ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

Public International Law Saturday class

Atty Roberto A. Demigillo

BOOK
Chapter 5 Subjects of International Law- States
Chapter 6 Other subjects of International Law

Cases
Reparation Case ICJRept (1949)
------------------------------------------------------- ADRAYAN
US. V Dorr, 2 Phil 332
-----------------------------------------------------------------BALITCHA
Bacani v. NACOCO 100 Phil 468, 471 ------------------------------------------------------ HUERTO
Tinoco Arbitration - Great Britain v. Costa Rica (1923)--------------------------------------JABAL
Upright v Mercury Business Machines Co 13 A.D. 2d 36, 213N.Y. S. 2d 417 -------MARQUEZ
Island of Las Palmas Arbitration (1938) -------------------------------------------------------NATIAL
Advisory Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996)--------------------------------- RAGILES
International Catholilc Migration Commission v Calleja G.R. 85750 Sept 28, 1990-----RAPAY
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center v Acosta And Lasco v UN Revolving fund
for Natural Resources Exploration G,R. No. 109095-109107 Feb 23, 1995 ------TUGAS
Kapisanan ng mgaManggagawa v. The International Rice Research Institute --------BRITANICO
Department of Foreign affairs v NLRB G.R. 113191, September 18, 1996 WQ23-----BUAQUEN
World Health Org. v Aquino G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972-----------------------CABBUAG
Jeffrey Liang v People, G.R. No. 125865 March 26, 2001------------------------------------CAWIGAN
Ex Parte Quirin317 U.S. 1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------DEMDAM
Ferdinand Marcos v Raul Manglapus, 178 SCRA ----------------------------------------------GRAFIL
Oriental Navigation Co. Claim (1928 Mexico v U.S. General Claim Commission 4 U.N.
Rep. Intl Arb Awards 341 (1928) -----------------------------------------------------------IGMEN
Trial of the Major War Criminals before Intl Military Tribunal, 14 November 1945, 1 October
1949 p. 108---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INOCENCIO

Research
Montevideo Convention of 1933 on Rights and Duties of States-------------------------------------LIGAY
Declaratory theory-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LUMANLAN
Constitutive Theory-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MARTINEZ
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Friendly Relations & CooperationAmong States-OLIVEROS
General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946)---------------PALABAY
Convention and Privileges of Specialized Agencies----------------------------------------------------RODRIGUEZ
Bangkok Declaration ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SALVADOR
1949 Geneva Convention------------------------------------------------------------------------------------TURARAY
Protocol I-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MINOZA
1977 Protocol II-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PATACSIL
Common Article 3--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PIMENTEL
Material field of Application--------------------------------------------------------------------------------TIRANA
Covenant on Civil and Political rights and 2 Protocols-----------------------------------------------BALDONADO
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural ------------------------------------------------------------CUANAN
Philippine Commission on Human rights----------------------------------------------------------------ENCINA
Wilson Doctrine
---------------------------------------------------------------------------VANGUARDIA
Tobar Doctrine -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ZOSA

ADDITIONAL READINGS
The Seven (7) Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
The United Nation's "Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations", adopted by the UN
General Assembly, thru Resolution No. 2625 (XXV) on October 24, 1970, after ten (10) years of work and
study, contain the following seven (7) basic principles of international law:
"1. The principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
"2. The principle that states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
"3. The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance
with the Charter;
"4. The duty of states to cooperate with one another in accordance with the Charter;
"5. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
"6. The principle of sovereign equality of states; and
"7. The principle that states shall fulfill in good faith the obligation assumed by them in accordance
with the Charter.".
The Declaration enumerated the elements of "sovereign equality" of a state, thus:
"The principle of sovereign equality of states.
"All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the
international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature.
"In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:
"(a) States are juridically equal;
"(b) Each state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
"(c) Each state has the duty to respect the personality of other states;
"(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the state are inviolable;
"(e) Each state has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural
systems;
"(f) Each state has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to
live in peace with other states." (cf. Principle No. 6 of the main body of the "Declaration" in
Magallona, 104).
The Subjects and Objects of International Law
A subject of international law is an entity with capacity of possessing international rights and duties and of
bringing international claims. This entity is said to be an international person or one having an international
personality, on the basis of customary or general international law.(Magallona, 18-19).
A subject of Public International Law is an entity directly possessed of rights and obligations in the
international legal order, e.g. a sovereign state, such as the Philippines. (Paras, 43).
An object of Public International Law, on the other hand, is merelyindirectly vested with rights and
obligations in the international sphere, e.g. a Filipino private citizen is generally regarded not as a subject but
an object of Public International Law because, while he is entitled to certain rights which other states ought
to respect, he usually has no recourse except to course his grievances through the Republic of the Philippines
and its diplomatic officers. (id.).

Kinds of Subjects in International Law

A. The STATE
Magallona distinguishes between (a) general or objective international personality and (b) particular or
special international personality, as follows:
"x xx As to the first (general or objective international personality), rights and obligations are conferred by
general international law and such personality is binding ergaomnes; and as to the second (particular or
special international personality), personality binds only those which give consent (express or tacit).
"The distinction is implied in the Reparation for Injuries Case, in which on the question as to the legal
personality of the United Nations to claim reparation for injury to its agents committed by nationals of a nonMember State, the (International Court of Justice or ICJ) states: "xxx fifty States, representing the vast
majority of the members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with international
law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality and not merely personality
recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims xxx [ICJ Reports, 1949, p.
185]."(Magallona, 19).
B. STATES: Single/Simple and Composite
Paras categorizes "subjects in international law" into two (2) categories: (a) the complete or perfect
international personality, and (b) the incomplete or imperfect, or qualified or quasi-international personality.
(Paras, 47).
He classifies states into the following species: (a) single or simple state (e.g., Philippines), and (b) composite
state.
The 1933 Monteviedo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides for the legal characteristics of
a State, thus:
"The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a)a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; (d) and capacity to enter into relations with other
States." (cf. Magallona, 20).
The "capacity to enter into relations with other States" refers to independence, which many highly qualified
publicists consider as the decisive criterion of statehood. (Magallona, 20-21).
RECOGNITION is considered as "the act by which another State acknowledges that the political entity
recognized possesses the attributes of statehood." (Magallona, 21, citing Jessup, Modern Law of Nations: An
Introduction, 1949, p. 4).
There are two theories on the nature and effect of recognition, as discussed by Magallona (at pp. 22-22):
xxx The constitutive school maintains that it is the act of recognition which constitutes or creates the status
of a State as a subject of law and thus gives it a legal personality. The international status of any entity as a
State is to be determined by the will and consent of already existing States.
xxx The declaratory theory asserts that recognition merely confirms the acceptance by States of the status of
an entity as a State. A new State acquires legal personality by its own creative act in bringing about the
objective criteria of statehood, rather than by the subjective act of other States.
xxx The declaratory school is the preferred approach, the prevailing view being that recognition is not an
element of statehood.
Paras, Coquia and Defensor-Santiago classify the different kinds of composite states as follows:
"(1) The Federation or Federal State (such as the United States and the United States of Switzerland);
"(2) The Confederation (such as the original Confederation of the American States, which eventually became
the nucleus of the present United States).

"(NOTE: The principal difference between a federal union and a confederation is that a federal union of
states exists when the central or federal government exercises authority overboth the various states in the
union and the citizens thereof; while the confederation has some sort of power over its individual states, but
not over the individual citizens of the member states. The federal union, as such, is an International Person,
thus the United States is represented in the United Nations as one juridical or international entity; onthe other
hand, the confederation as such is not an International Person, each of the member-states being represented
by its own delegate. However, there is at present no confederation of confederated states).
"(3) The Real Union (such as the former United Arab Republic which was formed by two sovereign states
[Egypt and Syria] linked by a common government in external affairs and by a common chief of state. The
union then possessed a single international personality [the separate personalities of the states having been
merged into a unified whole]. xxx.
"(4) The Personal Union (this is the merger of two separate sovereign states in the sense that both have the
sameindividual as the accidental or temporary head of state.However, the union as such has no separate
international personality since each of the member-states has its own government and its own separate
international personality. It would seem that today, there is no Personal Union in existence. xxx.
"(5) The Incorporate Union (one where the internal andexternal organs of government of two states are
merged into one, resulting in a single international personality. An example is the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland xxx. While in a Real Union there is a merger only of foreign affairs or external relations,
in the Incorporate Union the merger is actually complete and concerns internal as well as external affairs and
relations).
"NOTE: The British Commonwealth of Nations xxx apparently does not fall under any of the preceding
classifications xxx."
(Paras, 49-50; Coquia&Defensor-Santiago, 64-100).
c. The INCOMPLETE, IMPERFECT, QUALIFIED
OR QUASI-INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITIES
Paras lists the incomplete, imperfect, qualified or quasi-international personalities as follows:
"xxx among them are the dependent states (protectorate and suzerainties); belligerent communities (and in a
very, very modified way, insurgent communities, subject to certain conditions); colonies; dependencies and
possessions;mandates and trust territories; certain public and political corporations or
companies; and international administrative bodies." (Paras, 52; underscoring supplied).
It is noteworthy to state that "international Organizations such as the former League of Nations and the
present United Nations are of course in their own way International Persons." (Paras, 60).
The United Nations, being possessed of juridical personality, has the following capacities: to contract; to
acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; and to institute legal proceedings. (Paras, 63, citing
Art. 1, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General
Assembly on Feb. 13, 1946, in 1 UN Treaty Series 15).
Paras classifies the three (3) groups of International Organizations, aside from the United Nations, as
follows:
(1) Inter-governmental bodies, including specialized agencies of the UN, e.g., Food and Agricultural
Organization, International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund, United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization;
(2) Other Inter-Governmental Bodies, e.g., Permanent Court of Arbitration, International Criminal Police
Commission, Bank of International Settlements;
(3) Non-Governmental International Bodies, e.g. International Commission of Jurists, Christian Family
Movement Moral Re-Armament, International Chamber of Commerce, Rotary International. (cf. Paras, 6061).

Private Individuals: Developing

New Status in International Law
Paras discusses that while traditional writers insist that private individuals are merely objects and not
subjects of international law, some recognized writers in recent years have accorded to the individual a new
status in international law: they say, and with good reason, that private individuals should now be regarded
as subjects in the international order, in view of the importance laid on them by the following:
"(1) the Charter of the United Nations Organization, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
x xx;
"(2) the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Tribunals for War Crimes xxx;
"(3) the norm of general international law which prohibitspiracy x x x:
"(4) espionage rules; conventions punishing acts of illegitimate warfare; rules of general international
law punishing private individuals for breach of blockade and carriage of contraband;
"(5) the practice of certain courts of permitting foreigners to appear and prosecute claims;
"(6) the Genocide Convention of 1948 which directly holds liable not only states, but also private
individuals, for the mass extermination of a racial group;
"(7) the existence of rules safeguarding the rights of aliens and minorities;
"(8) punishment for the illegal use of the flag (Reporter's Note: this refers to vessels using the flag of
s state with which such vessel is not registered);
"(9) the procedure in admiralty and maritime matters;
"(10) the special status accorded to refugees, and to displaced persons, such as those fleeing from
South Vietnam, from Cambodia, and, more recently, from
Cuba x xx. (cf. Paras, 44-46).
BELLIGERENT AND INSURGENT COMMUNITIES
A status of belligerency recognized under international law may arise if (1) there exists within the State an
armed conflict of a general character;(2) the insurgents occupy a substantial portion of the national territory;
and (3) they conduct the hostilities in accordance with the rules of war thru organized groups acting under a
responsible authority. (Coquia/Defensor-Santiago, 85).Recognition of a status of belligerency on the part of
other States is necessary for the legal creation of the status of "belligerent community." (id.).A fourth
requirement that has been suggested for the recognition of belligerency is that there must exist a
circumstance which makes it "necessary" for the recognizing State to define its attitude to the conflict.
Coquia and Defensor-Santiago explains the matter, thus:
The reason for this final requirement is that if the parties to the struggle propose to exercise belligerent rights
on the high seas in such a manner as to affect the recognizing State's maritime interests, the need for it to
define its attitude to the struggle has arisen. If, on the other hand, a distant inland state with no maritime
interests, and in no way affected by the conflict were to recognize the rebels as belligerents, it could open
itself to the charge of encouraging rebellion. (id., 86).
Recognition of belligerency before the four conditions are fulfilled is considered as contrary to international
law (id., 86, citing Sorensen, 286).
Recognition of belligerency by a State not a party to the contest is frequently announced in a formal
proclamation of neutrality between the two contending parties. Recognition may be express or implied. (id.,
87).
If the foreign government gives aid to the de facto (belligerent) government recognized by it, and that de
facto government is defeated in the war, then the lawful government may hold the foreign State responsible
for an act of unjustifiable aggression and of premature recognition. (id., citing Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, 13).
The recognized belligerent community lacks the right to send or receive diplomatic agents to join
international organizations, and to benefit in a normal manner from multilateral conventions concerned with
peacetime international relations and activities of States. (id., 86).
Coquia and Defensor-Santiago cite the legal implications of recognition of a belligerent community, thus:
The granting of recognition of belligerency to rebels is only provisional. While conferring an equal status to
warring groups, it does so only for the purposes and for the duration of the war. For the purposes and for the
duration of the war, the insurgents recognized as a belligerent power possess for the most part, the duties and
rights of States when engaged in war. (id., citing Kelsen, 413).

A state of insurgency is not equivalent to a state of belligerency. The former is "a rebellion which has not yet
achieved the standing of a belligerent community xxx, a condition described as intermediate between internal
tranquility and civil war." (Coquia, 88).
The conditions for a state of insurgency are: (1) the insurgents must have a government and a military
organization of their own; (2) the insurrection must be conducted in the technical forms of war, that is, it
must be more than a petty revolt and must assume the true characteristics of a war; and (3) the government of
the insurgents must in fact control a certain part of the territory of the State in which the civil war takes
place. (id., citing Kelsen, 412).
A related matter is the "government in exile". It has two classes, according to Coquia and Defensor-Santiago:
The first category consists of governments whose heads and cabinets move from the national territory
temporarily during the moments of crisis. xxx. In such cases, no formal act of recognition (is) necessary xxx
because it (is) deemed that there (is) no break in legal continuity.
A second category consist of governments formed abroad, in which case there can be no legal connection
between the government in exile and the government operating on the national territory at the time. xxx. A
formal act of recognition (is) necessary. xxx.
The governments under the second category do not have any international status. While there may be groups
assuming governmental powers for their national territory for political or other reasons, the fact is that they
are merely hoping to form a legitimate government or State at some time in the future.
x xx.
xxx A recognition accorded during the effective continuance of the lawful (de jure) government over the
greater part of the national territory may be considered as an act of interference in the national affairs of
another State. (id., 97, citing the recognition of the Franco regime in Spain by Germany and Italy only five
months after the Spanish civil war broke out at the time when the republican government was still in control
of the greater part of Spain).