Cross-Strait Economic Relations - Recent Development and Implications For Taiwan

01/12/2015
CrossStraitEconomicRelations:RecentDevelopmentandImplicationsforTaiwan
Revuedelargulation
Capitalisme,institutions,pouvoirs
MaisondesSciencesdel'HommeParisNord
13|1ersemestre/Spring2013:
conomiepolitiquedelAsie(1)
conomiepolitiquedelAsie(1)
CrossStraitEconomic
Relations:RecentDevelopment
andImplicationsforTaiwan
LesrelationsconomiquesTransDtroit:dveloppementsrcentsetimplicationspourTawan
LasrelacioneseconmicasTransDetroit:desarrollosrecienteseimplicacionesparaTaiwn
MINHUACHIANGANDBERNARDGERBIER
Abstracts
EnglishFranaisEspaol
ThisarticlepurportstoelucidatetherecentprogressoftheCrossStraiteconomicrelations
and the implications for Taiwans economy and its political sovereignty. There are three
points made in this article. First, over the last decade, Taiwans investment in China has
changed from labour intensive manufacturing made mostly by small and medium
companies to high technology led by large enterprises. Although Taiwanese firms
benefitted from enlarging its economies of scale, the overdependence on manufacturing
productioninChinahasresultedinTaiwansdeindustrialization.Second,Taiwanstrade
has been increasingly dependent on China rather than viceversa. Even though the
conditionsforthepoliticalreconciliationarestillnotmatureatpresent,Taiwansrelatively
stronger economic dependence on China will put it in a disadvantageous position in the
futurenegotiation.Third,inviewoftheintensifiedeconomicintegrationwithChina,the
signing of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is unavoidable. However,
Taiwansminimalinvolvementintheeconomicintegrationwithotherregionaleconomies
will push it to open more to China as it offers the easiest shortterm solution to Taiwans
lackofinternaldynamicsforeconomicgrowth.CrossStraiteconomicintegrationforChina
isalsoencouragingasitwillfacilitateitspeacefulrisepolicyaswellasserveitslongterm
politicalgoalforTaiwan.
Cet article vise clairer les progrs rcents des relations conomiques TransDtroit et
leurs implications pour la souverainet conomique et politique de Tawan. Il comporte
https://regulation.revues.org/10177?lang=en
1/18
01/12/2015
troispoints.Premirement,surladerniredcennie,linvestissementdeTawanenChine
est pass de la production manufacture forte intensit en travail effectue
principalement par des PME de la production haute technologie par des grandes
entreprises. Bien que les firmes Tawanaises ont bnfici de laccroissement de leurs
conomies dchelle, la surdpendance lgard de la production manufacture en Chine
sest traduite par la dsindustrialisation de Tawan. Deuximement, le commerce de
TawanestdevenudeplusenplusdpendantdelaChinepluttquelinverse.Mmesiles
conditions dune rconciliation politique ne sont toujours pas mres aujourdhui, la
dpendance conomique relativement plus forte de Tawan lgard de la Chine va la
mettre en situation dsavantageuse dans la future ngociation. Troisimement, dans la
perspective dune intgration conomique accrue avec la Chine, la signature de lAccord
cadre de coopration conomique est invitable. Nanmoins, limplication minimale de
Tawan dans lintgration conomique avec les autres conomies rgionales va lobliger
souvrirencorepluslaChineparcequelleoffrelasolutiondecourttermelaplusfacileau
manque de dynamisme interne de Tawan pour sa croissance conomique. Lintgration
conomique TransDtroit est aussi intressante pour la Chine car elle va faciliter sa
politique de monte pacifique en mme temps quelle sert ses buts politiques de long
termeconcernantTawan.
Este artculo se propone iluminar los progresos recientes de las relaciones econmicas
TransDetroit y sus implicaciones para la soberana econmica y poltica de Taiwn.
Comprendetrespuntos.Primeramentesobrelaltimadcada,lainversindeTaiwanen
Chinapasdelaproduccinmanufactureraconunafuerteintensidadenfuerzadetrabajo
efectuadaprincipalmenteporPYMES,alaproduccinconunaaltatecnologarealizadapor
grandesempresas.Apesardequelasfirmastaiwanesassebeneficiaronconelincremento
desuseconomasdeescala,lasobredependenciarespectodelaproduccinmanufacturera
enChinasetradujoporunadesindustrializacinenTaiwn.Ensegundolugar,elcomercio
de Taiwn se hizo cada vez mas dependiente de China que lo contrario. Incluso si las
condiciones de una reconciliacin poltica no estn an maduras en la actualidad, la
dependencia econmica relativamente ms fuerte de Taiwn respecto de China va a
colocarla en una situacin desventajosa cuando se haga una negociacin en el futuro. En
tercerlugarenlaperspectivadeunaacrecentadaintegracineconmicaconChina,lafirma
de un Acuerdo marco de cooperacin econmica es inevitable. Sin embargo, la escasa
implicacindeTaiwnenlaintegracineconmicaconlasotraseconomasregionaleslava
aobligaraabriranmselcomerciohaciaChinaporqueellaleofrecelasolucindecorto
plazomasfcilporlafaltadinamismointernodelcrecimientoeconmicodeTaiwn.
La integracin econmica TransDetroit es tambin interesante para China pues ello va a
facilitarsupolticadeincrementarsuinfluenciaenelPacficoalmismotiempoquesirvea
losobjetivosdelargoplazodeTaiwn.
Indexterms
Motscls: relationsconomiquesTransDtroit,dsindustrialisationdeTawan,Accord
cadredecooprationconomique,accorddelibrechange,souverainetpolitiquede
Tawan
Keywords: CrossStraiteconomicrelations,Taiwansdeindustrialization,Economic
CooperationFrameworkAgreement,FreeTradeAgreement,Taiwanspoliticalsovereignty
Palabrasclaves: relacioneseconmicasTransDetroit,desindustrializacindeTaiwn,
Acuerdomarcodecooperacineconmica,acuerdodelibrecambio,soberanapolticade
Taiwn
JELcodes: F10General,F14CountryanIndustryStudiesofTrade,F15Economic
Integration,F21InternationalInvestmentLongTermCapitalMovements
Fulltext
Introduction
1
TheCrossStraiteconomicrelationsintensifiedwhenTaiwaneseentrepreneurs
began to invest massively in China since the early 1990s. The Mainlandbased
Taiwanese companies imported the intermediate goods and capital equipments
2/18
01/12/2015
from Taiwan, processed in China and exported finished goods to the world
market,mainlytotheUS.Chinasabundantandlessexpansivelabourforceand
huge landscape enabled Taiwanese companies to expand their operations, thus
benefitting from economies of scale and keeping their products globally
competitive. Over the last two decades, the wellestablished division of labour
acrosstheStraitallowedTaiwanfrombeingthemainexporteroflabourintensive
manufacturedgoodstotheleadingproducerofInformationandCommunication
Technology (ICT) products in the world. At the same time, the exportoriented
foreign direct investment (FDI), of which Taiwanese investment took a large
share, was advantageous for Chinas economic development and for its
integrationintotheregionalproductionnetwork.SinceChinaseconomicopening
up at the end of the 1970s, Taiwan has been one of the most important foreign
investors in China. In 2011, Taiwan, with US$ 6.7 billion investments, was the
second largest inward investment source for China, behind US$77 billion from
Hong Kong, according to Chinese official statistics. Taiwan also played an
essentialroleinpromotingChinastradedevelopment.In2009,amongthetop10
exportingcompaniesinChina,6ofthemweresubsidiariesofTaiwanenterprises.
Inparticular,thethreeTaiwaneseownedfirms,QuantaComputer,Foxconn,and
Compal,aretheleadingexportingcompaniesinChina(MinistryofCommerceof
PeoplesRepublicofChina).
The intensifying economic ties between Taiwan and China made the
establishmentofinstitutionalizedeconomicrelationsanecessity.Severalofficial
contactsacrosstheTaiwanStraitalreadystartedsincethefirsthalfofthe1990s.
However,in1995,inordertoprotestagainstthevisitofTaiwansPresidentLee
TengHui to the US, the scheduled CrossStrait negotiations were terminated
unilaterally by China. During Chen Shuibians era (20002008), China refused
any official talk with Taiwan mainly because Chens proTaiwan independence
appealwasunfavouredbyChineseleadership.SinceMaYingJeoutookofficein
2008, the CrossStrait talks, halted for 9 years, shortly resumed. Different from
former President Chen, President Mas emphasis on Chinese ethnicity and
Chinese identity won much of Chinas applause. As a result, since 2008, the
governmenttogovernment cooperation on CrossStrait affairs have been
developedquicklyandincorporatedavarietyofissues,fromfoodsecurity,joint
crime fighting to more economic opening up between the two sides.
RepresentativeoftheprogressininstitutionalizedCrossStraiteconomicrelations
was the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in
June 2010, which aimed at eliminating barriers to trade and investment across
theStrait.
Although the development of institutionalized economic relations seems
beneficial for both sides, one critical question remains: Will Taiwan be able to
maintainitspoliticalindependencewhiletakingadvantageofeconomicbenefits
from China? It is generally believed that the growing economic interdependence
between Taiwan and China will promote the peaceful political relations and
furtherenhancetheregionalstability(Peng,2002,p.6).Otherspointedoutthat
in the absence of the mutual political understanding, the economic integration
willbedevelopedwithconstraints(Chang,2004,p.2Crane,1993,p.715)From
thecurrentperspective,thepoliticalreconciliationbetweenTaiwanandChinais
still a long term issue. Indeed, the CrossStrait economic integration so far still
relieslargelyontheworldeconomy,particularlytheinvestorsandconsumersin
thedevelopedcountries(Breslin,2004,pp.1820).InadditiontoTaiwan,China
is also the largest trade partner for Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN),Japan,SouthKorea,AustraliaandIndiaandthesecondlargesttrade
partner for New Zealand. Therefore, at the regional level, Taiwans signing of
ECFA with China signified that the island is following the wave of China
3/18
01/12/2015
centred regionalization. The conventional market driven and Chinacentred

regionalization would be further supported by the different sorts of Free Trade
Agreements (FTA) already implemented between China and other major
economiesintheregion,suchasTaiwan,HongKong,MacaoandAssociationof
SoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN).
The main objective of this article is to elucidate the recent progress of Cross
Strait economic integration and how that integration implies for Taiwans
economyanditspoliticalsovereignty.First,overthelasttwodecades,Taiwans
massiveinvestmenthasresultedinitsdeindustrialization.Atthetimewhenthe
manufacturingproductionhasbeenrelocatedtoChina,Taiwanssmallscaleand
domestic market oriented service sectors are not able to stimulate the economy.
Second,thoughthepoliticalreunificationisnotyetpossible,therecenteconomic
rapprochement is likely to put Taiwan in a less advantageous position on the
futurenegotiationtablewithChina.WhiletheimportanceofChinainTaiwans
overalltradehasbeengrowing,theTaiwanmadeproductsinChinasmarkethas
showedadecliningtrend.Inotherwords,Chinainitiallyneededinvestmentfrom
Taiwan for its economic growth. When the division of labour across the Strait
becamemature,itisTaiwanthatcouldnolongerbreakthisbilateraleconomictie.
Finally, in view of the rapid development of FTA between the Asian economies,
Taiwans minimal involvement in regional economic integration will push it to
open more to China as it is the easiest shortterm solution to Taiwans lack of
internaldynamicsforeconomicgrowth.
1.TheChangingPatternofTaiwans
InvestmentinChina
5
Since1990whenTaiwansMinistryofEconomicAffairs(MOEA)liftedbanson
indirect investment in China, 1 China soon emerged as the most important host
country for Taiwans outward investment. Taiwans official figures showed that
the investment amounted from merely US$17 million in 1991 to about US$14
billionin2011(Figure1).Duringthesameperiod,theweightofChinainTaiwans
total outward investment also increased from 10% to 80%. In addition to the
ChinafeverthatattractedmanyTaiwaneseentrepreneurstotakeadvantageof
cheap labour force, less expansive land cost and preferential policies for foreign
investors,theincreasinginvestmentamountscouldbereasonedasfollows.First,
asTaiwanesegovernmentstrictlycontrolledtheoutwardinvestmentinChinain
the1990s,manyTaiwanbusinesspeopleinvestedinChinathroughHongKong
ortheirholdingcompaniesinBritishCentralAmerica,suchastheVirginIslands
and Cayman Islands2 in order to bypass the rules. Therefore, as the allowed
investment was limited, the investment amounts recorded by the government
were not substantial. After 2000, when Taiwan gradually deregulated the rules
from indirect to direct investment and opened up more sectors for direct
investment,therecordedinvestmentamountsenlargedasaresult.
Second, the dramatic change in the type of Taiwanese investment from small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) to large enterprises with much financial
resources also amplified the investment amounts. That shift from SME to large
enterprisescanbeobservedbytheincreaseintheaverageamountofinvestment
perproject,fromUS$0.7US$millionin1991toUS$16millionin2011.Suchcan
also be reflected in the changes by sector from traditional sectors to more high
technologyindustries.In1991,rubber,plasticandnonmetallicmineralproducts
(31% of Taiwans investment in China) and textile related products (23% of
Taiwans investment in China) accounted for the majority of Taiwans total
4/18
01/12/2015
investment in China. In 2011, the shares of these two sectors invested in China
declined to 7% and 2% respectively. At the same time, the ICT sectors have
emerged as Taiwans major outward investment focus in China. In 2011 for
example,35%ofTaiwanstotalinvestmentinChinawasinICTsectors,including
computer and electronic products. According to Taiwans Investment
Commission, Foxconn Technology and Compal Electronics, INC. Taiwans two
important ICT manufacturers, both made considerable investment in China in
2011,amountingtoUS$700millionandUS$400million,respectively.Thatshift
of investment from SMEs to large enterprises and from labour intensive to high
technology related sectors is still motivated by cost considerations, including
Chinaslessexpansivelabourforceandlandcost.
TherisingimportanceofICTsectorsinTaiwansinvestmentprofileinChinais
indeed a reflection of Taiwans structural changes toward ICT manufacturing.
Since 2006, the ICT industry has accounted for over 50% of Taiwans overall
manufacturing production. The employment in the ICT industry has also taken
the largest share of Taiwans total employment in manufacturing. Moving
productiontoChinaappearstohavehelpedTaiwaneseICTcompaniesgrowtheir
global market share. For example, the notebook PCs made by Taiwanese firms
increased from 56% of global market share in 2002 to 94% in 2010. The global
shareformotherboardalsoincreasedfrom72%to94%inthesameperiod.While
theirsubsidiariesinChinawereresponsibleforthefinalproductassembly(such
as for notebooks, digital cameras and motherboards), the island specialized in
highvalueaddedmanufacturingactivities(suchasICfoundry,ICtestingandIC
design). In recent years, due to the rising production cost in coastal regions of
China,bigTaiwanesemanufacturingfirms,suchasFoxconn,Acer,Inventec,have
moved some of their plants to the inland cities of China, such as Chendu, in
Sichuan Province (Want China Times, 2012). The share of Taiwans ICT
investmentinSouthwestChinathusincreasedfrom1%in2007to10%in2011.
Besides the migration of production to Chinas inland region, some Taiwanese
leadingICTcompaniesarealsoseekingtolowercostsbyoperatingResearchand
Development (R&D) centers in China. The R&D in China now plays a
supplementary role on product improvement, especially product lines for the
Chinesemarket(StraitsTimes,2011TheChinaPost,2012).
Figure1.TaiwansInvestmentinChina19912011
Source:InvestmentCommission,MOEA,Taiwan.
5/18
01/12/2015
2.Taiwansdeindustrializationand
DifficultyinTransformingintoa
ServiceOrientedEconomy
8
10
11
The immediate effect following the massive outward investment in

manufacturing is the deindustrialization problem. In 2011, the service sector
alreadyaccountedfor70%ofTaiwanstotalGDPwhileindustryandagricultural
sectors accounted for 29% and 1% respectively. This is very different from
Taiwansindustrializationperiodduringthe1980s,when40%ofitsGDPwasin
industrial production. Same structural changes were also reflected in
employment. During the 1980s, the development of the industrial sector
successfully absorbed a large portion of the mass labour force released by the
shrinking agricultural sector. However, the weight of employment in industry
thatoncereachedabout43%ofthetotalemploymentin1980haddiminishedto
36%in2011.Meanwhile,theshareofemploymentinservicesincreasedfrom38%
to59%.
The percentage of industrial sectors in GDP decreased gradually and at the
same time the economic growth rate decelerated (Figure 2). Similarly, although
the share of employment in services is greater than before, Taiwans
unemploymentrateincreased,fromnearly2%in1990toabout6%in2009and
4% in 2011 (Figure 3). Hence, the rising shares of service in both GDP and
employment are more a reflection of the decline in manufacturing activity in
Taiwanratherthanastrengtheningoftheservicesector.Whiletheservicesector
has not yet become the engine of economic growth, the industrial sector has
alreadymovedoutofTaiwanquicklyandlargelytoChina.Asnewjobscreatedby
theservicesectorisunabletoreplacethejoblossesresultingfromtheclosureof
factories,thenumberofthoseunemployedrose.
ThemainreasonfortheweakservicesinsupportingTaiwanseconomyisthat
Taiwansservicesectorshavebeenmostlysmallscaleanddomesticoriented.This
is very different from Hong Kong and Singapore, where an internationally
competitive service sector contributes significantly to their economic
development. In contrast, Taiwans services have been mainly for domestic
consumption, low valueadded and nontradable. The roles of Hong Kong and
Singapore as important transit ports for the grand markets of China and
Southeast Asia respectively are also essential reasons for their more significant
developmentoftradeinservices.
Overthelasttwodecades,Taiwansrelocationofmanufacturingproductionto
Chinaallowedmanyservicerelatedsectors(suchasR&D,sales,productdesign
etc.)toclusterinTaiwan.However,thetraditionalproductionrelationshipwhere
TaiwantakesordersandChinaproducesmaychangeinthefuture.Anofficial
surveydemonstratedthatsomeTaiwanesefirms,especiallythetraditionallabour
intensive industries, have already set up R&D departments in China. Some of
their subsidiaries in China also began to take the role of receiving orders from
foreign buyers (Liu, 2011, p. 39). Although Chinas R&D centers are less
significant and more advanced technology is still kept in Taiwan, from a longer
term perspective, the importance of Chinas R&D is likely to raise and even
surpass Taiwan and thus upgrade Chinas position in the global production
network. As a result, the CrossStrait division of labour will be shifted from
vertical integration to horizontal cooperation. More opening up in direct
transportation and other economic exchanges between Taiwan and China will
facilitatetheCrossStraitsynergyinbothmanufacturingandR&D.Furthermore,
owingtotheweakerdemandfromWesterncountriesandChinesegovernments
6/18
01/12/2015
12
13
recent emphasis on spurring domestic consumption, more and more Taiwanese

firms started to aim at Chinas domestic market. The services that support the
manufacturingproductionislikelytomoveoutfromTaiwaninthefutureinorder
to have an accurate and quick respond to Chinas domestic demand. Therefore,
the role China will no longer be as a simply assembling location for the
manufactured goods. A comprehensive supply chain, including manufacturing,
salesandaftersalesserviceswillbeconstructedinChina.
In addition to the considerable outward investment, the lack of inward
investmentinhighvalueaddedsectorsisanotherreasonthatworsensTaiwans
deindustrializationproblem.Since1997Taiwansinwardinvestmentshavebeen
constantly less than the outward investment. Between 2002 and 2012, the
outwardinvestmentamountedtonearlyUS$151billion,morethantwiceofthe
inward investment amounts (US$72 billion). In fact, not only foreign investors
but Taiwanese entrepreneurs also have no strong interests in investing on the
island.AccordingMOEAssurvey,in2010,86%oftheTaiwanesecompaniesthat
hadalreadyinvestedinothercountrieshadnoplanstoinvestinTaiwaninthe
next three years (Liu, 2011, p. 30). The main reason is that these Taiwanese
companies have already established their production network overseas. As the
current arrangement with upstream suppliers and downstream partners
functioned well, any modification to the production site is regarded as
disadvantageoustoachievingcostefficiency.
TherisinglabourcostandappreciationofNewTaiwandollarinthe1980swere
often attributed as the reason behind Taiwans less attractiveness for foreign
investors. More recently, the reason could be attributed to the government
inefficiency. According to the World Bank, the governments bureaucratic
practices,includingthelongprocedureneededtoobtainconstructionpermits,the
weakcontractsenforcementandprotectionforinvestors,therelativelyhighertax
and the less accessibility to credit are the main obstacles for foreign investors
doing business in Taiwan. In order to promote investment inflow, several
preferentialpolicies,suchaslowertaxrates,incentivesforleaseandpurchaseof
land in industrial parks and financial loans have been introduced by the
government to attract foreign investors. Nonetheless, the result is not so
satisfying.Aftertheglobalfinancialcrisis,theinwardinvestmentdecreasedfrom
US$ 15 billion in 2007 to US$5 billion in 2009. The promotion measures then
turned to attract Chinese investors. Since 2009, Taiwan has lifted the ban on
investmentfromChina.TheChinesecitizensnowcaninvestinavarietyofsectors
includingmanufacturing,servicesandpublicconstructioninTaiwan,exceptfor
some high technology sectors and some high value added service sectors. The
Taiwan government hopes that the opening up of Chinese investment will be
helpful in making up for Taiwans deficiency in foreign investment. In 2012,
among the US$5 billion of inward investments, 24% was mostly from British
overseas territories in the Caribbean, followed by investments from Holland
(20%), Japan (7%), the US (7%), Samoa (7%) and China (6%). In fact, inward
investment from British overseas territories in the Caribbean may be made by
TaiwanesecompaniesregisteredinBritishoverseasterritoriesinordertobenefit
from certain privileges aimed at attracting foreign investors. Like in the 1990s,
many Taiwanese business people invested in China through their holding
companies in British Central America, such as the Virgin Islands and Cayman
Islands in order to bypass the outward investment constraint. The insignificant
inflow of Chinese investments so far is probably because Taiwans small market
and the current sectors open to Chinese investors do not correspond with their
interests.ThehightechnologysectorsthatmanyChineseinvestorsareinterested
arestillnotderegulatedforChinatoinvest.
7/18
01/12/2015
Figure2.TaiwansGDPbySector19552011
Source:DGBAS,ExecutiveYuan,Taiwan.
Figure3.TaiwansEmploymentbySector19552011
Source:DGBAS,ExecutiveYuan,Taiwan.
3.TaiwansGrowingTrade
DependenceonChina
14
TaiwansgrowingtradedependenceonChinacanbeaccessedviatwoaspects.
The first one is to compare Taiwans trade with China and with other trade
partnerstoseehowimportanceofChinainTaiwansoverallexternaltrade.Since
2000, China and Hong Kong combined have surpassed the US to become
Taiwanslargestexportdestination.AsshowninFigure4,intenyears,Taiwans
exportstoChinaandHongKongaspercentageofitstotalexportsjumpedfrom
27%in2001to40%in2011.WhileTaiwansexportstoChinacontinuedtotakea
greatshareofitstotalexports,TaiwansexportstotheUS,EuropeandJapanas
shares of its total exports have declined significantly with the exception of
Southeast Asian countries. As for imports, although Japan remains Taiwans
largest import source, its share in Taiwans total imports has already decreased
considerablyfrom24%in2001to19%in2011.ImportsfromtheUS,Europeand
ASEAN also decreased noticeably over the last decade. Meanwhile, the share of
Taiwans imports from China increased from 7% to 16% in the same period
8/18
01/12/2015
15
16
17
(Figure5).InconsiderationoftherapidgrowthofimportsfromChinainrecent
years, China will be likely to overtake Japan to become the largest source of
importsforTaiwaninthenextfewyears.However,ChinawillnotreplaceJapan
as the main supplier of key component to Taiwan as Japan still holds more
advancedtechnology.Indeed,oneofthereasonsfortherisingshareofTaiwans
importsfromChinaisthatsomeTaiwanesecompaniesbegantoselltheindustrial
goods manufactured in China back to Taiwan. The CrossStrait trade are
increasinglytowardstointraindustrytradeinwhichtheexchangeofgoodsare
similarandinthesameindustries.In2011forexample,electricalmachineryand
equipments (HS Code 85), the most traded goods between Taiwan and China,
accounted for 39% of Taiwans total imports from and 31% of Taiwans total
exportstoChina. 3
ThesecondaspectistocomparetheshareofChinaandTaiwanineachothers
totaltradetoseewhichonehasmoreweighttotheother.Itisnoteworthythat
although China is increasingly important in Taiwans external trade, Taiwans
importance in Chinas overall trade is decreasing. From 2001 to 2011, Chinas
exports to Taiwan have remained at around 2% of total Chinese exports
(Figure6).ThealmostnonincreaseofChineseexportstoTaiwanasashareofits
totalindicatesthatTaiwanssmallmarketprovidesonlylimitedgrowthpotential
for Chinas products. Thus, while China is becoming a significant export
destinationforTaiwan,thesmallislandhasnotyetbeenandwillbelesslikelyto
becomeaninterestingmarketforChina.Meanwhile,ChinasimportsfromTaiwan
aspercentageofitstotalimportsdeclinedfrom11%to7%(Figure7).
There are three reasons behind Taiwans decreasing share in Chinas total
imports. First, in recent years, the Mainlandbased Taiwanese companies have
shiftedtheirpreferenceforpurchasingintermediategoodsfromChinainsteadof
importingfromTaiwan.AccordingtoTaiwansofficialsurvey,in2002,only15%
of Mainlandbased Taiwanese companies procured capital equipment and
intermediategoodsfromlocalfirmsinChinabutthisratioincreasedtoover60%
in 2010. During the same period, procurement for products from Taiwan
decreasedfrom45%toaround23%~28%(Liu,2003and2011).Thesharesoflocal
procurementinChinawereespeciallyhighintraditionalindustries,suchasfood
andchemicalproducts.Second,theunderperformanceofTaiwanesecompanies
inChinasubsequenttotherisinglaborcostinrecentyearsalsoledtoareduction
in their import of intermediate goods from Taiwan. According to Taiwans
NationalSecurityBureausreporttotheLegislativeYuaninSeptember2012,30%
of Taiwanese investors in China faced bankruptcy and another 30% were
strugglingforsurvival(TheEpochTimes,2012).Third,thereductionofTaiwans
share in Chinas total imports may also be a result of Chinas changing import
structure.Chinasimportsofmineralproductsincreasedfrom8%in2002to25%
in 2011 while its imports of machinery (from 43% to 32%) and electrical
equipment (from 25% to 20%) had decreased. 4 This import structural changes
from industrial goods to mineral products imply that as Chinas economy
continuestoupgrade,thedemandforintermediategoods(eg,fromTaiwanand
SouthKorea)islikelytobelessimportant.Inthemeantime,itsdemandforraw
materialsandnaturalresources(eg,fromresourcerichSoutheastAsiancountries)
may continue to expand. Taiwans high dependence on manufacturing goods
exports to China is thus vulnerable not only to the global demand but also to
Chinasindustrialupgrading.
From the above interpretation, it is clear that while China is increasingly
important for Taiwans overall external trade, its dependence on imports of
industrial goods from Taiwan is failing. For an exportoriented economy like
Taiwan,itshightradedependenceonChinameansthatChineseeconomicshifts
would be quite determinant for Taiwans economic up and down. Taiwans
9/18
01/12/2015
relianceonChinaimpliesthatanypoliticalconfrontationoreconomicchangein
China would result in a greater impact on Taiwans economy than viceversa.
SomeviewedthatBeijingseconomicsanctionagainstTaiwanislesspossibleasit
willalsoharmChinaseconomygiventheclosetiesintheCrossStraitdivisionof
labour (Tung, 2003, p. 143). However, although such an economic sanction
against Taiwans imports may also damage Chinese economy, Chinas greater
economycansupportbetterthansmallTaiwanforthateconomiccrash.Chinas
largerdomesticmarketcanabsorbtheshockfromeconomicbreakwithTaiwan.
Moreover, as mentioned previously, China is less dependent on trading with
Taiwan. If there is any disagreement between Taiwan and China, China can
switch its import sources from Taiwan to Japan and South Korea, which have
similarexportitemsasTaiwan.Onthecontrary,Taiwanwillbeunabletofinda
substitute for its exports immediately. In a nutshell, Taiwan will have less
leveragetosustainChinaseconomicsanctionifthereisany.
Figure4.ShareofTaiwansExportDestinationsbyCountry/Region20012011
Source:QuarterlyNationalEconomicTrends,DirectorateGeneralofBudget,Accountingand
Statistics,ExecutiveYuan,Taiwan,August2011MinistryofFinance,Taiwan.
Note:AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN6),includingBruneiDarussalam,Indonesia,
Malaysia,Philippines,SingaporeandThailand.
Figure5.ShareofTaiwansImportOriginsbyCountry/Region20012011
Source:QuarterlyNationalEconomicTrends,DirectorateGeneralofBudget,Accountingand
Statistics,ExecutiveYuan,Taiwan,Aug2011MinistryofFinance,Taiwan.
10/18
01/12/2015
Figure6.SharesofTaiwansexportstoChinaandChinasexportstoTaiwan2001
2011
Source:MinistryofFinance,TaiwanCEIC.
Note:ChinaincludesHongKong.
Figure7.SharesofTaiwansimportsfromChinaandChinasimportsfromTaiwan
20012011
Source:MinistryofFinance,TaiwanCEIC.
Note:ChinaincludesHongKong.
4.ECFA:PoliticalandEconomic
Considerations
18
The institutionalized economic relations seem the best solution to secure

Taiwans economic interests. Since 2008, a number of agreements have been
signedbetweentheStraitsExchangeFoundation(SEF,onbehalfofTaiwan)and
the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS, on behalf on
China), or during the ChiangChen Summit. 5 With the implementation of the
early harvest programme under ECFA on 1 January 2011, China has to lower
tariffson539items,rangingfromagriculturaltomanufacturingproductssuchas
petrochemicals, machinery, transport equipment and textiles while Taiwan
reducedtariffson267itemsimportedfromthemainlandsinceJanuary2011.The
11/18
01/12/2015
19
20
21
aimistoprogressivelyreducethetariffsoftheseitemstozeroby2013.Intermsof
trade in services, China opens up 11 service sectors for Taiwanese investment
whileTaiwanopens9sectorsinbothfinancialandbusinessservices.
To facilitate followup negotiations, the CrossStrait Economic Cooperation
Committee(ECC),initsfirst meeting in February 2011, decided to establish six
working groups, including those on trade in goods, trade in services, dispute
settlement,investment,industrialcooperationandcustomcooperation.Inspite
oftheprogressincrossstraiteconomicnegotiations,thepoliticaldebateonECFA
continued in Taiwan. The KMT argued that its economic opening up policy
toward China is beneficial to the islands economy (Taiwan News, 2011).
Nonetheless,theDemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP)continuedtoblametheKMT
governments underestimation of the negative impact on Taiwan, such as the
rising unemployment rate, Taiwans wider trade deficit in agricultural products
with China and the leakage of agricultural technology to the mainland (Asia
Pulse, 2011). Some opine that an assessment of the effects of ECFA may be
premature due to the relatively insignificant share of early harvest products in
totaltrade.In2009forexample,theproductslistedontheearlyharvestprogram
ofECFAaccountedforonly14%ofTaiwanstotalimportsfromChinaand11%of
ChinastotalimportsfromTaiwan.Infact,thepoliticalimplicationsofarismore
significant than its economic impact. China regards ECFA as a stepping stone
towardreunification.TheKMTexpectedECFAtocontributetoTaiwanseconomic
prosperityandfurtherretainitspoliticalpowerontheisland.The reelection of
President Ma Yingjeou in 2012 indicated that the KMT governments economic
openinguppolicytowardsChinaduringthefirsttermofMaspresidency(2008
2012) was generally supported by the majority of Taiwanese people, especially
some prominent Taiwanese entrepreneurs, who publicly affirmed that the 1992
consensus6 is beneficial for TaiwanChina economic cooperation as well as
Taiwanseconomicdevelopmentinthefuture.
Different from about two decades ago when Taiwanese government still tried
hardtoavoiditsoverdependenceonChina,thegrowingeconomictieswithChina
in terms of investment and trade have forced the government to make some
changes. Due to the severe business competition in the Chinese market, the
Taiwanesegovernmentisverykeenonfinalizingdealsoncommodityandservices
trade with China before China makes any further headway in FTA negotiations
with Taiwans competitors in the world market, such as South Korea. The Ma
administrationregardsECFAasanequivalenttoFTAandasameanstopromote
the islands economic growth. It also aims to use Chinas huge market as a
platform for the brand development of Taiwans service sectors. The
institutionalized economic relations is not to be seen as a move to further
encouragecrossstraiteconomicrelationship,butrather,apassivereactionofthe
Taiwanese government towards its inevitable strengthening relationship with
China.
Atthesametime,Taiwanisconcernedthatitsheavyeconomicdependenceon
China may lead to a political compromise in the future. Hence, in addition to
ECFA, the Ma administration has actively pursued FTAs with other economies.
The negotiations on the Agreement of SingaporeTaiwan Economic Partnership
(ASTEP)andEconomicCooperationAgreements(ECA)withNewZeelandarein
progress.EconomicagreementswithIsrael,Indonesia,thePhilippines,Malaysia
and India are also under feasibility study. Nonetheless, compared to other East
Asian countries, Taiwan lags behind in negotiating FTA with both individual
economies and the economic blocs. Southeast Asian countries can freely access
Chinas market via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus one
(ASEAN+1). South Koreas FTA with the US and European Union has already
taken effect. Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam also want to consolidate their
12/18
01/12/2015
22
23
economic relations with America via the TransPacific Partnership (TPP). The
leaders from China, Japan and South Korea agreed to launch the first round of
trilateral FTA negotiation in 2013. The three countries also joined ten ASEAN
members, Australia, New Zealand and India in plans to launch negotiations on
RegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnership(RCEP)in2013.Therelaxationof
Taiwans restrictions on imports of US beef in July 2012 paved the way for the
resumption of TaiwanUS Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)
and possibility to be part of TPP. However, as the US is likely to push for an
agreement to liberalize Taiwans services and agricultural sectors in favor of US
business,protectionistforcesinTaiwanmaymakeittoughforthegovernmentto
acceptsuchproposedmeasures.DuetotheunclearfutureofTaiwansFTAwith
other economies and Taiwans entry into TPP, the island is more likely to make
efforts to secure the economic benefits gained from ECFA in order to
counterbalance the impact from the rapidly developed regional economic
integration.
FullyexposedtointernationalcompetitionandahighdependenceonChinas
market, the Taiwan economy has been facing a prolonged period of de
industrialization,resultinginitssluggisheconomy.TheMasgovernmentismore
likelytodeepenitseconomicdependenceonChinaasitofferstheeasiestshort
term solutions to Taiwans lack of internal dynamics for economic growth.
Meanwhile, the new Chinese leadership is unlikely to alter the current
harmonious relation with Taiwan, the best they have had since 1949. Further
advancement in crossstrait economic relations can be expected from the
following aspects. First, Taiwan will accelerate its followup talks in ECFA,
includingtradeingoodsandservicessoastocounterbalancetheimpactofrapid
regionaleconomicintegration.Second,thefurtheropeninguptoChinesetourists
is expected as it will allow Taiwans tourism sector to enjoy a boom in terms of
tourism revenue and employment. Third, more deregulation of financial sectors
across the strait is encouraging as it will bring more business opportunities to
TaiwansfinancialcompaniesservingentrepreneursbetweenTaiwanandChina.
Infact,inordertoenhancetheprospectsoftheislandsfinancialsectors,Taiwan
has envisioned itself to become another Renminbi offshore centre after Hong
Kong.Asaresult,crossstraiteconomicintegrationwillbecomeacomprehensive
quasiFTAthatincludesfreemovementbetweenthepeople,goodsandfinancial
capitalintheforeseeablefuture.
TheCrossStraiteconomicintegrationsurelycreatesagoodenvironmentforthe
futurepoliticalreconciliation.However,thecurrentconditionsarenotmaturefor
thereunificationtobecarriedout.Theopinionspollin2013indicatesthatonlya
small share of people in Taiwan support immediate reunification with China
(3%). 9% of people in Taiwan support statusquo now and reunification later.
Themajorityofthemwantstokeepthestatusquoforever(28%)andstatusquo
nowanddecideindependenceorreunificationlater(33%). 7Moreover,inspiteof
theimprovementincrossstraiteconomicrelations,anothersurveyshowedthat
thecurrentmainstreamviewinTaiwanisthatChinaactsmorelikeabusiness
partner(44%)andfriend(18%),insteadoffamilies(8%)orrelatives(5%).
The majority of the Taiwanese people regard reunification an unnecessary
option(66%)evenifChinaisabletocatchupwithTaiwanintermsofGDPper
capita, political freedom and social stability (Global Views Survey Research
Center,2010).AsforChina,thepoliticalrelationwithTaiwanisconsideredalong
term issue. As long as Taiwan does not declare its independencedejure, in the
next few years, the CrossStrait relations will continue to be limited within the
economic framework. In fact, there are many social problems and economic
reformsthatareevenmoreurgentforChineseleadershiptodealwith.Inaddition,
Chinas frequent territorial disputes in recent years with its neighbouring
13/18
01/12/2015
countriesalongtheislandchaininEastAsia,includingwiththeSoutheastAsian
countriesontheSouthChinaSeaissueandwithJapanonDiaoyuIsland,have
made the peaceful relations with Taiwan quite essential. Despite the political
tensionwithitsneighbouringcountries,ChinasactiveinvolvementinFTAswith
many regional economies, including Taiwan, would help to ease the China
threatconcernsandfacilitateChinaspeacefulrisepolicyintheregion(Hsieh,
2011,p.132).Chinawillnotbewillingtobreaktheimageasapeacedefender
thoughthepoliticalgoalforTaiwancontinuestobeoneofChinasvitalnational
interests.
Conclusion
24
25
26
Different from the Cold War era when Taiwan depended on exporting final
goods to the US market for its economic advancement, it has now changed to
dependonChinatosustainitseconomicgrowth.TheimpactforTaiwanafterthe
deepened economic integration with China and prospect on the CrossStrait
relationscanbesummarizedasfollows.First,TaiwansinvestmentinChinahas
transformed from labourintensive industries led by SME to high technology
sectors led by large enterprises. This is actually in line with the changes of
Taiwansindustrialupgradingfromlabourintensivegoodstohighertechnology
products. Although Chinas current R&D is less significant as Taiwan retains
ownership of the more advanced technology in the ICT industry, from a longer
term perspective, the importance of Chinas R&D is likely to increase and even
surpass Taiwan. Therefore, different from the vertical integrationTaiwan
produces more valueadded goods and China is specialized in labor intensive
manufacturing,thecrossstraitsynergyinbothmanufacturingandR&Dwillbe
formulated. In other words, China will not be a simply final goods assembly
location for Taiwan. There will be more cooperation or competition between the
companiesonthetwosidesinavarietyofmanufacturingsectors.
Second, following its massive investment in manufacturing sectors in China,
Taiwanhasexperienceddeindustrializationsinceadecadeago.Whiletheweight
ofmanufacturinginTaiwanseconomyhasdecreased,Taiwanseconomicgrowth
hasnotprogressedbyasmuchanditsunemploymentroseprogressivelyinrecent
years.Infact,therisingsharesofservicesinbothGDPandemploymentaredue
more to the decreasing manufacturing activity in Taiwan. The development of
services to date has so far been constrained because of the small scale and
domestic orientation of service companies, Taiwans extensive dependence on
manufactured exports and insufficient inward investment. In addition to its
dependence on manufacturing production in China, the further development of
Taiwans service sectors will also have to depend on China, including Chinese
tourists spending and inflow of Chinas financial capital that is expected to
revitalizebothtourismandfinancialservicesectorsinTaiwan.
Third,thetradefiguresindicateTaiwansgrowingdependenceonChinainits
overalltradewhiletheshareofTaiwaninChinasexternaltradeisonthedecline.
Therefore,theharmfromthelossofChinasmarketforTaiwanwouldbegreater
thanthelossofsourceofimportsfromTaiwanforChina.AlthoughmanyAsian
economieshavealsoturnedtheirtradedependencefromtheUStoChinainrecent
years, the difference with Taiwan is that their dependence on China will not
damage their political sovereignties. The establishment of institutionalized
economicrelationsseemstheunavoidablewaytosecureTaiwansbenefitsinthe
CrossStrait economic exchanges. But that institutionalized economic relations
willinturntietheeconomiesbetweenTaiwanandChinamoredeeply.Although
thepoliticalreconciliationisstillalongtermissue,Taiwansrisingeconomicand
14/18
01/12/2015
27
28
tradedependenceonChinawillputtheislandinadisadvantageouspositionin
thefuturenegotiations.
In order to prevent from overdependence on China, Taiwan has tried to
diversifyitsexternaleconomicrelationsbyproposingFTAswithothereconomies.
However,theresultisnotyetsatisfying.Giventheitsminimalinvolvementinthe
regionaleconomicintegration,Taiwanwillbemorelikelytoaccelerateitsfollow
up trade talks with China in order to counterbalance the potential impact form
therapiddevelopmentofregionalFTAs.Inotherwords,theMagovernmentwill
deepen its economic dependence on China as it offers the easiest shortterm
solution to Taiwans current economic sluggish. From a long term perspective,
however,themostimportantworkforTaiwanisprobablytoupgradeitsdomestic
industries through innovation as a way to find an irreplaceable position in the
regiontoavoidbeingmarginalizedfromtherapidlydevelopedregionaleconomic
integration.
The current peaceful CrossStrait relations will surely allow Taiwan to enjoy
benefits from Chinas booming economy at the time when the reunification is
considered by both sides as a long term issue. But even from the economic
perspective, it is not without risk for Taiwan. Chinese peoples growing
dissatisfactionwiththecorruptivegovernmentandtherisinginequalitybetween
therichandthepoorislikelytomakethesocialriottoarouseinanytime.Evenif
Chinesegovernmentwasabletomaintainitspoliticalstability,Chinaseconomy,
whichisatthejunctureoftransformationafter30yearsofdependingonlabor
intensivemanufacturing,isanuncertainvariabletoTaiwanseconomicfuture.If
Chinasuccessfullyupgradeditsindustry,itsdemandforintermediategoodsfrom
Taiwanmaydip.Ontheotherhand,shouldChinafailuretoupgradeitsindustry,
it will negatively impact on its economic prospect and the Chinese economic
downturnthatfollowedwillhurtTaiwanaswell.
Bibliography
DOI are automaticaly added to references by Bilbo, OpenEdition's Bibliographic
AnnotationTool.
UsersofinstitutionswhichhavesubscribedtooneofOpenEditionfreemiumprogramscan
download references for which Bilbo found a DOI in standard formats using the buttons
availableontheright.
Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
The Bibliographic Export Service is accessible via institutions subscribing to one
OpenEditionfreemiumprograms.
If you wish your institution to become a subscriber to one OpenEdition freemium
programsandthusbenefitfromourservices,pleasewriteto:access@openedition.org.
AsiaPulse(2011),TaiwangovturgedtoreevaluateECFAChinaTradePact,28June.
Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
BreslinS.(2004),GreaterChinaandthePoliticalEconomyofRegionalisation,EastAsia,
21(1),Spring,pp.723.
DOI:10.1007/s121400040007x
Chang T. (2004), Why is Economic Integration Unlikely in Greater China?, Annual
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago,
Illinois,pp.123.
15/18
01/12/2015
ChungHua Institution for Economic Research (2011), Survey on Taiwans Outward

Investment and its Overseas Operational Profile, commissioned by Investment
Commission,MOEA,Taiwan.
Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
CraneG.T.(1993),ChinaandTaiwan:NotYetGreaterChina,InternationalAffairs,69
(4),October,pp.705723.
DOI:10.2307/2620593
Global Views Survey Research Center (2010), Peoples opinions on reunification with
China
and
Taiwan
independence,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/1329176511.pdf.
Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
HsiehPashaL.(2011),TheChinaTaiwanECFA,GeopoliticalDimensionsandWTOLaw,
JournalofInternationalEconomicLaw,14(1),pp.121156.
DOI:10.1093/jiel/jgr009
LinM.Q.andLiangW.K.(2003),ALongitudinalStudyofEntryModeChoices:Taiwans
Investment Experiences in China, The Proceedings of the 7th International Conference
onGlobalBusinessandEconomicDevelopment,Bangkok,Thailand,Jan.811,pp.234247.
Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
LinT.C.(1997),TaiwansInvestmentPolicyinMainlandChina:ADomesticPerspective,
JournalofChinesePoliticalScience,3(2),pp.2545.
DOI:10.1007/BF02876842
LiuM.C.(2003),TheInvestigationandAnalysisoftheOperationofInvestingBusiness
in Mainland China, ChungHua Institution for Economic Research, Commissioned by
MOEA,(inChinese).
LiuM.C.(2011),TheInvestigationandAnalysisoftheOperationofInvestingBusinessin
Mainland China, ChungHua Institution for Economic Research, Commissioned by
MOEA,(inChinese).
Ministry of Commerce of Peoples Republic of China, Top 200 Exporting Companies in
China, http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/qycx/qycx_ch/CNExpTop200_new.jsp
(in
Chinese).
Format
APA
MLA
Chicago
Peng D. (2002), Subregional Economic Zones and Integration in East Asia, Political
ScienceQuarterly,117(4),pp.613641.
DOI:10.2307/798137
Straits Times (2011), Taiwans Acer to invest $4 mn in China R&D centre, 19 July,
http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Money/Story/STIStory_692213.html.
16/18
01/12/2015
Taiwan News (2011), Wu Denyih: ECFA does not result in Taiwans dependence on
China,
16
September,
http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?
id=1708497.
TheChinaPost(2012),Foxconn,ChongqingtosetupR&Dcenter:report,26February,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/chinataiwan
relations/2012/02/26/332786/FoxconnChongqing.htm.
Tung C.Y. (2003), CrossStrait Economic Relations: Chinas Leverage and Taiwans
Vulnerability,Issues&Studies,39(3),pp.137175.
The Epoch Times (2012), Taiwanese investors in China in trouble 3 October,
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/chinanews/299629299629.html(inChinese).
Want China Times (2012), Chengdu increasingly attractive for Taiwanese investors,
14
March,
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/newssubclasscnt.aspx?
id=20120314000048&cid=1102&MainCatID=11.
Notes
1 In the 1990s, Taiwan government allowed only the indirect investment to China. The
indirectinvestmentchannelsincluded(1)abranchofaTaiwancompanyestablishedina
thirdcountry(2)anothercompanylocatedinathirdcountry(3)acompanyinaterritory
outsidemainlandChina(4)indirectremittanceoftheirinvestmentfromathirdcountry
toChina.(Lin,1997,p.29)
2TheinvestigationofLinand Liang shows that there are 4 principal investment centers
for Taiwanese firms to invest overseas: 34.5% of the firms through the Virgin Islands,
23.7%throughHongKong,15%viaSingaporeand8.1%viatheCaimanIslands.(Linand
Liang,2003,p.239).
3Sourceofstatistics:BureauofForeignTrade,MOEA,Taiwan.
4Sourceofstatistics:WorldTradeAtlas,GlobalTradeInformationServices,Inc.
5Chiang Pinkung is the Chairman of SEF and Chen Yunlin is the Chairman of ARATS.
The ChiangChen Summit followed the previous crossstrait talks, or KooWang Summit
whichwassuspendedin1999.
6The1992ConsensusspecifiesthatthereisoneChinaandTaiwanispartofChina,with
One China subject to the different interpretations of both sides, be it one China under
KMT or CPC leadership. Both KMT and CCP claim that this consensus is the result of
politicaldiscussionsbetweenthetwosides(theTaiwanbasedStraitExchangeFoundation
and Chinabased the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait) in Hong Kong in
1992. But some proindependence politicians in Taiwan argue that there was no such
politicalagreementbetweenTaiwanandChinain1992.
75% of people in Taiwan choose to have immediate independence, 16% want to have
status quo now and independence later and 6% of them have no opinion. Source:
MainlandAffairsCouncil,Taiwan.
Listofillustrations
Title
Figure1.TaiwansInvestmentinChina19912011
Credits Source:InvestmentCommission,MOEA,Taiwan.
URL
http://regulation.revues.org/docannexe/image/10177/img1.png
File
image/png,65k
Title
Figure2.TaiwansGDPbySector19552011
Credits Source:DGBAS,ExecutiveYuan,Taiwan.
URL
File
image/png,62k
Title
Figure3.TaiwansEmploymentbySector19552011
Credits Source:DGBAS,ExecutiveYuan,Taiwan.
URL
File
image/png,59k
Figure4.ShareofTaiwansExportDestinationsby
17/18
01/12/2015
Title
Figure4.ShareofTaiwansExportDestinationsby
Country/Region20012011
Source:QuarterlyNationalEconomicTrends,DirectorateGeneral
Credits ofBudget,AccountingandStatistics,ExecutiveYuan,Taiwan,
August2011MinistryofFinance,Taiwan.
URL
File
image/png,67k
Title
Figure5.ShareofTaiwansImportOriginsbyCountry/Region
20012011
Source:QuarterlyNationalEconomicTrends,DirectorateGeneral
Credits ofBudget,AccountingandStatistics,ExecutiveYuan,Taiwan,Aug
2011MinistryofFinance,Taiwan.
URL
File
image/png,33k
Title
Figure6.SharesofTaiwansexportstoChinaandChinasexports
toTaiwan20012011
Credits Source:MinistryofFinance,TaiwanCEIC.
URL
File
image/png,39k
Title
Figure7.SharesofTaiwansimportsfromChinaandChinas
importsfromTaiwan20012011
Credits Source:MinistryofFinance,TaiwanCEIC.
URL
File
image/png,21k
References
Electronicreference
MinHuaChiangandBernardGerbier,CrossStraitEconomicRelations:Recent
DevelopmentandImplicationsforTaiwan,Revuedelargulation[Online],13|1er
semestre/Spring2013,Onlinesince25June2013,connectionon01December2015.
URL:http://regulation.revues.org/10177
Abouttheauthors
MinHuaChiang
VisitingResearchFellow,EastAsianInstitute,NationalUniversityofSingapore,
eaicmh@nus.edu.sg
BernardGerbier
EmeritusProfessor,universitPierreMendsFrancedeGrenoble,
Bernard.Gerbier@upmfgrenoble.fr
Copyright
Tousdroitsrservs
18/18

Cross-Strait Economic Relations - Recent Development and Implications For Taiwan

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Cross-Strait Economic Relations - Recent Development and Implications For Taiwan

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

01/12/2015

centred regionalization. The conventional market driven and Chinacentred

The immediate effect following the massive outward investment in

recent emphasis on spurring domestic consumption, more and more Taiwanese

The institutionalized economic relations seem the best solution to secure

ChungHua Institution for Economic Research (2011), Survey on Taiwans Outward

You might also like