1

Single-Pole Operation Leads to Hazardous OverVoltage on Adjacent Lines

Mukesh Nagpal, Terry Martinich, Ska-Hiish, Tyler Scott, Gurinder Hundal and Apollo Zhang

BC Hydro, BC, Canada

AbstractBC Hydro recently developed a radial 287 kV

Northwest Transmission system which includes a long (340 km)
line. After the terminal station it connects to two shorter lines.
Short time after when the system went into the service, the long
line experienced multiple line-to-ground faults due to icing and it
led to single-phase trip protection and auto-reclose operations.
During open-pole condition phase duration, the floating phase on
the short lines experienced unsafe over-voltages causing
transformer and reactor protection trips. This paper will use
disturbance records to explain the sequence of events and present
the detailed waveform analysis. It was found that the sensitive
phase-to-phase fault protection operated on the shunt reactor.
The transformer protections operated on excessive magnetizing
current due to the differential restraint element fifth harmonic
currents dropping below the setting threshold (35% on three
phases). It appeared that the harmonic restraint dropped on
higher voltage due to excessive saturation causing flux to transfer
from transformer core to tank. The disturbance has been
simulated with EMTP and this helped to identify the causes of
the over-voltage. The paper will also discuss the simulation
results and some recommend solutions to avoid re-occurrence of
the over-voltages problem.
Index Terms Single-Pole Operation, Temporary OverVoltage, Transformer over-excitation

I. INTRODUCTION
he BC Hydro transmission system, in a remote corner of
the province, had a sizeable addition brought into service
near the end of 2014. To spur economic activity in the region a
series of new transmission lines were constructed to
accommodate both non-utility generation and large industrial
loads. The main 287 kV transmission line to the area is very
long and had significantly more faults than anticipated in
months following the first energization. The protection
systems had been very dependable during all the faults in the
initial months and in the time since then as well. The security
of the relaying system has also been quite good. It was tested
though under a severe unintended operating condition for a
fault that occurred on January 7th 2015. This paper outlines
how multiple faults that day left the system in the unintended
operating configuration. This condition resulted in
approximately 1.7 pu voltage at multiple substations. Next the
paper will discuss how protection relaying in the region
responded while the system was operating in a critical state.
Three protection relays operated while there was no fault

Submitted September 2015

Mukesh Nagpal e-mail BC Hydro, Burnaby, BC V3N 4X8, Canada
Mukesh.Nagpal@bchydro.comm

within their protection zones. The paper includes detailed

steady-state and high frequency analysis to re-create the
conditions witnessed in the field. Finally, the paper will briefly
describe potential remedies to prevent further abnormal
conditions in the system.
II. BC HYDRO SYSTEM
BC Hydro, the third largest utility in Canada, possesses
major hydro-electric generation assets. These resources,
primarily located in the northern (Peace River) region of the
province and in the south eastern (Columbia River) region, are
remote from the south-west corner of the province where most
of the demand for electricity is concentrated.
A. Northwest Transmission System
Figure 1 shows geographic one-line diagram of the
Northwest Transmission System (NTL). It consists of a new
287-kilovolt (kV), 340 km long transmission line, 2L102,
connecting the existing BC Hydro Skeena (SKA) Substation
near Terrace with a new substation Bob Quinn (BQN) near
Bob Quinn Lake.
The system was expanded to provide a secure
interconnection point for clean generation projects via 39 km
long 287 kV transmission circuit 2L379. The three connected
non-utility generating clusters are Forrest Kerr (FKR), and
Volcano Creek (VOL), all on the Iskut River near Forrest Kerr
Creek, north of Stewart in northwestern BC. The total output
from these clusters would be 305 MW from run of river
generation units. These generators supply clean electricity to
support development in the area.
The system is also serving the industrial and residential load
via a three terminal 287 kV 110 km long transmission line
2L374. The transmission system one - line diagram including
existing BC Hydro northern region transmission network, the
NTL, new Bob Quinn substation and IPP generation and
transmission system is shown in Figure 2. The area can now
reduce greenhouse gas emission by enabling communities now
relying on diesel generation to connect to the BC Hydro
transmission grid as well.
B. Detail of a 287 kV Line in Northwest System
Figure 3 shows a simplified one-line diagram showing
circuit 2L102, which was involved in the incident. As shown
in Figure 1, this line is the only transmission path between
Skeena (SKA) Substation and Bob Quinn (BQN) switching
stations. The line is 340 km long and is fully transposed. There
is an optical ground wire (OPGW) cable run between the tops
of high voltage electricity towers. The optical fiber within the

2
cable is used for high speed protection and SCADA functions.
Tower construction, conductor data along with the line
parameters determined from the construction data are listed in
Appendix I. There is 35% series compensation at the BQN end
of line and 72% positive sequence shunt compensation using
two reactors at SKA and one at BQN. The shunt reactors at
SKA (2RX1 & 2RX2) are fixed and the one at BQN
(2RX231) is switchable.
2L102 is protected by modern microprocessor-based relays
with a high speed, sub-cycle, current differential scheme. The
line breakers are rated as having a three cycle interrupt time.
Therefore overall fault clearing time is less than four cycles
for all bolted faults. This speed is within the performance
target specified in NTL system planning studies.

Figure 2: Northern Region BC Hydro Transmission System

One-Line Diagram.
To maintain the system stability, single-shot high speed
automatic reclose is attempted after line trips. The reclose
scheme is designed to initiate single-pole trips for singlephase-to-ground faults and three-pole trips for all multi-phase
faults. The SKA bus is the lead or master end for auto-reclose
and the associated breakers 2CB7 and 2CB8 are equipped with
point-on-wave (POW) closing to minimize the line pickup
transients. 2CB7 is the first breaker to close followed by
2CB8. The BQN bus is the follow end with 2CB3 closing first
and 2CB4 closing second.
Figure 1: BC Hydro Northwest Transmission System
Geographical Map.

Figure 3: Simplified 2L102 One-Line Diagram NTL

System.
III. EVENT DESCRIPTION
This section is divided into two subsections. The first
section describes a series of incidents which includes five
individual faults at different times and the nature of these
faults. The events with time stamps are listed in sequence in
Table 1. The second subsection focuses specifically on the
fifth event. During this event the entire system north of BQN
experienced significant over-voltage on one phase. The
subsection presents detailed analyses of the waveforms
recorded by the high speed digital fault recorders during this
incident.
A. Overview of the Incident
Table 1 lists the sequence of events for this series of events.
On 7th January, 2015 at 05:38:39 PST, the first Phase C-toground fault occurred on 2L102 about 2 km from BQN
station. The line protection responded correctly to trip singlepole (Phase C) in three cycles and executed an auto-reclose
after the one second open pole interval. The fault was caused
by an OPGW wire sagging under the heavy snow
accumulation on the wire. Since the sagging wire reduced
clearance between the phase conductor and ground wire, it
took longer for the fault to self-extinguish than expected.
Hence, the line was auto-reclosed onto a persistent fault. The
failure of auto-reclose resulted in a three-pole trip at both line

terminals (SKA and BQN). Referring to system one-line

diagram in Figure 2, 2L102 protection operation keys direct
transfer trip (DTT) to the downstream line protection relays,
2L374 and 2L379, to isolate the remote generation and
transmission customer load upon disconnection from BC
Hydro integrated system. On receipt of DTT, 2L374 tripped at
BQN terminal and RDC entrance circuit breakers. Similarly,
2L379 tripped BQN terminal as well as FKR and VOL
entrance circuit breakers. Note that RDC load remained
disconnected and 2L379 remained open-end at FKR and VOL
throughout the rest of events that morning.
A second Phase C-to-ground fault occurred at 05:44:42.732
PST; shortly after BC Hydro control center restored 2L102.
The control center had not yet restored 2L374 and 2L379.
Similar to the first event, the line tripped single-pole and then
ended up tipping three-pole trip due to the auto-reclose failure.
The third and fourth events are failed attempts to energize
2L102 from SKA station by BC Hydro control center. They
both failed due to a persistent fault on the line.
Before the fifth event, BC Hydro control center was in the
process of restoring the Northwest Transmission system. It
was restored to a point such that 2L102 was fully restored at
both ends, 2L374 energized from BQN to TAT and open
ended at RDC, and 2L379 energized at BQN but open ended
at FKR and VOL. In this system configuration, 2L102 from
SKA is the only source in the Northwest system. A Phase Cto-ground fault on 2L102 reoccurred at 06:21:21.972 PST at
the same location as the previous events - 2.8 km from BQN.
Breakers associated with Phase C of 2L102 were tripped by
the protection. Because non-utility generation was not
reconnected after the previous fault, opening of Phase C
breakers on 2L102 led to loss of source on that phase for all
three circuits in the Northwest Transmission system. In
absence of regulated source on Phase C, the voltage on that
phase in the BQN-2L374-2L379 sub-system experienced a
temporary over-voltage exceeding 1.7 pu. The high voltage
caused one shunt reactor and two transformer protections to
operate. This event is the main subject of analysis being
reported on this paper. The remaining paper will discuss
protection response during this event, analytical simulations
replicating the event and methods to avoid its reoccurrence.
B. Over-Voltage Waveforms
Figure 4 shows three phase-to-ground voltages captured by
the digital fault recorders (DFR) at the BQN bus. Phase C-toground voltage exceeded 1.6 pu within two cycles after
opening of Phase C beakers on 2L102. It is interesting to note
that, during the temporary over-voltage (TOV), Phase B-toground and the C phase-to-ground voltages are nearly 180
degrees out-of-phase. Figure 5 shows phase-to-phase voltages
which indicate that the BQN T3 delta-connected winding
between Phases B and C was subjected to the over-voltage and
saturation of that winding. This over-voltage resulted in BQN
T3 tripping in about 10 cycles after the single-phase opening.
Since BQN T3 and 2RX22 share the tripping zone, 2RX22
was disconnected from the system at the same time. This lead
to the voltage increasing yet again, this time to more than 1.7
pu. About 8.5 cycles after tripping of BQN T3 and reactor

4
RX22, TAT T1 tripped and
a
the overr-voltage starrted
2R
subbsiding.
Taable 1: Sequencce of Event on 07 January, 20
015
1

Time stamp
p
05:38:39.942
2
05:38:41.173
3

05:38:41.216
6

05:41:12.473
3
05:44:42.732
2
05:44:43.941
1

05:47:42.548
8

05:48:47.024
4
06:11:33.000
0

06:15:18.000
0
06:15:28.000
0
06:21:21.972
2
06:21:22.023
3

06:21:22.182
2

06:21:22.329
9

06:21:22.423
3

Event
2L102 initiial single-pole trip (C phase)) at
SKA and BQN
B
2L102 auto
o-reclose fail, three-pole trip
p at
SKA and BQN
B
2L102 open
n terminal logiic initiate transsfer
trips to 2L3
374 and 2L379
9
2L374 trip at BQN and RDC
R
2L379 trip at BQN, FKR and VOL
2L102 re-eenergized at botth ends
2L102 sing
gle-pole trip (C
C phase) at SK
KA
and BQN
2L102 auto
o-reclose fail, three-pole trip
p at
SKA and BQN
B
SKA 2L10
02 energization
n attempt fail due
d
to the persiistent fault
SKA 2L10
02 energization
n attempt fail due
d
to the persiistent fault
2L102 succcessful restoraation at SKA and
a
BQN
2L379 re-eenergized at BQ
QN
2L374 re-eenergized at BQ
QN and TAT
2L102 C-G
G fault initiatiion, 2.8 km fro
om
BQN
2L102 sing
gle-pole trip (C
C phase) at SK
KA
and BQN
BQN 287 kV bus C phase
p
experien
nce
over-voltag
ge (1.6 pu.)
BQN T3 PN tripped HV CBs, 2RX22 out
of service
BQN 287 kV bus C phase
p
experien
nce
higher overr-voltage (1.7 pu.)
p
TAT T1 PN
N tripped 2CB2, TAT T1 outt of
service
BQN 287 kV bus C ph
hase voltage drrop
u.
below 1 pu
BQN 2RX
X25 PN tripped
d bus CBs, BQ
QN
287 kV buss de-energized

Figure 4: The Phasee-Ground Volttages Capturedd by DFR at

BQN 2887 kV Bus.

Figure 5: The Phasee-Phase Voltaages Captured by DFR at

BQN 2887 kV Bus.

5
IV. PROTECTION AND CONTROL DESCRIPTION
In two months following Northwest Transmission system
energization, 2L102 had several phase-to-ground faults and
the protection performed correctly during all faults. Previous
sections detailed how the system ended up in an undesirable
operational state on the morning of 7th January 2015.
The following protection section will detail the protection
operations in the NTL system that morning besides the 2L102
operations. It will also discuss the protection operations that
did not occur. Section V will discuss the measures taken to
quickly take action in the protection system to reduce the
chance of a high temporary over-voltage in the future.
A. Duration of Over-Voltage Condition
The 2L102 line protection had single-phase tripping (SPT)
enabled on January 7th, which opens only the faulted phase
for any single-phase-to-ground fault. If the fault persists when
the open phase is closed (unsuccessful reclose), then the line
protection would open all phases with three-phase tripping
(3PT) logic, and send direct transfer trips to open entrance
breakers of RDC, FKR and VOL. The single-phase open
interval of the line is approximately 60 cycles (1 second). The
first phase-to-ground fault occurred at 5:38 AM and it was
persistent so, a direct transfer trip was sent to RDC, FKR, and
VOL taking them offline for the remainder of this time period.
During the 6:21 AM event 2L102 line protection detected the
single-phase-to-ground fault. During the approximately 1
second single-phase open (SPO) period, a number of addition
protection operations occurred, some unexpectedly.
B. BQN Transformer T3 Protection Operation
BQN T3 is a 10 MVA transformer with an HV delta
winding and an LV wye winding. The transformer serves a
fourth harmonic filter bank and the station service transformer
at BQN substation.
As shown in Figure 3, the voltage between Phase B and C
became very high (more 1.6 pu) during open pole period. It
saturated the delta winding of BQN T3 connected between the
two phases. Figure 6 shows the disturbance records from the
transformer differential relay. Three analog traces on top are
three-phase line currents processed by the 60-Hz digital filter
embedded in the relay. Two analog traces in the middle of the
figure are fifth harmonic frequency content relative to the
fundamental frequency in differential current measured by the
relay for the B and C phases. In bottom part of the figure,
digital traces are illustrating responses various relay elements
to the differential currents measured when the B-to-C winding
was overexcited by over-voltage. To illustrate distorted nature,
Figure 7 shows the unfiltered analog traces of the line currents
into the transformer. T3 primary (287 kV side) currents
demonstrate that, with harmonic distortion considered, these
currents were about 3 times the 20 Arms rated primary
current. Though not shown, negligible currents were coming
out of the transformer low-voltage windings confirming that
the high-side currents were transformer magnetizing currents.
In Figure 6 and Figure 7, Phase B and C line currents were
practically 180 out-of-phase which confirmed the saturation

of the B-to-C winding transformer core. There was negligible

line current in Phase A.
The magnetizing currents on high-side appeared as Phase B
and C differential or operate currents. However, the relay
operation was initially blocked for approximately three cycles
by the 2nd and 5th harmonic elements as shown by digital
traces in Figure 6. The relay was set to restrain the trip
operation when the 2nd harmonic component of the differential
current exceeded 15% of the fundamental frequency current in
one or more phase. Likewise, 5th harmonic restraint was set to
35%. Once the 2nd and 5th harmonic current content dropped
beyond their individual setting threshold, the relay tripped.
The BQN T3 tripping zone trips 287 kV circuit breakers
2CB2 and 2CB3. This protection operation also tripped reactor
BQN 2RX22 as collateral since they share a tripping zone. It
is likely that BQN 2RX22 would have eventually tripped as
well if given more time.

Figure 6: From the BQN T3 Protection Event Report,

Showing the Filtered Primary Currents.

Figure 7: From the BQN T3 Protection Event Report,

Showing the Unfiltered Transformer Magnetizing
Currents.
C. TAT Transformer T1 Protection Operation
TAT T1 is a 16.6 MVA transformer with an HV wye
winding and an LV wye winding. The transformer has a
buried delta tertiary winding. The transformer serves the small
amount of distribution load in the area at 25 kV.
TAT T1 was also exposed to high voltages well above the
knee point voltage of the saturation characteristic. T1
conducted a relatively high current for 8 cycles before its
protection tripped the transformer. From the event report, the

6
filtered primary currents are shown in Figure 8 and the
unfiltered currents appear in Figure 9. The maximum
instantaneous currents (Phase B and C) were about 170 A
peak, due to severe harmonic distortion. As a comparison, the
rated primary current is 33 Arms (47 A peak).
Like BQN T3, a high percentage of 5th harmonic current
blocked the transformer from operating instantaneously when
it began to saturate from the high voltage. This event report
also shows the 5th harmonic current dropping below 35% and
tripping shortly afterwards. Compared to BQN T3, this
transformer took nearly 8 cycles longer to saturate to the point
where 5th harmonic current dropped below the inrush
threshold.
The unfiltered event report shows that the harmonic current
started to reduce while the fundamental current increased four
cycles after the relays event report was triggered. This aligns
with the tripping of BQN T3 and RX22 and the subsequent
voltage rise that was recorded in the area. The even higher
voltage drove the TAT transformer core deeper into saturation
causing the magnetizing flux to leak out of the core and setting
up eddy currents in the non-laminated parts of transformer. As
a result, the fifth harmonic current dropped relative to the
fundamental frequency component and contributed to
transformer tripping. Similar to other transmission and
distribution transformers in BC Hydro, the transformers in the
new NTL system were neither equipped with over-voltage nor
Volt-per-Hertz protection. Trips by the differential protection
saved the transformers from possible damage.

Figure 8: From the TAT T1 Protection Event Report,

Showing the Filtered Primary Currents

Figure 9: From the TAT T1 Protection Event Report,

Showing the Filtered Primary Currents
D. BQN Reactor 2RX25 Protection Operation
BQN 2RX25 is a 20 MVA oil filled reactor. The primary
purpose of the reactor is to compensate line charging
capacitance for 2L374.
The reactor protection consists of primary high impedance
differential protection as well as primary and standby phase
and ground over-current protection. The differential protection
is able to detect phase-to-ground faults and trip
instantaneously. It is unable to detect turn to turn faults
though. We deploy two sets of over-current protection to
ensure we have redundant protection to detect turn to turn
faults with the reactor.
The reactor was subject to a 1.7 pu voltage, which translates
to a higher than 1.7 pu current due to saturation. Currents
observed during the over-voltage were 3 pu and were
sufficient to activate the inverse-time over-current protection.
Unlike the transformers discussed earlier there was no
differential current in the reactor. All current entering the
reactor left the corresponding low voltage terminal of the
reactor. This reactor has a phase over-current element set to
pick-up at 1.2 times nominal phase current with an inverse
time tripping element. It was initially assumed that this was
the element that tripped 2RX25. Upon investigating the event
reports from the protection relays it was determined that the
phase over-current element did not actually trip the reactor.
BC Hydro has devolved a specialized element to detect phaseto-phase faults deep within multi-phase reactors. A phase-tophase fault will result in an increase in phase-to-phase current
along with a corresponding decrease in phase-to-phase
voltage. Our element is looking for a 25 percent increase in
current along with and 20 percent decrease in phase-to-phase
voltage. Figure 10 is an event report for the reactor overcurrent protection. Element 50BCS is the Phase B to C overcurrent and Element 27CA is the Phase A to C under-voltage
element. Element SV5T is an 8 cycle pick-up timer required
for the phase-to-phase fault detector to operate.

7
event with filtered currents and voltages. The clearing points
of various protections are easily identified with changes in
currents and voltages at the BQN terminal.

Figure 10: From the BQN 2RX25 Protection Event Report.

The unfiltered event report in Figure 11 shows significantly
less harmonic current than either of the two transformers
experienced. More than 1.7 pu of phase-to-ground temporary
over-voltage was present at the transformer terminal at the
time of protection operation. The slope of the flux-current
characteristic of 2RX25 in the fully saturated region is
significantly higher than that of the transformer (air-core
inductance). Hence, the smaller harmonic content in the
reactor currents.

Figure 11: From the BQN 2RX25 Unfiltered Event Report.

E. Observations on Protection Operations
The operation of the protection systems helped to reduce the
severity of the over-voltage in the area. This is especially true
following the clearing of TAT T1. Figure 12 shows an
immediate decrease in voltage following TAT T1 breakers
opening.
It is also interesting to review the breaker clearing times for
these operations. The three protection operations were nearly
uniform in their breaker clearing times as shown in Figure 12.
All the breakers in this system are rated at a 2.4 cycle nominal
clearing speed. In actual operation under these conditions the
clearing time recorded by the protection relays was 6 cycles
more than double the rated time. All breakers are rated at 362
kV, but were exposed to voltages above the voltage rating. All
currents were well below the breaker rated interrupting current
of 40 kA. Higher than nominal breaker interrupting times are
expected at the lower fault currents. It must be taken into
account for breaker failure timer settings. An event report
from the BQN 2L374 protection relay nearly capture the entire

Figure 12: BQN Composite Protection Operations.

V. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
A. Simplified Steady-State Analysis
Simplified steady-state analysis for the unbalanced open
phase conditions is given in this section to estimate the natural
resonance frequency provided by the open phase condition.
When the natural resonance frequency is near the power
frequency (60Hz), it is highly possible [1-5] that this will lead
to the over-voltage phenomenon during the incident reported
in this paper.
Figure 13 shows the three-phase circuit diagram
representing BQN-2L374-2L379 sub-network. For simplicity,
there are a few assumption made to the network. They are as
follows:
Assume the healthy phase voltages (A and B) are equal
and 120 degree apart
Assume both lines are fully and properly transposed
Ignore non-linear effects, i.e. surge arrestor conduction,
transformer or reactor magnetic saturation, or corona
effects
Lump phase-to-ground capacitance and interphase
capacitance on both lines as one set of capacitance
Ignore the TAT primary to secondary coupling since the
load is very small

L g LT
L g LT

Figure 14: Simplified Thevenin Equivalent Circuit.

This simplified analysis is only for the purpose of
understanding. It does not include non-linear components
which will be considered in the following sections for more
accurate modelling and simulation.
Figure 13: Simplified BQN-2L374-2L379 sub-system with C
phase open.
The symbols used on Figure 13 are self-explanatory. The
shunt reactor 2RX25 at BQN can be represented by the shunt
inductance (Lg). The transformer TAT T1 leakage impedance
between Primary winding and Tertiary Winding can be
represented by the inductance LT. For each transmission line,
the phase-to-ground capacitance (Cg) and the inter-phase
capacitance (Cm) can be obtained from the line parameters
Positive Sequence Capacitance (C1) and Zero Sequence
Capacitance (C0):
C1 C0 , C C
g
0
3
The two transmission lines 2L374 and 2L379 are in parallel.
Therefore, their inter-phase mutual capacitance (Cm) and
ground capacitance (Cg) can be lumped together and be
represented by a total Cm and Cg.
Figure 14 (a) shows the equivalent network representation
for one open phase condition in Figure 13. It can be further
simplified by finding its Thevenin Equivalent circuit which is
shown in Figure 14 (b). The equivalent circuit is a simple LC
circuit, and the natural resonance frequency of this circuit can
be derived as follows:
Cm

f
2

1
62.6 Hz
Lg LT (C g 2C m )
Lg LT

The simplified circuit natural frequency is 62.6Hz which is

very close to the power frequency of 60Hz. With the
consideration of the transformer saturation, the leakage
impedance will become larger and hence change the resonance
frequency still closer to 60Hz. It is highly possible that the
resonance phenomenon could result in the open-pole voltage
rising above the source voltage level (1p.u.). Therefore, it
gives a general indication of how the system voltage could
possibly behave in the open pole condition.

B. EMTP Linear Analysis with and without TAT T1

To establish the dominant causes of the high over-voltages
during the 2L102 SPO period, all the nonlinear effects
(arrestor conduction, magnetic saturation, and corona losses)
are neglected; only the linear effects are simulation. Through a
process of elimination, each transformer and reactor is
removed one by one and the 2L102 SPO period is simulated.
The C phase voltages are then observed. It was determined
that TAT T1 was the dominant cause of the high C Phase
over-voltages. See Figure 15 for simulation with TAT T1 as
well as without TAT T1.
Other than the opening of 2L102 Phase C at BQN 3 cycles
after fault inception, no other switching occurs during the
simulations. For simplicity, in the simulations the small station
service load supplied from BQN T3 was neglected and the
TAT distribution load was assumed to be only 300 kW. Since
the instantaneous Phase C-to-ground voltage is of primary
interest, only that phase is plotted.
a) Linear Case with TAT T1
This case assumes the same initial conditions as on 7th
January Phase C fault near BQN and the same SPO switching
times. All shunt reactors and the BQN and TAT transformers
are in service. As can be clearly seen in Figure 15 (a), as soon
as 2L102 Phase C is disconnected at BQN, the magnitude of
the fundamental frequency voltage in Phase C of the BQNFKR-RDC system escalates dramatically, to more than 5 pu
after six cycles. This indicates the presence of a near
fundamental frequency resonance for this open-phase
condition. The Phase C voltage waveform is actually the first
part of a ring-down waveform. The waveform results from the
modulation of two frequencies, one being the power frequency
or forcing frequency and the other being the natural (or
resonant) frequency of the circuit. Capacitive and magnetic
coupling to two phases energized from the grid provides the
sustained source at power frequency. The transient resonant
response of Phase C will be shown to be close to 60 Hz.
Increasing the EMTP simulation time shows a beating effect
in the waveform where the modulation would have eventually
reached a minimum voltage (less than 1 pu) and then repeated
but with reduced magnitudes.

9
T
b) Linear Case without TAT T1
F
For this EMTP
P simulation, TAT
T
T1 (HV grounded-star
g
LV
L
groounded-star an
nd delta tertiaary) is assumeed to be out of
serrvice. The Phaase C phase-to
o-ground voltag
ge waveforms of
Figgure 15 (b) sh
how a dramattic reduction, compared to the
preeceding case, of the over-v
voltages during
g SPO. The beat
b
freequency of thee modulated waveform
w
is sim
milar to the case
witth TAT T1 an
nd BQN T3 ou
ut of service but
b the maximu
um
insstantaneous ov
ver-voltage on
nly marginally exceeds 1.0 pu.
Thhis case clearly
y demonstrates that TAT T1 must
m have play
yed
a ddominant role in
i producing th
he high temporrary over-voltag
ges
thaat occurred for the January 7, 06:21:21 SPO
O event.

The EMTP simullation of the phase-to-grouund voltages

correspoonding to the ssequence of evvents is shown aas a series of
dots sup
uperimposed onn the three ploots of the meaasured BQN
287 kV
V voltages. A
As can be seeen, the simulaated Phase C
voltage waveforms arre in good agrreement with the recorded
waveforrms. The gooddness of fit of tthe model is deetermined by
the Relaative Mean Squ
quared Error (R
RMSE), which is the square
of the eerror divided bby the RMS oof the field reccording. The
RMSE for phase A is 2.10%, for P
Phase B is 1.224%, and for
phase C is 7.39%. Thhe RMSE is used because it ccan take into
consideeration the erroor magnitude w
while consideriing the phase
offsets. In addition, thhe Pearson corrrelation coefficcients for the
field reccording and siimulation values are 0.9899, 0.9944, and
0.9673 for A phase,, B phase, annd C Phase, respectively.
Therefoore, the EMTP
P model of thee linear and noonlinear 287
kV sysstem has beenn verified annd is suitable for further
investiggations.

Figgure 15: EMTP

P Linear Analy
ysis with and without
w
TAT T1.
T

C. EMTP Non-L
Linear Analysiss with TAT T1
F
Figure 16 com
mpares the EM
MTP simulatio
on with the no
onlinnear effects to
o the recorded
d data from the digital faault
reccorder (DFR) at
a the BQN en
nd of the 2L37
79. The DFR 287
2
kV
V instantaneou
us C Phase voltage
v
(phase-to-ground) are
dissplayed in solid lines while the
t simulated values
v
are sho
own
as dotted lines. A Phase C-to-g
ground fault occcurred on 2L1
102
neaar BQN at T = 0 and the Phase C of the linee at BQN open
ns 3
cyccles later and
d SKA Phase C opens one--half cycle latter.
Wiithin 1.5 cyclees, Phase C-to
o-ground voltag
ge at BQN go
oes
intto a high TOV,, with an initiaal 2 cycles of an
a over-voltagee of
aroound 1.67 pu followed
f
by a TOV of abou
ut 1.6 pu. At T =
200 ms BQN T3
3 protection op
pens 2CB2 and
d 2CB3 and trrips
botth T3 as well as 2RX22. There is an immeediate increasee in
TO
OV on Phase C to about 1.71 pu, which peersists until TA
AT
T1 trips off.

Figure 16: EMTP Noon-linear Analyysis with TAT T1.

QN 2B5 are
The 2228kV rated ssurge arresterss 2SA25 on BQ
metal ooxide arresterrs rated IEC Class 4 withh an energy
absorptiion capability of around 10 kJ/kVr. The rrated energy
for this arrester is therrefore about 2..3 MJ. Figure 117 shows the
simulatiion of the 2SA
A25 Phase C energy accum
mulation, the
instantaaneous voltagee across the arrester, and the arrester
currentss during the S
SPO. As can be seen, the higghest rate of
energy accumulation occurs after T
T3 and 2RX222 trip off. By
the tim
me that TAT T
T1 trips off, ennding the tempporary overvoltage,, the arrester hhas absorbed 1..94 MJ, or 84 ppercent of its
capabiliity. Once a meetal oxide arreester is subjected to energy

10
abssorption abovee its rating, thee internal heatiing due to enerrgy
lossses may resu
ult in thermall runaway off the zinc ox
xide
com
mponents and the arrester faiils.

B. Lonng Term Solutioon

Analytiical studies iidentified thaat if there iis sufficient
generatiion and/or loadd in the BQN ssystem then theere is no risk
of a sevvere over-voltaage during sinngle-pole open intervals on
2L102. Faults betweenn October 2014 and January 2015 helped
to provee these results.
It waas decided thatt single-pole trripping of 2L102 would be
dynami cally controllled by monitoring real ttime system
loadingg at BQN substtation. To simpplify protectionn setting and
testing it was decideed to focus sollely on monitooring 2L379
MW infflow into BQN
N substation. A threshold of 23 MW was
chosen as this guaranntees at least ttwo generatingg units at the
NUG ar
are operating aat their full ouutput. A simplee hard wired
connecttion from the 22L379 to 2L1002 protection reelays toggles
single-ppole tripping onn and off.
EMP
PT studies anallyzing this sollution are show
wn in Figure
18. A ffurther long teerm solution is being explorred that will
possiblyy use remeedial action scheme conntrollers to
enable/ddisable single--pole tripping bbased on area ppower flows.
This maay achieve moore dependabillity than a purre protection
relay baased solution.
Advantaages:

This solutioon does not rrequire the innvestment in

additional m
major equipm
ment, is expeected to be
operational inn the least timee and at the leaast cost.

Disadvaantages:

Figgure 17: EMT

TP Simulation of BQN Surgee Arrestor 2SA
A25
Ennergy Absorptio
on.
VII. MITIGATION
N ALTERNATIV
VES
This section describes
d
the short-term, in
nterim, and lon
ngterrm over-voltagee mitigation alternatives.
A. Immediate Acction
mmediately afteer 7th January 2015 inciden
nt, 2L102 sing
gleIm
phase trip and reclose mod
de was disablled until furth
her
sollutions could be
b developed. The 2L102 reelays were sett to
tripp and auto-recllose three-polee for all detecteed faults.
Addvantages:

This solution
n prevented a repeat of the January 7th high
temporary over-voltage event with
hout additio
onal
investment in
n hardware and
d communicatiions.

Disadvantages:

Any single-lline to ground fault

f
causes a complete
c
break
kup
of the Nortthwest Transm
mission system
m, disruption and
a
loss of reveenue for the non-utility generator and Red
R
Chris Mine, loss of station service at BQN
N, as well as loss
of service to distribution cu
ustomers.

This solutioon does not detune the fundamental

resonant circcuit.

11
if tthe 2L379 terrminal breakerrs at FKR are open, this
trannsformer willl not be coonnected to the system.
Connsequently, ann operating orrder can probaably prevent
anyy problem created by the additioon of this
auttotransformer, if Alternative 2 is implementted.

V
VII. CONCLUSSIONS
A. Effeects of Single-P
Pole Tripping iin Radial Systeems
Overr-voltage mitiggation shouldd be a primaary planning
priorityy when consideering using a single-pole tripping scheme
in a reemote or radiial system. It is important for system
plannerrs to consider tthe system ressonance frequeency under a
variety of intentiional and unintentional operating
configuurations when specifying equuipment such aas line shunt
reactorss and transform
mers

TP Simulation
n of 23 MW of
o Generation on
Figgure 18: EMT
2L
L379 and Singlee-Phase Trip.
C. Equipment Replacement
R
F
For this option
n, the existing TAT
T
T1 would
d be replaced by
b a
dellta-grounded star
s
transformeer, the same as BQN T3. As
dessigned, single--line to ground
d faults on 2L102 would ressult
in SPO and all otther faults wou
uld result in 3PO
O.
Addvantages:

This option detunes

d
the ressonance and sh
hifts it to 53 Hzz.

During SPO
O, the voltagee waveforms on the 287 kV
system wou
uld be similar to Case 6, having
h
negligiible
temporary ov
ver-voltage.

A STATCO
OM that wou
uld reduce thee power quallity
problem in the distributio
on voltages at TAT during the
period of thee SPO

Disadvantages:

There could be a power qu

uality concern. On the TAT and
a
BQN 25 kV
V systems theree will be seveere modulation
n in
two of the ph
hase-to-ground
d voltages durin
ng the 1.1 seco
ond
SPO condition. Rotating machinery
m
(e.g
g. water treatm
ment
pumps, sewaage treatment pumps,
p
etc.) co
ould be impaccted
by the oscillaating electromaagnetic torque..

The over-voltage problem may re-emerg

ge when the NU
UG
installs a new 287/69 kV
V autotransforrmer at FKR to
mont project. This transform
mer
connect the future McLym
will have a delta-conneccted tertiary winding
w
and will
w
create a simiilar problem as found for TA
AT T1. Howev
ver,

B. Effeects of Magnetiic Coupling off Equipment in Single-Pole

Trippingg Schemes
The effects of L-C
C circuit resonnance are well understood.
This paaper highlighteed that a prevviously unknow
wn magnetic
couplinng of a transforrmers buried delta tertiary w
winding was
the prim
mary cause oof the over-vooltage experiennced by the
system. This effect is not easily dem
monstrated by cconventional
networkk analysis andd highlights thee need for dettailed EMPT
studies when designning single-ppole tripping schemes
especiallly in a radiial system thaat supplies onne or more
subsysteems.

C. Prootection Systtem Operation Prevented Equipment

Damagee
Withhout the three ooperations in thhe BQN protection system
the 1.7 pu over-voltaage condition would have lasted for 60
cycles. The protectionn relays reducced the length of the overvoltage to 20 cycles. Although none of the trippeed equipment
was expperiencing an iinternal fault, all of the equippment in the
area waas experiencinng a severe ovver-voltage. Thhe protection
operatioons helped to ssave the transfo
formers, reactorrs, and surge
arrestorrs from prolonnged over-volttage. To date, none of the
effectedd equipment hhas shown lastting negative effects from
the highhlighted incideent.

D. Quiick Protection Solutions to P

Prevent System Operation
Problem
ms
Modeern multi-functtion relays havve the versatilitty to be used
in a maanner beyond tthe original inntention of relaay engineers.
Once thhe source of tthe January 7thh over-voltage was clearly
identifieed BC Hydroo was able to quickly makke protection
modificcations to restoore single-polee tripping to thhe area only
when syystem configurration will safeely allow. Thiss has allowed
time forr further studiies such as equuipment replaccement to be
conductted without im
mmediate time cconstraints.

12
VIII. APPENDIX I
A. 2L102 Construction
Figure I-1 shows a typical steel-Y type monopole tower for
this flat-configuration circuit. The average height of the
conductor above ground at the tower is 15.0 m. Each phase
comprises a bundle of two 2B-1590 KCMIL ASCR Lapwing
conductors in a 45.7 cm arrangement.

Figure I-1: 2L102 Tower Configuration

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

IX. REFERENCES
F. Iliceto, E. Cinieri and A. Di Vita, Overvoltages Due to
Open-Phase Occurrence in Reactor Compensated EHV
Lines, IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and
Systems, Vol. PAS-103, No. 3, March 1984, pp. 474-482.
Marta Val Escudero and Miles Refern, Effects of
Transmission Line Construction on Resonance in Shunt
Compensated EHV Lines, Presented at the International
Conference on Power Systems Transients (IPST05),
Montreal, Canada, June 19-23, 2005, Paper No. IPST0509.
M. Nagpal, Terry Martinich, Amitpal Bimbhra and Dave
Sydor, Damaging Open-Phase Overvoltage Disturbance
on a Shunt-Compensated 500 kV Line Initiated by
Unintended Trip, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery,
Vol. 30, No. 1, February 2015.
M. Nagpal, Terry Martinich, Amitpal Bimbhra, Dave
Sydor and Jerry Wen, Damaging Open Pole OverVoltage Disturbance Initiated by Personnel Incident,
Western Protective Relaying Conference in October 2013,
Spokane, WA, USA.
Terry Martinich, M. Nagpal and S. Manuel, Analysis of

Damaging Open-Phase Event on a Healthy Shunt

Compensated 500 kV Line Initiated by Unintended Trip,
Presented at the International Conference on Power
Systems Transients (IPST2015), Cavtat, Croatia June 1518, 2015, Paper No. 15IPST200