
145. If the petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to
accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed
that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted
with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware
of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted
the office and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath,
thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he
would later be stopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of
which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and
the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.

In re Manzano [A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988]

Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the
appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of
Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a
Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee
will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as
Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member
of judiciary.
Issue: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line
insofar as administrative functions are concerned?
Ruling: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation
of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or
Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain
from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which
adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within
its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and
the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of
the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by
the organic law of its existence.
Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments
executive machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to
the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials
as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is
an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence we can readily see that membership in the
Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the

Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any

quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the
judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration
of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving
the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and
needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the
members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or
rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the
particular function involved in their implementation.

Consing vs Court of Appeals [177 SCRA 14 (1989)]

Facts:
Merlin Consing sold a house and lot to Caridad Santos. Provided
in their contract of sale were particular terms of payment in which the
purchase price shall be paid (installment basis, plus interest). In the
process, Santos defaulted in her payments. Consing demanded for her
payment and had planned to resort to court litigation. Santos
expressed her willingness to settle her obligation. However, this is
upon the condition that the Consings comply with all the laws and
regulations on subdivision and after payment to her damages as a
consequence of the use of a portion of her lot as a subdivision road. In
response, the Consings submitted a revised subdivision plan. CFI
Decision Santos was fully justified in refusing to pay further her
monthly amortizations because although Consing submitted a revised
plan and may have corrected irregularities and/or have complied with
the legal requirements for the operation of their subdivision, he
cannot escape liability to Santos for having sold to her portions of the
roads or streets denominated as right-of-way.
Contention of Consing: CA did not comply with the certification
requirement.
Purpose of certification requirement:
To ensure that all court decisions are reached after consultation
with members of the court en banc or division, as the case may be
To ensure that the decision is rendered by a court as a whole, not
merely by a member of the same
To ensure that decisions are arrived only after deliberation,
exchange of ideas, and concurrence of majority vote
Held: The absence of certification does not invalidate a decision. It is
only evidence for failure to observe the requirement. There could be
an administrative case on the ground of lack of certification.

Prudential Bank vs. Castro [A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988]
On November 16, 1984, respondent Regional Trial Court Judge Jose P.
Castro of Quezon City rendered a decision in Civil Case No. Q-42349,
entitled: "Macro Textile Mills Corporation vs. Prudential Bank and
Trust Co., et al.,"
Acting on the letter-appeal, dated June 6, 1988, filed on behalf of
respondent Judge by his children, seeking clarification of the Decision
of June 5, 1986, on whether or not the Order of this Court forfeiting
all of said Judge's retirement benefits and pay "exclude the monetary
value of his accumulated leave credits which he earned during his
thirty six (36) years of service in the government, the last eleven (11)
years of which were spent in the Judiciary," and praying that the same
be so excluded considering their need for funds for the continuing
medication of respondent Judge, now afflicted with liver cancer on its
terminal stage, the Court RESOLVED, out of humanitarian
considerations, and following the precedent in Cathay
"WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES:
" Respondent Judge is hereby ordered dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities. He may, however, enjoy all vacation and sick
leave benefits that he has earned during the period of his government
service. This decision is immediately executory."
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION
MUST CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION THAT THE CASE HAS
BEEN REACHED IN CONSULTATION DOES NOT APPLY TO
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES.
The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of
the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice
that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of
the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification requirement refers to
decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very
beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases
have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a
certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by
their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the

collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No. R510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok,"
cited in the Petition, is but an oversight.
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that
the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after
consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that.
Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a
whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be
assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is
obviously not required.

Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio [GR 186652, October 6, 2010]

Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials
including its Corporate Secretary, herein respondent. Petitioner denies the
allegations.
The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the
Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that
there was no showing of any reversible error.
The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents
petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the
facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of
the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based).
Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the
requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution applies only to
decisions of courts of justice, and it does not extend to decisions or
rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ.
Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to
courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as
to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.
Issue: 1. Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power.
2. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1. No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making
powers. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding,
but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the
guilt of innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the
determination whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasicourt, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused.
2. No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or
resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a
quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.
Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to
resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.

Macario Tayamura vs IAC [G.R. No. 76355, May 21, 1987]

** In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional
requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts
and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions
disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states
that, "No petition for review . . . shall be refused due course . . . without
stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution).
When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent
pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due
course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some
other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.
MINUTE RESOLUTION DOES NOT NEED TO BE SIGNED BY THE
JUSTICES NOR TO CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION REQUIRED UNDER
SECTION 13, ART VIII.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court
who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the
certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to
sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its
resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions
more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be
more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of
decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use
of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases
coming to it. Remedial legislation to meet this problem is also pending in
Congress.
In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the full time and
attention of its Clerks of Court and other key officials. Its officers do not
have the time to answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntled litigants
questioning decisions and resolutions of the Court and involving cases
deliberated upon and resolved by the Court itself. As earlier stated, all
resolutions and decisions are actions of the Court, not its subordinate
personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility for all its acts. Its
personnel cannot answer and should not be made to answer for acts of the
Court.

Nicos Industrial Corp. vs. CA [G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992]
FACTS: The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground
that it violates the aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8
Section
14
of
the
Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision
and does not clearly and
distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners co
mplain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their
21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement
that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the
derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for
the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of
Appeals.
January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of
P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and
to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels
of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the
supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July
11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original
date
for
the
auction
was
changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.
CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court
a quo while leaving much to be desired, substantially complies with the
rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial courts decision is unconstitutional
HELD: WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10,
for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986,
conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the
Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with
law.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION MUST
STATE CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH IT IS BASED IS AN ADDITIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE
PROCESS.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be
informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just

leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached
and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint
the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
In one case, this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a
decision rife with irrelevant details, castigated the trial judge for his
"extraordinary verbiage." Kilometric decisions without much substance
must be avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is
also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less unacceptable either. The ideal
decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the
factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its ruling and,
having done so, ends.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE
EXEMPTED FROM THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT.
It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision
does not apply to interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for
postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions
on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental
matters."
As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have already
observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that
The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute
resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a
case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are
factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported
by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case
and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that
the petitions were filed merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution
denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the
legal basis.
The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the
time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or
minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on
its evaluation of a case.
DISMISSAL ON LACK OF JURISDICTION DOES NOT REQUIRE A
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS
BASED, BUT WHEN DISMISSAL IS COUPLED WITH OTHER

GROUNDS LIKE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, THE COURT MUST

COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not
considered a judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the
aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this established principle.
However, the rule would be applicable only if the case is dismissed on the
sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some other additional
ground is invoked.
A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was
dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the
insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale.
Regarding this second ground, all the trial court did was summarily
conclude "from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that the sheriff's
sale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act
3135." It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain
why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Its
conclusion was remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable
trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the
ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits,
the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.

Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA [G.R. No. 114323, July 23,
1998]
FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment
rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner,
against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and
controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a
private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.
The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted
from the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well
cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite
petitioners several demands. The petitioner then informed the private
respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to
Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration
shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in
favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the
petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of
the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the
arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the
respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's
objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to
the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the
petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay
the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned
judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action.
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court
concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have
jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court
could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the
contract.
RULING: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the

law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum

decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in
the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and
executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in
this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply
because our rules provide otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of
the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED
MEMORANDUM
DECISION
IS
ALLOWED
UNDER
THIS
JURISDICTION.
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum
decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco v.
Permskul, this Court held that the following memorandum decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the requirements of
Section 14 Article VIII of the Constitution:
"MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of
this case, this Court hereby adopts reference the findings
conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that
there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.
"WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in
toto." (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier
case of Romero v. Court of Appeals, where the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals adopted the findings and disposition of the Court of
Agrarian Relations in this wise:
"We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a
re-assessment of the same, and We are persuaded, nay
compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial court's factual
findings and the soundness of its conclusion. For judicial
convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt by way
of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a

spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision."

(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if
only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is
particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy
and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this
case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single spaced
pages.
THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION APPLY ONLY
TO PHILIPPINE COURTS, BUT NOT TO FOREIGN COURTS.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has
held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or
the internal law of the forum. Thus, if under the procedural rules of the
Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by
adopting the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect.
In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an
Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the
necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate
the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

Borromeo vs. CA [G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990]

NATURE: Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS: Before 1933, defendant [Jose A. Villamor] was a distributor of lumber
belonging to Mr. Miller who was the agent of the Insular Lumber Company in
Cebu City. Defendant being a friend and former classmate of plaintiff [Canuto O.
Borromeo] used to borrow from the latter certain amounts from time to time. On
one occasion, defendant borrowed from plaintiff a large sum of money for which
he mortgaged his land and house in Cebu City to pay some pressing obligation
with Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller filed a civil action against the defendant and attached
his properties including those mortgaged to plaintiff, inasmuch as the deed
of mortgage in favor of plaintiff could not be registered because not properly
drawn up. Plaintiff then pressed the defendant for settlement of his obligation,
but defendant instead offered to execute a document promising to pay his
indebtedness even after the lapse of ten years. Liquidation was made and
defendant was found to be indebted to plaintiff in the sum of P7,220.00, for
which defendant signed a promissory note therefor on November 29, 1933 with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum, agreeing to pay as soon as I have money'.
The note further stipulate that defendant 'hereby relinquish, renounce, or
otherwise waive my rights to the prescriptions established by our Code of Civil
Procedure for the collection or recovery of the above sum of P7,220.00. * * *
at any time even after the lapse of ten years from the date of this instrument'.
After the execution of the document, plaintiff limited himself to verbally
requesting defendant to settle his indebtedness from time to time. Plaintiff
did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the
execution of the document as there was no property registered in defendant's
name, who furthermore assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of
ten years. After the last war, plaintiff made various oral demands, but defendants
failed to settle his account. CFI: Villamor ordered to pay Borromeo (represented
by his heirs) the sum of P7,220.00 within ninety days from the date of the receipt
of such decision with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the expiration
of such ninety-day period. CA: reversed CFI ruling
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the ruling of the CFI in finding
the lack of validity of the stipulation amounting to a waiver in line with the
principle "that a person cannot renounce future prescription"
HELD: YES! Between two possible interpretations, that which saves rather than
destroys is to be preferred.
It is a fundamental principle in the interpretation of contracts that while
ordinarily the literal sense of the words employed is to be followed, such is not
the case where they "appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the
contracting parties," which intention shall prevail (Art. 1370). The terms,
clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order (in this case the
contested stipulation) should be separated from the valid and legal contract
when such separation can be made because they are independent of the
valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties.

-MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE ALLOWED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of
the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are
factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial
evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws,
where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the
early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal
basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta (148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987],
"[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a
legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" (Italics supplied). This
is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly,
discharge its constitutional functions. The Court ordinarily acts on the incidents
or basic merits of three hundred (300) to four hundred (400) cases through its
three Divisions every Monday and Wednesday when the Divisions meet and on
one hundred (100) to one hundred twenty (120) cases every Tuesday and
Thursday that it meets en banc or around one thousand (1,000) cases a week. It
is only on Fridays and week-ends that the members of the Court work in their
separate chambers or at home because the Court does not meet in session
either in Divisions or En Banc.
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are
promulgated by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of
sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the
resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the
parties of the action taken on their cases by quoting the resolution adopted by
the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All
decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely
transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case G.R. No. 56280,
"Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.", where, in a resolution dated
July 6, 1981, the Court said "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or
dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the
result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does
not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court
or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is
denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or
order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."
In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement
that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it
is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall
under the constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for review . . .
shall be refused due course . . . without stating the legal basis therefor" (Section
14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a petition

and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to

deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual
or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some
other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
MINUTE RESOLUTION DOES NOT NEED TO BE SIGNED BY THE
JUSTICES NOR TO CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION REQUIRED UNDER
SECTION 13, ART VIII.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who
took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the
Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued
would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of
their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of
Court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and
the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even
with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the
backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of
cases coming to it. Remedial legislation to meet this problem is also pending in
Congress.
In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the full time and
attention of its Clerks of Court and other key officials. Its officers do not have the
time to answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntled litigants questioning
decisions and resolutions of the Court and involving cases deliberated upon and
resolved by the Court itself. As earlier stated, all resolutions and decisions are
actions of the Court, not its subordinate personnel. The Court assumes full
responsibility for all its acts. Its personnel cannot answer and should not be
made to answer for acts of the Court.

Valdez vs. CA [G.R. No. 85082, February 25, 1991]

This is a case of double sale of real property where both vendees registered the sales with the Register of Deeds and
each produced their respective owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title to the property.
Spouses Francisco Ante and Manuela Ante were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at 20th Avenue,
Murphy, Quezon City, with an area of approximately 625.70 square meters as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 141582 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Said spouses executed a special power of attorney in
favor of their son, Antonio Ante, a lawyer, authorizing him to execute any document conveying by way of mortgage or sale
a portion or the whole of said property, to receive payment and dispose of the same as he may deem fit and proper under
the premises.
Antonio Ante offered to sell the lot to Eliseo Viernes, who was occupying the same with the permission of Ante. Viernes,
however, turned down the offer as he did not have money. Antonio Ante then told Viernes that he will instead sell the
property to Pastor Valdez and Virginia Valdez.
Antonio Ante had the said lot subdivided into Lot A with an area of 280 square meters and Lot B with an area or 345.70
square meters, each lot having its corresponding technical description.
On June 15, 1980, Antonio Ante, as attorney in fact, executed a deed of sale of Lot A in favor of spouses Pastor Valdez
and Virginia Valdez, for and in consideration of the amount of P112,000.00
On February 12, 1987, in the same capacity, Antonio Ante sold to said Valdez spouses, Lot B for the amount of
P138,000.00.
The Valdez spouses demanded from Antonio Ante the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 covering
said two (2) lots. Ante promised them that he will deliver the title to them in a few days.
In the meanwhile petitioners started fencing the whole lot with cement hollow blocks in the presence of spouses Eliseo
and Felicidad Viernes. Except for the gate, it took them two weeks to finish fencing the whole lot. On said occasion the
Viernes spouses were informed by the Valdez spouses that they were fencing the same as they purchased the land from
Antonio Ante.
As Ante failed to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate of title demanded by the Valdez spouses, the latter filed their
affidavit of adverse claim over the subject lot with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on September 6, 1982 as the
vendees of the property.
Upon inquiries made, the Valdez spouses learned that Antonio Ante had delivered the owner's duplicate certificate of title
as a collateral to one Dr. Camilo Garma of Purdue Street., Cubao Quezon City to secure his rentals in arrears in the
amount of P9,000.00. On September 13, 1983, upon the prodding of the Valdez spouses, Antonio Ante wrote to Dr. & Mrs.
Garma to request them to entrust the owner's duplicate copy of the title of the questioned lot to the Valdez spouses with
the assurance that Ante will pay his indebtedness to them. The Garma spouses turned over to the Valdez spouses the
said owner's duplicate certificate of title after said Valdez spouses paid for the obligation of Antonio Ante to the Garma
spouses.
The Valdez spouses then proceeded to register the two deeds of sale dated June 15, 1980 and February 12, 1981 7 with
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City by presenting the owner's duplicate copy of the title. They were, however, informed
that the said owner's duplicate certificate of title had been declared null and void per order of Judge Tutaan dated
November 10, 1982. They also found out that spouses Francisco and Manuela Ante earlier filed a petition for the issuance
of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title and to declare null and void the lost owner's duplicate certificate of title.
The Valdez spouses also discovered that the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 141582 and in lieu thereof issued TCT
No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes on the basis of a deed of assignment of the same property dated February
17, 1982 executed by Antonio Ante in her favor.
When Virginia Valdez inquired from Antonio Ante why he executed the said deed of assignment when he had previously
sold the same lot to them, Ante replied that they could sue him in court.
Thus, the Valdezes filed their adverse claim over the lot covered by TCT No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes.
They filed the complaint in Barangay office of San Roque, Quezon City against Felicidad Viernes but as no amicable
settlement was reached, the Valdezes filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking among others,
that the order dated November 10, 1982 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City authorizing the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate certificate of title in the name of Francisca Ante be declared null any void; that the deed of assignment
dated February 17, 1982 executed by Antonio Ante in favor of Felicidad Viernes be cancelled and revoked; that TCT No.
293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be cancelled and declared null and void;
that the Register of Deeds of Quezon City be ordered to reinstate, revalidate and give full force and effect to the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 in the name of spouses Francisco and Manuela Ante and declare petitioners as the
true and lawful owners of the property; ordering respondents Viernes and all persons claiming right under them to vacate
the property, and to pay damages and costs to petitioners.

After trial on the merits before which the Antes were declared in default, a decision was rendered by the trial court on April
9, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the complaint is dismissed as against defendants Vierneses, and defendants Antes are hereby
ordered to pay to plaintiff, as prayed for in their complaint, as follows:
Defendant Antes are hereby ordered to pay actual damages in the amount of P250,000.00 to plaintiffs.
Defendants Antes are hereby ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00.
Defendants Antes, are hereby ordered to pay P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied therewith the Valdezes interposed an appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a
decision was rendered on September 12, 1988, affirming in toto the appealed decision, with costs against the appellants.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Valdezes ------------An examination of the decision of the trial court dated April 9, 1986 shows that there are no findings of facts to serve as
basis for its conclusions. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates as follows:
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also provides clearly as follows:
Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments. All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by
him, and filed with the clerk of the court. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is the reason why this Court, through Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988, reminded all judges "to
make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the
evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced."
Of course, when a petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court is denied due course, or is
otherwise denied, it is not necessary that such findings of facts be made. However, the denial must state the legal basis
thereof.
In the present case, the three-paged decision of the trial court contained in the first two pages a statement of the
allegations of the pleadings of the parties and enumerates the witnesses presented and the exhibits marked during the
trial. Thereafter, the trial court arrived at the following conclusion:
After considering the evidence on record, this Court finds that plaintiff have failed to prove their case as against
defendant Felicidad Viernes, but proved their case against defaulted defendants Antes. The Court finds that there is no
sufficient proof of knowledge or bad faith on the part of defendant Vierneses, and on the basis of existing
jurisprudence, a third person who in good faith purchases and registers a property cannot be deprived of his title as
against plaintiff who had previously purchased same property but failed to register the same
THE DECISION SHOULD NOT ONLY MAKE A CONCLUSION OF LAW, BUT SHOULD STATE THE FACTS AND THE
APPLICATION OF THE LAW. This is not what is contemplated under the Constitution and the Rules as a clear and
distinct statement of the facts on the basis of which the decision is rendered. The foregoing one-paragraph statement
constitute a mere conclusion of facts and of law arrived at by the trial court without stating the facts which serve as the
basis thereof. Indeed the conclusion of fact therein that petitioners had not registered the sale to them is traversed by the
records which show on the contrary, petitioners earlier registered the sale to them. The court statement in the decision
that a party has proven his case while the other has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the Constitution and
the rules to be clearly and distinctly stated.
Unfortunately, the appellate court overlooked this fatal defect in the appealed decision. It merely adopted the alleged
findings of facts of the trial court. Although it made some findings on how the deed of assignment in favor of respondent
Viernes came about, it is far from complete and is hardly a substantial compliance with the mandate aforestated.
As it is now, this Court has before it a challenged decision that failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts on which it is
predicated. This Court has said again and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual findings of the
lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. But as it is, in this case, the Court has to wade through the
records and make its own findings of facts, rather than further delay the disposition of the case by remanding the records
for further proceedings.

Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 127682, April 24,
1998]
Before the Court is pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of petitioner
and denominated as a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of September 10, 1997. This
resolution does not in the least depart from or enervate the specific
prohibition against second motions for reconsideration [1] Which are
applicable thereto. Considering however, the increasing practice by
defeated parties of conjuring scenarios which they blame for their debacle
instead of admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court is
constrained to once again express its displeasure against such unethical
disregard of the canons for responsible advocacy, with the warning that
this insidious pattern of professional misconduct shall not hereafter be
allowed to pass with impunity.
Indeed, petitioner has gone to the extent of attributing supposed errors
and irregularities in the disposition of this case to both the Court of
Appeals and this Court, with particular allusions amounting to misconduct
on the part of counsel for respondent private corporation and with specific
imputations against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla in connection therewith.
These will hereafter be discussed in light of the records of this Court and
the vigorous disclaimer of counsel for said private respondent.
Petitioner's unbridled remonstrations are directed at the fact that its
petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision of respondent
Court of Appeals[2] was denied by this Court for failure to sufficiently show
that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned
judgment.[3] This was arrived at after due consideration by the Second
Division of this Court of the merits of the challenged decision and the
extended resolution of respondent court denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration thereof, the arguments of petitioner in his present petition
for review on certiorari, the joint comment of respondents, the reply of
petitioner, and the joint rejoinder of respondents, as well as the respective
annexes of said pleadings. Indeed, the parties had all the opportunity to
expound on and dissect the issues in this case, and in some instances even
the non-issues, through the liberal admission by this Court of such
pleadings.
Petitioner then filed a 24-page motion for reconsideration, and this Court
required respondents to comment thereon, after which petitioners reply
filed without leave was nonetheless admitted, and to which, on leave
sought and granted, respondents filed a joint rejoinder. All these pleadings,
just like those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, were so extensive, to
the point of even incorporating new and modified issues, as to cover all

possible aspects of the case to subserve the partisan views of the parties.
Since no additional and substantial arguments were adduced to warrant
the reconsideration sought, the Court resolved to deny the motion on
January 26, 1998.[4]
It defies explanation, therefore, why petitioner would still insist that the
parties should further have been allowed to file memoranda, an obvious
ploy to justify a resolution giving due course to its petition, while
simultaneously insinuating that its pleadings were not read. Indeed,
petitioner would even dictate how this Court should have acted on its
petition, with the improbable theory that because the case had progressed
to the rejoinder stage, the petition must be given due course and a decision
be rendered thereafter in its favor. This it tries to buttress by the palpably
erroneous submission that since respondent court reversed the decision of
the court a quo, this Court is duty bound to determine the facts involved.
Firstly, this is a deliberate misstatement of our jurisprudence which merely
holds that, in such a case, this Court may at its option review the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals instead of being bound thereby. Secondly,
and worse for petitioner, there is no conflict in the factual findings of the
two lower courts as the Court of Appeals actually adopted the findings of
fact of the trial court.
In its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner now tries a different
tack by lecturing this Court on its theory that the minute resolutions it
assails are supposedly in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the present
Constitution. In characteristic fashion, it insinuates that such procedure
adopted by this Court is a culpable constitutional violation and can be
subject of impeachment proceedings. Petitioner is, of course, free to
believe and act as it pleases just as this Court may likewise be minded to
take the appropriate sanctions, for which purpose it would do well for all
and sundry to now imbibe the consistent doctrines laid down by this Court.
MINUTE RESOLUTIONS. As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al, it has been stressed that these "resolutions" are not "decisions"
within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers
have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial since,
for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals' decision.
This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al., and further clarified in Munal
vs. Commission on Audit, et al. that the constitutional mandate is

applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and
after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor
stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on
a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the
petition and states that the questions raised "are factual or there is no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.

Mendoza vs. CFI [G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973]

Facts: In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title. During
pendency of the application before the land registration court, Mendoza
sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The contract of sale was admitted in court in
lieu of the pending application for land title. The registration court
rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering the registration of the two
parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of
Mendoza.
The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of
Cruz to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name
of Cruz be cancelled. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza
on the ground that the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land
title to Cruz who was not a party to the application of title initiated by
Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.
ISSUE: Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a third
party.
HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. First of all, it
was proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz
pursuant to their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks Section 29
of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of
the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the
buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an
instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the
application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the
decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the
land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto
shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any time before
issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had
been made. The interested party may, however, present such instruments
to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the
register of deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered in
relation with the application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall
order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a said
instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the
buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said
instruments. . . .
A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration
proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument
be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion

that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that
prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and
circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have
been complied with in this case.
Dissenting Opinion (Justice Aquino):
It is not lawful and just that the two lots in litigation should be registered
in the name of Daniel Cruz. The registration in his name is not proper
because he did not intervene in the land registration proceeding; he did
not defray the expenses thereof, and he has not paid to Generoso Mendoza,
or his widow, Diega de Leon, the sum of P6,000 as the price of the parcel of
land.
-MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF STATEMENT OF FACTS
AND LAW.
That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration
objecting to our dismissing the petition through a minute resolution. It is
his contention that there should be an extended decision. As noted at the
outset, reliance is had on the constitutional provision requiring a decision
by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, what is
expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear why
either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established.
Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy
the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular
judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no
sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being
considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs."
What must then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in
the early case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, the decision
spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the
proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon
which its disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v.
Henares, the above decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following: "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as
another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement
of the facts and the law on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on
Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions have been
held to refer only to decisions of the merits and not to orders of the trial
court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar."

It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a

grievance. For if the situation is subjected to a searching analysis, it cannot
be denied that what is really involved is just a mere incident in the
prosecution of petitioner. Had he prevailed, he would have been entitled to
provisional liberty. Under the circumstances, as the facts of the case clearly
demonstrate, with the plea for habeas corpus being unavailing, we felt that
a minute resolution which certainly would require less time than a fullblown decision, was not inappropriate.
Precisely, the leniency shown the parties to dwell at length on their
respective contentions should disprove any suspicion that the decision
arrived at was reached without according the parties the fundamental
fairness to which they are entitled under the Constitution. Since, at the
most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way, foreclose the
ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we
deemed that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for
application. In that sense, a minute resolution certainly cannot be
stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a constitutional command.

Francisco vs. Permskul [G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989]

An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which
started out as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question
squarely presented to the Court is the validity of the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the
private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of
P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent
deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid
rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by
reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent
vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his deposit
minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten
days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner
rejected this request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges,
including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for
repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original
condition. 1
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati.
After the submission of position papers by the parties, a summary
judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining the complainant
and holding that the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant
was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the
balance of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity charges.
The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney's fees,
plus the Costs. 2
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was
affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was done in
a memorandum decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the
records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch
63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in
toto. 3
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review
was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for
reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. 4 He is now before us to fault the
respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of
the regional trial court. His contention is that it violates Article VIII,

Section 14 of the Constitution.

This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefor.
Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present
charter, Section 14 has been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The
provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has
been virtually restored to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to
apply to all courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose has always
been the same, viz., to inform the person reading the decision, and
especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after
consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.
According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by the
regional trial court should be revoked for non-compliance with the abovequoted constitutional mandate. He asks that the case be remanded to the
regional trial court for a full blown hearing on the merits, to be followed by
a decision stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. For his part, the private respondent demurs. He justifies
the memorandum decision as authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the
ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals, 6 Which sustained the
said law.
REQUIREMENTS
DECISIONS.

FOR

THE

VALIDITY

OF

MEMORANDUM

It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually

reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below,
it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above provision. The
distinctive features of the memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered
by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by reference the findings
of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling
under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it
is not impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by the lower court
may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate,
the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid
the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or
portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid
having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or
conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted
anyway.

That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the
following requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section
40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot
incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower
court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged
decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it
must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In
other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P.
Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law
of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part
of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no
study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was
merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on
which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should
suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course,
also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with,
comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or
adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum
decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for
judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind of
decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main
accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there are
no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be
employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases,
where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the
time needed to dismiss it.