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for the symptomatic flight from reality that it shared with all the
art, literature, and philosophy of the Expressionist movement and
life-philosophical paradigm.3
Roughly forty-five years after this compelling, if heavy-handed,
Marxist critique, Deleuze and Guattari appropriate a crucial concept from Worringers life-philosophically inflected writing, namely,
inorganic life, in order to theorize the resistance to global capitalism. Through a close reading of Worringer, I pose the following
critical question: How can a concept that was once condemned
from a Marxist perspective as an ideologically suspect flight from
reality later be, mutatis mutandis, celebrated as a revolutionary
line of flight? In critically reading the concept of inorganic life
in Worringer via Lukcs, I want to anticipate how exactly Deleuze
and Guattari appropriate this concept, and to what endindeed,
to what dead endthey seem to do so. I do not mean to imply that
Lukcsian Marxism is the orthodox version of Marxist thought,
thereby taking Deleuze and Guattari to task with the same reductionism that Lukcs himself might have employed. Rather I aim to show
how the discursive history of inorganic life implicates the intersection
of Marxism and modernist aesthetics in the reading of Worringers,
Lukcss, and Deleuze and Guattaris texts. My reading thus suggests
that Deleuze and Guattari do not inherit a fixed, stable concept of
inorganic life, but rather a concept that, since its invention by
Worringer, has rhetorically figured its own instability at the expense
of its claim to reality, to history. If Deleuze and Guattari mobilize
such an ahistorical aesthetic concept into a Marxist project, then I
question whether the vitality they attribute to inorganic life in their
text does not ultimately coincide with the Worringerian deadness
of a conceptual and historical impasse.
I
At a time when life appears to be an increasingly prominent concept
in humanistic research, it is important to reflect critically on a previous paradigm in Western intellectual history according to which this
recent interest in life is not just old news, but perhaps bad news, as
well. The paradigm is that of the aforementioned Lebensphilosophie
that dominated research in the humanities and social sciences in late
nineteenth and early twentieth-century Germany.4 Lebensphilosophie
was concerned with elaborating the rational content of concepts nevertheless considered to be fundamentally irrational (e.g., drive, will,
energy, organism and, of course, life). The insurmountable problem
intrinsic to Lebensphilosophie is the construction of conceptual models
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refers the reader back to the very figures that structured the reading
in the first place. The content of the argument collapses into the
movement of its form; the object of the constative utterances of the
text becomes interchangeable with the enunciation itself. To make
an analogy to a far better known and indeed richer, more complex,
but ultimately very similar kind of text: for the reader of Friedrich
Nietzsches Birth of Tragedy (1872), the Apollonian and Dionysian
very quickly lose their plausibility as real, historical agencies, but
gain all the more in their power as words on the page and figures
circulating through that ceaselessly generative, contradictory text.
Worringer, like Nietzsche, steps out of that quasi-universal realm of
readerly uncertainty and into the discrete historical and cultural
moment of Lebensphilosophie precisely when the figures that shape
his writing (e.g., style, expression, and indeed life itself) themselves
masquerade as timeless and universal concepts. Worringers concept
of style, from which expression and inorganic life implicitly follow,
is a good example of this masquerading.
Worringerian style is ultimately and fundamentally unintelligible. The will to art and its stylistic effects are mysteriously and
permanently separated from conscious intention and explanation,
originating and operating elsewhere, dimly, intuitively, primordially.
Worringer speculates that the first artistic abstractions were a purely
instinctual creation (reine Instinktschpfung) and that the need for
abstraction had at first nothing to do with the conscious reproduction of geometric laws of composition, but stemmed from a much
deeper and more mysterious source:
This urge was bound to find its first satisfaction in pure geometric abstraction, which, set free from all external connections with the world, represents a felicitation whose mysterious transfiguration emanates not from
the observers intellect, but from the deepest roots of his somato-psychic
constitution. (35)
(Dieser Drang mute seine erste Befriedigung in der reinen geometrischen Abstraktion finden, welche, von allem ueren Weltzusammenhang erlst, eine Beglckung darstellt, die ihre geheimnisvolle Erklrung
nicht im Intellekt des Betrachtenden, sondern in den tiefsten Wurzeln
seiner krperlich-seelischen Konstitution findet. [7071])
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Worringer persistently disassociates the intellect (Geist) from artistic activity: intellect is only a mediator between the body and the
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artwork, and only in the body does art have its meaning. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is a fundamental affinity between
organic and inorganic nature, such that the organic body (with its
mediating intellect) is at best a secondary formation (Weiterbildung)
or deviation (Differenzierung) from inorganic nature. Abstract art,
then, only confirms the primordiality of the inorganic over the
organic. Abstraction in art is the echo of inorganic nature that
reminds us, painfully, that every notion of intellectual progress
and organic growth is felt, at this deeper bodily level, as pain and
longing for the primordial simplicity of inorganic form. Every new
birth, every human step forward gives rise to a need and a will to
step backwards and outwards, a need whose gratification is felt by
and is present to the body (in its deepest, primordial constitution),
but never to the intellect.
All of the subtle ways that Worringer hedges his claims here (e.g.,
foregrounding the assumption, hypothesizing a token evolutionist,
excessive use of the subjunctive, perhaps, so to speak, and as it
were) indicate that this is a tenuous, but crucial, part of his argument. This passage, in a move typical to Lebensphilosophie, also uses
the explanatory powers of the inexplicable, of the appeal to the
inexplicable as the last word of every coherent explanation. Precisely
because the will to art and its stylistic effects present themselves (and
are presented) as manifestations of an unintelligible, mysterious
bioexistential longing, more need not be said. It suffices merely to
mention the enigma of the inorganic, the inchoate allure of primitive, irrational longing.
If the task of art history is the presentation of such a need (irrational, unknowable, inexplicable), then we have to emphasize that
presentation itself involves the indirect evocation of the ceaseless
mystery of art, namely, the contradictory relation (Auseinandersetzung) between organic human life and inorganic form. Such a mystery, although it may be unknowable, is not necessarily unspeakable.
To present it, to make it seen, felt, and heard (but never directly
visible, sensible, or audible), requires, both in art and in art history,
style, i.e., the formal qualities that are necessary for the limitation
and expression of the will that wants to overcome them. Style, thus
defined, is the conceptual paradox that lurks in the background
when Worringer uses the word presentation. Style is the (un)speakable movement of thought that (un)speaks and expresses (entspricht)
artistic need and artistic will. It is the possibility of an impossible
voice that one hears in certain Worringerian words, sounding at the
edges of what is audible, readable, conceivable.
Inorganic life is the term that roots this conception of style most
explicitly in the problematic of Lebensphilosophie. This oscillating
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concept draws together the organic and the abstract into a tacit,
unstable unity that belies the texts ostensibly dualistic or polar
structure. We first see this breakdown of textual polarity in Worringers discussion of organic vs. abstract styles of ornamentation.
Organicism in style is only a belated, derivative moment of the style
of abstraction, just as the very quality of organic life itself would
seem to be a derivative of a primary, underlying inorganic vitality:
Both styles, linear as well as vegetal ornament, thus represent at bottom an abstraction, and their diversity is, in this sense, really only one
of degree; just as, in the eyes of a monist, organic regularity, in the last
analysis, differs only in degree from that of the inorganic-crystalline. We
are concerned only with the value this difference of degree possesses in
relation to the problem of empathy or abstraction. (6061)
(Beide Stile, lineare wie vegetabile Ornamentik, stellen also im Grunde
eine Abstraktion dar und ihre Verschiedenheit ist in diesem Sinne
eigentlich nur eine graduelle, wie die organische Gesetzmigkeit fr
eine monistische Anschauung auch im letzten Grunde nur graduell verschieden von der anorganisch-kristallinischen ist. Fr uns kommt es nur
auf den Wert an, den diese graduelle Verschiedenheit der Stile in bezug
auf das Problem Einfhlung oder Abstraktion hat. [9798])
The organic life represented, in this example, by the plant ornament is, at the deepest psychological level, not life at all, but rather
the outward, living appearance of a dead structure. The living thing,
the disavowed Naturvorbild, is stripped of its organic life, and that
life becomes a visual cipher for the inorganic principle of its form.
Paradoxically the artwork itself becomes an organism, full or possessed of that same uncanny life that is only to be distinguished by
degree from the regularity of lifeless matter. When he insists that the
continuity between the organic and the inorganic is only of value
insofar as it pertains to the problem of empathy and abstraction,
Worringer both affirms and overlooks the fact that his entire polar
or antithetical argument rests upon a mysterious, unintelligible
continuum of opposites (where the conscious life of the mind is
knotted together with the unconscious, inorganic undeadness of
the body), not their polar or antithetical opposition. Because he has
defined his terms in such a way as to be defended and sustained by
their own conceptual ambiguity, his bipolar argument can appear
quite logically and conceptually coherent. However, it is precisely
what lurks in that obscure, uncanny overlap of opposites that
forms the real center of Worringers presentation: the expression
of inorganic life.
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Although the paradoxical concepts of life and style are unintelligible, Worringer argues that certain peoples (explicitly the Gothic
peoples of Northern Europe, and implicitly, certain bourgeois
intellectuals of Wilhelmine Germany) still intuit these concepts as
problems and cannot get free of them. From the perspective of
these peoples, the complete release theorized as artistic abstraction becomes impossible. Instead, abstraction leads only to an
intensification of the contradiction, not to redemption; hence the
problem of expression, whereby the confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) of organic need and inorganic form can only be ceaselessly
expressed in art, but never resolved. Concluding his discussion of
ornamentation, Worringer writes,
In spite of the purely linear, inorganic basis of this [Gothic] ornamental
style, we hesitate to term it abstract. Rather it is impossible to mistake
the restless life contained in this tangle of lines. This unrest, this seeking, has no organic life that draws us gently into its movement; but there
is life there, a vigorous, urgent life, that compels us joylessly to follow
its movements. Thus, on an inorganic fundament, there is heightened
movement, heightened expression. (7677)
(Trotz der rein linearen anorganischen Grundlage dieser [gotischen]
Ornamentik zgern wir, sie eine abstrakte zu nennen. Vielmehr ist in
diesem Liniengewirr [der gotischen Ornamentik] ein unruhiges Leben
nicht zu verkennen. Diese Unruhe, dieses Suchen hat kein organisches
Leben, das uns sanft in seine Bewegung mit hineinzieht, aber Leben ist
da, ein starkes, hasterflltes, das uns zwingt, glcklos seinen Bewegungen
zu folgen. Also auf anorganischer Grundlage eine gesteigerte Bewegung,
ein gesteigerter Ausdruck. [11516])
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than the figures and concepts of the text serving the process of
historical understanding, history is both evacuated of meaning and
mythologized as a rhetorical figure.
II
Part, if not all, of the experience or reading Abstraction and Empathy
lies in getting caught in such endlessly hyperbolic passages without
any sense of how the textor the readerwill ever get back out.
This is where a critic like Lukcs can be useful, and where we can
see more clearly that the implicit move to dispense with history is
itself a historically contingent gesture.
Lukcs offers a scathing critique of Worringers work in his 1934
essay on Expressionism, in which Worringer figures as the intellectual spokesperson of the entire movement.7 Lukcs argues that
Expressionism, for all its radical and revolutionary rhetoric, is to be
reduced to a quintessentially bourgeois ideology and condemned
for its ideological flight from the realities of imperialism and capitalism. For Lukcs, once the proletariat had assumed the role of the
real agent of history, the bourgeoisie found itself engaged in an
unconscious, involuntary struggle for self-preservation, forced into a
losing battle to answer new social questions that history had already
rendered it unable to answer. The bourgeoisie, then, could only try
to reassert its compromised dominance through the indirect apology
for capitalism, an apology that characterized all its intellectual and
ideological products, whether it wanted it or not, indeed whether
it knew it or not:
The more strongly capitalism develops, and the stronger its internal contradictions become, the less possible it is to make direct and open defense
of the capitalist economy the centrepiece of an ideological justification
of the capitalist system. . . . There is therefore a general estrangement
from the concrete problems of economy, a concealment of the connections between economy, society and ideology, with the result that these
questions are increasingly mystified. . . . At most, even criticisms [of the
system] that had subjectively good intentions developed into an unconscious and unwilled component, a particular nuance, of the basic ideological tendency of the epoch: an indirect apology, an apology by way of a
mystifying critique of the present. (8182, translation modified by author)
(Je strker sich der Kapitalismus entfaltet und je strker er dementsprechend seine inneren Widersprche entwickelt, desto weniger kann
die direkte und offene Verteidigung der kapitalistischen Wirtschaft im
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Mittelpunkt des ideologischen Schutzes des kapitalistischen Systems
stehen. . . . Es kommt also zu einer allgemeinen Entfernung von den
konkreten Problemen der Wirtschaft, zur Verschleierung der Zusammenhnge zwischen Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Ideologie, und es
entsteht demzufolge eine stndig wachsende Mystifizierung dieser Fragen. . . . Zumeist entwickelt sich auch die subjektiv ehrlich gemeinte
Kritik zu einemunbewuten und ungewolltenBestandteil, zu einer
besonderen Nuance der allgemeinen ideologischen Grundstrmung
der Epoche: der indirekten Apologetik, der Apologetik vermittels einer
mystifizierenden Kritik der Gegenwart. [15253])
Later in the essay, Lukcs calls this distancing, veiling, and mystifying
apology an act of ideological flight, and he shows, in concrete
albeit reductive terms, that such a flight is essential not only to the
artistic methods of Expressionism, but to its underlying intellectual
basis, and ultimately to the political consequences of the movement,
namely, German Fascism.
Worringers Abstraction and Empathy unwittingly exposes the problematic essence of the entire movement.8 To paraphrase Lukcss
Hegelian-influenced Marxism: what characterizes Worringers text,
the Expressionist movement, and, as we will see, the deep intellectual
background of Lebensphilosophie, is a false synthesis of the dialectical
relation of subject and object. On the one hand, Expressionism tries
to claim access to an abstract, absolute, purely formal knowledge
of reality, of the thing-in-itself beyond the illusory surfaces of
perception and ideology. On the other hand, the movement feels
the compulsion to fill in the Inhaltlichkeit of the objects of its purely
formal knowledge, to grasp the objects both objectively by their real
content and subjectively by their abstract essence. However, such
objective grasping is impossible because, in the bourgeois mind,
what is objectively real and concrete and active in history can be
conceived only as an eternal problem of humanity (e.g., expression or life), and such a problem, from this perspective, can be
approached only intuitively, mystically, subjectively. Herein lies the
shortsighted, short-circuited dialectic of intuitive, subjectivist insight
into the objective reality of eternal problems of humanity, a
dialectic that leaves the real problems of that particular historical
movement utterly unthought.
Worringers text shows exactly the same structure: the objective problem of the history of style in art is approached through
a subjective, intuitive argument about polarized needs and their
expression. The synthesis of that polar argument is the figure
of inorganic life, accessible and operative only in the text itself, in
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Life is the source of Lebensphilosophies swinging back and forth (Schillern, literally flickering or shimmering) between an overweening
subjectivity and a false objectivity. The conceptual content of life
in Lebensphilosophie amounts to the false objectivity of Leben and the
mythical intuition of Erlebnis. What drives this philosophy is the
need to transcend the limits of reason and of the rational subject,
but without transcending the rational subject itself; that is, without
abandoning a certain structure of subjective idealism. As a result,
the subject of Lebensphilosophie is only circulating back and forth
between its irrational, mythical needs and the phantasmatic form
they assume for it as objects of its intuition and lived experience.
Real, objective realitythat is, for Lukcs, the reality of class struggle
and of an imperialist economy on a crash course with world war
only increases the dread or panic of bourgeois intellectuals, driving
them further into the vortex of their life philosophy, blinding them
ever more to the economic reality that should by all other accounts
have been their downfall or wake-up call.
From this perspective, one can see how insidious the concept
of life was in the German context of the prewar and interwar
periods, and this is all the more so for Worringers inorganic life
because it figures on the page precisely the conceptual dead end
that Lukcs finds in history. The philosophical dead end, this oscillating pseudoconcept of life, that Lukcs locates at the core of
Lebensphilosophie assumes a purely rhetorical form in Worringers
text. The contradiction that arguably forms the deepest background
of an epochs philosophical, artistic and, albeit implicitly, political
views is brought to center stage in Abstraction and Empathy, where,
even if in disguised form, in costume as it were, it steals the show.
The stylistic line that Worringer celebrates, that expressive movement of vivified forces without direction or development, that line
of pure intensity and ceaseless interruptionas passionately and
rhetorically heightened as it is in his writingsuch a line must also
be understood as the hysterical shriek of a mind that is trying, and
failing, to escape from its economic reality.
III
In turning to Deleuze and Guattaris appropriation of Worringers
concept of inorganic life, I dont mean to suggest that the economic
and social reality of imperial Germany in 1908 could be in any way
similar to the France of 1980, when the second volume of Capitalism
and Schizophrenia was first published. However, in a book that offers
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then the continuous oscillation of the inside (of the state, of capitalism) and the outside (of the war machine, of the resistance or
alternative to capitalism) can be reduced merely to a different formulation of the same oscillation of life in Lebensphilosophie, can be
reduced, that is, to what Lukcs calls a parasitical reconciliation to
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the system (152). The flux of inside and outside in Deleuze and
Guattaris nomadic line shares the same structure as the Lukscian
Schillern between subjectivity and objectivity and the Worringerian
pseudopolarity of abstraction and empathy. And despite their various
jargons (post-structuralist, Hegelian-Marxist, life-philosophical), the
concept life is the undead end of all three texts.
Notes
This essay is dedicated with gratitude to Stanka Radovic.
1.
Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 19721990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1995).
2.
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context (and to Worringer) in Jrgen Kleins Vitalism, Empiricism and the Quest
for Reality in German and English Philosophy in that volume (190229). Bergsons
influence on Deleuze is treated in Paul Douglasss Deleuzes Bergson: Bergson
Redux (36888).
5.
Worringer borrows and expands this term from Alois Riegls Sptrmische
Kunstindustrie [Late Roman art industry] (Vienna: K. K. Hof und sterreichische
Staatsdruckerei, 1901). For a further account of what Worringer borrowedand
distortedfrom Riegl in historiographical terms, see Michael W. Jennings, Against
Expressionism: Materialism and Social Theory in Worringers Abstraction and Empathy,
in Invisible Cathedrals: The Expressionist Art History of Wilhelm Worringer, ed. Neil Donahue
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 87104.
6.
Claudia hlschlger describes a discourse of such synthesizing thought processes (synthetische Denkoperationen) that includes not only Worringer, Simmel, and
Dilthey, but also the early Lukcs (see her Abstraktionsdrang: Wilhelm Worringer und
der Geist der Moderne [Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2005], 39). Neil Donahue suggests that
it is precisely those affinities that make Lukcss 1934 critique of Worringer all the
more vehement (see Donahue, Forms of Disruption: Abstraction in Modern German Prose
[Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993], 30n1). In another context, Michael
Lwy has argued that Lukcss explicitly Marxist works can be read as a repudiation
of his earlier Weberian life-philosophical, romantic-anticapitalist phase (see Lwy,
Naptha or Settembrini? Lukcs and Romantic Anticapitalism, New German Critique
42 [1987]: 1731). See finally Louis Althussers incisive comment that the rigor of
Lukcss Marxism is tainted by a guilty Hegelianism: as if Lukcs wanted to absolve
through Hegel his upbringing by Simmel and Dilthey (Althusser, For Marx, trans.
Ben Brewster, Radical Thinkers series [London: Verso, 1990], 114n29).
7.
Lukcss essay was massively important for German literary criticism, prompting the so-called Expressionism debate in the Moscow exile journal Das Wort in
the late 1930s. By posing the question of the relation of modernism to the rise of
Fascism, this text sparked a debate on aesthetics and politics that attracted almost
all the major leftist writers and critics of the time, lasting well into the 1970s in both
the German and North American contexts (see, respectively, Hans-Jrgen Schmitt,
ed., Die Expressionismusdebatte: Materialien zu einer marxistischen Realismuskonzeption
[Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973]; and Theodor Adorno et al., Aesthetics and
Politics, afterword by Fredric Jameson, Radical Thinkers series [New York: Verso,
2007]). In terms of its impact on Worringers reception, Lukcss essay had been
more or less neglected by literary critics and art historians until Geoff Waite evoked
it in his ideologically and rhetorically critical reading of Worringers text (see Waites
Worringers Abstraction and Empathy: Remarks on its Reception and on the Rhetoric
of its Criticism, which was first published in 1981 and was reprinted in Donahue,
Invisible Cathedrals, 1340). My argument differs from Waites through my emphasis
on inorganic life as the essential rhetorical and ideological contradiction of Worringers text. In a second essay (also in Invisible Cathedrals, 157202) entitled After
Worringerian Virtual Reality: Videodromes and Cinema 3, MassCult and CyberWar,
Waite connects Worringers thought to the postmodern political theory of, among
others, Deleuze and Guattari through the concept of virtual reality as it was invented
by Wilhelm Worringer. Though the terms of Waites second essay differ from mine,
my critique of the Deleuzian version of Worringerian life is not incompatible with
Waites thesis on Worringers pervasive postmodern influence.
8.
Worringer, in a 1911 essay in the journal Sturm, was one of the first critics and
artists to use the word Expressionism in print. Through the teens and twenties,
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he wrote reviews and criticism that were engaged in contemporary artistic trends, in
addition to his scholarly works on ancient and medieval art and architecture, which,
incidentally, were seen by Lukcs, among others, to be tacitly advocating the Expressionist movement under the guise of Gothic expression. For the genesis of the word
Expressionism across German art media between 1910 and 1914, see Otto F. Bests
preface to Theorie des Expressionismus (Stuttgart, Germany: Philipp Reclam, 1976); WolfDieter Dubes Expressionism, trans. Mary Whittal (New York: Oxford University Press,
1972), 1821; and John Willetts Expressionism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 7577.
9.
For a thorough discussion of the relation of Deleuze and Guattari to Marxism,
see Jean-Jacques Lecercle, A Marxist Philosophy of Language, trans. Gregory Elliott,
Historical Materialism Book Series, 12 (Boston: Brill, 2006). In his own words, Deleuze
has said, I think Flix Guattari and I have remained Marxists, in our two different
ways, perhaps, but both of us. You see, we think any political philosophy must turn on
the analysis of capitalism and the ways it has developed (Negotiations, 171). Readers
of Deleuzes works on cinema and painting can trace the influence of Worringerian
inorganic life on his conception of Expressionism in film and hysteria in painting in
Cinema I: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 5051; and Francis Bacon: The Logic of
Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003,),
4041. For a detailed analysis of Worringers impact on Deleuzes aesthetics (that
does not take into account the political dimension of Deleuzes thought), see Joseph
Vogls Anorganismus: Worringer und Deleuze in Wilhelm Worringers Kunstgeschichte,
ed. Hannes Bhringer and Beate Sntgen (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2002), 18192.
10.
This formulation recalls Deleuzes theory of literary style as the capturing of
the outside of language within language (see his Essays Critical and Clinical, trans.
Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997]). Deleuzes formulation is indebted to Michel Foucaults 1966 essay The
Thought of the Outside, published in English in Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology:
Essential Works of Foucault 19541984, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, ed. James D. Faubion
(New York: New Press, 1999), 14770.