Chapter 1 Introduction to ISD

1.
2.
3.

Inherent: existing in something as a permanent and inseparable element...

Eliminate or minimize hazards rather than control hazards
Safety based on physical and chemical properties of the system, not addon safety devices and systems

Hazard
1.
2.
3.

2.

Inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the potential for

causing harm to people, environment, or property
Intrinsic to a material or its conditions of use
Eliminate hazard by
Eliminate material
Change material
Change conditions of use

Reduced consequence of incident (explosion, fire, toxic

material release)
Improved effectiveness and feasibility of other protective
systems like
o
Secondary containment
o
Reactor dump or quench system

Moderate
Dilution. Ex:

Aqueous ammonia and HCl instead of anhydrous

Sulphuric acid instead of oleum

Wet benzoyl peroxide instead of dry

Process safety strategies (in order of robustness and reliability)

1.

2.

3.

4.

Inherent
Eliminate or reduce hazard by changing to non- or less hazardous
process or material
Integrated to the product, process, or plant cannot be changed
without process/plant design alteration
Ex: substitute flammable solvent with water
Passive
Reduce frequency or consequence of hazard without using active
devices
Ex: containment dike around hazardous material storage tank
Active
Controls, safety interlocks, automatic shutdown systems
Multiple active elements

Sensor detect hazardous condition

Logic device decide what to do

Control element implement action

Prevent incidents, mitigate consequences
Ex: sprinkler system to put off fire
Procedural
SOP, safety rules, ERP, training
Ex: confined space entry procedures

3.

Layer of protection concept

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

Process design
Reduce/eliminate hazards
Apply ISD to process design and chemistry
Basic controls, process alarms, and operator supervision
Basic process control system (BPCS) and SOP
Critical alarms, operator supervision, and manual intervention
Alarm and operator actions
Automatic action
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) apply LOPA technique to design
Physical protection (relief devices)
Consequence mitigation system
Pressure relief valves and rupture disks
Physical protection (dikes)
Consequence mitigation system
Physical protection for loss of containment
Plant emergency response
Consequence mitigation system
Fire brigade response, evacuation, or shelter in place
Community emergency response
Municipal fire brigade response, community evacuation or
community shelter in place

Inherently safe process - no additional layers of protection needed if consider

all hazards. But we can be inherently safer.

4.

Chapter 3 ISD Conflicts, Trade-offs and Inherent Safety Review

1.
2.
3.

Chapter 2 - Inherently Safer Design Strategies

4.
1.

Minimize
Process intensification
Use small quantity of hazardous substance or energy by

Storage

Intermediate storage

Piping

Process equipment
Benefits

Refrigeration
Less severe processing conditions

Ex: ammonia manufacture pressure condition from 600 bar

(1930s) to 100 bar (1980s)

Result of understanding and improving the process

Lower pressure plants are cheaper, more efficient, as well as

safer
Physical characteristics
Containment (described as passive rather than inherent)
Substitute
Substitute less hazardous reaction chemistry
Replace hazardous material with less hazardous alternative
Ex: Water based coatings and paints in place of solvent-based

Reduce fire hazard

Less toxic

Less odor

More environmentally friendly

Reduce hazards for end users and manufacturers

Simplify
Eliminate needless complexity to reduce risk of human error
Ex: Reactive distillation methyl acetate process
Modification gives fewer vessels, pumps, flanges, instruments,
valves, piping etc.
However,

Reactive distillation column itself is more complex

Multiple unit operations occur within one vessel

More complex to design

More difficult to control and operate

Conflict: design of each vessel is much simpler before undergoing
simplification. In some ways, the overall plant is more complex.
Need to understand specific hazards for each situation to decide what
is best

5.

Inherently Safer does not necessarily mean lower risk.

Process change may introduce new hazards
Ex: hydrogen gas generated by hydrolysis
Loss event likelihood may be affected
Ex: Supplying from many small cylinders instead of one large
cylinder increases frequency of connecting and disconnecting
cylinders
Loss event severity can also be affected
Ex: total containment increases burst pressure
Everything has multiple hazards
Automobile travel

velocity (energy), flammable fuel, exhaust gas toxicity, hot

surfaces, pressurized cooling system, electricity
Chemical process or product

acute toxicity, flammability, corrosiveness, chronic toxicity,

various environmental impacts, reactivity

Different populations may perceive the inherent safety of different

technology options differently. Who is right?
Ex: chlorine handling - 1 ton cylinders vs. a 90 ton rail car

A neighbor two miles away?

An operator who has to connect and disconnect cylinders 90

times instead of a rail car once?

2.

Inherent Safety Review

1.

What does inherently safer mean?

1.
2.

Inherently safer is in the context of one or more of the multiple hazards

There may be conflicts. Ex: CFC refrigerants
low acute toxicity, not flammable
potential for environmental damage, long term health impacts
are they inherently safer than alternatives such as propane
(flammable) or ammonia (flammable and toxic)?

2.
3.
4.

Discussion: Volatile toxic liquid storage

1.
2.

Situation: One stakeholder wanted one large storage tank, another

stakeholder wanted two smaller storage tanks.
Second stakeholders rationale: Worst-case impact is half as serious.
What about complexity of the two smaller storage tanks?
Any add on of valves, piping, relief systems etc.

5.

6.

ISD
1.

Some hazardous materials and processes can be eliminated or the hazards

dramatically reduced.

7.

LC phase
Idea phase

Tasks
First check of feasibility on economics, and SHE

Process R&D

Reaction chemistry
Examination of raw materials and reaction chemistry
Process concept creation
Examination competing processes, patent and license situation
Market analysis
Examination of legal aspects
Laboratory & reaction
calorimeter tests
Bench and pilot scale tests
Prefeasibility study (profitability , SHE)
Process concept selection from alternatives
Selection of unit operations
Flowsheet simulation
Preliminary sizing of equipment
Analysis of logistics and material flows
Rough ISBL layout
Estimations of emissions
Feasibility study (profitability, SHE)
Process design of equipment
Process design of pipes
Basic automation and instrumentation engineering
Layout design
Project planning

Process
predesign

Basic
engineering

Procurement
Fabrication
Construction

Piping design
Instrumentation and automation design
Mechanical design of the equipment
Structural and civil engineering
Electric design
Design of OSBL services
Vendor and fabrication documents
Inspection reports
Field change documents

Start-up

Start-up and test-run documents

Operation

Operation reports

Detailed
engineering

The useful characteristics of other materials or processes make their

continued use essential to society for the foreseeable future we will
continue to manage the risks.

Two basic IS activities

Design and build inherent safety into a process
Continually look for ways to reduce or eliminate hazards throughout
the process life cycle
Apply at all levels
A way of thinking, a way of approaching technology design at every level
of detail part of the daily thought process.
Most effective life cycle phases to review a process for opportunities to
make it inherently safer
R&D
Conceptual design
Detailed engineering
Routine operation
Typical inherent safety review steps
1. Collect and review background information
2. Identify /define / document the major hazards
3. Review the process flow schematic

Look at each process step and hazardous material

Identify creative ways to improve the process by applying

inherently safer principles to reduce or eliminate hazards
4. Document the review and follow-up actions
Questions a designer should ask when he has identified a hazard
1. Can I eliminate this hazard?
2. If not, can I reduce the magnitude of the hazard?
3. Do the alternatives identified in questions 1 and 2 increase the
magnitude of any other hazards, or create new hazards?
4. At this point, what technical and management systems are required to
manage the hazards which inevitably will remain?
Suitable safety analysis tools
Information produced
First evaluation of feasibility
basic data on chemicals
chemicals
and
their
characteristics
chemical
reactions
and
interactions
thermodynamics
physical properties
process concept
first version of flowsheet
prefeasibility study

Suitable safety analysis tools

Evaluation based on the basic
properties of chemicals
Laboratory screening and testing
for chemicals (toxicity, instability,
explosives)
for reactions (explosiveness)
for impurities
Pilot plant tests

Flowsheet
material balance
energy balance
process concept
operating conditions
layout sketch
feasibility study

Inherent safety indices. Dow F&E

Index, Mond Index, Hazop in
simplified form

PI-diagram (AFD)
process data on equipment,
piping and instruments
preliminary layout
project plan
detailed cost estimate
detailed engineering data for
equipment, piping, controls,
instruments, constructions
layout
operating, start-up and
shut-down manuals
vendor data on equipment
as built data

Hazop, Dow Indices, Mond Index,

Hazan, Fault tree, RISKAT

data on process performance

first operation experience
operation data
operation experiences

What-If, Checklist

Inherent safety indices partly in

simplified form.

Hazop, Dow Indices, Mond Index,

Fault tree

What-If, Checklist

Hazop, Dow Indices, Mond Index,

Fault tree, Operation fault analysis

Chapter 6 Design Prevention (Design to Prevent Overpressure)

Introduction
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

How Can High Pressure Develop? Some possible causes of the high
pressure:
Over-pressurization from an upstream (or downstream high pressure
source) -compressed gas, high pressure liquid, dead ended positive
displacement pump, etc
Operator error; External fire
Overfilling and hydraulic compression
Thermal expansion of fluid/gas in a blocked in system
Runaway exothermic chemical reaction and self-heating

Generation of non-condensable gas, e.g. nitrogen or carbon

dioxide

Increased vapor pressure of contents with temperature

Relief System Protection
Should pressure rise to an unsafe level: potential for mechanical
failure (rupture) of equipment.
Rather than allowing this to happen the pressure is released.
Relieved fluids may be harmless & released (e.g. water or steam) or
taken to downstream processing equipment, i.e. a scrubber/absorber
or a flare.
Part of Engineering Design and layered safety approach
Last layer of preventive protection
Prevent a more costly upset incident and potentially compromise
safety, environment, equipment, production
System designed to release material into a plant-wide containment
and disposal process
Set pressure: Pressure at which the relief device begins to open.
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP): Maximum design
pressure at the top of a vessel for a designated temperature.
Vessel fails at 4 or 5 times the MAWP.
Overpressure: Pressure increase over set pressure during relieving.
Expressed as % of set pressure. Must be specified prior to relief design.
Typically 10%

12. Relieving pressure shall not exceed MAWP (accumulation) by more than:
3% for fired and unfired steam boilers
10% for vessels equipped with a single pressure relief device
16% for vessels equipped with multiple pressure relief devices
21% for fire contingency
Relief Design Methodology
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Locate Reliefs
Choose Type
Develop Scenarios
Size Reliefs (1 or 2 Phase)
Choose Worst Case
Design Relief System

Process and Relief System Design

Locating Reliefs Where?

7.

Accumulation: The pressure increase over the MAWP of the vessel during
the relief process. Expressed as % of MAWP.

8.

Backpressure: The pressure downstream of the relief device during the

relieving process. Must be considered in any relief system design.
9. Normal
pressure
relief valve
has definite
pop
and
reseat
pressures.
10. These two
pressures
can be noted
on a gauge
as shown.

11. Blowdown = Difference between pop and reseat pressure

Without safety valves:

With safety valves:

Spring Relief Valve Types

1.

2.

3.
Choosing Relief Types
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Select type and size

Materials: gases, liquids, gases & liquids, solids
Properties, e.g., corrosive, flammable, toxic, inert
Process conditions
Vent: atmosphere, treatment systems (scrubber, flare, condenser,
incinerator)
Two general relief device categories:
spring operated. Two types:

conventional

balanced bellows
rupture discs

Rupture Discs
1.

2.

Spring-Operated Valves: Conventional Type

3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

Operation: pressure drop across valve seat

Flow rate increases with increase in pressure drop
Set pressure: spring tension adjusted for ~10 % above normal operating
pressure
Set pressure and flow rate through valve are dependent on downstream
pressure or backpressure
Advantages:
Most reliable type if properly sized and operated
Versatile - can be used in many services
Disadvantages:
Relieving pressure affected by back pressure
Susceptible to chatter if built-up back pressure is too high

Relief valve for liquids

Begins to open at set pressure
Fully open at 25% overpressure
Safety valve for gases
Pops open above set pressure
Flow keeps valve open
Reseats at ~ 4 % below set pressure (blowdown)
Safety relief valve for liquids & gases
Functions as a relief valve for liquids
Functions as a safety valve for gases

4.

A rupture disc is a thin diaphragm (generally a solid metal disc) designed

to rupture (or burst) at a designated pressure. It is used as a weak element
to protect vessels and piping against excessive pressure (positive or
negative).
There are five major types available
Conventional tension-loaded rupture disc
Pre-scored tension-loaded rupture disc
Composite rupture disc
Reverse buckling rupture disc with knife blades
Pre-scored reverse buckling rupture disc
They are often used as the primary pressure relief device.
Very rapid pressure rise situations like runaway reactions.
When pressure relief valve cannot respond quick enough.
They can also be used in conjunction with a pressure relief valve to:
Provide corrosion protection for the PRV.
Prevent loss of toxic or expensive process materials.
Reduce fugitive emissions to meet environmental requirements.

Rupture Devices
1.
2.
3.

Calibrated metal disk

Remains open after rupture
Subject to pressure cycling
fatigue

Spring-Operated Valves: Balanced Bellows Type

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

Spring and back of valve seat are separated from fluid by a bellows
Back of valve is open to atmosphere
Valve opens near the set pressure regardless of the backpressure level
Flow rate through valve is dependent on the backpressure level
Advantages:
Relieving pressure not affected by back pressure
Can handle higher built-up back pressure
Protects spring from corrosion
Disadvantages:
Bellows susceptible to fatigue/rupture
May release flammables/toxics to atmosphere
Requires separate venting system

Problem: Piece of rupture disk might break off and plug spring relief
Piston Type Pilot Operated Safety Relief Valve
1.
2.

Upper surface is larger, causing a greater downward pressure.

Advantages:
Relieving pressure not affected by backpressure
Can operate at up to 98% of set pressure
Less susceptible to chatter (some models)

3.

Disadvantages:
Pilot is susceptible to plugging
Limited chemical and high temperature use by O-ring seals
Vapor condensation and liquid accumulation above the piston may
cause problems
Potential for back flow

When to Use a Rupture Disc/Pin

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Capital and maintenance savings

Losing the contents is not an issue
Benign service (nontoxic, non-hazardous)
Need for fast-acting device
Potential for relief valve plugging
High viscosity liquids

When to Use Both Types

1.
2.
3.

Need a positive seal (toxic material, material balance requirements)

Protect safety valve from corrosion
System contains solids

Relief Event Scenarios

1.
2.
3.

Conventional Rupture Pin Device

1.
2.
3.

A rupture pin is designed to be a non-reclosing pressure relief device,

similar to a rupture disc
A piston is held in the closed position with a buckling pin which will fail
at a set pressure according to Euler's Law
An o-ring on the piston is used to make a bubble tight seal.

4.

A description of one specific relief event

Usually each relief has more than one relief event, more than one scenario
Examples include:
Overfilling/overpressuring
Fire
Runaway reaction
Blocked lines with subsequent expansion
Developed through Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Installation guidelines
System

Recommendation
Rupture disc in corrosive service or for highly
toxic materials where spring loaded valve may
leak

Comparison of Rupture Pins To Rupture Discs

Advantages:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Not subject to premature failure due to fatigue

Can be operated closer to its set point
Setpoint is insensitive to operating temperature
Available as balanced or unbalanced device
Capable of operating as low as 0.1 psig (0.007 barg)
Suitable for liquid service
Resetting after release usually requires no breaking of flanges
Replacement pins are 1/3 to 1/4 the cost of replacement discs

Disadvantages:
1.
2.

The elastomer o-ring seal limits the maximum operating temperature to

about 230C
Initial cost of installation is greater than for a rupture disc
twice as costly for 2carbon steel
up to seven times as costly for 8stainless steel

When to Use a Spring-Operated Valve

1.

2.
3.
4.

Losing entire contents is unacceptable

Fluids above normal boiling point
Toxic fluids
Need to avoid failing low
Return to normal operations quickly
Withstand process pressure changes, including vacuum

Two rupture discs in extremely corrosive

service.
The 1st may periodically need to be
replaced.
Rupture disc and spring loaded relief.
Normal relief may go through spring loaded
device, and rupture disc is back-up for larger
reliefs
Two reliefs in series.
The rupture disc protects against toxicity or
corrosion.
The spring loaded relief closes and
minimizes losses.
Two rupture disc with special valve which
keeps one valve always directly connected to
vessel.
This type design is good for polymerization
reactors where periodic cleaning is needed.
A. pressure drop not more than 3% of set
pressure
B. long radius elbow
C. if distance is greater than 10 feet, weight
and reaction forces should be supported
below the long radius elbow
Orifice area of single safety relief in vapor
service, should not exceed 2% of the cross
sectional area of the protected line
Multiple valves with staggered setting may
be needed
Process lines should not be connected to
safety valve inlet piping

A. turbulence causing device

B. dimension (B) shown below
Minimum
Device causing turbulence
number
of
straight pipe
diameter
Regulator or valve
25
2 ells or bends not in same
plane
20
2 ells or bends in same plane
15
1 ell or bend
10
Pulsation damper
10

Data for Relief Sizing

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

6.

Tangential Knock-Out Drum -When Space is Limited

Physical property data

Chemical reaction rate behavior
Single phase releases: vapor, liquid, solid
Multiple phase releases
Runaway reaction relief: commonly liquid & vapor
Gas or dust explosions from combustion apparatus
Such data are part of the process safety information needed for a PHA

Runaway Reaction Behavior

Material Treatment
1.

2.
Chatter
1.
2.

3.
4.

Chattering is the rapid, alternating opening and closing of a PR Valve.

Resulting vibration may cause misalignment, valve seat damage and, if
prolonged, can cause mechanical failure of valve internals and associated
piping.
Chatter may occur in either liquid or vapor services
Causes:
Excessive inlet pressure drop
Excessive built-up back pressure
Oversized valve
Valve handling widely differing rates

Worst Case Event Scenario

1.
2.
3.

Worst case for each relief is the event requiring the largest relief vent area
Worst cases are a subset of the overall set of scenarios for each relief
The identification of the worst-case scenario frequently affects relief size
more than the accuracy of sizing calcs

Flare Design
1.

Heat Intensity (Btu/hr/ft2) and Effect

5,300
- Blisters in 5 sec
3,000 4,000
- Vegetation and wood are ignited
2,000
- Blisters in 20 sec
350
- Solar radiation

Chapter 7 Design Prevention (Relief System Sizing)

Problems:
1.
2.

If relief is undersized, high pressures will result.

If relief is oversized, costs will be high and relief may chatter during
operation.

Relief Area Requirements

Design Relief System

1.

1.

2.

Relief System is more than a safety relief valve or rupture disc, it includes:
Backup relief device(s)
Line leading to relief device(s)
Environmental conditioning of relief device
Discharge piping/headers
Blowdown drum
Condenser, flare stack, or scrubber

Scrubbers: columns for surface contact; convert to less hazardous or more

manageable materials
Scrubber examples: caustic bath (for H2S), water (for NO2)
Flares: flammable or toxic materials are converted to less hazardous
combustion products (e.g., CO2, H2O, )
Flare design: for a stable flame and non-hazardous radiation

3.
4.

Flow to hold spring relief valve seat in open position: 25-30 % of maximum
flow
Low flow can lead to rapid opening and closing (chattering) with valve
damage
Overpressures, OP, are designed to be 10 to 25 % above set pressures to
avoid excessive vent sizes
To hold pressures near the set pressures would require much larger vent
sizes

Required Vent Area, 2-phase Flow

Total Containment Systems

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Relief materials are vented primarily to total containment and treatment

systems
Knockout / blowdown drums: separation of liquid from vapor; coolant for
high boiling material
Liquid collected, transferred, incinerated
Vapor transferred to treatment, e.g., condenser (high boiling), scrubber
(toxic), incinerator, flare (combustible, toxic), combination
Blowdown Drum Separating Vapor from Liquid

Address Relief Sizing for Following Cases

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Conventional spring operated relief in liquid or gas service

Rupture discs in liquid or gas service
Two phase flow during runaway reactor relief
Reliefs for dust and vapor explosion
Reliefs for fires external to process vessels
Reliefs for thermal expansion of process fluids