Webber, Jeremy. Institutional Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures in The Definition of Fundamental Rights

23.3.
2016 Webber,Jeremy"InstitutionalDialogueBetweenCourtsandLegislaturesintheDefinitionofFundamentalRights:LessonsFromCanada(andEls
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Webber, Jeremy "Institutional Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures

in the Definition of Fundamental Rights: Lessons From Canada (and
Elsewhere)" [2003] AUJlHRights 8 (2003) 9(1) Australian Journal of Human
Rights 9
Institutionaldialoguebetweencourtsandlegislaturesinthedeinitionoffundamental
rights:lessonsfromCanada(andelsewhere)
JeremyWebber*
Introduction
Inrecentyears,anumberofcommentatorshaveusedtheconceptofdialoguetocapturethe
relationshipbetweenCanadiancourtsandlegislaturesinthejudicialreviewof
constitutionality.1Aslongasdialogueistreatedscepticallyandisnotassumedtodescribean
idealconversation,theideaofdialoguecanprovideausefulperspectiveonhumanrights
protectionsgenerally,foritemphasisestheextenttowhichbothcourtsandlegislatureshave
valuablethingstosayaboutrights,directsourattentiontothewaysinwhichthetwo
institutionsinteract,andprovidestoolsforevaluatingtheremarkablybroadrangeof
mechanismsthatcanbeusedtoprotectrights.
Thispaperreviewsaspectrumofmeansbywhichsuchdialogueoverrightscanbestructured
inaconstitutionalsystem.Itthenfocusesinmoredetailonthreespeciicformsofrights
protectionandevaluatestheinstitutionalbalanceachievedineach:
theinding,bythecourts,thatconstitutionalprovisionsdealingwithothermatterscontain
implicitrightsguarantees,sothatrightscometobeaddressedthroughtheadjudicationof
provisionshavinglittleostensiblytodowithrights(animpliedrightsapproach);
theentrenchmentofaBillofRightsintheConstitution,backedbyjudicialreview,butsubject
toexpressderogationbylegislativeaction(theapproachcontainedins33the
notwithstandingclauseoftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms);and
thedeclarationofrightsinanordinarystatute,lackingconstitutionalstatusbutprotectedbya
requirementthatderogationoccurinaspeciiedmannerandform(thestatutoryBillofRights
approach).
EachofthesemechanismshasbeenusedinCanada.InthispaperIwilldrawprimarilyon
Canadianexperience,althoughIwillalsodiscusstheAustralianjurisprudenceonimpliedrights
andrefertoapproachestorightstakeninanumberofotherchielyAngloAmerican
jurisdictions.
Thenotionthatrightsguaranteesarecharacterisedbydialoguebetweencourtsand
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AJHR/2003/8.html
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23.3.2016 Webber,Jeremy"InstitutionalDialogueBetweenCourtsandLegislaturesintheDefinitionofFundamentalRights:LessonsFromCanada(andEls
legislaturesmaystrikethereaderasbothcounterintuitiveandnormativelyinappropriate.We
generallythinkofjudicialreviewinmuchsimplerandmonologicalterms.Parliamentpasses
laws,andcourtseitherupholdthemorstrikethemdownonthebasisoftheirinterpretationof
theConstitution.Anysensethatpoliticalactorsinluencethecourtsinterpretationofthe
Constitutionseemsincompatiblewithjudicialindependenceandtheruleoflaw;weassumethat
courtsshouldcometotheirownconclusionsastoconstitutionality,withoutreferencetowhat
politicalactorslikeordislike.Somelegalrealistshaveemphasisedthatpoliticalactorsdohave
animpactonjudicialreview.Butthisimpactisgenerallytreatedbytherealiststhemselvesas
incompatiblewithclaimsofjudicialindependence.
Inthispaper,Iwilldealwithprincipledjustiicationsforlegislativeparticipationinthe
deinitionofrightsonlyenpassant,aspartoftheevaluationofthebalancestruckbyvarious
rightsinstruments.2Ishouldnote,however,thatinstitutionaldialogueoverrightsismuchmore
commonthanisoftenacknowledgedindeedis,tosomeextent,universal.
InCanada,theclaimthatjudicialreviewinvolvesdialoguehasspecialcredencebecauseoftwo
distinctiveaspectsoftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.First,theCanadianCharter
containsanexpresslimitationclause,s1,whichstatesthatitsrightsandfreedomsaresubject
onlytosuchreasonablelimits,prescribedbylaw,ascanbedemonstrablyjustiiedinafreeand
democraticsociety.Thisclauserecognisesnotonlythatrightsaresubjecttolimits,butalso,
implicitly,thatgovernmentshouldhavetheburdenofjustifyingthoselimits(RvOakesat136
137).Second,theCanadianCharterpermitslegislaturestoderogatefromsomeoftherightsit
enunciates.Section33providesthatlegislaturescaninsulateastatutefromcertainformsof
Charterreviewbyexpresslydeclaringthatthestatuteshalloperatenotwithstandingcertain
sectionsoftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.Whenthisoccurs,judicialreviewis
excluded.Boththeseprovisionssuggestthatthelegislaturemayactivelyparticipateinthe
deinitionofconstitutionalprotections.
AlthoughtheseclausesaredistinctivelyCanadian,therearefunctionalparallelsinvirtuallyall
constitutions.OtherBillsofRightscontainexpresslimitationclauses(seeNewZealandBillof
RightsAct1990,s5;ConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica1996,s36;forclausesapplicable
tospeciicrights,seeInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,art19(3);European
ConventiononHumanRights,art10(2)).Buteveniftheydonot,itisgenerallyconcededthatall
rightsaresubjecttolimits.Thoselimitsmaynotbeconceivedasrestrictionsofanotherwise
unlimitedright;theymaybeconceivedasaspectsofthedeinitionoftheright.Andtheremaybe
noclearunderstandingthatgovernmenthastheburdenofjustifyinglimits;itmaysimplybe
assumedthatthecourtswilldeterminethelimits.Butthesedistinctionsmakelittledifference
forourpurposes.Therightsare,inanycase,subjecttolimits;andwhenastatuteissubjectedto
judicialreview,anygovernmentwillseektojustifyameasurethatitwishestoretain.
TheCanadianChartersnotwithstandingclauseappearsmorestrikinglyoriginalthanthe
limitationclause,butevenithasfunctionalparallelselsewhere.Virtuallyeveryconstitutionis
subjecttoamendmentbysomelegislativeprocess,onerousthoughitmaybe.3Thedistinctive
characteristicoftheCanadianprovisionisreallytheeasewithwhichtherightsguaranteesmay
besetaside,andtheimplicitmessagethatitmaybelegitimatetodoso.
Allofthissuggeststhatthereissomethingofbroadersigniicancetothenotionofdialogue
betweencourtsandlegislatureinjudicialreview.Attheveryleast,itemphasisesthat
constitutionalreviewisaboutacomplexrelationshipbetweenlegislaturesandcourts.Judicial
reviewisnotsimplyaboutlawsenactedandthensubjectedtotheguillotineofjudicial
nulliication.Thereisconsiderablymorepotentialforindeedpresenceoftoandfro
betweenlegislaturesandcourts.Or,toputitanotherway,theinterpretationandenforcementof
rightsbycourtsalwaysoperateswithinazoneoftolerancecreatedbytherelativedificultyof
legislativeoverride(whethertheoverridewouldoccurbyordinarylegislativeprocessorby
constitutionalamendment).Thecontrolofthecourtsoverlegislativeactionisalways
conditional,dependentonthedegreeofinstitutionalfrictionwithinthesystem.Thismeansthat
itispossibleforframersofaconstitutiontostructuretheinstitutionalrelationshipinavariety
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ofwaystoachieveadesiredbalanceinlegislativeandjudicialroles.
Oneinalcomment.ThroughoutthispaperIusepoliticalincontrasttojudicialtorefertothe
broadspectrumofpublicdebate,decisionmakingandactionoutsidethecourts.Ofcourse,
judgesarealsopoliticalactorsinabroadsense.Moreover,Iacceptthatthereisnosharp
distinctionbetweenthekindsofreasonsemployedbyjudgesandthoseemployedinpolitical
discoursegenerally(althoughtherearesigniicantdifferencesintheweightgiventoparticular
kindsofreasons).Mychoiceofterminologyismerelyamatterofconvenience.InthispaperIam
concernedwiththemannerinwhichjudgesenterintodialoguewithbroaderpoliticalprocesses
(especiallywithgovernmentsandlegislatures)intheiradministrationofrightsguarantees.
Thosebroaderpoliticalprocessesarewideandvarious;itissimplesttousethecatchall
politicaltodescribethem.
Clearingtheunderbrush
Beforeplungingintothemechanismsfordialogue,itisworthsettingoutaseriesofassumptions
thatunderliemydiscussionofBillsofRights.
First,Idonotacceptasimplechecksandbalancesorlibertarianjustiicationfor
constitutionalreview,inwhichjudicialreviewisdefendedpurelyandsimplybecauseitlimits
government,regardlessofthegroundsoflimitation.Onthecontrary,theabilitytoparticipate
activelyingovernmenttoachievesocietalgoalsisakeydimensionoffreedom.Acorollaryofthis
isthevestingofameasureoftrustindemocraticinstitutionsacommitmenttotheireficacy,
asthemostrepresentativeofgovernmentalinstitutions.Allotherthingsbeingequal,democratic
institutionsshouldbepermittedtomakedecisionsandcarrythemintoeffect.Thenulliication
ofstatutesthroughjudicialreviewthereforerequiresspeciicjustiication.
Second,thechoiceofwhethertohavejudicialreviewofrightsguaranteesisnota
straightforwardchoicebetweenhavingrightsornot.Legislaturestooareconcernedwithrights,
althoughsometimesindifferentwaysfromcourts.Indeed,institutionalcharacteristicsmean
thatbothcourtsandlegislatureshavestrengthsandweaknessesinthedeinition,interpretation,
andapplicationofrights,towhichIwillreturnbelow.Onecanthereforebeastrongsupporterof
rightswithoutsupportingjudicialreviewonthebasisofaconstitutionalisedBillofRights.
Supportforjudicialreviewrequiresanadditionalpremise:areasonwhythatparticular
institutionalformisappropriate.
Idonotwanttoappeardisingenuousaboutthis.Idohaveconcernswiththeextentofhegemony
ofthediscourseofrightsandaboutitstendencytowardssimpliication,uniformityoftreatment,
highlysymbolicargumentation,andresistancetocompromise,allofwhichIhaveexplored
elsewhere(Webber1993:2000a).ScepticismtowardsoroppositiontoaconstitutionalisedBill
ofRightsisoftenfoundeduponoppositiontothepeculiarroleofrightsdiscourseundersucha
regime,andthispaperisnoexception.Butforthepurposesofthispaper,itissuficienttonote
thatscepticismwithrespecttojudicialreviewmayhavelittletodowithsupportforor
oppositiontorights.Onecanbeforrights,butconsiderothermeansofprotectiontobe
preferable.
Third,constitutionalBillsofRightsoftenserveavarietyofends;thesubstantiveprotectionof
individualrightsandfreedomsisnottheirsolefunction.Theyhaveoftenplayedanimportant
role,forexample,innationalconsolidation.Theyhaveestablishedacommonbasisof
citizenship,afirmedthatallcitizensaresubjecttothesamegovernmentalauthority,orsought
toenunciatethefundamentalvaluesofthenation.Thisnationalsymbolicrolemayalignclosely
withtheprotectionofrightsbutthetwofunctionsarenotidentical.Therecanbepointsat
whichtheydiverge.Theremay,forexample,beverygoodreasonongroundscloselylinkedto
humanrightsconcernsforrecognisingameasureofdiversitywithinthepublicinstitutionsof
thestate.Itmaybeperfectlyappropriate,forexample,forculturalminorities(indigenous
peoples;largelinguisticminoritiesinacountrysuchasCanada)tohaveaccesstotheirown
institutions(schools;socialprograms;evengovernmentalstructures).Yetthoseverydemands
haveoftenbeenresistedinthelanguageofequalityderivedfromconstitutionalguarantees,for
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reasonsthathavelittletodowithindividuallibertybutagreatdealtodowithadesirefor
nationalconsolidation(Webber1993:230231;1994:141144and234andfollowing;1999:
260277).Itisimportant,then,tobeclearonthefunctionstobeservedbyaBillofRights.Inthis
articleIwillfocusentirelyonthehumanrightsdimensionofBillsofRights,althoughnoting
complicationsposedbytheirnationalsymbolicrole.
Fourth,itisimportanttopayattentiontotherealissuesthatarelikelytobedealtwithundera
BillofRights.ManyjustiicationsforBillsofRightsrelyuponaparadeofhorribles;therights
guaranteesarejustiiedonthebasisoftheneedtopreventthegrossestofhumanrights
violations.Butinmostsocietieswithstrongdemocraticcultures,BillsofRightsarenotusedto
preventgrossviolations.Theyaredeployedatthemargins.Theydeinetherightsouterlimits,
orruleupontheirimplicationsinsituationsinwhichjudgmentsofrightandwrongarehighly
complexanddisputed.UndertheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,forexample,the
SupremeCourtofCanadastruckdowntheFederalGovernmentslegislationregulatingtobacco
advertisingonthebasisoffreedomofexpression(RJRMacDonaldvCanada));ithasstruck
downprovisionsthatprohibitedinterprovinciallawirms(BlackvLawSocietyofAldebta)or
requiredlawyerstobeCanadiancitizens(AndrewsvLawSocietyofBritishColumbia).Granted,it
hasmadesomedecisionsthathavehadanimportantimpactontherightsofindividuals.Thisis
true,forexample,ofitsearlyjudgmentstrikingdownCanadasabortionlawonprocedural
grounds(RvMorgentaler),oritsmorerecentdecisionextendingAlbertasIndividualsRights
ProtectionActtoincludediscriminationonthebasisofsexualorientation(Vriend).Butinthe
vastmajorityofcasestherehavebeenstrongargumentsoneachsideoftheissue;theultimate
decisionhasbeenamatterofinedetermination.
Iftherightscultureinaparticularcountryissuficientlystrongthatgrossviolationsofrights
nevercomebeforethecourts,thenonehastoaskwhetherjudgesmusthavethelastword.If
judicialreviewdoesnothingmorethansubstitutethereasonedopinionofajudgeforthe
reasonedopinionofthelegislatureonamatterofrealdoubtastowhatjusticerequires,why
bother?Ofcourse,thesituationisrarelythatsimple.Legislaturescanlosesightofrights
considerationsintheirrushtoachieveasocialobjective.Unpopularminoritiescanind
themselvesdisadvantagedbymeasuresthatindividuallymaynotamounttomuch,butthat
cumulativelyimposeasigniicantanddebilitatingburden.Thepointisthattherearemanyways
inwhichrightsprotectionscanbeachieved.Onemaystructuretheinstitutionalrelationship
differentlydependingonthematterslikelytocomebeforethecourts.
Thisinturnsuggeststhatdifferentformsofrightsprotectionmaybeappropriateindifferent
contexts.OnemayneedentrenchedBillsofRightsmostinsocietiesthatlackanestablished
democraticorhumanrightsculture,wherethesymbolicafirmationofrightsservesan
importantroleandpoliticalpowermustbeforcefullyconstrained.Theymaybelessnecessaryin
societiesinwhichhumanrightsalreadyformanimportantstrandinpoliticaldebate.
Institutionaldialogueandthestructureofhumanrightsprotections
Whatelementsdeterminethescopefordialogueintheenforcementofhumanrights
protections?Theyareremarkablydiverse.Whentakentogether,theydeineabroadrangeof
optionsfortheinstitutionalisationofhumanrights.Itwillbeusefultoaddressthemunderthree
headings:Extentofentrenchment;Strategyofjudicialreview;andMechanismsforlegislative
involvementinthedeinitionofrights.
Extentofentrenchment
Wecommonlythinkofconstitutionalentrenchmentasbeingallornothing:rightsareeither
enshrinedintheConstitution,exemptfromlegislativetampering,ortheyarelefttothemercyof
thelegislature.However,entrenchmentisamuchmorerelativeconceptthanthissuggests.In
essence,itisconcernedwiththedegreetowhichrightsprovisionshaveacontrollingimpacton
legislation,andtheeasewithwhichtheprovisionscanbechanged.Thereareawidevarietyof
meansbywhichrightscanbepursued,eachpostulatingadifferentrelationshipbetween
legislatureandcourts.Oftenthesearecumulatedwithinonelegalsystem.Canadianlawsportsa
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particularlyrichselection.HereIcanvassthepossibilitiesinorderofincreasingconstraint.
Nonbindingdeclarationsofrights
Somerightshavenobindingforcewithinthedomesticlegalsystem.Theprotectionsoperateby
virtueoftheirmoralforcealone.Theirimpactcanneverthelessbesubstantial,inducing
legislaturestoamendtheirlawstobringthemintoconformity.
Themostcommonexampleoccursinthecaseofinternationalnorms.Incountriesdescended
fromtheBritishconstitutionaltradition,internationalnormscreatedbytreatyhavenodirect
forcewithindomesticlaw.Theyneedtobeincorporatedintolegislationinordertotakeeffect
domestically.Informalterms,then,therightsareatthemercyofthedomesticlegislaturesand
canexercisenodirectconstrainingeffect.
Theinternationalinstrumentscanneverthelesshaveasubstantialimpact.InCanada,for
example,adecisionbytheUNHumanRightsCommitteeheldthatthedeinitionofIndianinthe
federalIndianActcontravenedart27oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,
becausetheActsgenderspeciicstructure(underwhichIndianwomenwhomarriednon
Indianmenlosttheirstatus,butIndianmenwhomarriednonIndianwomendidnot)
unjustiiablydeniedAboriginalwomentherighttoenjoytheircultureincommunitywithother
membersoftheirgroup(LovelacevCanada).TheActwasamended,eventhoughthemeasure
hadpreviouslybeenupheldbytheCanadiancourtsundertheCanadianBillofRights(a
statutoryBillofRightspredatingtheadoptionoftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms)
andeventhoughanumberofFirstNationsdisagreedvehementlywiththechange(AnActto
amendtheIndianAct(Canada);AGCanadavLavell).Similarly,inAustralia,adecisionofthe
HumanRightsCommitteepromptedtheCommonwealthParliamenttoadoptlegislation
overridingTasmaniascriminalisationofsexbetweenconsentinghomosexualadultmen(Toonen
vAustralia;HumanRights(SexualConduct)Act(Cth);CroomevTasmania).Anduntilthe
incorporationoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsintoBritishlawbytheHumanRights
Act1998(UK),thatConvention,toohadnodirectforcewithindomesticBritishlaw(exceptasan
aidtointerpretation).Itneverthelesshadasigniicantimpact,leadingtoanumberof
amendmentstoBritishlaw(Kinley1993).
Therearealsoprogrammaticrightsininternationallawandsomenationalconstitutions.These
rightsaresimilarlyexemptfromjudicialreview.Theirimplementationisleftentirelytothe
discretionofthelegislature(see,forexample,InternationalCovenantonEconomic,Socialand
CulturalRights,art2(1);ConstitutionoftheRepublicofIreland,art45;ConstitutionofIndia,Pt
IV).
Interpretiveconventionsbasedonimplicitnorms
Humanrightscanalsohaveanimpactonthelawthroughinterpretiveconventions,underwhich
courtsstrivetointerpretlegislationinamannerconsistentwithrights.Here,therights
considerationshavenoindependentconstrainingeffect.Theycannotbeusedtostrikedown
legislation.Theysimplyshapethejudgesinterpretationofthelaw,sothatthelawisrenderedas
consistentaspossiblewithhumanrightsnorms.
Thesehumanrightsnormscansometimesbeamatterofgeneralprinciple,withnoauthoritative
legislativeexpression.OnegoodexampleisfoundintheSupremeCourtofCanadasdecisionin
MacKeiganvHickman.There,therelevantstatuteprovidedthataCommissionofInquirycould
summonanypersonstogiveevidenceasawitness.TheCourtheldthatthisverygeneral
languageshouldnotbetakentooverrideaprincipleasimportantasjudicialindependence;it
thereforeheldthatthestatutedidnotpermitaCommissiontocompelajudgetotestifyasto
theirreasonsfordecisioninaparticularcase.Anotherexampleistherequirementof
compensationwhenpropertyisexpropriatedinCanadaandtheUK.Thereisnoexpress
guaranteeofcompensation.Thecourtssimplypresumethatcompensationistobepaidunless
thelegislaturestipulatesotherwise(AGvDeKeysersRoyalHotel;BurmahOilvLordAdvocate;
ManitobaFisheriesvTheQueen).
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Hereagaintheimpactcanbesubstantialeventhoughostensiblyoneismerelyintherealmof
statutoryinterpretation.Thereisalwaysconsiderablelatitudeininterpretation.Ifcourtsinsist
uponanextraordinarydegreeofclaritybeforetheyinterpretastatutesothatitconstrains
rights,theprotectioncanbeverygreatindeed.Itcanamounttoarequirementthattoimpair
rights,alegislaturemustdosoexplicitly.
Interpretiveconventionsbasedonexplicitnorms
Insomecases,legislaturesenactexpressnorms,whicharethenusedbycourtsintheir
interpretationofotherstatutes.Thismethodofrightsprotectionworksmuchlikethatdescribed
intheprevioussection:thecourtsdonotinvalidatelegislation,buttheydointerpretit
restrictivelyinordertoavoidanimpairmentofrights.Asintheprevioussection,theeffectcan
besigniicant;thecourtscanrequireaveryhighdegreeofclaritybeforetheyindthatrights
havebeenrestricted(see,forexample,WinnipegSchoolDivisionNo1vCratonat156).
Thedifferenceistheinvolvementofthelegislatureinthespeciicationofthenorms.Thiscreates
realgiveandtakebetweencourtsandlegislature.Thelegislaturesetsthenorms,sometimes
enshriningtheminastatutoryBillofRights;thecourtstakethosenormsandusethemto
interpretotherlaws,construingthoselawssothattheyrespectthelegislaturesnorms.This
differsfromthesituationdescribedintheprevioussection,inwhichcourtsareresponsibleboth
forthearticulationofthenormsandfortheiruseininterpretation.
Thisformofinterpretationwasoneofthewaysinwhichthestatutory,preCharter,CanadianBill
ofRightswasunderstoodtoworkalthoughhowwellitworkedisanotherquestion.The
weaknessoftheCanadianBillofRightsitslackofconstrainingeffectwasiercelycriticised
byhumanrightsadvocates(Tarnopolsky1975).AmoresuccessfulexampleistheNewZealand
BillofRightsAct1990.Thatactcannotbeusedtoinvalidatelegislation,yetithasnevertheless
hadasigniicantimpactoncriminalprocedureandthecommonlawofdefamation(seeKeith
2000;Allan2000).InterpretationisalsoonestrategyusedbytheUKsHumanRightsAct1998,
whichincorporatestheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights.ThatAct,however,goeswell
beyondinterpretation(i)toinvalidatesubordinatelegislation;(ii)tobindpublicauthorities;(iii)
topermitcourtstodeclarethatprimarylegislationisincompatiblewiththeConvention
(althoughthatdeclarationdoesnotaffectthestatutesvalidity);and(iv)topermitaMinisterof
theCrowntomakeamendmentstobringthestatuteintoconformity.4
Ineachoftheseexamples,thehumanrightsnormsareenactedbythesamelegislaturewhose
statutesarethensubjecttoscrutiny.Butjudicialinterpretationsometimesdrawsonnorms
articulatedbyotherlegislaturesthantheonescrutinised.Indeed,thisisonewayinwhichtreaty
normscanhaveanimpactondomesticlaw,evenwithouttheincorporationofthetreatyinto
domesticstatutes.Thecourtsinterpretdomesticlawsothatitis,asfaraspossible,consistent
withinternationallaw(see,forexample,MinisterofStateforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsv
Teoh).
Rightsguaranteesprotectedbyamannerandformrequirement
Inthemechanismsexaminedthusfar,therightsnormsdonotbindthelegislature.Atleastin
theory,thelegislaturecouldsetthemaside,aslongasitdidsowithsuficientclarityto
overcomethecourtsinterpretivepresumptions.InCanada,however,legislatureshaveenacted
rightsnorms,bindingthoseverylegislatures,throughtheimaginativeuseofmannerandform
requirements.
Tounderstandhowtheserequirementswork,itisimportanttorealisethatintheBritish
traditionlegislaturesgenerallycannotbindthemselves.Thedoctrineofparliamentary
sovereigntyrequiresthatatanypoint,thelegislaturecanchangeitsmind,passinglawsthat
contradictitsearlierenactments.Wheneverthereisinconsistency,theformerlawsarerepealed
totheextentofthatinconsistency.Amongotherthings,thisprincipleoperatesasanimportant
bulwarkofdemocracy,foritmeansthatlegislatorscanalwaysrepealtheworkoftheir
predecessors;agovernmentfacingdefeatcannotbinditssuccessor.
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Mannerandformrequirementsoperateasalimitedexceptiontothisprinciple,atleastin
Canada.5Althoughlegislaturescannotbindthemselvesastosubstance,Canadiancourtshave
heldthatlegislaturescanbindthemselvesastoprocess.Theycanstipulateaparticular
procedureaspeciicmannerandformbywhichenactmentsmustbemade.Until
repealed,thesestipulations(aslongastheyaregenuinelyproceduralanddonotamounttoa
disguisedlimitonsubstance)mustbefollowedbythelegislaturessuccessors(RvDrybones;
FordvQuebec;ReferenceRe:CanadaAssistancePlanat322324).Theserequirementscanbe
usedtoofferaqualiiedprotectiontohumanrightsnorms.Insteadofattemptingtoimposethe
normsdirectly,thelegislatureenacts,intherightsinstrument,adistinctiveprocedurebywhich
restrictionsmustbeadopted.Becauseitispurelyprocedural,therequirementbindsthe
legislaturessuccessors.
InCanada,thestipulatedrequirementisusuallythat,tosetasidetherightsguarantees,the
legislaturemuststateexplicitlythatthestatuteistoapplynotwithstandingtherights
guarantees.Thisdoesnotbindastosubstance;thelegislaturecanalwayssetasidethe
protections,byanordinarymajority,aslongasitdoessoexplicitly.Butitdoesguardagainst
inadvertentrestrictionsofrights,anditalsoplaysaveryimportantsignallingfunction:any
governmentseekingtosetasidetheguaranteesmustdosoexplicitly,andthatwillinturntend
togenerateavigorouspublicdebate,forcingthegovernmenttojustifyitsactions.Themanner
andformrequirementserves,inotherwords,asatriggertothedemocraticprocess,by
providingclearnoticethatarightsissuehasbeenraised.
InCanadasfederalsystem,statutoryBillsofRightsofthiskindonlybindlegislationofthelevel
ofgovernmentthatenactsthem.6
ThiswastheprincipalapproachadoptedintheCanadianBillofRightsthestatutoryBillof
RightsenactedbytheParliamentofCanadain1960.Althoughitsroleinrightsprotectionhas
largelybeenovertakenbytheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms(aconstitutional
instrument),theCanadianBillofRightsremainsinforce.In1985,itwasusedbythreejudgesof
theSupremeCourtofCanadatostrikedowntherefugeedeterminationprocessinCanadas
ImmigrationAct(SinghvMinisterofEmploymentandImmigration;theotherthreejusticescame
tothesameconclusiononthebasisoftheCharter).Albertaemployedasimilarapproachinthe
AlbertaBillofRightsof1972.QuebecdidsoaswellintheCharterofHumanRightsandFreedoms,
astatutoryBillofRightsenactedin1975.In1988,theSupremeCourtofCanadareliedonthe
QuebecChartertostrikedownasofQuebecslanguagelegislationthatbannedtheuseof
Englishoncommercialsigns(FordvQuebec).Thedecisionhadaverysigniicantpoliticalimpact.
TheQuebecNationalAssemblyreadoptedthesignlawinmodiiedform(AnActtoamendthe
CharteroftheFrenchLanguage,1988,popularlyknownasBill178),thistimeprotectingitfrom
theCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms(butnottheQuebecCharterofHumanRightsand
Freedoms)throughtheuseofanotwithstandingclause.AsIdiscussfurtherbelow,thataction
provokedvigorouscriticismfromEnglishspeakingCanadians.Thisreactioncontributedtothe
ultimatedefeatofapackageofconstitutionalamendments(theMeechLakeAccord)supported
byQuebec(Webber1994:138ff).
TheeffectivenessofmannerandformrequirementsisthereforewellestablishedinCanadian
law.Theyareusedtogivequaliiedforcetostatutoryrightsguarantees.Ireturntothevalueof
theseinstrumentsinstructuringinstitutionaldialoguebelow.
Constitutionallyentrenchedguarantees
Ofcourse,whenwethinkaboutBillsofRightsweusuallythinkofinstrumentssubjecttofull
constitutionalentrenchment.Evenhere,however,thereismorevariationthanmightatirst
appear.
First,thenatureoftheentrenchednormscanbeverydifferent,withimportantconsequences
forthescopeofjudicialreview.Occasionally,decisionsthatare(onesuspects)primarilybased
onrightsconsiderationsareframedinlanguagethathaslittletodowithrights.Thiswasa
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familiarphenomenoninCanadapriortotheadoptionoftheCanadianCharterofRightsand
Freedomswhere,inafewcelebratedcases,decisionswithastronghumanrightselementwere
basedonthefederal/provincialdivisionofpowers.
Insomecases,thiswasbonaidedivisionofpowersreasoning,inwhichtherightsconcernwas
genuinelytiedtothenatureoftheparticularpowerinissue.Thus,inCanada,criminallawisa
federalmatter.Thecriminalpowerwasinterpretedtocoveranumberoflegislativeaimsthat
hadstrongpotentialtoimpairindividualrights,suchasthesuppressionofseditionorthe
enforcementofreligion(aninterpretationwithsomejustiication,giventhepurposestowhich
thecriminallawhadhistoricallybeenput).Provinciallawsdealingwiththesematterswere
struckdownasinfringinguponfederalauthority(SwitzmanvElbling;AGOntariovHamilton
StreetRailway;HenryBirks&SonsvMontreal).7
Atothertimes,onehadtheimpressionthatdivisionofpowersreasoningwasbeingdistortedin
ordertoattainarightsobjective.ThismayhavebeenthecaseinMcKayvTheQueen,for
example,inwhichbylawsenactedunderprovincialauthoritytoregulatesignswereheldnotto
applytofederalelectionsigns.
Inanycase,althoughprovisionsdealingwiththedivisionofpowershaveonoccasionservedthe
endsofhumanrights,theirpotentialhasbeenlimited.Theprotectiontheyaffordedwas
minimalist,forthecourthadtoindaplausiblehookwithindivisionofpowersreasoningon
whichtohangitsdecision.Inprinciplethedecisionswereonlyconcernedwithwhocould
infringerights;ifthemeasuresofonelevelofgovernmentwerestruckdown,itwasalwaysopen
totheotherleveltoadoptthem.Finally,thesimplefactthatthesedecisionsreliedonsurrogate
argumentsmeantthatitwasimpossibletodevelopacoherentandexplicitrightsjurisprudence.
Asecondtypeofentrenchedrightsconsistsofimpliedrights.Theserightsarenotexplicitlyset
outintheConstitution,butinsteadarederivedfromotherprovisionsthatostensiblyhavelittle
todowithrights.Theydifferfromthedivisionofpowersjudgmentsinthatthecourtusesthe
languageofrightsinitsreasoning,indingthataparticularrightisimplicitintheconstitution.
Thenotionofimpliedrightshashadalargehurdletoclear.Thereisastrongcommitmentto
parliamentarysovereigntyintheBritishtradition.Thathasgenerallymeantthatconstitutional
restrictionsarereadnarrowly,especiallyif(asinthecaseofrights)theeffectoftherestriction
wouldbetopreventalllevelsofgovernmentfromenactingthemeasure.
Therearemanywaysinwhichrightsmightplausiblybeimplied.Theonesthathaveattainedthe
mostcurrency,however,arefoundedonconstitutionalprovisionsthatestablishdemocratic
structuresofgovernment.Theargumentisthatdemocraticinstitutionscannotoperatewithout
freepoliticaldebate.Someprotectionoffreedomofspeechmustthereforebeimplied.
AlthoughcertainCanadianjudgeslirtedwiththeimplicationofrightsguaranteespriorto
adoptionoftheCharter(andindeedafter),thisreasoninghadnotfounditswayintothereasons
forjudgmentofthemajorityoftheSupremeCourtofCanadapriortotheadoptionofthe
CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.Instead,themajorityhadalwaysresteditsdecisionon
alternativegrounds.Ironically,however,CanadianmusingsaboutanimpliedBillofRightsdid
contributetothedevelopmentofavigorousimpliedrightsjurisprudenceinAustralia.8Iwill
returntothisformofprotectionbelow.
Third,thereareexplicitrightsguarantees.Ineedsaylittleaboutthemherefortheyarebyfar
thebestknown.Isimplynotethattheytoocanvaryconsiderablyintheirconstrainingeffect,
dependingonhowtheyaredrafted.
Indeed,notallexpressrightsarejusticiable.Socalledprogrammaticrightsoftenrightsto
servicesthatwouldimposeonerousinancialobligationsongovernment(housing;education;
socialwelfare;environmentalprotection)servemerelyasdirectionstogovernmenttomake
thoseaimsalegislativepriority.Thecourtshavenoroleintheirenforcement.
Entrenchedrightsalsodifferintheextenttowhichtheyareinsulatedfromlegislative
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impairmentorchange.Thereareatleastthreedifferentwaysinwhichrightsprotectionscanbe
subjecttolegislativerestriction.
First,allrightsaresubjecttolimitations;theveryprocessofdeinition,throughjudicial
interpretation,involvesadelineationoflimits.Whenscrutinisingastatuteimpugnedonhuman
rightsgrounds,thecourtswillattempttodeterminewhetheralegislaturehasoversteppedthose
bounds.Inthisprocess,politicalactorstooplayarole.Theycandiscussrightsconsiderationsat
thetimeofadoptinglegislation,offeringrationalisationsthatinturninluencethecourts.9They
can,throughtheirlawyers,offerfurtherjustiicationswhenthemattergoestocourt.Thus,at
leastthroughtheexerciseofpersuasion,politicalactorscanhaveanimpactonthescopeofthe
rights.InCanada,thisroleiscontemplatedins1oftheCharter.
Second,ChartersofRightscanexpresslypermitlegislativederogations.Asalreadymentioned,
thatisthecaseins33oftheCanadianCharter.Iexplores33indetailbelow.
Ultimately,rightsguaranteescanalwaysbesetasidebyconstitutionalamendment.Theeaseof
amendmentdiffersfromconstitutiontoconstitution.Someconstitutionalprovisions,insome
countries,areamendablebyordinarymajority.InCanada,thiswasthecasewithguaranteesfor
theuseofFrenchoriginallyappliedtotheNorthWestTerritoriesandinheritedbytheprovinces
ofAlbertaandSaskatchewanupontheircreation.Theseprovisionshadfallenintodisuseprior
totheprovincescreation,withoutbeingformallyrepealed.When,in1988,theSupremeCourt
foundthattheywerestillinforce,thetwoprovincesimmediatelyrepealedtheguaranteesand
validatedpreviousactspassedinviolationoftherequirements(RvMercure;TheLanguageAct
(Saskatchewan);LanguagesAct(Alberta)).
Generallythemodeofamendmentisconsiderablymoredificultthanthis.Itmaybesodificult
astobefunctionallyimpossible.Indeed,ithasbeenarguedthatsomeprovisionsofsome
constitutionsareunamendable(althoughthisisveryrare).Eventhoseconstitutions,however,
canbeoverthrownbyrevolution.10Itispreferable,then,nottotreatentrenchmentasthoughit
renderedconstitutionalprovisionsuntouchable.Inthelastanalysis,allconstitutionsareopento
change.Thesanctityofrightsprotectionsthereforedepends,always,uponthedynamicrelations
amonginstitutionsinthepoliticalorder.Entrenchmentisalwaysamatterofdegree.
Strategyofjudicialreview
Theextentofinstitutionalinteractionincludingtheextenttowhichlegislaturesparticipatein
thedeinitionofrightsisalsoaffectedbythejudgesconceptionoftheirtask.Theirdeinition
ofthecontentofrightscaneitherfosterlegislativeactionorforecloseit.
Rightsguaranteesasminimumguarantees
First,roomforlegislativeactioncanbepreservedbycourtsapproachingconstitutional
provisionsonthebasisthattheyaremeanttoprovideminimumguarantees,nottoconferon
courtsthepowertoregulateeverythinghavingtodowiththesubjectmatterofparticularrights,
suchasexpressionorreligion.Sucharestrainedinterpretationhasthemeritofcoincidingwith
mostjustiicationsforjudicialreviewonrightsgrounds.Thesejustiicationstendtofocuson
rightsguaranteesasminimumguaranteesasensuringabasicminimumlevelofrespectfor
individualfreedomandequality.11
Constitutionaltextsrarelytakesuchaminimalistform,however.Theyspeakinringinglanguage,
proclaimingtheneedtorespectfreedomofexpressionorequalitybeforethelaw,without
hedgingthoseconceptsaboutwithqualiications.Constitutionalprovisionsdonotspeakofa
necessaryminimumoffreeexpressionorafundamentalbaselineofequality.Courts,faced
withtherightsbroadlanguage,canbetemptedtogiveitfullrein.Theycanstartwiththe
abstractconceptsofexpressionandequalityandseektodeineexhaustivelytheirscopeand
meaninginaliberalsociety.Theroleofjudiciallyenforcedrightsasminimumguaranteescanfall
away,theconceptscometobedeinedinplenaryterms,andalllegislativerestrictionscompelled
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topassrigorousconstitutionalstandards.
ThisseemstobewhathashappenedinCanadawithfreedomofexpression.TheSupremeCourt
ofCanadadeinedexpressionbroadlytocoveranyattempttoconveymeaning,fromcommercial
advertisingtotheimageryofasexualgadget(IrwinToyat606608;RvButlerat472).All
expressionsareaccorded,atleastostensibly,equalconstitutionalprotection.Thus,the
constitutionistakentohaveentrenchedtherightofthetobaccocompany,RJRMacDonald,to
advertisetobaccointhesametermsasitprotectsthecitizensrighttocriticisehisorher
government(RJRMacDonald;seethecritiqueinHiebert1999b:1015).Evenifcommercial
expressionhassocialutility(anditundeniablydoes),whatcompellingreasonistheretosubject
itsregulationtoconstitutionalconstraintsnormallyreservedforpoliticalorartisticexpression?
Iftherightsaretakenasminimalstandards,somedimensionsofexpressioncanbeleftto
unencumberedlegislativecontrol.Theconstitutionalrightscanbedeinedasbasicguarantees,
notallencompassingcodesofexpression.
JudicialdeferencetolegislatureorExecutiveinthelimitationofrights
CourtscanalsoleaveroomforlegislativeorExecutiveparticipationthroughjudicialdeference,
thecourtsdeferring,onsomequestions,tothejudgmentofthelegislatureorExecutive.Under
thismodel,acourtdoesnotinsistthatthelegislatureconforminallrespectstothejudgesown
opinion.Thecourtrecognisesthattherecanbelegitimatedifferencesofview,andallowsthe
legislaturesomelatitude.Thiskindofdeferenceiscommoninjudicialreviewofadministrative
action,wherecourtshaveoftenrecognisedthatadministrativetribunals,astheprimarydecision
makers,shouldbepermittedtodeveloptheirowninterpretationsoflaw.Afterall,legislatures
haveconferreddecisionmakingpoweronthetribunals,oftenbecausethetribunalspossess
specialexpertise.Thecourtshaveexpressedthisdeferenceinavarietyofways,dependingon
thedraftingofthelegislativeregime.Butacommonformulationisthatthecourtsshouldnot
interveneunlessatribunalsdecisionismanifestlyunreasonable.
Deferenceiscontroversialintheareaofrightsprotections,however.Humanrightsaregenerally
consideredtobesuperveningnormsthatshouldstandbeyondalllegislativeorExecutive
control.Theirverypurposeistoconstraingovernment.Itmakesnosense(onthisview)for
courtstodefertotheirjudgments.TheSupremeCourtofCanadahas,forexample,distinguished
betweenconstitutionalandlegislativenormsindescribingitsdeferencetowardsadministrative
tribunals,holdingthatitwantstohearwhatadministrativetribunalshavetosayabout
constitutionalissues,butitwillintheendmakeupitsownmind(CuddyChicksvOntarioat129
130).
Atthesametime,theCourthasindicatedthatitwillexercisesomedeferencetowardsthe
legislaturesinitsjudgmentsonlimitationsofrights,whenthoselimitationsinvolvethe
evaluationofsociologicalfactorthebalancingofmultipleinterests,onthegroundsthat
legislaturesareequallyorbetterplacedtomakethosejudgments.Thishascompensated,to
someextent,foritsexpansivedeinitionofsuchrightsasfreedomofexpression.Therightsmay
bedeinedbroadly,butlegislaturesaregivenlatitudeintheirlimitation.12Usingthisdeference
tocompensateforanoverbroadinterpretationgeneratestensions,however,forontheone
handitappearstoweakentheprotectionofthingsthatgenuinelyshouldberights,andonthe
otheritcontinuestotreatthingsthatshouldnotberightsasthoughtheywereworthyof
constitutionalprotection.InCanada,thattensioncametotheforeinRJRMacDonald(at88and
following),wheretheSupremeCourtdrewbackfromthepreviousextentofitsdeferenceto
limitationsonadvertising.
Nevertheless,signiicantdeferencecontinues.TheCourthasevenupheldlegislationthatwas
consciouslyframed,byParliament,onthebasisofthejudgmentsofdissenting,notmajority
justices,inapreviousCharterdecision.Intheirstdecision,theSupremeCourthaddivided54
onthecircumstancesinwhichapersonaccusedwithsexualassaultmust,inthepreparationof
hisdefence,haveaccesstotherecordsofrapecounsellorswhohadsupportedthevictiminthe
aftermathoftheallegedassault(RvOConnor).Thedissenthadarguedforamuchstricterscope
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ofdisclosure.Parliamentclearlypreferredthedissentingjudgment,andframedlegislationthat
departedinmaterialwaysfromthemajoritysposition(AnActtoamendtheCriminalCode
(Productionofrecordsinsexualoffenceproceedings)(Canada)).Inasubsequentchallenge,the
SupremeCourtupheldthatlegislation,onthegroundsthatCharterdecisionsalwaysleftopena
rangeofpermissibleresponses,andthatParliamentwasentitledtolistentothevoicesofparties
otherthanthecourts(inthiscase,thosevulnerabletosexualviolence)whenframingtheir
responses.TheCourtfocusedprimarilyontheseriousnesswithwhichParliamenthad
consideredtherightsconcerns,andspeciicallyinvokedtheideaofdialogueinjustifyingthat
degreeofdeference(RvMills,especiallyat1920and37andfollowing).13
Framingnorms
Theinterpretationofrightsusuallyproceedsupontheassumptionthatonecan,intheory,
describepreciselywhatrightsrequireandwhattheyproscribe.Itmaywellbeimpossibletodo
soinadvanceadjudicationtendstoelaboratenormscasebycase,asthecourtisconfronted
withthecircumstancesinwhichthenormsoperatebutinprinciplerightsaresusceptibleof
detailedstatement.Thisassumptionmaynotholdtrueofallguarantees,however.Somerights
maybeincapableofdetailedelaboration.Theirnormativecontentmayoperateatapurely
abstractlevel,compatiblewithawiderangeofdetailedinstantiations.Thesenormsarecalled
framingnorms,fortheyprovideaframeworkofentitlementwithoutspecifyingpreciselywhat
thatentitlemententails(Webber2000b:7576).
Oneofthebestexamplesofaframingnormistheindigenousrighttoselfgovernment,which
hasbeenwidelydiscussedbutnotyetrecognisedinCanada.14Itisunrealistictothinkthatself
governmentcouldeverbereducedtoahighlyspeciicsetofrequirementsenforcedbythe
courts.Itselementsremainirreduciblyabstract:theabilityofindigenouspeoplestoparticipate
ininstitutionsthatgoverntheircommunities;therighttohavegovernmentalinstitutionsrelect
normsdeterminedinthecommunity;thecapacityofthecommunitytocontrolmatterscentral
toindigenousidentity.Theprecisemeansbywhichtheseobjectivescouldbeachievedareas
variousasthecommunitiesthemselves.Judicialreviewofsuchnormsthereforetakesa
distinctivecharacter.Insteadofseekingtorendertherequirementsprogressivelymoreexplicit,
itbeginswiththelegislativemeasuresunderreview,considerstheminthelightofthebroad
standardsimplicitinthenorm,anddecidessimplyonthebasisofthebroadstandardswhether
theyconformornot.
Framingnormsarenotasuncommonastheymightappear.Indeed,tosomeextentallnorms
haveanelementofframeworkaboutthem,fornomatterhowexplicittheyaremadethroughthe
processofinterpretation,theyneveraddressaspeciiccaseinallitsparticularity.Atthelast
stageofanyjudgment,thejudgemustdecidehowthecasefallsinrelationtotherule,using
muchthesameapproachasthatdescribedabove.Thedifferencebetweenframingnormsand
othernormsliesinthefactthatintheformer,onenolongerexpectstobeabletorenderthe
normsincreasinglyconcrete.Rather,oneacceptsthattheywillremainpermanentlyabstractand
oneiscontenttoworkwiththatabstraction.15
Therecognitionofaclassofframingnormsdoesmakeadifference.Totakeoneexample,ina
seriesofcasesinthelate1980stheSupremeCourtofCanadaheldthattheChartersguarantee
offreedomofassociationincludednospecialprotectionoftherightofworkerstobargain
collectively.TheCourtcametothisdecisioneventhoughfreedomofassociationhadcommonly
beenused,ininternationalconventions,torefertoworkersrightsofcollectiveaction(ILO
ConventionNo87).TheprincipalreasonfortheCourtsdecisionwasitsconcernthatthephrase,
freedomofassociation,couldnothavebeenintendedtoconstitutionaliseCanadashighly
detailedcollectivebargainingregime.Itnotedthatothercountrieshadadoptedverydifferent
formsofworkerscontrol(RePublicServiceEmployeeRelationsAct;PSACvCanada;RWDSUv
Saskatchewan).Thisreasoningisrightasfarasitgoes.Itwouldindeedbeinappropriatetohold
thatthelabourrelationsregimeofthe1980shadbeenfrozeninconstitutionalstone.Butatthe
sametime,theCourtsdecisiondeprivedfreedomofassociationofoneofitsprincipal
contemporaryelements.TheproblemmayhavelainintheCourtsassumptionthatCharter
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rightshadtobeinterpretedinamannerthatprogressivelydevelopedasingle,precise,
determinatecontenttotheright,andthatonlythatcontentcouldhavenormativeforce.Instead,
freedomofassociation,insofarasitrelatestoworkerscollectiveaction,maybebestconceived
asaframingnorm,establishingaprincipleatalevelofabstractiononly,leavingwidelatitudeto
legislaturesastohowtherightmightbefuliled.16
Framingnormshavebecomemuchmorefamiliarinrecentyearsasaresultofthedevelopment
oftheEuropeanUnion.TheEuropeanCommissionsdirectivestakethisform.Theydonot
stipulatethemeasuresthatgovernmentsmustadopt.Theyestablishbroadobjectivesandleave
togovernmentshowthoseobjectivesmightbeachieved.
Forthepurposesofthisarticle,thechiefsigniicanceofframingnormsisthattheypresupposea
substantialmeasureofcollaborationofdialoguebetweencourtsandlegislatureinthe
practicaldeinitionofrights.Thecourtssettheframework;thelegislaturedeterminesthe
means.
Nonjusticiablenorms
Finally,courtsmaysimplyindthatsomenormsarenotsusceptibletojudicialreviewandleave
thementirelytothepoliticalprocess.Somenorms(suchasthecommitmenttoequalisation
paymentsbetweengovernmentsins36ofCanadasConstitutionAct1982)mayexpresslyset
asidejudicialreview;thesearetheprogrammaticrightsdiscussedpreviously.Butitisalso
possiblethatthecourtsmightindthatotherprovisionsdonotgiverisetojudicialreview,either
becauseadifferentremedyisspeciiedorbecausethesubjectmatteroftherightisheldsimply
tobeinappropriateforjudicialdetermination.17Ineithercasethedeinitionoftherightwould
beleftwithinthelegislativerealm.
MechanismsforlegislativeandExecutiveinvolvementinthedeinitionandenforcementof
rights
Finally,therearemanymechanismsbywhichthelegislatureandExecutivecanthemselves
shapethemeaningofrights.
Democraticparticipation
Mostimportantly,theveryexistenceofdemocraticgovernmentandpopularparticipationserves
toprotectrights.Constitutionallawyerstendtothinkofrightsentirelyintermsofconstraint
andspeciicallyconstraintofthelegislaturebutwithoutdoubt,themostpowerfulbulwarkof
rightsinademocracyisbroadparticipationbyanengagedcitizenryinthebusinessof
government.Thatparticipationcontributestothearticulationofrightsthroughtheprominent
rolethatrightsplayinparliamentarydebateandExecutivedecisionmaking.Theabilityto
petition,toquestiononesgovernment,andtoseektochangegovernmentsconstitutepowerful
meansofchallengingabusiveconductandvindicatingrightsclaims.Itisprofoundlywrong
indeeddangerouslysotobelievethatrightsmustoperateonlybyconstrainingdemocratic
action.
Legislative/Executiveenforcement
Moreover,theresponsibilitytoenforceconstitutionalprotectionshasattimesbeenconferred
directlyonthelegislatureandExecutive,ratherthancourts.Thisistrue,forexample,ofthe
guaranteesintheCanadianConstitutionAct1867withrespecttoreligiousschools.Although
schoolsarenormallyunderprovincialjurisdiction,thoseguaranteesprovidethatanappealfrom
anyactordecisionaffectinganyRightorPrivilegeoftheProtestantorRomanCatholicMinority
oftheQueensSubjectsliestotheFederalGovernorinCouncil(theFederalCabinet).Ifthe
Cabinetsorderisnotobeyed,theFederalParliamentisempoweredtopassremediallegislation
(ConstitutionAct,1867,s93(3)and(4)).TheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionofthe
UnitedStates(adoptedfollowingtheCivilWartoentrenchtheequalityoftheformerslaves)also
providedforCongressionalactiontoenforceitsterms.18Legislativeenforcementisparticularly
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providedforCongressionalactiontoenforceitsterms. Legislativeenforcementisparticularly
usefulwhentryingtoprotecttherightsofminoritieswithincomplexpublicinstitutions,where
judicialremediesmayproveinadequatelylexibleorincapableofcreatingdetailedremedial
administrativeregimes.
Legislatureshavealsopursuedrightswithintheirownjurisdictions,enactingdeclarationsof
rightsandestablishingcommissionsfortheirenforcement.Undoubtedly,inCanada,thepractical
impactofthesemeasuresonthelivesofindividualshasfaroutstrippedtheeffectoftheCharter,
fortheyapplytoprivateaswellaspublicactionandguardagainstdiscriminationin
employment,inhousing,andinahostofotherdaytodaycontexts.Thedoctrinesdeveloped
undertheseregimeshavealsohadasigniicantimpactontheinterpretationoftheCharter,
notablyintheconceptofdiscriminationadoptedbythecourts(see,forexample,Andrewsat16
19).
Priorexaminationandreview
ConstitutionalBillsofRightsalsostimulateameasureofselfscrutinyonthepartofthe
legislatureandExecutive.Thishelpstoensurethatlegislationiskeptwithinconstitutional
bounds.Itmayalsofurnishcarefuldiscussionsofrights,whichmayinturninluencethecourts
ifthelegislationissubsequentlychallenged.
Theselfscrutinycanoccurinamyriadofplacesinlawreformcommissions,administrative
tribunals,thedecisionsofombudsmen,andsoon.InCanada,therehasalsobeenastructured
processforreviewinglegislationtoensurecompliancewiththeCharter.Intheperiod
immediatelyfollowingadoptionoftheCharter,existinglegislationwasexaminedandamended
tobringitintoconformitywiththelawoficersunderstandingoftheChartersrequirements.
Indeed,theentryintoforceoftheequalityguaranteeintheCharterwasdelayedforthreeyears
toallowthisprocesstooccur.Now,aspartoftheregularprocedurefordraftingnewlegislation,
eachlawisscrutinisedtoensureitconforms(DepartmentofJusticeAct(Canada),s4.1).19
Thestandardsappliedinternallycanbemoredemandingthanthoseappliedbythecourts,the
lawoficerstakingamoreexpansivedeinitionoftherights.Thiscanhappenhaphazardly,aslaw
oficersmakethewrongguessastotheinterpretationthatwillultimatelybeadoptedbythe
courts.Butsometimesgovernmentspurposelydisagreewiththecourtsinterpretation.Agood
exampleoccurredinrelationtoOntariosSundayclosinglegislation.ThatlawprescribedSunday
asthecommondayofrestintheretailsector.Therewereexceptions,notablyonedesignedto
accommodateindividualswhosereligiousbeliefsspeciiedadayofrestotherthanSunday,
althoughthisexceptionwasrestrictedtostoresunderacertainsize.TheSupremeCourtof
Canadaupheldtherestrictionasestablishinganacceptablebalancebetweentheproprietors
beliefsandtheinterestsoftheemployees(RvEdwardsBooks).Yet,underanewgovernment,the
Ontariolegislatureamendedthelawsothatthereligiousexemptionwasnolongerlimitedby
thestoressize.20
Argumentsinjustiication
Asalreadynoted,theCanadianCharteritselfimplicitlyinvitesgovernmentstojustifytheir
legislationaspartofCharterchallenges.Theysometimesdothisinanticipation.Theydoitin
argumentbeforethecourts.
Legislatureshavealso,insubstance,reenactedlegislationthathasbeeninvalidatedbythe
SupremeCourtofCanada,orhaveenactedlegislationthatappearsatvariancewiththereasons
ofthemajorityoftheCourt,advancingrenewedjustiicationunders1.Theyhavethereby
expressedtheirdisagreementwiththeCourtsdecisionandforcefullyreengagedthedebate
overjustiication.Ofcourse,bydecliningtouses33andrelyinginsteadons1,theyhaveleftthe
ultimatedecisiononvaliditytothecourts.Butinatleastonesuchcasetheenactmentof
provisionstolimitthecircumstancesinwhichanallegedvictimsrapecounsellingrecords
wouldbereleasedtotheaccused(discussedabove)Parliamentsargumentshavebeen
successful(RvMills).21
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Governmentconsiderationofrightsconcerns,aspartofitsexerciseinjustiication,cantherefore
haveanimpact,attimesdramatic,onthepracticeofjudicialdeliberation.
Politicalpressureonjudicialdecision
Finally,thereisonelastsetofmechanismsbywhichgovernmentscaninluencethe
interpretationofrights:directpoliticalpressure.
Wegenerallythinkofthesemechanismsasbeingplainlyantagonistictorights,notcontributing
toanysortofdialogue.Theyoftenstrikeusasillegitimateexercisesofpower,almostcertainly
impairingtherightsofindividuals.Thiscautioniswise.Judicialdecisionmakingisdistinctivein
itsacuteattentiontotheindividualcase,sothatdecisionsaremadeinamannersensitivetothe
situation,therebydoingjustice(asfarashumanfallibilitypermits)totheinterestsofthe
individualsconcerned.Politicalargumentrarelyattendssocarefullytotheindividualcase.If
legislaturesorExecutivesmadeallthedecisions,wewouldruntheriskoflosingsightof
individualsinterestsinourrushtoachieveasocialaim.Ourdefenceofjudicialindependence
anddueprocessisthereforeaprofoundlyimportantprinciple.
Butthefactremainsthatmechanismsforpoliticalpressuredoexist,andtheyaredeployed
(amongotherthings)indisputesoverthemeaningofrights.Theyincludeiercepolitical
criticism,pressureontheresourcesofthecourts,thepackingofcourts,physicalintimidation,
forcedremoval,andultimatelyconstitutionalamendment.Someofthesemechanismsare
legitimateinthesensethattheyareexpresslycontemplatedbytheConstitutionsuchas
powersofjudicialappointment,ortherequirementsforconstitutionalamendment.Norare
theireffectsalwaysbad.Theyaresometimesused,itappearsinretrospect,onthesideofthe
angels.Thiswastrue,forexample,ofFranklinDelanoRooseveltscourtpackingplan,whichmay
wellhaveinluencedtheUSSupremeCourttooverturnitsdoctrineofsubstantivedueprocess,
thuspavingthewayfortheNewDeallegislation(Tribe2000:13601361).Theircontribution,
then,isnotunremittinglynegative,althoughwegenerallydowelltoassumetheworst.
Butdespitetheevilorambivalenceoftheireffects,weshouldrememberthem.Theybringhome
thefactthatnomatterhowweinsulatethejudicialrole,therelationshipisoneofinstitutional
interaction,notcompleteautonomy.Realisingthat,wecanworktostructuretheinteractionin
themostappropriatemanner,includingestablishingprotectionsforjudicialautonomy.
Moreover,inabackhandedway,recognisingtheexistenceoftheseforcesrelativisesandclariies
ourclaimsaboutjudicialreview.Inotedatthebeginningofthispaperthatjustiicationsfor
judicialreviewfrequentlyrelyontheneedtoguardagainstthegrossestofabuses.Thereisareal
question,however,whetherjudicialreviewismuchofabulwarkwhenapoliticalsystemdecays
tosuchadesperatedegree.Evenifthecourtsdostandup(andhistoryshowsthattheyoftendo
not),22thepoliticalprocesshasleversatitscommandtoovercomethecourtsifthedemocratic
ethicofrightsprotectionisabsent.Thisisnotanargumentforignoringthepotentialforabuse,
norisitanargumentagainsthumanrightsadjudicationinnormaltimes.Butitdoessuggestthat
theremediestogrossabusesliewithinabroadersocial/politicalapproach,andthatjudicial
reviewneedstobejustiiedintermsofitsrelativecontributioninnormal,notabnormaltimes.
Thistoodrivesusbackupontheanalysisofinteraction,relationshipandbalance.
Dialogueinthreestrategiesforhumanrightsprotection
Therearethereforeawidearrayofmechanismstoprovideforinstitutionaldialogueinthe
deinitionandenforcementofrights.Noristhisaccountexhaustive.Thereaderwilldoubtless
haveaddedhisorherownexamples.
Inthissection,Iwillexamineinmoredetailthreemeansofrightsprotectionallemployedin
Canada,oneinAustraliatoassesstheformofinstitutionalrelationshipcreated.The
mechanismsare:
impliedrights;
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expressconstitutionalguarantees,subjecttolegislativederogation;and
astatutoryBillofRights,protectedbyamannerandformrequirement.
Iwillfocusprimarilyonthesecondandthird,citingtheirstprincipallybywayofcontrast.
Impliedrights
Asmentionedabove,thismechanisminvolvesthedeterminationthatcertainrightsareimplicit
intheConstitution.Commonly,therightsarefoundeduponconstitutionaltermsthatestablish
democraticinstitutions(fromwhichrightstopoliticalfreespeecharederived)orestablishthe
courts(fromwhichnormstoprotectjudicialindependencearederived).Thisiscertainlythe
caseinAustralia,wheretheHighCourthasrecognisedarightoffreepoliticalexpression,
workingofftheprovisionsestablishingrepresentativegovernmentintheAustralian
Constitution(notablyss7and24,whichstatethatmembersoftheSenateandHouseof
Representativesaretobedirectlychosenbythepeople).Intheirstofthesecases,BrennanJ
(ashethenwas)summarisedtheessentialargument(NationwideNewsat4849):
...wherearepresentativedemocracyisconstitutionallyentrenched,itcarrieswithitthoselegal
incidentswhichareessentialtotheeffectivemaintenanceofthatformofgovernment.Onceitis
recognisedthatarepresentativedemocracyisconstitutionallyprescribed,thefreedomof
discussionwhichisessentialtosustainitisasirmlyentrenchedintheConstitutionasthe
systemofgovernmentwhichtheConstitutionexpresslyordains.
ThisrightwasusedtostrikedownlawsthatprohibitedcriticismofmembersoftheIndustrial
RelationsCommissionandthatlimitedtelevisionadvertisinginelections(NationwideNewsPty
LtdvWills;AustralianCapitalTelevisionPtyLtdvCommonwealth).ItalsopromptedtheHigh
Courttorevisethelawofdefamationinsofarasitappliestocriticismofpublicoficials
(TheophanousvHerald&Weekly;LangevAustraliaBroadcastingCorporation).
OtherrightstoomightbeimpliedfromtheConstitution.InMcGintyvWesternAustralia,the
CourtconsideredwhethertheWesternAustralianConstitutionrequiredroughequalityinthe
determinationofelectoralboundaries(sothateachpersonsvotewouldbeofapproximately
equalvalue).TheCourtrefusedtoindsucharequirement.TheHighCourthasdeclinedtohold
thatageneralrightofequalitycanbederivedfromtheFederalConstitution(Leethv
Commonwealth;KrugervCommonwealth).Butotherprincipleswithstrongrightsimplications
havebeenimplied.InbothAustraliaandCanada,thecourtshavedevelopedconstitutional
guaranteesoftheindependenceofthejudiciary,fromwhichadditionallimitationshavebeen
derived:inCanada,judicialreviewofthejurisdictionofadministrativetribunalshasbeen
constitutionalisedonthisbasis;inAustralia,theprincipleoftheseparationofpowershasbeen
usedtostrikedownalawdesignedtokeepanamedoffenderinpreventativedetentionbeyond
theendofhisoriginalsentence.23
Impliedrightsinvolvetheindingthatrightshavebeenconstitutionallyentrenched,butdosoin
aparticularlyconinedway.Theydonotdirectlypromotedialoguebetweenlegislatureand
courtstheydonotinvolveanyspecialinteractionbetweencourtandlegislatureinthe
deinitionofrightsbuttheydotendtoleavesubstantiallatitudetothelegislature.
Impliedrightsareconinedbytheveryfactthattheyarebasedonimplication.Thereisno
general,unambiguousstatementoftherights.Thecourtsmust,aboveall,establishthatthe
rightsareentrenched,eventhoughthedocumentmakesnoreferencetothem.Thereisoften
disagreementoverthestandardtobeappliedwhenindinganimpliedright:doestherighthave
tobenecessarytoanyreasonableinterpretationofthetext,orisitsuficientthatitbebroadly
congruentwiththeConstitutionsprinciples?Thereistheproblemofdistinguishingbetween,on
theonehand,amereassumptiononwhichaconstitutionalprovisionisbasedand,ontheother,
atrueimplication,inwhichtheassumptionitselfisconstitutionallyprotected(AustralianCapital
Televisionat135,perMasonCJ).24Moreover,theveryfactthatanimpliedrightisnotexpress,
yethassuchasigniicantimpactonlegislativeauthority,encouragesjudicialrestraint.Courtsare
15/33
lesslikelytofallpreytoonecommonhazardofconstitutionalisedChartersofRightsthe
temptationtowardsmaximalratherthanminimaldeinitionsofrights.
Finally,animpliedrightalwaysdependsuponcuesinthetext,andthislimitstherangeofrights
thatcanbeimplied.Therightstendtobepolitical,stronglytiedtotheintegrityofpublic
institutions.Hence,theyprotectpoliticalspeech(onthebasisthattheConstitutionestablishes
representativegovernment)butnotartisticspeech.InAustralia,animpliedguaranteeof
equalityfounderedpreciselybecausetherightclaimedwasgeneralandsweeping,lackinga
clearconstitutionaltouchstone(Leeth;Kruger).
Impliedrightsthereforehavearestrictedscope,tightlytiedtotheexpressprovisionsofthe
Constitution.Theytendtobefocusedsolelyonpoliticalfreedoms.Andbecausetherightsare
inferred,becausetheyarederivative,neverprimary,andbecausetheyaretheproductof
complexinterpolation,thereisalwaysthepotentialforadjustmentintothefuture.These
limitationsarevirtuesifonebelievesthatconstitutionallyentrenchedguaranteesshouldbe
restrictedtotrulyfundamentalprinciples,dealingwiththecitizenspoliticalrelationshiptothe
state.
Expressrights,subjecttoderogation
Underimpliedrights,judicialreviewhasarestrictedrolesimplyasaresultoftheallusiveand
ambiguousforminwhichtherightsareexpressed(orunexpressed).Inthesecondmechanism
forrightsprotectionexaminedhereexpressrightssubjecttoderogationbythelegislature
therightsarestatedjustastheyareinanyconstitutionalisedBillofRights,buttheyarethen
subjecttolegislativederogation:thelegislaturecanchoosetooverridetheminamanner
expresslyprovidedintheconstitution.
TheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsistheprincipalexampleofthisstrategy.Section33
oftheCharterreadsinpart:
(1)ParliamentorthelegislatureofaprovincemayexpresslydeclareinanActofParliamentor
ofthelegislature,asthecasemaybe,thattheActoraprovisionthereofshalloperate
notwithstandingaprovisionincludedins2orss7to15ofthisCharter.
(2)AnActoraprovisionofanActinrespectofwhichadeclarationmadeunderthissectionisin
effectshallhavesuchoperationasitwouldhavebutfortheprovisionofthisCharterreferredto
inthedeclaration.
Certainconditionslimittheuseoftheoverride,althoughthesectionitselfkeepsthesetoa
minimumandthecourtshavebeenreluctanttoindthatmoreexistbyimplication.First,the
overrideisonlyapplicabletocertainrights(thosefoundinss2and715).Paradoxically,these
tendtobethemostbroadlyacceptedrights,includingfreedomofreligion,freedomof
association,freedomofexpression,rightsarisinginthecontextofcriminalproceedings,and
equality.Thechiefexclusionsarerightstovoteand,signiicantly,mobilityrightsandoficial
languages.Thelasttwoexclusionsgiveacluetotherationaleunderlyingthechoicetoincludeor
exclude.Mobilityrightsandlanguagerightswerehighlycontroversialamonganumberof
provincesatthetimeoftheChartersadoption,theformerbecauseofpotentialinterference
withprovincialpolicieswithrespecttoeconomicdevelopmentandabsenteeownership,the
latterbecauseofQuebecsdesiretorequiretheuseofFrenchincertaincontexts.Atthesame
time,theFederalGovernmentwasintenselycommittedtobothsetsofprovisionsaswaysof
requiringbotheconomicintegrationandbilingualism.Theoverrideexcludedpreciselythose
rightsmostlikelytobesubjecttoderogation.
Secondly,anyinvocationofs33issubjecttoaiveyearsunsetclause.Attheendofiveyears,the
derogationlapses(althoughitcanbereenactedindeinitely).Thisrequiresthatderogationsbe
justiiedrepeatedly,atperiodicintervals.Fiveyearswaschosenastheperiodbecausethat
coincideswiththemaximumtermofanygovernment.
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Supericially,s33oftheCanadianCharterissimilartothenotwithstandingclauseinthe
CanadianBillofRights,thestatutoryBillwhichIintroducedaboveandwilldiscussfurther
below.Eachclauseapparentlypermitsthelegislaturetoderogate,andineachcase,derogation
mustbeexpressinthederogatingactitself,inordertotriggerapopulardebateinwhichthe
governmentwillbecompelledtojustifyitsactions.Indeed,inthisrespecttheCanadianBillof
Rightsservedasthemodelfors33oftheCanadianCharter.Butinanotherrespect,thetwo
instrumentsareverydifferent.InastatutoryBillofRights,itistheveryabilitytoderogatethat
renderstheBilleffectual;thatcapacitytransformstheBillfromwhatwouldbeaninvalid
constraintonthesubstanceoflegislationtooneofprocedureonly.Paradoxically,then,itisthe
veryabilitytosettherightsasidethatrendersthestatutoryinstrumentbindingonlater
legislation.IntheCharter,ontheotherhand,therightsareconstitutionallyentrenched;they
control,oftheirownforce,alllegislation.There,thenotwithstandingclausedoesnothingbut
allowthelegislaturetosettherightsaside.
IntheCharter,s33wasacompromisebetweenparliamentarysovereigntytheBritish
constitutionaldoctrinethattreatsthelegislatureasthesupremebranchofgovernmentand
judicialreview.AtthetimeofpatriationoftheCanadianConstitutionintheearly1980s,the
governmentsofSaskatchewanandManitobaopposedtheinclusionofanentrenchedCharterof
Rightspreciselybecausetheybelieveditwouldshiftdecisionmakingfromthelegislaturetothe
courts.SaskatchewansleftleaningGovernmentcitedtheUSconstitutionaldoctrineof
substantivedueprocess(whichhadimpededtheadoptionofmuchsociallegislationuptothe
1930s),asareasonforlimitingthepowersofjudicialreview.Thoseprovincesagreedtothe
Charteronlyonconditionthatitincludeaclausepermittinglegislaturestoderogatefromits
guarantees.Section33wasthereforeadoptedpreciselybecauseofmisgivings,amongsome
governments,aboutrightsreview.25Thesectionhasbeenseenbymany(notleastinCanada),as
inconsistentwiththeveryideaofaCharterofRights.Somehavearguedthatitshouldbe
removed(seeRussell1991:301302;Mandel1994:87andfollowing;Hiebert1999a:3132).
Suchastarkoppositionisunfortunate,however.Thereisajustiicationforthenotwithstanding
clauseperhapsthebestjustiicationthatseesitasestablishinganappropriatebalance
betweencourtsandlegislature,throughthefacilitationofdialoguebetweenthoseinstitutions
withrespecttorights.Accordingtothisview,s33isnotantirights;itsimplyallowsthe
legislaturetoparticipateintheirinterpretationandapplication(Weiler1984:7992;Russell
1991).
Thejustiicationstartsfromthepremisethattherecanbelegitimatedifferencesoverthe
deinitionofrights.Thereisreason,then,toprovideanoutletthroughwhichalternative
understandingsofrightscanbeadvancedanddefended.Thisisespeciallytruewhen,under
entrenchedChartersofRights,courtsinterpretationscanbeverydificulttocorrect(theusual
mechanismsbeingrevisionbythecourtsthemselvesorconstitutionalamendment).
Italsorecognisesthatdifferenttypesofinstitutionscarrydifferentadvantagesanddifferent
biasesinrightsdeinition(Webber1993:218andfollowing;2000a:137144).Courtsexcel
atthesoberanalysisofspeciicclaimsinamannerthatpayscloseattentiontoindividualsand
thatisisolated(thoughonlyinrelativeterms)frombroaderpoliticalconcerns.Theyare
especiallyeffectivewhereallconsiderationsrelevanttoaparticulardisputearewelldeined,so
thatinterestsarecrystallisedandthepartiesimplicatedareknownandrepresented.They
depend,intheirprocedure,onpartiesappearingbeforethemandarguingallrelevant
considerations.Theyhavegreatdificultydealingwithissuesinwhichinterestsarewidely
distributed,sothatnoonepartyhassuficientinteresttoappearandtheonlyviableprocedural
approachwouldinvolveinquiryandinvestigation.Courtsfocusoverwhelminglyonprotection
againstgovernmentinterference,notpositiveactionbygovernmenttoadvancetheinterestsof
individualsorgroups,forjudicialreviewisconceived(rightly)asarestraintongovernment
action,ratherthantheassertionofanalternativeorcomplementarygovernmentalauthority.
Theneteffectofthis,however,isthatjudicialreviewtendstoprivilegeprivateoverpublic
action,foronlythelatterissubjectedtoCharterscrutiny.Finally,courtsdobestwhenthe
interestsaresimplyalignedwhenthedisputetakesabipolar(withtwoopposedpositions)
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ratherthanpolycentricform(whereamultitudeofcompetinginterestsneedtobebalanced).
Theformeraccordsmostcloselytocourtsadversarialprocedures,inwhich,paradigmatically,
twopartiescontend,marshallingtheirownsetsofevidence.Indeed,becauseoftheiradversarial
procedureandtheirbiastowardstherestraintofgovernment,courtsarepronetosimplify
rightsclaimssothattheyconform,ascloselyaspossible,toabipolarformtheindividual
pittedagainstthestateevenwhenthestatemaysimplybeservingasastandinforthe
broadlydistributedinterestsofindividualsinsocietyatlarge.
Legislatureshavestrengthsandweaknessesthatbroadlycorrespondtothoseofcourts.Theyare
muchbetteratdealingwithpolycentricissuesandwithwidelydistributedinterests.Theyhave
procedureswelladaptedtoinvestigationandinquiry.Theyareabletoactpositively,deploying
resourcestoattainendsratherthanstandingbacktoletthesituationbedeterminedbytheplay
ofprivateforces.Thoseadvantagescomewithdisadvantages.Legislaturescanrespondtoa
perceivedbalanceofinterestsortoastronglyarticulatedmajorityinterestinamanner
thathasinsuficientregardforminoritiesorindividuals.Becausetheyworkbymajorityrule,
theycanweighallindividualsselfdeinedinterestsequally,whensomeinterestsmaydeserve
addedweightbecauseoftheirfundamentalcharacter(religiousbeliefs;freedomofexpression;
thefreedomtoassociate;mobilityrights).Intheirpursuitofgeneralsocialinterests,theycan
losesightoftheparticularsituationofindividuals.
Section33,itmightthenbeargued,achievesanappropriatebalancebetweenthebeneitsofthe
legislatureandthoseofthecourtsinthedeinitionofrights.Itprovidesforjudicialreviewona
fullarrayofrightsconcerns,butitalsoallowslegislaturestohavethelastwordiftheydisagree
fundamentallyonhowrightshavebeendeinedandapplied.Eventhen,rightsconcernsare
highlightedbecauseoftherequirementthatthelegislaturebeexplicitinitsintentiontooverride
theConstitutionsdeclarationofrights.Thistriggersdemocraticscrutiny,whichonlythe
strongestjustiicationislikelytosurmount.
Thismaybethebestjustiicationfors33,butinpracticethesectionhasbeenlessthan
successfulatfosteringaproductivedialogue.Ithasbeenusedinseventeensituations(although
inonetheactwasneverproclaimedinforce).Theexperiencehasbeendecidedlymixed.Theuse
ofs33hasbeenconcentratedinfewhands.TheprovinceofQuebecwasresponsiblefor
fourteenoftheseventeeninstances;althoughotherjurisdictionshavefromtimetotime
vehementlydisagreedwithCharterdecisions,allexceptAlbertahavetended,inrecentyears,to
shyawayfroms33andtouserenewedjustiicationunders1instead.Moreover,inagreatmany
instances,theuseofs33hasescapedpublicnoticealmostentirely.Wereitnotfortherecent
workofTsviKahana,thirteenofthoseinstanceswouldhaveremainedinutterobscurity
(Kahana2000:255291)26.
Quebecwastheirstjurisdictiontousetheclause.InJune1982,soonaftertheproclamationof
theCharter,itpassedalawinvokings33withrespecttoallexistingQuebecstatutes(AnAct
RespectingtheConstitutionAct1982(Canada)).Itthenproceededtoinsertacomparableclause
ineachsubsequentact.ThiswasdonetoprotestagainstthepatriationoftheConstitutionover
Quebecsobjections.TheQuebecGovernment,undertheindpendantistePartiQue
be
cois,had
participatedinthenegotiationsleadinguptopatriation,buthadultimatelyrejectedthepackage
agreedtobyOttawaandtheotherprovinces.Quebectookthepositionthatitshouldbeableto
vetoconstitutionalreform,giventhatitwastheonlyprovincewithaFrenchspeakingmajority.
Whenpatriationproceededregardless,itoptedoutofthenewChartertothemaximumextent
possible(Webber1994:113andfollowing).
Thisuseofthenotwithstandingclausewashighlyunusual,focusedasitwasonthelegitimacyof
theconstitutionalorderasawhole.TheblanketuseoftheclausewaschallengedinFordv
Quebec,theplaintiffsarguingthatthewordingofs33contemplatedamorepreciseorexplicit
derogation.Theysuggestedthatavalidderogationshouldoccuronlyafterthecourtshadruled
ontherightsconcerns,shouldidentifypreciselywhatrightsweretobesetaside,orshould
specifytheaspectofthelawtobeprotectedfromscrutiny.Theyarguedthatthisinterpretation
wasjustiiedbythesignallingfunctionofthenotwithstandingclause;iftherewerenoexpress
18/33
identiicationoftherightsinquestioniftheinvocationoftheclausesimplyexemptedall
statutesfromrightsreviewnosensibledebateovertheissuescouldbejoined.Thismayhave
beenright,buttheSupremeCourtsawthatsuchrequirements,onceestablished,werelikelyto
becomedisguisedsubstantivelimitationsontheabilityofthelegislaturetoinvokes33.It
declinedtostartdownthatroadandinsteadupheldtheblanketinvocationofthe
notwithstandingclause.Insodoing,itconirmedthats33wasarecognitionofparliamentary
sovereigntywithintherightscontext,onethatwasnottobehedgedaboutbyjudiciallyimposed
restrictions.
IntheQuebecprovincialelectionof1985,thefederalistLiberalPartydefeatedtheParti
Que
be
cois.ThenewGovernmentstoppedinvokings33ineverypieceoflegislation,butitdid
notrepealpreviousinvocations.Instead,itletthemexpireastheyreachedtheiveyearlimit.
Thisexposed,fortheirsttime,QuebecslegislationtofullCharterreview.Sincethen,Quebec
hasinvokeds33onthirteenoccasions.Twelveconcernedhighlycomplexlegislativeregimes
dealingwithpensions(raisingconcernsofgenderdiscrimination),theroleofreligionin
education(freedomofreligion),andagriculturaldevelopment(agediscrimination).These
twelveinstancesreceivednopublicattention(Kahana2001:255291).Thereasonsareobscure,
butareprobablyduetothearcanenatureofthelegislativeregimes,thelimitedlegitimacyofthe
CharterinQuebec(ineachcasetheirstuseoftheclauseoccurredshortlyaftertheblanket
invocationswerediscontinued),andthefactthatintheeducationacts,theprovisionswere
closelyrelatedtoconstitutionallyentrenchedguaranteesofreligiousschoolboards.
In1988,however,therewasaverypublicandhighlycontesteduseoftheclause.Thisoccurred
inresponsetothedecisioninFord,notedabove.Thatdecisionhadstruckdownprovisionsof
QuebecslanguagelawthatrequiredthatcommercialsignsandcompanynamesbeinFrench
only.Ironically,themostimportantsectionswereinvalidatedonthebasisofQuebecsown,
statutory,CharterofHumanRightsandFreedoms,nottheCanadianCharter,forthesignlaw
provisionswereprotectedfromtheCanadianCharterbyastillsubsistingnotwithstanding
clause.
FordgeneratedaiercepoliticalcontroversyinQuebec.MostfrancophoneQuebecersmighthave
beenwillingtorelaxtheprovinceslanguagelaws,buttheydidnotwantrelaxationtobe
dictatedbytheSupremeCourtofCanada,inamannerthatremovedcontrolfromQuebecers
electedrepresentatives.Quebecthereforereenactedthesignlawprovisions,inmodiiedform,
thistimeprotectingthemagainsttheCanadianCharterthroughtheuseofthenotwithstanding
clause(AnActtoAmendtheCharteroftheFrenchLanguage1988(Quebec)).Here,theclausewas
usedpreciselyinthemannercontemplatedinthebestjustiicationfors33offeredabove;a
legislativemajoritysetasiderightsreviewonthebasisthatfreedomoflinguisticexpression,in
commercialsignage,wasoutweighedbyotherpublicconsiderations.
TheQuebecGovernmentpaidasigniicantpriceforitsuseoftheclause.Anglophonemembers
ofthegovernmentresigned,manyQuebecanglophoneslefttheprovincialLiberals,andan
Englishspeakingprotestmovementtookhold.Mostimportantly,angerintherestofCanada
overBill178(astheActwasknown)contributedtothedefeatoftheMeechLakeAccord,asetof
constitutionalamendmentsdesignedtoaddressQuebecsconstitutionalgrievances.Theevents
demonstrated,then,thatbroadpopulardebatecouldbegeneratedbytheuseofs33andthat
governmentscouldincurheavycostsasaresultevenwhen,asinQuebec,theyretainedthe
supportofmajorityopinionwithintheprovince.Fiveyearslater,oncepassionswithinthe
provincehadcooled,theLiberalGovernmentagainamendedthesignlawsothatitfellwithin
thelimitssetbytheSupremeCourtofCanadaandallowedthenotwithstandingclausetolapse
althoughbythattime,muchofthedamagehadbeendone(AnActtoAmendtheCharterofthe
FrenchLanguage1993(Quebec);Webber1994:138andfollowing).
ThenotwithstandingclausehasonlybeenusedonthreeoccasionsoutsideQuebec.Theirstwas
intheYukonTerritoryin1982.Thisprovision,neverproclaimedinforce,wasdesignedto
protectaboriginalnominationstotheLandPlanningBoard.Itreceivednopublicattentionand
wasalmostcertainlyunnecessarygiventhedistinctivetreatmentofindigenouspeoplesinthe
CanadianConstitution(s39(1)ofLandPlanningAct1982(Yukon);Kahana2001:258and266).
19/33
In1986,Saskatchewanusedtheclausetoprotectastatuteadoptedtoendastrike.Thiswas
ultimatelyprovenunnecessarywhentheSupremeCourtheld,inaseparatecase,thattherightto
strikewasnotprotectedundertheChartersguaranteeoffreedomofassociation.Theinvocation
oftheclauseelicitedrealcriticaldebate,althoughtheSupremeCourtssubsequentdecisiontook
someoftheforceoutofthatdiscussion(s9ofSGEUDisputeSettlementAct(Saskatchewan);
Kahana2001:269270;RWDSU).In2000,theAlbertalegislatureamendeditsMarriageActto
deinemarriageinexclusivelyheterosexualterms,invokings33.Again,therewaspublic
opposition,althoughmuted,perhapsbecausecapacitytomarryfallswithinfederaljurisdiction
andAlbertasenactmentwouldthereforehavebeenpurelysymbolic(MarriageAmendmentAct
2000(Alberta);Kahana2001:268269).In1998theAlbertaGovernmentseriously
contemplatedtheuseofs33intwoothercircumstancesthatwouldhavehadamaterialeffect
onlegalrights.Ineachcaseitretreated,inoneinstanceinresponsetoaverystrongpublic
reaction.27
Thus,theclausehasbeeninvokedveryrarelyoutsideQuebec,andeveninQuebecmostofits
useshavebeenburiedinhighlycomplexregimes,insixcasescloselyrelatedtoexisting
guaranteesofreligiousschoolboards.Indeed,itisfairtosaythats33hasachievedverylittle
legitimacyoutsidefrancophoneQuebec,withthepartialexceptionofAlberta.Itwasiercely
criticisedbymanyrightsadvocatesatthetimeoftheChartersadoption.Therearestillforceful
callsforitsremoval,aswellasperiodicdemandsthatstricterconditionsbeplacedonitsuse
(seeRussell1991:301302;Mandel1994:87andfollowing;Hiebert1999a:3132).28
Legislativeinterventionunders33tendstobeseenasplainlyandsimplyantirights,notasa
meansbywhichlegislaturescaninsistontheirowninterpretationsofrights.
Section33has,intheend,madeverylittledifferencetothewayinwhichrightsareconceived
undertheCharter,atleastinEnglishspeakingCanada.Themythologyofjudicialreviewon
rightsgroundsremainsverystrongthesensethatcourtsprotectrights,unproblematically
deined,againstlegislativeorExecutiveoppression.Thereislittleconsciousweighingofthe
strengthsandweaknessesoflegislaturesandcourtsasinterpretersofrights.Isuspectthatthis
isdueinlargemeasuretothefactthattherightsarestillenshrinedinaconstitutionaltext.
RegardlessofwhethertheconstitutioninviteslegislativeparticipationastheCanadian
Charterarguablydoesins33theverycontextoftheclausesuggeststhatwhenitisinvoked,
fundamentalrightsaresetaside.Constitutionscarryapowerfulsymboliccharge.Theyare
perceivedtobebasiclaws,settingoutthepremisesonwhichsocietyshouldbegoverned,witha
measureofixityandpermanencethatisbeyondpolitics.Againstthisbackdrop,s33looksvery
oddindeed,introducingvariabilityandthewillofatransientmajorityintotheveryapplication
oftheConstitution.29
AstatutoryBillofRights,protectedbymannerandformrequirements
Thisbringsustothelaststrategyofrightsprotectionexaminedhere:thedeclarationofrightsin
statutoryform,protectedbyamannerandformrequirement.
Ihavealreadydescribedthenatureofthismechanismabove.Therightsareexpressedinan
ordinarystatute.Theycanbesetaside,however,bythelegislatureexpresslystatingthatanact
appliesnotwithstandingtheBillofRights.Thatabilitytosettherightsasidetransformstheact
fromasubstantivetoaprocedurallimitation,permittingittobindthelegislatureforthefuture.
StatutoryBillsofRightsarebinding(inCanada),butonlyinrelativeterms.Infact,therearetwo
waysinwhichtheireffectcanbemodiiedordisplaced:i)alegislaturecanstipulatethatanact
appliesnotwithstandingtheBillofRights;orii)itcanamendtheBillofRightsitself,changing
theveryexpressionoftherights(andindeedtherehavebeenanumberofsuchamendmentsto
provincialBillsofRightsinCanada).
TheCanadianBillofRights,adoptedbytheFederalParliamentin1960,wastheirstexampleof
thislegislativemethod,althoughthesameapproachwasadoptedinQuebecandAlberta.The
recordoftheCanadianBillofRightswasnotparticularlynoble.Priortotheadoptionofthe
20/33
Charter,itwasusedtostrikedownonlyonelegislativeprovision(RvDrybones).Formuchofits
history,therewassomequestionastowhetheritrenderedlegislationinvalidormerely
providedstandardstobeappliedwheninterpretinglegislation.Itwaspronetoinconsistent,
timid,anddownrightpoorinterpretations(Tarnopolsky1975).Thishassometimesbeen
blamedonitsstatutory,notconstitutional,character.30Althoughthischaractermayhaveplayed
somerole,onesuspectsthattheproblemwasmoregeneral:theCanadianBillofRightswas
adoptedatatimewhenjusticiablerightswereuncommonoutsidetheUS,andCanadaslegal
cultureandlegaleducationwereilladaptedtorightsreview.Judicialinterpretationofstatutory
BillsofRightsandofhumanrightscodes(whichareapplicabletoparticulartypesofservices
anddonotpurporttobindthelegislature)hasbeenmuchbolderandmoresophisticatedin
recentyears,suggestingthatitwaslegalcultureratherthantheCanadianBillofRights
statutorycharacterthatdeterminedthatinstrumentsweakinterpretation.Indeed,the
interpretationoftheCanadianBillofRightsitselfhasimproved.
BecauseoftheinadequateinterpretationoftheCanadianBillofRights,andbecauseallof
CanadasstatutoryBillsofRightshave,sincetheearly1980s,largelybeendisplacedbythe
CanadianCharter,itisdificulttodrawsatisfactoryconclusions.Istronglysuspect,however,that
statutoryBillsofRightshaveadvantagesthatareworthrevisiting,especiallyforthosenations,
likeAustralia,thatdonothaveconstitutionalisedBillsofRightsandareconsideringadopting
them.InparticularIbelievethatstatutoryBillsofRightsmayprovideabetterframeworkfor
dialoguebetweenlegislatureandcourts.
Asarguedabove,oneofthechiefobstaclestodialogueundertheCanadianCharterofRightsand
FreedomshasbeenthesymbolicforceofaconstitutionalisedCharter,whichdrivesadeepgulf
betweentheconstitutionallyprotectedrightsandallotherinterests.Therightsassumea
superordinateimportance,resistanttobalancing.AnyattemptbythelegislatureorExecutiveto
deinerightsordeterminetheirapplicationisviewedwithextremescepticism,asanillegitimate
attempttoimpairfundamentalliberties.Theabilityoflegislaturestoderogateins33becomes
virtuallyunusable.
StatutoryBillsofRightsescapesomeoftheseevils.Theactitself,asanordinarystatute,carries
nothinglikethesamesymboliccharge.Itisthereforelesssusceptibletotheviewthattherights
asdeinedbythecourtsareimmutable,tobekeptexemptfromanylegislativetampering.Onthe
contrary,thestatutoryrightsareemphaticallytheproductoflegislativeaction.Thelegislatureis
acollaboratorintheiradoptionanddeinition,notanantagonist.Ithasamanifestclaimtoshare
intheircontinueddeinition,notonlythroughexpressderogationbutmoreimportantlythrough
theamendmentofthestatutoryBillitself(whichclearlyinvolvesredeinition,notjustthe
settingasideoftherights).Thereisthusaviableavenuethroughwhichtheparticularstrengths
oflegislaturestheweighingofdispersedsocialbeneits;balancinginpolycentricissues;the
abilitytoinquireandinvestigate;anunderstandingofthepositivevalueofstateactionin
promotingsocialwelfarecanmakethemselvesfeltinrightsjurisprudence.
Moreover,thestatutoryformavoidssomeproblemswiththeinterpretationofconstitutional
rights,preciselybecausethestatutoryrightsarenotsetapartinasacrosanctdocument.The
rightscanbeconsideredinrelationtootherinterestswithoutanexaggeratedgulfbetweenthe
two.Moreover,theirapplicationislesslikelytobedistortedbythehighsymbolismand
nationalisticaimsthatsometimesaflictconstitutionalinstruments.
Yet,becauseoftheirrelativebindingforce,thestatutoryprovisionsdocontinuetoprotect
againstinadvertentorsurreptitiouslegislativeimpairmentofrights.Theydothis,notby
removingaswathofdecisionsfrompoliticaldebate,conferringthemexclusivelyonthecourts
(asconstitutionalprovisionstendtodo).Rather,theyworkbystimulatingdebate,warningthat
rightsmaybeinperilandtherebyprompting(onehopes)vigorouspopularengagementinthe
issues.
Inshort,throughtheadjudicationoftherightsthemselves,statutoryBillsofRightsprovidean
opportunityforthekindofcareful,individualisedandrelativelydispassionateanalysisofrights
concernsthatweexpectofthecourts.Thatanalysishasrealeffect:thecourtscaninvalidate
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23.3.2016
Webber,Jeremy"InstitutionalDialogueBetweenCourtsandLegislaturesintheDefinitionofFundamentalRights:LessonsFromCanada(andEls
concernsthatweexpectofthecourts.Thatanalysishasrealeffect:thecourtscaninvalidate
legislation,certainlyprotectingagainstinadvertentimpairmentsandevenprovidingsome
protectionagainstpurposefulrightsinfringements.Yettheydothisinawaythatreliesupon
provisionsthataredeinedbythelegislature,andtheyexpresslydependuponthesupportofan
engagedcitizenryfortheirultimateeficacy.Thus,theyfeedthedemocraticprocess,ratherthan
detractingfromit.StatutoryBillsofRightsarethereforemostcompatiblewiththeview,whichI
accept,thatdemocraticinstitutionsareanindispensablebulwarkagainstrepressiveconduct
abulwarkwhich,onceeroded,cannotadequatelybereplacedbyjudicialinstitutions,forthe
courtsthemselvesultimatelydependuponameasureofpopularsupportfortheireficacy.31
Conclusion
Therangeofinstitutionalmechanismsforrightsprotectionisthereforeconsiderablybroader
thanwegenerallythink.Eveninjurisdictionsmostcommittedtojudicialreview,rights
protectionsinvolveacomplexinteractionamonginstitutions.Whenaddressingissuesof
constitutionaldesign,thereisavarietyofwaysinwhichthatinteractioncanbestructured.32
Myownpreference,insocietieswithastrongrightsculturelikeCanadaorAustralia,isfor
mechanismsthatpermitacontinuedroleevenapredominantroleforthelegislature.
Therearemanyreasonsforthispreference,someofwhichhavebeenevidentinthisarticleand
whichIhavediscussedfurtherelsewhere.Butoneessentialoneisthatinsuchsocieties,most
rightsissuesdonotinvolvegrossviolationsbutratherdificultissuesofjudgment.Icannotsee
whythelegislatureshouldhavenolegitimatepartinthosedecisions.
Section33oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsmaybebestjustiiedintheseterms,
butithasnotfuliledthatpromise,foritstillparticipatesinthehighsymbolismofa
constitutionalisedBillofRights,whichforcefullyimpedesinstitutionaldialogue.Section33may
haveservedasapressurevalveatthetimeofadoptionoftheCharterandmaycontinuetodoso
aslongasthereisextensivedissatisfactionwiththeCanadianConstitutioninQuebec,butitis
unlikelytoprovideacontinuingmechanismfordialogue.Surprisingly,thestrongestexamplesof
institutionaldialogueundertheCanadianCharterhaveoccurredwithintheframeworkof
argumentsoverjustiicationunders1.
StatutoryBillsofRightshaveabetterchanceofcapturingtheappropriatebalance.There,the
courtsretainarole,butitisarolefocusedupontheareawherecourtsundeniablyhaveastrong
institutionaladvantage:theapplicationofgeneralnormstoparticularsituations,inamanner
thatmaximisesthechancethattheparticularityofthosesituationswillnotbeoverlookedor
overpoweredintherushtoachieveageneralobject.Theuseofanordinarystatutedoesmean
thatrightsarevulnerabletoacynicalorrepressivelegislativeinitiative.Thereareinstitutional
impedimentstothis,throughthepromotionofpoliticaldebateandtheopportunityforjudicial
pronouncement.Butattheendofthedayadeterminedmajoritycanhaveitsway.The
peremptorycontrolofaconstitutionalisedBillofRightsmaybeappropriateinsomecontexts,
then,especiallywheretherearepermanentpoliticalminorities,orwheretheweaknessofa
countrysrightsculturemakesstrongconstitutionalstatementdesirable.
Butitisimportanttorealisethatacapacitytooverpowerrightsdoesnotnecessarilymeanthat
rightsareinjeopardy.Onthecontrary,maintaininglegislativeresponsibilitycanfosterabroader
andmoreinclusiverightsdebate,onethatreinforcesaconcernforrightswithinthepopular
milieugenerally.Norshouldweexaggeratetheeficacyofjudicialreview.It,too,canbeswayed
byaninlamedpublic.It,too,canloseitsnerve.
Incountrieswithastrongrightsculture,questionsofrightsserveaspromptstorelectionand
institutionalselfrestraintasoccasionstoconfrontonceagainthedificultmediationbetween
individualandsociety.Theyserveonlyveryrarelyastheoccasionforheroicstandsagainst
oppression.StructuresthataremorenuancedthanconstitutionalisedBillsforrights
structuresthatprovideforagenuinedialoguebetweenthecourtsandthedemocraticprocess
maywellbemostappropriate.
*ProfessorJeremyWebberisCanadaResearchChairinLawandSociety,FacultyofLaw,
22/33
*ProfessorJeremyWebberisCanadaResearchChairinLawandSociety,FacultyofLaw,
UniversityofVictoria;previouslyProfessorandDean,FacultyofLaw,UniversityofSydney.This
isaversion,revisedforanAustralianaudience,ofapaperoriginallypublishedinSadurski
(2002),acollectionexploringthecomparativeexperienceofconstitutionaladjudicationwith
speciicreferencetocentralandeasternEurope.MythankstoEricGhoshforhisableresearch
assistanceandtoEric,JanetHiebert,PeterHogg,RodMacdonald,AndrewPetter,andWojciech
Sadurskifortheirtrenchantcommentsonanearlierdraftofthispaper.
1SeeHoggandBushell(1997);Hiebert(1999a);Hiebert(1999b);Roach(2001);Hiebert
(2002).Foraprecursor,seeTushnet(1995).Hiebertinitiallypreferredthetermconversation,
buthermostrecentworkrejectsdialogicmetaphorsandnowspeaksofarelationalapproach:
Hiebert(2002),especially5051.Forcriticismsoftheideaofdialogue,seeCameron(2001),
whorejectstheideaofdialogue,atleastwithins1oftheCanadianCharterofRightsand
Freedoms(theCharter),becauseitunderminesthesupremacyofconstitutionalinterpretation
withouttheproceduralsanctionsofs33;and,fromopposingpositions,ManfrediandKelly
(1999),whoarguethatHoggandBushellexaggeratetheextenttowhichthereistruedialogue;
andPetter(2003),whochallengestheextenttowhichdialoguetheoryhascontentorcoherence.
ThereisarejoinderinHoggandThornton(1999).Thecourtsthemselveshaveembracedthe
languageofdialogue(VriendvAlbertaat438439perCoryandIacobucciJJ;CorbirevCanada
at63perLHeureuxDube
J;RvMillsat1920and3738perMcLachlinandIacobucciJJ;Little
SistersBookandArtat294perIacobucciJ;RvHallat554perMcLachlinCJCand581582per
IacobucciJ;SauvvCanada(ChiefElectoralOficer)at597perMcLachlinCJCand628631per
GonthierJ.Thelasttwocasesweredecisionsofnarrowmajorities(5judgesto4),wherethe
implicationsofdialoguewerestronglycontested.
HoggandBushellarechielyconcernedwithalessdemandingformofdialoguethanthatwhich
isthefocusofthispaper:theabilityoflegislaturestoadapttheirlegislationtowithstand
constitutionalscrutiny,oncealawhasbeendeclaredinvalid.Thispaperconcentratesnoton
legislaturesresponsestojudicialdecisions,butonlegislaturesimpactontheinterpretationand
applicationoftherightsthemselves.
2IaddresssomeoftheissuesinWebber(2000a).
3See,however,art79oftheBasicLawoftheFederalRepublicofGermany,whichpurportsto
prohibitamendmentstosubstantialsectionsoftheConstitution.TheSupremeCourtofIndiahas
alsoheldthatthebasicstructureandframeworkoftheIndianConstitutionisunamendable,
eventhoughtheexpresstermsoftheConstitutionimposenosuchlimitation(Bhardwaj1995:
1013).
4AustraliasRacialDiscriminationAct1975hasalsobeenusedtointerpretlaterlegislation.
TherewasconsiderablediscussionwhentheNativeTitleAct1993wasenacted,andwhenthat
actwasamendedin199798,overwhetheritshouldbemadeexpresslysubjecttotheRacial
DiscriminationActsothatanyprovisionsoffendingtheRacialDiscriminationActwouldbe
renderedinoperative.Onbothoccasions,Parliamentultimatelysettledonlanguagethatmerely
invitedthecourtstousetheRacialDiscriminationActtointerprettheNativeTitleAct(Brennan
1998:6971,7374and85).
5ThereisgreaterdoubtastothebindingeffectofmannerandformrequirementsinAustralia,
especiallywithrespecttoCommonwealthlegislationandnonconstitutionalenactmentsofthe
states.ThemostsubstantialdiscussionisfoundinWinterton(1980).Heconcludesthatthe
CommonwealthcouldbinditselftoarequirementlikethatoftheCanadianBillofRightsas
indeedhadbeencontemplatedintheCommonwealthsHumanRightsBillof1973(never
passed)anddiscussedatthetimeoftheadoptionandamendmentoftheNativeTitleAct1993
(seepreviousnote).
6Itispossible,dependingonthenatureofthefederalregime,forastatutoryBillofRights
enactedatoneleveltobindlegislationenactedbytheotherlevel.ThisisthecasewiththeRacial
DiscriminationAct,adoptedundertheCommonwealthsexternalaffairspowertoincorporate
theInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationinto
23/33
Australianlaw.Becauseitbeneitsfromtheparamountcyoffederallegislationoverinconsistent
statelegislation,itbindstheStateswithoutanyneedtoresorttomannerandformrequirements
(KoowartavBjelkePetersen).
7ThecelebratedAustraliancase,AustralianCommunistPartyvCommonwealth,alsoused
divisionofpowersreasoningintheserviceofhumanrightsends.There,theHighCourt
consideredthevalidityoftheCommunistPartyDissolutionAct1950,whichattemptedtorelyon
thedefencepoweroronanimpliedpowertodefendgovernmentalinstitutionstodeclarethe
CommunistPartyunlawfulandprohibitCommunistsfromservingintheCommonwealth
Governmentandincertainunions.TheCourtheldthatthestatutewasbeyondthescopeofboth
powers.SimilarlyinAdelaideCompanyof
JehovahsWitnesses,theHighCourtstruckdownawartimeregulationpurportingtodissolvea
JehovahsWitnessesorganisationonthegroundsthatitwentbeyondwhatwasnecessaryforthe
prosecutionofthewarandwasthereforebeyondthescopeofthedefencepower.Thislast
decisionisespeciallyinterestingforthereisanexpressguaranteeforfreedomofreligioninthe
AustralianConstitution(s116),whichtheCourtdecidedwouldnothavebeenviolatedbythe
regulation.Thispreferencefordivisionofpowersreasoningmayrelectthefactthatatleast
untilrecently,judicialreviewondivisionofpowersgroundshadmorelegitimacythanreviewon
thebasisofrights,perhapsbecausejudgmentsbasedexpresslyonrightschallengelegislative
policymuchmoredirectly.
8Canadiancasesoftenconsideredtoopenthedoorforimpliedrightsinclude:Re:Alberta
Statutesat133134(perDuffCJ);SaumurvCityofQuebecat354(perKellockJ)and363(per
LockeJ);SwitzmanvElblingat328(perAbbottJ);OPSEUvOntarioat57(perBeetzJ).The
Australiandecisionsarediscussedbelow.
9HoggandBushell(1997:101104)giveanumberofexampleswherelegislaturesor
governmentagenciesexplicitlystate,sometimesinthepreambletoanAct,whythemeasure
constitutesareasonablelimitationwithinthemeaningofs1oftheCharter.
10Forunamendableconstitutionalprovisions,seenote3above.Dicey(1959:128131)argued
thatthefactthataconstitutionwasunamendablemightactuallyencouragerevolution,citingthe
rapiditywithwhichsupposedlyunamendableFrenchconstitutionshadbeenreplaced.
11Thisapproachtointerpretationandthatinthenextsectionalsoallowmoreroomforthe
kindofdialogueemphasisedbyHoggandBushell(1997)legislativeresponsestojudicial
decisionsthatmeetlegislativeaimsandyetconformtojudicialdecisionsformorelatitudeis
permittedtolegislativeaction.Foranexample,seeRoach(2001:271273).Itispuzzling,
however,thatHoggandBushellcite(8587)situationsinwhichthecourtsdirecthowlegislation
mightberedraftedasexamplesofthepotentialfordialogue.Totheextentthatthecourtdictates
howalegislaturemustrespond,therelationshiphardlyseemsoneofdialoguebutratheroneof
compliance(asHoggandBushellacknowledge,thoughhalfheartedly,at98).SeeHiebert
(1999b:1015)fordiscussionofoneparticularinstance,andManfrediandKelly(1999)
generally.
12See,forexample,IrwinToyvQuebecat625630;McKinneyvUniversityofGuelphat665673.
Hiebert(1999a:28)rightlynotesthattheCourthasrarelyheldthelegislativeobjectivetobe
insuficienttojustifylimitingtheright.Judgmentshave,withveryfewexceptions,beendecided
ontheproportionalityofthemeasures.
13ForbackgroundtoRvMills,seeHiebert(1999b:1625;2002:107116).Cameron(2001)
criticisesthedecisioninMillsonthebasisthatitgrantsthelegislaturelicencetoignorethe
courtsinterpretationoftheCharter,underminingthesupremacyofthecourtsinconstitutional
review.Moreover,Parliamentcandothiswithoutpayingtheinstitutionalpricedemandedins
33.
14See,forexample,theformoftherightinthefailedsetofconstitutionalamendmentsknown
24/33
inCanadaastheCharlottetownAccord,ss29andfollowing.Aninherentrightofself
governmentwasrecognised,butitsinstantiationwastobedeterminedthroughnegotiations
supervisedbythecourts.TheCorbiredecisionevincesasimilarspirit.It,too,concernedthe
designofindigenousgovernmentalinstitutions(althoughnotunderaninherentright).There,a
statutoryprovisiondenyingnonresidentbandmemberstherighttovotewasruledinvalid
undertheCharter.Butthedeclarationofinvaliditywassuspendedfor18monthsinorderto
permitareplacementprovisiontobedeveloped.
15Itisimportant,however,thatframingnormsarelimitedtosituationsinwhichnorms
genuinelyareincapableoffurtherprecision.Otherwise,courtdecisionscanleavelegislaturesin
aninvidiousposition,havinglittlesenseofhowlegislationmightberedraftedinordertorender
itvalid.
16TheCourthassincemovedawayfromtherigourofthelabourtrilogytoindthatthe
exclusionofagriculturalworkersfromprotectionsagainstunfairlabourpracticesoffends
freedomofassociation(DunmorevOntario(AttorneyGeneral)).Thedecisionwasbasedonthe
Courtsabilitytoreviewand,ifwarranted,ordertheextensionofunderinclusivelegislation
designedtoprotectconstitutionalrights.Theprotectionsatissueconcernedthecoreabilityto
formorganisationswithoutinterference,notfullrightstobargaincollectively.Butsomeaspects
ofthedecisionsuggestthattheCourtmaybeinchingtowardstherecognitionofframingnorms.
TheCourtdistinguishesthegeneralvalueoffreedomofassociationfromthespeciicsofany
statutoryregimeandnotes(at227)thatthecollectivebargainingstatuteinquestiondoesnot
simplyenhance,butinstantiates,thefreedomtoorganise.Thatsaid,therearereasonstobe
gratefulforthenonrecognitionofcollectivebargainingundertheCharter(Webber2000a:141
142).
17Canadasdenominationalschoolsguarantees(ConstitutionAct1867,s93(3)and(4))have
beenanalysedashavingtwodimensions,oneenforceablebyboththecourtsandthefederal
executiveandlegislature,theotherenforceableonlybythelatter:TinySeparateSchoolTrusteesv
TheKingat369370.Canadiancourtshaverejectedthepoliticalquestionsdoctrine,under
whichcertainostensiblyconstitutionalquestionswouldbedeemednonjusticiable:Operation
DismantlevTheQueenat472perWilsonJ.
18ThisisalsooneofthestrategiesusedbytheUKsHumanRightsAct1998,s10,togetaround
thelimitationsimposedbyparliamentarysovereignty:Ministersareempoweredtoamend
legislationtobringitintoconformitywiththeEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsifthere
arecompellingreasonstodoso.
ThepoweroftheCanadianGovernmenttodisallowprovincialstatutes(ConstitutionAct1867,s
90)nowindisuse,butusedactivelyduringtheirstdecadesofConfederationwasalso
employedintheserviceofindividualrights,especiallypropertyrights.
19Fordiscussionsofthisprocess,seeHiebert(1999b:69,2002:319).Forargumentsin
favour,seeSlattery(1987)andHiebert(1998).Forsimilarrequirements,seeCanadianBillof
Rights,s3;NewZealandBillofRightsAct1990(NZ),s7andKeith(2000:731735);Human
RightsAct1998(UK),s19.
20HoggandBushell(1997:104105)giveanotherexampleofthesamephenomenon,where
theCanadianParliamentrevisedlegislationdealingwiththetaxdeductibilityofchildsupport
payments,eventhoughtheGovernmenthadwonthepreviousCharteraction.
21ThesubstantialreenactmentofprovisionsdeclaredinvalidoccurredinresponsetoRv
Daviault,andwascontainedinAnActtoamendtheCriminalCode(Selfinducedintoxication)
(Canada).Forbackground,seeHiebert(2002:96107).Therehasyettobeadeinitiverulingon
theconstitutionalityofthatlegislationlargelybecause,evenifvalid,itwouldonlyapplyinvery
specialcircumstances.Thosedecisionsthathaveconsidereditsvalidity,allbylowercourts,are
divided(RvVickberg;RvBrenton;RvDunn).
25/33
22TheUSSupremeCourtsacceptanceoftheinternmentofJapaneseAmericansduringWorld
WarIIisoftencited(KorematsuvUnitedStates).Institutionalmechanismswithinthepublic
servicecansometimesbemoreeffective.InaseminarattheFacultyofLaw,McGillUniversity,
basedonSimpson(1994),BrianSimpsonnotedtheinstitutionalethicoftheBritishHomeOfice
inthedefenceofthelibertiesofthesubject,andtherelativestrengthofthisbranchofthepublic
service,incontrasttothecourts,intheprotectionoftherightsofdetaineesduringWorldWarII.
23TheCanadiandecisionstendtouses96oftheConstitutionAct1867asthefoundationforthe
protectionofjudicialindependenceinCanada,althoughthishasbeensupplementedbys11(d)
oftheCharter.Moreover,judicialindependencehasrecentlybeenrecognisedasageneral
unwrittenprinciple(ReRemunerationofJudges).Section96is,onitsface,merelyapowerof
appointment,althoughitistheirstinasetofprovisionsthatenshrinetheActofSettlement
1701inCanadianconstitutionallaw.Fordiscussionoftheimplicationsbaseduponit,seeHogg
(1992:184andfollowing).Fortheconstitutionalisationofjudicialreviewofadministrative
jurisdiction,seeCreviervAGQuebec.
FortheseparationofthejudicialpowerinAustraliaandthederivationofindividualrightsfrom
thatseparation,seeZines(1997:161218and202212),ChuKhengLimvMinisterfor
Immigration;KablevDirectorofPublicProsecutions.
24Agoodexampleiss92oftheAustralianConstitution,whichformanyyearswasinterpreted
asprohibitingarangeofgovernmentmeasures,especiallynationalisation,thatwouldinterfere
withfreemarkets.In1988,however,theHighCourtruledthatthesectiononlyprohibitedtariff
liketradebarriers(ColevWhitield).Theframersofs92mayhaveassumedtheexistenceof
privateownership,buttheydidnotintendtosetitinconstitutionalstone.
25PatriationisthetermcoinedinCanadatodescribethecreationofadomesticamending
formulafortheCanadianConstitution(priorto1982,theprincipalconstitutionaldocumentwas
simplyastatuteoftheBritishParliament,amendableonlybythatParliament).Aspartof
patriationtheConstitutionwassigniicantlyamended,notablybytheintroductionofthe
CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.Fordiscussionsoftheprocessleadingtopatriation,
seeRomanowetal(1984),Webber(1994:99120).
26Kahana(2001:255291)describesindetaileachoftheusesoftheclause.Iamgratefulto
JanetHiebertforbringingthependingappearanceofthearticletomyattention.
27ThetwocircumstancesinwhichAlbertacontemplatedbutrefrainedfrominvokingtheclause
wereaproposedstatutetolimitthedamagespayablefortheforcedsterilisationofcertain
classesofdisabledpeopleunderpreviousprovinciallegislation,andtheprovincesresponseto
thedecisioninVriend.Intheformercase,strongpublicoutcryforcedtheGovernmentto
withdrawtheBill.Inthelatter(whichwouldhavereversedtheSupremeCourtofCanadas
extensionofAlbertasIndividualsRightsProtectionActtobandiscriminationonthebasisof
sexualorientation),theGovernmentitselfdecidednottousetheclause,despitedemandsfrom
itssupporters(seeHiebert1999a:30and34;2002:181182,190191and197198).
TheFederalGovernmentalsoseriouslycontemplatedtheuseofthenotwithstandingclauseon
atleasttwooccasions,althoughitquicklyrejectedtheoption(Roach2001:272;Hiebert2002:
87).
28Itisindicativeofs33sshakylegitimacythatfollowingthedecisionsinDaviaultand
OConnor,Parliamentdidnotuses33butinsteadreliedonarenewedargumentunders1.
29Thereisanargumentthats33mayhavehadanindirectimpactondialoguebyrenderingthe
courtsmoredeferentialtovigorousclaimsofjustiicationunders1.Onthisview,s33provides
supportforthelegitimacyofalegislativerole(andapossibleoptionforafrustratedlegislature)
thatmayleadcourtstoentermorereadilyintodialogue.(IamindebtedtoEricGhoshforthis
argument.)Itisofcourseverydificulttoassesswhethertherehasbeensuchaneffect.Isuspect
thatitisabsentormodest,giventheexistenceofvigorousargumentsbetweencourtsand
26/33
legislaturesoverrightsdeinitioninallcountries,theavenuetoexpresssuchargumentsunders
1oftheCanadianCharter,ands33sownperceivedillegitimacy.
30ForsuggestionsthattheweaknessoftheCanadianBillofRightswasduetoitsnon
constitutionalcharacter,seeRvBigMDrugMartat333and341344(perDicksonJ).However,
thisisprobablybestunderstoodasthemostobviouspointofdistinctionbetweentheBilland
theCharterforaCourtseekingtodistanceitselffromthepreviouscaselaw.Forinterpretations
subsequenttotheCharter,seeSinghand
MacBainvLederman.Keith(2000:730731and737)makesanargumentsimilartominein
relationtotheNewZealandBillofRightsAct1990.
31Fordiscussionofthisdemocraticdeicit,seeWebber(2000a:141144).Itisimportanttobe
clearonthenatureofthepublicsupportnecessaryforthecourts.Itisnotsupportforeachand
everydecision.Ifthiswerenecessary,therewouldbenoadvantagewhatever(otherthan
spreadingtheworkload)inhavingcourtsseparatefromthelegislature.Judicialindependence
trulywouldbeamirage.Astudiedandinstitutionalisedinattentiontopopularopinionisa
criticaldimensioninthejudicialrole.Withoutit,thecourtsaredisabledfromexercising
preciselythekindofdeliberationweexpectofthem.Theredoeshavetobepopularsupportfor
themasinstitutions,exercisingindependentjudgment,however.Wecannotaffordtoneglectthe
publiccultureofrightsandlibertiesandtheinstitutionalsafeguardsthatsustainsthem.
32Forastimulatingargumentalongsimilarlines,seeMacdonald(1993).
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27/33
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28/33
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VriendvAlberta(1998)156DLR(4th)385(SCC)
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ConstitutionofAustralia,enactedbyCommonwealthofAustraliaConstitutionAct,1900(UK)
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29/33
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30/33
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Webber, Jeremy "Institutional Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures

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