A STUDY ON DISASTER MANAGEMENTMUMBAI FLOOD 2005

MASTER OF COMMERCE
ACCOUNTANCY
SEMESTER II
(2015-16)

SUBMITTED BY:
AKSHATA RAVINDRA GAWAND
ROLL NO. 8
GUIDE NAME :
SHOBHA MATHEW

VIVEKANAND EDUCATION SOCIETYS

COLLEGE OF ARTS, SCIENCE & COMMERCE
Sindhi Society, Chembur , Mumbai- 400071.

A STUDY ON DISASTER MANAGEMENTMUMBAI FLOOD 2005

MASTER OF COMMERCE
ACCOUNTANCY
SEMESTER II
Submitted
In Partial Fulfillment of the requirements
For the Award of the Degree of
Master of Commerce Accountancy
By
AKSHATA .R. GAWAND
8
VIVEKANAND EDUCATION SOCIETYS COLLEGE OF
ARTS, SCIENCE & COMMERCE Sindhi Society,
Chembur, Mumbai- 400071.

VIVEKANAND EDUCATION SOCIETYS

COLLEGE OF ARTS, SCIENCE & COMMERCE
Sindhi Society, Chembur, Mumbai- 400071

CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that Shri/Miss Akshata Ravindra Gawand
M.Com.

Accountancy

Semester

II

(2015-16)

has

successfully completed the project on _A Study on Disaster

Management Mumbai Flood 2005 under the guidance of
Prof. Shobha Mathew .

Course Coordinator

Principal

Project Guide/ Internal Examiner

External Examiner

DECLARATION

I, Akshata Ravindra Gawand , the student of M. Com.

(Accountany) Semester II (2015-16) hereby declare that I have
completed this Project on A Study on Disaster Management
Mumbai Flood 2005
The information submitted is true and original to the best of my
knowledge.

_____________________
Students Signature
Akshata Gawand
8

Acknowledgement

First of all immensely and wholeheartedly I thank God and also my parents for
giving me this opportunity for successful completion of my project work . Also I
thank the management for giving us a chance for doing this course. I wish to
express my sincere thanks to all my teachers, for the continuous and creative ideas,
given during my studies and also for this project .I am deeply indebted to my
mentor,

my

guide and

my

respected

teacher

Mrs.

Shobha

Mathew, for his patience, valuable inputs, motivations toperform more better and h
is instincts support without which the project work would not have completed .I
am extremely indebted to the internet technology for the valuable help rendered to
me by providing the necessary materials and support needed for the preparation of
this project work.

Research Methodology

The information collected is from secondary data.

Secondary Sources :
Secondary data is a data which is collected and complied for
different purpose, which is used in research for the study. The secondary
data includes material collected from internet, newspaper, books and
magazines.

Executive Summary
July 26, 2005 , a day of disaster due to the heavy rains, flooding and
loss of life in Mumbai. There was flooding in many parts of India. Large
numbers of people were stranded on the road, lost their homes, and many
walked for long distance back home from work that evening. People had
lost their houses in large number. Flood had caused massive losses to the
infrastructure

and

public

utilities. In education sector more than 20000

classrooms had been damaged, and 97 school buildings had collapsed. The
banking transactions across the countries were adversely affected and many
branches

and commercial establishments were unable to function from late

evening of 26 July 2005. ATM transactions could not be carried out in several
parts of

India. For the 1st time ever, Mumbais domestic and international

airports were shut for more than 30 hours due to heavy flooding of the runways
and extremely poor visibility. The government mounted a large scale rescue and
evacuation operation in all the areas affected by floods. The food and
drinking water for all the evacuated people were arranged with the help of
NGOs and other local organization . The IAF planes and helicopters were used
for dropping food packets. The government soon resumed the distribution of
food grains through ration shops. It was distributing coupons to the people
for getting the food grains free of cost. The government was seeking to
involve the NGOs in the distribution of foodgrains. The government

decided

to provide textbooks to the children who lost them during the floods. The
Chief Minister convenced a meeting of the insurance companies and
requested them to settle insurance claims on a fast track basis. Over 25000
people were provided relief at 15 locations across the city.

Contents
Disaster
1. Introduction
2. Definition
3. Types of disaster
4. Disaster effect
5. Factors affecting disaster
Mumbai Flood 2005
6. Introduction
7. Financial effect
8. Threat to public health
9. Factors aggravating the disaster in Mumbai
10.
Damages and losses
Disaster Management in Mumbai
11.
Rescue and relief measures
12.
Recommendation of flood mitigation strategies for Mumbai
13.
Overcoming recovery implementation problems
14.
Conceptual model of the local recovery process
15.
Mitigation measures
16.
Conclusion
17.
Bibliography

Disaster:

Introduction

A disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a

society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses
and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to
cope using its own resources.
In contemporary academia, disasters are seen as the consequence of
inappropriately managed risk. These risks are the product of a combination of both
hazards and vulnerability. Hazards that strike in areas with low vulnerability will
never become disasters, as is the case in uninhabited regions.
Developing countries suffer the greatest costs when a disaster hits more than 95
percent of all deaths caused by hazards occur in developing countries, and losses
due to natural hazards are 20 times greater (as a percentage of GDP) in developing
countries than in industrialized countries.
A disaster is a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a
community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental
losses that exceed the communitys or societys ability to cope using its own
resources. Though often caused by nature, disasters can have human origins

Definition
A disaster can be defined as any occurrence that cause damage, ecological
disruption, loss of human life, deterioration of health and health services on a

scale, sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected

community or area.

Definition
Disaster is defined as a crisis situation causing wide spread damage which far
exceeds our ability to recover. Thus, by definition, there cannot be a perfect ideal
system that prevents damage, because then it would not be a disaster. It has to
suffocate our ability to recover. Only then it can be called as disaster. Disasters
are not totally discrete events. Their possibility of occurrence, time, place and
severity of the strike can be reasonably and in some cases accurately predicted by
technological and scientific advances. It has been established there is a definite
pattern in their occurrences and hence we can to some extent reduce the impact of
damage though we cannot reduce the extent of damage itself.

Types of Disaster Disasters are mainly of 2 types:

1. Natural disasters. Example earthquakes, floods, landslides, etc.
2. Man made disasters. Example war, bomb blasts, chemical leaks, etc.

Natural disaster
Natural disasters are often extreme, sudden events that are usually caused by
abrupt climatic changes and certain environmental factors. A natural disaster can
cause property damage, econimic damage or loss of life. Man has spent years
trying to find ways to predict weather patterns, but it seems that there's still a long
way to go because windstorms, earthquakes, floods, diseases, and other types of
natural disasters are still striking the earth with death tolls in the millions. Here's a
list of the top 10 natural disasters that changed the face of the world.

1.) Floods
When an expanse of water overflows, it submerges land and destroys everything
that gets in its way. This is a flood. Floods are usually caused when the volume of
water within a lake, river, or other body of water exceeds the total capacity of the
body. Sometimes, the water level rises and causes it to overflow its channel.
Worst Case:
The world has seen numerous floods throughout history, but the Yangtze River
floods were the most disastrous ever recorded. They were caused by torrential rains
and killed more than 3.7 million people in southern China.

2.) Tornadoes
Tornadoes are violent, rotating, funnel-shaped clouds that usually extend from
thunderstorms to the ground and have wind speeds of between 50 and 300 mph. A
tornados path of damage can exceed 50 miles in some cases. Some tornadoes are
clearly visible, while others are not. Similarly, there can be only one tornado at a
time or there can be a large number of tornado outbreaks along, what are called
squall lines.

Worst Case:
Tornadoes are responsible for causing an average of 70 deaths and over 1,500
injuries in the U.S. each year. The Tri-State tornado that hit Illinois, Missouri, and

Indiana in 1925 is still the deadliest tornado of all time with a death toll exceeding
695.

3.) Extreme Temperatures

Extreme temperatures caused by a heat wave or cold wave are one of many
climatological hazards. A heat wave increases the temperature in a certain region
and pushes the human body beyond its limit. The same is the case with a cold wave
that is accompanied with heavy snowfall and extreme cold, which may lead to
hypothermia.
Worst Case:
The deadliest heat wave of all time struck Europe in 2003 and led to 70,000
casualties.

4.) Avalanches
An avalanche is a geophysical hazard caused by a large amount of snow sliding
down a mountainside. It is a common sight in some mountains in winter. When an
avalanche moves towards ground level, it gains mass by amassing snow from the
snowpack and is usually at its highest speed when it gets nearer to the bottom of
the slope. An avalanche occurs when the snow packed down on the surface fails to
carry its weight. Rapid wind speed, major temperature changes, and manmade
influences are other common factors causing avalanches.
Worst Case:
The Huascarn avalanche in Peru is considered the deadliest in history it was
triggered by the 1970 Ancash earthquake and killed more than 20,000 people.

5.) Droughts
A drought occurs when a region doesn't receive enough rainfall which leads to a
severe deficiency in the water supply. When the situation persists over an extended
period, it changes the ecosystem and destroys the agriculture of the region.
Worst Case:
The Horn of Africa witnessed the worst drought in 60 years in 2011, leaving more
than 12.4 million people with limited to no food supply. Due to its impact, a
draught has to be included in the list of natural disasters.

6.) Wildfire
In the United States, over 90% of wildfires are caused when people leave
campfires unattended, discard cigarettes carelessly, etc., but long-lasting lightning
bolts can also start a fire in wild lands.
Worst Case:
The Peshtigo Fire in Wisconsin is the deadliest wildfire in U.S. history with
estimated deaths of over 2,500 people.

7.) Tsunami
Usually caused by a powerful earthquake, underwater explosions, landslides, or
volcanic eruptions under the ocean floor, a tsunami is one of the deadliest types of

natural disasters and can affect millions of people. Tsunami waves get bigger as
they approach the coast and cause tremendous damage.

Worst Case:
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami is the deadliest of all time causing about 280,000
deaths.

8.) Volcanic Eruption

A volcano is formed when magma from the earth's upper mantle moves to the
surface. It takes the form of a pool filled with molten rock. A volcano erupts when
pressure builds. This can cause hot ash flows, lava flows, lateral blasts, falling ash,
and avalanches. An erupting volcano can often trigger flash floods, tsunamis,
mudflows, earthquakes, and rock falls.
Worst Case:
Indonesia witnessed the deadliest volcanic eruption in 1815 when Mount Tambora
erupted and killed over 92,000 people.

9.) Hurricanes
Cyclones, tropical storms, typhoons, and hurricanes describe the same disaster
type. Basically, these types of natural disasters refer to a closed circulation system
in the atmosphere that consists of strong winds and low pressure. The winds rotate
clockwise in the southern hemisphere and counter clockwise in the northern
hemisphere. A tropical cyclone is usually characterized by a low-pressure center
with strong winds and spiral rain bands.

Worst Case:
Bhola cyclone that hit Bangladesh in 1970 is considered the deadliest since it
caused the deaths of over 500,000 lives.
10.) Earthquakes
Earthquakes are one of those types of natural disasters that strike without an early
warning. An earthquake is the result of the sudden break within the upper crust of
the earth, which may also break the surface and lead to the vibration of the
ground.
Worst Case:
In 2008, the 7.9 magnitude earthquake that struck Wenchuan, a county of Sichuan
Province in China was devastating and killed over 61,150 people.

Manmade disaster
Manmade disaster is a disasters that can be man made where the cause is
intentional or unintensional. All kinds of man made disasters lead to human
suffering, loss of life and long term damage to a nations economy.

Types of Manmade Disasters:

1. Nuclear disaster:

Nuclear disaster are the types of disaster that falls in this category is nuclear bomb.
When this occurs, it is often as a result of intent and the end results are even more
catastrophic with a large percentage of those involved losing their lives.

2. Chemical disasters/industrial disasters:

By their nature, the manufacture, storage, and transport of chemicals are accidents
waiting to happen. Chemicals can ne toxic,and they may react,often explosively.
The impacts of chemical accidents can be deadly, for both human being
environments.

3. Fire disasters:
Bush fires, forest fires, and mine fires are generally started by lightning, but
also by human negligence or arson. They can burn thousands of square kilometers.

4. Deforestation forest:
It is an important source for satisfying peoples demands and needs. Thus,
undoubtedly people would try to exploit forest resources. This process of
exploiting forest is called deforestation.

5. Biological disasters:

They are referred as poor mans nuclear bomb as they are easy to manufacture,
transport and have the ability to kill hundreds and thousands of people. They are
delivered using dusting airplanes or small perfumes atomizers. They have ability to
generate immediate effects.

6. Terrorism:
This is another type of disaster that results in loss of life and property. Terrorists
use violence and strike without warning. They use bombs, guns etc to terrorize
people.

7. Epidemic :
Epidemic occurs when a disesse attacks a large no of peopleat one time. It
spreads at rapid rate among human population. Most of diseases are spread after
natural disaster like tsunami, flood etc.

8. Fire accidents:
Accidents that are caused due to fire are quite common. Fire results in heavy
damage both in terms of life and property. Loss of life is high in a crowded
building.

Disaster Effects:

1. Deaths
2. Disability
3. Increase in communicable disease
4. Psychological problems
5. Food shortage
6. Socioeconomic losses
7. Shortage of drugs and medicial supplies
8. Environmental disruption

Factors affecting disaster

Host Factors
Age
Immunization status
Degree of mobility
Emotional stability

Environmental Factors

 Physical Factors
Chemical Factors
Biological Factors
Social Factors
Psychological Factors

Characteristic of disaster
1. Predictability
2. Controllability
3. Speed of onset
4. Length of forewarning
5. Duration of impact
6. Scope and intensity of impact

Mumbai flood 2005

Introduction :

The 2005 Mumbai floods refers to the flooding of many parts of

the Indian stage of Maharashtra including large areas of the metropolis Mumbai a
city located on the coast of the Arabian Sea, on the Western coast of India, in
which approximately 1,094 people died. It occurred just one month after the June
2005 Gujarat floods. The term 26 July, is now always used to refer to the day when
the city of Mumbai came to a standstill due to flooding.
Large numbers of people were stranded on the road, lost their homes, and many
walked long distances back home from work that evening. The floods were caused
by the eighth heaviest, ever recorded 24-hour rainfall figure of 944 mm (37.17
inches) which lashed the metropolis on 26 July 2005, and intermittently continued
for the next day. 644mm (25.35 inches) was received within the 12-hour period
between 8am and 8pm. Torrential rainfall continued for the next week. The highest
24-hour period in India was 1,168 mm (46.0 inches) in Aminidivi in the Union
Territory of Lakshadweep on 6 May 2004 although some reports suggest that it
was a new Indian record. The previous record high rainfall in a 24-hour period for
Mumbai was 575 mm (22.6 inches) in 1974.
Other places severely affected were Raigad, Chiplun, Khed, Ratnagiri and Kalyan
in Maharashtra and the southern state of Goa.
The rains slackened between 28 July and 30 July but picked up in intensity on 31
July. The Maharashtra state government declared 27 July and 28 July as a state
holiday for the affected regions. The government also ordered all schools in the
affected

areas

to

close

on

August

and

August. Mumbai

Police commissioner Anami Narayan Roy requested all residents to stay indoors as
far as possible on 31 July after heavy rains disrupted the city once again, grounding
all flights for the day.

Beginning:
The 2005 monsoon proved to be extremely erratic for Maharashtra. In the
beginning, a serious deficiency of rainfall, particularly in the western Vidarbha and
Marathwada, created a drought-like situation with shortage of drinking water and
fodder. The situation changed dramatically in the course of a week from July 21,
when unusually heavy rains lashed the coastal areas of konkan and Western Ghats.
It caused extensive flooding in Raigad and Ratnagiri districts, with many towns
and villages under waters. On July 26, when the highest ever rainfall recorded in
the last 100 years in the country battered the suburban Mumbai and Thane,
Maharashtra experienced one of the worst loods in its history. The downpour was
heavy in other parts of the state too, particularly in Nanded and Parbhani. Soon the
Godavari was in spate, flooding a large number of towns and villages. No sooner
did the flooding Sangli, Kolhapur, and Solapur districts.

Timeline
On 26 July 2005, around 2:00 p.m. the Mumbai Metropolitan Region was struck by a
severe storm and subsequent deluge. The Indian Meteorological Department (IMD)
station in Santacruz recorded 944 mm. of rain for the 24 hours ending 8:30 a.m. on
27 July. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai [MCGM] control room
started receiving phone calls reporting the heavy rain and subsequent water logging
in suburban areas.
Local train movement came to a halt by 2:30 p.m. due to the water logging on the
tracks. Thus caused vehicular traffic intensity on roads to increase dramatically.
Water logging and submergence of certain low lying pockets of the region such

as Dharavi, Bandra-Kurla Complex, Chunabhatti, Chembur, Ghatkopar,

Milan

Subway

and Sion either slowed down traffic, or in some areas, brought it to a complete halt.
With the sudden rush of vehicles after around 4 p.m., it took about 4 hours for a
BEST bus to reach from Churchgate to Mahim. The situation worsened when cellular
phone networks collapsed around 5 p.m. Land-lines of M.T.N.L. were also only
partially

functional.

Adding

to

the

chaos

was

the

lack

of

public

information. Radio stations and many television stations did not receive any weather
warnings or alerts by the civic agencies. The Met department blamed it on the lack
of sophisticated weather radars which would have given a 3-hour prior warning
which came due to high tides.
The Powai Lake had started overflowing at 4 p.m. and discharged 5.95 million
cubic meters of water into the Mithi River. The rainfall hydrographs of 26 & 27
July later revealed that two flood waves were generated in the streams and river
basins of Mumbai, one between 2:30 & 20.30 p.m.- coinciding with the high tide
period and another between 8 and 10 p.m. Normally, the second wave would have
harmlessly drained because of the prevalent low-tide. But that did not happen
because the accumulated water from the first flood wave had yet not flushed out
effectively during the ebb period because of a choked drainage system. The result
was that the flood situation kept on aggravating throughout the night. There was
some relief in sight only when the second ebb period commenced at 6 p.m. on 28
July.
Due to submergence of the power stations and substations, Suburban power supply
was suspended from the evening of 26 July and it was restored only after the flood
waters receded.

Thousands of school children were stranded due to flooding and could not reach
home for up to 24 hours. The following two days were declared as school and
college holidays by the state government.

Financial Effects
The financial cost of floods was unprecedented and these floods caused a stoppage
of entire commercial, trading, and industrial activity for days.
ATM Network of several banks stopped functioning.
The Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange of India, the
premier stock exchanges of India could function only partially.
Total Loss in flood upto Rs. 550 Crores

Threat to public health

The rain water caused the sewage system to overflow and all water lines were
contaminated. The Government ordered all housing societies to add chlorine to their
water tanks while they decontaminate the water supply.
Thousands of animal carcasses floated in the flood waters, raising concerns about
the possibility of disease.
Reports in the media warned of the threat of waterborne diseases, and hospitals and
health centers geared up to distribute free medicines to check any outbreak.

Effect on Mumbai's links to the rest of the world

For the first time ever, Mumbai's airports ( Chatrapati Shivaji International
Airport, Sahar and Juhu aerodrome) were shut for more than 30 hours due to heavy

flooding of the runways, submerged Instrument Landing System equipment and

extremely poor visibility. Over 700 flights were cancelled or delayed. The
airports reopened on the morning of 28 July 2005. Within 24 hours of the
airports becoming operational, there were 185 departures and 184 arrivals,
including international flights. Again from early morning of 31 July, with
increase in water logging of the runways and different parts of Mumbai, most
of the flights were indefinitely cancelled.

Rail links were disrupted, and reports on late evening of 30 July indicated
cancellation of several long distance trains till 6 August 2005.

The Mumbai-Pune Expressway, which witnessed a number of landslides, was

closed the first time ever in its history, for 24 hours.

According to the Hindustan Times, an unprecedented 5 million mobile and 2.3

million MTNL landline users were hit for over four hours.

According to the .in registrar (personal communication), the .in DNS servers
in Mumbai had to be reconfigured because the servers were not operational.

Factors aggravating the disaster in Mumbai

Antiquated drainage system:

The present storm-water drainage system in Mumbai was put in place in the early
20th century and is capable of carrying only 25 millimetres of water per hour
which was extremely inadequate on a day when 993 mm of rain fell in the city. The
drainage system was also clogged at several places.
Only 3 'outfalls' (ways out to the sea) are equipped with floodgates whereas the
remaining 102 open directly into the sea for more than 24 hours. As a result, there
is no way to stop the seawater from rushing into the drainage system during high
tide.

In 1990, an ambitious plan was drawn to overhaul the city's storm water drainage
system which had never been reviewed in over 50 years. A project costing
approximately 600crore rupees was proposed by UK based consultants hired by
the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation to study the matter. Implementation of the
project would have ensured that rainwater did not flood the streets of Mumbai. The
project was planned to have completed by 2002 and aimed to enhance the drainage
system through larger diameter storm water drains and pipes, using pumps
wherever necessary and removing encroachments. The project, if implemented
would have doubled the storm water carrying capacity to 50 mm per hour.
The BMC committee had rejected the proposed project on the grounds that it was
"too costly". These were few of the drawbacks due to which the city suffered so
gravely.

Uncontrolled, unplanned development in Northern Suburbs:

Development in certain parts of Mumbai is haphazard and buildings are
constructed without proper planning. The drainage plans in northern suburbs is

chalked out as and when required in a particular area and not from an overall point
of view.
The Environment Ministry of the Government of India was informed in the early
1990s that sanctioning the Bandra-Kurla complex (a commercial complex in northern
Mumbai) was leading to disaster. No environment clearance is mandatory for large
urban construction projects in northern Mumbai. Officials in the environment
ministry claimed that it was not practical to impose new guidelines with
retrospective effect "as there are millions of buildings".

o Destruction of mangrove ecosystems:

Mangrove ecosystems which exist along the Mithi River and Mahim Creek are being

destroyed and replaced with construction. Hundreds of acres of swamps in Mahim

creek have been reclaimed and put to use for construction by builders. These
ecosystems serve as a buffer between land and sea. It is estimated that Mumbai has
lost about 40% of its mangroves between 1995 and 2005, some to builders and
some to encroachment (slums). Sewage and garbage dumps have also destroyed
mangroves. The Bandra-Kurla complex in particular was created by replacing such
swamps. The most acclaimed Mindspace CBD (INORBIT MALL) in Goregaon &
Malad has been built by destroying a large patch of mangroves in Maharashtra.

Damages and Losses:

The Government had commenced an assessment of damages and losses caused by
floods. The details of these damages and losses were being compiled at the district-

level. All the departments had also been directed to report their losses and
damages.
Agriculture :
In agriculture sector, approximately 5.5 lakh hectares of land had suffered crop
losses. Almost the entire Kharif crop in the Konkan region had been destroyed by
the flooding. The loss to the sugarcane crop in western Maharashtra was also
extensive, which had a major impact on the production of local sugar mills.
More than 20,000 hectares of land had become waste due to the top soil having
been washed away, which would require considerable investment for being
reclaimed. Farmers could not re-sow their crops in the entire region.

Cattle Losses:
The total number of cattle losses in the floods is 15,321.

Housing:
People had lost their houses in large numbers.
District Houses Damaged-Full Cost(in lakhs)
Mumbai 2 1 0 0

Infrastructure and Public Utilities:

Floods had caused massive losses to the infrastructure and public utilities. In the
education sector, more than 20,000 classrooms had been damaged, and 97 school
buildings had collapsed. About 437 Primary Health Centers, rural hospitals, and
residential premises for health personnel had been damaged by flooding.
The Public Works Department estimated that it would require Rs. 1,200 crores for
repairing roads and bridges damaged by flooding. The Maharashtra State

Electricity Board has suffered huge losses-5,667 of its transformers were affected,
12 high-tension towers fell and 14 small distribution stations were flooded. Water
supply schemes in both the urban and rural sectors have suffered extensive
damages.

Trade and Commerce:

The most extensive loss had been suffered by the trade and commerce sector. A
large number of shops, commercial establishments, and warehouses had suffered
heavy losses due to flooding. The Indian Merchants Chamber had pegged these
losses at Rs 5,000 crores.

Financial:
The financial cost of floods was unprecedented and these floods caused a stoppage
of entire commercial, trading, and industrial activity for days. Preliminary
indications indicate that the floods caused a direct loss of about Rs, 450 crores. The
financial impacts of the floods were manifested in a variety of ways.

Disaster Management in Mumbai

Rescue and Relief Measures

The entire Government machinery along with the local offices of the MCGM
immediately got into action for the desired relief, rescue and thereafter in the

mission for restoring the city to normalcy. The Municipal machinery tried to
organize safe evacuation of people through boats and buses. The evacuated people
were sheltered in public buildings including schools and transit shelters.
Community kitchens were started and free food grains were provided by the
Government of Maharashtra [GOM] and MCGM as well as voluntary NGOs and
individuals.
The Traffic Police and Fire Brigade cleared 26,000 vehicles stranded by the
roadside on the following day. Power and water supply were restored gradually.
Train services returned to normalcy on 28 July. 24,000 animal carcasses were
disposed and more than 2 lakhs tonnes of garbage was mopped up with the help of
about 1,000 dumpers & J.C.Bs deployed from all over the State with the support of
NGOs and the Transport Commissionerate. The B.E.S.T. plied extra buses to
Mahim and Sion to facilitate movement of around 1.5 lakh stranded commuters at
the C.S.T. & Churchgate Railway Stations. The Fire Brigade and the "Rescue
Teams" of MCGM undertook 282 major and minor rescue operations of around
3,700 stranded people including rescuing school children as well as rescuing
people from 140 marooned BEST buses. Rescue boats of the Navy were
requisitioned and deployed in Kurla and Kalina.
Emergency relief arrangements were organized on a war footing. Food packets and
drinking water was arranged for the stranded people with the help of NGOs and
Social Organizations on 27 July. Over 25,000 people were provided relief at 15
locations across the city including Air India Colony, Kranti Nagar (Jari Mari
Road), Filter pada at Bhandup and Panchsheel Nagar. Affected people were shifted
to nearby Municipal schools, local buildings and halls on 27 July. 8,750 and 3,250
food packets were distributed in City and Western suburbs.

Recommendations of Flood Mitigation Strategies for

Mumbai:
The heavy rains that have been inundating the city of Mumbai and it surrounding
regions time and again during the monsoons every year indicate that the city is still
short of a sound flood mitigation framework. The existing efforts by the citys
governing and planning authorities towards formulating flood alleviation strategies
have only been marginally successful in fulfilling their purpose. Moreover, the
national disaster management framework released in the year 2004 takes a holistic
approach at managing and reducing disasters by suggesting general policies
applicable to all the states in the country and not just the Mumbai region in
particular. The framework also considers floods only as one of the many natural
disasters that it suggests strategies for. It does not provide any flood-specific
mitigation strategies so to speak of.
The Chitale Committee appointed by the governing authorities of Mumbai,
following the floods of 2005, does provide some mitigation strategies specific to
flooding. However, these strategies have succeeded only partially in tackling the
flooding in the following year. Thus, this study aims at suggesting improvements
to the existing flood-mitigation framework of the city to minimize or if possible,
completely avoid the destruction of life and property and the disruption of the
normal functioning of the city which results from the floods. For this purpose, this
study conducts case-studies of other flood stricken areas and refers other
professional literature as a guideline to suggest additional flood mitigation
strategies specific to the city and the region of Mumbai. The flood mitigation
framework can be broadly classified into pre-event measures and post-disaster
measures. In an approximate chronological order these are as follows:
1. Pre-flood Mitigation Measures:

a. Mitigation of floods:
- Data Collection and Analysis
- Vulnerability Reduction
b. Preparation for Floods
-Prediction
- Emergency Preparedness (including monitoring, alerts)
- Education, Training and Awareness
2. Post-flood Mitigation Measures:
- Rescue and evacuation
- Relief
- Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
3. Role of Government and Private Sector in the flood mitigation framework

Maintenance of natural drainage

There are many natural drainage in Mumbai. Maintaining them is also one efficient
method to reduce emergencies like 26th July 2005 flood.
Tulsi lake: Its dam have 2 spillways which discharge into Dahisar river and Vihar
lake.
Vihar lake: Its spillways discharge into Mithi river.
Powai lake: Its discharge also meets Mithi river
Mahul and Vakola lake, two branches of Mithi River which were existed till 1976
in the map of Mumbai now disappeared on the cost of development.

Developing a new action plan for these holding rivers by developing new drain in
city and suburbs, and installing new gates and pumping stations is under progress.

Management of local disposal and waste:

One effective and sustainable solution is to use efficient, cost effective and
automated waste collection and processing technology specifically in metro cities
is using effective piping system like shown below:

Management of local disposal and waste

CAD software gives an integrated drainage design suite that facilitates engineers
with powerful but easy to use system convert digital surveyed data into a detailed
digital model on ground very quickly. The model can be used to design roadmaps,
their alignments and design drainage system, long-sections and cross-sections with
the help of CAD software. These ground models can be used for many other
applications like land fill management, mineral extraction. Modified Rational
Method used for Drainage designs and Foul drainage networks and can be tested
for flood conditions using a Powerful Simulation module. Typical flood prevention
methods and techniques with sustainable systems such as ingress pavements, paver
blocks, parking's and pedestrian walkways shall be used.
Research undertaken to examine local governments' capacity to manage recovery
activities after Mumbai 26th July 2005 flood has shown that their overall
performance in conclusion is, ''in-consistent and problematic''(Mehta Report 2006).
The reason was lack of resources and poor planning (K B Singh et al. 2007); the
difficulty local officials faced was lack of proper planning between pre and post

disaster period; Resource dependence on the state government; lack of adequate

numbers of professionalized staff; poor leadership and bureaucratic and legal
constraints; and the lack of awareness among powerful citizen and business groups
that overshadow local government officials efforts. The locally based
reconstruction efforts, such as aid that does not meet the needs of the victims and
the possibility to delegate all responsibility on local involvement. On the basis of a
study of the recovery processes after the flood of 26 July 2005 in Mumbai, public
opinion clearly indicates that government jurisdictions, especially local
governments, have little guidance to direct their recovery activities.

Overcoming recovery implementation problems

Is it possible to overcome the ''problem'' of local government capacity to manage
the disaster recovery process? Researchers showed successful local recovery by
communities at their own level. I studied 14 municipal Wards (Chembur, Malad,
Borivali, Juhu, Goregaon,Vile Parle, Mahalaxmi, Kurla, Bandra, Kandivali,
Tardeo, Sion, Matunga, Wadala) recovery processes and found that the speed and
quality of recovery appeared . That was the function of three factors: (1) productive
intergovernmental relationships, (2) effective competition for scarce resources, and
(3) effective management of CBO decision making. Pre disaster planning was not
there because nobody at authority level had imagined such terrific flood situation
so post flood recovery was slow and unsatisfactory, which encouraged
communities in these wards to organize processes for more timely and efficient
action at their own level, clarify key recovery roles and responsibilities, identify
and secure fnancing, and avoid repetition of such emergencies again in future.
Many plans are difcult to implement; they at least draw our attention to some
important features of the recovery process. In particular, they highlight the

importance of collective action involving multiple organizations-from both the

public and private sectors-which cross governmental jurisdictions.
One promising fnding from the Emergency preparedness recovery plans comes
from an assessment of the Mumbai's roads, railways, drainage system, waste
disposal system, municipality proactiveness in future. The citizens and local
ofcials improvised a successful ''adaptive strategy'' that should implemented in the
city directly for managing the recovery process.

Inter and intra-community network and the local recovery process

I found that the degree of integration among organizations that comprise the
emergency response network prior to flood in Mumbai is a reliable predictor of
readiness and response effectiveness in future. In this regard I conveyed the idea to
the Disaster Research Center, " the stronger and more well dened the interorganizational linkages are prior to an event, the 'smoother' subsequent rescue
related activities will go''. CBO preparedness is synonymous to Emergency
preparedness which requires response effectiveness, and strong structural interorganizational relations.
The role of ''self-evident natural networks'' and ''self-organization'' in emergency
preparedness is necessary and required very much. After 5 years Wards of Mumbai
are very considerable in their capacity to respond to 26th July 2005 type
emergencies. Emergency groups are now aware about recovery and redevelopment
processes. This is a particularly important problem in the reconstruction and
recovery phase, where competition over resources and CBO redevelopment goals
often replaces the immediate post event spirit of cooperation.

Conceptual model of the local recovery process

The response phase of emergency management of flood like situations in Mumbai,
some of the lessons learned in that context may be transferable to the recovery and
reconstruction phases. A variety of studies suggesting that ''the capacity of citizens
and organizations involved in recovery to adapt to changing conditions is higher
and inter-organizational aid delivery systems are more capable of meeting the
needs and capacities of disaster stricken citizens when intra-CBO and intergovernmental ties are strong''.
The importance of three key variables related to CBO problem-solving capacity:
horizontal integration, vertical integration, and network centralization. Horizontal
integration refers to relations among the individuals and organizations within a
community. Thus, a CBO with a high degree of horizontal integration is
characterized by a tightly knit social network with relatively equal power
distributions and features frequent, sustained interactions and communications.
Conversely, communities with a low degree of horizontal integration have a
weakly knit social fabric. Vertical integration de-scribes a CBO's relations with
extra CBO systems. A CBO's ties with larger political, social, and economic
institutions may explain resource and information transfers and inuence the
extent to which these institutions are dependent on their environment.
Network centralization refers to ''the power and control structure of the network,
and whether network links and activities are organized around any particular one or
small group of organizations''. Integration and centralization are important
complementary measures. Integration is a measure of the extent to which
organizations in a system are interconnected; centralization describes the extent to
which horizontal and vertical cohesion is organized around particular focal points.

Horizontal and Vertical Integration and the Role of Focal Organizations

The potential relationships between horizontal and vertical integration and depicts
four types of communities. The dominant recovery strategies that characterize each
type of CBO. A type I CBO is ideally suited for an effective recovery effort.
Communities of this type have well-developed ties to external resources and
programs as well as viable horizontal networks that enable it to exert inuence
over CBO recovery activities. Such type of communities rely on preexisting stores
of social capacity and cohesion are formed in Mumbai they are showing ''selforganizing'' behavior.
CBO types by degree of horizontal and vertical integration and disaster recovery
strategies. Horizontal integration was high owing to the high degree of interest in
and experience with political activities on the part of the citizen ship. The local
government develops new partnerships and capabilities with its citizens. A
cooperative association of households known as the Neighborhood Survival
Network (NSN) was established to facilitate citizen self-help in future disasters.
The high degree of horizontal integration played a vital role in aiding overlooked
minority and low-income populations in rural mountain neighborhoods and in
providing a basis for increasing vertical integration. The central Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) utilized the well-established ties developed by the
NSN to assess needs and distribute assistance. Emergency experienced by the
people of Mumbai that day stimulated local horizontal integration. Subsequently,
local problem-solving capacity was expanded by vertical integration between
federal relief efforts and local CBO organizations.
A type II CBO is an autonomous, relatively isolated CBO with few vertical ties.
These types of communities are also formed in Mumbai they have viable

horizontal social networks; they suffer from a lack of knowledge about and
interaction with important external resources. Communities of this type will adopt
a strategy of cooperation with potential resources providers, such as the state or
federal government. In type II CBO they have a highly active network of, social
clubs, and CBO groups. Owing to the high degree of horizontal integration, the
CBO rapidly mobilized its limited resources to set up evacuation centers, provide
food and safe drinking water, and establish communication channels to disseminate
recovery information. But the scale of the disaster, coupled with the inexperience
of local public officials with central governmental disaster aid programs. The city
received assurances from FEMA that they would be helped ''every step of the
way''. Corruption and bureaucracy is a part our system that had eaten up a large
share of the relief package. Despite the public pleadings of civic leaders,
governments' aid was delayed for several weeks. Meanwhile, people discovered
that the governments' monies would cover only a small portion of the damages.
A type III CBO is in a classic state of dependency. They also involved in number in
Mumbai lacking a viable horizontal network, it is less likely to take into account
local needs, concerns, or values in the recovery effort. A type III CBO does have
the advantage of strong vertical ties and channels to facilitate the delivery external
aid. They have disproportionate share of disaster-related resources are allocated by
the central government. These types of communities will adopt a dual strategy of
recovery. Because horizontal cohesion is weak, local policy makers must engage in
a strategy based on the cooptation of important constituencies within the CBO.
However, owing to strong vertical linkages, these communities will be able to
make claims on external resources. In Mumbai such communities are politically
powerful communities can bypass normal relief channels and, in effect, coerce the
central government into providing massive aid.

Overall horizontal integration in such communities is low. Its vertical ties,

particularly with corporators and relief and emergency management agencies, are
quite strong. As a consequence, these type of communities bypass many of the
intergovernmental aid hurdles that other jurisdictions nd so difficult. Indeed,
owing to corporator's intervention and the high level of government interest, the
aid was mobilized with speed. The main point is to ensure that large amounts of
government aid poured into the city and to placate affected groups in the
communities. Despite the rapid government response, weak horizontal linkages
slowed reconstruction efforts as private property owners and local officials
squabbled over the details of CBO recovery.
A type IV type of CBO is in large number in Mumbai. They face signi cant
obstacles in undertaking successful recovery efforts because it lacks access to
external resources. Even if these vertical channels are activated, the lack of intra
CBO integration severely limits the ability to man-age the aid process or to
influence the direction of recovery efforts. CBO leaders in this situation will and
their strategic options limited to attempting to mediate conict. They had a much
lower capacity to cope with the demands of disaster recovery than the
communities. Many nongovernmental organization operating in Mumbai after the
disaster, with good administrative staff residing in the CBO.
A low degree of horizontal and vertical integration was that disaster recovery
initiatives were, for the most part, organized outside of the CBO, with little input
from the local people. A disaster recovery board was created to oversee recovery
and reconstruction. Sometimes committee suffers from internal politics and social
resistance.

The ability or inability of a CBO to activate horizontal and vertical networks to

engage in reconstruction activities is likely related to the presence or absence of
focal organizations in the CBO. The focal organizations may or may not
governmental entities. Cooperative CBO groups are perfectly capable of taking on
this role.
The importance of centralized, coordinating mechanisms in disaster response
networks are significant. The key actors at the focal points of emergency response
networks tend to play a critical role in the formation and maintenance of inter
organizational relationships. It is not yet known precisely what role centralized
personnel play in the recovery and reconstruction processes.

Mitigation Measures:
Infrastructure Improvement
o Transport Infrastructure
o Service and related Infrastructure
o Housing Infrastructure
Communication and Public Information systems
o Upgrading Wireless communication
o Setting up Display boards
o Using Cable TV for information dissemination

 Land use policies and planning

o Improvement and protection of landfill sites
o Control on land reclamation
o Shifting of storage and hazardous units from residential areas.

Conclusion
The Mumbai flood 2005 , had destroyed many areas in Mumbai. There
was flooding in many parts of India. People had lost their houses in large
number. Flood had caused massive losses. The food and drinking water for all the
affected people were arranged

with the help of NGOs and other

local by

organization. The government soon resumed the distribution of food grains.

Although 26th July 2005 Mumbai flood was unique , there are lessons that can be
learned by examining the successes and failures of other parts of country that
have been visited by same type of emergency. Local government officials
should develop relationships with their counterparts in communities that have
been through disaster to share information about the recovery process. Over 25000

people were provided relief at 15 location across the city. The Chief Minister
convened a meeting of insurance

companies and requested them to settle

insurance claim on a fast track basis. After this flood in Mumbai CBO leaders and
local government ofcials take steps before and after such event to enhance the
likelihood of achieving successful recovery and reconstruction outcomes' analysis.

Bibliography
1. http://www.slideshare.net/rohitkirulkar/mumbai-mega-flood-2005
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maharashtra_floods_of_2005
3. http://www.preventionweb.net/applications/hfa/lgsat/en/image/href/470
4. www.google.com

5. www.yahoo.com