Q: What are the requisites of fulfillment of duty?

1.
2.

Accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
Injury caused or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
The defense of having acted in the fulfillment of a duty requires as a condition, inter alia, that the
injury or offense committed be the unavoidable or necessary consequence of the due performance of
the duty (People v. Oanis, G.R. No. L47722, July 27, 1943

Any person who acts in the fulfillment of duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
Elements:
1. accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
2. injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance
of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office; and
3. accused was not negligent or that there was no abuse, or excess or oppression on the part of
the accused

Judgment and discretion of public officers in the performance of duties must be exercised neither
capriciously nor oppressively but within reasonable limits. In the absence of clear legal provisions,
they must act in conformity with exercise of sound discretion.

Any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession

About this injury, it is already ruled by the SC that the injury contemplated here
must be quantifiable in money. It has reference to material injury, not to any
damages which are subject of speculation. So the complainant here cannot invoke its
violation, only because he suffers moral damages or because he suffered some
temperate or moderate damages. The damages here must be one that is quantifiable in
money.
Violations of the Anti-graft and corrupt practices act are mala prohibita. So except
in that particular situation in subsection (e) of Section 3, evidence of good faith
or lack of criminal intent is not a defense. The fact that the government benefited
out of the prohibited transaction is no defense at all. SC categorically pronounced:
In crimes mala prohibita, the law is not interested in the effect of the prohibited
act, but simply from the fact that the prohibited act was VOLUNTARILY committed. That
being so, criminal liability attaches.
So where a municipal mayor who was elected into office found the coffers of the local
government empty, nothing to pay the salary of the employees of the municipal
government, no money to pay the basic services. He rented out a part of the municipal
building. Nobody was interested to rent because they have to renovate the place. So
his son made an offer to the municipal council which conducted the hearing that
because there is no interested bidder, he conducted an offer. It was found to be the
most advantageous because the son of the mayor would convert the place into a canteen
and a convenience store without any centavo coming from the municipality. The

municipality after all was bankrupt. So he will advance the {amount} will operate the
place, and he will only get whatever the amount he had advanced. Any profit earned
out of the operation therefore will inure to the municipality. He announced that he
is only willing to do this because his father is the mayor and he wanted the father
to be able to attend to the basic services needed by the constituent of the
municipality. In fact, the other parties who wanted the same concession challenged
the legality of the contract before the local RTC. The local RTC dismissed the
complaint. So he instead raised the axed against the mayor, filed with the SB a
criminal case for violation of RA 3019, based on the fact that he contracted with his
son involving the property of the municipality.

affirmed the conviction. It is enough that the act is prohibited and that the public
officer voluntarily performed the act, that means w/out duress only. The high court
said: In crimes MP, the law is not interested in the effects of the law on the
prohibited act. The law is interested only in whether the act was voluntarily done or
not. If voluntarily done, then criminal liability attaches.
So you should know the important point there that the act was done to benefit the
government, as long as the act is prohibited under this law, it is therefore a malum
prohibitum if is from the voluntarily doing of the act which will violate the law,
that will be controlling.

one of the predicate of the complaint under this subsection of the law is that of
evident bad faith. The injury caused was brought about by evident bad faith on the
part of the public officer accused of the violation. Although violations of this law
are mala prohibita and in crimes mala prohibita, good faith or lack of criminal
intent is not a defense, and therefore irrelevant or immaterial, yet in this
violation of the law where the complaint is based on alleged evident bad faith, the
accused as an exception, should be allowed to adduce evidence of good faith or lack
of criminal intent in causing the damage. SC SAID that if would not be allowed, the
accused would be denied the chance to defend himself because the only way to
controvert the alleged evident bad faith is to adduce evidence of good faith and of
lack of criminal intent. {You take note of this exception. You must have planted in
your minds now that in bar exams, most of the problems given refer to situation to
exceptions to the rule.}
M]ere allegation in the information "that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in
relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is a mere conclusion of law not a factual averment
that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of accuseds
official duties."
8

etitioner was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the alternative mode of "causing
undue injury" to Moleta committed with evident bad faith, for which she was correctly found guilty.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
"Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes, Uriarte v. People, 540 Phil. 477, 494
(2006), citing Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722, 737 (1966
36

As regards the two other elements, the Court explained in Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan that there are
two (2) ways by which a public official violates Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his
functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The accused may be
charged under either mode or under both.
33

Notably, a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused
acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as when the accused committed gross
inexcusable negligence.56 Unlike in the commission of ordinary felonies however, the law requires that the
intent or negligence, which must attend the commission of the prohibited acts under Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019, should meet the gravity required by law. Thus, in construing these phrases, the Court observed that
bad faith or partiality, on the one hand, and negligence, on the other hand, per se are not enough for one to
be held criminally liable under the law; that the bad faith or partiality is evident or manifest, or, that the
negligent act or omission is gross and inexcusable must be shown. 57
?r?l1

Gross inexcusable negligence is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care; acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that
care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property; 58 in cases
involving public officials, it takes place only when breach of duty is flagrant and devious. 59
?r?l1

Considering the countless scenarios that may fall under the provisions of Section 3 of RA No. 3019,
particularly paragraph e, and the avowed purpose of the law to repress certain acts of public officers
constituting graft or corrupt practices or leading thereto,60 the law considers the gravity of the bad faith (or
partiality) or negligent act or omission as a mode to commit the violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. In
requiring the negligence to be both gross and inexcusable, the law demands the neglect or disregard of duty
to be willful and intentional in order for a violation to exist, although it may fall short of the required degree
of bad faith, which must be evident, or of partiality, which must be manifest.

The essential elements of the offense are as follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party,

including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his function