Professional Documents
Culture Documents
***Info***
An exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims that is
perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and
the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from social, political, and civic
life.
What is CRT?
Housee, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of
Wolverhampton, 2012
(Shirin, Whats the point? Anti-racism and students voices against Islamophobia,
Race Ethnicity and Education, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2012, 101120, accessed
7/3/2015 JCP PB)
In my attempt to get to the deep-root of racism in education, I turn to critical race theory (CRT). CRT
has its roots in US legal scholarship, Bell (1992), Crenshaw et al. (1995), Delgado (1995), and
Williams (1993), are often referred to as the founders of this movement. In the last decade CRT has crossed over to
other disciplines including Sociology, History, Womens Studies and Education. And through the work of Gillborn
apply CRT to education. They claim that the continued racial discrimination in schools and colleges, the race
specific pedagogic issues of curricular and the marginalisation of black students in classroom teaching, continue to
be features of the education institution in the United States. In this critique they highlight the importance of black
cultural identities in its analysis of such issues. Con- firming this view, Solrzano and Yosso (2009, 132) argues that:
***AFF***
***1ACs***
1AC Legalism
The FBIs domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and
organizations has trickled down to the state and local level
these tactics spread terror throughout Muslim communities
while innocent people are harassed, watched, profiled, and
policed all in the name of protecting the nation from Islamist
Extremism
Shamas, 13 (Diala; attorney at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &
Responsibility project, based out of Main Street Legal Services at CUNY School of
Law; Wheres the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,
http://www.thenation.com/article/176911/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims)
The New York City Police Department has sought to place an informant on the board of a prominent Arab-American
own misguided post-9/11 policies . When they were first revealed, the details of the NYPDs
program attracted necessary outrage. Associated Press reporters Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo won the Pulitzer
Prize for their investigative series based on a trove of leaked internal NYPD documents. The series would then
become a book, the recently released Enemies Within: Inside the NYPDs Secret Spying Unit and Bin Ladens Final
Plot Against America. The authors, like much media and many activists, paint a picture of a rogue police
department with Ray Kelly at the helm, and an intelligence division chief (David Cohen) with a chip on his shoulder.
The NYPDs excesses are personified, its programs the product of egos and power struggles among people who
need to be reined in, rather than fundamentally flawed policing policies and assumptions that are at the root of
domestic counterterrorism policing. Reports that members of the FBI have been publicly critical of the NYPDs
tactics, along with descriptions of turf wars between the two agencies, have contributed to a perception that the
federal agencys intelligence gathering is somehow more restrained and law-abiding than the NYPDs. These
reactions mask the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have joined forces with
other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and
showing continuity in profiling policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that prohibits racial profilingeven
overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both. Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has
supported a future inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance practices. The
NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices in three different
federal lawsuits. This election season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by
more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe have served, most have been targeted for what are often
misleadingly termed voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing
expeditions. These
un-joining groups and deleting the news articles he had posted in the hope that would spare him from a repeat. It
did not work. The interrogations are also deeply stigmatizing: when an individual is approached for questioning, he
the majority are young Muslim menis perceived by his peers as someone under investigation, and from whom
people want to keep their distance. Our clients regularly explain that they agreed to get into the FBI agents cars
because they did not want to let them into their homes and expose their families, but also did not want their
neighbors to see them. Ive had conversations with college students weighing the pros and cons of taking up a
leadership position in their Muslim student group. Instead of weighing their class workload against their
experience being questioned by the FBI would be bad for the organization, as other students may hesitate to join.
And the FBI doesnt just come in through the front door. Like the NYPD,
either. Like the NYPD, the agency shrugs off serious challenges regarding the harmfulness, ineffectiveness and
unconstitutionality of its surveillance policies by pointing to the rules within which it operates. But an examination
of these rules shows that they are woefully permissive. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG),
based on
2008 amendments, an agent may conduct an assessmentthe lowest
level of investigationwithout needing any approval, or showing any
factual predication of wrongdoing. Simply put, suspicion of criminal or
terrorist activity is not needed to interrogate individuals or send
informants into mosques, neighborhoods or organizations. The DIOG also
which governs agents intelligence-gathering activities, has been repeatedly amended. Today,
prescribes domain management assessments to collect racial and ethnic community demographics and allows
FBI agents to consider focused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular
criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community. In other words, the DIOG seems to allow the FBI to do much
In 2007,
the NYPD laid out its theory of Muslim radicalization, ascribing a range of criminal implications to commonplace
60
There are strong reasons for thinking the suspect, Craig Stephen Hicks, was motivated by anti-Muslim animosity to
murder Deah Barakat, 23, Yusor Abu-Salha, 21, and Razan Abu-Salha, 19. The FBI is now investigating the case as a
possible hate crime, although initial reports stated the murder may have been about a dispute over parking. In
In a suburban
restaurant in Houston, I saw a poster that perfectly captured the nature of
the problem. The restaurant owner had used a photograph of a lynching in
the early 20th century, featuring a tree, a dead body hanging from a
branch and a crowd of white people in the foreground looking jubilant. In
place of the black victim of the original image, the face of a stereotypical
Arab was superimposed with the caption: Lets play cowboys and
Iranians. It was a disturbing sight. In the same neighbourhood, I had heard stories of teenagers beaten up at
2011, I spent a year travelling around the US investigating anti-Muslim prejudice.
school simply for being Arab, of harassment of mosque congregations and of death threats against Muslims aired on
and one that continues to haunt an American culture obsessed with enemies at its frontiers. Likewise, the use of a
photo of a lynching ties its meaning to the history of racial segregation after the abolition of slavery, and the ways
also always takes on a racial character. The British Empire relied upon racist ideology to maintain its authority, both
domestically and in colonial settings, and particularly in the face of resistance to its rule. Blacks and Asians from the
colonies who settled in Britain after the Second World War encountered the racism imperialism had fostered there,
persisting long after the British Empire itself no longer existed. Since the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy
planners have regarded the Middle East as their most troublesome territory, where resistance seems to be
In
other words, the problem is their culture, not our politics. With the War on
Terror, that rhetoric was generalised to Muslims as a whole: the religion
somehow especially prone to terrorist violence. The US governments own
violence torture, drone strikes, and military occupations, which result in
many times more deaths than jihadist terrorism can then be more
easily defended. Take, for example, the popular US writer Sam Harris, one of the sooccupation and for human rights, it has been more convenient to think that Arabs are inherently fanatical.
called new atheists who seem to have influenced Craig Hicks in Chapel Hill. Harris has said that Islam is the
claims
human rights problems in what he reductively calls the Muslim world
are caused by Islam, as if it is a monolith that mechanically drives
followers to acts of barbarism. But beliefs reflect social and political
conditions as much as they shape them. Global opinion polls suggest that whether one
thinks that violence against civilians is legitimate, for example, has more
to do with political context than religious belief. Such violence is
considered more acceptable in the US and Europe than everywhere else in the world. Indeed,
mother-lode of bad ideas and that we are misled to think the fundamentalists are the fringe. He
Sam Harris himself has written in support of killing civilians for the beliefs they hold. In his book, The End of Faith,
he says that
even greater cost to ourselves and to innocents abroad, elsewhere in the Muslim world, he wrote. We will
more than by the jihadists regarded as the chief threat of terrorism. However the online
response to the Chapel Hill murders shows there is also another America one that recently took to the streets to
protest against police racism with the slogan #BlackLivesMatter. (This month, the slogan #MuslimLivesMatter also
defense apologist such as Huntington (2004) specifically links geopolitical concerns and security threats to internal
American identity issues, most notably coming from those impoverished immigrants who may have the audacity to
challenge Western male privilege, socioeconomically, politically and ultimately epistemologically (Etzioni 2005).
in regions inhabited by Muslims can somehow be understood by exclusively scrutinizing their religion or their
region, effectively turning the Islamic World into its own unit of analysis.3 Epistemic racism leads to the
racism allows the West to not have to listen to the critical thinking produced by Islamic thinkers on Western
decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility for a serious inter-cultural dialogue.
and the
nuclear energy conflict with Iran, have been all encoded in Islamophobic
language in the Western public sphere. Western politicians (with some exceptions
such as Rodriguez Zapatero in Spain) and the mainstream media have been complicit if
not active participants of Islamophobic reactions to the outlined events.
Epistemic racism as the most invisible form of racism, contributes to
legitimate an artillery of experts, advisers, specialists, officials, academics
and theologians that keep talking with authority about Islam and Muslim
people despite their absolute ignorance of the topic and their
Hezbollah to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the bombing of Spanish suburban trains (3/11),
Islamophobic prejudices. This artillery of intellectuals producing Orientalist knowledge about the
inferiority of Islam and its people has been going on since the 18th century (Said 1979) and they contribute to the
Western arrogant dismissal of Islamic thinkers.
I wish I could say that general understanding of the Middle East, the Arabs and Islam in the US has improved, but
alas, it really hasn't. For all kinds of reasons, the situation in Europe seems to be considerably better. What
American leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept
clean like a blackboard, so that "we" might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these
lesser people to follow. It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the
map of the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar.
But this has often happened with the "orient", that semi-mythical construct which since Napoleon's invasion of
Egypt in the late 18th century has been made and remade countless times. In the process the uncountable
sediments of history, a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, are swept aside or
ignored, relegated to the sandheap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken
foreign policy and who have no knowledge at all of the language real people actually speak, has fabricated an arid
landscape ready for American power to construct there an ersatz model of free market "democracy". But there is a
difference between knowledge of other peoples and other times that is the result of understanding, compassion,
careful study and analysis for their own sakes, and on the other hand knowledge that is part of an overall campaign
influences on George W Bush's Pentagon and National Security Council were men such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad
experts on the Arab and Islamic world who helped the American hawks to
think about such preposterous phenomena as the Arab mind and the
centuries-old Islamic decline which only American power could reverse.
Today bookstores in the US are filled with shabby screeds bearing
screaming headlines about Islam and terror, the Arab threat and the
Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to
knowledge imparted by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the
heart of these strange oriental peoples. CNN and Fox, plus myriad evangelical and rightwing
Ajami,
radio hosts, innumerable tabloids and even middle-brow journals, have recycled the same unverifiable fictions and
vast generalisations so as to stir up "America" against the foreign devil. Without a well-organised sense that
the people over there were not like "us" and didn't appreciate "our" values - the very core of traditional
orientalist dogma - there would have been no war. The American advisers
to the Pentagon and the White House use the same clichs, the same
demeaning stereotypes, the same justifications for power and violence (after
all, runs the chorus, power is the only language they understand) as the scholars enlisted by the
Arabs and Muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depredations of empire are only ways of
evading responsibility in the present. You have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. This of
course is also VS Naipaul's contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to
the dogs. But what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how little it wishes to face the long
succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of Palestinians or Congolese or
reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. My idea in Orientalism was to use humanistic critique to open up
the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of
polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us. I have called what I try to do "humanism", a word I continue to
use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated postmodern critics. By humanism I mean
first of all attempting to dissolve Blake's "mind-forg'd manacles" so as to be able to use one's mind historically and
rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding. Moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community
with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an
isolated humanist. Thus it is correct to say that every domain is linked, and that nothing that goes on in our world
has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. We need to speak about issues of injustice and suffering
within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. I have spent a great deal of
my life during the past 35 years advocating the right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination, but I
have always tried to do that with full attention paid to the reality of the Jewish people and what they suffered by
way of persecution and genocide. The paramount thing is that the struggle for equality in Palestine/Israel should be
directed toward a humane goal, that is, coexistence, and not further suppression and denial. As a humanist whose
field is literature, I am old enough to have been trained 40 years ago in the field of comparative literature, whose
leading ideas go back to Germany in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. I must mention too the supremely
creative contribution of Giambattista Vico, the Neapolitan philosopher and philologist whose ideas anticipate those
of German thinkers such as Herder and Wolf, later to be followed by Goethe, Humboldt, Dilthey, Nietzsche,
Gadamer, and finally the great 20th-century Romance philologists Erich Auerbach, Leo Spitzer, and Ernst Robert
Curtius. To young people of the current generation the very idea of philology suggests something impossibly
antiquarian and musty, but philology in fact is the most basic and creative of the interpretive arts. It is exemplified
for me most admirably in Goethe's interest in Islam generally, and the 14th-century Persian Sufi poet Hafiz in
particular, a consuming passion which led to the composition of the West-stlicher Diwan, and it inflected Goethe's
later ideas about Weltliteratur, the study of all the literatures of the world as a symphonic whole which could be
apprehended theoretically as having preserved the individuality of each work without losing sight of the whole.
There is a considerable irony to the realisation that as today's globalised world draws together, we may be
approaching the kind of standardisation and homogeneity that Goethe's ideas were specifically formulated to
prevent. In an essay published in 1951 entitled "Philologie der Weltliteratur", Auerbach made exactly that point. His
great book Mimesis, published in Berne in 1946 but written while Auerbach was a wartime exile teaching Romance
languages in Istanbul, was meant to be a testament to the diversity and concreteness of the reality represented in
western literature from Homer to Virginia Woolf; but reading the 1951 essay one senses that, for Auerbach, the
great book he wrote was an elegy for a period when people could interpret texts philologically, concretely,
sensitively, and intuitively, using erudition and an excellent command of several languages to support the kind of
understanding that Goethe advocated for his understanding of Islamic literature. Positive knowledge of languages
and history was necessary, but it was never enough, any more than the mechanical gathering of facts would
constitute an adequate method for grasping what an author like Dante, for example, was all about. The main
requirement for the kind of philological understanding Auerbach and his predecessors were talking about and tried
to practise was one that sympathetically and subjectively entered into the life of a written text as seen from the
perspective of its time and its author. Rather than alienation and hostility to another time and a different culture,
philology as applied to Weltliteratur involved a profound humanistic spirit deployed with generosity and, if I may use
the word, hospitality. Thus the interpreter's mind actively makes a place in it for a foreign "other". And this creative
making of a place for works that are otherwise alien and distant is the most important facet of the interpreter's
mission. All this was obviously undermined and destroyed in Germany by national socialism. After the war,
Auerbach notes mournfully, the standardisation of ideas, and greater and greater specialisation of knowledge
gradually narrowed the opportunities for the kind of investigative and everlastingly inquiring kind of philological
work that he had represented; and, alas, it's an even more depressing fact that since Auerbach's death in 1957 both
the idea and practice of humanistic research have shrunk in scope as well as in centrality. Instead of reading in the
real sense of the word, our students today are often distracted by the fragmented knowledge available on the
internet and in the mass media. Worse yet, education is threatened by nationalist and religious orthodoxies often
disseminated by the media as they focus ahistorically and sensationally on the distant electronic wars that give
viewers the sense of surgical precision, but in fact obscure the terrible suffering and destruction produced by
modern warfare. In the demonisation of an unknown enemy for whom the label "terrorist" serves the general
purpose of keeping people stirred up and angry, media images command too much attention and can be exploited
at times of crisis and insecurity of the kind that the post-September 11 period has produced. Speaking both as an
American and as an Arab I must ask my reader not to underestimate the kind of simplified view of the world that a
relative handful of Pentagon civilian elites have formulated for US policy in the entire Arab and Islamic worlds, a
view in which terror, pre-emptive war, and unilateral regime change - backed up by the most bloated military
budget in history - are the main ideas debated endlessly and impoverishingly by a media that assigns itself the role
of producing so-called "experts" who validate the government's general line. Reflection, debate, rational argument
and moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings must create their own history have been replaced
by abstract ideas that celebrate American or western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and
regard other cultures with contempt. Perhaps you will say that I am making too many abrupt transitions between
humanistic interpretation on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and that a modern technological society
which along with unprecedented power possesses the internet and F-16 fighter-jets must in the end be commanded
by formidable technical-policy experts like Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Perle. But what has really been lost is a
sense of the density and interdependence of human life, which can neither be reduced to a formula nor brushed
aside as irrelevant. That is one side of the global debate. In the Arab and Muslim countries the situation is scarcely
better. As Roula Khalaf has argued, the region has slipped into an easy anti-Americanism that shows little
understanding of what the US is really like as a society. Because the governments are relatively powerless to affect
US policy toward them, they turn their energies to repressing and keeping down their own populations, with results
in resentment, anger and helpless imprecations that do nothing to open up societies where secular ideas about
human history and development have been overtaken by failure and frustration, as well as by an Islamism built out
of rote learning and the obliteration of what are perceived to be other, competitive forms of secular knowledge. The
gradual disappearance of the extraordinary tradition of Islamic ijtihad - the process of working out Islamic rules with
reference to the Koran - has been one of the major cultural disasters of our time, with the result that critical thinking
and individual wrestling with the problems of the modern world have simply dropped out of sight. This is not to say
that the cultural world has simply regressed on one side to a belligerent neo-orientalism and on the other to blanket
rejectionism. Last year's United Nations world summit in Johannesburg, for all its limitations, did in fact reveal a vast
area of common global concern that suggests the welcome emergence of a new collective constituency and gives
the often facile notion of "one world" a new urgency. In all this, however, we must admit that no one can possibly
humanistic education, not as a sentimental piety enjoining us to return to traditional values or the classics but as
the active practice of worldly secular rational discourse. The secular world is the world of history as made by human
beings. Critical thought does not submit to commands to join in the ranks marching against one or another
approved enemy. Rather than the manufactured clash of civilisations, we need to concentrate on the slow working
together of cultures that overlap, borrow from each other, and live together. But for that kind of wider perception
we need time, patient and sceptical inquiry, supported by faith in communities of interpretation that are difficult to
sustain in a world demanding instant action and reaction. Humanism is centred upon the agency of human
individuality and subjective intuition, rather than on received ideas and authority. Texts have to be read as texts
that were produced and live on in all sorts of what I have called worldly ways. But this by no means excludes power,
since on the contrary I have tried to show the insinuations, the imbrications of power into even the most recondite
of studies. And lastly, most important, humanism is the only, and I would go as far as to say the final resistance we
have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history.
(John Collins, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting
Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language: A
User's Guide to America's New War, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language)
As any university student knows, theories about the social construction and social effects of language have
horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the Soviet Union to the
destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan is
the most
fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects
of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language
that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human
bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with
land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of violence can easily
be made more palatable through the use of euphemisms such as
pacification or, to use an example discussed in this book, targets. It is important to point out,
however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the
violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of vital
interests and surgical strikes and the flattering language of
civilization and just wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental
gaze from the physical effects of violence.
the political culture of supposedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however,
Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain of the online publication Intercept. That story
reveals that the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation covertly
monitored the emails of five Mus-lim-Americans who have "all led highly
public, outwardly exemplary lives," the article said. Among the five is Faisal
Gill, who served in President George W. Bush's Department of Homeland
Security and is a longtime Republican Party activist. "I've done everything in
my life to be patriotic," Gill told the Intercept. "I served in the Navy, served in the
government, was active in my community. I've done everything that a good citizen,
in my opinion, should do." Another victim of this snooping is Nihad Awad, who
heads up the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the largest Muslim
civil rights organization in the United States. The three others are: Asim
Ghafoor, whom the article identifies as "a prominent attorney who has
represented clients in terrorism-related cases;" Hooshang Amirahmadi,
"an Iranian-American professor of international relations at Rutgers
University;" and Agha Saeed, "a former political science professor at
California State University, who champions Mus-lim civil liberties and
Palestinian rights." It appears that the government spied on these five not on
the basis of reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal or terrorist
activity but simply because of the expression of legitimate religious or
political opinions that the government considers unacceptable . The
Intercept article revealed what it called " blatant prejudice against MuslimAmericans ." And it showed good proof: One NSA document instructed staff on
how to draw up a target list for surveillance. In place of the target's real name,
the memo used the following fake name: " Mohammed Raghead ." These
documents suggest that the government is viewing all Muslims - be they Arab,
Asian or African-American - as suspect because of their membership in a
religious community. And when their Islamic belief is combined with political
opinions critical of U.S. foreign policy, they become even more suspicious - to the
point of being treated as possible terrorists. This violates the First Amendment
of the Constitution, which prevents discrimination on the basis of one's
religious or political opinions. It is also a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, which protects us from unlawful searches. The spying on
Muslim-Americans is all too reminiscent of the FBI's COINTELPRO and the
NSA's Project Minaret decades ago, which spied on people like Joan Baez, Jane
Fonda and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. We have to strongly reject the
surveillance of Muslim-Americans and recognize that an attack on the
rights of one group of people inevitably fans out to others. As the U.S.
labor movement once put it - an injury to one is an injury to all.
the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have
joined forces with other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD
activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and showing continuity in profiling
policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that
prohibits racial profilingeven overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both.
Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has supported a future
inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance
practices. The NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and
intelligence-gathering practices in three different federal lawsuits. This election
season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by
decrying suspicionless surveillance. ADVERTISEMENT Yet the majority of our
clients at CLEAR are victims of aggressive intelligence gathering by the
FBI, not the NYPD. Of the more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe
have served, most have been targeted for what are often misleadingly termed
voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing
expeditions. These FBI interrogations are as terrifying as they are clumsy:
What Islamic lecturers do you follow? Would you travel to Bangladesh
unaccompanied by a male relative? (this one directed at a young, devout
woman) What do you think of the Arab Spring? Do you hate Israel?
How often do you call your mother in Yemen? On a daily basis, our
clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most intimate and
protected areas of their lives. They are approached at night at their
homes, stopped in front of their neighbors or children, solicited outside
their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their
colleagues and customers. And the interrogations are far from voluntary.
FBI agents regularly warn our clients who invoke their right to have an
attorney present that they can do this the easy way or the hard way.
One client was so frightened by the agents threats that he agreed to accompany
them to FBI headquarters and let them strap him to what they claimed was a
polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions, accused
him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an
informant. While the precise number of these interviews is not available, our
experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members facilitate KnowYour-Rights workshops at mosques in New York City, we often ask for a show of
hands in the room of people who have themselves been, or know others
who have been, interrogated by law enforcement. In many mosques, every
hand will go up. The interrogations have a devastating chilling effect on
communities. Being pressed about their religious and political affiliations or
their community activities inevitably makes our clients hesitate before
being active in their mosque or community. After a visit by the FBI, one 20year-old client scrubbed his Facebook account, un-joining groups and deleting the
news articles he had posted in the hope that would spare him from a repeat. It did
not work. The interrogations are also deeply stigmatizing: when an individual is
approached for questioning, hethe majority are young Muslim menis perceived
by his peers as someone under investigation, and from whom people want to keep
their distance. Our clients regularly explain that they agreed to get into the FBI
agents cars because they did not want to let them into their homes and expose
their families, but also did not want their neighbors to see them. Ive had
conversations with college students weighing the pros and cons of taking up a
leadership position in their Muslim student group. Instead of weighing their class
workload against their extracurricular commitments, the balancing involved
exposure to further FBI questioning if they were to become more active
Muslims, and whether their past experience being questioned by the FBI would be
bad for the organization, as other students may hesitate to join. And the FBI doesnt
just come in through the front door. Like the NYPD, the FBI sends informants
into Muslim communities . The agency maintains over 15,000 informants,
and tens of thousands more unofficial ones. Expanding its roster of Muslim
informants is a law enforcement priority. A presidential order from 2004 called
for a broad expansion of the FBIs informant program; in 2007 an FBI official boasted
of the intelligence gathering derived from its Confidential Human Source Program.
The FBIs 2008 fiscal year budget authorization request includes funding for a
program to track and manage the growing number of informants. By now, the
tragic fallout of this aggressive drive has been well documented, as
informants prey on the vulnerable and sow fear and distrust in
communities. But the FBI isnt going rogue, either. Like the NYPD, the agency
shrugs off serious challenges regarding the harmfulness, ineffectiveness and
unconstitutionality of its surveillance policies by pointing to the rules within which it
operates. But an examination of these rules shows that they are woefully
permissive. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), which
governs agents intelligence-gathering activities, has been repeatedly amended.
Today, based on 2008 amendments, an agent may conduct an
assessmentthe lowest level of investigationwithout needing any
approval, or showing any factual predication of wrongdoing. Simply put,
suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity is not needed to interrogate
individuals or send informants into mosques, neighborhoods or
organizations. The DIOG also prescribes domain management assessments to
collect racial and ethnic community demographics and allows FBI agents to
consider focused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated
with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community. In other
words, the DIOG seems to allow the FBI to do much of what the NYPD is doing. In
using these tactics, the FBI is operating on the same faulty and dangerous
assumptions that guide the NYPD: that the religious practices of millions
of ordinary Muslims can be indicators of criminal activity . In 2007, the NYPD
laid out its theory of Muslim radicalization, ascribing a range of criminal
implications to commonplace religious practices. The FBI has propagated the
same logic in its training materials for years. Both agencies consider
wearing religious attire and growing facial hair to be indicators of a
potential terrorist . Both agencies make it their business to intrude on sacred
and First Amendmentprotectedspaces. Neither has shown that this is a strategy
that makes us any safer.
in the context of
surveillance of Muslims, the government has used intelligence gathering
as a means of manufacturing counterterror prosecutions that result in
what a federal judge has called a fantasy terror operation created and
incited by a government informant. Such intelligence gathering assists the
government in furtherance of an adversarial system that prioritizes
bolstering the number of terrorism investigations, prosecutions, and
convictions of Muslims in America.
discrimination. As author and investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson argues,
also
support of political elites . This shift in the movements playing field raises questions about the viable tactics of
attempted counter- movements. How might the successful use of law as strategy
legitimize a movement, politically incorporating and empowering the movement,
such that it cannot be directly challenged? Similarly, as the political process model suggests, a movements acquisition
of elite allies can provide greater political opportunities. The Islamophobia
movements legislative successes have garnered the support of political
insiders like Newt Gingrich and Michelle Bachmann, which only drives further political access,
opportunity and power. Insofar as Fear, Inc. suggests that elites support is given in exchange for political
donations, further research might consider the temporal relationship between resources elite allies and political opportunity. To what
extent is the successful use of law as strategy dependent upon fluid resources? Finally, though less readily measurable, a shift in
broader discourse such as the notable increase in New York Times articles about Sharia is a significant measure of a movements
impact.
1AC Critical
The FBIs domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and
organizations has trickled down to the state and local level
these tactics spread terror throughout Muslim communities
while innocent people are harassed, watched, profiled, and
policed all in the name of protecting the nation from Islamist
Extremism
Shamas, 13 (Diala; attorney at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &
Responsibility project, based out of Main Street Legal Services at CUNY School of
Law; Wheres the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,
http://www.thenation.com/article/176911/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims)
The New York City Police Department has sought to place an informant on the board of a prominent Arab-American
own misguided post-9/11 policies . When they were first revealed, the details of the NYPDs
program attracted necessary outrage. Associated Press reporters Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo won the Pulitzer
Prize for their investigative series based on a trove of leaked internal NYPD documents. The series would then
become a book, the recently released Enemies Within: Inside the NYPDs Secret Spying Unit and Bin Ladens Final
Plot Against America. The authors, like much media and many activists, paint a picture of a rogue police
department with Ray Kelly at the helm, and an intelligence division chief (David Cohen) with a chip on his shoulder.
The NYPDs excesses are personified, its programs the product of egos and power struggles among people who
need to be reined in, rather than fundamentally flawed policing policies and assumptions that are at the root of
domestic counterterrorism policing. Reports that members of the FBI have been publicly critical of the NYPDs
tactics, along with descriptions of turf wars between the two agencies, have contributed to a perception that the
federal agencys intelligence gathering is somehow more restrained and law-abiding than the NYPDs. These
reactions mask the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have joined forces with
other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and
showing continuity in profiling policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that prohibits racial profilingeven
overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both. Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has
supported a future inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance practices. The
NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices in three different
federal lawsuits. This election season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by
more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe have served, most have been targeted for what are often
misleadingly termed voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing
expeditions. These
client was so frightened by the agents threats that he agreed to accompany them to FBI headquarters and let them
strap him to what they claimed was a polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions,
accused him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an informant. While the precise
number of these interviews is not available, our experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members
un-joining groups and deleting the news articles he had posted in the hope that would spare him from a repeat. It
did not work. The interrogations are also deeply stigmatizing: when an individual is approached for questioning, he
the majority are young Muslim menis perceived by his peers as someone under investigation, and from whom
people want to keep their distance. Our clients regularly explain that they agreed to get into the FBI agents cars
because they did not want to let them into their homes and expose their families, but also did not want their
neighbors to see them. Ive had conversations with college students weighing the pros and cons of taking up a
leadership position in their Muslim student group. Instead of weighing their class workload against their
experience being questioned by the FBI would be bad for the organization, as other students may hesitate to join.
And the FBI doesnt just come in through the front door. Like the NYPD,
expansion of the FBIs informant program; in 2007 an FBI official boasted of the intelligence gathering derived from
its Confidential Human Source Program. The FBIs 2008 fiscal year budget authorization request includes funding for
either. Like the NYPD, the agency shrugs off serious challenges regarding the harmfulness, ineffectiveness and
unconstitutionality of its surveillance policies by pointing to the rules within which it operates. But an examination
of these rules shows that they are woefully permissive. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG),
based on
2008 amendments, an agent may conduct an assessmentthe lowest
level of investigationwithout needing any approval, or showing any
factual predication of wrongdoing. Simply put, suspicion of criminal or
terrorist activity is not needed to interrogate individuals or send
informants into mosques, neighborhoods or organizations. The DIOG also
which governs agents intelligence-gathering activities, has been repeatedly amended. Today,
prescribes domain management assessments to collect racial and ethnic community demographics and allows
FBI agents to consider focused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular
criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community. In other words, the DIOG seems to allow the FBI to do much
In 2007,
the NYPD laid out its theory of Muslim radicalization, ascribing a range of criminal implications to commonplace
There are strong reasons for thinking the suspect, Craig Stephen Hicks, was motivated by anti-Muslim animosity to
murder Deah Barakat, 23, Yusor Abu-Salha, 21, and Razan Abu-Salha, 19. The FBI is now investigating the case as a
possible hate crime, although initial reports stated the murder may have been about a dispute over parking. In
In a suburban
restaurant in Houston, I saw a poster that perfectly captured the nature of
the problem. The restaurant owner had used a photograph of a lynching in
the early 20th century, featuring a tree, a dead body hanging from a
branch and a crowd of white people in the foreground looking jubilant. In
place of the black victim of the original image, the face of a stereotypical
Arab was superimposed with the caption: Lets play cowboys and
Iranians. It was a disturbing sight. In the same neighbourhood, I had heard stories of teenagers beaten up at
2011, I spent a year travelling around the US investigating anti-Muslim prejudice.
school simply for being Arab, of harassment of mosque congregations and of death threats against Muslims aired on
and one that continues to haunt an American culture obsessed with enemies at its frontiers. Likewise, the use of a
photo of a lynching ties its meaning to the history of racial segregation after the abolition of slavery, and the ways
also always takes on a racial character. The British Empire relied upon racist ideology to maintain its authority, both
domestically and in colonial settings, and particularly in the face of resistance to its rule. Blacks and Asians from the
colonies who settled in Britain after the Second World War encountered the racism imperialism had fostered there,
persisting long after the British Empire itself no longer existed. Since the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy
planners have regarded the Middle East as their most troublesome territory, where resistance seems to be
other words, the problem is their culture, not our politics. With the War on
Terror, that rhetoric was generalised to Muslims as a whole: the religion
somehow especially prone to terrorist violence. The US governments own
violence torture, drone strikes, and military occupations, which result in
many times more deaths than jihadist terrorism can then be more
easily defended. Take, for example, the popular US writer Sam Harris, one of the socalled new atheists who seem to have influenced Craig Hicks in Chapel Hill. Harris has said that Islam is the
claims
human rights problems in what he reductively calls the Muslim world
are caused by Islam, as if it is a monolith that mechanically drives
followers to acts of barbarism. But beliefs reflect social and political
conditions as much as they shape them. Global opinion polls suggest that whether one
thinks that violence against civilians is legitimate, for example, has more
to do with political context than religious belief. Such violence is
considered more acceptable in the US and Europe than everywhere else in the world. Indeed,
mother-lode of bad ideas and that we are misled to think the fundamentalists are the fringe. He
Sam Harris himself has written in support of killing civilians for the beliefs they hold. In his book, The End of Faith,
he says that
even greater cost to ourselves and to innocents abroad, elsewhere in the Muslim world, he wrote. We will
more than by the jihadists regarded as the chief threat of terrorism. However the online
response to the Chapel Hill murders shows there is also another America one that recently took to the streets to
protest against police racism with the slogan #BlackLivesMatter. (This month, the slogan #MuslimLivesMatter also
defense apologist such as Huntington (2004) specifically links geopolitical concerns and security threats to internal
American identity issues, most notably coming from those impoverished immigrants who may have the audacity to
challenge Western male privilege, socioeconomically, politically and ultimately epistemologically (Etzioni 2005).
in regions inhabited by Muslims can somehow be understood by exclusively scrutinizing their religion or their
region, effectively turning the Islamic World into its own unit of analysis.3 Epistemic racism leads to the
racism allows the West to not have to listen to the critical thinking produced by Islamic thinkers on Western
decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility for a serious inter-cultural dialogue.
and the
nuclear energy conflict with Iran, have been all encoded in Islamophobic
language in the Western public sphere. Western politicians (with some exceptions
such as Rodriguez Zapatero in Spain) and the mainstream media have been complicit if
not active participants of Islamophobic reactions to the outlined events.
Epistemic racism as the most invisible form of racism, contributes to
legitimate an artillery of experts, advisers, specialists, officials, academics
and theologians that keep talking with authority about Islam and Muslim
people despite their absolute ignorance of the topic and their
Hezbollah to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the bombing of Spanish suburban trains (3/11),
Islamophobic prejudices. This artillery of intellectuals producing Orientalist knowledge about the
inferiority of Islam and its people has been going on since the 18th century (Said 1979) and they contribute to the
Western arrogant dismissal of Islamic thinkers.
(John Collins, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting
Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language: A
User's Guide to America's New War, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language)
As any university student knows, theories about the social construction and social effects of language have
horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the Soviet Union to the
destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan is
the most
fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects
of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language
that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human
bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with
land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of violence can easily
be made more palatable through the use of euphemisms such as
pacification or, to use an example discussed in this book, targets. It is important to point out,
however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the
violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of vital
interests and surgical strikes and the flattering language of
civilization and just wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental
gaze from the physical effects of violence.
the political culture of supposedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however,
Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student
comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university classrooms is
fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real. Through racism people suffer physically,
psychologically, socially, educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is
just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other oppressions. Classroom
discussions and general teaching form a very important contribution to
this work of anti racism in education. There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work
of anti-racism is a difficult one. As educators we should make use of classroom
exchanges; students engaged learning could be the key to promoting
anti-racism in our class. My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the
socio-economic political/religions issues that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist
such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom practices
and the curriculum, because: if
Pedadogy: Reflections from the Educational Front Lines, American Journal of Islamic
Social Sciences 21:3
As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as
September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response
to address and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities
of Muslims from all walks of life and social conditions . Among the most vulnerable
were children and youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were
experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically
neutral arena of crisis management. Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear
resistance to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to
name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did not even exist within
the educational discourse. While schools were reluctant to name specific incidents as racism part of an all-too-
translated as an attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents. However, this definition presents a
narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social, structural, and ideological dimensions
through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted. Applying a more holistic analysis, far from
being based on mere ignorance, Islamophobic attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and
domination that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of discrimination and oppression. The idea
that discrimination, be it based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from ignorance
allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an
essentially irrational fear, this conception denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression,
which operates on multiple social, ideological, and systemic levels. Therefore, to capture the complex dimensions
through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the definition from its limited conception as a fear
and hatred of Islam and Muslims and acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to individual,
ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For
example, individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic
forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional practices as
anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and
religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on this
understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia education.6 This
includes the need to reclaim the stage through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and
suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. Reclaiming
Another
foundational aspect of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating
the systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by
analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in society that sustain
social inequality. Racial profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith,
or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic barriers that
criminalize and pathologize entire communities. In schools, the practice of color-coded
sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are confronting, engaging, and challenging.
streaming, whereby a disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into
lower non-academic level streams, is another example of institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by
teachers and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to assumptions of failure or limited
chances for success, based on such false stereotypes as the notion that Islam doesnt value education for girls or
Black students wont succeed. These negative attitudes are relayed to students through the hidden curriculum
Developing
critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these
systems of domination is part of building a transformative and liberatory
pedagogy, one geared toward achieving greater social justice in both
schools and society. Another key goal of anti-Islamophobia education
involves the need to demystify stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of
of schooling and lead to lower expectations being placed upon youth from specific communities.7
difference have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical
Deconstructing
and demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a
critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making . Critically
examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social
and ideological divide between us and them is important to exposing
how power operates through the politics of representation.
terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world.
***Inherency***
Responsibility project, based out of Main Street Legal Services at CUNY School of
Law; Wheres the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,
http://www.thenation.com/article/176911/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims)
The New York City Police Department has sought to place an informant on the board
of a prominent Arab-American organization. It has sent undercover officers into
Muslim students organizations. It created a unitformerly dubbed the
Demographics Unitthat deploys officers into coffee shops to pretend to be
patrons, order their favorite dishes and listen in on coffee- It has even
designated entire house banter. It has placed video cameras outside
mosques to monitor congregants. mosques as terrorism enterprises in
an attempt to give itself legal cover to conduct multi-year investigations
into mosques religious leaders, congregants and basic daily activities.
Since 2001, the NYPD has mapped Muslim communities and their
religious, educational and social institutions and businesses in New York
City and beyond. It has riddled communities with undercover officers and
informants. And it has done so unapologetically. Contrary to popular perception,
however, the NYPD has not gone rogue. In fact, the NYPD is following in the
footsteps of its federal counterparts at the FBI. Both agencies claim their
intelligence gathering activities are governed by rules; the difference is
that while the NYPD faces some skepticism with regards to the validityor
relevanceof its justifications, the FBIs own surveillance policies have
been accorded far more deference . As an attorney working with New Yorks
Muslim communities at the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability &
Responsibility (CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, along with student attorneys
and colleagues, I have engaged in various efforts to hold the NYPD accountable for
its surveillance and tactics. Along with the ACLU and the NYCLU, we represent
Muslim individuals and organizations bringing a legal challenge to the NYPDs
surveillance program. But CLEAR clients experiences also show us that the NYPDs
tactics are not exceptional. Aggressively intrusive and harmful
intelligence gathering on Muslims daily lives is a national epidemicand
the chief culprit is the FBI. The task of holding the NYPD accountable must not
supersede the equally, if not more important, task of holding the FBIand the
broader law enforcement communityto account for their own misguided
post-9/11 policies . When they were first revealed, the details of the NYPDs
program attracted necessary outrage. Associated Press reporters Adam Goldman
and Matt Apuzzo won the Pulitzer Prize for their investigative series based on a
trove of leaked internal NYPD documents. The series would then become a book, the
recently released Enemies Within: Inside the NYPDs Secret Spying Unit and Bin
Ladens Final Plot Against America. The authors, like much media and many
activists, paint a picture of a rogue police department with Ray Kelly at the helm,
and an intelligence division chief (David Cohen) with a chip on his shoulder. The
NYPDs excesses are personified, its programs the product of egos and power
struggles among people who need to be reined in, rather than fundamentally flawed
policing policies and assumptions that are at the root of domestic counterterrorism
policing. Reports that members of the FBI have been publicly critical of the NYPDs
tactics, along with descriptions of turf wars between the two agencies, have
contributed to a perception that the federal agencys intelligence gathering is
somehow more restrained and law-abiding than the NYPDs. These reactions mask
the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have
joined forces with other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD
activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and showing continuity in profiling
policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that
prohibits racial profilingeven overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both.
Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has supported a future
inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance
practices. The NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and
intelligence-gathering practices in three different federal lawsuits. This election
season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by
decrying suspicionless surveillance. ADVERTISEMENT Yet the majority of our
clients at CLEAR are victims of aggressive intelligence gathering by the
FBI, not the NYPD. Of the more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe
have served, most have been targeted for what are often misleadingly termed
voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing
expeditions. These FBI interrogations are as terrifying as they are clumsy:
What Islamic lecturers do you follow? Would you travel to Bangladesh
unaccompanied by a male relative? (this one directed at a young, devout
woman) What do you think of the Arab Spring? Do you hate Israel?
How often do you call your mother in Yemen? On a daily basis, our
clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most intimate and
protected areas of their lives. They are approached at night at their
homes, stopped in front of their neighbors or children, solicited outside
their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their
colleagues and customers. And the interrogations are far from voluntary.
FBI agents regularly warn our clients who invoke their right to have an
attorney present that they can do this the easy way or the hard way.
One client was so frightened by the agents threats that he agreed to accompany
them to FBI headquarters and let them strap him to what they claimed was a
polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions, accused
him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an
informant. While the precise number of these interviews is not available, our
experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members facilitate KnowYour-Rights workshops at mosques in New York City, we often ask for a show of
hands in the room of people who have themselves been, or know others
who have been, interrogated by law enforcement. In many mosques, every
hand will go up. The interrogations have a devastating chilling effect on
Education, and is a PhD candidate in Educational theory. She teaches at Rutgers University. Educating
Muslim American Youth in a Post-9/11 Era, Project Muse #95. Fall)
The terrorist attacks of September 11th on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, though nearly
a decade ago, are still indelibly marked in the lasting consciousness of Americans and people
worldwide. The literature suggests that living in a post 9/11 America has been an increasing
challenge for Arabs, Arab Americans, and Muslims as they are often seen as the "other," a
threat to the nation, and inherently linked to terrorism and violence (Ajrouch, 2004; Akram &
Johnson, 2004; Jamal & Naber, 2008). This challenge appears to be especially demanding for Arab American youth
as they navigate education in this post-9/11 context (Abu El-Haj, 2006, 2007, 2009; Abu El-Haj & Bonet, 2011;
Bayoumi, 2008; Wingfield, 2006; Zaal, Salah & Fine, 2007). As the most visible hand of the state and oftentimes the
first one that students encounter, public schools have profound effects on the ability of students to negotiate their
sense of nation, belonging and citizenship (Banks 2004, 2008; Suarez-Orosco, 2001; Wingfield, 2006).
questions: What federal and state policies, specifically those constructed [End Page 46] as measures of ensuring
national security, have found their ways into public secondary schools? What are the effects of those policies on
Muslim American youth2 ? And finally, what pedagogical practices can be changed to engage these youth in active
citizenship-in a post 9/11 context- for meaningful inclusion and participation in their societies?
Education, and is a PhD candidate in Educational theory. She teaches at Rutgers University. Educating
Muslim American Youth in a Post-9/11 Era, Project Muse #95. Fall)
he Patriot Act is arguably the most pervasive of securitization policies issued soon after 9/11-one that
indubitably had the most negative impact on Arab and Muslim American youth. The USA PATRIOT Act, an acronym
for "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism," was submitted several days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It was drafted by the Department of Justice
presentation to the House and Senate. Doyle (2002), writing on behalf of the Library of Congress, contended that
the law sought to further protect American borders against foreign terrorists as well as remove those found within
its borders. Doyle also argued that the law
and
facilitated more efficient procedures to be used against domestic and international terrorists.
While Doyle (2002) and other supporters of the law (Sales, 2010; Wong, 2006) framed it as an innocuous and
necessary means of maintaining national security, the law was not without critics and opponents. Many opponents
of the act viewed it as a dangerous encroachment on civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights (Vasi & Strang,
2009). Even Doyle (2002) recognized that critics of the law contend that some of its provisions go too far. The act
amended several previous restrictions which protected civil liberties and privacy including
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and,
most pertinent for this research, the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974 (Doyle, 2002; Lugg &
Soho, 2006; Sales, 2010).
Lugg and Soho (2006) highlight how the PATRIOT Act may potentially affect students' formerly protected privacy.
FERPA had formerly provided students and their parents with broad privacy rights, which protected student data
According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) over 7,000 people have reported abuse and numerous others
were unaware that they were being searched due to secrecy required by the law (Vasi & Strang, 2009).
The literature suggests that the political climate after the attacks of 9/11 facilitated the passing of this act (Sales,
2010; Wong, 2006). Wray-Lake et al. (2008) contend that citizens surrender certain individual freedoms to a
government in exchange for the guarantee that their liberties will be secured. Polls (Pew Research Center,
8/18/2004) show that shortly after the attacks, 49% of Americans agreed that it was acceptable and wise to
sacrifice individual freedoms to ensure national security. As time passed, however, Americans became increasingly
critical of the law and its effects on their privacy and other civil liberties, as evidenced by lower poll numbers of
agreement with the law, which by 2004, had dropped to 38%. Reports of targeted abuses gave rise to more
criticism as it became apparent that the Patriot Act disproportionately affected Arab non-citizens, Arab Americans
and Muslims (Salaita, 2006).
Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments have peaked after 9/11 attacks (Akram & Johnson, 2004;
Jamal & Naber, 2008; Murray, 2004; Salaita, 2006). This is evidenced by the violent attacks on Arabs, Muslims,
South Asians and anyone who "appeared" to fall into these categories in the wake of 9/11 (Grewal, 2003; Salaita,
manifests itself in oppression and discrimination, occurring on both individual and structural levels. This fear of
Islam and its followers indicated that after 9/11, America had redefined itself and somehow, Arab Americans had
fallen outside the boundaries of the "new" post 9/11-imagined community of America (Anderson, 1983/1991).
Grewal (2003) highlights the ways that America as nation became a site for the new articulations of gender and
race after 9/11. He argues that America, as a nation-state, experienced a new form of nationalism that became
overt and accepted (both inside and outside of the nation) post 9/11. Arabs and Muslims seemed to fall outside the
boundaries this post 9/11 nationalism overnight, which was articulated by hegemonic state power. Grewal also
that the transnational figure of the "terrorist" suggests that such a figure is beyond
redemption and is of such high risk to the nation/state as to be incarcerated or destroyed
immediately. He then questions this newly formed racialized form of nationalism asking "how then do we
suggests
understand the incarceration and criminalization of certain kinds of bodies which are identified as inclined to
commit violence or having tendencies of violence essential to them" (2003, p. 539)?
This question articulated by Grewal seems especially poignant in light of the over-targeting of Arabs and Muslims in
Human Rights Watch (2002) confirms these abuses of detainment, methods of questioning and the secrecy involved
in much of the FBI's dealings. Salaita (2006) notes that
in undisclosed locations
Arab Americans were also subject to clear violations of existing privacy acts, even those left intact after the Patriot
Act was passed. Lynette Clemenson of The New York Times (7/30/2004), reports that the Census Bureau provided
information of Arab Americans is often singled out as a "measure of security." Many lawsuits resulted from these
abuses, including one settled in February of 2006, in which the federal government paid $300,000 to Ehab
a restaurant owner in New York who reported being physically abused while
he was held in a federal detention center for over a year (Vasi & Strang, 2009). Elmaghraby
and countless others tell stories of extended solitary confinement as well as physical
Elmaghraby,
and mental abuse. Clearly, Arabs and Muslims were disproportionately affected by the easing
[End Page 48] of surveillance and policing. However unsettling these incidents are, it is arguably more
disturbing when children and youth become targeted citizens.
in the context of
surveillance of Muslims, the government has used intelligence gathering
as a means of manufacturing counterterror prosecutions that result in
what a federal judge has called a fantasy terror operation created and
incited by a government informant. Such intelligence gathering assists the
government in furtherance of an adversarial system that prioritizes
discrimination. As author and investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson argues,
estimates range from 2000 to 5000. A number of policies were put into effect which used immigration laws as
counterterrorism tool and Muslim men on temporary visas were the chief target of these initiatives. These policies
were termed as clear examples of profiling based on race, religion, and nation of origin and each of them not only
led to interrogation, detention, and deportation of people not involved in terrorist activities but also contributed to
the notion of Muslims as a suspect community. The first round of investigations, termed as Pentagon Twin Tower
bombing Investigation (PENTTBOM), was started by the FBI immediately after the 9/11 attacks with two primary
objectives: identifying the terrorists and their accomplices involved in the attack and coordinating all levels of law
agencies about neighbors, coworkers and strangers based on their ethnicity or appearance. 8 The DOJ report found
that law enforcement agencies selectively followed up on such dubious tips for persons of Arab or Muslim
extraction. In fact, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) accepted the arbitrary nature of arrests and designation
as special interest by FBI in its 2003 report.9 The excessive use of immigration laws in the initial investigation of
9/11 attacks was quite extraordinary. Soon after 9/11, the INS issued eleven operational orders to its field offices
regarding the handling of 9/11 detainees, which altered normal procedure for immigration detainees significantly.
(Hatem, Professor University of California Berkely, ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL VOLUME 1, NO. 1,
SPRING 2012, PP. 163-206)
As
the then Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated after the Lodi indictments, Since the terrorist attacks of Sept.
11, 2001, the number one priority of the (Justice) Department has been to detect, disrupt and prevent terrorist
attacks, which means using every tool available including the recruitment and deployment of paid informants.5 For
many, this is a legitimate use of national resources to possibly prevent another 9/11, and the Muslim community,
collectively, should be ready to cooperate with the authorities in conducting these much needed operations. A more
FBI operations mentioned above and others that can be readily documented point toward a comprehensive
intelligence program directed at the American Muslim community and all of its civic, religious and charitable
institutions.6 At its core, the program is rationalized with the intent to detect and disrupt terrorism activities
(Hatem, Professor University of California Berkely, ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL VOLUME 1, NO. 1,
SPRING 2012, PP. 163-206 //ASG)
terrorists before they do us any harm. The red-scare of the 1960s has become a green one by utilizing the same
method. The targets at the present are the Arab, Muslim and South East Asian populations with all of their subdivisions, ethnic groupings, theological orientations and levels of political involvement. In his book, War at Home
subject to a massive infiltration campaign, and the same goal is pursued domestically inside the United States. The
problem confronting the Department of Homeland Security today is how to gain access to a closed religious
community that has been identified as the new enemy of the state, one that the country must be defended
against to prevent possible future attacks. Here we are concerned with identifying the active operational methods
and tools of those who are designing and implementing a new infiltration program directed at law abiding Muslim
populations, the FBI placed ads in newspapers and on TV and radio, seeking individuals with language skills as well
as knowledge of the identified/targeted communities. Such an effort followed an old proven tactic of the carrot and
stick. In some cases, recruitment was undertaken by means of a very sweet tasting carrot, that being money,
position, prestige and allure of the world or a green card for an illegal immigrant. At times, though, the best tool for
recruitment is a very long and mighty stick, which produces results; however, the first method is often preferable
since it originates in an inherent weakness in the individual that makes them want to cooperate to secure a benefit
they have been after for some time. The second is less full proof since the individual has possibly 185 demonstrated
a resistance to a carrot offer and only after reaching a breaking point he/she becomes ready to cooperate and be
employed by the security agencies. In my estimation, the period of recruitment was put in place immediately after
September 11th, and it is still underway twelve years removed from the tragic events as FOIA documents from the
NYPD and SFPD demonstrate. I do not know the number of those to be recruited, but it would take a large
investment in human agents to infiltrate a 3-7 million member community with all its sub-groups and nationalities.
In the previous COINTELPRO programs, the most frequently used intelligence collection technique was through the
deployment of informants accounting for 83% frequency followed by 74% of a confidential police source being the
source for information.30
(Diala Shamas, Nermeen Arastu, Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and its Impact on
American Muslims)
Since 2001, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has established a secret
surveillance program that has mapped, monitored and analyzed American
Muslim daily life throughout New York City, and even its surrounding states. In 2011, the
unveiling of this program by the Associated Press (AP) and other journalists1 who had obtained leaked internal
NYPD documents led to an outcry from public officials, civil rights activists, American Muslim religious leaders, and
NYPD Intelligence Division, Lt. Paul Galati admitted during sworn testimony that in the six years of his tenure, the
unit tasked with monitoring American Muslim life had not yielded a single criminal lead.2 Proponents of the
sprawling surveillance enterprise have argued that, regardless of its inefficacy, mere spying on a community is
harmless because it is clandestine and that those who are targeted should have nothing to fear, if they have
nothing to hide. Our findings, based on an unprecedented number of candid interviews with American Muslim
community members, paint a radically different picture.
that the NYPDs spotlight on American Muslims practice of their faith, their degree of religiosity and their places of
worship disrupted and suppressed their ability to practice freely. Many also indicated that within heterogeneous
Muslim communities, this has resulted in the suppression of certain practices of Islam more than others. Interviews
also highlighted the atmosphere of tension, mistrust and suspicion that permeates Muslim religious places which
the NYPD has infiltrated with informants and undercover agents, deeming them hot spots. These law enforcement
policies have deeply affected the way Muslim faith is experienced and practiced in New York City. Section Two
are all deemed off-limits as interviewees fear such conversations would draw greater NYPD scrutiny.
This same fear has deterred mobilization around Muslim civil rights issues,
and quelled demands for law enforcement accountability. Parents discourage their children from being active in
Muslim student groups, protests, or other activism, believing that these activities would threaten to expose them to
government scrutiny. Surveillance has also led to a qualitative shift in the way individuals joke, the types of
metaphors they use, and even the sort of coffee house chatter in which they engage.
There are strong reasons for thinking the suspect, Craig Stephen Hicks, was motivated by anti-Muslim animosity to
murder Deah Barakat, 23, Yusor Abu-Salha, 21, and Razan Abu-Salha, 19. The FBI is now investigating the case as a
possible hate crime, although initial reports stated the murder may have been about a dispute over parking. In
In a suburban
restaurant in Houston, I saw a poster that perfectly captured the nature of
the problem. The restaurant owner had used a photograph of a lynching in
the early 20th century, featuring a tree, a dead body hanging from a
branch and a crowd of white people in the foreground looking jubilant. In
place of the black victim of the original image, the face of a stereotypical
Arab was superimposed with the caption: Lets play cowboys and
Iranians. It was a disturbing sight. In the same neighbourhood, I had heard stories of teenagers beaten up at
2011, I spent a year travelling around the US investigating anti-Muslim prejudice.
school simply for being Arab, of harassment of mosque congregations and of death threats against Muslims aired on
and one that continues to haunt an American culture obsessed with enemies at its frontiers. Likewise, the use of a
photo of a lynching ties its meaning to the history of racial segregation after the abolition of slavery, and the ways
also always takes on a racial character. The British Empire relied upon racist ideology to maintain its authority, both
domestically and in colonial settings, and particularly in the face of resistance to its rule. Blacks and Asians from the
colonies who settled in Britain after the Second World War encountered the racism imperialism had fostered there,
persisting long after the British Empire itself no longer existed. Since the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy
planners have regarded the Middle East as their most troublesome territory, where resistance seems to be
claims
human rights problems in what he reductively calls the Muslim world
are caused by Islam, as if it is a monolith that mechanically drives
followers to acts of barbarism. But beliefs reflect social and political
conditions as much as they shape them. Global opinion polls suggest that whether one
thinks that violence against civilians is legitimate, for example, has more
to do with political context than religious belief. Such violence is
considered more acceptable in the US and Europe than everywhere else in the world. Indeed,
mother-lode of bad ideas and that we are misled to think the fundamentalists are the fringe. He
Sam Harris himself has written in support of killing civilians for the beliefs they hold. In his book, The End of Faith,
he says that
even greater cost to ourselves and to innocents abroad, elsewhere in the Muslim world, he wrote. We will
more than by the jihadists regarded as the chief threat of terrorism. However the online
response to the Chapel Hill murders shows there is also another America one that recently took to the streets to
protest against police racism with the slogan #BlackLivesMatter. (This month, the slogan #MuslimLivesMatter also
Michigan Chronicle, the Michigan Front Page, the Michigan Citizen, and he is a staff
writer for the the American Muslim Magazine. He is currently writing a book about
the historical, spiritual and contemporary effects of violence in America, and how
this violence impacts upon the minds and the lives African people in particular and
all people in general. Islamophobia. Afromerica.
http://www.afromerica.com/columns/shelton/vantagepoint/islamophobia.php)
According to a recent national survey, 44 percent of Americans believe the US
government should suspend civil rights and use surveillance techniques to spy on
Muslim Americans. The poll was commissioned by the Media and Society Research
Group through Cornell University's Department of Communication. In what may
indicate increasing intolerance for Islam and Muslims in America, 22 percent of
quarter of a million Negroes. ... Their doctrine is being taught in 50 cities across the
nation. Let no one underestimate the Muslims [emphasis added]. They have their
own parochial schools like this one in Chicago, where Muslim children are taught to
hate the white man. Even the clothes they wear are anti-white man, anti-American,
like these two Negro children going to school. Wherever they go, the Muslims
withdraw from the life of the community. They have their own stores, supermarkets,
barber shops, restaurants. Here you see a progressive, modern, air-conditioned
Muslim department store on Chicago's South Side ... "Let no one underestimate the
Muslims." Here was Islamophobia front and center, used as a proxy for white fears
of black self-determination and economic independence: Forget the furor over
mosques; let's talk about the threat posed by modern, air-conditioned Muslim
department stores! More than 50 years later, the specter of "Negro American
Muslims" -- or even the mere suggestion of them -- still causes anxiety and panic
among some in white America. Witness the recent incident when anti-mosque
demonstrators gathered at the site of the proposed Park51 Community Center and
attacked a black man they mistakenly thought was Muslim, simply because he wore
a skullcap. Or the black Broward County, Fla., judge up for re-election who found
himself having to fend off accusations that he was a secret Muslim, simply because
his first name was Elijah -- the name of a Hebrew prophet in the Old Testament that
was, more important for purposes of Islamophobia, also the first name of Nation of
Islam leader Elijah Muhammad. For his part, President Obama has disavowed the
rumors in every way possible, short of wearing a crucifix around his neck. But this
"Obama as Muslim" (and the more extreme "Obama as Malcolm X's love child") is
not so much a concern about whether he prays to Allah as it is a proxy for political
dissatisfaction being used disproportionately by whites. No matter how ridiculous
these cases of mistaken religious identity may be, they reveal how Islamophobes
have historically targeted, and may continue to target, African Americans as proxies
for Muslims regardless of their religious persuasion. Any effective strategy to
combat the spread of Islamophobia, then, will have to take into account the historic
relationship between anti-Muslim bigotry and anti-black racism. Hopefully this will
be one of the contributions the Coalition of African American Muslims makes to this
struggle.
Britain, the 7th July 2005 London bombings and the realisation that these acts were carried out by Muslims born
In its
scaremongering tactics, the press, for example, has succeeded in creating a
moral panic concerning an internal terrorist threat constructed around a
new folk devil that of the young British Muslim male (Abbas 2001,248). Asian male
and raised in the country, has led to increased anxiety concerning British Muslim youth (Abbas 2007, 8).
masculinities are read through images of terrorist youth juxtaposed with the passivity of Asian Muslim female
***Internals***
Our argument is different. We think that the enemy is not so shadowy, and that Americans perceptual lenses may
have more focus, as it were, when it comes to the War on Terror. In Converses (1964) treatment of group-centrism,
group-centric depending on whether specific events, political debates, and issue frames provide this linking
informationand group cues are salient and clear (Conover1988; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Nelson and Kinder 1996).
For example, American attitudes toward Germans and Italians were related to support for intervention in Europe in
1939 (Berinsky 2009). During the Cold War, the more Americans perceived the Soviet Union as threatening and
untrustworthy, the more they favored a militaristic foreign policy and containment of the Soviet Union (Hurwitz and
Peffley 1990).
Thus,
those with a negative overall view of Muslims should be more likely to
support the War on Terror. The only research that connects attitudes
toward Muslims and the War on Terror finds that unfavorable views of
Islam were associated with increased support for subjecting Muslims
within the United States to additional legal restrictions or police scrutiny
both Muslims and Arabs that have existed for centuries in literature, travelogues, and popular culture.
(Nisbet, Ostman, and Shanahan 2007, Schildkraut 2002). Our analysis extends this research by examining both
Muslims and Muslim-Americans, by considering different stereotype dimensions, and by linking these dimensions to
a broader range of policy preferences. One way our argument pushes further is through a focus on stereotype
dimensions. Any linking information may not only identify the relevant group, but also help to describe and define
that group in terms of its characteristicswhether it is, for example, peaceful or violent. People can then link not
only their overall view of a group, but their assessments of the group in terms of specific traits, to their attitudes on
an issue. For example, perceptions that blacks are lazy are more strongly associated with attitudes toward
government assistance for blacks, welfare, and affirmative action than are perceptions that blacks are violent
(Gilens 1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993), but stereotypes of blacks as
violent are associated with attitudes toward criminal justice policies (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997)
Another recurring theme was apprehension about NYPDs anti-Muslim culture both within the Intelligence Division and outside of it.
trainings were made public through NYPD documents obtained by the Brennan Center for Justice, sparking a public outcry. Adding to
the communitys frustrations was the fact that Police Commissioner Ray Kelly and NYPD Spokesman Paul Brown had participated in
the films production and that the NYPD never did a review of its police cadet training protocols.
A lawsuit filed
in 2006 by a former American Muslim officer described in great detail a
culture of systematic discrimination, with hundreds of anti-Muslim and
anti-Arab email briefings sent to the unit over the course of two years. The
majority of the emails were sent by Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence
advisor to the NYPD Bruce Tefft, but the complaint also made it clear that supervisors and ranking officers
within the intelligence unit either turned a blind eye or worse, participated. For instance, Muslim officers
were made to leave the room when certain briefings occurred. Among the eCriticism of the NYPD Intelligence Divisions work has also come from within its own ranks.
mails that were circulated to the unit was a commentary to a news headline that [o]ne in four hold anti-Muslim
views. The email noted: Then 1 in 4 is informed. Or Burning the hate-filled Koran should be viewed as a public
service at the least. The officer had repeatedly complained to four different supervisors, but his complaints were
all ignored
Services, Inc., the clinical arm of the CUNY School of Law, Mapping Muslims: NYPD
Spying and its Impact on American Muslims, 2013,
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/MappingMuslims.pdf,N8)
The NYPD has frequently justified the broad based surveillance of
American Muslim communities by claiming its effectiveness in thwarting
terrorist plots. In the wake of the Associated Press reports, an NYPD Deputy Commissioner, Paul Browne,
credited the NYPD Intelligence Division with thwarting terrorist plots. New York City officials have asserted that
surveillance has thwarted 14 terrorist plots. On closer scrutiny, however, such claims of the programs effectiveness
plots, and not one was prevented by the NYPD. Further, the other cases either involved government informants who
played a dominant and enabling role in the plot, were so lacking in credibility that federal officials declined to bring
charges, or were instances where plots were abandoned.
Nor has the NYPD shown that its secret surveillance program has any role
to play in yielding leads to potential criminal activity. In fact, the
Intelligence Divisions documents themselves show an emphasis on
separating intelligence gathering from criminal investigation . Our interviews
with ex-NYPD intelligence or counterterrorism officials confirmed that the Demographics Units efforts to spy, map,
and document American Muslim life were unrelated to active investigations. Correspondingly, Assistant Chief of the
Intelligence Unit, Thomas Galati, testified that the Demographics Unit never led to a single lead or investigation.
The NYPDs Radicalization in the West report cast a shadow of suspicion on a large swath of Muslim life. The Muslim
American Civil Liberties (MACLC) first convened to respond to this report, noting its troublesome implications for
racial and religious profiling.
After several meetings with various NYPD officials, the NYPD appended a clarification to the published document,
noting that the report is not intended to be policy prescriptive.
2013, double the number four years earlier, and increasingly includes biometric data. This database includes
20,800 persons within the United States who are disproportionately concentrated in Dearborn, Michigan, with its
significant Arab American population.2 By any objective standard, these were major news stories that ought to have
Institute found that 42 percent of Americans think it is justifiable for law enforcement agencies to profile Arab
security surveillance in the United States is inseparable from the history of US colonialism and empire.
history of national
security surveillance in North America, tracing its imbrication with race, empire, and
capital, from the settler-colonial period through to the neoliberal era. Our focus here is on
The argument is divided into two parts. The first identifies a number of moments in the
how race as a sociopolitical category is produced and reproduced historically in the United States through systems
In the
been a constant feature of American history. For instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 1790s were passed
by the Federalist government against the Jeffersonian sympathizers of the French Revolution. The British hanged
State surveillance
regimes have always sought to monitor and penalize a wide range of dissenters,
radicals, and revolutionaries. Race was a factor in some but by no means all of
these cases. Our focus here is on the production of racialized others as security
threats and the ways this helps to stabilize capitalist social relations. Further, the
current system of mass surveillance of Muslims is analogous to and overlaps with other
systems of racialized security surveillance that feed the mass deportation of immigrants under the
Nathan Hale because he spied for Washingtons army in the American Revolution.
Obama administration and that disproportionately target African Americans, contributing to their mass incarceration
W. E. B. Duboiss notion of the psychological wage, we argue that neoliberalism has been legitimized in part
through racialized notions of security that offer a new psychological wage as compensation for the decline of the
social wage and its reallocation to homeland security.
***Impacts***
(Arun Kundnani teaches at New York University. His latest book is The Muslims
Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (Verso Books, 2014)., Deepa Kumar is an
associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at Rutgers University. She is the author of
Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire (Haymarket Books, 2012).)Race, Surveillance, and Empire
Federalist government against the Jeffersonian sympathizers of the French Revolution. The British hanged Nathan
disproportionately target African Americans, contributing to their mass incarceration and what Michelle Alexander
as the New Jim Crow.4 We argue that racialized groupings are produced
in the very act of collecting information about certain groups deemed as
threats by the national security statethe Brown terrorist, the Black and Brown drug dealer
and user, and the immigrant who threatens to steal jobs. We conclude that security has
become one of the primary means through which racism is ideologically
reproduced in the post-racial, neoliberal era. Drawing on W. E. B. Duboiss notion of the
refers to
psychological wage, we argue that neoliberalism has been legitimized in part through racialized notions of
security that offer a new psychological wage as compensation for the decline of the social wage and its
reallocation to homeland security.
John Comaroffs description of this process in southern Africa serves equally to summarize the colonial states of
North America: The
the Indigenous populations of America as bearers of the state of nature, to which the modern state is
The earliest
process of gathering systematic knowledge about the other by colonizers often
began with trade and religious missionary work. In the early seventeenth century, trade
counterposedwitness Hobbess references to the the Savage people of America.11
in furs with the Native population of Quebec was accompanied by the missionary project. Jesuit Paul Le Jeune
worked extensively with the Montagnais-Naskapi and maintained a detailed record of the people he hoped to
In addition to sedentarization, the establishment of chiefly authority, and the training and punishment of children,
Le Juene sought to curtail the independence of Naskapi women and to impose a European family structure based on
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun established the Office of Indian Affairs (later Bureau), which had as one of its
tasks the mapping and counting of Native Americans. The key security question was whether to forcibly displace
Native Americans beyond the colonial territory or incorporate them as colonized subjects; the former policy was
implemented in 1830 when Congress passed the Indian Removal Act and President Jackson began to drive Indians
to the west of the Mississippi River.
important after 1848, when Indian Affairs responsibility transferred from the Department of War to the
Department of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs sought to comprehensively map
the Indigenous population as part of a civilizing project to change the savage into a civilized
man, as a congressional committee put it. By the 1870s, Indians were the quantified
objects of governmental intervention; resistance was subdued as much
through rational techniques of racialized surveillance and a professional
bureaucracy as through war.14 The assimilation of Indians became a comprehensive policy through
the Code of Indian Offenses, which included bans on Indigenous cultural practices that had earlier been catalogued
by ethnographic surveillance. Tim Rowse writes that For the U.S. government to extinguish Indian sovereignty, it
had to be confident in its own. There is no doubting the strength of the sense of manifest destiny in the United
States during the nineteenth-century, but as the new nation conquered and purchased, and filled the new territories
U.S.
sovereign power was not just a legal doctrine and a popular conviction; it was an
administrative challenge and achievement that included acquiring, by the 1870s, the
ability to conceive and measure an object called the Indian population. 15
The use of surveillance to produce a census of a colonized population was
the first step to controlling it. Mahmood Mamdani refers to this as define and
rule, a process in which, before managing a heterogeneous population, a
colonial power must first set about defining it; to do so, the colonial state wielded the
with colonists, it had also to develop its administrative capacity to govern the added territories and peoples.
census not only as a way of acknowledging difference but also as a way of shaping, sometimes even creating,
difference.16 The ethnic mapping and demographics unit programs practiced by US law enforcement agencies
state
agencies use of demographic information to identify concentrations of
ethnically defined populations in order to target surveillance resources and
to identify kinship networks can be utilized for the purposes of political policing.
Likewise, todays principles of counterinsurgency warfarewinning hearts
and minds by dividing the insurgent from the nonresistantecho similar
techniques applied in the nineteenth century at the settler frontier.
today in the name of counterterrorism are the inheritors of these colonial practices. Both then and now,
Judith
,( Professor at UC Berkeley, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence Ch. 3:
Indefinite Detention, p. 50)
If a person is simply deemed dangerous, then it is no longer a matter of deciding whether criminal acts occurred.
Indeed, "deeming" someone dangerous is an unsubstantiated judgment that in these cases works to preempt
determinations for which evidence is required. The license to brand and categorize and detain on the basis of
suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of "deeming," is potentially enormous.)
containment" takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airports, on the street, in the workplace? A falafel
restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly
the flag in the months following September Il, zooi were a sign of sympathy with al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but
which nevertheless ruled public culture-and business interests_at that time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed
dangerous, and no dangerous acts need to be proven to establish this as true, then the state constitutes the detained population
unilaterally, taking them out of the jurisdiction of the law, depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national
and international law are entitled. These are surely populations that are not regarded as subjects, humans who are not
conceptualized within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so
make known that a certain vanquishing had taken place, the reversal of national humiliation, a sign of a successful vindication.
These were not photographs leaked to the press by some human rights agency or concerned media enterprise. So the international
response was no doubt disconcerting, since instead of moral triumph, many people, British parliamentarians and European human
rights activists among them, saw serious moral failure. Instead of vindication, many saw instead revenge, cruelty, and a nationalist
and self-satisfied flouting of international convention. So that several countries asked that their citizens be returned home for trial.
this way has little, if anything, to do with actual animals, since it is a figure of the
animal against which the human is defined . Even if, as seems most probable, some or all of these people
have violent intentions, have been engaged in violent acts, and murderous ones, there are ways to deal with murderers under both
criminal and international law. The language with which they are described by the US, however, suggests that these individuals are
exceptional, that they may not be individuals at all, that they must be constrained in order not to kill, that they are effectively
reducible to a desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot apply to beings such as these. The treatment of
these prisoners is considered as an extension of war itself, not as a postwar question of appropriate trial and punish- ment. Their
detention stops the killing. If they were not detained, and forcibly so when any movement is required, they would appar- ently start
killing on the spot; they are beings who are in a permanent and perpetual war. It may be that al-Qaeda representatives speak this
way-some clearly do-but that does not mean that every individual detained embodies that position, or that those detained are
centrally concerned with the continuation of war. Indeed, recent reports, even from the investigative team in Guantanamo, suggest
that some of the detainees were only tangentially or transiently involved in the war effort." Other reports in the spring of 2003 made
clear that some detainees are minors, ranging from ages thirteen to sixteen. Even General Dunlavey, who admitted that not all the
detainees were killers, still claimed that the risk is too high to release such detainees. Rumsfeld cited in support of forcible detention
the prison uprisings in Afghanistan in which prisoners managed to get hold of weapons and stage a battle inside the prison. In this
sense,
; there is a chance of battle in the prison, and there is a warrant
for physical restraint, such that the postwar prison becomes the continuing site of war. It would seem that the rules that govern
combat are in place, but not the rules that govern the proper treatment of prisoners separated from the war itself. When General
Counsel Haynes was asked, "So you could in fact hold these people for years without charging them, simply to keep them off the
street, even if you don't charge them?" he replied, "We are within our rights, and I don't think anyone disputes it that we may hold
enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict. And the confiict is still going and we don 'z see an erm' in sig/zz right now" (my
War on Terror hypocritical on Americas partperpetuators demonize the Middle East while
aware of American past of terrorism
Diana Ralph 6, PhD in Psychology and a Master of Social Work. She is an Associate
Professor of Social Work at Carleton University, "ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE WAR ON
TERROR: THE CONTINUING PRETEXT FOR U.S. IMPERIAL CONQUEST", The Hidden History of
9-11-2001 (Research in Political Economy, Volume 23), Emerald Group Publishing Limited,
pp.261-298,
The 9-11 attacks were intended to shock, frighten, and outrage Americans into accepting
the myth that Muslim terrorists pose such a serious threat to their security that they
should cede virtually unlimited power and money to Bush to carry out a war on terror.
However,
Without in any way trivializing the 9-11 attacks, it is worth remembering that they lasted
less than two hours, and posed no threat to the U.S. economy, infrastructure, or
government. In spite of numerous false alarms, no other terrorist act has occurred in the U.S.
since 9-11. By contrast, many CIA-instigated terrorist initiatives, such as the Contra
campaign against the Sandinistas, lasted for years and had disastrous, long-term
consequences for entire nations (Chomsky, 1991, p. 4). John Stockwell, a former highranking CIA agent testified in 1987 about CIA terrorist interventions. What we're talking
about is going in [to foreign countries] and deliberately creating conditions where
government administration and programs grind to a complete halt, where the hospitals are
treating wounded people instead of sick people, where international capital is scared away
and the country goes bankrupt. (Stockwell, 1987) About 2,600 people died in the 9-11
attacks. As of February 22,. 2006, 3,146 U.S. troops and coalition members have been
killed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
fraud), normal criminal justice, international law, or diplomatic options for redress were
rejected. There was no move to consider international law, to give the Taliban any avenue of
retreating with some honour and dignity, no intention or sign of giving a measured and
reflective response to the threat of al Qaeda, nor any introspection as to the reasons behind
why these attacks occurred. (Geaves & Gabriel, 2004, p. 7). In its rush to war, Washington
briskly dismissed Taliban offers to turn over bin Laden to a neutral country and Iraqi
assurances that it was fully complying with U.N. sanctions and that it had no weapons of
mass destruction. Leaping to a military response (especially threatening global war) is an
unprecedented response to a terrorist attack like this (Pillar, 2001, pp. 29, 50-56). Prior to 11
September 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not regard transnational Islamic
terrorism as a strategic threat. In fact, in the past states have generally chosen to
downplay or minimize military response to terrorist campaigns. (Stevenson, 2004, pp. 7-8).
and Tony Blairs White Paper proof was widely dismissed as a weak exercise in public
relations (Blair, 2001). As Francis Boyle points out:"[T]here
overt wars were promoted using specific pretext episodes (Saunders, 2003, p.1). As early
the ensuing months and years, the White House vehemently resisted all attempts to
investigate the 9-11 attacks. Under enormous pressure, Bush finally appointed a highly
partisan 9/11 Commission in 2003, with an extremely limited mandate and blocked access to
documents or to interviewing key witnesses. The resulting Report is an obvious cover-up. As
David Ray Griffin quipped, some people may wonderis there anything in the 9/11
Commission Report that is untrue? Butthe big question is, can I find a true sentence in the
Report? (Griffin, 2005, p. 45). Enemies of freedom, freedom itself is under attack,
they hate our freedoms:
and the Irish Republican Army. Others are heavily infiltrated or even financed by the CIA,
such as the Abu Naidal Organization and the Abu Sayaff Group (Ahmed, Chapter 3; Country
Reports on Terrorism, 2004, 2005) . Even if bin Laden were the architect of 9-11, his stated
grievances with the U.S. are not with its freedoms, but with its leading role in violating the
freedoms (and lives) of others (Bodansky, 2001). Al-Qaeda... is...imposing its radical beliefs
on people everywhere.
Islamist and Arab liberation groups hope to take back control of their countries from
imperial-imposed puppets, and to eventually to establish a democratic Arab Economic Union
similar to the E.U. (Al-Alim, 2005; Third Cairo Conference, 2005). 13 Most Islamist groups and
many Jewish and Christian groups, as well as the United Nations support the cause of
Palestinian people, and oppose the imperialist role Israel continues to play both in the
Occupied Territories and worldwide as a U.S. strategic asset (Kosky, 2002, p. 25). In short,
Goitein, co-directs the Liberty and National Security Program at New York University
School of Law's Brennan Center for Justice: December 9th 2013,
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/12/war-on-terrorcounterterrorismguantanamo.html)
In numerous meetings and panel discussions over the past several years, I have observed U.S. government officials
involved in the detention or targeting of suspected members of foreign terrorist groups refer to these individuals as
the bad guys. The corollary, usually unstated, is that we the people doing the detaining or targeting are the
good guys. The first time I heard a government official use the term, I cringed. Bad guy is the term parents use
to describe criminals to their four year olds, on the premise that young children lack the capacity for any more
nuanced understanding. The officials use of the label bad guys infantilized his audience, which happened to be a
room full of experienced attorneys. I found it patronizing, but more than that, I was embarrassed by his use of a
term that children use when playing games on the playground, which seemed so unsophisticated and
unprofessional. Yet he was simply adopting the prevailing jargon. As I heard officials utter these words in meetings
and instatement after statement, I was increasingly disturbed by them.
symptomatic of the attitude that Americans should not ask, or seek to understand, the motivations of those who
wish to attack us. To be sure, some politicians throw out facile statements positing reasons for terrorists actions. In
2001, former president George W. Bush famously proclaimed, they hate our freedoms. Earlier this year, during a
radio talk show, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee suggested that Islam is inherently violent. Such twodimensional explanations, however, do not count as serious efforts to understand the enemy. They are simply
another way of saying bad guys. It seems far more likely that people join Al Qaeda or similar groups for a variety
of reasons. Some may indeed interpret Islam as requiring violent jihad against perceived enemies of the religion.
Others could be impressionable young men pressed into membership by friends, relatives or mentors. Still others
may simply be attracted to war, an affinity that has plagued mankind throughout history. And undoubtedly, some
join terrorist networks to oppose what they consider U.S. interference in the Arab world, such as the war in Iraq
or simply to seek revenge for loved ones killed in U.S. attacks. However,
reflected in the public pronouncements of national security officials. The 'bad guy vs. good guy' frame precludes an
objective assessment of America's own conduct in the war on terror. If terrorists are bad guys, further inquiry is
unnecessary. Indeed, it is effectively stifled. Americans who seek a better understanding of why we are under threat
of attack cannot freely search online for the speeches or writings that reportedly inspire our enemy. U.S.-based
websites like YouTube remove such materials from their public server. Moreover, anyone surfing the web for these
items risks being placed on a government watch list. To be sure, the U.S. government since 9/11 has devoted
significant time and money to researching strategies for countering violent extremism. This research, however,
has focused more on identifying visible signs of radicalization and crafting interventions than understanding why it
happens.
information from suspected detainees. And the U.S. can hold those who violated the law after 9/11 responsible. But
if we have already decided that were the good guys, even when engaged in acts of torture, there is little
incentive to hold ourselves accountable for actions that otherwise might seem for lack of a better word bad.
There is no doubt that the deliberate taking of innocent life a terrorists standard mode of operation is a
reprehensible act. But the caricature of bad guy versus good guy does our country a great disservice. It
prevents us from understanding our enemies a necessity in this unconventional war of ideologies. And it gives us
false license to act against Americas own stated values in the struggle.
Katrina in 2005 dramatically exposed the human costs of this war that was supposed to protect Americans (Sheer, 2005).The $204.4
billion appropriated thus far for the war in Iraq could have purchased any of the following desperately needed services in our
country: 46,458,805 uninsured people receiving health care or 3,545,016 elementary school teachers or 27,093,473 Head Start
places for children or 1,841,833 affordable housing units or 24,072 new elementary schools or 39,665,748 scholarships for
For Muslims
worldwide, and especially for Afghani and Iraqi people, the war
on terror has not only failed to protect their security, but actively
destroyed it. The billions Bush has poured into unprovoked assaults on Afghani and Iraqi people, money siphoned from
university students or 3,204,265 port container inspectors. (Bennis, Phyllis & Leaver, Eric, 2005, p. 6)
fulfilling basic human needs, threatens to plunge U.S. and world economies into a disastrous depression (Fram, Feb. 14, 2005). The
war on terror threatens everyone on the planet with military assaults through the Missile Defense system, which also has the
potential to end life on the planet by creating nuclear winter (Behrens, 2004; Caldicott, 2002, pp. 10-11).
The concept
of a war on terror pre-dates 9-11 by 22 years . Its seeds were first planted in 1979
at the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism (JCIT) organized by Benjamin Netanyahu (future Israeli Prime Minister). JCIT
Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of
course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to
, it was entirely
about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing.
After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about
fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan,
be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of course
go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But the idea was to drum up this fear of this
menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the
oil-rich region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the
North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some of them
Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled
because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book
about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, and things like
. So, you
know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim Americans and
people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11.
deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth
(Arun, New York University, Deepa, Rutgers University, Race, surveillance, and
empire http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, International
Socialist Review issue # 96, spring 2015, accessed 6/29/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
The resistance that Filipinos mounted to American benevolence could then only be
seen as an atavistic barbarism to be countered through modern techniques of
surveillance and repression. While local police departments within the United States had begun to
develop techniques of political surveillance, it was under the US colonial regime in the
Philippines that systematic and widespread surveillance of political
opponents and the manipulation of personal information as a form of
political control was first institutionalized. A unit within the police called the Constabulary
Information Section was established in Manila in 1901, founded by Henry Allen, a former military attach to Tsarist
among militants were applied to combating radical nationalist groupings in Manila. Control over
information proved as effective a tool of colonial power as physical force. As historian Alfred W. McCoy notes, during
World War I police methods that had been tested and perfected in the colonial Philippines migrated homeward to
After
years of pacifying an overseas empire where race was the frame for
perception and action, colonial veterans came home to turn the same lens
on America, seeing its ethnic communities . . . as internal colonies
requiring coercive controls.34 On this basis, a domestic national security
apparatus emerged, with notions of race and empire at its core . From 1917,
the FBI and police department red squads in US cities increasingly busied
themselves with fears of subversion from communists, pacifists,
anarchists, and the ten million German Americans who were suspected of harboring
disloyalties. During World War I, thirty million letters were physically examined and 350,000 badge-carrying
provide both precedents and personnel for the establishment of a US internal security apparatus.
Education, and is a PhD candidate in Educational theory. She teaches at Rutgers University. Educating
Muslim American Youth in a Post-9/11 Era, Project Muse #95. Fall)
The research above highlights the many injustices and hate crimes Arabs and Muslims were subjected to after 9/11.
The lines were blurred for the aggressors committing these crimes, who were unable to distinguish Arab noncitizens, Arab Americans and Muslims from the fundamentalist terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon. In fact, Arabs, Arab Americans and Muslims were associated with the "axis of evil" that threatened
America and all it stands for. The rhetoric and political climate of nationalism (as evidenced by the spike in the
displaying of American flags on buildings, businesses and homes) seemed to exclude those who might be
The literature suggests that Arab, Arab American and Muslim students are over-targeted by measures of
surveillance, securitization and investigation. Lugg and Soho (2006) suggest that the Patriot Act affects the privacy
of students' records, which can be requested and acquisitioned by the federal government if it is deemed necessary
for a terrorism investigation. In Abu El Haj's (2007) work with Palestinian high school-aged youth, she highlights the
discrimination Arab and Muslim students experienced , particularly in the wake of the 9/11
attacks. Muslim young women who wore the hijab (head scarf worn as a symbol of religious
propriety) were especially vulnerable at their schools. Abu El-Haj (2007) reports that several Muslim
veiled female students were harassed in their neighborhood school, being told by their
teachers that they "look like a disgrace in that thing," while some were threatened with
disciplinary sanctions if they did not remove their scarves . Additionally, a student was
disciplined for mispronouncing the word "tourist," which was heard by his teacher as "terrorist." This student had to
resort to legally challenging the school district to have the incident removed from his permanent record. Another
student was sent to the principal for disciplinary action after drawing two planes hitting the twin towers, despite the
A
particularly disturbing event occurred on the day of September 11th, when an angry teacher
stormed into the principal's office and demanded that all the Palestinian and Arab
students be "rounded up". To this the principal mockingly replied, "And would you like
me to put targets on their backs as well?" (Abu El-Haj, 2007, p. 303). In the wake of the anger
against the 9/11 culprits, some teachers and school personnel were unable to distinguish
between the fanatic and radical Islamists who attacked the twin towers and their
own Muslim students, causing their students to feel alienated and unsafe in their own
neighborhood school.
fact that countless students of all ethnicities, races and religions were reported as having drawn similar pictures.
In her research with high-schooled aged students and parents in a Sunni community in Canada, Zine (2001)
highlights the difficulties students experience as a result of their identification as Muslims. While Islamophobia was
present before 9/11, and Muslim students have long been subjected to racialized treatment, these experiences
became more acute after 9/11. The students she interviewed and observed came from a wide cross-section of
Muslim students whose reported ethnicities were South Asian, Arab, Somali and Caribbean. Students
wearing the hijab reported experiencing patronizing interactions with teachers who
before knowing them seem to equate their difference (in this case difference in dress) to
foreignness. One student tells of how teachers who do not know her speak slowly to her
until she replies in fluent English at which time the teachers seem relieved that she is
"OK". Another student speaks of the messages she received about "whiteness" and how
it is equated to all things [End Page 49] good and beautiful. Her dark skin as a Pakistani Muslim
was in stark contrast to this ideal of beauty. An Indian mother speaks of her daughters' entrenched ideas that being
"brown" and wearing the hijab was a barrier in dealing with Caucasians who are more respected and "listened to".
Young women who wore the hijab had particularly difficult experiences with discrimination
as they have often become the metaphor of Muslim oppression. Despite the fact that many women wear the hijab
out of a sense of religious identification and modesty, the dominant culture continues to interpret this as a symbol
Research has established that tracking is inherently tied with race and class (Oakes, 2005; Rubin, 2006). Zine
track despite their academic achievement. Zine (2001) also reported that Muslim students have been placed in ESL
placement decisions have significantly negative effects on students' ability to participate in college-bound tracks,
which have profoundly negative effects on their future life outcomes.
years of almost continuous national brainwashing on the subject of terror, Terrorized by 'War on Terror' washingtonpost.com http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/... 2 von 3 26.03.07 22:52 Uhr
quite unlike the more muted reactions of several other nations (Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany, Japan, to mention
just a few) that also have suffered painful terrorist acts. In his latest justification for his war in Iraq, President Bush
even claims absurdly that he has to continue waging it lest al-Qaeda cross the Atlantic to launch a war of terror
potentially important national targets for would-be terrorists. With lobbyists weighing in, by the end of that year the
list had grown to 1,849; by the end of 2004, to 28,360; by 2005, to 77,769. The national database of possible
targets now has some 300,000 items in it, including the Sears Tower in Chicago and an Illinois Apple and Pork
Festival. Just last week, here in Washington, on my way to visit a journalistic office, I had to pass through one of the
absurd "security checks" that have proliferated in almost all the privately owned office buildings in this capital -and in New York City. A uniformed guard required me to fill out a form, show an I.D. and in this case explain in
writing the purpose of my visit. Would a visiting terrorist indicate in writing that the purpose is "to blow up the
building"? Would the guard be able to arrest such a self-confessing, would-be suicide bomber? To make matters
more absurd, large department stores, with their crowds of shoppers, do not have any comparable procedures. Nor
do concert halls or movie theaters. Yet such "security" procedures have become routine, wasting hundreds of
and some print media have found that horror scenarios attract audiences, while terror "experts" as "consultants"
provide authenticity for the apocalyptic visions fed to the American public. Hence the proliferation of programs with
manner sadly reminiscent of the Nazi anti-Semitic campaigns. Lately, even some college student organizations
have become involved in such propagation, apparently oblivious to the menacing connection between the
The
atmosphere generated by the "war on terror" has encouraged legal and
political harassment of Arab Americans (generally loyal Americans) for conduct that
has not been unique to them. A case in point is the reported harassment of the Council on
stimulation of racial and religious hatreds and the unleashing of the unprecedented crimes of the Holocaust.
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) for its attempts to emulate, not very successfully, the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Some House Republicans recently described CAIR members as "terrorist apologists" who
concerned with the Middle East has intensified, while America's reputation as a leader in fostering constructive
interracial and interreligious relations has suffered egregiously. The record is even more troubling in the general
area of civil rights. The culture of fear has bred intolerance, suspicion of foreigners and the adoption of legal
procedures that undermine fundamental Terrorized by 'War on Terror' - washingtonpost.com
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/... 3 von 3 26.03.07 22:52 Uhr notions of justice.
Innocent until proven guilty has been diluted if not undone, with some -even U.S. citizens -- incarcerated for lengthy periods of time without
effective and prompt access to due process. There is no known, hard evidence that such
excess has prevented significant acts of terrorism, and convictions for would-be terrorists of any kind have been few
gravely damaged the United States internationally. For Muslims, the similarity between the rough treatment of Iraqi
civilians by the U.S. military and of the Palestinians by the Israelis has prompted a widespread sense of hostility
the resentment is not limited to Muslims. A recent BBC poll of 28,000 people in 27 countries that sought
respondents' assessments of the role of states in international affairs resulted in Israel, Iran and the United States
being rated (in that order) as the states with "the most negative influence on the world." Alas, for some that is the
new axis of evil! The events of 9/11 could have resulted in a truly global solidarity against extremism and terrorism.
By categorizing certain
groups as inferior others, hegemonic powers rob those people of their
humanity, thus, making it easier to commit acts of brutality against them
for imperial interests. Racism, under the banner of manifest destiny, was used to justify the genocide
humanity, such as irrationality, primitivity, criminality, and barbarity.
committed against the Native Americans that made room for American territorial expansion. Racism was used to
justify the enslavement of millions of black Africans whose free labor was exploited to work on plantations and build
the American economy. Despite the advancements made during the civil rights movement, racism still exists in
many areas of American life, such as the disproportionate number of African-Americans and Latinos in prison, de
facto housing segregation, inequality in the education system, and police brutality committed against people of
color. Some of the most recent cases of police brutality were the deaths of 22-year-old Oscar Grant in
Oakland[xvi] and 7-year-old Aiyana Jones in Detroit[xvii] both of whom were African-American. Americas wars
against Afghanistan and Iraq serve to maintain American global hegemony and access to key resources such as oil.
Racism is the
fundamental ideological motivation behind Americas wars and use of
torture. The key task now is to end Americas use of torture and, more
broadly, eliminate racism and imperialism; a daunting task but a necessary one,
Latino people are suspected of being drug-dealers, gang members and criminals.
nevertheless. First, it is important for everyone, of all races, to see and treat every other person as a human being.
Despite our cultural differences, we are part of one human family. Second, it is crucial that we hold our political
leaders accountable for authorizing acts of torture and starting wars. At Stanford, we can start by pressuring our
government to hold current Professor and former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and other
government officials, accountable for authorizing torture and engaging in aggressive wars against Iraq and
Afghanistan. Third, it is vital that we work to build institutions that foster peace instead of war and sustain humanity
rather than destroy it. To build a better future for humanity is by no means an easy task. But a million-mile journey
begins with one step. Lets make that first step.
being involved in terrorism. It is hard not to notice when the former Vice President brags about
personally authorizing the use of torture on national television[v]. These acts included waterboarding, physical beatings, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and, in
some cases, murder[vi]. The primary justification is that torture is a
necessary tool to extract information from people who might know about
impending threats of terrorism. Politicians (both Republican and Democrat), intellectuals, pundits and
other leaders argue that America faces a new kind of threat. America is up against extremist,
religious fanatics who hate the United States and wish to kill innocent
Americans. Current domestic and international laws and law enforcement tactics are not sufficient to subdue
this threat. As Alberto Gonzalez said to former President George W. Bush, the Geneva Conventions are obsolete in
war is against a nebulous enemy, the war against terrorism is essentially a permanent war. Despite the compelling
arguments used to justify torture, adopting an objective view of the facts rips them asunder. First, there is little to
no evidence to prove that torture is a useful interrogation technique. In fact, the evidence that does exist proves the
opposite that torture is ineffective because the suspect will say anything, whether its true or not, in order to make
the torture stop. Ali Soufan, an intelligence official who interrogated Guantanamo terror suspect Abu Zubaydah,
stated[viii]that conventional interrogation techniques compelled Zubaydah to provide actionable intelligence. It was
most
of the people detained, usually indefinitely, in places like Guantanamo Bay
and CIA-owned black sites are not diehard terrorists. The vast majority of
them are innocent. Even President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and
other high government officials may have been aware of this[ix]. Lawrence Wilkerson, a
only after Zubaydah was waterboarded several times that he could not provide useful intelligence. Second,
top aide to former Secretary of State Colin Powell said that Cheney had absolutely no concern that the vast
majority of Guantanamo detainees were innocentIf hundreds of innocent individuals had to suffer in order to
Yusor Mohammad Abu-Salha, 21, and her sister Razan Mohammad Abu-Salha, 19 were
found shot in
the head, execution-style, in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The two young
women were wearing traditional hijabs when they were killed . The man who
turned himself in to authorities in connection with the murders had previously brandished guns at the victims and
threatened them. Before the shooting, Yusor Abu-Salha told her father, Daddy, I think he hates us for who we are
arson attack that destroyed a substantial portion of the building and caused an estimated $100,000 in damage. On
February 17, police in Austin, Texas arrested a man for threatening to bomb an Islamic center as well as a Middle
Eastern restaurant. Last month, a Texas Muslim Capitol Day event (the declared purpose of which was to engage
American Muslims in the political process) was attacked and disrupted by anti-Muslim thugs. Another attack was
organized on Muslim Day in Oklahoma City. The attacking groups Facebook page screamed, Get Islam Out of
The rate of hate crimes against Muslims in the United States stands
at five times what it was before September 2001 . A recent poll found that out of all
America.
religions, Americans harbor the most negative feelings towards Muslims.The American political and media
establishment bears a significant portion of the responsibility for these trends.A recent report by the Center for
American Progress entitled Fear, Inc. 2.0, The Islamophobia Networks Efforts to Manufacture Hate in America
exposes a veritable Islamophobia industry operating on the periphery of the American state. Tens of millions of
dollars have been spent over the past decade to promote anti-Muslim bigotry through a shady network of
according to the report, encourage police and intelligence agents to see a terrorist plot in every mosque. The
intentional whipping up of anti-Muslim bigotry has intensified internationally in the wake of theCharlie
Hebdo attacks last month. As the World Socialist Web Site has explained, the campaign to vilify Muslims serves
definite political ends. Anti-Muslim hysteria provides a justification for imperialist mayhem abroad as well as a
wedge with which to attack democratic rights at home. Policies can be pursued in the climate of such hysteria that
February 5. Bowing to pressure from the right, Obama utilized the occasion (a reactionary spectacle under any
circumstances) to denounce ISIL, a brutal, vicious death cult that, in the name of religion, carries out unspeakable
acts of barbarism, terrorizing religious minorities like the Yezidis, subjecting women to rape as a weapon of war, and
claiming the mantle of religious authority for such actions. Obama also mentioned the Crusades and the Inquisition
as examples of terrible deeds committed in the name of religion. Obamas appearance fueled an ongoing
campaign by the Republican right denouncing the White House for not going far enough in vilifying Muslims. Obama
was criticized on the grounds that his invocation of the Crusades and the Inquisition throws Christians under the
bus. The words radical Islamic terrorism do not come out of the presidents mouth, declared Republican Senator
Ted Cruz. The word jihad does not come out of the presidents mouth. And that is dangerous. The presidents
comments at the prayer breakfast are the most offensive Ive ever heard a president make in my lifetime, former
Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore told reporters. He has offended every believing Christian in the United States. This
goes further to the point that Mr. Obama does not believe in America or the values we all share. The engines of
anti-Muslim agitation in the United States do not include only the usual suspects: the Republican Party, the military,
AM talk radio, police, the intelligence agencies, Fox News, the Murdoch Press, religious zealots, billionaire
more violent than Judaism or Christianity. No significant section of the political establishment in any of the
imperialist countries has shown itself capable of taking a principled stand in opposition to the promotion of anti-
Muslim sentiment. That task falls to the socialist movement, which stands for the international unity of the working
class, defends its democratic achievements, and rejects all attempts to whip up national, ethnic or religious bigotry.
bolstering the United States badly damaged image in the Muslim world. Indeed,
this speech marked a significant rhetorical shift from the Bush era; a shift to the
language of liberal imperialism and liberal Islamophobia. The key characteristics
of liberal Islamophobia are the rejection of the clash of civilizations
thesis, the recognition that there are good Muslims with whom
diplomatic relations can be forged and a concomitant willingness to work
with moderate Islamists. Liberal Islamophobia may be rhetorically gentler but it
reserves the right of the US to wage war against Islamic terrorism around the
world, with no respect for the right of self-determination by people in the countries
it targets. It is the white mans burden in sheeps clothing. The truth is that my
foreign policy is actually a return to the traditional bipartisan realistic policy of
George Bushs father, of John F. Kennedy, of, in some ways, Ronald Reagan,
Obama once said. Since taking office, he has embraced and expanded Bushs
second-term policies. He has deployed 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan,
expanded the war into Pakistan, tried to bully Iraq into granting an
extension of the US occupation (which failed), carried out drone attacks
and black ops in Yemen and Somalia and participated in the NATO-led
war in Libya. Domestically, Obama has continued Bushs policies of torture,
extraordinary rendition and pre-emptive prosecution. American Muslims
continue to be harassed and persecuted by the state. Obama has even
gone further than Bush in several ways, not only by securing the power to
execute US citizens suspected of ties to terrorism without so much as a
trial but also by signing the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
which, among other things, allows the military to detain indefinitely
without charge terror suspects who are US citizens. His 2011 counterradicalizationstrategy document elicits the help of Muslim American teachers,
coaches and community members, who are to be turned into a McCarthy-type
informant system.
used to detain Muslim men without charges is the material witness law.
Congress enacted the material witness statute to authorize the government
to briefly hold a person who has witnessed a crime when it appears he may
flee. Before September 11, this law was only to hold witnesses who were
scared to testify, such as witnesses to a mafia or alien smuggling trial. Since
September 11, however, the government has used this law to circumvent
probable cause requirements to hold Muslim witnesses it believes to be
suspects, indefinitely without charges. The Justice Department has
from Congress, the Justice Department has refused to disclose the names
or number of witnesses it has held, where or for how long witnesses were
detained, or the details surrounding material witness arrests. The Justice
(Anjana, professor SUNY Buffalo Law School, December 10, Overlooking Innocence:
Refashioning the Material Innocence Law to Indefinitely Detain Muslims Without
Charges, https://www.aclu.org/files/iclr/malhotra.pdf)
Enacted in its current form in 1984, the material witness statute authorizes the government to arrest and detain
law to arrest individuals who had witnessed a crime and who had a legal reason or had made clear to the
government that he or she would not comply with a subpoena to testify at a criminal trial. The former INS made the
most material witness arrests, most commonly to hold immigrants who were smuggled into the country in order to
obtain their testimony for trials against alien smugglers and courts were careful to release witnesses if they faced
that courts have deferred to the governments arguments that witnesses need be detained because of national
Circuit not only made several significant inferential leaps in presuming that an individual has relevant knowledge
to the investigation, but also broke with pre-September 11 case law that required the government to prove the
witness was a flight risk because she had previously evaded service or was a fugitive from justice. The second
reason the government has been able to detain witnesses without judicial oversight is that it held material
witnesses more frequently for grand jury proceedings, where courts are largely restricted in reviewing the Justice
the Justice
Department has exceedingly broad powers of investigation in grand jury
investigations to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.
Thus, in Awadallah, the Circuit held that the government need only
produce a mere statement from a government official that a witness has
material information to establish that his testimony is necessary for a
grand jury investigation. Arresting material witnesses for grand jury investigations has also allowed
Departments subpoena powers. Unlike a trial, where there is a defendant and a concrete crime,
the government to hold material witnesses in complete secrecy. Grand jury proceedings and records have long been
the post-September 11 grand jury material witness arrests also departed from past practice; for example, the
government read the material witness arrest warrant in an open bond proceeding for material witness Terry Lynn
Nichols, arrested in connection with the grand jury investigation to the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing.
(Anjana, professor SUNY Buffalo Law School, December 10, Overlooking Innocence:
Refashioning the Material Innocence Law to Indefinitely Detain Muslims Without
Charges, https://www.aclu.org/files/iclr/malhotra.pdf)
Behind the unprecedented secrecy surrounding post-September 11
material witness arrests, our review of material witness detentions
indicates that the Justice Department has arrested and detained witnesses
in a manner unauthorized by Congress and the U.S. constitution to evade
proving probable cause. In the days following September 11, Attorney General John
Ashcroft made clear that the material witness law was part of the Justice Departments legal arsenal
to hold suspects, declaring that [a]gressive detention of lawbreakers and material
witnesses is vital to preventing, disrupting, or delaying new attacks. 18
Material witnesses consistently described to the ACLU and HRW that from the moment of their arrest, the Justice
Department treated them as high profile terrorism suspects, arresting witnesses in their homes or in public with
armed agents with their guns drawn, shackling witnesses and transferring them to maximum security prisons and
Inspector General of the Justice Department.19 During interrogations of material witnesses, FBI agents and U.S.
attorneys made direct and veiled threats to material witnesses and their families. In a number of cases, the Justice
Department made clear that it arrested individuals as witness to his own criminal proceeding, often initiating a
criminal proceeding only after arresting the witness, submitting evidence replete with admissions that the witness
was a major suspect in a terrorismrelated crime, and telling witnesses that they faced long jail sentences or capital
around the constitutional requirement of proving that there is probable cause to detain a suspect; in many cases,
the government used flawed and unsubstantiated evidence to hold material witnesses who had no information
about any crime. Government officials have issued statements acknowledging or apologizing for the
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES REPORT 4 wrongful detention of at least 11 material witnesses, most of whom
spent weeks in detention, often in solitary confinement, and Congress, federal courts and the Department of
Justices internal review agencies has initiated investigations into flawed or prolonged material witness arrests.20
that it had made a 100 % positive identification of Mr. Mayfields fingerprint with a print found on a bag of
detonators found near the Madrid bombing.21 The FBI further informed the court that it believed that Mr. Mayfield
was in Spain even though he did not have a valid passport or records indicating he had left the country in ten years;
the government argued that Mr. Mayfield was a flight risk because his
fingerprint was found in Spain, making it likely that he traveled under a
false or fictitious name, with false or fictitious documents .22 In justifying the
arrest of Mr. Mayfield, it did not connect him with anyone who was under
investigation for the bombing and had not yet convened a grand jury investigation. To the
contrary, the Justice Department identified Mr. Mayfield in court filings as a potential target.23 Based on this
attorneys suggested that he could face capital punishment if criminally charged and refused to grant him immunity
Department of Justices Office of Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility is currently
investigating the conduct of the U.S. Attorneys and the FBI in this case.
Abu, June 17, writer for Center for a New American Security, Center for a New
American Society, Some Thoughts on Blowback, http://www.cnas.org/blog/somethoughts-on-blowback-6025#.VZr3axNViko)
This leads into a larger problem, which is with the concept of blowback
itself. Chalmers Johnson, who popularized the term, described blowback, in its usage of CIA analysis of the
coup against Mossadegh, as "a metaphor for the unintended consequences of the
US government's international activities that have been kept secret from
the American people." Of course, now blowback encompasses overt military operations as well as
covert machinations, and now not simply to the actions of say, the aggrieved victims of a war, but sympathizers
mobilized by it indirectly - to the point where a Christian of Nigerian descent, born and raised in London, could
The aggressor
does something wrong, like invade Iraq or harass Muslims, and collects
the bloody wages of its work. Of course, this is essentially a justification. So instead, it seems
qualify as blowback. Blowback makes sense to many as an implicit moral narrative.
appealing to paint such events as the obvious and inevitable consequence of adopting such policies. One of the
Woolwich killers argued, "The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by
British soldiers." Yet privileging the public justification of an act as its explanation requires too much credulity and
than an accurate self-assessment of the forces of history upon our psyches, these kinds of justifications are
narrative elements in how a person presents themselves to the world. People tell narratives to and about
themselves because that renders our lives and the worlds comprehensible and meaningful, especially when
they're about to undertake an action that will alienate them from wider society and possibly result in their own
death. But from a social science perspectives, we know the stories that people tell too and about themselves
don't necessarily reflect the underlying causal forces. The stuff that makes for good last words can help inform us
about somebody's ideology and beliefs, but to give credence to their grievances simply because of what they said
just grants them that their ideology and beliefs accurately reflect how the world works. This is not to say that
understanding the political grievances of terrorists isn't important, and Freedland likely goes too far in saying we
simplistically invoke the boogeyman of blowback when the vast majority of even radical objectors to government
policies do not decide to hack people to death or gun down children at a youth camp. Yet it is also dangerous to
be so dismiss the actions we often label blowback, even if we wish to delegate it as a problem to be managed
rather than almost superstitiously avoided. Understanding the moral justifications and narratives invoked in
blowback arguments matter, just as studying any aspect of ideology would. We have to resist the temptation,
however, of cherry-picking which parts of grievances we wish to use (the notion that blowback, radicalization, and
the operationalization of preexisting grievances are not mutually exclusive). The problem is, blowback emerged
as a description after the fact, and made its way into policy arguments as more of a moral piety than as a
rhetorically, understanding the mechanisms of blowback beyond the morally intuitive narrative is more difficult.
Some enterprising scholars have made attempts to understand the mechanisms by which violence provokes
counterproductive effects. As Jason Lyall pointed out in his unsettling study of Russian shelling of Chechen
Tamil diaspora and a long history of conflict, the massive, bloody Sri Lankan assault on Tamil Tiger strongholds in
the 2000s saw the routine application of horrific force among and against civilian populations. However squalid a
victory it might seem, and however strong the Tamil diaspora which contributed logistically to the fight, local and
international blowback seems insignificant in comparison to the strength of Tamil militancy prior. This is not to say
Sri Lanka's victory was a flawless success for the implementing elite - but the validity of blowback as a
disincentive depends, at least, on the reaction to violence invalidating the cost of implementing it.
defense apologist such as Huntington (2004) specifically links geopolitical concerns and security threats to internal
American identity issues, most notably coming from those impoverished immigrants who may have the audacity to
challenge Western male privilege, socioeconomically, politically and ultimately epistemologically (Etzioni 2005).
in regions inhabited by Muslims can somehow be understood by exclusively scrutinizing their religion or their
region, effectively turning the Islamic World into its own unit of analysis.3 Epistemic racism leads to the
racism allows the West to not have to listen to the critical thinking produced by Islamic thinkers on Western
decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility for a serious inter-cultural dialogue.
and the
nuclear energy conflict with Iran, have been all encoded in Islamophobic
language in the Western public sphere. Western politicians (with some exceptions
such as Rodriguez Zapatero in Spain) and the mainstream media have been complicit if
not active participants of Islamophobic reactions to the outlined events.
Epistemic racism as the most invisible form of racism, contributes to
legitimate an artillery of experts, advisers, specialists, officials, academics
and theologians that keep talking with authority about Islam and Muslim
people despite their absolute ignorance of the topic and their
Islamophobic prejudices. This artillery of intellectuals producing Orientalist knowledge about the
Hezbollah to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the bombing of Spanish suburban trains (3/11),
inferiority of Islam and its people has been going on since the 18th century (Said 1979) and they contribute to the
Western arrogant dismissal of Islamic thinkers.
The underlying Western-centric view is that Muslims can be part of the discussion as long as they stop thinking as
Any Muslim
that attempts to think these questions from within the Islamic tradition is
immediately suspicious of fundamentalism. Islam and democracy or Islam and Human
Rights are considered in the hegemonic Eurocentric common sense an oxymoron. The incompatibility
between Islam and democracy has as its foundation the epistemic
inferiorization of the Muslim world views. Today an artillery of epistemic
racist experts in the West talks with authority about Islam, with no
serious knowledge of the Islamic tradition. The stereotypes and lies repeated over and over
Muslims and take the hegemonic Eurocentric liberal definition of democracy and human rights.
again in Western press and magazines ends up, like in Goebbels Nazi theory of propaganda, being believed as
religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orientals, or
Asians. My contention is that most of this is unacceptable generalization of the most irresponsible sort, and
What we expect
from the serious study of Western societies, with its complex theories,
enormously variegated analyses of social structures, histories, cultural
formations, and sophisticated languages of investigation, we should also
expect from the study and discussion of Islamic societies in the West. (Said
1998: xixvi) The circulation of these stereotypes contributes to the portrayal of
Muslims as racially inferior, violent creaturesthus, its easy association
with terrorism and representation as terrorist.
could never be used for any other religious, cultural, or demographic group on earth.
(Thomas Ehrlich, Affiliated Faculty in the Ethnic Studies programme at the University
of San Diego, 9-23-2006, Militarization, Globalization, and Islamist Social
Movements: How Todays Ideology of Islamophobia Fuels Militant Islam,
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/5/, Human Architecture:
Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 5, accessed
7/6/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
In responding to September 11, 2001, Westerners and policy makers, influenced above all by the work of Bernard
Lewis (2003)awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President George Bush for his role as an intellectual
architect of the invasion and occupation of Iraqhave focused, on What Went Wrong? in the Islamic world.
2003). Indeed, as Ken Silverstein (2007) has pointed out, if democracy actually spread throughout the Islamic world,
Islamiststhanks in part to U.S. policies that have increased support for these groups, including by refusing to
engage with themwould control substantial blocs if not majorities of the electorate in nearly every Muslim
majority state in the Middle East.
terrorist
attacks increased dramatically after the invasion of Iraq. Globally there was a
in the 1980s (see Chomsky, 2006b: 18-24). Indeed, according to a new study, The Iraq Effect,
607% rise in the average yearly incidence of attacks (28.3 attacks per year before and 199.8 after) and a 237
percent rise in the fatality rate (from 510 to 1,689 deaths per year).10 And in by far the most comprehensive study
of suicide bombing to date from 1980, Robert Pape (2006) shows that Iraq had no instances of suicide bombings
before the U.S. invasion. After the invasion, however, suicide bombings in Iraq have more than doubled each year.
Suicide bombers seek to force foreign forces to withdraw from territory they consider important or their homeland,
and this includes September 11, 2001, as U.S. forces were then stationed in Saudi Arabia, home to some of Islams
most sacred sites, Mecca and Medina (see Scheuer, 2004, 2006). After the U.S. invasion of Iraq the remaining U.S.
troops in Saudi Arabia were withdrawn, but by then the U.S. invasion and occupation of oil rich Iraq had conjured a
new generation of jihadist militants into being (Chomsky, 2006b: 18-38).11 According to Pape (2005, 2006),
there is every reason to expect that the end of the U.S. occupation could
end or at least reduce the steady campaign of suicide bombing in Iraq, and
elsewhere, as has been the case in past examples where occupations generated suicide bombing, yet the Bush
administration and its allies continue to argue that we have to fight the terrorists abroad in Iraq lest they follow us
movements, many of them in pan-Islamic and pan-Arab guises, fighting national liberation wars so as to compel the
U.S. and allied troops to withdraw from Muslim territory and to stop propping up repressive regimes (Pape, 2006). In
this instance, though, the territory occupied is often more broadly defined as Muslim lands as a whole rather than
individual Muslim majority states. The Bush administrations actions towards the Muslim world, notably its invasion
and occupation of Iraq and support for Israel, have undoubtedly contributed to converting national liberation
movements into more pan-Islamic ethno-religious transnational social movements against Western imperialism and
its local manifestations (see Caryl, 2005; see Khosrokhavar, 2005).
the torture revealed at Abu Ghraib and thereafter, scandals that flowed
from decision-making at the highest levels of the U.S. government, was a
godsend here for Osama bin Laden and militant Islam as a whole in terms
of their ability to recruit new members (see Reifer, 2007a; see also Gerges, 2006: 57-58).13
As shown in Papes detailed study, the most comprehensive of its kind, the primary dimension of suicide bombing
campaigns is nationalist resistance against foreign occupation. Religious difference between the occupied and
occupier is secondary to the occupation itself, though still critically important in generating suicide bombing
been instrumental in globalizing modern jihad and adding an ever-more important transnational dimension to its
Age of Sacred Terror; Islam and Terrorism; The Blood of the Moon; Sword of Islam; Extreme Islam; and Religion of
way: The whole continent of North America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be
peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and political
principles, and accustomed to one general tenor of social usages and customs. 7 This doctrine, which
would later come to be known as manifest destiny animated the project of
serves equally to summarize the colonial states of North America: The discovery of dark, unknown
lands, which were conceptually emptied of their peoples and cultures so that their
wilderness might be brought properly to orderi.e., fixed and named and mapped
by an officializing white gaze.9 Through, for example, the Bureau of Indian
The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 was said to have ushered in a new post-racial
era, in which racial inequalities were meant to be a thing of the past. African Americans and Muslim
Americans placed their hopes in Obama, voting for him in large numbers. But in the so-called
***Solvency/Framework***
Solvency 1AC
The United States federal government should curtails its
domestic surveillance of Muslim individuals and communities.
This solves Surveillance is rooted in Islamophobia and
violates the populations fundamental rights to privacy and
religion.
Kundnani, 14 (Arun Kundnani;leading commentator on racism, immigration and
multiculturalism in Britain, professor at New York University; Stop Spying On
Muslim-Americans, Providence Journal, 1 Edition; July 21, 2014 Monday)
The U.S. government has been snooping on prominent members of the
Muslim-American community, according to documents released by National
Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden and publicized in a story by Glenn
Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain of the online publication Intercept. That story
reveals that the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation covertly
monitored the emails of five Mus-lim-Americans who have "all led highly
public, outwardly exemplary lives," the article said. Among the five is Faisal
Gill, who served in President George W. Bush's Department of Homeland
Security and is a longtime Republican Party activist. "I've done everything in
my life to be patriotic," Gill told the Intercept. "I served in the Navy, served in the
government, was active in my community. I've done everything that a good citizen,
in my opinion, should do." Another victim of this snooping is Nihad Awad, who
heads up the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the largest Muslim
civil rights organization in the United States. The three others are: Asim
Ghafoor, whom the article identifies as "a prominent attorney who has
represented clients in terrorism-related cases;" Hooshang Amirahmadi,
"an Iranian-American professor of international relations at Rutgers
University;" and Agha Saeed, "a former political science professor at
California State University, who champions Mus-lim civil liberties and
Palestinian rights." It appears that the government spied on these five not on
the basis of reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal or terrorist
activity but simply because of the expression of legitimate religious or
political opinions that the government considers unacceptable . The
Intercept article revealed what it called " blatant prejudice against MuslimAmericans ." And it showed good proof: One NSA document instructed staff on
how to draw up a target list for surveillance. In place of the target's real name,
the memo used the following fake name: " Mohammed Raghead ." These
documents suggest that the government is viewing all Muslims - be they Arab,
Asian or African-American - as suspect because of their membership in a
religious community. And when their Islamic belief is combined with political
opinions critical of U.S. foreign policy, they become even more suspicious - to the
point of being treated as possible terrorists. This violates the First Amendment
of the Constitution, which prevents discrimination on the basis of one's
religious or political opinions. It is also a violation of the Fourth
own misguided post-9/11 policies . When they were first revealed, the details of the NYPDs
program attracted necessary outrage. Associated Press reporters Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo won the Pulitzer
Prize for their investigative series based on a trove of leaked internal NYPD documents. The series would then
become a book, the recently released Enemies Within: Inside the NYPDs Secret Spying Unit and Bin Ladens Final
Plot Against America. The authors, like much media and many activists, paint a picture of a rogue police
department with Ray Kelly at the helm, and an intelligence division chief (David Cohen) with a chip on his shoulder.
The NYPDs excesses are personified, its programs the product of egos and power struggles among people who
need to be reined in, rather than fundamentally flawed policing policies and assumptions that are at the root of
domestic counterterrorism policing. Reports that members of the FBI have been publicly critical of the NYPDs
tactics, along with descriptions of turf wars between the two agencies, have contributed to a perception that the
federal agencys intelligence gathering is somehow more restrained and law-abiding than the NYPDs. These
reactions mask the truth. The NYPD has rightly come under fire, and Muslim New Yorkers have joined forces with
other communities sharing serious grievances about NYPD activities, linking stop-and-frisk with surveillance and
showing continuity in profiling policies. Together, these advocates successfully passed a historic City Council bill
that establishes an inspector general to monitor the NYPD, and another one that prohibits racial profilingeven
overriding Mayor Bloombergs vetoes of both. Mayoral candidate and likely future mayor Bill de Blasio has
supported a future inspector generals investigation into the legality of the NYPDs surveillance practices. The
NYPDs lawyers are defending the departments surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices in three different
federal lawsuits. This election season in New York City, candidates have courted the American Muslim vote by
more than 100 clientsprimarily Muslim New Yorkerswe have served, most have been targeted for what are often
misleadingly termed voluntary interviews. In the office, we have come to view most of them as fishing
expeditions. These
client was so frightened by the agents threats that he agreed to accompany them to FBI headquarters and let them
strap him to what they claimed was a polygraph machine for four hours as they peppered him with questions,
accused him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work for them as an informant. While the precise
number of these interviews is not available, our experience suggests they are omnipresent. When CLEAR members
un-joining groups and deleting the news articles he had posted in the hope that would spare him from a repeat. It
did not work. The interrogations are also deeply stigmatizing: when an individual is approached for questioning, he
the majority are young Muslim menis perceived by his peers as someone under investigation, and from whom
people want to keep their distance. Our clients regularly explain that they agreed to get into the FBI agents cars
because they did not want to let them into their homes and expose their families, but also did not want their
neighbors to see them. Ive had conversations with college students weighing the pros and cons of taking up a
leadership position in their Muslim student group. Instead of weighing their class workload against their
experience being questioned by the FBI would be bad for the organization, as other students may hesitate to join.
And the FBI doesnt just come in through the front door. Like the NYPD,
its Confidential Human Source Program. The FBIs 2008 fiscal year budget authorization request includes funding for
either. Like the NYPD, the agency shrugs off serious challenges regarding the harmfulness, ineffectiveness and
unconstitutionality of its surveillance policies by pointing to the rules within which it operates. But an examination
of these rules shows that they are woefully permissive. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG),
based on
2008 amendments, an agent may conduct an assessmentthe lowest
level of investigationwithout needing any approval, or showing any
factual predication of wrongdoing. Simply put, suspicion of criminal or
terrorist activity is not needed to interrogate individuals or send
informants into mosques, neighborhoods or organizations. The DIOG also
which governs agents intelligence-gathering activities, has been repeatedly amended. Today,
prescribes domain management assessments to collect racial and ethnic community demographics and allows
FBI agents to consider focused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular
criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community. In other words, the DIOG seems to allow the FBI to do much
In 2007,
the NYPD laid out its theory of Muslim radicalization, ascribing a range of criminal implications to commonplace
also
support of political elites . This shift in the movements playing field raises questions about the viable tactics of
attempted counter- movements. How might the successful use of law as strategy
legitimize a movement, politically incorporating and empowering the movement,
such that it cannot be directly challenged? Similarly, as the political process model suggests, a movements acquisition
of elite allies can provide greater political opportunities. The Islamophobia
movements legislative successes have garnered the support of political
insiders like Newt Gingrich and Michelle Bachmann, which only drives further political access,
opportunity and power. Insofar as Fear, Inc. suggests that elites support is given in exchange for political
donations, further research might consider the temporal relationship between resources elite allies and political opportunity. To what
extent is the successful use of law as strategy dependent upon fluid resources? Finally, though less readily measurable, a shift in
broader discourse such as the notable increase in New York Times articles about Sharia is a significant measure of a movements
impact.
also
support of political elites . This shift in the movements playing field raises questions about the viable tactics of
How might the successful use of law as strategy
legitimize a movement, politically incorporating and empowering the movement,
such that it cannot be directly challenged? Similarly, as the political process model suggests, a movements acquisition
of elite allies can provide greater political opportunities. The Islamophobia
movements legislative successes have garnered the support of political
insiders like Newt Gingrich and Michelle Bachmann, which only drives further political access,
opportunity and power. Insofar as Fear, Inc. suggests that elites support is given in exchange for political
attempted counter- movements.
donations, further research might consider the temporal relationship between resources elite allies and political opportunity. To what
extent is the successful use of law as strategy dependent upon fluid resources? Finally, though less readily measurable, a shift in
broader discourse such as the notable increase in New York Times articles about Sharia is a significant measure of a movements
impact.
The
case law, meanwhile, follows a judicial variation on this theme: identify
the governing legal standard, be it constitutional or statutory, boil down
the messy religious and other particulars of the case to the dispositive
legal issue, and then derive a neutral result in terms that can be justified
can account for the tremendous pluralism and dynamism of American religious conflict and collaboration. n2
overbroad framing of the question it purports to answer. A litigant can assert many different kinds of religious
liberty claims in an American court, and Muslim Americans have appealed to every available category in recent
of a [*145] specifically Muslim-American legal activism, whether in religious liberty or other terms. During the
Second World War, when persons of Japanese descent were detained in internment camps on the American and
Canadian west coasts, "the actions of both white and Japanese advocates fused in litigation that was appealed to
the highest courts." n10 A similar merger of civil libertarian and community-level institutional activism has
characterized the post-9/11 period. n11
justification for such measures. States are required to bring an end to discrimination against women in the
enjoyment of their rights, which includes eradicating all forms of violence against women, irrespective of the
religion, culture, or racial and ethnic identity of the victim or perpetrator, and effective prevention consists in states
should be made for women and girls in diverse religions and traditions to debate and inform others about the reality
adopt a more rational approach to concerns about womens equality in minority religions and cultures based on the
views and preferences of the women themselves and their experience of discrimination either by those who claim
to be in their community, or those from other parts of society.
issue . While changing culture and attitudes will take time, many of this
Another provision, Section 507 of the Patriot Act, which altered The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974 (FERPA), or the Buckley Amendment, should also be reconsidered due to its effect on individual civil rights.
n136
Section 507 of the Patriot Act authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to
n139
n142
there are other means the government can use to obtain student academic records, provided [*29] they
demonstrate a compelling need. The American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers
(Association) in Washington, D.C. reported that immediately after 9/11, the FBI and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (the "INS") contacted educational institutions - all of which released information about foreign
students to the federal authorities. n143 An Association survey also revealed that federal authorities had contacted
The
coercive NSL requests have prompted some higher education institutions
to express apprehension about the dilution of FERPA protection. n145
However, more needs to be done to protect the privacy rights of students
and scholars/faculty who fall under the protection of FERPA. Attempting to root
203 schools and served subpoenas on twenty-two, ordering the release of student information. n144
out terrorists, Congress created a law that has quite specific and extensive implications for the quality of intellectual
and interpersonal engagement and discourse on college campuses. n146 Clearly, the intent of the Patriot Act was not
to serve as a barrier to educational pursuits and to limit academic freedom and civil rights. Yet, the Patriot Act's
consequences for American higher education and its effect upon the global community must be [*30] considered.
War on Terror hypocritical on Americas partperpetuators demonize the Middle East while
aware of American past of terrorism
Diana Ralph 6, PhD in Psychology and a Master of Social Work. She is an Associate
Professor of Social Work at Carleton University, "ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE WAR ON
TERROR: THE CONTINUING PRETEXT FOR U.S. IMPERIAL CONQUEST", The Hidden History of
9-11-2001 (Research in Political Economy, Volume 23), Emerald Group Publishing Limited,
pp.261-298,
The 9-11 attacks were intended to shock, frighten, and outrage Americans into accepting
the myth that Muslim terrorists pose such a serious threat to their security that they
should cede virtually unlimited power and money to Bush to carry out a war on terror.
However,
Without in any way trivializing the 9-11 attacks, it is worth remembering that they lasted
less than two hours, and posed no threat to the U.S. economy, infrastructure, or
government. In spite of numerous false alarms, no other terrorist act has occurred in the U.S.
since 9-11. By contrast, many CIA-instigated terrorist initiatives, such as the Contra
campaign against the Sandinistas, lasted for years and had disastrous, long-term
consequences for entire nations (Chomsky, 1991, p. 4). John Stockwell, a former highranking CIA agent testified in 1987 about CIA terrorist interventions. What we're talking
about is going in [to foreign countries] and deliberately creating conditions where
government administration and programs grind to a complete halt, where the hospitals are
treating wounded people instead of sick people, where international capital is scared away
and the country goes bankrupt. (Stockwell, 1987) About 2,600 people died in the 9-11
attacks. As of February 22,. 2006, 3,146 U.S. troops and coalition members have been
killed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
fraud), normal criminal justice, international law, or diplomatic options for redress were
rejected. There was no move to consider international law, to give the Taliban any avenue of
retreating with some honour and dignity, no intention or sign of giving a measured and
reflective response to the threat of al Qaeda, nor any introspection as to the reasons behind
why these attacks occurred. (Geaves & Gabriel, 2004, p. 7). In its rush to war, Washington
briskly dismissed Taliban offers to turn over bin Laden to a neutral country and Iraqi
assurances that it was fully complying with U.N. sanctions and that it had no weapons of
mass destruction. Leaping to a military response (especially threatening global war) is an
unprecedented response to a terrorist attack like this (Pillar, 2001, pp. 29, 50-56). Prior to 11
September 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not regard transnational Islamic
terrorism as a strategic threat. In fact, in the past states have generally chosen to
downplay or minimize military response to terrorist campaigns. (Stevenson, 2004, pp. 7-8).
Solvency Research/Scholarship
Our role as scholars of domestic surveillance policy should be
to produce research and arguments that deconstruct
ideological investments in the War on Terror
Elliot, professor of American literature, 2012
(Emory, UC Riverside, Terror, Theory, and the Humanities ed. Di Leo, Open
Humanities Press, http://openhumanitiespress.org/Di%20Leo%20and%20Mehan
%20-%20Terror%20Theory%20and%20the%20Humanities.pdf, accessed 7/6/2015
JCP PB @ GDI)
In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo expressed his views on the place of literature in
In a
repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society
thats filled with glut and endless consumption, the act of terror may be
the only meaningful act. People who are in power make their
arrangements in secret, largely as a way of maintaining and furthering
that power. People who are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a
vision. There is a deep narrative structure to terrorist acts, and they
infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers used to aspire to.
(qtd. in DePietro 84) The implications of DeLillos statement are that we are all engaged in
national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts of
representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical
violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for
the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere . In the early
days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power of images , such as those of the
mother of all bombs and a wide array of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to
influence and shape the consciousness of millions and to generate strong
support for the war. The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those
days after 9/11 have enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military
agenda that it had planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruc- tion, scandals and
our times in a statement that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his novel Mao II:
illegalities, and domestic and international demon- strations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction
verbal and visual constructions as devices of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable
opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist re- ligious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world,
rigid definitions and methods inherited from theology and classical metaphysics. The history of religion has
the
enterprise of thinking Islam today can only be achieved-if ever-by dynamic
teams of thinkers, writers, artists, scholars, politicians, and economic
producers. I am aware that long and deeply rooted traditions of thinking
cannot be changed or even revised through a few essays or suggestions
made by individuals. But I believe that thoughts have their own force and
life. Some, at least, could survive and break through the wall of uncontrolled
beliefs and dominating ideologies. ... Many other problems must be raised and solved because
sometimes polemical literature on the religions of the Book, as we shall see. . . .Thus presented,
Islam has regulated every aspect of individual and collective life; but my wish here is to indicate a general direction
of thinking and the main conditions necessary to practice an itihdd [-my intellectual effort to find adequate
answers-] recognized equally by Muslims and modern scholars.
Solvency Pedagogy
Education about Islamophobia is key to prevent rampant
violence and exclusion of Muslim communities
Zine, researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora,
2004
(Jasmin, Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from
the Educational Front Lines, http://i-epistemology.net/v1/attachments/847_Ajiss213%20-%20Zine%20-%20Anti%20Islamophobia%20Education.pdf, American Journal
of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3, accessed 7/1/2015 JPC PB @ GDI)
As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as September 12 that
pedagogical tools to address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and anti-Semitism. However,
Ramberg, 2004
(Ingrid, 1-6 June 2004, Islamophobia and its consequences on Young People,
Seminar report for the Council of Europe,
https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Resources/Publications/Islamophobia_conseq
uences_young_people_en.pdf, accessed 7/1/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
What young people experience what they are exposed to from others, as well as their own
behaviour and attitudes matters tremendously. Like Ms Hadia Himmat said in her talk on the situation
of young women: Young Muslims, as every young person, are in the process of
building their personality and identity. They are subject to many
influences which come from outside and from different directions. What
then, if the young people she referred to are constantly exposed to
Islamophobic acts and attitudes? Hadia Himmat summarises the detrimental effects: Lack of
Muslims in Toronto also revealed the lived experiences of housing discrimination based on both race and religious
Solvency Education
Anti-racist education allows for the critical consciousness
necessary to pursue social justice and fight against oppression
Housee, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of
Wolverhampton, 2012
(Shirin, Whats the point? Anti-racism and students voices against Islamophobia,
Race Ethnicity and Education, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2012, 101120, accessed
7/3/2015 JCP PB)
This article argues for making anti-racist thinking possible in class. The student voice, that
critiques mainstream thinking as found in the media and elsewhere, is a
starting point for this political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our
classroom should encourage the critical consciousness necessary for
pursuing social justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university
spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational
exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political
projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates,
such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct
classroom practices and the curriculum, because: if we are not working
for equity in our teaching and learning environments, then...educators are
inadvertently maintaining the status quo. In conclusion I argue that a classroom
where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is a classroom
where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social
justice education calls on people to develop social, political and personal
awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions . I end by suggesting
that in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence, in August and
September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race
Relations 2010).
challenge, and for me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic as it
might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: Education can enlighten
students and promote positive attitudes.... Education settings can be the
first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia. It is to
education that our attention should be directed. (162)
Solvency Epistemology
The aff reclaims the epistemological foundations that are the
root cause of Islamophobia by shifting the discourse of Islam
away from essentializing portrayals of Muslims as terrorists
Zine, researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora,
2004
(Mohammed, senior research fellow and member of the Board of Governors of the
Institute of Ismaili Studies, Rethinking Islam Today, Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and
Changing Realities (Jul., 2003), pp. 18-39, JStor, accessed 6/30/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
This is at the same time a methodology, an epistemology, and a theory of
history. It is certainly an operative intellectual framework used and perpetuated by generations of Muslims
since the debate on authority and power started inside the community according to patterns of thinking and
representing the world specific to the islahi movement. ... To rethink Islam one must comprehend the socio-cultural
genesis of isla-hi thinking and its impact on the historical destiny of the societies where this thinking has been or is
Solvency Deconstruction
Students specifically need to develop the critical pedagogical
tools necessary to analyze the way in which hegemonic
discourses lead to Islamophobia
Zine, researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora,
2004
asked to make declarations along the lines that Islam is a religion of peace or that
Muslims are not homogenous or the majority of Muslims are moderates. While
in a moment of urgency such declarations may have some part to play, on their own
they are unlikely to counteract Islamophobia. These declarations apparently
challenge the idea that Islam is a religion of violence, or all Muslims are
extremists; but this exchange takes place in a context in which Muslims
continue to be narrated in subaltern positions, and thus, are easily
countered by assertions that Muslims are extremist or Islam is violent. The
logic of Islamophobia in its various forms is a relationship of domination.
The end of Islamophobia will come about when the hierarchy that makes it
possible dissolves. Countering Islamophobia requires the dismantling of
the assemblages that make it possible. These assemblages are specific, and
while any strategy would need to be as granular as the circumstances of the
occurrence of Islamophobia, it may be useful to suggest that the most successful
means of ending a relationship of domination is to facilitate and
empower those who are its subjects. Counter-measures against
Islamophobia have to be more than just refutation of the claims made by
Islamophobia; ultimately, they have to tell different stories not just in
words but also in deeds. These alternative stories need to abandon a
Westernizing horizon as a common destiny.
CONCLUSION In this paper I have made three main claims: (1) that ontic approaches
to Islamophobia cannot do justice to the concept, (2) that a Heideggerian
Wittgensteinian approach to Islamophobia is better than what is currently
in play, (3) that it is possible to use such an approach to open a
conversation with public policy. To describe a phenomena as Islamophobic is not
to disclose a pre-existing pattern of behavior. To name something as being
Islamophobic is a constitutive act; it enables the gathering of disparate elements
into recognizable formations of cruelty and injustice, which is the first task of
making demands for their rectification. To account for Islamophobia in a way that
can make a difference in social policy requires an understanding of it that sees it as
a definite issue, not simply as an amorphous mass of tangentially related attitudes
and beliefs. The implicit demand is that 23 Islamophobia should be
measurable in ways that produce evidence, which could be the basis of a
rational policy. The difficulty, of course, is that Islamophobia is so
contested as a concept that any evidence for its occurrence is unlikely to
be forthcoming as such. This is simply because there is little agreement on what
Islamophobia entails and therefore what evidence would support or undermine it. In
this article, I have argued that it is important to clarify the conceptual
haze surrounding Islamophobia so as to better understand what kind of
ameliorative measures can be taken. To this end, I have suggested that it
is important to understand Islamophobia as belonging to the family of
racism. I have also suggested a Heideggerian phenomenological understanding of
knowledge acquisition, which ties in with a Wittgensteinian-inspired understanding
of the language game, played around the category of Islamophobia which allows a
us to measure Islamophobia phronetically. The emergence of Islamophobia points to
two key developments: firstly, Islamophobia posits a post-racial subject that is
subjected to exclusionary practices. Secondly, Islamophobia marks the
transformation in the balance of power and anxieties generated by the de-centering
of the West. Naming something 'Islamophobia' is a way of alerting us to the
persistence of the racial in the post-racial. Much of the opposition to the deployment
of Islamophobia reminds us of the post in the post-racial.20
Solvency Genealogy
Learning about the historical basis for Islamophobia allows for
students to deconstruct the discursive practices that justify
western militarism towards Islam
Zine, researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora,
2004
the expulsion of the Muslim Moors in sixteenth-century Spain, and European colonization of Muslim societies.
key theme resounds in Muslim American history: the belief that Muslim American
dissent is a threat to national security. Dissent does not equal terrorism (more about
that shortly), but the fear that Muslim American dissent begets violence was a
concern long before 9/11. There are important similarities between pre-9/11 and
post-9/11 state surveillance of Muslim Americans. For much of the twentieth
century, it was not Muslim immigrants, but rather indigenous African American
Muslims who were, from the point of view of federal authorities, the public and
potentially dangerous face of American Islam. The parallels between earlier and
later periods of state surveillance are striking. We seem to be living in a new age of
consensus in which, like the late 1940s and 1950s, a vital center has identified
Islamic radicalism, and by extension Muslim American dissent, as an existential
problem, a dangerous expression of extremism. It hasnt always been this way. One
common mistake is to assume that prejudice toward Muslims is unchanging and
static. To be sure, fears of Muslim aggressors in North America are as old as the
Puritans and other Europeans who brought such phobias with them from the
Occident. And certain common features of Islamophobiaideas about Islam and
Muslims as violent, misogynistic, and backwardhave remained potent throughout
U.S. history. But our national discourse on Islam in the past two centuries has been
far more dynamic and rich than this. In the pre-Civil War period, for example, the
administration of President John Quincy Adams identified enslaved Muslim
Americans as foreigners who were friendly to American interests. His secretary of
state, Henry Clay, mistook these West Africans for Moors, or North Africans, and
argued that by freeing and repatriating them, the young nation might be able to
improve relations with the Barbary states against whom the United States fought its
first foreign war. With Clays approval, Abdul Rahman Ibrahima, an enslaved Muslim,
was feted up and down the East Coast by some of the United States most
important citizens, including David Walker, the Tappan brothers, Francis Scott Key,
and Edward Everett. The Origins of American Islamophobia So what happened? How
did domestic Muslims go from being rather friendlyif not misunderstood
foreigners to dangerous dissenters? At what point did domestic Muslims become a
major threat to the American nation-state? The origins of government-supported
Islamophobia emerged explicitly in the post-World War I period. The U.S. acted on its
fears of physical and ideological pollution through immigration laws, like the 1924
National Origins Act, as well as through the suppression of organizations like Marcus
Garveys Universal Negro Improvement Association. Fueling national suspicion of
African American Muslims was the fear that immigrants of color were bringing
political diseases like Bolshevism and anti-colonialism with them, and that such
disease would spread among black people. There was much at stake, since
enormous federal, state, and local resources were maintaining Jim Crow
segregation. Terrifying predictions of Americas people of color uniting with
colonized people abroad ensued, and the federal government put Islam among
black Americans at the front of its surveillance agenda. Nonetheless, the formation
of American Islam as a simultaneously religious and political response to colonialism
and racism only accelerated in the 1930s. In 1930, W. D. Fard, a person of color
whose background remains contested, founded the Nation of Islam (NOI). Other
black-led Sunni organizations followed suit, founding groups in Cleveland, Brooklyn,
and along the East Coast; many of them eventually convened in Philadelphia in
1943 to form the United Islamic Society of America. The FBI viewed the
transnational ties and diasporic consciousness of these black Muslim Americans as
truly dangerous. This perception only worsened when thousands of African
Americans, Muslim or not, put their hopes in the messianic prophecy that the
Empire of Japan would liberate them from the cage of American racism through a
military invasion. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, black Muslims, black Jews,
advocates of black emigration to Africa, and black advocates for pan-Asian solidarity
declared their public support for Japan, a fellow colored nation. A Japanese
national, Major Satokata Takahashi, formed a Development of Our Own group to
galvanize such feelings in Detroit, Chicago, and St. Louis. Several African American
leaders appropriated Takahashis ideas. As the fear of a Japanese invasion spread in
the early 1940s, the U.S. government arrested African American leaders suspected
of stoking such feelings. Among the twenty-five leaders charged with sedition was
Elijah Muhammad, leader of the Nation of Islam. Muhammad was acquitted of the
sedition charge but was jailed for refusing to register for the military draft. Radicals
and Counter-Intelligence After World War II, federal agencies experimented with
different approaches to neutralizing the political power of African American Islam,
culminating in extensive counter-intelligence operations against the Nation of Islam
and other Muslim groups. One strategy was the denial of First Amendment
protections to Muslim prisoners. The Justice Department argued that since the NOI
was not an authentic religious movementbut rather a cult that operated as
political organizationits followers in prison did not have the right to meet or
conduct religious services.By redefining Islam as a cult the government could
avoid the messiness of legal protections for religious expression. As was often the
case, the word cult was used to label a religion that lots of people disliked or
feared. Making out the Nation of Islam to be a cult was an easy argument to make,
if not in federal court then at least in the media. The FBIs campaign against the NOI
also included commissioning and releasing to the public sociological scholarship
that depicted black Muslims as false ethnics. In the early 1960s the Bureau
commissioned a full-length monograph on the NOI; it argued that the African
American identification with Islam represented a psychologically dysfunctional
association of black Americans with a foreign culture. Mainstream media echoed
these claims, covering black Muslims as deluded fakes. Despite such disinformation,
the Nation of Islam achieved success as perhaps the most prominent black
nationalist organization in the late 1950s and early 1960s. NOI also emerged, at
least for a period, as the preeminent challenge to the liberal promise of the civil
rights movement. This is why Martin Luther King, Jr., singled out the NOI for special
attention in his Letter from the Birmingham Jail in 1963. The NOI and African
American Islam more generally also became a symbol of black American resistance
to U.S. foreign policy in the developing world, especially in Vietnam. NOI created
what Penny Von Eschen called a spacefor the most part unthinkable in the Cold
War erafor an anti-American critique of the Cold War.Elijah Muhammad and
Malcolm X lauded the rise of independent Muslim-majority nations, and sought to
become allies of third-world Muslim leaders. After Malcolm X separated from the
Nation, he became even more politically radical.But there was no more effective
symbol of both domestic and international political resistance to U.S. power than
Muhammad Ali. Ali, a hero to many people of color and leftists around the world,
was seen as a fifth columnthe enemy inside the wallsby the U.S. government,
which sought to blunt his rising popularity by convicting him in 1967 of draft
evasion. It was by then a familiar way of dealing with troublesome black Muslims. In
the second half of the 1960s, at the height of U.S. troop commitment in Vietnam
and with the rise of Black Power groups like the Panthers, the federal government
scholars since 11 September 2001 who lack adequate grounding in the extensive existing literature on the wider
argued that the field must also face up to a number of unique normative and political challenges. These include:
there is a need for terrorism scholars to reflect more deeply on ethical-normative issues, such as whether their
research ought to be oriented towards national security or towards human security65, as the two are quite often not
protect the core interests and boundaries of the field, and by the roots of the field in positivist social science and a
problem-solving approach. Nevertheless,
when virtually the entire academic field collectively adopts state priorities
and aims, and when it tailors its research towards assisting state agencies
in fighting terrorism (as defined by state institutions), it means that terrorism studies
functions ideologically as an intellectual arm of the state and is aligned
with its broader hegemonic project. The fields problem-solving, state-oriented and therefore
ideological character is also illustrated by the way in which the fields knowledge functions to
delegitimise any kind of non-state violence while simultaneously reifying
and legitimising the states employment of violence; and the way it constructs
terrorism as a social problem to be solved by the state but never as a
problem of state violence itself. From this viewpoint, the silence regarding state terrorism within
the discourse (Jackson, 2008b), and in particular the argument of many terrorism studies scholars that state actions
should not be defined as terrorism, actually functions to furnish states with an authoritative academic justification
it
provides them with greater leeway when applying terror-based forms of
violence against civilians, a leeway exploited by a great many states who
intimidate groups and individuals with the application of massive and
disproportionate state violence. In other words, by occluding and obscuring the
very possibility of state terrorism, and as a field with academic and
political authority, the discourse of terrorism studies can be considered
part of the conditions that actually make state terrorism possible. Furthermore,
for using what may actually be terroristic forms of violence against their opponents and citizens. In effect,
the discourse is deeply ideological in the way in which its core assumptions, narratives, and knowledge-producing
practices function to legitimise existing power structures and particular hegemonic political practices in society. For
states and their allies to pursue a range of discrete and often illiberal political projects and partisan interests aimed
by reinforcing the
dominant knowledge that non-state terrorism is a much greater security
threat than state terrorism and by obscuring the ways in which
counterterrorism itself can morph into state terrorism (see Jackson, forthcoming),
the discourse functions to legitimise the current global war on terror and
its associated policies of military intervention and regime change,
extraordinary rendition, military expansion to new regions, military
assistance programmes (often to repressive regimes), the imposition of sanctions,
the isolation of oppositional political movements, and the like (see, among many
others, Stokes and Raphael, forthcoming; El Fadl, 2002; Mahajan, 2002, 2003; Callinicos, 2003). More directly, the
discourse provides legitimacy to broader counter-insurgency or
counterterrorism programmes in strategic regions where the actual
underlying aims clearly reside in the maintenance of a particular politicaleconomic order - such as is occurring in Colombia at the present time (see Stokes, 2006). At the domestic
level, the dominant terrorism discourse can and has been used by political
at maintaining dominance in a hegemonic liberal international order. Specifically,
elites to justify and promote a whole range of political projects, such as:
expanding and strengthening the institutions of national security and the military-industrial complex; the
construction of extensive surveillance and social control systems; the
normalisation of security procedures across all areas of social life; expanding the powers and jurisdiction of state
security agencies and the executive branch, in large part by normalising a state of exception; controlling wider
social and political dissent, restricting human rights, and setting the parameters for acceptable public debate: and
altering the legal system - among others (see, among many others, Mueller, 2006; Lustick, 2006; Cole,
2007. 2003; Jackson, 2007c; Scraton, 2002).
states they work in; a willingness by researchers to expand the focus of their research to include topics such as the
use of terrorism by states, gender dimensions of terrorism, ethical-normative analysis of counter-terrorism, and the
adherence to a set of
responsible research ethics which take account of the various users of
terrorism research, including the suspect communities from which
terrorists often emerge and the populations who bear the brunt of
counter-terrorism policies; a commitment to taking the subjectivity of both
the researcher and the researched seriously, particularly in terms of being willing to talk to
terrorists; and a commitment to normative values and a broadly defined
notion of emancipation. These commitments go beyond simply the call to engage in more rigorous and
discursive foundations which make terrorism studies possible in the first place;
self-reflective research. In their normative dimensions in particular, these kinds of commitments amount to an
orientation that shares many of the same attitudes and approaches as the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and
(CSTWG) within the British International Studies Association (BISA) in early 2006.[3] The intention of the working
group is to establish an international network of critically-oriented terrorism scholars, to generate and coordinate
new kinds of research activities, and to organise papers and panels for conferences. Later, in October 2006, we
organised a special conference on the topic, Is it time for a critical terrorism studies?, partly out of which we
published a symposium on The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies in the journal, European Political Science
(volume 6, number 3). In terms of teaching, a number of openly critical terrorism studies modules and
programmes have been established at Aberystwyth University, the University of Kent at Canterbury, the University
of Manchester, and elsewhere. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, in early 2007 we launched a new peerreviewed academic journal entitled Critical Studies on Terrorism.[4] The aim of the journal is to provide a focal point
for the publication of explicitly critical research on terrorism, to provide a forum in which critical and orthodox
accounts of terrorism can engage in respectful debate, and to review and influence developments in the wider field
of research.
remain under-researched. As already mentioned, the reasons for this distortion lies
partly in the event-driven nature of terrorism (or more accurately, how terrorism has
been socially constructed as an unpredictable event), partly in the dominant narratives and
myths which lie at the heart of the field60, and partly in the current
institutional structures of the field (see below). The main point is that vast amounts of
energy and resources are currently being invested in research questions
of lesser or even dubious value, while far more pressing issues remain
under-researched. The issue of the empirical evaluation of counter-terrorism policies is a particular case
in point. As Lum et.al.s study discovered, despite literally hundreds of billions of dollars spent on counter-terrorism
measures over the past ten years, hundreds of thousands of deaths in counter-terrorism operations, a plethora of
new laws and security measures, and a truly vast terrorism literature, there is an astounding lack of empiricallybased research into the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures. Only a tiny handful of studies have been
conducted (Lum et.al.s survey found seven rigorous empirical studies on counter-terrorism measures from 1975
2002), and these have discovered that many of the most commonly used counter-terrorism measures offensive
military operations, target hardening, and harsher laws, for example did not have a statistically discernible effect
this
shocking assessment raises extremely uncomfortable questions about the
utility of current terrorism research for policy-makers, and its role in
perpetuating the continued use of counter-productive or even harmful
policies.
on reducing terrorism across time and, in some cases, led to increases in terrorism.61 By itself,
Drawing upon auto-ethnographic observation in my own project of trying to promote critical terrorism studies since
2006, I would like to conclude the article with a discussion of some of the main challenges which I see facing the
studies, which is in turn reflective of the different research cultures between Europe and North America, particularly
ought to
terrorism likes a lot of people watching not a lot of people dead (see Jenkins, 1998) appeared across the
terrorism studies literature without anyone ever critically questioning what it really meant and the social scientific
basis or qualitative/quantitative method for getting to this conclusion. This problem has been underscored by
Michael Stohl who accurately pointed towards what: Popper (1934) might caustically designate as wisdom rather
than science. Thus, the assembled wisdom might be correct but the demarcation between wisdom and science
that would allow proposing the necessary conjectures, collecting the appropriate data and subjecting these
conjectures and data to tests which might arguably demonstrate their falsifiability has not yet met the standards of
disciplinary boundaries altogether is one way to do this, although it is important to heed Booths warning against
lowest common denominator interdisciplinarity (Booth 2008). The establishment of an explicitly critical field
should help to bring in those from cognate disciplines who have so far shunned Terrorism Studies because of its
reputation, earned or not, for political bias and lack of theoretical sophistication (see Gunning 2007a; Dalacoura,
Gunning, 2009; Gunning, 2009; Sylvester and Parashar, 2009). It also implies a commitment to taking subjectivity
This means
being aware of and transparent about the values and impact of the
researcher on the process and outcomes of the research, and being willing
to seriously engage with the subjectivity of the terrorist. Importantly, this latter
seriously, in terms of both the researcher and the research subject (see Breen Smyth, 2009).
point implies an additional commitment to engaging in primary research when relevant, as opposed to relying
primarily on secondary sources a long-standing practice in terrorism research due to the perceived difficulties and
dangers of face-to-face encounters with terrorists (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996).
understanding
dedicated scholars.55 In this context, the exclusion of other approaches and cognate fields could be viewed as part
of the process of attempting to maintain the boundaries of a core terrorism studies field, which is separate from
other disciplines. As noted above, however, I believe that the pluralization and growing multi-disciplinarity of the
field is making it more and more difficult to maintain the previous essential core to the field. In any case,
an
challenged with enough effort. Even rarer are those instances when these well established facts are investigated to
academic rigor or scientific standards. Within terrorism studies, there are sometimes no bounds to the ingenuity of
President Bill Clinton, former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Microsoft
founder Bill Gates, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and fomier UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
also proved fraudulent, such as: being a former advisor to the French Ministry of Defence on Transatlantic Affairs;
having been Director of the Scientific Committee for the Institut Montaigne (Paris); 'working on the largest
manuscript ever written on the history of the Central Intelligence Agency'; and working with RAND, among many
other cases (Boumier and Lesnes, 2007).
Another exceptionally perceptive explanation offered to account for the absence of introspective critiques within the
review as a means of quality control, but suffers from the very absence that drives academic knowledge forward
Much of the
literature does not engage with alternative schools of thought or theorybuilding. The majority of debate is currently occurring in book review sections and rarely encompasses
rigorous critique of the validity of theories or methodology. However, even where articles are
peerreviewed, the peers reviewing may lack the expertise, as so much
terrorism knowledge is fragmented. Few terrorism experts are really
qualified to authoritatively comment on the internal structures of different
terrorist groups across different contexts. However, as pointed out by Ken Booth: diversity
against-the-grain theories and rigorous intellectual debates and critiques among scholars.
and debate is not therefore a problem for Terrorism Studies, but a sign of life (Booth, 2008: 67). It is essentially in
the post-9/11 era that these types of essential and major academic debates have been surfacing with widely
different schools of thought. Many of these debates have been sparked as a response to the construction of
databases and from these have emerged analyses that go against the grain of widely-held assumptions and
challenge the main orthodoxy.
***ATs***
journalist and associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at
Rutgers University, " Interview: Author Arun Kundnani on Understanding Terrorism, the
Surveillance State & How to Discuss Reform," FireDogLake - progressive news site, January
16th 2015, http://firedoglake.com/2015/01/16/interview-author-arun-kundnani-on-origins-ofthe-surveillance-state-and-possible-reforms/)
JORDAN: In a column on March 28 for The Guardian, you noted the tools of the state could
not be dismantled even with National Security Agency reforms. What
would be needed, therefore, to diminish the American Islamophobic
surveillance complex? KUNDNANI: I think it is back to what Martin Luther King said; we need
a revolution of values. Right now in the NSA debate, you have a lot of people who are
very concerned about government surveillance. But the actual advocacy
work has two strands to it: One is the legal argument to introduce legal
reforms, which in my opinion wont make any difference . The other is a
technical solution, where the tech community advocates for better encryption. What neither
of those two groups of advocates is addressing is the politics of this. Why is there
government surveillance and who is under surveillance ? Its actually not a
situation where were all equally vulnerable to government surveillance. It
is specific communities (Muslims, Arabs, political activists, leftists, journalists) being
targeted. Sometimes it is a result of racial or religious profiling. For Muslim communities,
surveillance is not just about digital surveillance, but FBI informants in the mosques and the
communities. But the debate about NSA surveillance does not really address that. It doesnt really
want to talk about those issues and how targeted surveillance can also be a violation of peoples
rights.
surveillance . When you start doing that, you will soon realize it is not just
about one or two legal reforms here or there. It is about fundamentally
questioning what the purpose of governmental surveillance is. It is not just to
go after the so-called terrorists or criminals. Its to go after political dissidents or communities having
radical critiques of the government. Once you start looking it at the way, then you
start to think about all kinds of aspects of the surveillance state .
How come
when we talk about spying we don't talk about the lives of ordinary people being spied upon? While we have been
rightly outraged at the government's warehousing of troves of data, we have been less interested in the
my
book on Islamophobia and the War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to
Texas and Minnesota to Virginia. Some told me about becoming aware their mosque
was under surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined
the congregation. Others spoke about federal agents turning up at colleges to question every student who
consequences of mass surveillance for those most affected by it such as Muslim Americans. In writing
happened to be Muslim. All of them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives abroad were
wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by government officials. There were the young Somali
Americans in Minnesota who described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI agents for no reason
other than their ethnic background. Some had been placed under surveillance by a local police department, which
disguised its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the
political opinions.
York who discovered that fellow students they had befriended had been
informants all along, working for the New York Police Department's
Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them. There was no reasonable
suspicion of any crime; it was enough that the targeted students were active in the Muslim Students Association.
And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American imam, whose mosque was infiltrated by the
FBI, leading to a 2009 raid in which he was shot and killed by federal agents . The government
had no evidence of any terrorist plot; the sole pretext was that Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US
government. These are the types of people whom the National Security Agency can suspect of being two "hops"
away from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred to
Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs and Muslims in America had some sort of national security file
compiled on them. Today, that number is likely to be even higher. A study published last year by the Muslim
American Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this kind of mass surveillance. In targeted communities,
a culture of enforced self-censorship takes hold and relationships of trust start to break down. As one interviewee
said: "You look at your closest friends and ask: are they informants?" This is what real fear of surveillance looks
like: not knowing whom to trust, choosing your words with care when talking politics in public, the unpredictability
of state power. Snowden has rightly drawn our attention to the power of what intelligence agencies call "signals
intelligence" the surveillance of our digital communications but equally important is "human intelligence", the
result of informants and undercover agents operating within communities. Underpinning all the surveillance of
Muslim Americans is an assumption that Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over the last 20 years, far more
people have been killed in acts of violence by right-wing extremists than by Muslim American citizens or
permanent residents. The huge numbers being spied upon are not would-be terrorists but law-abiding people, some
of whom have "radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected by the First Amendment to the constitution.
Just the same, there are plenty of other minority Americans who are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists but
stored for much longer, but there's a multitude of other ways you're
always being watched.
(Shirin, Whats the point? Anti-racism and students voices against Islamophobia,
Race Ethnicity and Education, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2012, 101120, accessed
7/3/2015 JCP PB)
Teaching in an anti-racist way, is, in my view, a political project. If we argue
that the unequal structures, institutions and ideas of racism, and sexism
and other oppressive ideologies, are articulated within society and has
damaged our understanding and reasoning, then a job (in my view) for the
anti-racist educator must be to facilitate the process that help undo
oppressive ideas, in order that we can reconstruct progressive ones. My
challenge, therefore, is to nurture democratic sentiments that critique
discrimination and injustices through teaching that , as Nagda (2003, 168) says:
...fosters a critical consciousness by which students and teachers see their
experiences situated in historical, cultural contexts and recognized
possibilities for changing oppressive structures. Social justice in education takes a moral
position that critiques society as unjust towards the marginalised and the excluded. In terms of antiracism, the focus of this position is twofold: to highlight the moral
imperative that racism is wrong, and that the commitment to anti-racist
education, is to work to empower learners so they can raise their voice
against such racism. Education for social justice then, takes an approach to learning and teaching based
on human rights, active participation, the evaluation of change and the empowerment of people to become actively
When Irish
immigrants began to arrive in the United States in large numbers from the
1850s onwards, they were considered nonwhite because they were perceived to be of
threats, but which immigrants counted as white in this homeland was somewhat unstable.
Celtic rather than Anglo Saxon background. More importantly, Irish Catholics faced the same exclusionary practices
that Catholics did in previous centuries. Even though by the mid-eighteenth century, the need for English colonies
to be economically sustainable and militarily secure from indigenous threat, opened up non-English immigration to
North America, Catholics (along with Indian tribes) were denied basic rights on the grounds that they were
began excluding around half of all Asian Indians from entering. Following concern from the British government that
anti-colonial nationalists from India were using the United States as a base to spread radical politics, US officials
began to interrogate Indian migrants at West Coast ports, and a British agent arranged for the Justice Department
to monitor all mail moving between India and the Berkeley and San Francisco post offices.26
contexts, countries and international organisations, and amongst academic observers, there are several other
terms. They include anti-Muslim racism, intolerance against Muslims, anti-Muslim prejudice, antiMuslim
bigotry, hatred of Muslims, anti-Islamism, anti-Muslimism, Muslimophobia, demonisation of Islam and
demonisation of Muslims. There is a similar range of contested terms in other languages, not just in English. In
German, for example, there is a contest between Islamophobie and Islamfeindlichkeit, the latter implying hostility,
not fear. In French, the contest is in part between islamophobie on the one hand and racisme anti-arabe or racisme
anti-maghrbin on the other, the latter two phrases indicating that the phenomenon is primarily to be seen as a
form of anti-immigrant racism directed towards communities from parts of the former French Empire, not primarily
to do with religion or culture. The Scandinavian term Muslimhat translates literally into English as Muslim hatred,
though more accurately as hatred of Muslims, with echoes of legal usage in English terms such as incitement to
Despite its disadvantages, the term Islamophobia looks as if it is here to stay it cannot now be discarded from the
lexicon. Not least, this is because
amongst people who are at the receiving end of anti-Muslim hostility and
prejudice, and acts therefore as an activist concept (Bevelander and Otterbeck
capable of mobilising opposition and resistance . It has been observed, say Peter
Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, that movements against discrimination do not begin
until a commonly understood label evolves that brings together under
2012)
one banner all forms of that particular prejudice . They continue: Resistance to gender
discrimination coalesced under the term sexism. The civil rights movement gained momentum when harnessed to
the notion of racism that encapsulated the variety of innate prejudices and institutional obstacles in a white
dominated society. The concept of antisemitism has provided a powerful tool to object to anti-Jewish sentiment that
was once, like the denigrations of women and blacks, considered normal and left largely unchallenged by people
unjustified discrimination . Undoubtedly this term will elicit the same unease among and even
backlash from some of those whose notion of normal it challenges, just as its historical predecessors have and still
do. (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008: 11)
the history of language, that words are coined that are less than ideal. The word antisemitism, for example, is
lexically nonsensical since there is no such thing as semitism; and in any case not all Jewish people are so-called
Semites, nor are all so-called Semitic people Jewish. The word has been current long enough now, however, for it to
be generally accepted as unproblematic. The same kind of acceptance is apparently being accorded to
Islamophobia, despite the problems and disadvantages outlined above. It is nevertheless apposite to note and
discuss some of the alternative terms which have been proposed, in particular anti-Muslim racism and intolerance
against Muslims
if any, relationship is there between Islamophobia and racism, or Islamophobia and Orientalism. What, in short, do
In the past few months, the AP has removed homophobia, Islamophobia, and ethnic cleansing from their Style Book,
explaining that "'-phobia,' 'an irrational, uncontrollable fear, often a form of mental illness' should not be used 'in
political or social contexts,' including 'homophobia' and 'Islamophobia.' It also calls 'ethnic cleansing' a
'euphemism,' and says the AP 'does not use 'ethnic cleansing' on its own. It must be enclosed in quotes, attributed
and explained.'" Interesting. However, a commenter on Politico points out that "[t]his is completely wrong .
They
have confused the WORD "phobia" with the SUFFIX '-phobia' . The word
"phobia" is just what they said: a technical term denoting an extreme,
debilitating fear. The suffix '-phobia', on the other hand is much broader. It
can mean not just fear of, but also dislike of, aversion to, prejudice
against, having a really bad (physical) reaction to, etc . Consider
'Anglophobia', 'Francophobia', 'hydrophobia', photophobia, etc. It has
become an all-purpose (suffix) antonym to '-philia' . (bibliophilia, bibliophobia)."
account would need more money next year, it made more sense to have a generic fund they could tap into based
on emerging needs, Work said. We felt that this would be -- actually provide us with more flexibility, Work said.
Adm. James Sandy Winnefeld, who testified alongside Work, said the Pentagon also was too constrained by
Congress-imposed defense budget caps under sequestration. See, most of the authorities that Congress has
provided, sir, have caps on them. And the whole purpose of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund was to use those
release of FBI documents obtained through FOIA litigation, which demonstrate that from at least 2004 through
2010, the San Francisco and Sacramento FBI field offices documented and disseminated records on American
FBI's retention of such information in its intelligence files-almost all of the documents were classified as secret or
has provided a tangible basis on which to graft violent Islamist ideology.195 Although such a grievance base has not traditionally
that addresses their life circumstances .196 Those charged with designing our domestic
counterterrorism policies should carefully evaluate whether current tactics could create such a grievance base in the United
States.
information shared with FBI officials in these informal settings will be documented and stored in intelligence files,
shared with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and potentially used to target these individuals, their
agencies for a particular purpose from being used or made available for another purpose without the targeted
investigate Privacy Act violations within the FBIs San Francisco and Sacramento Divisions, and to initiate a broader
audit of FBI practices throughout the nation to determine the scope of the problem and identify solutions.
(Risa, Muslim Homegrown Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the
Threat?, International Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Fall 2011, pp. 7-47, Project
MUSE, accessed 7/2/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
These political obstacles aside, more should be done to promote a balanced
discussion of terrorist threats in the United States. Otherwise, Americans are presented
with a distorted picture in which terrorist attacks appear to be originating primarily with Muslims, rather than with
extremists of all varieties. In an era when the mistrust of Muslim communities is a serious social and political issue,
cultivation of informants and infiltration of undercover agents into Muslim communities can be helpful to
investigators, there are inevitable risks associated with these [End Page 45] methods, and using them requires care
In many places,
federal law enforcement and local police departments have sought to
build strong relationships through outreach to Muslim communities. Such
efforts help to lay the groundwork for good relations and ease tensions
associated with law enforcements monitoring efforts.153 But FBI sting
operations, such as those employed in the case of the Portland bombing suspect, Mohamed Osman
Mohamud, can seriously test those relationships .154 Evidence of mismanagement and
insensitivity are similarly troubling.155 More broadly, the perception that authorities
routinely run armies of informers through American Muslim
communities contributes to the sense, as the president of the Islamic Society of North America
describes it, that law enforcement is viewing our communities not as partners
but as objects of suspicion.156 Equally insidious is how these tactics, by
and awareness of how they may affect the communities in which they are employed.
law
enforcement agencies current response to the complex question of
radicalization among American Muslims is heavily reliant on scattershot
intelligence gathering, even when this risks good relations with the very communities with which it
But it did so without randomly probing and stigmatizing entire ethnic communities. In contrast,
seeks to partner in fighting terrorism. When asked what it is doing to combat the threat of radicalization among
American Muslims, the FBI generally has two responses: 1) it cites its own intelligence-gathering capabilities and its
leveraging of the intelligence-gathering capabilities of its federal, state, and local law enforcement partners; and 2)
it notes its efforts to foster good relations with Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities and to encourage them
to report on the radicalization of individuals toward violent Islamic extremism.125 Occasionally, the Bureau casts
Although
the FBI does not explain how it deploys its intelligence-gathering
capabilities, there is accumulating evidence that its monitoring and
the latter set of activities as attempts to dispel misconceptions that may foster radicalization.126
(Faiza is Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan
Center, focusing on civil liberties issues affecting Muslims in the United States.
Rethinking Radicalization
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf
//ASG)
Given the rhetoric used by the 9/11 attackers and those who have come in their wake, it
is no surprise that religion is assumed to lie at the heart of Islamist
terrorism.60 This assumption has led some to suggest that we should look to Muslim communities to find
incipient terrorists and that expressions of devout faith are signs that someone is
likely to become a terrorist . The notion that the practice of Islam is, in and of
itself, a precursor to terrorism appears to have gained a hold on the
American psyche, as demonstrated by the recent furor over plans to build an Islamic cultural center in
downtown Manhattan and protests against mosques around the country.61 The view that Islam drives
terrorism also seems to have found its way into some government
understandings of the radicalization process. Even leaving aside the important First
Amendment and profiling concerns raised by the embrace of such an assumption by government officials, the
religiosity-terrorism connection is simply not borne out by empirical research. The British MI5 Study explicitly
debunked this view. It found that [f]ar from being religious zealots,
a significant
proportion of actual terrorists exhibited the religious behaviors
identified as indicative of radicalization.67 For example, only 17.1 percent of the sample
even among the sample population examined, the FDD Study was unable to establish that
exhibited low tolerance for perceived theological deviance and only 15.4 percent of the sample attempted to
view that Islam drives terrorism or that observing the Muslim faitheven a particularly stringent or conservative
variety of that faithis a step on the path to violence.69 In fact, that research suggests the opposite: Instead of
promoting radicalization, a strong religious identity could well serve to inoculate people against turning to violence
in the name of Islam.
study by the United Kingdoms security service MI5 (British MI5 Study)45 found there was no typical profile of the
regard radicalization in this country as a linear conveyor belt moving from grievance, through radicalization, to
violence This thesis seems to both misread the radicalization process and to give undue weight to ideological
factors.48 The conclusions of MI5 are largely consistent with the analysis in Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the
Twentieth Century, in which former CIA case officer and psychologist Marc Sageman analyzed more than 500 cases
to II. RETHINKING RADICALIZATION | 9 understand how people evolve into terrorists.49 While Sageman described
conducted at [the Rand Corporation] and elsewhere suggests that no single pathway towards terrorism exists,
making it somewhat difficult to identify overarching patterns in how and why individuals are susceptible to terrorist
recruitment as well as intervention strategies.52 Rands model was unable to predict who among similarly situated
people would adopt radical views, or to identify the smaller sub-set of individuals who would commit violence.53
Indeed, the latter was the most difficult to isolate and was often a matter of happenstance.54
(Risa, Muslim Homegrown Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the
Threat?, International Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Fall 2011, pp. 7-47, Project
MUSE, accessed 7/2/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
Despite the concerns expressed by many analysts and public officials, the evidence does not
support the conclusion that Americans face a growing threat of deadly
attacks plotted by Muslims in the United States. First, it is unclear that
more American Muslims are intent on mounting such attacks. Although it may yet
prove to be the case, the evidence at present does not substantiate such a
finding. The exploratory nature and approach of studies of [End Page 36] radicalization provide limited tools for
evaluating whether Muslim Americans are increasingly exhibiting cognitive and behavioral changes that predispose
violence. The surge could be the result of a clustering of arrests of those long engaged in militancy or the
apprehension of large groups, such as the members of the Daniel Boyd network or the al-Shabaab recruits.
Improvements in detection or other actions by law enforcement could also be contributing to an increase in the
number of individuals charged with terrorist offenses independent of any larger trends in the population.
in preparing for their attacks. For example, both Zazi and Shahzad had to contend with serious technical problems
and committed errors in operational security.
radicalization is
essentially a theological-psychological process in which dangerous
religious beliefs and identities, activated by group dynamics or cognitive openings,
transform individuals into terrorists has been influential among law
enforcement agencies. In 2007, the Intelligence Division and Counter-Terrorism Bureau of
the NYPD published a study, entitled Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, that
outlined a simplified version of this kind of radicalization model. It was the
first time the NYPD had chosen to publish a document that claimed any kind of
scholarly credentials; it did so, it stated, in order to contribute to the debate among intelligence and
Radicalization Models as Policing Tools The view shared by Sageman and Wiktorowiczthat
law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat. The report is backed by outside experts,
such as Brian Jenkins Mead of the RAND Corporation, and strongly influenced by the work of Sageman and
Wiktorowicz; it identifies jihadist ideology as the key driver of radicalizatio n
and suggests four phases an individual passes through in going from being unremarkable to a person quite likely
to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act: preradicalization (before they are exposed to
jihadi- Salafi Islam); self-identification (they begin to explore Salafi Islam as a result of a cognitive opening, which
leads to the breakdown of an existing identity and to associations with like-minded others); indoctrination (the
progressive intensification of their beliefs which, as a result of group socialization, leads to the complete adoption of
the ideology); and jihadization (their acceptance of their individual duty to participate in jihad). These four stages
are described as a funnel through which ordinary persons become terrorists, as their religious beliefs become
affiliating with like-minded individuals; joining or forming a group of like-minded individuals in a quest to
strengthen ones dedication to Salafi Islam; 99 giving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling and urban hip-hop
radicalization are
carried out by Muslims is driven by a radicalization process different from other forms of terrorism should, if made,
be derived from whatever case-based evidence is available to support it rather than assumed as a given in the
design of the study. Finally, even constraining ourselves to the small number of cases the NYPD study actually
describesand ignoring the absence of a control group and the absence of comparisons with other forms of
terrorismthe study offers weak evidence for any correlation between religious behaviors and terrorist activity,
because its assertions linking religious behaviors and terrorist acts are generally impressionistic, arbitrary, and
lacking in any analytic rigor. Following Sageman and Wiktorowiczs emphasis on the group dynamic in
radicalization, the NYPD considers it crucial to identify the venues where socialization into radical ideology is
occurring, what it refers to as radicalization incubators. These the study describes as places where like-minded
individuals will congregate as they move through the radicalization process. They can be mosques but are more
likely to be cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, non-governmental organizations,
hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops and book stores [or] extremist 100 websites and chat-rooms.29 Thus, in
the hands of the NYPD, Sagemans and Wiktorowiczs radicalization scholarship becomes a prospectus for mass
surveillance of Muslim populations.
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) are the federal governments lead agencies to combat radicalization.5 These
expert agencies have made public statements that recognize the complexity of the radicalization process. But they
have not expressly repudiated theories suggesting that it is possible to detect radicalization long before people take
concrete steps toward violence. Nor have they proposed a unified set of responses that take account of the
difficulty of combating radicalization without impinging on the Constitution.6 Domestic law enforcement agencies,
They have
developed simplistic theories of how American Muslims become
radicalized. These theories suggest, contrary to empirical social science studies, that the path to
terrorism has a fixed trajectory and that each step of the process has
specific, identifiable markers. They imply that by closely monitoring the communities deemed
including the FBI and state and local police departments,7 have stepped into the breach.
susceptible to radicalization, law enforcement officials can spot nascent terrorists and prevent future 25 attacks.
Since the markers of radicalization they identify are inextricably linked to Muslim religious behavior, these theories
justify broad monitoring of American Muslim communities,8 including in their places of worship. Indeed, the theories
are characterized by the view that there is a sort of religious conveyor belt that leads from grievance or personal
crisis to religiosity to the adoption of radical beliefs to terrorism, with each step along that continuum identifiable to
law enforcement officials who know how to recognize the signs.
Radicalization models, whether based solely on theology or including a social psychological component,
have encouraged national security establishments to believe they can
preempt future terrorist attacks through intensive surveillance of the
spiritual and mental lives of Muslims. As noted earlier, radical religious ideology
has been defined as a kind of virus infecting those with whom it comes
into contact, either by itself or in combination with psychological processes. But we have seen
that the radicalization literature fails to offer a convincing demonstration
of any causal relationship between theology and violence , and there is no
evidence of any significant statistical correlation between the supposed
indicators of radicalization and terrorist violence. Moreover, the concept of
radicalization tends to confuse a propensity for violence with an interest
in radical ideas, leading the question of what causes violence to be insufficiently isolated from the question
of how belief systems and ideologies come 103 to be adopted. In a paper that is less widely read than his better
known books on Islam, the French sociologist Olivier Roy, a widely respected authority on European Muslims, argues
that it makes more sense to separate theology from violence: The
process of violent
radicalisation has little to do with religious practice , while radical theology, as salafism,
does not necessarily lead to violence.46 The leap into terrorism is not religiously inspired but better seen as
sharing many factors with other forms of dissent, either political (the ultra-left), or behavioural: the fascination for
sudden suicidal violence as illustrated by the paradigm of random shootings in schools (the Columbine
syndrome).47 While a Salafi vocabulary is used by certain groups to articulate their narratives, this by itself is not
evidence that religious ideology is causing violence, merely that, within this milieu, theological references provide a
veneer of legitimacy. Religious ideology seems to play at most an enabling role in cohering a group rather than
scholarship that can give them a magical formula to predict who will be a future terrorist, the microlevel question of
what causes one person rather than another in the same political context to engage in violence is probably beyond
analysis and best seen as unpredictable.48 Sizable resources have been allocated to finding a general formula of
radicalization, yet no plausible one has been offered. At best, the path to becoming a terrorist can be reconstructed
on an individual basis after the event. For law enforcement agencies, the best approach is therefore to investigate
the active incitement, financing, or preparation of terrorist violence rather than wider belief systems which are
wrongly assumed to be its precursors. On the other hand, the mesolevel question of what conditions are likely to
increase or decrease its legitimacy for a particular political actor (either a social movement or a state) is amenable
to productive analysis. So too is the macrolevel question of how particular social movements and states are
constituted to be in conflict with each other, and how the interaction between these different political actors
produces a context in which violence becomes seen as a legitimate tactic.49 An objective study would examine how
state and nonstate actors mutually constitute themselves as combatants in a global conflict between the West and
radical Islam and address under what conditions each chooses to adopt tactics of violence, paying close attention to
the relationships between their legitimizing frameworks.
Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay
College, A Decade Lost Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism, January 2015,
http://mabonline.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Claystone-rethinkingradicalisation.pdf)
The author, who later served on President Obamas National Security Council, spent a number of months in London
in 2002 conducting ethnographic fieldwork with al-Muhajiroun, the radical Islamist group founded by Omar Bakri
Muhammad. The study seeks to answer the question of why thousands of young Britons are attracted to the
panoply of radical Islamic movements with bases or branches in the United Kingdom, including Hizb ut-Tahrir,
Supporters of the Shariah, al- Muhajiroun, and al-Qaeda. Al-Muhajiroun is taken as a case study. Like Sageman, he
emphasizes the importance of social networks and refers to the importance of psychological crises in which
previously accepted beliefs are shaken and an individual becomes receptive to radical views and perspectives. 29
contexts and individual activists and former activists have been involved in violent actions. Wiktorowicz offers little
reflection on what factors legitimise or delegitimise the use of violence within the group. Instead, the question of
what causes people to adopt radical religious beliefs becomes a proxy for the question of what causes violence. As
has moved away from his earlier emphasis on religious ideology as a significant factor in causing terrorism. In 2013,
has highlighted problems with the notion of radicalisation is John Horgan, director of the International Center for the
Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University. He comments that: The
March 31, 2009 to March 31, 2011, the FBI initiated more than 82,000 assessments of individuals and groups
some level of operational development (targets chosen, surveillance undertaken, and the like), twelve involved the
use of federal officials at the plots formative stages.
counter violent
extremism (CVE) in Boston, Minneapolis and Los Angeles. The program, which aims to
bring community and religious leaders together with law enforcement to
develop comprehensive local strategies and share information on best
practices may sound nice, but no one should be surprised that civil rights groups and American
Muslim communities were less than enthusiastic about this news. CVE meetings are not
new. Previous FBI outreach efforts to Muslim communities have been less about
curbing violence than thinly veiled attempts to recruit informants and gather
intelligence. Some Justice Department-sponsored community outreach
events, like a workshop in Seattle focused on improving police relations with the Muslim community, was
seen as offensive. Other unannounced FBI community outreach visits to peoples homes have bordered
Security, and the National Counterterrorism Center to launch a new pilot program to
on harassment. DHS launched a new outreach effort in 2011 which generated similar frustrations. Last April,
National Security Advisor Lisa Monaco announced to community groups at Harvards Kennedy School that DHS
would be sending an envoy to Boston to conduct training to community groups so they could recognize extremist
terrorist radicalization claims that the commonplace activities of many American Muslims, including wearing
traditional religious attire, frequent attendance at mosques, participating in a pro-Muslim social group or political
cause, or even growing facial hair, are indicators in a four-step process toward becoming a terrorist. A 2008 FBI
counterterrorism textbook teaches agents they can quantitatively gauge whether a Muslim is militant by asking a
series of questions about his or her political and religious beliefs. It is no wonder that civil rights groups are
concerned about CVE programs that falsely identify religious practices and political opinions as terrorism indicators.
Monaco told the Harvard Kennedy School audience that community members could help prevent violence by
identifying even more subtle warning signs of radicalization, which included sudden personality changes in their
children, clashes over ideological differences, or watching violent material. Many parents of teenagers would
recognize their children in some or all of these attributes, and become unnecessarily alarmed about entirely normal
adolescent behavior. After the Kennedy School speech, the Brennan Center for Justice and several national and local
civil rights and advocacy groups wrote a letter to DHS requesting a meeting to discuss the program and review the
materials supporting it. There was no response, raising further concerns that these new CVE programs will rely on
CVE
programs that rely on false theories of terrorist radicalization will only
spread fear, distrust and dissension within communities, and lead to unwarranted
the same old discredited theories. All communities want to protect themselves from crime and violence.
law enforcement reporting. Instead of wasting resources chasing false leads, police should focus their resources
(Faiza is Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan
Center, focusing on civil liberties issues affecting Muslims in the United States.
Rethinking Radicalization
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf
//ASG)
The net effect of the monitoring and surveillance that has come to light, as well as other government programs that
are explicitly aimed at Muslims, is that American Muslims often believe they are treated as a suspect class.169
radicalization, some law enforcement agencies believe that a properly trained patrol officer would be able to do so
in the course of writing a ticket. 24 | BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
increased fear and suspicion within the Muslim community toward law
enforcement and made individuals more reluctant to call the
authorities when needed. 171 Similarly, a representative of another major American Muslim group
testified that [t]he perception of the community has become one where they believe
they are viewed as suspect rather than partner in the War on Terror , and that
their civil liberties are justifiably sacrificed upon the decisions of federal
agents.172 Ingrid Mattson, the president of the Islamic Society of North America, and an influential American
Muslim voice, has also noted the deterioration of relations between Arab American groups and law enforcement
agencies.173 Highprofile cases of the type discussed above have sown a corrosive fear among their people that
F.B.I. informers are everywhere, listening.174 In general, Mattson stated, There is a sense that law enforcement is
viewing our communities not as partners but as objects of suspicion.175
Despite the
frictions and problems between various traditional and nontraditional
groups, coalition building can be a useful tool of critical race praxis in the
current period. African Americans have been used to being the dominant
minority in the United States, able to keep their concerns at the center of
the civil rights movement. Latinos are now surpassing Blacks
numerically,208 and are the majority in California already.2 They will be 25% of the U.S. population by
rather than in coalition." "Work in conjunction with us-each working among our own kind."207
2050.210 Blacks will have to learn to work in coalition with Latinos to ensure that Black concerns are not lost in a
that involve "immigration, family, citizenship, nationhood, language, expression, culture, and global economic
though it is only one of various issues that could be the basis for coalition building. Asian scholars have noted how
times will not be easy. In his timely book, Justice at War: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in a Time of Crisis, Richard
Delgado, a founder of CRT, queries, "Will the establishment insist on Americanism and toeing the line in the war on
terrorism, and demand that minorities demonstrate loyalty, in return for a symbolic concession or two?.. .Will it
There are
several foreseeable scenarios in this regard. For example, the Bush
administration could reconfigure rather than terminate various federal
affirmative action programs after an expected hostile Supreme Court
decision in the upcoming Michigan cases,223 to attempt to ensure Black
support for the war efforts. The administration's rejection of the pro-affirmative action position of the
University of Michigan may have attracted some Asian support.224 The perpetuation of the forty
year old blockade against Cuba despite U.S. business opposition ensures
Cuban American loyalty,225 and the rumored appointment of a Hispanic for
the next U.S. Supreme Court vacancy may attract other Latinos .22 ' Delgado
wonders whether people of color will "be able to work together toward
mutual goals--or [will] the current factionalism and distrust continue into
the future, with various minority groups competing for crumbs while
majoritarian rule continue[s] unabated? 22
choose one minority group for favored treatment, in hope of keeping the others in line."2'22
by patriarchal interpretations of the scriptures as the dominant perspective in these world religions. Therefore,
Like Black
women, headscarved Muslim women often experience discrimination as
Muslim women - not the sum of race, religion, and sex discrimination . n146 Yet,
their rights are protected [*225] only to the extent that Muslim males or
White women experience the same type of discrimination. While Muslim
women experience some forms of discrimination in ways similar to Muslim
males, the headscarf engenders subordination of women in ways
overlooked by generic strategies against anti-Muslim (male)
discrimination. Specifically, her headscarf marks her as a terrorist, terrorist
sympathizer, unassimilable foreigner, and an oppressed woman. If she has
an ostensibly assertive personality and strong intellect, then she is also
prone to being stereotyped as a "bad woman," often pejoratively labeled a
"bitch." Broader societal biases against women coupled with the visibility of the distinctly female headscarf expose Muslim women to discrimination
different in form and frequency from Muslim males. If a co-worker, neighbor, or other member of the public has never
interacted with a headscarved Muslim woman, she is more likely to be
particularly germane to Muslim women. n145 A. POSITIONED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE RACIAL, GENDER, AND RELIGION HIERARCHY
misogynists. The Muslim woman's loyalty to the nation and right to be in the workplace, especially in a leadership capacity, is explicitly or implicitly
States interprets her refusal to uncover herself as unpatriotic and unappreciative of the opportunities America makes available to immigrants and women.
In exchange for such opportunities, immigrants are expected to assimilate by adopting the predominant Anglo-Saxon culture, dress, and mannerisms. And
Unlike a Muslim
man who can shave his beard without violating a mandatory religious
obligation, she does not have the [*228] option of "passing" without
abandoning her religious beliefs. n158 Placed at the lower rungs of the racial hierarchy, she experiences racial or ethnic
origin discrimination. The headscarved Muslim woman is also still susceptible to
stereotypes that she is oppressed and subjugated by her husband, father,
and religion. Before 9/11, this stereotype often evoked pity and sympathy
n159 but increasing anti-Muslim sentiment now produces anger and
disgust. Her presence is just another reminder of what is wrong with
women are expected to uncover to look more "Western." Refusing to do so becomes a basis for legitimate suspicion.
avoiding discrimination. n161 A "conversion" for purposes of identity performance is effectively a religious conversion of sorts, as
she replaces her orthodox religious beliefs with a secularized interpretation of Islam. n162 Removing her headscarf,
therefore, requires her to abandon a fundamental religious belief. n163 [*229]
Nor can the headscarved Muslim woman "pass" as a non-Muslim because
there is no acceptable way of wearing a headscarf that circumvents
stereotypes. n164 Despite the various fashionable ways to wear a headscarf, it remains the marker of the terrorist, the terrorist's wife, the
unwelcome foreigner, and the oppressed woman. In the eyes of many Americans, the only "good Muslim woman" is
the one that does not cover her hair and secularizes, which brings her
back to having to effectively convert out of her religious beliefs. For similar reasons,
she cannot "cover" as a means of downplaying her differences with mainstream groups. n165 Some women wear make-up, modern suits, and adopt
dominant cultural mannerisms as a means of "covering." But so long as that "cover" is on her head, her differences are on full display, rendering attempts
leaders and spokespersons claim to speak for "Muslims" but often fail to incorporate the perspectives of Muslim women beyond a superficial defense of
her right to wear a headscarf. n170 Community-wide protests against unlawful government action often focus on cases involving profiling of Muslim men
in airports and immigration enforcement. Selective anti-terrorism investigation and prosecution of Muslim men is also a source of grievance. With regard
to private acts of discrimination, resources are expended towards protecting the right to build mosques, the right to religious accommodation in the
workplace, and negative stereotyping in the media. The focus on discrimination of women is often limited to a case-by-case basis rather than a more
effective systemic approach. Underrepresentation of Muslim women's issues by Muslim civil rights and cultural organizations takes on additional
importance in light of recent efforts by the government to correct culturally insensitive counterterrorist practices. n171 On February 8, 2012, the FBI
[*231] Director of Public Affairs met with leaders of several Muslim and Interfaith organizations to discuss changes in FBI training materials. n172 While the
government's overture to the Muslim American community was a positive step in dealing with the contentious topic of offensive FBI training material, the
meeting unintentionally highlighted the danger that underrepresentation of Muslim women in these organizations presents. Namely,
Muslim organizations that met with Mueller have women in leadership roles, only one has women visibly directing advocacy efforts. n173 While these are
legitimate concerns that warrant attention and affect both men and women, they constitute only part of the post-9/11 adverse impact on Muslim
communities in America. For instance, in the context of religious accommodation in the workplace, the Muslim woman faces discrimination against her
Muslim civil rights groups focus solely on the discrimination she faces as a Muslim who wears a headscarf. Should [*232] she choose not to wear it, yet
nonetheless face discrimination; it is unlikely that community resources are expended in her defense. n174 If groups do offer to assist the headscarved
woman, they often do so through agendas based on a male-centric definition of anti-Muslim bias that does not see the issue beyond the right to practice
one's faith. Muslim civil rights groups may even decide that she is to blame for the discrimination because of her "bad attitude," mirroring mainstream
American gender stereotypes of the "good woman" as obedient and deferential. . C. SACRIFICING MUSLIM WOMEN'S RIGHTS TO DEFEND MUSLIM (MALE)
broader Muslim civil rights agenda by challenging the patriarchy within their communities and institutions. n175 As Muslim communities across the
country experience mosque vandalizations, n176 hate [*233] crimes, n177 forced exile on No Fly lists, n178 profiling in airports, n179 and aggressive law
enforcement tactics that border on entrapment, n180 intra-community gender rights are quickly marginalized. Further complicating women's predicament
is the likelihood that internal power struggles based on allegations of male domination, even if true, only reinforce negative stereotypes of (male) Muslims
n182 Consequently, a significant portion of the new generation of Muslim women leaders may have little choice but to support defensive strategies that
collectively marginalize Muslim women as a group. n183 Notably, and perhaps in response to the effects of intersectionality, a new generation of Muslim
women post-9/11 have begun to break into the community leadership. Although Muslim women collectively remain at the periphery of community
leadership, women are founding and managing some new organizations. Organizations founded and operated by highly educated Muslim women include:
Muslim Advocates, n184 South Asian Americans Leading Together, n185 and Karamah. n186 These represent the few examples of female leadership at the
national level. n187 While there are certainly other talented Muslim female [*235] professionals in leading roles, many of them work for and report to
predominantly male executives and male board members. n188 Another consequence of women's exclusion from American Muslim leadership is the rise
of female dissidents who converted out of Islam and now ally with far right organizations holding anti-Muslim bias. Women such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, n189
Wafa Sultan, n190 Bridgette Gabriel, and Nonie Darwish n191 hold themselves out as experts on Islam but proffer views highly controversial, if not
outright offensive, to a vast majority of Muslims in America. n192 These women, with no identifiable Muslim constituency, are often touted by their
benefactors as courageous voices against the oppressive ideology of Islam. While they may hold sincere views, they appear to be exploited to do the
bidding of right-wing political groups with clear anti-Muslim agendas, which further objectifies [*236] Muslim women within the larger culture war. Indeed,
many Muslims perceive such women as mere pawns in the larger assault
on Muslim's civil rights in America. As a result, Muslim women trapped at
the intersection of race, religion, and gender tend to suffer in silence to
preserve community cohesion during a time of siege, take on the
monumental endeavor of starting their own organizations and competing
with legacy organizations, or become surrogates of opponents of
mainstream Muslim organizations as a channel for expressing their
dissent. To prevent such distorted consequences, Muslim American women
should have opportunities to play meaningful roles in existing institutions
whose mandates are to defend the rights of women, Muslims, or civil
liberties in the post-9/11 era. Those roles should not be limited to those
associated with traditional gender roles such as mothers, nurses, or
teachers. Similarly, American feminist groups have an obligation to
include American Muslim women in their leadership and gender rights
agenda and advocacy campaigns. Civil liberties groups focused on adverse
consequences of national security laws would also be more effective if
they included American Muslim women in their discussions on identifying
violations of individual rights in the American Muslim communities. Their
strategies would be more informed in ensuring all those caught in the
post-9/11 counterterrorism preventive dragnet n193 benefit from
advocacy projects, not just males. Until such changes occur, American
Muslim women are likely to remain caught at the intersection of bias
against gender, race, and religion with little recourse . D. THE FAILURES OF AMERICAN WOMEN'S
RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS Some American feminists' near obsession with Muslim women's rights abroad n194 makes their ten-year silence over the various
the dimension of race or ethnicity, then a third layer of intersectionality exacerbates her predicament. In the case of an African American headscarved
Muslim woman, rarely, if ever, [*239] have Black civil rights groups taken on these issues directly. n201 And while Arab or South Asian groups may be
sensitized to the ethnic origin bias underlying the discrimination, they often punt the case as an anti-Muslim or anti-Black case. In all scenarios, few of the
organizations recognize the gender dimension in the same way they would had the discrimination occurred within the pre-9/11 subjuga-tion paradigm.
Quite the opposite,
practice from the base sexualiza-tion of women in the West . n202 Consequently, the
analysis of
antidiscrimination that does not take intersectionality of race, religion,
and gender into account cannot sufficiently address the particular ways in
which Muslim women are subordinated. n203 As demonstrated in Section V below, Muslim women donning a
headscarved Muslim woman is caught in the crosshairs of intersectionality at her own peril. Consequently,
headscarf face palpable discrimination in employment and public spaces. Some are physically attacked in conjunction with accusations of terrorism. Their
children are also bullied as their mother's headscarves "out" them as the same Muslims the bully's parents vilify at the dinner table. Headscarved Muslim
women have also been evicted from courthouses and law enforcement agencies for pretextual reasons. n204
has been deeply implicated. n46 We must remember where the Taliban came [*1588] from, that U.S.
administrations thought that religious fundamentalists made better anti-Communist fighters, and so supported the
not elaborate on whether consented or imposed, other French feminists unequivocally invalidate the possibility of
consent, coupling the voluntary submission argument with a false consciousness. Anne Zelensky and Anne Vigerie
informant 8 akin to the classical anthropological sidekick emerges to spread relatively constant ideas about her
culture and community (Ansari 50), and justify state intervention to outlaw the veil. Far from being voiceless,
this new subaltern is urged to speak, for the conditions of speaking have
been reconfigured in a way congruent with contemporary expectations of
self-representation, but her speech should benefit dominant sites (52).
These new figures, 9 who play an important role in contemporary feminist
politics, can be thought of as internal feminist Orientalists for they
endorse feminist orientalism (Zonana) and bestow on it the legitimacy
and epistemic privilege of cultural insiders . Their contributions, uttered
from the authoritative standpoint of insiders, have been central to making
gender paradigmatic of the civilisational gap between the West and the
rest. Yet the ambiguity of their positioning, which entails a complex
Orientalist dialectic, should be highlighted. Not only does their portrayal
of veiled women as oppressed sustain the image of Western women as
emancipated, but also it functions as a mirror to good Muslims, those
who are les e volue s ; unveiled, enlightened Muslim women like
themselves and secular, gentle Arab men who accompany them a couple
to be opposed to bad Muslims; veiled girls and violent Arab/Muslim boys
(Gue nif-Souilamas; Bowen). In the French headscarf debates, these accredited insiders were
French women of Muslim background who publiclyopposed the veil , and
since they are veiled, which means they are either alienated or
manipulated into wearing the symbol of their own oppression (Intervention).
Conversely, those who opposed the veil offered highly praised expert testimonies to the Stasi Commission.
Chahdortt Djavann, whose claim to expertise relied on her own experience in Iran after the revolution and who
fiercely opposed the veil, offered sensationalist tales of womens oppression in Muslim countries (Scott 163). Her
incendiary pamphlet begins with: For ten years I wore the veil. It was either the veil or death. I know what I am
talking about (Djavann 7). Another figure, Fadela Amara, the leader of the organisation Ni Putes Ni Soumises
(NPNS 10 ), and a strong supporter of the ban, declared before the Stasi Commission: I consider the veil to be first
and foremost a tool of oppression (Audition). She has received extraordinary attention and recognition from
media and politicians. In early 2004, at the same time as French legislators were debating the bill banning religious
symbols in public schools, Amaras book, co-authored with a journalist from Le Monde , received an emblematic
prize, the political book of the year, granted by the Parliament. As cogently put by Bowen: [F]or politicians the NPNS
analysis was a pure gift. NPNS explained the problem of violence in terms of sexism in the underdeveloped portions
of urban France rather than the result of policies of labor migration and residential segregation. Problems of labor
and discrimination would require imaginative, expensive policies; Arab sexism called for denunciation and a law
feminist philosopher, for whom allowing girls to wear headscarves in public schools meant that the French republic
had given up on gender equality for the sake of religious tolerance (Murphy cited in Bilge 122), invited European
feminists to learn a lesson from the French ban:
dependent definition of agency, a truly humanistic one resonating with the Millsian premise that one cannot freely
submit to slavery, nor prefer a slothful life to one of Socratic questioning (Mookherjee 33), is not uncommon either
British controversy on the niqab following the October 2006 comments of Jack Straw, then Labour leader of the
Commons, that niqab signified separation and impeded communication, Khiabany and Williamson (77) argue that
media representation of veiled Muslim women moved from the one of oppressed victims without agency who need
to be saved by the West to that of aggressors who have been conceded too much agency by Western liberalism.
The idea of veiled women qua aggressors also coloured French debate s.
Once it was established that veiling troubled public order, it was difficult to maintain the view that Muslim girls and
women were victims; wearing the headscarf itself became an act of aggression. Jacques Chirac said as much in a
speech in Tunisia in December 2003. Wearing
North, labor leaders had little appetite for abolition, fearing competition from a newly freed Black workforce.21 After
Du Bois
used the term psychological wage to describe this sense of superiority
granted to non-elite whites in the South: It must be remembered that the white group of
laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated by a sort of
public and psychological wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because
abolition, the same racial anxieties were mobilized to disenfranchise the Black laborer in the South.
they were white. They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and
the best schools. The police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, dependent under their votes, treated
them with such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. On the other hand, in the same way, the Negro was subject
to public insult; was afraid of mobs; was liable to the jibes of children and the unreasoning fears of white women;
Marx had an
orientalist epistemic racist view of non-Western peoples in general of which he did
write extensively (Moore 1977). Moreover, his close collaborator, Fre- derick Engels, did write about
Muslim people and repeated the same racist stereo- types that Marx used
against Oriental people. Talking about French colonization of Algeria,
Engels said: Upon the whole it is, in our opinion, very fortunate that the Arabian chief
has been taken. The struggle of the Bedouins was a hopeless one , and though
the manner in which brutal soldiers, like Bugeaud, have carried on the war is highly blamable, the conquest
of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization. The
Alg- iers in 1882 recovering from a sickness, he wrote almost nothing on Islam. However,
piracies of the Barbaresque states, never interfered with by the English government as long as they did not disturb
their ships, could not be put down but by the conquest of one of these states. And the conquest of Algeria has
already forced the Beys of Tunis and Tripoli, and even the Emperor of Morocco, to enter upon the road of civilization.
They were obliged to find other employment for their people than piracy... And if we may regret that the liberty of
the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed, we must not forget that these same Bedouins were a nation of
robberswhose principal means of living consisted of making excursions either upon each other, or upon the
settled villagers, taking what they found, slaughtering all those who resisted, and selling the remaining prisoners as
All these nations of free barbarians look very proud, noble and glorious at a
distance, but only come near them and you will find that they , as well as the more
civilized nations, are ruled by the lust of gain, and only employ ruder and more cruel means. And
after all, the modern bourgeois, with civilization, industry, order, and at least relative enlightenment
following him, is preferable to the feudal marauding robber, with the barbarian
state of society to which they belong. (Engels, French Rule in Algiers, The Northern Star,
slaves.
January 22, 1848, in: MECW, Vol.6, pp.469- 472; quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Mod-
statement. Talking about India, the irrational fanaticism of Muslims is expressed in the following quote of Engels:
The insurgent warfare now begins to take the character of the Bedouins of Algeria against the French; with the
difference that the Hindoos are far from being so fanatical, and that they are not a nation of horsemen. (Engels:
New York Daily Tribune, July 21, 1858, MECW, Vol.15, p. 583) If there is any doubt about Marxs shared views with
Engelss on the inferior- ity of Muslims and non-Western people relative to the West, the following quote is a
confirmation: ... The question ... is not whether the English had a right to conquer India, but whether we are to
prefer India conquered by the Turk, by the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton. England has to
fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regeneratingthe annihilation of old Asiatic society, and
the laying of the material foundations of West- ern society in Asia. Arabs, Turks, Tartars, Moguls, who had successively overrun India, soon became Hinduized, the barbarian conquer- ors being, by an eternal law of his- tory,
conquered themselves by the superior civilization of their sub- jects. The British were the first con- querors superior,
and, therefore, inaccessible to Hindu civilization... The day is not far distant when by a combination of railways and
steam vessel, the distance between England and India, measured by time, will be shortened to eight days, and
when that once fabulous country will thus be actually annexed to the Western World .... (Marx, The Future Results
Marx
did not have much hope in the proletarian spirit of the Muslim masses
when he stated in relation to the Ottoman Empires expansion to Eastern
European territories the following: The principal power of the Turkish population
in Europe, indepen- dently of the reserve always ready to be drawn from Asia, lies in the mob of
of the British Rule in India written on July 22, 1853, in Marx and Engels On Colonialism, page 81-83...)
Constantinople
[Istanbul] and a few other large towns. It is essentially Turkish, and although it finds its
Tribune, April 7, 1853, written by Engels at Marxs request, quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on Colonialism and
European merchants, therefore, who risked the chances of commerce with such a people, contrived to secure
themselves an exceptional treatment and privileges originally personal, but afterwards extended to their whole
nation. Hence the origin of capitulations. (The Outbreak of the Crimean WarMoslems, Christians and Jews in the
Ottoman Empire, New York Daily Tribune, April 15, 1854, quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on Colonialism and
in the Ottoman Empire, New York Daily Tribune, April 15, 1854, quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on
by a civil emancipation, you cancel at the same time their subjection to the clergy, and provoke a revolution in their
the Crimean WarMoslems, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, New York Daily Tribune, April 15, 1854,
This
secularist view of Marx was a typical colonial strategy promoted by the
Western Empires in order to destroy the ways of thinking and living of the
colonial subjects and, thus, impede any trace of resistance. By arguing that
Muslim people are subjected to the rule of a religion, Marx projected in
Islam the cosmology of the secularized Western-centric, Christian- centric view.
Islam does not consider itself a religion in the Westernized,
Christianized sense of a sphere separated from politics, economics, etc.
quoted in S. Avineri (1968), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (Doubleday: New York, p. 146)
not simply an extension of some historical bias against blacks , but rather,
is an amalgam of old-world Islamophobia linked to the history of the
Iberian peninsula, and to the notion of souless beings embodied in popular
conceptions about the indigenous natives of the Americas. These beliefs
would contribute to an ideological basis for, and justification of, colonial conquests
in the name of cultural and religious conversion, as well as pave the way
for the enslavement and human trafficking of sub-Saharan Africans.
Whites are responsible for racism Race essentialist positions almost always set up a white/non-white dichotomy.
There is a tendency to simplify the sources of oppression, to take the position, "whites did it to us," as if whites
invented racism, imperialism and slavery. They did not. They have just been more successful over the last few
centuries, and they have managed to impress an ideology of white supremacy on the world, thanks in part to their
to speak as if
whites invented racism, imperialism, and slav- ery is to ignore five to ten
dedication to improving the technologies of travel, communications, and warfare. But
thousand years of human history featuring various empires, interracial/ethnic/religious wars, and slavery in many areas of the world. It is
also to aggregate and romanticize all non-white (indigenous, Asian,
African, Australian, and South American) societies prior to contact with Europeans as
I
am not referring here only to the historical facts that it was African
slavers who sold their peoples into slavery to the Europeans, or that the
European imperial powers in non-settler colonies such as India depended
upon local elites, who were only too happy to support the British rulers
who were helping them to maintain their castel ethnic privileges and
oppress others. As elsewhere, so complete was their dependence on the collaboration of Indian elites that
may do our own oppressing based on cul- tural systems and the economic and power interests of certain classes.
the British contemplated creating "a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in
morals and in intellect.t'J> Yum yum yum, said the little aliens as they lined up for implantation. However, as
Mohanty notes, "all forms of ruling operate by constructing and consolidat- ing, as well as transforming, already
existing social inequali- ties." As well as constructing "hegemonic masculinities as a form of state rule, the colonial
state also transformed ex- isting patriarchies and caste/class hierarchies.t'-v It seems that they did not need to
implant very many aliens; they were already present. In arguing that people of colour do our own oppressing,
that there were forty-eight ethnic wars/conflicts being fought in Europe, Asia, Africa, South America and the Middle
East during 1993.37 Many of these conflicts were/are based on ethnic animosities wherein each party has racialized
an ethnic "other." In many cases such "othering"
Race essentialist
positions that hold only whites accountable for racial oppres- sion are overly simplistic, miss the
complexity of the issues involved, and encourage a focus on only one set
of villains.
ethnic/cultural/religious groups, classes, or women within their populations.
we
are not just black writers, we are black people and as black people we live every
day of our lives in an anti-black world. A world that defines itself in a very
whether or not people will like or accept me and this is a difficult thing to overcome especially for a black writer because
one of causality but one of accompaniment , when I write I want to hold my political beliefs and my
political agenda loosely. I want to look at my political life the way I might look at a solar eclipse which is to say look indirectly, look
I said at the beginning this is an anti-black world. Its anti black in places I hate like apartheid South Africa and apartheid America
the world but if I can get away from the result of my writing, if I can think
of my writing as something that accompanies political struggle as
opposed to something that will cause political struggle then maybe just maybe I will be
able to explore forbidden territory, the unspoken demands that the world come to an end, the thing that I cant say when I am trying
to organize maybe I can harness the energy of the political movement to make breakthroughs in the imagination that the movement
can't always accommodate, if its to maintain its organizational capacity.
of this filling and its reproduction are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the
signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of
exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for
deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere
engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled.
the curvature of intersubjective space (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific
modes of the othering of otherness are nowhere decided in advance (as a
certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social
Put differently,
does not have to be divided into white and black , and the meaning of these
signifiers is never necessary because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism
institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks who are not. But this
ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic that is, of all contingently
constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers
to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the
white man doesnt exist, the black man doesnt exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate
sociality
Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the
existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time because it is the presence of one object in another undermines any identity ever being
(fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of
antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All
sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans
understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgans work and actually see racism being inscribed in
the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that
it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us
and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. Racism was created by policy. It will likely only be
ultimately destroyed by policy. Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I dont believe the law created
racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound
aspects of human psychology it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can
no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such
hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more
manageable goal than TNCs utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant
to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you
define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyaltybasically just prejudicethen Sullivan is right to throw
water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But
slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit
for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially
sanctioned behaviorowning a home, getting marriedand then blame them for the adverse consequences.
Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact
dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not
because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active
with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get
away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of
monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social
stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To
deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But
with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a
sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument,
that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed
as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize
their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire
encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this
As we shall see below, blacks in the US cannot and do not have ontology, or so Wilderson argues, denying with the
same breath the workability of analogy as a method, because analogy can only be a ruse. Thus, what he calls the
ruse of analogy grants those who fall for it, for example, Black film theorists or Black academics, an opportunity to
reflect on (black) cinema only after some form of structural alteration. (38) Analogy does seem tricky if one follows
Wildersons line of thought, that is, the Holocaust/Jews and slavery/Africans. Jews entered and came out of
Auschwitz as Jews whereas Africans emerged from the slave ships as Blacks.2 Two types of holocaust: the first
Human, the second Human and metaphysical, something which leads to Wilderson saying that the Jews have the
for Wilderson,
blacks are socially and ontologically dead in the sense that the black body has been violently
Dead ... among them; the Dead have the Black among them. (38) It bears reiterating that
turned into flesh, ripped apart literally and imaginatively, that it is a body vulnerably open, an object made
available (fungible) for any subject and not in the world or civil society the way white bodies are. (38)
Wilderson reflects on black women suffering in US prisons in the 1970s and then juxtaposes the suffering with white
womens concurrent public preoccupations in civil society. For example, the violence and neglect underwent by
Safya Bukhari Alston3 in solitary confinement at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women is linked to the similar
plight of another black woman, Dorothy, in Haile Gerimas Bush Mama (1977) before Wilderson questions what both
situations mean in relation to images of [w]hite women burning bras in Harvard Square ... marching in ...
Manhattan campaigning for equal rights. (135) Wildersons answer is that the images of female black pain and
white activism are irreconcilable precisely because they cannot be read against one another without such an
exercise appearing intellectually sloppy. However,
quote begins] as opposed to white apathy, is necessary to White political radicalism and to White political cinema
because it sutures affective, emotional, and even ethical solidarity between the ideological polar extremes of
Whiteness. This necessary antiBlackness erects a structural prohibition that one sees in White political discourse
and in White political cinema. (131) [wilderson quote ends] undamentally, the first three chapters of Red, White
and Black are concerned with what it takes to think blackness and agency together ethically, or to permit ourselves
intellectual mindful reflections upon the homicidal ontology of chattel slavery. Wilderson posits ways through which
the dead (blacks) reflect on how the living can be put out of the picture. (143) There seems to be no let off or
way out for blacks (The Slave) in Wildersons logic, an energetic and rigorous, if unforgiving and sustained,
treadmill of damning analysis to which Indians (The Savage/The Red) will also be subjected, first through
approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is
problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the interconnectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in
point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lotts mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwoods idea of
African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been
fundamentally questioned since Lotts 1990s theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of
talking about Wildersons choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked
unfairly for failing to acknowledge a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black body, the Black
home, and the Black community (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughess Menace II Society (1993),
overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act(STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wildersons dubious and questionable
conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by
for exaggeration
Wildersons propensity
[wilderson
quote begins] The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture
became Black style ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold
territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or
direct this process ... Anyone can say nigger because anyone can be a nigger. (235)7 [wilderson quote ends]
Black is
irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right
Similarly, in chapter ten, A Crisis in the Commons, Wilderson addresses the issue of Black time.
historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are the ship
hold of the Middle Passage: the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time but also the moment of
no time at all on the map of no place at all. (279) Not only does Pinhos more mature analysis expose this point as
cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once
Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while
dismissing jazz as belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking, (225)
there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that
Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his
sustained bashing of blacks and anti Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly
plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood films badly planned sequel: How does one deconstruct life? Who would
benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow. (340)
***NEG***
***T/Framework***
also
support of political elites . This shift in the movements playing field raises questions about the viable tactics of
How might the successful use of law as strategy
legitimize a movement, politically incorporating and empowering the movement,
such that it cannot be directly challenged? Similarly, as the political process model suggests, a movements acquisition
of elite allies can provide greater political opportunities. The Islamophobia
movements legislative successes have garnered the support of political
insiders like Newt Gingrich and Michelle Bachmann, which only drives further political access,
opportunity and power. Insofar as Fear, Inc. suggests that elites support is given in exchange for political
attempted counter- movements.
donations, further research might consider the temporal relationship between resources elite allies and political opportunity. To what
extent is the successful use of law as strategy dependent upon fluid resources? Finally, though less readily measurable, a shift in
broader discourse such as the notable increase in New York Times articles about Sharia is a significant measure of a movements
impact.
applied in the private sector. Amnesty International maintains that differences of treatment implemented by
private, and in some cases public, employers against Muslims wearing religious and cultural symbols and dress with
the purpose of promoting a specific corporate image, pleasing clients, or enforcing a concept of neutrality, amount
rights to freedom of expression and religion or belief may sometimes be restricted by individual schools to achieve
a legitimate aim, such as the need to promote human rights of the others, states should ensure that schools do not
implement restrictions which are not necessary or proportionate to the sought aim . When a restriction on religious
or cultural symbols or dress is applied to pupils, it is up to the restricting authority to prove it is in line with
international human rights standards and it does not result in the violation of the best interest of the child.
justification for such measures. States are required to bring an end to discrimination against women in the
enjoyment of their rights, which includes eradicating all forms of violence against women, irrespective of the
religion, culture, or racial and ethnic identity of the victim or perpetrator, and effective prevention consists in states
should be made for women and girls in diverse religions and traditions to debate and inform others about the reality
adopt a more rational approach to concerns about womens equality in minority religions and cultures based on the
views and preferences of the women themselves and their experience of discrimination either by those who claim
to be in their community, or those from other parts of society.
***Islamophobia Debate***
Islamophobia No Impact
Muslims arent being solely focused- other religions are
discriminated as much as Islam is
Goldberg 10
(Jonah, Jonah Jacob Goldberg is an American conservative syndicated columnist and author.
Goldberg is known for his contributions on politics and culture to National Review Online, of which he is editor-atlarge. He is the author of Liberal Fascism (2008), which reached #1 on the New York Times Best Seller list..
Islamophobia? Not Really Los Angeles Times. August 24)
Regardless, 2001 was the zenith or, looked at through the prism of our national shame, the nadir of the much-
following year, the number of antiIslamic hate-crime incidents (overwhelmingly, nonviolent vandalism and nasty
words) dropped to 155. In 2003, there were 149 such incidents. And the number has
hovered around the mid-100s or lower ever since. Sure, even one hate crime is too many.
But does that sound like a anti-Muslim backlash to you ? Let's put this in even sharper
focus. America is, outside of Israel ,probably the most receptive and tolerant country in the
world to Jews. And yet, in every year since 9/11, more Jews have been hatecrime victims than Muslims. A lot more. In 2001, there were twice as many antiJewish incidents as there were anti-Muslim, again according to the FBI. In 2002 and pretty
much every year since, anti-Jewish incidents have outstripped anti-Muslim ones by at
least 6 to 1. Why aren't we talking about the anti-Jewish climate in America?
Because there isn't one. And there isn't an anti-Muslim climate either. Yes, there's
a lot of heated rhetoric on the Internet. Absolutely, some Americans don't like Muslims. But if
discussed anti-Muslim backlash in the United States. The
you watch TV or movies or read, say, the op-ed page of the New York Times never mind left-wing blogs
you'll hear much more open bigotry toward evangelical Christians (in blogspeak, the
"Taliban wing of the Republican Party") than you will toward Muslims. No doubt some
American Muslims particularly young Muslim men with ties to the Middle East and South Asia
have been scrutinized at airports more than elderly women of Norwegian extraction, but does
that really amount to Islamophobia, given the dangers and complexities of
the war on terror?
(Jeff, An Op-Ed columnist and nationally recognized conservative voice, Jacoby was hired from the
Boston Herald in 1987. He briefly practiced law and was a commentator for WBUR-FM. His awards include the 1999
Breindel Prize and the 2004 Thomas Paine Award.. The Islamophobia Myth The Boston Globe. December 8)
America is many things, but Islamophobic plainly isnt one of them. As Time
itself acknowledged: Polls have shown that most Muslims feel safer and freer in the US
than anywhere else in the Western world. That sentiment is powerfully buttressed by the FBIs
newly released statistics on hate crimes in the United States. In 2009, according to data gathered from
more than 14,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide, there were 1,376 hate crimes
motivated by religious bias. Of those, just 9.3 percent fewer than 1 in 10 were
committed against Muslims. By contrast, 70.1 percent were committed against Jews, 6.9 percent were
Hate crimes driven by antiMuslim bigotry were outnumbered nearly 8 to 1 by anti-Semitic crimes. Year after
year, American Jews are far more likely to be the victims of religious hate crime than
members of any other group. That was true even in 2001, by far the worst year for
anti-Muslim incidents, when 481 were reported less than half of the 1,042 antiJewish crimes tabulated by the FBI the same year. Does all this mean that America is in
reality a hotbed of anti-Semitism? Would Times cover have been closer to the mark if it had asked: Is
America Judeophobic? Of course not. Even one hate crime is one too many, but in a
nation of 300 million, all of the religious-based hate crimes added together amount to
less than a drop in the bucket. This is not to minimize the 964 hate crimes perpetrated against Jews
aimed at Catholics or Protestants, and 8.6 percent targeted other religions.
last year, or those carried out against Muslims (128), Catholics (55), or Protestants (40). Some of those attacks were
especially shocking or destructive; all of them should be punished. But surely the most obvious takeaway from the
FBIs statistics is not that
are so frequent
are so rare.
(Robert, Robert Spencer is an American Author. he has published twelve books, including two
New York Times best-selling books. In 2003 he founded and has since directed Jihad Watch. He has also co-founded
Stop Islamization of America (SIOA) and the Freedom Defense Initiative with blogger Pamela Geller, with whom he
also co-authored a book, The Post-American Presidency: The Obama Administration's War on America. The Top
Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Hoaxes of 2014 The Counter Jihad Report. December 29.)
Cultural Center in Fresno was yet another in a long series of fake hate crimes designed to prop up the fiction that
geared towards the Islamic community, it was not geared to the Islamic faith or any of those things and was simply
to get back at a few people at the center who had belittled him and in his eyes bullied him. Dyer and other law
enforcement authorities were extremely unlikely to consider it as they investigated Khans crimes, but the Hamas-
on mosques. CAIR and other groups like it want and need hate crimes against Muslims, because they can use them
for political points and as weapons to intimidate people into remaining silent about the jihad threat.
This has
happened many times in 2014. Here are five of the most egregiously manipulative examples: 1. The
Saleh and Akbar viral video. In October, the Muslim bloggers Adam Saleh and Sheikh Akbar
released a video entitled Racial Profiling Experiment. It showed the duo in
Western clothing, coming to blows in front of an indifferent NYPD cop. In the
second part of the video, they pass by the same cop in Muslim garb, arguing
mildly only to be harassed and frisked by the same policeman. The video went viral. The
Huffington Post hysterically proclaimed that it offered a small glimpse into the ugly world of racial profiling.
badly at the Koran school. It has always hurt me. He also had tried to burn down two other mosques; it wasnt
reported whether or not he had been to Quran school and been treated badly in all three. But until he was
imam, Sheikh Husham Al-Husainy met with lawyers to discuss his proposal for a statute criminalizing the
desecration of holy books. We want all of the religions to cooperate with us, he declared, to bring respect to the
the name Singh here suggests that this young man is himself a Sikh. His Facebook page gives no sign that he cares
about much of anything but sports and babes, but apparently he does have some significant political concerns. If he
is a Sikh, this would by no means be the first time that Sikhs have served as useful idiots for the Islamic
supremacist victimhood posturing enterprise. Sikhs even stood with Hamas-linked CAIR to call for the allowance of
hijabs on an amusement park go-kart ride that had already seen one Muslima killed as her hijab was caught in the
They even staged a campaign, One Million Hijabs for Shaima Alawadi. Reza Aslan, the celebrated author of Zealot,
bashed out a sub-literate tweet blaming Pamela Geller and me for the murder: If a 32 year old veiled mother is a
terrorist than [sic] so am I you Islamophobic fucks Gellar [sic] Spencer et. [sic] al. Come find me. This tweet
indicated how much mileage the Islamophobia propaganda machine thought it could get from the Alawadi murder
in its efforts to intimidate people into thinking it wrong to oppose jihad terror.
hate crime. And since the mainstream media remains so uncritical about Muslim claims of having been
victimized, there will be many more in 2015.
(Kenan, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. I am a presenter of Analysis, BBC Radio 4's flagship
current affairs programme and a panelist on the Moral Maze. I used to present Nightwaves, BBC Radio 3's wonderful
arts and ideas programme. I have also written and presented a number of radio and TV documentaries including
Disunited Kingdom, Are Muslims Hated?, Islam, Mullahs and the Media, Skullduggery and Man, Beast and Politics.
My books include From Fatwa to Jihad (2009), Strange Fruit (2008), Man, Beast and Zombie (2000), and The
Meaning of Race (1996). I am currently writing a history of moral thought. The Islamophobia Myth KenanMalik
February.)
does Islamophobia really exist? Or is the hatred and abuse of Muslims being
exaggerated to suit politicians' needs and silence the critics of Islam? The trouble with Islamophobia is that it
But
is an irrational concept. It confuses hatred of, and discrimination against, Muslims on the one hand with criticism of
simply plucked out of the sky. There is disproportion in the treatment of Asians. Asians make up about 5 per cent of
the population, but 15 per cent of those stopped under the Terrorism Act. Could this be because of anti-Muslim
prejudice? Perhaps. It's more likely, however, to be the result of majority of anti-terror sweeps taking place in areas
- near Heathrow Airport, for instance - where there happen to be higher numbers of Asians. Almost two thirds of
terrorism stop and search operations took place in London, where Asians form 11 per cent of the population. The
claims of Islamophobia become even less credible if we look at all stop and
searches. Stop and searches under the Terrorism Act form only a tiny
proportion of the 900,000 stop and searches that took place last year. If there
was widespread Islamophobia within the police force we should expect to find Asians
in disproportionate numbers in the overall figures. We don't. Asians are stopped and searched
roughly in proportion to their population once age structure is taken into account. All these figures are in the public
domain and easily available. Yet not a single reputable journalist challenged the claim that Asians were being
disproportionately stopped and searched. So pervasive is the acceptance of
reporter at New York Times; 10/15/14, What Does Islamophobia Actually Mean?,
Atlantic; http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/is-islamophobiareal-maher-harris-aslan/381411/)
But is the term 'Islamophobia' itself, with its connotations of a
psychological disorder, an offensive word? Offensiveness is in the eye of the
beholder, said William Downes, a linguist with a focus on religion at York University
in Toronto. The key question is offensive to whom? The term might be
offensive if it reminded the Islamic community ... that there were those in
society who actively disliked it and feared it because they identify it with
a terrorist threat or an existential threat , he continued, noting that
using the word contributed to othering Muslims as a group . Richardson,
for his part, regrets employing the term in his 1997 Runnymede report and has
outlined eight problems with using 'Islamophobic' as a descriptor of an anti-Islamic
individual or activity. Characterizing someone as an Islamophobe, he says,
implies that they are "insane or irrational," which impedes constructive
dialogue, obscures the context-specific roots of the observed hostility,
and erroneously portrays anxiety about Muslims as a minority condition.
"All racism and bigotry is phobic in one sense or the other." The key phenomenon
to be addressed is arguably anti-Muslim hostility, namely hostility towards an ethnoreligious identity within western countries (including Russia), rather than hostility
towards the tenets or practices of a worldwide religion, Richardson writes. The
1997 Runnymede definition of Islamophobia was a shorthand way of referring to
dread or hatred of Islamand, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims. In
retrospect, it would have been as accurate, or arguably indeed more accurate, to
say a shorthand way of referring to fear or dislike of all or most Muslimsand,
therefore, dread or hatred of Islam.
1. Medically, phobia implies a severe mental illness of a kind that affects only a tiny
minority of people. Whatever else anxiety about Muslims may be, it is not
merely a mental illness and does not merely involve a small number of
people.
2. To accuse someone of being insane or irrational is to be abusive and, not
surprisingly, to make them defensive and defiant. Reflective dialogue with
them is then all but impossible.
3. To label someone with whom you disagree as irrational or insane is to
absolve yourself of the responsibility of trying to understand , both
intellectually and with empathy, why they think and act as they do, and of
seeking through engagement and argument to modify their perceptions
and understandings.
4. The concept of anxiety is arguably more useful in this context than the
concept of phobia. It is widely recognised that anxiety may not be (though
certainly may be) warranted by objective facts , for human beings can on
occasions perceive dangers that do not objectively exist, or anyway do not
exist to the extent that is imagined . Also it can sometimes be difficult to
identify, and therefore to name accurately, the real sources of an anxiety.
5. The use of the word Islamophobia on its own implies that hostility
towards Muslims is unrelated to, and basically dissimilar from, forms of hostility
such as racism, xenophobia, sectarianism, and such as hostility to socalled fundamentalism (Samuels 2006). Further, it may imply there is no
connection with issues of class, power, status and territory; or with issues
of military, political or economic competition and conflict.
6. The term implies there is no important difference between prejudice
towards Muslim communities within ones own country and prejudice
towards cultures and regimes elsewhere in the world where Muslims are
in the majority, and with which the West is in military conflict or economic
competition.
7. The term is inappropriate for describing opinions that are basically
anti-religion as distinct from anti-Islam . I am an Islamophobe, wrote the
journalist Polly Toynbee in reaction to the Runnymede 1997 report, adding I am
also a Christophobe. If Christianity were not such a spent force in this country, if it
were powerful and dominant as it once was, it would still be every bit as damaging
as Islam is in those theocratic states in its thrall If I lived in Israel, I'd feel the
same way about Judaism.
8. The key phenomenon to be addressed is arguably anti-Muslim hostility,
namely hostility towards an ethno-religious identity within western
countries (including Russia), rather than hostility towards the tenets or
practices of a worldwide religion. The 1997 Runnymede definition of
Islamophobia was a shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam and,
therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims. In retrospect, it would have been
without being read as terrible people. It prevents people from being able
to deal with their phobias in useful ways, whether by avoiding them or by
attempting to find treatment for them. It encourages people to hurt
themselves by entering painful situations and ignoring the pain, because the pain is
seen as a manifestation of their own personal failures. Using -phobia for
bigotry is an example of bigotry and is definitely oppressive. This becomes
especially a problem because occasionally oppression and phobias overlap. If you
spend your life shamed for expressing a personality trait or because of your mind,
and are constantly harassed and demeaned because of something about you, and
see people around you who exhibit said trait be harassed and treated as jokes or
disgusting or terrible people, you can quickly develop a phobia of said trait. But
then, when you have that reaction, everyone around you uses the words to describe
your reaction to describe the people who hate you. Whose oppression has caused
this reaction in the first place? You have panic attacks when you try to transition
because youve been bombarded by messages that trans people are terrible and
freaks. Only then, you cant talk about it. You cant say Oh hey I have a phobia of
being trans because transphobia isnt anxiety about stepping outside of prescribed
gender roles, its oppression of people who do that. Calling oppression of trans
people transphobia is likely to be oppressive to trans people. Fighting bigotry
with bigotry isnt just helping one group at the expense of another , its
hurting the group youre trying to help, and makes their oppressors
sympathetic. This is, understandably, problematic. Further, there are
relatively reasonable replacements for many common -phobia terms,
that often serve better to explain what the oppressive forces are. For
example, cissexism much more clearly encompasses all the manifestations of
oppression and erasure of transness, not merely the overt violence. Monosexism,
cissexism, and heterosexism are all words that much more clearly discuss how
erasure and normativizing one group at the expense of others is a problematic
element of society. (In addition, replacing phobia with -hate or bigotry can serve to allow discussion of specifically more overt violence ,
or in cases where there isnt such an obvious replacement term.)
***Coopteration CP***
1NC
The United States federal government should ban the use of
Muslim community outreach programs for surveillance
purposes; and it should establish an ongoing, impartial, and
transparent review of law enforcements surveillance of
Muslim communities.
Distinguishing between these two forms of engagement
creates cooperation between law enforcement and muslim
communities and makes counter terrorism more effective
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2014
(September 2014Federal Civil Rights Engagement with Arab and Muslim American
Communities, http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ARAB_MUSLIM_9-30-14.pdf, accessed
7/9/2015 JCP PB @ GDI)
In its examination, the Commission found that [t]here are two trends in
addressing major civil rights and national security challenges: the
suspect trend of engagement which encourages aggressive intelligence
and surveillance activities; and the partnership trend of engagement
where local communities have developed strong relationships with law
enforcement agencies and local government agencies. 1 The goals of constructive
partnership engagement and aggressive intelligence gathering are prone to work at cross purposes. As the
of the governments actions not only deepened mistrust, but became flagrant violations of the civil rights of Arab
large-scale profiling by Customs and Border Patrol, the Transportation Safety Administration and the [FBI]. 4 The
Commission found that the federal government has maintained secret watch lists.5 Also of concern is the fact that
[t]raining materials used by the FBI post-9/11 undermined their relationship with (and were harmful to) the Arab
and Muslim American communities due to incorrect and discriminatory content. The FBIs initial denial of the
It is well
past time for all involved federal agencies to countenance any violations
of the civil rights of Arab and Muslim Americans. To the extent that
ongoing engagement with these communities is important for purposes of
legitimate information-gathering, it should be carried out through as much
constructive engagement as is feasible. This engagement must respect to
the fullest extent possible the distinction between the suspect trend of
engagement and the partnership trend of engagement . A solid example of an agency
materials existence, and later refusal to reveal the content, further lowered the communities trust.6
which has done so is the U.S. Department of Justices (DOJ) Civil Rights Division (CRD).
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),
"Muslim Americans and US Law Enforcement: Not Enemies, But Vital Partners," The
Christian Science Monitor, December 30th 2009
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1230/Muslim-Americans-andUS-law-enforcement-not-enemies-but-vital-partners)
three involved the questionable use of FBI informants, one case involved a man going on a violent
rampage, and another involved youth seeking violent adventures abroad. Yet, at a time when
terrorism remains a challenge to US national security, these events feed into the false and
communities are less willing to talk to law enforcement and we need all
the help we can get from Muslim Americans. After years of building trust with local law
enforcement, the Pakistani community in Lodi, Calif., is trying repair relations that were tattered by the
highly questionable use of an FBI informant in a counterterrorism investigation just after Sept. 11.
Muslims themselves have helped authorities in two recent cases . The Virginia men in
Pakistan were detained and the Detroit-bound airline bomber was flagged because
2NC Transparency
The Muslim community distrusts the police now due to
surveillance and informants and only independent
investigations restore that trust
Aleef, attorney specializing in criminal justice policy, 2015
(Junaid, former executive director of the Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater
Chicago, and a Truman National Security Project Political Partner, Why Independent
Investigations Promote Trust Between Communities and Law Enforcement,
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/altmuslim/2015/03/why-independent-investigationspromote-trust-between-communities-and-law-enforcement/, accessed 7/4/2015 JCP
PB @ GDI)
The African American community is not alone when it comes to having a strained relationship with law enforcement.
The
national Countering Violent Extremism program is predicated on a
collaboration between law enforcement and the community. Until those
cases of questionable conduct by the FBI with regard to its use of
confidential informants and unlawful surveillance are properly addressed,
the community will remain hesitant, and the CVE effort will falter . And as
(Cleveland) at the hands of law enforcement still need to be investigated by independent authorities.
mentioned above, the British government needs to conduct an independent investigation into MI5s conduct with
and MI5 officers have difficult and dangerous jobs, but their work can be made easier and safer when they have the
They contain significant loopholes, and based on recent incidents in Seattle9 and Minnesota, 10 they do not appear
to have had much effect. The FBI reportedly revised the policy in 2013,11 a copy of which the Brennan Center has
DUBLIN, Ohio -- In this central Ohio town, parents and community leaders are expressing growing fears
that their
Security Secretary Jeh Johnson showed up recently at the Noor Islamic Cultural Center here to offer a
sympathetic ear and federal assistance, he faced a litany of grievances from a group of mostly Muslim
leaders and advocates. They complained of humiliating border inspections by brusque federal agents,
F.B.I. sting operations that wrongly targeted Muslim citizens as terrorists and a foreign policy that leaves
President Bashar al-Assad of Syria in place as a magnet for extremists.
built on trust, but the U.S. government hasn't given us very many reasons
to build up that trust,''
said Omar Saqr, 25, the cultural center's youth coordinator. As the
the Obama
administration is redoubling its efforts to stanch the flow of radicalized
young Muslim Americans traveling to Syria to join the fight and
potentially returning as well-trained militants to carry out attacks here .
United States carries out yet another bombing campaign across two Islamic countries,
American law enforcement and intelligence officials say more than 100 Americans have gone to Syria, or
tried to so far. That number of Americans seeking to join militants, while still small, was never seen
during the two major wars fought in Afghanistan and Iraq after the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The
threat of homegrown radicals like the Boston Marathon bombers has prompted the F.B.I., the
Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies to try to forge ties with community
leaders and police departments as a front line in the war against a sophisticated online propaganda
and recruiting effort mounted by the Islamic State. But as administration officials attempt to
accelerate their own lobbying campaign, they have found that
--
that case, who were characterized by the U.S. Department of Justice as a sleeper cell waiting for the word to put
might have attacked except for the fact that the local
Muslim community passed crucial information to the FBI that prompted
their investigation. And the Lackawanna case does not stand alone. For example, in the Toledo terrorism
their deadly agenda into action,
case mentioned by FBI Director Robert Mueller in his 2006 speech in Cleveland,31 the Muslim community played
the same kind of critical role. When the FBI announced the indictments of the three individuals in Toledo, Ted Wasky,
the FBIs Special Agent in Charge of the Cleveland field office, explicitly acknowledged the help of Toledos
Muslims.32 Wasky praised the extensive and essential cooperation of members of the local Muslim community in
most credit, Wasky said. The ability to prevent another terrorist attack cannot be won without the support that the
building for at least twenty years, on the basic principles, goals, and benefits of community policing.35 Law
enforcement almost everywhere acknowledges that police efforts alone cannot make cities and towns safe from
That type of partnership requires sustained effort by both the police and communities to build trust through
establishing relationships and networks with each other, to develop a track record of joint efforts toward common
if we
believe that potential terrorists lurk in our Muslim communities, we must
have good communications with them. This requires relationships built on
trustjust like everything else in community policing .
goals, and to respect each other as real partners.38 The lessons for our antiterrorism efforts seem clear:
Report outlines a comprehensive strategy for the U.S. to enhance international security by improving relations with
key Muslim countries and communities. The strategy reflects the consensus of 34 American leaders, including 11
Muslim Americans, in the fields of foreign and defense policy, politics, business, religion, education, public opinion,
psychology, philanthropy, and conflict resolution. We come from different walks of life, faiths, political perspectives,
and professional disciplines. Our shared goal is to develop and work to implement a wise, widely supportable
strategy to make the U.S. and the world safer by responding to the primary causes of tension between the U.S. and
Muslims around the world. We believe that a strategy that builds on shared and complementary interests with
Muslims in many countries is feasible, desirable, and consistent with core American values. The central message of
institutions, but we can succeed only if counterparts in Muslim majority countries and communities also take
responsibility for addressing key challenges: reducing extremism, resolving political and sectarian conflicts, holding
governments accountable, creating more vibrant economies, correcting misconceptions, and engaging in dialogue
to build mutual respect and understanding.
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, has one proposal: he has renewed calls for
increased surveillance of all Muslim communities. King asserts that this is the same practice used against
Irish and Italian gangsters involved in organized crime. But that is simply not the case.
Monitoring
Moreover,
of common concern. Partnerships have already been piloted in domestic counterterrorism efforts, and have been
used for years in cities like Dearborn, Los Angeles, and London. And beyond the counterterrorism context,
partnerships have achieved success in reducing gang violence in cities like Boston and Glasgow, and drugs sales in
places like High Point, North Carolina. It is by relying on common sense that the national security infrastructure can
be expanded to address some of its current limitations. It is true that not all terrorist acts in the United States can
incorporating voluntary, partnershipbased community intelligence gathering practices into our national
security infrastructure, we can improve our chances of preventing some
attacks.
be avoided, and unfortunately more will succeed. But by
Many argue that tactics like recruiting informants through immigration law and surveilling mosques are necessary
to prevent terrorist attacks, and that national security must be the nation's top priority, whatever the cost. These
creates an elaborate terrorism plot for the surveillance targets to participate in. n100 After 9/11, many individuals
who showed no signs of violence or extremism prior to involvement with informants and government-created plots
have been prosecuted under terrorism charges. n101 Until the informants provided the means, these individuals did
not have the finances or the proper connections to conceive and carry out these terrorism plans. Although
orchestrating these plots makes the FBI's preventative stance appear successful in the public eye, it diverts law
enforcement resources from focusing on real targets . Moreover, Professor David A. Harris claims that "the
unregulated use of informants in mosques and other religious and cultural settings can also do great damage
prosecutions where a terrorist attack plan actually existed prior to informant involvement, community members
since
9/11, community members have assisted law enforcement in stopping
potential terrorism plots in a number of cases. n105 A [*252] recent example, the case of
who had noticed something amiss were the first to alert the FBI and identify the subjects. n104 In fact,
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the "Underwear Bomber," shows that the attempted bombing could have been
prevented had law enforcement heeded the warnings that Abdulmutallab's father gave the CIA at the U.S. embassy
in Nigeria. n106 As the president of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and former criminal prosecutor, David
Chiu testified regarding the Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian communities in San Francisco:
A U.S. Muslim leader who addressed 500 agents during a recent training seminar at the FBI Academy in Virginia
the relationship between his constituents and the FBI isnt perfect, but
its never been better. Its a very healthy relationship, said Nawar Shora of the American-Arab Antisaid
Discrimination Committee, the largest Arab-American civil rights group in the U.S. We may not always agree, but
both sides know that we need to be sitting at the table having that
dialogue. The dialogue began in earnest in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The FBIs Washington field office
helped create an advisory council of Arab, Muslim, and Sikh leaders to improve relations with communities that
might be helpful in the search for intelligence. Shoras group, meanwhile, formed a Law Enforcement Outreach
Program in early 2002 to ensure the lines of communication with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies were
wired for two-way conversations. The effect has been a slow build-up of trust through casual gatherings, periodic
meetings, and training seminars for agents like the event at the FBI Academy earlier this month. This
is an
area where we need to develop better relationships, said Joseph Persichini Jr., acting
assistant director in charge of the Washington field office, the second largest of 56 field offices in the U.S. We
must maintain a robust intelligence gathering mechanism. If we dont
have an understanding of the communities that we serve, how can we do
that? To that end, Persichini has Muslim leaders on his speed-dial and recently began requiring all new agents
in his field office to meet with community leaders and visit area mosques. Whats important here is were going to
their community and meeting their community. Its not them coming to us, Persichini said.
public approval of their existence, actions, and behaviour, and their ability to
secure and maintain public respect. 4 To recognize always that to secure and
maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing
of willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of
laws. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the
historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police
(Myhill, 2006, p. 3) It is evident from these statements that Peel placed value on
maintaining a positive relationship built between the police and the public they
serve. A modern iteration of Peels philosophy in the United States and the
United Kingdom can be found in the practice of community policing,
which may be seen as a return to the foundations of the police role Peel outlined
early in the 19th century (Myhill, 2006; Peak, Bradshaw, & Glensor, 1992). Just what
constitutes community policing? Vito, Walsh, and Kunselman (2004) suggest that:
From its title, community policing infers a partnership between the police
and the people they serve. This partnership is designed to improve the quality of
life in the community through the introduction of strategies designed to enhance
neighborhood solidarity and safety. It is expected that the police and citizens of the
community will work together to address issues of crime and social disorganization.
(p. 2) Much like Peel approximately 175 years earlier, these modern authors
emphasize the relationship maintained between the public and the police.
In the most basic sense, community policing is therefore essentially any effort
designed to bring together the public and the police, in which this
togetherness is understood as a shared understanding of problems
that require attention, as well as some degree of joint responsibility in
undertakings to deal with those problems (Mastrofski, 1993, p. 65). The emphasis
on themes such as partnership, collaboration, and 5 relationships are foundational
aspects of the human side of community policing, included in nearly every
explanation of the topic (Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998; Ren, Cao, Lovrich, & Gaffney,
2005; Vito, Walsh, & Kunselman, 2004), and the importance of this interpersonal
side of community policing is therefore difficult to overstate. It is clear that
community policing simply cannot take place without efforts in which the
public and police depend on the relationships built between one another.
Indeed, Ren, Cao, Lovrich, and Gaffney point out that the desire to
improve the relationship between the public and the police since the
1970s was perhaps one of the greatest driving forces behind the
movement toward community policing (2005, p. 56). The particular type of
community policing activity may vary widely (community problem-solving meetings,
neighborhood watches, joint crime prevention efforts, etc.), but in the end, it is the
relational aspect which is emphasized so often as a cornerstone of the
community policing philosophy, without which community policing, by
definition, would not exist. As Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller point out
Almost any activity that increases face-to-face interactions with the public and
builds relationship with the community may qualify as a form of community
policing (2006, p. 6)
9/11, https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/law-enforcement-andintelligence-gathering-in-muslim-and-immigrant-communities-after-911-harris.pdf)
Using informants in Muslim religious and cultural contexts too frequently
and casually damages the FBIs critical and generally successful efforts to
build partnerships with Muslim and Arab American communities. It will
cause lasting damage to efforts to bring Muslim communities and law
enforcement together to build a common cause against extremism, and it
will harm efforts to obtain intelligence from these communities through
carefully-built cooperative relationships established in the last five years.
The reaction of Muslim communities to news of the involvement of informants in
terrorism cases has, in fact, seemed especially sharp precisely because it comes
against a background of police and community efforts to engage in purposeful
cooperation. When Muslims learn that the government has used informants,
members of these communities feel used and betrayednot partners of
law enforcement, but suspects, each and every one.23 We can ill afford to
damage the possibility that these partnerships can serve as sources of information;
they remain our bestperhaps our onlyhope for obtaining the intelligence we
need to head off the damage of actual terrorist attacks in the future. Constructing
these law enforcement/community partnerships requires great efforts to
build trust;24 as a result, when the use of informants has come to light, the
community perceives this as a betrayal of that trust. As it now stands, the law
provides virtually no legal protection against the use of government
informants. The Fourth Amendment imposes no standards for, and does
not require any judicial oversight of, police use of informants.25 Neither
substantive criminal law defenses26 nor civil actions27 hold any promise of
restraining this type of government activity. Therefore, we find ourselves at a
sensitive crossroads. On the one hand, we cannot wholly discount the possibility
that very small groups of terrorists in our country may attempt to do catastrophic
damage. And it remains at least possible that infiltration of these groups by
informants could prevent a disaster. On the other hand, the unregulated use of
informants in mosques and other religious and cultural settings can also
do great damage because it poses the risk of cutting off our best possible
source of intelligence: the voluntary, cooperative relationships that have
developed between law enforcement and Muslim communities.
terror has multiple forms (original italics) and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of global
communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement of living
conditions, and the political taming of unbounded capitalism, but also in the telos of mutual understanding.
Only through this telos with its strong normative bias towards nonviolence (p. 43) can a universal condition of
peace and justice transform the globe. In other words, the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting
around an un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President Obama,
and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate
norms of transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish a
In the end, uncoerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how
it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate
critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under the guise
of soi-disant cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes
the human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the
cosmos and each other (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya. In
analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way
that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a
secularism that might create an enduring architecture of basic shared values (p. 46).
struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean
Booth further
maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is
something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as
university international relations departments are not now, it would seem,
struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy,
identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the
notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly
manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to other minority communities and create a politics
of fear.
fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert that orthodox analysts
rarely bother to interview or engage with those involved in 'terrorist' activity (p. 2) or spend any time on the
ground in the areas most affected by conflict (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the
ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of Meibion
Glyndwr who would as a matter of principle avoid pob sais like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot
terrorism research, namely, an inability to engage with the particular dynamics of the political world (p. 70).
Analogously, Stohl claims that the US and English [sic] media exhibit a tendency
to psychologize terrorist acts, which reduces structural and political
problems into issues of individual pathology (p. 7). Preoccupied with this
problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts
have lost the capacity to reflect on both their practice and their research
ethics.
sciences, is such an understanding dependent upon our own commitment or independent of it? Strauss explains,
if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my
capacity as a social scientist. In that latter capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the
perception and appreciation of all commitments or value systems. I go through the process of empathetic
understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic
It is
also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open
society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy
with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist's explicit
loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures
this constituting fact.
understanding. This means, however, that such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic.5
1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, Understanding Terrorism). Some of those scholars most associated with the critique
of empiricism implied in Orthodox Terrorism Studies have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the
terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly,
***Terrorism DA***
1NC Terrorism DA
Surveillance of Muslim communities is necessary to prevent
domestic terrorist attacks
Barkan 15
(Ross, Ross Barkan is a senior political reporter at The New York Observer and working in City Hall.
Congressman Says French Hostage Siege Shows Why Muslim Surveillance Is Necessary. The New York Observer.
Jan, 09.)
France
said the NYPD has been demoralized in recent years by the New York Times, the Associated Press and lawsuits
basically saying the surveillance they were doing into these Muslim communities is illegal, its unconstitutional. I
certainly believe it was not and its been one of the reasons why weve been able to
hold off any major attacks in New York, he added. While critics of the NYPDs Muslim
surveillance program argued it amounted to unnecessary racial profiling, Mr. King, a longtime proponent of the
program, said it was important. Im not talking about illegal wiretapping or breaking into peoples homes but to
NYPD, they are the best. Theres nobody in the country or the world who I think is better at monitoring and
responding, Mr. King said. Now, theyve had a rough time over the last few years, because of whether its the
media or whether its Mayor Bill de Blasio and his campaign or theyre talking about how this is profiling and how
terrible isthe fact is this has worked.
the lessons learned on that one particular day, first responder agencies have been the recipients of a major influx in
federal funding. The intended use of these grants is to enhance and increase the capability and expertise of illequipped organizations to res pond to such events. For example, in 2004 alone, the FDNY had completed training
for 46 technically enhanced and specialized hazardous materials units in preparation for a potential WMD attack. 41
Additionally, new equipment, including a state-of-the-art mobile command center and chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-rated self-contained breathing apparatus, has been introduced to further augment
the Department s ability to operate at these incidents effectively and safely. Surprisingly, John V. Parachini, a no
table policy analyst at RAND, seemingly disagrees with the formula of increasing spending for first responder WMD
preparedness at the expense of law enforcement, intelligence, border patrol, diplomacy and military action. 42 In an
attempt to dispel this line of reasoning one may ask, How likely is it that a WMD attack will occur in NYC? In
building his WMD argument Parachini states, More than anything else...the mindset of leadership, opportunity and
technical capacity are the factors that most significantly influence a [terrorist] groups propensity to seek, to
acquire and to use unconventional weapons. 43 In his analysis of each fact or he primarily takes a stand against
the eventuality of a WM D attack, claiming that historically there exists no proof of relative success. However,
Parachinis effort pre-dates the recent public announcement by a former Central Intelligence Agency officer of the
2003 fatwa, issued by the well- known Islamic cleric Sheik Nasir bin Ha mid al Fahd, permitting the use WMD as a
means of attack. 44 Hence, it would be imprudent to disregard the obsessive mindset of the al-Qaeda leadership
evident in this important religious ruling. Recent data obtained from military operations in Afghanistan supports the
popular belief that al-Qaeda has persistently tried to acquire materials for the development of biological and
outlining the catastrophic effects of this easily improvised homemade device. In assessing the realistic threat of a
WMD terrorist attack, Parachini gets it right when he states, Al-Qaeda...continues to be interested in [WMD] but is
also willing and able to conduct significant, multiple, and near simultaneous attacks with conventional means. 48
Extinction
Barrett, Carnegie Mellon Engineering and Public Policy PhD, 2013
(Anthony, Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between
the United States and Russia, Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for
Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2,
Taylor & Francis)
War involving
the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the
largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely
reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization
worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could
significant fractions of
occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and
inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to
maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes
without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate
information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is
under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies
incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise
accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of
subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the
other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides development of capabilities to detect a
first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that
with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of EastWest nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war
between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and
Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in
including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded
could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14
It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.Russian
crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.Russian
We face a much greater recurring threat from lone offenders and possibly
loose networks of individuals. Of the eleven attacks in the West since last
May, ten were conducted by individual violent extremists. Two occurred in the U.S.
one in September, and another in October. The majority of these NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 2015
lone offender attacks more closely resemble the size, scale, and sophistication of random acts of violence than they
do the destructiveness of the organized and well-developed plots that we witnessed in the years after September
None of this,
however, seems to have dented al Qaedas determination. Always
resilient, it has morphed to exploit new opportunities in North Africa and
the Middle East. Al Qaedas affiliates current presumed operational
capabilities are sufficiently lethal and their supposed geographic range is
extensive enough to make the U.S. government close 19 diplomatic offices
international co-operation have made the terrorists operating environment more hostile.
on the strength of reports indicating a terrorist threat. Although the closures took
place while these proceedings were being reviewed and edited, they reflect assessments that were in place at the
Al Qaeda is more
decentralized, more dependent on its affiliates and allies, and reliant on
its ability to inspire homegrown recruits to carry out terrorist attacks. It is
still unquestionably a dangerous organization, but its ability to launch a
9/11-scale spectacular has been substantially lessened, if not eliminated . Al
Qaedas international plotting persists, but fewer of the plots are core-connected . Al Qaeda affiliates
and homegrown terrorist plots now constitute a bigger part of the threat.
While al Qaeda remains committed to ambitious strategic attacks, it also has embraced do-ityourself terrorism, exhorting followers to do whatever they can,
wherever they are. Thus far, however, its efforts to mobilize homegrown terrorists have achieved only
time of the conference. Todays threat environment is more diffuse.
limited success.
Moreover, in the years since 2001, the attacks of Sept ember 11 stand out as both the hallmark al - Qaeda attack as
well as the singular exception. Bali [2002], Casablanca [2003], Madrid [2004], and London [2005] all fit a different
The individuals who conducted the attacks were for the most part
all citizens or residents of the states in which the attacks occurred. Although a
paradigm.
few may have received training in al - Qaeda camps, the great majority did not. While al - Qaeda claimed
responsibility for each attack after the fact, these attacks were not under the command and control of al - Qaeda
central, nor were they specifically funded by al - Qaeda central. Rather ,
comparatively secular Muslim countries such as in Pakistan; restive, youthful populations that feel estranged from
the state such as in Saudi Arabia; and prison populations, which, by definition, are home to the socially isolated and
the probability of their involvement in the terrorist network. People who email, talk on the phone, or intentionally
SNA can
help law enforcement identify and then surveil the inner circle. Because
acquaintances can also play a critical role in the network, greater data-mining power and
accuracy need to be developed to expose these weak ties without undue
meet with terrorists or their close friends are statistically more likely to be complicit. In this way,
infringements on civil liberties.137 Demand-side strategies should focus on divesting terrorism's social utility, in two
exchange for actionable intelligence against their fellow Brigatisti, the Italian government infiltrated the Red
Brigades, bred mistrust and resentment among the members, and quickly rolled up the organization.138 Similar
deals should be cut with al-Qaida in cases where detainees' prior involvement in terrorism and their likelihood of
counterterrorism strategies must reduce the demand for at-risk populations to turn to terrorist organizations in the
first place. To lessen Muslims' sense of alienation from democratic societies, these societies must improve their
records of cracking down on bigotry, supporting hate-crime legislation, and most crucially, encouraging moderate
places of worshipan important alternative for dislocated youth to develop strong affective ties with politically
moderate peers and mentors. In authoritarian countries, an abrupt transition to democracy risks empowering
extremists.139 These regimes must, however, permit the development of civil society to provide opportunities for
the socially disenfranchised to bond in peaceful voluntary associations. Counterterrorism operations must also
redouble their efforts to minimize collateral damage, which invariably creates dislocation, social isolation, and calls
for revenge. Such policies will help reduce the incentive and therefore incidence of terrorism by diminishing its
social benefits, which are what its practitioners apparently value most.
Five of those plots were carried out before law enforcement was able to
intervene.
Fifty-three of the cases almost 72 percent happened after April 2009.
That's a 152 percent increase over that time period and constitutes a
spike, according to the report by the service, an agency that works exclusively for the U.S. Congress, providing
policy and legal analysis to committees and members of the House and Senate.
Terrorism Task Forces are extremely effective, but they are case-oriented, and
investigation differs from intelligence. The fusion centers are venues for sharing
information and have diverse responsibilities, but few collect intelligence.
Carolina at Chapel Hill who specializes in Middle East and Islamic studies, MuslimAmerican Terrorism in 2013, February 5, 2014,
http://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/06/Kurzman_MuslimAmerican_Terrorism_in_2013.pdf)
Of the violent plots that were disrupted, most (7 of 12 individuals) were
discovered through the suspects own statements. Two of these involved
statements to informants at mosques. 9 Another two individuals (Shelton
Thomas Bell and a minor whose name was not released) appear to have been
brought to the attention of law enforcement authorities by fellow mosque - goers
who were concerned about their extremist comments. 10 Another individual
bragged on Facebook about militant activities in Syria (Eric Harroun), and another
two alerted law enforcement by contacting fake Syrian rebel web pages operated by
the FBI (Basit Sheikh and Abdella Tounisi ). Since 9/11, 54 Muslim - American
terrorism suspects and perpetrators were brought to the attention of law
enforcement by members of the Muslim - American community, out of 188
individuals where the initial tip was made public. Another 52 individuals
were discovered through U.S. government investigations .
radicalization process that lone wolves go through prior to their attacks. Insight
into these processes may provide investigators with a sort of detection
system, or signaturesas minimal as they may appearthat an individual with a
terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Such signatures include
the combining of personal and political grievances, broadcasting of
terrorist intent, an affinity with online sympathizers/or extremist groups,
the reliance on enablers, and triggering events. When fused with
intelligence assembled by area specialists (religious scholars, psychologists,
communications experts, explosive specialists and the like), these signatures could identify
indicators of how lone wolf attacks are formulated. Equally important,
investigators must have an understanding of counterterrorism efforts that
have proven successful in the past, and the extent to which these
successes have derived from an operational understanding of the
radicalization process.
potential pitfalls. In fact, had the Internet been accessible during Kaczynski's reign of terror, he probably would have
later his brother turned him in after reading the manifesto in a newspaper would have likely occurred once his
brother read it online. Subsequent attacks may have therefore been prevented.
Another lesson learned from the study of lone-wolf terrorists is that lone wolves are not as crazy as many people
assume. While some are mentally ill, such as Kaczynski and Kurbegovic, and others have psychological problems,
such as Breivik, many are not "abnormal' in the psychological sense, such as Rudolph and Choudhry. While some
lone wolves combine personal grievances and problems with a political or religious cause to justify their violence,
It is also a
myth that little can be done to preventlone-wolf terrorism. In addition to
monitoring the Internet, other measures can be taken to reduce the risk of
lone-wolf attacks. These include the continual development of devices to
identify package bombs or letters containing anthrax spores; the expansion of closedcircuit television cameras in public settings; and further advances in
biometrics, including the use of gait analysis, which can determine if a person is carrying a bomb, and facialmany others are as dedicated to the issues for which they are fighting as are "regular" terrorists.
expression analysis, which can predict hostile intent. In addition, there is the obvious, but usually ignored, public
responsibility to report unattended packages at airports, bus terminals, shopping malls and other possible targets.
We don't yet know how long the bags containing the bombs were left unattended at the Boston Marathon's finish
line, but there might have been enough time for somebody to notify the police and begin moving people away from
danger.
Homeland Security Science and Technology Chair at the Center for Technology and
National Security Policy (CTNSP), Samuel Bendett is a Research Associate with the
CTNSP Homeland Security Team, National Defense University. His previous work
encompassed security and foreign policy issues at the U.S. Congress and a range of
private and non-profit consulting companies, Islamic Radicalization in the United
States New Trends and a Proposed Methodology for Disruption, September 2010,
http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2013/07/DTP-077.pdf)
It is, therefore, essential to assess the emerging trends in domestic radicalization and treat this menace not just as
institutions of our democracy were unable to protect us from our enemies, we might go even further, taking the law
into our own hands. We have a history of lynching in this country, and by the time fear and paranoia settled deep in
our bones, we might repeat the worst episodes from our past, killing our former neighbors, our onetime
friends. That is what defeat in a war on terror looks like. We would survive, but we would
no longer recognize ourselves. We would endure, but we would lose our identity as free peoples. Alarmist? Consider
where we stand after two years of a war on terror. We are told that Al Qaeda's top leadership has been decimated
by detention and assassination. True enough, but as recently as last month bin Laden was still sending the
Europeans quaint invitations to surrender. Even if Al Qaeda no longer has command and control of its terrorist
network, that may not hinder its cause. After 9/11, Islamic terrorism may have metastasized into a cancer of
independent terrorist cells that, while claiming inspiration from Al Qaeda, no longer require its direction, finance or
advice. These cells have given us Madrid. Before that, they gave us Istanbul, and before that, Bali. There is no
shortage of safe places in which they can grow. Where terrorists need covert support, there are Muslim
communities, in the diasporas of Europe and North America, that will turn a blind eye to their presence. If they need
raw recruits, the Arab rage that makes for martyrs is still incandescent. Palestine is in a state of permanent
insurrection. Iraq is in a state of barely subdued civil war. Some of the Bush administration's policies, like telling
anyone who
says "Relax, more people are killed in road accidents than are killed in
terrorist attacks" is playing games. The conspiracy theorists who claim the
government is manufacturing the threat in order to foist secret government upon us ought
to wise up. Anyone who doesn't take seriously a second major attack on
the United States just isn't being serious. In the Spanish elections in March, we may have
Ariel Sharon he can keep settlements on the West Bank, may only be fanning the flames. So
had a portent of what's ahead: a terrorist gang trying to intimidate voters into altering the result of a democratic
election. We can confidently expect that terrorists will attempt to tamper with our election in November.
Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, said in a recent television interview that the Bush administration is
concerned that terrorists will see the approaching presidential election as "too good to pass up."
Thinking the
worst is not defeatist. It is the best way to avoid defeat . Nor is it defeatist to concede
that terror can never be entirely vanquished. Terrorists will continue to threaten democratic politics wherever
oppressed or marginalized groups believe their cause justifies violence. But we can certainly deny them victory. We
can continue to live without fear inside free institutions. To do so, however, we need to change the way we think, to
step outside the confines of our cozy conservative and liberal boxes.
by scattering the
radioactive material, it has the effect of contaminating an area. The extent of
enough radiation to kill people immediately or cause severe illnesses. However,
local contamination depends on several factors, including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of
radioactive material used, and weather conditions. While there could be an increase in the cancer risk among those
exposed to radiation from a dirty bomb, the more significant effect of a dirty bomb could be the closing of
applied in multiple quantities and layouts, could generate explosions of varying sizes, and different types and
quantities of radioactive material would contaminate an area to different degrees. These designs could typically
the Irish Republican Army, law enforcement considers white males with brogue accents. In each of these examples,
Arabs or Muslims. Of course, the FBI and Justice Department did not investigate all whites. Instead, they
investigated white supremacist groups in the South. In determining whom to investigate, they obviously considered
the race of the suspected domestic terrorists. As this example shows, political conservatives and honest liberals
should in fact be able to agree that profiling is a useful tool in threatening crime and terrorism.14 Defending
terrorist profiling should not be misconstrued as a suggestion that race alone justifies investigating somebody for a
crime. Suggesting someone is guilty of something solely because of race is immoral, wrong, and should be
Terrorists have local support, and the fact of the matter is that
Arab, Muslim individuals are one of the few demographics that
consistently show a small, yet notable trend towards violent
terrorism
Smith 3 (Mark W. Smith currently works as a trial attorney in private practice in
New York City. He serves as the Vice President of the New York Chapter of the
Federalist Society, and serves as National Co-Chairman of the Lawyers Divisions
Subcommittee on the Second Amendment, CIVIL RIGHTS IN DEFENSE OF COMMON
SENSE: THE CASE FOR TERRORIST (NOT RACIAL) PROFILING, 2003,
20080221_CivilRightsSmith.pdf)
In the real world, the United States is at war with the Arab terrorists who killed
thousands of people on September 11, 2001. In the real world, these
terrorists have followers and supporters right here in the United States.17
The search for bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and Daniel Pearls murderers18 show that we still lack necessary
information about the terrorists who seek to destroy the United States in terms of where, or how, to find them.
Thus,
should we really ignore those few facts that we do know about these
terrorist threats, i.e., that they consist predominantly of Muslim
fundamentalists of Arab descent who are males?
To illustrate, consider the following:
In 1983, the United States Marine barracks in Beirut was blown up, killing
243 United States Marines. By whom?
In 1985, the Achille Lauro cruise ship was hijacked and an elderly
wheelchair-bound American was murdered. By whom?
In 1988, Pan Am flight 103 was bombed killing 270 innocent people. By
whom?
In 1993, the World Trade Center was bombed. By whom?
In 1995, the U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia were bombed killing
292 people. By whom?
In 1997, American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed killing
243 people and injuring over 5000. By whom?
In 2000, the naval ship USS Cole was bombed killing 17 American sailors.
By whom?
And on September 11, 2001, four airliners were hijacked, turned into
missiles, aimed at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,27 and used
to kill 3000 people. By whom?
These acts were committed by Arab males who were Muslim extremists ,
mostly between the ages of 17 and 40.28 Should our nations law enforcement
officers be asked to ignore these undeniable facts and this undeniable history when
attempting to thwart terrorist attacks and save innocent lives? The correct answer
and the answer supported by the majority of Americans is that these facts
should be considered.29
Foreign Relations and the author of Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military
Operations in the Post-Cold War World. He writes regularly at Politics, Power, and
Preventative Action. CIA Director: Were Winning The War On Terror, But It Will
Never End Mentions within the article Joe Brennan, a CIA director. 7/5/15 L.C.)
If I look across the board in terms of since 9/11 at terrorist organizations,
and if the United States in all of its various forms. In intelligence, military,
homeland security, law enforcement, diplomacy. If we were not as
engaged against the terrorists, I think we would be facing a horrendous,
horrendous environment. Because they would have taken full advantage of the opportunities that
they have had across the region. We have worked collectively as a government but
also with our international partners very hard to try and root many of
them out. Might some of these actions be stimulants to others joining their ranks? Sure, thats a possibility. I
think, though it has taken off of the battlefield a lot more terrorists, than it has put on. This statement is impossible
to evaluate or measure because the U.S. government has consistently refused to state publicly which terrorist
organizations are deemed combatants, and can therefore be taken out on the battlefield. However, relying upon
the State Departments annual Country Reports on Terrorism,the estimated strength of all al-Qaeda-affiliated
groups has grown or stayed the same since President Obama came into office. Of course, non-al-Qaeda-affiliated
groups have arisen since 9/11, including the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which the Central Intelligence
Agency estimated last September to contain up to 31,500 fighters, and Boko Haram, which has
perhaps 10,000 committed members. However, the most interesting question posed to Brennan came at the very
end from a Harvard freshman who identified himself as Julian: Weve been fighting the war on terror since 2001. Is
there an end in sight, or should we get used to this new state of existence? Brennan replied :
There is evil in the world and some people just want to kill for the sake of killingThis is something that, whether
its from this group right now or another group, I think the ability to cause damage and violence and kill will be with
us for many years to come. We just have to not kill our way out of this because thats not going to address it. We
terrorist, or a lack of governance, but they certainly do allow these terrorist organizations to grow and they take full
as long as lethal technologies and mass communication remain available to evil people.
we have
must also be prepared to meet the inescapable demands to surge . We
have to have the agility and the flexibility to surge without hollowing out
the hard target operations that must remain our principal focus. To meet these
means we will have to mount increasingly complex and expensive operations. At the same time,
challenges, we will rebuild our field strength. Over the next few years, we will increase the number of our
operations officers. We will augment existing stations and increase the number of our stations and bases. And we
will see to it that they have the communications infrastructure they need to support their operations .
At the
core, our success depends on our people. We will establish a recruitment
program that parallels the very best in private industry. We will bring the
best and the brightest people into CIA day after day, month after month and prove we have a
mission and system of rewards in place to give them the incentive to stay.
Fulbright scholar to the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and author of "The National
Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How they Shape our Present and
Future," among other books. 10 Reasons the War on Terror Must Continue- Saying
that the War on Terror can end is naive and misguided. June 18, 2013, L.C. 7/3/15)
Terrorism is a world wide network. The only way to measure the War on Terror is to
do so worldwide, whether it is Sunni extremist and Shiite extremist collaboration
such as the 1996 Hezbollah/Qods/al-Qaida bombing of the American military
residence, the Kohbar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the bizarre terror links with the
Columbian FARC and the IRA, to the Iranians giving safe haven to some in al-Qaida
while publicly announcing the detention of others. It is the same evil. The network
of terror is broader than one group, or even so-called ideological divides. This has
been the case for decades, with Marxist-Leninist revolutionary terrorists training in
Libya and Lebanon (especially the Bekka Valley), to Uighur extremists training in
Afghanistan. They are not a monolith, but they do drink at the same iniquitous
fountains that train, arm, finance and support this horror of the 21st century. 10)
The War on Terror is a war of civilization versus barbarism. I, in my book on the Bush
Doctrine, and others have named it such. Dr. Sergey Kurginyan, president of the
International Public Foundation Experimental Creative Center, Russian Federation,
believes there is a dichotomy in the world between those who see the conflict as a
war, where the barbarian must be annihilated for civilization to survive, and those
who see it as a game, where ultimately there is a union between "counter modern"
forces and the barbarian to form a postmodern world. This issue strikes at the very
heart of the War on Terror. If it is a war, and I believe it is, then there will ultimately
be winner and vanquished. There will ultimately be victory for the side of light that
sees hope and progress through the lenses of democracy, human rights and civil
society or those in the dark who see the blackness through violence, regress and
totalitarianism. There is no compromise with terrorists. True as this statement is, the
fact remains that the counter-terror community, diplomats and politicians alike,
have failed to provide a strategic framework to deal with these 10 issues. These 10
"metrics" can provide a pathway to judging victory and defeat, the discussion of
which is conspicuously lacking in media and academic circles. Many seem willing to
backtrack on the issue of democracy if "stability" can be purchased. This belies the
whole twelve years since 9/11 and the eight years of the Bush administration, which
clearly stated that true stability can never be achieved without draining the swamp
that stability was purchased from. The endless lectures about American naivet,
namely, that we believe only elections equal democracy, do nothing to enhance the
debate. This mantra grows wearisome if not rehearsed. America had the answer for
the War on Terror which began in earnest twelve years ago. The fundamental
promoting of civil society and democracy serves as the only strategic answer for a
problem so evil, the answer must be found in man's ultimate good.
as the FBI
and CIA have adapted to al-Qaida, so has the terror organization adapted.
countries will arrest them. Osama bin Laden is isolated, unable to command his organization. Yet
Al-Qaida has pulled back, but that has made it harder for U.S. intelligence to pick up leads because the target is
more diffuse. Still, al-Qaida would love to release biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons on the U.S. A terrorist
bent on detonating a nuclear weapon would have to negotiate a series of steps, says Vahid Majidi, the FBIs
assistant director in charge of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. A terrorist would have to find an expert
with the right knowledge. He would have to find the right material. Such a terrorist would have to bring the device
into the country, and he would have to evade detection programs. While the net probability is incredibly low, a tenkiloton device would be of enormous consequence, Majidi says. So even with those enormously low probabilities,
200 analysts from the CIA and FBI sit side by side analyzing threats 24
hours a day at the National Counterterrorism Center in McLean, Va. A secure video
other,
conference takes place three times a day with all members of the intelligence community and the White House to
analyze threats and parcel out leads. The USA Patriot Act tore down the so-called wall that Attorney General Janet
Reno had imposed, a wall that prevented FBI agents from sharing information with each other and with the CIA. But
with success has come complacency and the sort of recklessness that led the Obama administration to decide to try
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 plot, in federal court in New York. Neither the FBI nor New York
City police were consulted before Attorney General Eric Holder Jr. made that decision. Despite such self-generated
perils, FBI agents and CIA officers work around the clock and risk their own lives to keep us safe. Most could be
aside outrageous attacks from the likes of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who claimed the CIA routinely lies to
Congress. A subhead over a recent Washington Post series said, The government has built a national security and
intelligence system so big, so complex and so hard to manage, no one really knows if its fulfilling its most
***Politics Links***
1NC Unpopular PC
Decreasing surveillance on Muslims is unpopular massive
funding goes toward surveillance now
Jones 12 (Brent, Brent Jones serves as USA TODAY's public editor and is the primary link between USA
TODAY's newsroom and its readers. In addition to his reader representative role, Jones is the guardian of newsroom
best practices, which involves monitoring sourcing, diversity, fairness and balance in news coverage. He oversees
USA TODAY's hiring and recruitment efforts and directs the newsroom's internship program. He also serves on the
Gannett Foundation's Media Committee and Gannett's Leadership & Diversity Council.. White House helps pay for
NYPD Muslim Surveillance USA Today. February 27.)
Since the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush and Obama administrations have
provided $135 million to the New York and New Jersey region through the High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program , known as HIDTA. Some of that money it's
unclear exactly how much because the program has little oversight has paid for the cars that plainclothes
NYPD officers used to conduct surveillance on Muslim neighborhoods . It also paid for
computers that store even innocuous information about Muslim college students,
mosque sermons and social events. When NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly was filled in on these
efforts, his briefings were prepared on HIDTA computers. The AP confirmed the use of White House
money through secret police documents and interviews with current and former city
and federal officials. The AP also obtained electronic documents with digital
signatures indicating they were created and saved on HIDTA computers. The HIDTA grant
program is overseen by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. The disclosure that the White
House is at least partially paying for the NYPD's wholesale surveillance of places
where Muslims eat, shop, work and pray complicates efforts by the Obama
administration to stay out of the fray over New York's controversial counterterrorism
programs. The administration has championed outreach to American Muslims and has said law enforcement
The money is part of a little-known grant intended to help law enforcement fight drug crimes.
should not put entire communities under suspicion. The Obama administration, however, has pointedly refused to
endorse or repudiate the NYPD programs it helps pay for. The White House last week declined to comment on its
department also gives grant money to the NYPD and is one of the lead federal agencies helping police build
relationships with Muslims, has refused in recent months to discuss the police tactics. Tom Perez, the Justice
Department's top civil rights lawyer, has repeatedly refused to answer questions about the NYPD. Outside
Washington, the NYPD's efforts drew increased criticism last week. College administrators at Yale, Columbia and
elsewhere issued harsh rebukes for NYPD's infiltration of Muslim student groups and its monitoring of school
websites. New Jersey's governor and the mayor of its largest city have complained about the NYPD's widespread
surveillance there, outside New York's police jurisdiction. The White House HIDTA grant program was established at
much HIDTA money has been used to pay for the intelligence division, in part because NYPD intelligence operations
receive scant oversight in New York.
Further Curtailing the Surveillance State is unpopularAlthough the Congress passed the FREEDOM Act and allowed
the PATRIOT act the expire, they do not seek to restrict the
NSA and the Surveillance State any longer
Berman 15
(Russell, Russell Berman is a senior associate editor at The Atlantic, where he covers political
news. He was previously a congressional reporter for The Hill and a Washington correspondent for The New York
Sun. A Long-Awaited Reform to the Patriot Act. The Atlantic. May 14.)
Fourteen years after the Patriot Act gave sweeping spy powers to the government in its war against terrorism, a
consensus is finally emerging in Congress that the government needs to be reined inat least a bit. The next two
weeks could determine whether that consensus will yield a new law.
In a bipartisan vote of 338-88, the House on Wednesday afternoon passed the USA Freedom Act,
which seeks to restrain the nations surveillance state while extending other key parts of the 2001 Patriot Act that
are set to expire at the end of the month. At its core, the
House
measure
collection program first exposed two years ago by Edward Snowden, and requires the government to be
more transparent about the data it seeks from citizens. The vote comes just a week after a federal appeals court
ruled that the Patriot Acts controversial Section 215 did not authorize the bulk collection program, which allowed
the NSA to access domestic telephone metadata. The ruling by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals didnt end the
libertarians. The White House has said that President Obama would sign it. Yet it faces an uncertain fate in the
Senate, where Majority Leader Mitch McConnell wants to extend the entire Patriot Act, untouched, for another five
years. Democrats have vowed to block that effort and are hoping that the strong House vote and the chance that
the surveillance programs could expire altogether on June 1 will force McConnell to accept the reform bill. A shortterm extension, giving the Senate more time to debate, is also possible. (The Senate has a recess scheduled after
next week.) The bills supporters say its the most far-reaching reform to U.S. surveillance programs in nearly 40
years. On the House floor, Conyers said
in the United States. Today, we have a rare opportunity to restore a measure of restraint to surveillance
programs that have simply gone too far, he said. Many privacy advocates, however, think it
doesnt go far enough to protect civil liberties. Theyve criticized provisions that
expand surveillance powers by allowing access to data from more modern
forms of communication, like video chats. And they say the proposal doesnt
sufficiently limit the search terms the NSA can use in requesting data and
that it contains too many loopholes that would allow the government to
access data in an emergency without a warrant. It completely fails to
meaningfully curtail mass surveillance and actually codifies some of the worst modern spying
practices into law, said Evan Greer, campaign director of Fight for the Future, an Internet-freedom advocacy group.
Activists also find little comfort in the fact that the bill has drawn support from the intelligence community and tech
firms. An earlier version of the proposal passed the House last year but fell two votes of overcoming a filibuster in
doing it. The government may one day again attempt to expand its surveillance powers by clever legal argument,
but it will no longer be allowed to do so in secret, Conyers argued. Theres also recognition among some privacy
advocates that although the Tea Party has helped elect more libertarian-minded conservatives to Congress, the USA
Freedom Act is likely the most significant reform possible under majorities still led by old-school Republican
national-security hawks, and at a time when fears of a terrorist attack remain ever-present. The ACLU, for example,
is taking no formal position on the bill even though it sent lawmakers a list of areas in which it didnt go far enough.
That dynamic was on display this week when GOP House leaders rejected a bid by a group of younger libertarian
members to offer amendments that would have further restricted the NSA. "This is a very delicate issue, Speaker
John Boehner explained to reporters. I know members would like to offer some amendments, but this is not a place
for paying lip service to reform while leaving intrusive surveillance programs untouched. The truth on this one lies
somewhere in the middle, said Benjamin Wittes, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of its
Lawfare blog. This is a significant reform and rollback of a FISA program, he told me. But it pales in the context of
the extensive collections of NSA surveillance tools and the many, often unrelated provisions of the Patriot Act.
Section 215 is, after all, just one section, and the reforms in this bill beyond ending bulk data collection are modest.
This
is one, small program, Wittes said. It is not the big enchilada, or even one
of the big enchiladas of the NSA programs.
(Daniel, Daniel Haqiqatjou was born in Houston, Texas. He attended Harvard University
where he majored in Physics and minored in Philosophy. He completed a Masters degree in Philosophy at Tufts
University. Haqiqatjou also studies traditional Islamic sciences part-time. He writes and lectures on contemporary
issues surrounding Muslims and Modernity. Congress Doesnt Applaud Muslim Tolerance- Are We Surprised?
Muslim Matters. January 22.)
Congress. The feeling is mutual. By now, we have all seen it. During the State of
the Union, President Obama called for a rejection of offensive Muslim
stereotypes. Instead of applauding approval, the crowd went dead silent. As far as we can tell,
Congress and the other government officials who were in attendance are perfectly fine
with offensively stereotyping Muslims. My question is, are we really surprised? Let's take a look
Trust me,
at a brief list of facts in order to gauge how Muslim-friendly Congress and the US government at large have been
over the years. 1.
This is the same Congress and the same President that have initiated and
continued the War on Terror, backing military operations in seven different
Muslim nations over the past fourteen years: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Syria,
North West Pakistan. In the few Muslim nations that have not been subjected to direct assault, the US has
supported brutal dictators (Egypt, the Gulf) or perpetuated punitive
sanctions (Iran, pre-invasion Iraq). The loss of innocent life in these parts of
the Muslim world is beyond tallying. To add insult to injury, the instability caused by the War on
Terror has directly led to the rise of brutal warlords and radical groups, like ISIS, which predominantly kill Muslims.
2. Did you know that as of 2014, there are eight US states that ban Shariah law? Did you know that
34 states have considered banning Shariah just in the past five years? 3. Some Muslims have praised President
Obama for speaking against offensive Muslim stereotypes in the State of the Union address. But, let's not overlook
was prohibited by President Reagan in 1988 when he signed the UN General Assembly's Conventions Against
Torture. In light of the CIA Torture Report, Obama is violating international law by not prosecuting
those in the Bush Administration who authorized torture. 4. On that point, let's not forget the recent CIA Torture
law. 5. Also mentioned in the State of the Union was good ol' Guantanamo. Obama promised to shut it down. We
can only wonder if this latest promise will be as hollow as the promise he made as a presidential candidate in 2008.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the majority of Gitmo prisoners are Muslims who have not been charged
the most important legal advocacy group the American Muslim community
has. Of course, we were all left wondering, what is the grave domestic Islamic
terrorism threat Congress is so concerned about, since the vast majority of
domestic terrorism in the US is not conducted by Muslims. The FBI itself reports that,
between 1980 and 2005, there were more Jewish acts of terrorism within the United States than Muslim (7% vs.
have heard of the FBI's entrapment program, known best for foiling terror plots of its own making. According to a
express dissident ideologies and then provides those provocateurs with fake (harmless) missiles, bombs, guns,
details are often unbelievable. Some have even reported on how the FBI and other agencies use outreach
Attorney
General Eric Holder of the DOJ has expressed support for the FBI's tactics with
programs to spy on the Muslim community. As far as the Obama Administration is concerned,
respect to the Muslim community. 9. It hardly requires mention, but surely we cannot overlook President Obama
demanding, in an address to the UN last year, that Muslims denounce ISIS and radical Islamic ideologies. As myself
and many other commentators have repeatedly explained, requiring Muslims as a collective to apologize for and
denounce the crimes of a deranged few to which we have no connection is nothing other than racist stereotyping.
Even comedian Aziz Ansari made this simple point on Twitter, but apparently our President and much of Congress
are too dense to understand this. If Obama wants us to reject offensive Muslim stereotypes, he should start with
comments in support of Park51 initially but quickly backtracked and stated: I was not commenting and I will not
comment on the wisdom of making the decision to put a mosque there. So much for offensive Muslim stereotypes.
11. So, we have covered the CIA, the FBI, the DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security. How about the NSA? Do
NSA has
been datamining the communications of Muslim leaders and activists for
years.
they have a disproportionate interest in Muslims? Why, yes indeed! As the Snowden leaks detail, the
(Celeste, Celeste Katz is a New York-based journalist who blogs daily about local politics on her New
York Daily News blog The Daily Politics. Katz started her career at the Providence Journal in 1995 where she served
as a staff writer and columnist until 2000. She left Providence Journal for the New York Daily News where she served
as an education reporter before becoming a political reporter for the paper. Katz attended Brown University,
graduating in 1995 with a BA in International Relations. More Than Half New Yorks Congressional Delegation:
Punish NYPD For Muslim Surveillance. The Daily Politics. May 10.)
The mostly symbolic vote was aimed at getting the NYPD to stop any efforts
to quietly monitor or infiltrate mosques, bookstores or cafes, and to get rid of any data
collected on Muslim individuals not accused of any crime. Rep. Rush Holt, DN.J., introduced the amendment, saying the wholesale surveillance of innocent
communities, many in his state, has not caught any terrorists. "Contrary to the blanket assertions by
some that the tactics have kept New York City safe, the NYPD failed to uncover two actual plots
against New York City," Holt said, referring to foiled bombings in Times Square and the New York subway
system. Holt's proposal would have banned any federal funds from flowing to
law enforcement agencies that engage in any form of racial, ethnic, or
religious profiling. The amendment drew fire from Rep. Peter King, head of the House
Homeland Security Committee. He defended both the NYPD and its
counterterrorism surveillance programs. "I remember years ago when the Justice Department
was going after the Mafia, they went to the Italian American communities. When they were going after the Westies,
they went to the Irish American communities. When you're looking for the Russian mob, you go to the communities
in Coney Island and Brighton Beach. That's where the enemy comes from," King said, according to a transcript of
Wednesday's midnight debate. "Ninety-nine percent of the people are law-abiding. But if you're looking for the
person who is going to that community to carry out a crime, you look in that community. If you're looking for an
Islamic terrorist, you don't go to Ben's Kosher Deli. When they were looking for the Italian mob, they didn't go to an
Irish bar. They went to the Italian social clubs," King said.
193.
The split ran along partisan lines, with only 16 Republicans calling to block funding to police departments
that run such surveillance programs and only 8 Democrats voting against the measure. Among New York's 29
congress members, three Democrats broke party ranks to support the police departments' efforts -- Carolyn
Congressman
Joseph Crowley, whose father was an NYPD cop, said the New York City police
did not engage in racial profiling, but he nonetheless voted in favor of the ban. "The NYPD
engages in behavioral profiling, which is a responsible counterterrorism tactic
and far different from the racial, religious or ethnic profiling we have seen
elsewhere," he said in a statement.
McCarthy of Long Island and upstate representatives Brian Higgins and Kathy Hochul. Queens
(Trevor, Trevor Timm is a co-founder and the executive director of the Freedom of the Press
Foundation. He is a journalist, activist, and lawyer who writes a twice weekly column for The Guardian on privacy,
free speech, and national security. He has contributed to The Atlantic, Al Jazeera, Foreign Policy, Harvard Law and
Policy Review, PBS MediaShift, and Politico. Trevor formerly worked as an activist at the Electronic Frontier
Foundation. Before that, he helped the longtime General Counsel of The New York Times, James Goodale, write a
book on the Pentagon Papers and the First Amendment. He received his J.D. from New York Law School. In 2013, he
received the Hugh Hefner First Amendment Award for journalism.. Congress wont protect us from the surveillance
state- theyll enhance it. The Guardian. March 14.)
Senator who warned the public about the NSAs mass surveillance pre-Snowden said this week
that the Obama administration is still keeping more spying programs aimed at
Americans secret, and it seems Congress only wants to make it worse. In a
revealing interview, Ron Wyden often the lone voice in favor of privacy rights on the Senates powerful
Intelligence Committee told Buzzfeeds John Stanton that American citizens are being
monitored by intelligence agencies in ways that still have not been made
public more than a year and a half after the Snowden revelations and countless
promises by the intelligence community to be more transparent. Stanton wrote:
The same
Asked if intelligence agencies have domestic surveillance programs of which the public is still unaware, Wyden said
simply, Yeah, theres plenty of stuff.
governments still-hidden surveillance; its just the latest reminder that they refuse to come
clean about it. For instance, when the New York Times Charlie Savage and Mark Manzetti exposed
a secret CIA program collecting bulk records of international money
transfers handled by companies like Western Union into and out of the United States in 2013,
they also reported that several government officials said more than one other
bulk collection program has yet to come to light. Since then beyond the myriad Snowden
revelations that continue to pour out the public has learned about the Postal Services massive database
containing photographs of the front and back of every single piece of mail that is sent in the United States. There
was also the Drug Enforcement Administrations mass phone surveillance program wholly separate than the NSAs
in which phone records were retained even if there was no evidence the callers were involved in criminal
activity, according to the New York Times. And recently, the Justice Departments national database to track in
real time the movement of vehicles around the US, reported by the Wall Street Journal. That there are still
programs aimed at Americans that the Obama administration is keeping secret from the public should be a front
theyve barely made a peep about reforming Section 215 of the Patriot Act, the controversial law that was twisted
and warped to allow the NSA to collect every phone record in the United States.
American
Muslims also live in a sociopolitical climate in which Islamophobia is steadily on
the rise. Many talk show hosts play on their audiences fears by attacking Islam and Islamic values. The U.S.
government continues to profile Muslims, spy on them and keep them at
arms length. And anti-Muslim discourse has become a mainstream
phenomenon. In 2012, presidential candidate Newt Gingrich compared Islam to
Nazism. Fellow Republican contender Herman Cain swore not to appoint a Muslim
to his Cabinet if he was elected. Prominent social commentators such as Bill Maher often blame Islam for
much of the violence in the world. More than half the states are considering anti-Islam
legislation under the guise of barring consideration of foreign laws and court rulings. The FBI and
municipal police departments such as New Yorks routinely spy on Muslims
and their institutions. Yet the overall picture is mixed. Even as Islamophobia increases in the U.S.,
American society. In fact, they are seen as a model for European countries to emulate. But
American Muslims are benefiting from political opportunities. There are two Muslims in Congress, and Muslims are
being appointed as judges and are winning elections as mayors, city council members and state legislators. There
are more Muslims in the legal and political arena, more Muslims working or interning with legislators and many
communitys political
influence has dropped precipitously. The 2016 election campaigns will
likely heighten anti-Muslim sentiments. As in 2012, when Republicans used the
more in federal agencies. Despite this improved civic engagement, the
controversy over the so-called ground zero mosque as a political mobilizer, there will be a lot of anti-Muslim
Council on American-Islamic Relations, there are 6 million to 7 million Muslims in the United States. In previous
elections, the Muslim community voted as a bloc. Nearly 80 percent of registered Muslim voters picked George W.
Bush in 2000, while nearly 90 percent supported Obama in 2008, according to an informal exit poll by the group.
More than 85 percent of American Muslims voted for Obama in 2012. The community hoped to have positive
candidate, American Muslims should focus on using the electoral process to have a lasting national influence. Here
are five strategic options available to them.
(Dean, Former Lawyer, Rights and clearance/researcher for NBCs Saturday Night Live, Cocreator/co-executive producer of Internet show and pilot The Watch List, Co-creator/co-executive producer of the
annual NY Arab-American Comedy Festival, President of the Dean of Comedy Productions, and the Co-producer/CoDirector of The Muslims Are Coming Documentary. For Republicans, Muslims Will Be the Gays of 2016. The Daily
Beast. January 21.)
Now that Republicans realize that the fight over gay marriage is over, theyre
pivoting back to the old reliable: Muslims. Its true that Muslim-bashing among Republicans is
hardly new, but I think that as 2016 approaches were going to see even more of it as
candidates try to outflank one another. The latest example was Louisiana
Governors Bobby Jindals speech on Monday in London. Jindal told the audience that there
are no-go zones in Europe where Muslims have in essence carved out Islamic
autonomous zones that are ruled by Koranic law and where non-Muslims fear
to tread. His point, of course, was to warn Americans that Muslims could try the
same thing in the United States. Now if that concept sounds familiar its because last week Fox
News served up this same rancid red meat to its viewers. Some Fox News anchors claimed
these so-called no-go zones existed in parts of France. And Fox News terrorism expert Steve Emerson even
went as far as to say that Birmingham, England, the nations second biggest city with more than one million people,
was a totally Muslim city where non-Muslims dont go in. The backlash to these comments was swift. Even
British Prime Minster David Cameron responded, When I heard this, frankly,
I choked on my porridge and I thought it must be April Fools Day. This guy is
clearly a complete idiot. Fox News stirring up fear of Muslims is nothing new. In fact, in my view its
part of Foxs business model since its viewers hold the most negative views of Muslims of any cable news audience.
are located. Jindal, in what looked almost like a sketch from Saturday Night Live, hemmed and hawed, finally
responding: I think your viewers know. For those unfamiliar with Jindal, hes no Louie Gohmert. Hes an Ivy League
graduate and a Rhodes scholar. Jindals remarks were not a mistake, but rather part of a calculated strategy to
garner support from more conservative Republicans for an expected2016 presidential run. Now, in the past,
candidates trying to garner support from these right wing voters could use
opposition to gay marriage to curry favor. As conservative James Kirchick noted in an article he
penned for The Wall Street Journal in 2008, the Republican Party has a long history of its candidates using not just
opposition to gay marriage, but also anti-gay rhetoric to attract support from the GOP Base. Kirchick went on to
urge Republicans to kiss gay-bashing goodbye. But we still saw this bigotry in the 2012 race. For example, Rick
Perry ran a campaign commercial that said you know theres something wrong with this country when gays can
announced Friday that it is considering the constitutionality of same-sex marriage this term, gay marriage will likely
soon be the law of the land.
are truly an easy target. First, Muslims are a small percentage of our nations population at approximately 1 to 2
percent. Second, there are horrible Muslims who do commit terror in the name of our faith, which does offer cover
for anti-Muslim bigotry. Third, we still dont have many allies outside of our community that stand with us. Sure, we
have some interfaith supporters. But when ant-gay comments are made, like in the case of Duck Dynastys Phil
Roberson in 2013, the response by the left was swift and united. But with anti-Muslim bigotry, we dont see that. We
see silence from many on the left, including from most Democratic elected officials. And worse, we see some
designed to stir up fear with no factual support. His remarks were applauded by conservative ++Larry Kudlow in
countered anti-Muslim remarks made by a supporter at one of his campaign rallies. My hope is that Im wrong. But
a thousand people over the weekend protesting a MuslimAmerican event in Texas that was ironically organized to counter extremism,
Im not so optimistic. The more conservative parts of the GOP base tend to vote in
higher numbers in the primaries. So dont be surprised when you see Republican candidates trying
after seeing close to
lack confidence in the ability of individuals from either community to perform their duties as Americans
should they be appointed to an important government position. 36% of respondents felt that Arab
Americans would be influenced by their ethnicity and 42% of respondents felt that
American Muslims would be influenced by their religion. While the persistence of
negative Arab and Muslim stereotypes is a factor in shaping attitudes toward both groups, our polling
establishes that lack of direct exposure to Arab Americans and American Muslims also plays a role in
shaping attitudes. What we find is that Americans who say they know either Arabs or Muslims have
significantly higher favorable attitudes toward both (33% higher in both cases) and also have greater
confidence in their ability to serve in important government positions. This is especially true among
younger and non-white Americans, greater percentages of whom indicate knowing Arabs and Muslims
and having more favorable attitudes toward both communities.
Social Policy and Understanding, the Duke Islamic Studies Center, November 2012
http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ispu_brief_islamaphobia.pdf)
Realistically, Islamophobia will remain a serious national problem even after two or three election
cycles, because many Islamophobic policies, including those discussed below, enjoy wide
public support. Various factors are responsible for this, among them widespread bigotry and the
unquestioned need for innovative and tough counterterrorism policies. This latter reason represents a
significant political hurdle for those elected officials who seek to challenge any counterterrorism policy,
no matter how discriminatory. In short, the current political climate needs to be changed so that those
who ask reasonable questions about current or envisaged counterterrorism policies will not be accused
of being soft on terrorism. Such change often begins at the local level . As regards to
changing the American publics opinion about Muslims and Islam, the road
ahead is quite long. Public opinion polls show that large numbers of
Americans have a negative view of Muslims and Islam. A 2003 poll found
that 47% viewed Muslims favorably and that 32% did not. By 2010, however,
55% held an unfavorable view and only 35% held a favorable view. The
numbers had evened out by 2012: 41% unfavorable and 40% favorable.
Given these stark numbers, a common strategy employed by politicians at all
levels is an antiMuslim strategy, as discussed by political scientist. Senzai noted that
many of the eighty-five Republican members of Congress swept into office in the 2010 midterm
election found the political virtues of anti-Muslim rhetoric an easy way to prove their mettle to the
surging conservative base. The less on here is clear: Many public officials believe that
Islamophobia pays off. Changing the dynamic so that the phenomenon is seen for what it is
bigotryis necessary.
***Capitalism K***
1NC Capitalism K
Postcolonial studies, such as Islamophobia and Orientalism,
obscure class relations and fracture alliances against capitalist
structures.
Chibber & Farbman, 13 (Vivek Chibber, associate professor of Sociology at
New York University; Jason Farbman, member of International Socialist Organization
in New York; Marxism, postcolonial studies, and the tasks of radical theory,
International Socialist Review, Issue #89, http://isreview.org/issue/89/marxismpostcolonial-studies-and-tasks-radical-theory) //ZML
HISTORICALLY ON the left, intellectuals always took it as their duty to take complex
matters and present them in a simple and clear way. Thats how you
organize people . The reality of capitalism seems to be overwhelming and
complicated, which people from the Right keep saying is not accessible to
ordinary people. They insist you need experts to understand the world and
should therefore leave the governing of society to managers and experts.
The Right has always said that. Intellectuals of the Left have always tried to show that in fact, realities can be
grasped by anybody with a reasonable intelligence, whether or not they are in college, as long as they think hard
about it. And theyve tried to exemplify that by taking highly complex ideas and making them simple. Noam
Chomsky likes to say that back in the 1930s, Communist intellectuals wrote books like Mathematics for the Millions
and Physics Made Simple. That was a good expression of the mission that intellectuals saw themselves on when
they were on the Left. What postcolonial studies has done is reverse this. You could
forgive all of its sins, all of its intellectual mistakes. You could forgive all of its grandstanding and its ignorance
graduate student seminars. I think its pretty destructive. WHAT IS the outcome when activist meetings turn into
people who either dont mind this speaking in tongues or people who care so little about understanding the world
they dont care about what the discourse is thats being presented to them. Imagine what this does to the culture of
the Left. Postcolonial Theory is now well established in the academy. What are the prospects of repelling these
attacks on Marxism, or at least chipping away at some of the more pernicious assumptions made commonsense by
because it wasnt just the US or China or Germany or Greece that got caught in this maelstrom but it was the entire
world .
Its shown in a very stark way that the category of capitalism that
all
around the world, showing that its not just that capitalism is a reality
because of the massive mobilizations and social struggle that have erupted over the past few years. Again,
across the world but also our common humanity and our common interest
in fighting against it . If postcolonial theory was right, there should not
have been the explosion in Egypt, in Tahrir Square, that there was a year
and a half ago. If it were right, even if there was an explosion they should
not have been demanding jobs, butter, democracy, these basic things that
workers in the West do . And if postcolonial theory were right, it should
not be the case that activists in Madison and Detroit, or in Occupy, take
inspiration from activists in Cairo, and come together on the same
demands . Because if postcolonial theory were right, they should have
fundamentally different psychologies, different aspirations, different
needs. What these movements have shown us is that the needs and
aspirations, even though they might have some differences, also share
certain crucial commonalities . So I think that this is the best time weve seen in some time.
The attacks on East European immigrants and the US critique of Cuba and Venezuela further support
this point. International and National Concerns in the contemporary world. Recent polls suggest that immigration is
now the third most important topic for British voters. Since 9/11 issues of race, religion and migration have become
centre stage in society. During the late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s interest in the whole Muslim
community in the UK increased significantly. Beginning with national issues such as the Rushdie affair and
international matters such as the 1991 Gulf War, a series of events brought Muslims into the media spotlight and
adversely affected the Muslim population in the UK. New components within racist terminology appeared, and were
used in a manner that could be argued were deliberately provocative to bait and ridicule Muslims and other ethnic
minorities. Old favourites such as Paki, were accompanied by shouts of Taliban, Bin Laden and of course terrorists.
This abuse was also directed to non-Muslims such as Sikhs, Hindus and Christian-Arabs. Anyone who looked like the
other was fair-game for such abuse. The language of the media prompted the idea of a criminal culture and a
perception that British Muslims supported of Bin Laden, Palestinian suicide bombers and Kashmiri separatists. This
view was further fueled by recent events in the North of England. The disturbances in the North of England have in
some quarters been presented as a particular problem with the Muslim community and not with the British-Asian
community as a whole. However much they seek to identify themselves as British, young Muslims regularly find
that others assume them to be first and foremost Muslim. In Britain today, especially after the events of 9/11 and
the beginning of the so-called War on Terror, it is now Muslims who have been identified as a group of potentially
false nationals and systematically constructed as the other. A discourse has been produced that directly links British
Muslims with support for terrorism, fundamentalism, illegal immigration and an Oriental stereotype of the East.
British Muslims are repeatedly implored by voices in the media and by politicians of all sides to make more
strenuous efforts to integrate into British society, and reassert their loyalty to the British state in a manner that no
non-Muslim anti-war group would ever be instructed. Race Contemporary racism manifests itself in a number of
different hybrid forms. However, its agency is premised on a number of false assumptions about race, and on
Race as a
concept does not exist, yet belief in this lie leads to the direct and indirect
discrimination, abuse and suffering of billions of people on Earth on a
daily, hourly and secondly basis. Across the globe racism manifests itself
in various ways that ensures people are victimised on the basis of some
generalising human beings existence and experiences into simple homogenous groupings.
immediacy, currency and future of racism is virtually impossible, since the institutional structures, types, targets
and experiences are so potentially vast and full of regional, local and national variations that dispute and debate
will be inevitable. What cannot be disputed is that human beings will suffer. Simultaneously cultural racism is
evident with politicians questioning the success of a multicultural society. The moral panic surrounding the events
of 9/11, and 7/7 have led to a right-wing led debate under the guise of community cohesion that have suggested a
return to core national values/culture (note that the debates suggest the lack of precise meanings for these
terms; national and culture) alongside stricter immigration and policing controls. Recently a new dominant neo-right
wing discourse has been formulated that questions the whole concept of multiculturalism. What makes this different
from previous right wing criticism of multiculturalism is that much of this criticism is coming from previously centre
left commentators. Much of this language has taken even the more sinister view of questioning the need of
immigration, questioning minority communities and questioning the actual benefits of a multicultural society.
subjugation . This ideology at times is clear and brutal but is maintained through hegemonic control. Thus
the privileged position of the Western nations is seen as natural and due to greater political pluralism and
democracy not the continued exploitation of other parts of the world or other peoples
naturalized.
strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal
attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it , while simultaneously
replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.)
are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are
simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and
start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We
create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and
strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our
new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist
relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To
think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight , in the midst of a
crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow
within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist
relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist
laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what were
doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can
live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that
the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.)
There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we cant imply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it).
Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is
not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of
everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use
coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of
the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so .
Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will
enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we
can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our
ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community
rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets , and so forth, we were forced onto
the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. Its quite clear then
how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to
live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the
labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively
produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing
capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an
important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system . We can sometimes in some
places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its
victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually
destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an
entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into
something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a
lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed
millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else
and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want . It is not useful to think of this as a new
ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing
vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and
not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities,
to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to
perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The
long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant
revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a
free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the
free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term
goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the
accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who
democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world .
The shift from "production" to "consumption" manifests itself in postpreoccupation not with the
"political economy" ("base") but with "representation"? for instance, of race, sexuality,
environment, ethnicity, nationality, and identity. This is, for example, one reason for [Hill's] ridiculing
equality is performed!
al left theories through the focus on "superstructural" cultural analysis and the
the "base" and "superstructure" analytical model of classical Marxism (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy) with an anecdote (the privileged mode of "argument" for the post-al left) that the base is really
not all that "basic." To adhere to the base/superstructure model for [him] is to be thrown into an "epistemological
For the post-al left a good society is, therefore, one in which, as [France] puts it, class
antagonism is bracketed and the "surplus value" is distributed more evenly among
men and women, whites and persons of color, the lesbian and the straight. It is not a
gulag."
society in which "surplus value"?the exploitative appropriation of the other's labor-is itself eliminated by
revolutionary praxis. The post-al left's good society is not one in which private ownership is obsolete and the social
established. This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle
classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy in these texts
therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of
consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to "politicizing the classroom" in OR-1 [Hogan]) and in which knowledge
(concept) is turned through the process that OR-3 [McCormick] calls "translation"?into "consumable" EXPERIENCES.
The more "intense" the experience, as the anecdotes of [McCormick] show, the more successful the pedagogy. In
short,
as OR-5 [Williams] calls it-and not class struggle-is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-l [Hill] writes) is
an "epistemological gulag"? a construct of power and thus any form of "ideology critique" that raises questions of
"falsehood" and "truth" ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the "other" truths by, in
[Williams'] words, "staking sole legitimate claim" to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic
against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of "epistemology" is displaced in the ludic academy by "rhetoric." The
question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the "truth" of a practice but whether it "works." (Rhetoric has
always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, [France] is not interested in whether my practices are truthful
but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the
"truth" of my texts) end up "cutting our funding?" [he] asks. A post-al leftist like [France], in short, "resists" the state
only in so far as the state does not cut [his] "funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like [Williams]
The
post-al dismantling of "epistemology" and the erasure of the question of "truth ," it
must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If
the "truth question" is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox
binarism ([Hill]), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded
from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization
that disregards the "difference" of the ruling class . This is why a defender of the ruling class such
to conclude that my argument "has little prospect of effectual force" in order to disregard its truthfulness.
as [Hill] sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness
as a form of "epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables [France] to answer my
question, "What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics
(rhetoric): what is "wrong" with dogmatism, [he] says, is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus
Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of [his] text) I will not get a political or
philosophical argument but a tropological description.6
The post-al left is a New Age Left: the "new new left"
dialogic left of coalitions,
voluntary work, and neighborhood activism (more on these later). It is, as I will show, anti-intellectual and
populist; its theory is "bite size" (mystifying, of course, who determines the "size" of the "bite"), and its model of
social change is anti-conceptual "spontaneity": May 68, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and, in [Hill's] text, Chiapas. In the
classroom, the New Age post-al pedagogy inhibits any critique of the truth of students' statements and instead
The rejection of
"truth" (as "epistemological gulag"?[Hill]), is accompanied by the rejection of what the post-al left
calls "economism." Furthermore, the post-al logic relativizes subjectivities , critiques functionalist
explanation, opposes "determinism," and instead of closural readings, offers supplementary ones. It also
celebrates eclecticism; puts great emphasis on the social as discourse and on discourse as always
offers, as [McCormick] makes clear, a "counseling," through anecdotes, concerning feelings.
inexhaustible by any single interpretation? discourse (the social) always "outruns" and "exceeds" its explanation.
Post-al logic is, in fact, opposed to any form of "explanation" and in favor of mimetic description: it regards
"explanation" to be the intrusion of a violent outside and "description" to be a respectful, caring attention to the
immanent laws of signification (inside). This notion of description which has by now become a new dogma in ludic
feminist theory under the concept of "mimesis" (D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation)?regards politics to be always
immanent to practices: thus the banalities about not politicizing the classroom in [Hogan's] "anarchist" response to
my text7 and the repeated opposition to binaries in all nine texts.
an ideological alibi for erasing class struggle, as is quite clear in [France's] rejection
of the model of a society "divided by two antagonistic classes" (see my Theory and its Other).
It "appears" as if the
worker, during the working day, receives wages that are equal compensation for his labor .
This mystification originates in the fact that the capitalist pays not for "labor" but for
"labor power": when labor power is put to use it produces more than it is paid for. The "working day" is
the site of the unfolding of this fundamental contradiction: it is a divided day, divided into "necessary
labor" the part in which the worker produces value equivalent to his wages and the
"other," the part of "surplus labor"?a part in which the worker works for free and produces "surplus value."
The second part of the working day is the source of profit and accumulation of capital.
alienated reality-there is a contradiction between its appearance and its essence.
as a protector of ruling class interests in the academy, [Hill], with a studied casualness, places "surplus value" in
the adjacency of "radical bible-studies" and quietly turns it into a rather boring matter of interest perhaps only to
consciousness so as to assist in organizing people into a new vanguard party that aims at abolishing this FACT of
the capitalist system and trans-forming capitalism into a communist society. As I have argued in my "Postality"
[Transformation 1], (post)structuralist theory, through
such facts an effect of interpretation and turns them into "undecidable" processes. The
boom in ludic theory and Rhetoric Studies in the bourgeois academy is caused by the service it renders the ruling
As they
pursue the politics of difference, the class war rages unabated and they
seem either unwilling or unable to focus on the unprecedented economic
carnage occurring around the globe. Harvey's searing criticism suggests that postMarxists have been busy fiddling while Rome burns and his comments echo those
been reduced to the role of supplicants in the most degraded form of pluralist politics imaginable.
made byMarx (1978, p. 149) in his critique of the Young Hegelians who were, in spite of their allegedly world-
any number of disorientations and even oppressions, but one cultivates all kinds of politeness and indirection about
the structure of capitalist class relations in which those oppressions are embedded. To speak of any of that directly
it is absolutely essential to
reiterate that most things are a matter of class. That kind of statement is surprising
and simply is to be vulgar. In this climate of Aesopian languages
only in a culture like that of the North American university But it is precisely in that kind of culture that people
substantive analyses
of the carnage wrought by globalized class exploitation have, for the
most part, been marginalized by the kind of radicalism that has been
instituted among the academic Left in North America. He further suggests that while
various post-Marxists have invited us to join their euphoric celebrations
honoring the decentering of capitalism, the abandonment of class politics ,
and the decline of metanarratives (particularly those of Marxism and socialism), they have failed to see
need to hear such obvious truths. Ahmad's provocative observations imply that
that the most meta of all metanarratives of the past three centuries, the creeping
annexation of the globe for the dominance of capital over laboring
humanity has met, during those same decades, with stunning success
(Ahmad, 1997b, p. 364). As such, Ahmad invites us to ask anew, the proverbial question: What, then, must be
done? To this question we offer no simple theoretical, pedagogical or political prescriptions. Yet we would argue that
MESZAROS 1995
[Istavan, Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of
Transition p. 65)
The modern state as the comprehensive political command structure of capital is
both the necessary prerequisite for the transformation of capitals at first fragmented units
into a viable system, and the overall framework for the full articulation and
maintenance of the latter as a global system. In this fundamental sense the state on account of its
constitutive and permanently sustaining role must be understood as an integral part of capitals
material ground itself. Or it contributes in a substantive way not only to the formation and consolidation of
all of the major reproductive structures of society but also to their continued functioning. However, the close
we must speak of a close match between the social metabolic ground of the capital system on the one hand, and
the modern state as the totalizing political command structure of the established productive and reproductive order
on the other. For socialists this is a most uncomfortable and challenging reciprocity. It puts into relief the sobering
any intervention in the political domain even when it envisages the radical
overthrow of the capitalist state can have only a very limited impact in the realization
of the socialist project. And the other way round, the corollary of the same sobering fact is that, precisely
because socialists have to confront the power of capitals self-sustaining reciprocity
under its fundamental dimensions, it should be never forgotten or ignored - although
the tragedy of seventy years (if Soviet experience is that it had been willfully ignored that there can be no
chance of overcoming the power of capital without remaining faithful to the Marxian concern
with the withering away of the state .
fact that
2NC Ethics
You have an ethical obligation to reject capitalism its costs
are beyond calculation
Zizek & Daly, 04
(Glyn, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University
College, Northhampton, Conversations with Zizek p. 14-16)
For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern
protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the
constitutive violence of todays global capitalism and its obscene
naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout
the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture with all its pieties concerning
multiculturalist etiquette Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called radically incorrect in the sense that
it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of todays social reality:
the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been
bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of
Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that
enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem
that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the
taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly
accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian- Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can
end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition
conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizeks point
is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives
and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marxs central
insight that in order to create universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politicodiscursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by
that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of
theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of
propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility
which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are
pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that
greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts
of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight
page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times
conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social
existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode
of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in
assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology,"
in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist
research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory
consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems
require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just
another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the
traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or
population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an
excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963).
Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial
oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata
arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or
another system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad,
class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary
stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person
from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has
an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The
working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it
argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent
The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to
different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles
of change.
have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income
distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are
overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for
economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But
this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless
related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as
the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among
others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential. Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion
that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the
crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and
the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of
experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the
interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret
those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues
that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this
is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact
that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical
attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does
not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative
difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is
important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside
class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other
forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to
acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether
we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried
and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright,
1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in
dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that
but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of
tend to
Difference needs
and
in relation to
domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in
specific contexts. Drawing on the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle the categorical (and
sometimes overly rigid) approaches to both class and difference for it was Marx himself who warned against
creating false dichotomies at the heart of our politicsthat it was absurd to choose between consciousness and the
world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will, and historical or structural determination. In a
Bannerji has pointed to the need to historicize difference in relation to the history and social organization of capital
and class (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies) and to acknowledge the changing configurations of
difference and otherness. Apprehending the meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily
highlights the importance of exploring (a) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (b) the meanings
and connotations that are attached to categories of difference; (c) how differences are produced out of, and lived
within, specific his-torical, social, and political formations; and (d) the production of difference in relation to the
it presents a challenge to
identitarian understandings of difference based almost exclusively on questions of
cultural and/or racial hegemony. In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts
to creating greater cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their
complexities, contradictions, and exploitative relations of capitalism. Moreover,
voices
more than a demand for an end to monocultural quarantine and for inclusion into
the metropolitan salons of bourgeois representation a posture that
reinscribes a neoliberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free
market capitalism . In short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace, and freedom amounts to
the liberty of all vendors to display their different cultural goods. A paradigmatic expression of this position is
encapsulated in the following passage that champions a form of difference politics whose presumed aim is to make
social groups appear.Minority and immigrant ethnic groups have laid claim to the street as a legitimate forum for
the promotion and exhibition of traditional dress, food, and culture. . . . [This] is a politics of visibility and invisibility.
Because it must deal with a tradition of representation that insists on subsuming varied social practices to a
standard norm, its struggle is as much on the page, screen . . . as it is at the barricade and in the parliament,
This
position fosters a fetishized understanding of difference in terms of
primordial and seemingly autonomous cultural identities and treats such differences
traditional forums of political intervention before the postmodern. (Fuery & Mansfield, 2000, p. 150)
as inherent, as ontologically secure cultural traits of the individuals of particular cultural communities.
Rather than exploring the construction of difference within specific contexts mediated by
the conjunctural embeddedness of power differentials, we are instead presented with an overflowing
cornucopia of cultural particularities that serve as markers of ethnicity, race, group boundaries,
and so forth. In this instance, the discourse of difference operates ideologicallycultural recognition
derived from the rhetoric of tolerance
and presents a strategy for attending to difference as solely a n ethnic, racial, or cultural
issue. What advocates of such an approach fail to acknowledge is that the forces of diversity
and difference are allowed to flourish provided that they remain within the
decapitation of discourses of intelligibility from the politics of antagonistic relations. He framed the question quite
pointedly: In a society stratified by uneven property relations, by asymmetrical allocation of resources and of
power, can there be equality of cultures and genuine toleration of differences? (pp. 232- 233).
Linguistic Turn, Materialism and Race Toward an Aesthetics of Crisis," Callaloo 24.1
(2001) 334-345, Muse)
Not only do such postmodern discourses reify culture, in what Kenan Malik calls "cultural formalism," but in their
anti-totality move and privileging of the logic of indeterminacy postmodernists suppress notions of causality.
Postmodern
discourses of race
merely
and
bracket the political economy of race, and consequently the text is set as the limit of intelligibility.
In arguing for the "constructed-ness" of race but locating it textually there is a theoretical problem in accounting for
the textual inscription of race or its extra-textual effects in daily life under capitalism (and we must account for
Postmodernists are
unable to explain why race has acquired its oppressive social meaning in the first
place and across various localities--that is race is a translocal articulation. Reading race as
essentially constructed but not accounting for its production, race is mystified
extra-textual effects because for people of color it is a matter of life and death).
and metaphysics is reintroduced ; in fact, in a recent symposium on race and racism Howard
Winant asserts that "Race remains a mysterious phenomenon"(7). Race is not a mystery as it operates today
as a material practice in marking racially coded subjects for differential levels of
surplus extraction and violence and it has an historical emergence. As Alex Callinicos indicates,
"Racism as we know it today developed during a key phase in the
development of capitalism as the dominant mode of production on a global
scale--the establishment during the 17th and 18th centuries of colonial plantations in the New World using slave
labour imported from Africa to produce consumer goods such as tobacco and sugar and industrial outputs such as
cotton for the world market" (11). As Eric Williams succinctly put it, " Slavery
postmodern discourses have moved away from ontologically based inquiries, a recent essay by Linda Alcoff
attempts to (re)configure race as an "ontological" category. Her intervention opens the possibility for foregrounding
the nexus between race and materialism. This possibility is quickly closed down as her discourse moves away from
materialism and thus for Alcoff "Race is a particular, historically and culturally located form of human categorization
articulates an empiricist idealism. Therefore what is really at stake here is not so much the question of ontology and
the related question of objectivity--which puts one on [End Page 336] the road to materialism--as much as it is the
articulation of what Roy Bhaskar has called the "epistemic fallacy" and consequently the recuperation of
experience. One must remember Alcoff's original concern was not only to "validate hybrid identity or hybrid
positionality against purist, essentialist accounts" but also to " take
to be a member of a
is to be oppressed and in this regard class is a wholly social category
(Eagleton, 1998, p. 289). Furthermore, even though class is usually invoked as part of the
aforementioned and much vaunted triptych, it is usually gutted of its practical, social
dimension or treated solely as a cultural phenomenonas just another form
of difference. In these instances, class is transformed from an economic and, indeed,
social category to an exclusively cultural or discursive one or one in which class merely
signifies a subject position. Class is therefore cut off from the political economy of capitalism
and class power severed from exploitation and a power structure in which those who
characteristics known as class which then results in their oppression; on the contrary,
social class
just
control collectively produced resources only do so because of the value generated by those who do not (Hennessy
oppression
(Marx, 1978, p. 60). With regard to this issue, Kovel (2002) is particularly insightful, for he
explicitly addresses an issue which continues to vex the Leftnamely the priority given to different categories of
what he calls dominative splittingthose categories of gender, class, race, ethnic and national exclusion, etc.
Kovel argues that we need to ask the question of priority with respect to what? He notes that if we mean priority
with respect to time , then the category of gender would have priority since there are traces of gender oppression in
all other forms of oppression. If we were to prioritize in terms of existential significance , Kovel suggests that we
would have to depend upon the immediate historical forces that bear down on distinct groups of peoplehe offers
examples of Jews in 1930s Germany who suffered from brutal forms of anti-Semitism and Palestinians today who
classism to go along with sexism and racism, and species-ism). This is, first of all, because class is an
essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without
gender distinctionsalthough we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is
eminently imaginableindeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species time on earth,
during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because class
signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races
Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation
of womens labor. (Kovel, 2002, pp. 123124)
***Anti-Blackness***
1NC Anti-Blackness
The affirmative is the perfect example of #AllLivesMatter
their focus on contingent violence of Muslim oppression puts
anti-blackness as an afterthought their erasure of this
ontological condition is inexcusable the combination of
struggles through the perm is genocide
Qalander 15, (Mast Qalander is a Pakistani Muslim who advocates anti-racist, anticolonial feminism. She has published multiple books and essays/articles on the matters of
social justice. WHY IM NOT DOWN WITH #MUSLIMLIVESMATTER,
https://muslimreverie.wordpress.com/tag/anti-black-racism-in-the-muslim-community/, )
I dont have a twitter account, but Im well aware of how hashtags can be used
as tools to express solidarity, speak out, and mobilize against injustice.
Almost immediately after the Chapel Hill murders, I noticed a lot of Muslims on
Facebook using the hashtag #MuslimLivesMatter. It was heartbreaking to
hear the news and I understood the grief Muslims were expressing online.
However, I cringed when I saw the hashtag because I recalled all of the
critiques of #AllLivesMatter, which was used online and in activist rallies/spaces
as a response to #BlackLivesMatter. Though #MuslimLivesMatter is not
exactly the same as #AllLivesMatter, it still co-opts the movement against
police brutality and racism that systematically targets, terrorizes, and
devalues black people. It became more unsettling when I watched South Asian,
Arab, white, and other non-black Muslims posting up both
#MuslimLivesMatter and #AllLivesMatter. While there are many people who
mean well when they post these hashtags, I still see a disturbing amount of people
getting very defensive (and even make racist remarks) when they are informed
about how these hashtags co-opt and appropriate #BlackLivesMatter (and this is
yet another example of how we cannot make it about peoples intentions). When
they persist in posting these hashtags, it seems like they are doing it out
of defiance against #BlackLivesMatter, as if the latter is ethnocentric
and supposedly doesnt value the lives of non-black people. The
persistence and refusal to listen also reflects the anti-blackness that
exists in our communities . I know this is an issue that needs to be addressed
sensitively. We know the lives of brown Muslims are not valued in this
society and I know there are lot of Muslims who are shaken up or feel triggered
after the brutal murders of Deah Barakat, Yusor Abu-Salha, and Razan Abu-Salha.
Hashtags may seem trivial to some, but they become more than hashtags
when we see them used to organize protests and movements.
#BlackLivesMatter was created by three self-identified Black queer women, Alicia
Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi. As Garza writes : Black Lives Matter is
an ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives are
systematically and intentionally targeted for demise. It is an affirmation
of Black folks contributions to this society, our humanity, and our
resilience in the face of deadly oppression [] W hen we deploy All Lives
Matter as to correct an intervention specifically created to address antiblackness,, we lose the ways in which the state apparatus has built a
program of genocide and repression mostly on the backs of Black people
beginning with the theft of millions of people for free laborand then adapted it
to control,
murder, and profit off of other communities of color and immigrant communities. We perpetuate a level
of White supremacist domination by reproducing a tired trope that we are
all the same, rather than acknowledging that non-Black oppressed people
in this country are both impacted by racism and domination, and
simultaneously, BENEFIT from anti-black racism . When you drop Black
from the equation of whose lives matter, and then fail to acknowledge it
came from somewhere, you further a legacy of erasing Black lives and
Black contributions from our movement legacy . And consider whether or not when
dropping the Black you are, intentionally or unintentionally, erasing Black folks from the conversation or
homogenizing very different experiences. The legacy and prevalence of anti-Black racism and hetero-patriarchy is a
lynch pin holding together this unsustainable economy. And thats not an accidental analogy. There are excellent
critiques that I will quote and share below about #MuslimLivesMatter (because I believe they do a better job at
the media and Hollywood has demonized Muslims and Islam for a very long time. We know that Islamophobia isnt
something that only started after 9/11, but existed well before that. We know how the massacres against
Palestinians, Iraqis, Afghans, and Pakistanis show us how brown people are not seen as human beings, especially if
they are Muslim. At the same time,
accept all Muslims (he liked to emphasize on how Malcolm started to accept white people). The conclusion the
a post one of these days on how religious and community leaders, especially those in the west, use Islam to silence
anti-racism). Well hear non-black Muslims speak highly of Hazrat Bilal (peace be upon him), the Abyssinian
companion of the Prophet, and how he was chosen specifically by the Prophet to be Islams first muezzin. Well hear
them talk about how beautiful his voice must have been and how he was one of the most trusted companions of the
when
it comes to the way we treat black people or talk about black people,
whether Muslim or not, there is no denying that anti-black racism exists
and needs to be actively addressed and challenged. Well still hear Arab, South
Asian, white, and other non-black Muslims use the n-word (and even argue that they can
Prophet. Well also hear talk about how Islam doesnt tolerate racism and point to Hazrat Bilal as proof. Yet,
reclaim the term) and use derogatory, anti-black words in Arabic, Urdu/Hindi, and other languages. When two
Somali Muslims, Mustafa Mattan and Abdisamad Sheikh-Hussein, were recently murdered (Mattan was murdered a
day before the Chapel Hill murders), we didnt see the same outrage from Muslims in North America nor did we see
the start of Muslim Lives Matter. It was necessary and important that Muslims spoke out against the murders of
SUV that had a message reading Islam is worse than Ebola on the rear-view mirror. The Islamophobia and antiMuslim violence was frighteningly explicit in this case, but why wasnt there a national outcry about his murder
from Muslim communities and national organizations? As Khaled A. Beydoun and Margari Hill recently wrote in their
article, The Colour of Muslim Mourning: The curious case of Mustafa Mattan is as much a story of intra-racial
division and anti-black racism within the Muslim population as it is a narrative about the neglected death of a young
man seeking a better life far from home The outpouring of support and eulogies that followed their deaths
revealed that Deah, Yusor and Razan were, in life and in death, archetypes of young, Muslim Americans. Lives
neglected by the media, but ones that mattered greatly for Muslims inside and outside of the US. [] Despite a few
vocal critics, Mattans erasure in the discussion of Islamophobia in North America is evident. The exclusion of
Mattan and Sheikh-Hussein perpetuates a harmful hierarchy that privileges Arab narratives and excludes
black/African Muslims. This racial stratification relegating black Muslim lives is evident as much in death as it is in
need to understand that these critiques are more than just about
hashtags. Because #BlackLivesMatter is not just a hashtag, it
represents a movement . We can create our own hashtag and call for
justice and solidarity for all Muslims without co-opting, appropriating,
and/or stepping upon the rights of other communities.
#JusticeForMuslims and
#OurThreeWinners (the latter was started by the victims family) should be used instead. Below is an excerpt from
Anas Whites excellent article, A Black Muslim Response To #MuslimLivesMatter: #BlackLivesMatter began as a
statement to an establishment an overall system if you will, declaring the seeming unrecognized value of black
lives. It continues to hold that same meaning, even as it moves to become an expression of the movement itself. A
movement against deep rooted systemic racism, high rates of police brutality, extra-judicial executions, media
smearing and vitriol, and the failure of the justice system to actually hold anyone accountable for dead black men,
except dead black men. It is important to remember, that #
[] A
12 year old black boy was shot and killed for playing with a BB gun, his sister then handcuffed to watch him bleed.
A black father was killed in a Walmart, holding a toy gun sold at that very Walmart, in a state where it is legal to
carry guns. A black father was shot in the back, while handcuffed. A black father was essentially choked to death in
high definition. A black protest was met with a para-military, and national guard troops. A black woman was shot
seeking help. A black man was literally lynched. Where were you then? My respect to every single one of you that
ever attended a protest, and to every Imam that ever gave mention, but I mean this on a deeper level. Where was
the Muslim community in response to these egregious civil rights violations? Where is the Muslim community in
solidarity with a movement against these civil, and even human rights issues? And an excerpt from Sabahs article,
Stop
another peoples struggle. And solidarity, while important (and in fact, essential), never involves co-opting another
movement. [] There is obviously nothing inherently wrong with saying that Muslim lives matter, but
contextually, its being used parallel to #BlackLivesMatter its meant to evoke the same concepts, using the
same kind of language.
and frankly unfair to both the Black and Muslim communities . We should
not be blending together two complex, multifaceted issues for the sake of
convenience. Its a reductive move that simplifies both struggles, and it
only contributes to erasing the very real, very dangerous implications that
Islamophobia specifically holds for Muslims.
Anti-blackness and Islamophobia structure American Black Muslim subjects through opposing regimes of identity
and visibility There is a scene in Alex Haleys miniseries Roots where Kunta Kinte, the enslaved protagonist, is in the
hold of a cargo ship en route to the Americas. Having succumbed to nausea, he vomits on himself. Kunta is lying
prone, squeezed into a tiny space packed with hundreds of other tortured Black bodies. Humiliated, he turns to a
warrior from his village in Gambia who is chained alongside him on the roiling ship and shouts aloud that he is still a
man as though the words themselves made it true. The warrior turns to him and says, Kunta, Allah sees. He
than three or four persons, or any other self-determined social custom, non-Christian religiosity was a threat to be
Muslim slaves and freedpeople in Georgia and South Carolina maintained their traditions at great risk to themselves
in places like Sapelo Island and St. Simons Island self-contained majority-Black enclaves with large, centralized
plantation infrastructures. The first piece of Islamic jurisprudence written on U.S. soil was written some time in the
17th or even 16th century by an enslaved West African, likely from Guinea, named Bilali or Ben Ali Mohammet.
Black Muslims existed prior to the colonial systems which brought them to
the Americas, and they have been fighting assimilation for centuries. For a
long time, to be Black has been to be Muslim. For many Americans, the
two identities have been part of an active praxis of resistance that has
been made hard to see in the archive of U.S. history. Much like in the
central dogmas of more well-known and sometimes parallel Black
Christian liberation movements, the Black American Muslim subject has
always been whole in the eyes of her God. In Roots, Kunta is warned of the dangers of
practicing his faith by an elder named Fiddler: You know white folks dont like that kind of praying. Youll make
sanctuary and salvation to the enslaved and the oppressed in America for
generations. But the brutal trappings of anti-blackness would remain. * * *
Ontology, the worlds semantic field, is sutured not simply by white supremacy. More specifically, it is held together
scholars have come to understand the barracoons, slave holds, and plantations of the Middle Passage as spatial,
discursive, ontological, and economic analogues of modern punishment that have haunted their way into the
present. Folk rationalizations for anti-Blackness from above and below have survived along with these growths,
sustaining cartoonish claims about Black people and Blackness that still structure our most quotidian choices as
citizens.
immigrants enter into when they land on U.S. shores. Its an implicit contract with explicit aims: when you come to
youd better not ally yourself in any way with Black people or
Blackness if you expect to get ahead. Black people are bad news. For Arabs
and South Asians who make up a significant portion of the U.S. Muslim community, this
manifests in a model-minority ethos that uses Black Americans as an
example of what not to do and who not to affiliate with. I experienced this myself as
a young Black Muslim woman, and it disgusted me. Ya abid ! It was not uncommon to hear jokes
whose punchline rested on a word that meant, essentially, nigger. When I
resisted what I saw as racism from my Muslims peers, I would receive a
half-hearted, but we dont mean you! We mean those other Black
people! My grandmother was a Black Somali woman who worked as law enforcement in the Emirates in the
America,
late 1970s. Widowed tragically youngmy grandfather died in his fortiesshe was forced to take the position of
breadwinner for her family, my young mother and her eight siblings. At the time, male police officers were not
culturally permitted to deal with unmarried female subjects alone. Religious custom dictated the need for a small
force of female officers, hijabis, who would process or interview women that the male police officers could not freely
engage with. As a result, my mother and her siblings attended high school in Abu Dhabi, at an Arab school. My
grandmother was and still is a hard woman. My mother and aunts and uncles, all nine of them, would learn Arabic
and attempt to assimilate into Emirati life. But despite being an embodied representative of the state as a police
officer, she suffered profound racism from Arab citizens. My mother didnt talk freely about growing up in Abu
Dhabi. As a child, I would pry for details sparingly given by her at long intervals. Because she would ritualistically
remind me of the privilege I had growing up in the West, I wondered what her girlhood was like. I dreamed of my
mothers adolescent becoming: Where did she go to high school ? What was it like? How did she meet my father?
These chapters were always missing, carefully excluded from the abridged version of her youth I got: the stories
she would tell us of Somalia. Ha Nolaato! I was sure I came from a beautiful place in Africa where beaches were
endless and guavas and papayas grew bigger than my head. Whats more, Hooyo inscribed Black is beautiful on
my brain when I was still small. Her standards of beauty and self were determinedly Afrocentric, something I would
later learn was an act of resistance in her childrearing. But my mother would always tell me I was a Muslimah too,
something I tried to incorporate into the way carried myselfeven as a little girl. It wasnt until I was out in the
world myselfin the House of God of all placesthat I would understand and experience anti-Blackness for the first
time. At twelve, my tearful recounting of racism from my Brown Muslim peers at the kitchen table prompted my
mother to finally open up to me about her own experiences in the Emirates growing up. They were ugly: her peers
bullied her and her siblings systematically and on racial grounds. Abid was a word painfully familiar to her but
not one she expected to follow her through space and time, across the sea to the West. Here, where we would start
over from the smoldering trauma the Somali Civil War left in its wake, we were still just niggers. Even to those we
shared our deen with. My mother was heartbroken that she could not protect me from cruelties of those she saw as
her own people, but chose to teach me to love Blackness and love Allah nonetheless. In her eyes and in His, I was
whole. * * * As Black folks, we are in practice not a part of the larger community of Muslims; we are allowed to
practice, but we dont share deen with the ummah. America is home to the most racially diverse group of Muslims
in the world, but the community is still segregated. What does it mean to be seen as Muslim ? As a legitimate
believer? Whatever the answer, in the eyes of many U.S. Muslims today, its negated by Blackness. Black Muslims
are a contradiction in termsinvisible despite being the foundation for the faith in the country. Black Muslims are
not seen as true Muslims. And that is the moral equivocation that legitimizes and props up all manner of anti-Black
racism in American Muslim community today. Black people are not seen as viable potential partners in Muslim faith
or love; Black families are not accepted into Muslim faith communities outside of their own.
State violence
ask: does Black Life Matter to the Muslim community? Is the Muslim
community aware of the structural impacts of anti-Black racism in
America? The very idea of a larger coherent Muslim community is thrown
into question when we confront cultural rifts as deep, wide, and painful as
these. The public perception of Muslims, particularly since the faith was thrust into the spotlight post 9/11,
remains riddled with misconceptions. Racist stereotypes external to the Muslim community dictate that Americans
still think of Muslims as brown bearded men. As recently as the white supremacist massacre at a Sikh gurdwara in
Oak Creek, Wisconsin, the conflation of Sikh men who wear turbans with Muslims has had deadly consequences. In
2013, Columbia Professor Prabhjot Singh, who studied hate crimes against Sikhs wrongly believed to be Muslim in
the U.S. post-9/11, was himself the target for such violence. He was attacked by a group of young men on his way
home in what was believed to be a hate crime. I heard, Terrorist, Osama, get him, Singh recalled, explaining in a
New York Times article after the attack that Our turban and beard are a trigger for fear in the minds of many
Americans. Public perception of Muslims as the bearded brown other post-9/11 functions as a shadowy parallel to
Islamophobic state violence, the vigilante enforcer of racial categories of difference. Islamophobia is a lived reality
for everyone who is Muslim, including those who are seen as Muslim but are not. Because Black Muslims are not
perceived as Muslim, they face rogue Islamophobic violence less oftenbut when that violence comes, their deaths
do not garner as much outrage or mobilize Muslims in the same ways. Around the same time three young Arab
Muslims were murdered in their Chapel Hill home, a Somali Muslim man was shot through the door of his apartment
in Fort McMurray, Alberta. While Deah, Yusor, and Razans deaths trended worldwide, Mustafa Mattans murder was
barely a passing blip outside of the Somali community. In a thought-provoking article co-written by UCLA Professor
Khaled Beydoun and Muslim Anti-Racist Collaborative cofounder Margari Hill entitled The Color of Muslim
Mourning, the authors pointedly ask the Muslim community who they prioritize and why. Deahs fundraiser for
dental supplies for Syrian refugees went from $20,000 before his death to $380,000. In contrast, Mattans family
the downward thrust of cognitive dissonance: you will always be too Black
to be a true Muslim, but you must live with all of the pain that America
inflicts on both Black people and Muslims. How are we to understand ourselves and our
social locations, if being Muslim precludes being Black, which cannot be reconciled with being an American subject ?
Civil Society and the world as we know it are built upon black
dispossession and death and are not elastic enough to
contemplate a truly radical black position. The onus is on the
aff to prove that blackness is of this world, before they can
access their reformism claims.
Wilderson III
(Frank B., Associate Professor of African American Studies and Drama at the University of
10
Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims
successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on
positing an operational analytic for cinema, film studies, and political theory that
appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and
Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today's Blacks in the United States as Slaves and everyone else
(with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by
demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully
made on the state has come to pass. In other words, the election of a
Black president aside, police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and
substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of HIV infection, and
the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the
lived experience of Black life. But such empirically based rejoinders would
lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on "solid" ground,
which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to
appeal to "facts," the "historical record," and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned
Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates
ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a position
the Slave
is, to borrow from Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous
violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a
against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, its corporeal integrity; if
awaits an answer.
semiotics; we have a past but no a heritage. To the data generating demands of the Historical Axis, we present a
This places us in a
position, one that is outside the articulations of
also places hegemony in a structurally impossible
this is key- our presence works back on the
and threatens it with its incoherence. If every subject,
virtual blank, much like that which the Khoisian presented to the Anthropological Axis.
structurally impossible
hegemony. However, it
possible because-and
grammar of hegemony
even the most massacred among them, Indians- is required to have analogs within the nations structuring narrative
the experience of one subject on whom the nations order of wealth was
built is without analog then that subjects presence destabilizes all other
analogs. Fanon writes: Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of
the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder. If we take him at his word,
then we must accept that no other body functions in the Imaginary, Symbolic, or the
Real so completely as a repository of complete disorder as the black body.
and
Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of the Real, for in its magnetizing of bullets the black body
functions as a map of gratuitous violence through which civil society is possible-namely, those bodies for which
violence is, or can be, contingent. Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of the Symbolic, for
blackness in America generates no categories for the chromosome of history and no data for the categories of
immigration or sovereignty. It is an experience with analog-a past without a heritage. Blackness is the site of
prison abolition. If a social movement is to be neither a social-democratic nor Marxist in terms of structure of
political desire, then it should grasps the invitation to assume the positionality of subjects of social death. If we are
to be honest with ourselves, we must admit that the Negro has been inviting whites, as well as civil societys
junior partners, to the dance of social death for hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps. They
have been, and remain today-even in the most anti-racist movements, such as the prison abolition movementinvested elsewhere. This is not to say that all oppositional political desire today is pro white, but is usually anti
incoherence,
and allow oneself to be elaborated but, if indeed, ones politics are to be underwritten by a
desire to take down this country. If this is not the desire that underwrites ones politics, then through what strategy
of legitimation is the word prison being linked to the word abolition? What are this movements lines of political
(unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps coalitions today prefer to remain in-orgasmic in the face of civil
society with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. If through this stasis or paralysis they try to do the
work of prison abolition, the work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (Le., the worker) on
behalf of a position of incoherence of the black subject, or prison slave. In this way, s ocial
formations on
the left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between workers
and slaves. They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil
society and function less as revolutionary proses than as crowding out
scenarios of black antagonisms, simply feeding our frustration. Whereas the positionality of the
worker (whether a factory worker demanding a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a
Jew] belongs to the race of those [who] since the beginning of time have never known cannibalism. What an idea,
to eat ones father! Simple enough one has only not to be a nigger [emphasis mine]...[I]n my case everything takes
on a new guise. I am the slave not of an idea others have of me but of my own appearance. (Black Skin, White
simple
enough one has only not to be [black] a nigger.xvi This, I submit, is the essence of
being for the White and non-Black position: ontology scaled down to a
global common denominator. The other tension is found in the
impossibility of ethical dilemmas for the Black: I am, Fanon writes, a slave
not of an idea others have of me but of my own appearance. Being can
thus be thought of, in the first ontological instance, as non- niggerness; and
Masks 115-16) Two tensions are at work here. One operates under the labor of ethical dilemmas--
slavery then as niggerness. The visual field, my own appearance, is the cut, the mechanism that elaborates the
Whereas
Humans exist on some plane of being and thus can become existentially
present through some struggle for/of/through recognition, Blacks cannot
attain the plane of recognition (West 82). Spillers, Fanon, and Hartman maintain that the
violence that has positioned and repetitively re-positions the Black as a
void of historical movement is without analog in the suffering dynamics of
the ontologically alive. The violence that turns the African into a thing is
without analog because it does not simply oppress the Black through
tactile and empirical technologies of oppression, like the little family quarrels which for
Fanon exemplify the Jewish Holocaust. Rather, the gratuitous violence of the Blacks first
division between the non-niggerness and slavery, the difference between the living and the dead.
Subjective vertigo is vertigo of the event. But the sensation that one is
not simply spinning in an otherwise stable environment, that ones
environment is perpetually unhinged stems from a relationship to violence that cannot be
analogized. This is called objective vertigo, a life constituted by disorientation rather
than a life interrupted by disorientation. This is structural as opposed to
performative violence. Black subjectivity is a crossroads where vertigoes
meet, the intersection of performative and structural violence. [4] Elsewhere I
have argued that the Black is a sentient being though not a Human being. The Blacks and the Humans disparate relationship to
violence is at the heart of this failure of incorporation and analogy. The Human suffers contingent violence, violence that kicks in
when s/he resists InTensions Journal Copyright 2011 by York University (Toronto, Canada) Issue 5 (Fall/Winter 2011) ISSN# 19135874 Wilderson The Vengeance of Vertigo 4 (or is perceived to resist) the disciplinary discourse of capital and/or Oedipus. But
for the Black, as for the slave, there are no cognitive maps,
no conceptual frameworks of suffering and dispossession which are
analogic with the myriad maps and frameworks which explain the
dispossession of Human subalterns.
Rico as a territory. But
When discussing anti-Black racism amongst Arab-Americans one often finds themselves immersed in reductionism,
apologetics and ponderous efforts to incapacitate any discourse at all related to the subject. For some ,
the
very idea that anti-Black racism exists not only abroad but within ArabAmerican communities brings with it a wave of humiliation which rapidly creeps
over them, while for others this subject induces a mixture of outright denial peppered with unashamed bouts of
acrimony. This issue is one that demands a much more dynamic and vigorous response, and it is about time we do
more than have a conversation about a worrisome subject that continues to generate immense trauma for its
victims. As explained in Dancing on Live Embers: Challenging Racism in Organizations, by Tina Lopez and Barb
Thomas, institutional racism stems from a network of structures, practices and policies which construct advantages
for white people and oppression, disadvantage and discrimination for racialized people, this includes specific
practices and laws which enforce segregation in housing, employment and education and the policies and
procedures work to marginalize and exclude people of color. Structural racism is the intersection of many folds of
institutional power so as to normalize and legitimize racism. It allows individuals to practice racism unchecked.
rise of race, racism, racial violence, white supremacy, and racial colonialism." - Professor Reiland Rabaka Our
communities must recognize that the active convergence of racism, colonialism and capitalism is necessary to
interpret the historical context of societal inequality because, in the words of Reiland Rabaka, Professor of African,
African American, and Caribbean Studies in the Department of Ethnic Studies at the University of Colorado, from his
work on Black radical politics, Capitalism is utterly incomprehensible without connecting it to the rise of race,
racism, racial violence, white supremacy, and racial colonialism" (Du Boiss Dialectics: Black Radical Politics and the
Reconstruction of Critical Social Theory). Psychiatrist, and political radical Frantz Fanon, whose philosophies
continue to impact anti-racist and leftist movements, born in 1925 on what was then a French colony on the
Caribbean island of Martinique, discusses these crossings in chapter 5 of Black Skin, White Masks (1952) in which
he writes of what he calls the lived experience of the black; the discovery of his blackness and the ever-present
whiteness around him. In the aforementioned chapter, Fanon continues to grapple with not only his identity as a
black man but the confluence of class, capitalism and colonialism and their effects on the colonized - from the
racialized political-economic nature of imperialism, including its push for civilizing regions of the world and the
creation of the other, to branches of capitalism which deny the very humanity of said other.
The Negro
problem does not resolve itself into the problem of Negroes living among
white men but rather of Negroes exploited, enslaved, despised by a
colonialist, capitalist society that is only accidentally white , writes Fanon in
chapter 6 of Black Skin, White Masks (The Negro and The Psychopathology); expounding upon the manner in which
racism has been institutionalized so as to not only continue but rationalize the subjugation of one group by another.
Fanons fiery response to racism and colonialism came by way of his masterpiece The Wretched of The Earth (1961)
- where we find colonialism there is capitalism, and where there is capitalism there is racism and where these
pieces intersect is where we discover the native robbed of his economic, political and human rights. With this in
mind,
be viewed through a lense that reaches far beyond the lowest tier, that of
social interactions; the language employed, including the use of
admit that we are complicit in the demoralization and subjugation of Black persons and communities, and that the
extensive exploitation of these communities is oftentimes denied or outright justified. Dawud Walid, the Executive
Director of the Michigan chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-MI), has been one of many
African-Americans bringing attention to pervasive anti-Blackness both online and on the ground, demanding that
the use of the word abeed end and challenging Arab-Americans to do more than endlessly call for dialogue. This
issue has been dealt with too passively for many years, writes Walid. He goes on to note that
Arab-
The romanticism surrounding oppressed peoples is pervasive, especially amongst those involved in
anti-racist work who, while claiming to be allies, engage in increasingly dominant savior-esque fetishism. What
comes after recognizing the existence of racist structures and the identification of our own complicity is a long but
necessary course of action that entails working against these structures and the tokenization that sometimes
follows social justice organizations and activities. The romanticism surrounding oppressed peoples is pervasive,
especially amongst those involved in anti-racist work who, while claiming to be allies, engage in increasingly
dominant savior-esque fetishism and thereby turn powerful opportunities to learn from and engage with
marginalized communities into narcissistic therapy sessions where their voices overwhelm and muffle the narratives
of these groups; those who tokenize these communities oftentimes come across as well-intentioned but their
actions are no less destructive. We are not giving a voice to the voiceless, as the tired adage goes, because their
voices surround us - in the words of Lilla Watson, Australian aboriginal artist, activist and educator: If you have
come here to help me, you are wasting our time. But if you have come because your liberation is bound up with
mine, then let us work together.
puzzling is the singularly incoherent nature of the reasoning demonstrated in current race talk, a failure, that is, to
offer cogent accounts of the implications of this newfound (or, more precisely, rediscovered) complexity. Taken
together, these twin ambiguities beg a key question: what economies of enunciation are involved in this broadly
provocative thought on this score. During a symposium on critical race theory at the Yale Law School
ethical law hence his ambiguous references to Kanta law justifying risk and ruin rather than sacrifice and
resignation. Hence, the move from colonialism to decolonization represents a
move, not from the ethical into history, but involves a radical leap into a
way of life based on indeterminate negation, a negation without end but
always at work in the depths of history . On the other hand, Fanon also states, "My black skin
is not the wrapping of specific values. It is a long time since the starry sky that took away Kant's breath revealed
the last of its secrets to us. And the moral law is not certain of itself" (Fanon; Black Skin, 227). This statement
follows another explicit reference to Kant: "One duty alone: That of not renouncing my freedom through my
choices" (229). The text referred to here is Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, which concludes as follows: "Two
things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on
them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me."19 It is important to note that Fanon is not
denying Kant's confidence in the sublime presentation of moral ideas, which, in the Critique of Judgment, Kant
argues discloses the whole power (Macht) of the mind. Rather he is stating that Kant's enthusiasm for the infinitude
of the starry heavens-the infinitude of which allows us to recognize, in turn, the infinite destiny of our own moral
nature-cannot happen in the Antilles. It cannot happen there precisely because of the racial distribution of guilt and
its paralysis at the level of the imaginary. Fanon's critique of Kant echoes that of Nietzsche's. For Nietzsche, the
sacrificial exercise of morality in Kantian ethics results in impotence when the will to obey the law against natural
desire and out of no interested motive-not even fear-overwhelms the individual and produces the resort to
ressentiment, the culture of reaction. Nietzsche is not condemning the disciplining of natural desire, on the
contrary, he commends it, but what he objects to is its moralized accountability, when it is justified as disinterested
misrecognized form, not of law, but of will to power. Its crueltyfrom Kants perspective its indifference to
Masks explores this aporia in terms of a question: namely, what is it about colonial authority that allows it to
generate forms of nihilistic passivity rather than Kants inner freedom of moral law? What is it about the
autonomous imposition of duty that turns the black subject into a reactive affect, thematized here as a submission
to racialized time and history? Colonial power reveals the limits of Kants categorical law here understood as the
autonomous imposition of duty. The moral law is uncertain of itself in the Antilles because colonial racism makes
that law, in terms of duty, an impossible demand which is aporetic: be like me and do not be like me, be white but
not quite. As such, colonialism transforms the moral law into a will to power based on racial exclusion. In order to
grasp why Fanon thinks this is the case, I have explored the relation between the loss that racial forgetting
represents and the negative sublimity of moral law in the Antilles. A
inevitably,
negativity
that
exposes , almost
one defined by its perpetual readiness to wage war against the colonized
at the level of both ideological fantasy and psyche. For Fanon, colonialism
operates a pure power politics completely divested of ethical and
charts civil society's semiotics; we have a past but not a heritage. To the data-generating demands of the Historical
This
places us in a structurally impossible position, one that is outside the
articulations of hegemony. However, it also places hegemony in a
structurally impossible position because-and this is key-our presence works
back on the grammar of hegemony and threatens it with incoherence. If every subject
Axis, we present a virtual blank, much like that which the Khoisan presented to the Anthropological Axis.
even the most massacred among them, Indians-is required to have analogs within the nation's structuring narrative,
and the experience of one subject on whom the nation's order of wealth was built is without analog, then that
subject's presence destabilizes all other analogs. Fanon writes, "Decolonization, which sets out to change the order
of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder.nIl If we take him at his word, then we must accept that
no other body functions in the Imaginary, the Symbolic, or the Real so completely as a repository of complete
disorder as the black body. Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of the Real, for in its magnetizing
of bullets the black body functions as the map of gratuitous violence through which civil society is possible-namely,
those bodies for which violence is, or can be, contingent. Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of
the Symbolic, for blackness in America generates no categories for the chromosome of history and no data for the
categories of immigration or sovereignty. It is an experience without analog-a past without a heritage. Blackness is
the site of absolute dereliction at the level of the Imagi nary, for
whoever says "prison" says black (Sexton), and whoever says "AIDS" says black-the
"Negro is a phobogenic object."13 Indeed, it means all those things: a phobogenic object, a
past without a heritage, the map of gratuitous violence, and a program of
complete disorder. Whereas this realization is, and should be, cause for alarm, it should not be cause for
(Fanon),
lament or, worse, disavowal-not at least, for a true revolutionary or for a truly revolutionary movement such as
worker demand ing a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward
Wilderson (an associate professor of African American studies and drama at the University of California, Irvine.
He is the author of Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid (2008), winner of the American Book Award. killed
apartheid officials in South Africa, nuff said)
Antagonisms, pgs. Ix-x) CA
2010 (Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S.
unfortunate turn of events (Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid), so I'll not rehearse the details here.
Suffice it to say, this book germinated in the many political and academic discussions and debates that I was
fortunate enough to be a part of at a historic moment and in a place where the word revolution was spoken in
earnest, free of qualifiers and irony. For their past and ongoing ideas and interventions, I extend solidarity and
appreciation to comrades Amanda Alexander, Franco Barchiesi, Teresa Barnes, Patrick Bond, Ashwin Desai, Nigel
Gibson, Steven Greenberg, Allan Horowitz, Bushy Kelebonye (deceased), Tefu Kelebonye, Ulrike Kistner, Kamogelo
Lekubu, Andile Mngxitama, Prishani Naidoo, John Shai, and S'bu Zulu.
Frank B. Wilderson 2010 [Frank B., killed apartheid officials in South Africa, nuff said, Red, White & Black: Cinema
and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pages 1-5]
When I was a young student at Columbia University in New York there was
a Black woman who used to stand outside the gate and yell at Whites,
Latinos, and East- and South Asian students, staff, and faculty as they
entered the university. She accused them of having stolen her sofa and of selling her into
slavery. She always winked at the Blacks, though we didnt wink back. Some of us thought her
outbursts too bigoted and out of step with the burgeoning ethos of
multiculturalism and rainbow coalitions to endorse. But others did not wink back
because we were too fearful of the possibility that her isolation would
become our isolation, and we had come to Columbia for the express, though largely assumed and unspoken,
purpose of foreclosing upon that peril. Besides, people said she was crazy. Later, when I
attended UC Berkeley, I saw a Native American man sitting on the
sidewalk of Telegraph Avenue. On the ground in front of him was an upside down
hat and a sign informing pedestrians that here was where they could
settle the Land Lease Accounts that they had neglected to settle all of
their lives. He too, so went the scuttlebutt, was crazy. Leaving aside for the moment their state of mind, it
would seem that the structure, that is to say the rebar, or better still the grammar of their
demandsand, by extension, the grammar of their sufferingwas indeed an ethical
grammar. Perhaps their grammars are the only ethical grammars available to
modern politics and modernity writ large, for they draw our attention not to the way in which space
and time are used and abused by enfranchised and violently powerful interests, but to the violence that
underwrites the modern worlds capacity to think, act, and exist spatially
and temporally. The violence that robbed her of her body and him of his
land provided the stage upon which other violent and consensual dramas
could be enacted. Thus, they would have to be crazy, crazy enough to call not merely the actions of the world to
account but to call the world itself to account, and to account for them no less! The woman at Columbia was
not demanding to be a participant in an unethical network of distribution :
she was not demanding a place within capital, a piece of the pie (the demand for her sofa notwithstanding). Rather, she was
articulating a triangulation between, on the one hand, the loss of her
body, the very dereliction of her corporeal integrity, what Hortense
Spillers charts as the transition from being a being to becoming a being
for the captor (206), the drama of value (the stage upon which surplus value is extracted from labor power through
commodity production and sale); and on the other, the corporeal integrity that, once
ripped from her body, fortified and extended the corporeal integrity of
everyone else on the street. She gave birth to the commodity and to the
Human, yet she had neither subjectivity nor a sofa to show for it. In her eyes, the worldand not its myriad
discriminatory practices, but the world itselfwas unethical. And yet, the world passes by her
without the slightest inclination to stop and disabuse her of her claim. Instead, it calls
her crazy. And to what does the world attribute the Native American mans insanity? Hes crazy if he thinks hes getting
any money out of us? Surely, that doesnt make him crazy. Rather it is simply an indication that he does not have a big enough gun.
intellectually, and cinematicallyunless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Return
Turtle Island to the Savage. Repair the demolished subjectivity of the
Slave. Two simple sentences, twelve simple words, and the structure of U.S.
(and perhaps global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An ethical modernity would no longer
sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been
promoted to the level of antagonisms: class struggle, gender conflict, immigrants rights.
When pared down to twelve words and two sentences, one cannot but wonder why questions that go to the heart of the ethicopolitical, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides, and even socially and
politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem
for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clearif the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors,
the archive of progressive scholars, and the plethora of Left-wing broadsides are anything to go byis that what can so easily be
spoken is now (five hundred years and two hundred fifty million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that they not only
render their speaker crazy but become themselves impossible to imagine. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, Left-
the
questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not Should the
U.S. be overthrown? or even Would it be overthrown? but rather when
and howand, for some, whatwould come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that there remained a discernable
leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable.i In the 1960s and early 1970s
quantum of ethics in the U.S. writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King, Jr. prior to his 1968 shift, to
the Tom Hayden wing of SDS, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of SNCC, to Bobbie Kennedy Democrats) were accountable,
in their rhetorical machinations, to the paradigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the
the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks.ii One could (and many did) acknowledge Americas
strength and power. This seldom, however, rose to the level of an ethical assessment, but rather remained an assessment of the so-
of all retreated as did White radicals and progressives who retired from struggle. The questions echo lies buried in the
graves of young Black Panthers, AIM Warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers, or in prison cells where so many of them have
been rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, thirty years, and at the gates of the academy where the crazies shout
at passers-by. Gone are not only the young and vibrant voices that affected a seismic shift on the political landscape, but also the
intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary
political discourse in the streets nor of intellectual discourse in the academy? The answer is no in the sense that, as history has
shown, what cannot be articulated as political discourse in the streets is doubly foreclosed upon in screenplays and in scholarly
prose; but yes in the sense that in even the most taciturn historical moments such as ours, the grammar of Black and Red
suffering breaks in on this foreclosure, albeit like the somatic compliance of hysterical symptomsit registers in both cinema and
scholarship as symptoms of awareness of the structural antagonisms. Between 1967 and 1980, we could think cinematically and
intellectually of Blackness and Redness as having the coherence of full-blown discourses. But from 1980 to the present, Blackness
and Redness manifests only in the rebar of cinematic and intellectual (political) discourse that is, as unspoken grammars. This
grammar can be discerned in the cinematic strategies (lighting, camera angles, image composition, and acoustic strategiesdesign),
even when the script labors for the spectator to imagine social turmoil through the rubric of conflict (that is, a rubric of problems
that can be posed and conceptually solved) as opposed to the rubric of antagonism (an irreconcilable struggle between entities, or
positionalities, the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions). In other words, even
when films narrate a story in which Blacks or Indians are beleaguered with problems that the script insists are conceptually coherent
(usually having to do with poverty or the absence of family values) the non-narrative, or cinematic, strategies of the film often
disrupt this coherence by posing the irreconcilable questions of Red and Black political ontologyor non-ontology. The grammar of
which underwrite Film Theory and political discourse (in this book, discourse elaborated in direct relation to radical action), and
is also
unspoken. This notwithstanding, film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume an
which underwrite cinematic speech (in this book, Red, White, and Black films from the mid-1960s to the present)
details of comparative (or relational) analysis is to play into the hands of divide-and-conquer tactics and to
Number 2 Summer/Autumn 2010Race and Racisms, is associate professor in the Department of Media and
Cultural Studies at the University of California, Riverside. G.L)
To be clear, I am not arguing against the explanatory usefulness of a blackwhite binary. Nor am I arguing that
lighter-skinned Native peoples are more oppressed than those who are darker-skinned. Recently, with the growth of
immigrant paradigm of exclusion from the settler state that does not challenge the conditions of the settler state
interventions. Rather, I think these interventions can be strengthened with some attention to settler colonialism.
The consequence of not developing a critical apparatus for intersecting all the logics of white supremacy, including
Our theoretical
frameworks then jointly consolidate anti-black racism rather then
destabilise it. This tendency affects not only the work of race theorists, but the work within Native studies as
settler colonialism, is that it prevents us from imagining an alternative to the racial state.
well. In the next section, I will focus on some of the work emerging in Native studies as it grapples with white
supremacy.
doomed to miss what is- essential about the situation . Black existence
does not represent the total reality of the racial formation it is not the beginning
and the end of the story but it does relate to the totality ; it indicates the
(repressed) truth of the political and economic system . That is to say, the whole
range of positions within the racial formation is most fully understood
from this vantage point , not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under
patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer. 75
What is lost for the study of black existence in the proposal for a
decentered, postblack paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale
and nature of black suffering and of the struggles political, aesthetic, intellectual, and
so on that have sought to transform and undo it . What is lost for the study of nonblack
nonwhite existence is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of its material and symbolic power relative to
option
and the only effective defense against the intensifying cross fire
alliance with an antiblack civil society and further capitulation to the magnification of state
power. At the apex of the midcentury social movements , Kwame Ture and
Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 clas - sic, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation , that
black freedom entails the necessarily total revamping of the society. 77
For Hartman, thinking of the entanglements of the African diaspora in this
context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more
appropriately envisioned as the creation of an entirely new world : I knew that
no matter how far from home I traveled, I would never be able to leave my
past behind. I would never be able to imagine being the kind of person
who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was black and a history of terror had
produced that identity. Terror was captivity without the possibility of flight,