Advantages and

Disadvantages of
European Integration
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia Integration
vis--vis the Albanian Long-Way

Theotaq Gjikoka
University of New York Tirana
Political Sciences / International Relations

January, 2014

Mentor Professor:
Prof. Dr. Fatos Tarifa

European Union has been the unique form of collective governance among regional and international
arena, but it has also remained something in between supranational and intergovernmental political, economical
and social organization. Moreover, for the majority of countries joining EU, the union was as much efficient as
familiar to them, having in mind a wide range of aspects starting with economy, politics, society and cultural
exchange among states. However, there is also something that opens holes in its image, and for this we have to
have in mind the fast integration processes of countries which were not ready for this complex union, neither
were they able to harvest the great fruits of the big family. The acceptance of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 to
join EU, followed by Croatia in 2013, have opened some serious debates according the criteria of EU
acceptance principles. Albania is another country in the waiting list, after Macedonia and Montenegro, which is
preparing its way toward the candidate status. Bosnia and Herzegovina together with Kosovo are in their initial
procedures for their long way joining the greater Union. It is evident that the whole region of Western Balkans,
have been under difficult situations for this last two decades, starting from 1990s, particularly speaking for
economical fluctuations, political instability, vandal nationalistic movements, multicultural societies and ethnic
conflicts. Furthermore, one thing is sure among all this nations, claiming to join EU (or even the ones that
joined the union in 2007), that they have been a particular example, compared to other members of EU,
according to their step-by-step performance in the eyes of European Integration.
This paper will bring on table some very essential points according the EU and countries willing to enter
the union. In the beginning I will explain in general terms the historical way Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and
Albania toward European Integration. I will give a prospect of advantages and disadvantages for countries that
enter the union without taking in consideration some crucial aspects of socio-political and economic
consolidation within domestic borders. The research will give a comparison and contrast among three accepted
countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia in front of the Albanian process, the country which has the highest pro
stand for EU citizenship in the region. The skeptics of European Union, after some series of problematic
acceptances, like the Cyprus Phenomenon, have learned lessons and made huge reflection on negotiations
opening, candidate status, and full acceptance on EU for potential states.

The most intense timeframe of the paper, with some parallel logics from 1993, will be from the very important
event of Helsinki Summit in 1999, till 2013, a period which determine precisely the moment when Western
Balkans and South East Europe got the major focus from European Union. This was also the moment when EU
established a new semi-tactical and semi-obligatory worldview because it shifted the point of interest form
CDSP (Common Defense and Security Policy) into an expansion strategy for further enlargement (ESI, 2005).

Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, in regard to the EU Integration, as typical cases of malfunctioning and
fluctuations in political, economical and social strata.
Considered also as the fifth wave of enlargement, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in European
Union went through various processes, some of which were also avoided unconditionally, but caused problems
and lessons for the entire future of the Union. It is interesting while we argue about powerful states in the postcommunist Europe and their relations with the European Community since then, for they have a difference of
180 degree compared to other countries in neighboring regions. Romania was the first country, in the region,
which opened its gates toward another powerful world system, the European Community, leaving its old terrible
way under communist regime. However, Romania together with Bulgaria, were still at the bottom levels with
the pre-conditions settled in this new challenging community. Since Romanian Revolution, in 1989, the
European Community was the main dream and goal, not only for the governments in power, but also for the
political affiliations happening during those years. The same story appear to happen even within Bulgarian state,
but with some more powerful progresses in years.
Even if Romania had signed a cooperation application in 1993, both, Romania and Bulgaria directed the
application form to European Union (European Community during those years) for an official membership
application in 1995. After this, a new wave appeared in the political spectrum, introduced from EU authorities,
presenting the differing methods of classification for countries applying (Brennan, 2008). We see here a

polarization of the same region, Southeast Europe, into two main groups, created from the political and
executive framework of EU, based also in the progress reports of domestic reform evaluation.
The Luxemburg Summit, a cornerstone of this enlargement process, held in 1997, was the initial time where the
grouping strategy started to be applied. Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, Cyprus and Czech Republic were
classified in the first group, the most favorable group for the fourth wave of enlargement in 2004. Lithuania,
Latvia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were classified in the second group, which was considered, according
to the prescriptive report, as a non-consolidated group toward accession.
It was obvious that the division made in those two groups, justified also the position that those countries
had in regard with the European Community. Looking at this stage, we see that the future of Bulgaria and
Romania had to be confident in terms of reforms concentrated on multidimensional fields of domestic and
international state functions. Defined from the Copenhagen Criteria, and strongly supported later own from the
community because of bad experiences with problematic accessions in EU, a lot of political, economical, social
and geostrategic reforms had to be taken seriously by Romania and Bulgaria. Both, Sophia and Bucharest,
became later own, another good lesson for EU because of their not-so-good example on integration process. In
2000, Romania had gone through drastic reforms and the new political elections brought in governance Adrian
Nastase. The new Prime Minister of Romania, during 2000-2004 electoral term, was characterized by a very
intense preoccupation and pro-Western policy making. The economic growth, political stability, social
responsibility and civic support gave to Nastase electoral mandate a powerful significance. In spring 2004,
Romania enter the biggest world army alliance, NATO. In the same period it signed with EU an accession
treaty, which later own would proceed with 2007 full accession in European Union (EU 5th Enlargement, 2008).
However, Romania had a lot of problems in its domestic regulations for corruption, consolidation of democracy,
rule of law, freedom of markets and organized crime. All this destroying issues, for Romanian pro-EU image,
were put into an end from the new political era of governance. President Traian Basescu, a known Liberal
Democrat (PDL), appointed as prime minister the leader of National Liberal Party (PNL), Calin PopescuTariceanu. This is considered also as the glory time when the country won full accession in EU, on 3 January
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2007, achieved strong partnership with US in international arena, implemented powerful national reforms in
health care and consolidated judicial system (EU Annual Progress Report, 2007, 2008).
Its semi presidential-parliamentary representative democratic republic made possible also the control of power
and it avoided the hegemonic tendency within state governances, giving to the president and the prime minister
separated control of power.
Bulgaria also reminds pretty close the example of the Romanian steps toward the EU integration
process. They have learned a lot from their neighboring relationship and they, in the same time, have integrated
reform based on each-others mistakes. However, Bulgaria has a different form of government political structure.
It is parliamentary representative democratic republic, where the prime minister is the head of government and
it operates under a multi-party system. Bulgaria had experienced an unstable political environment with its
political parties in power. United of Democratic Forces and Bulgarian Socialist Party were two of the most
important political parties in the country after the fall of communist regime in 1990. Furthermore, this two
parties made state politics a very hard tool with their instability, collapses, boycotts and coalitions blackouts.
The parliamentary elections of 1997 gave power to UDF party, and this signed the first regular 4 year term in
power till 2001. During this governance, Bulgaria was invited in 1999 from the Helsinki Summit to start the
negotiations for membership with European Union, joining it 8 years later, 1 January 2007. National Movement
of Simeon II, former King of Bulgaria, won the elections of 2001, and ruled the country in its good days.
The accession in NATO by 2004 and the beginning of EU accession procedures started a new era for Bulgaria,
followed afterward with the success and reformative vision of Bulgarian Socialist Party, gaining power in 2005.
In addition, EU gave a lot of challenging duties to Bulgaria in order for it to be part of the union and collaborate
efficiently with other member countries. The criteria was mainly focused on the same principles that Romania
was conducted, but with some other difficult parts to consolidate. Rule of law, freedom of market economy,
consolidation of democracy, war against corruption and organized crime, and minority rights were the main
fields of focus, made clear from EU as a passport for full membership accession (EU Annual Progress Report
for Bulgaria, 2007, 2009).
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Coming closer into Western Balkan region, Croatia is considered more like a success story, rather than a
failure, in the European Integration process, this not only because of political and economic reforms, but also
for the regular steps it followed under the EU pressure. It is to be mentioned the period when Franjo Tudjman
and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) who won the 1990s elections and lead country till 1999, with two
terms in office, 1992 and 1997. During this time, he won the war for state independence with Serbia,
consolidated the internal political system, proposed and ruled under a semi-presidential democratic system.
After President Tudjmans death, Stjepan Mesic won 2 consecutive term in office, 2000 and 2005, with his
Croatian Peoples Party (HNS). President Mesic took the major merit of European Integration for Croatia
through his political changes, increase in economy and financial domestic budgets, incoming touristic strategy
and socio-cultural promotion all over continents. Mesic had built typical tangible relationships with US and UN,
known worldwide as Balkanic contraversary spirit. He opposed openly the US intervention in Iraq and all
focuses of Bush administration by that time. A close friend of Syrian President, Muammar al-Gaddafi, and the
Russian President, Vladimir Putin, he stood mostly oriented in the Eastern Allie. However, EU and NATO
accessions were two greater merits of President Mesic, followed after with other presidencies and prime
ministers contributions, coming in the great date of glory for Croatia, 1 July 2013, for full European Union
accession (EU Annual Progress Report, 2011, 2012, 2013).
Even though Croatia was investing a lot for EU Integration, both economically and politically, it is interesting
the fact that the majority of civil society was against the integration. Skeptic and critical Croatian analysts,
citizen preference polls and general peoples will were contradicting the initiative of EU integration for the bad
example it had promoted in other neighboring countries like Slovenia, or in the entire region, the cases of
Bulgaria and Romania.

Albanian steps toward European Integration process. A unique form of inherited unsuccessful politics
Albania is the country of numerous changes through all this last century. The history of Albanian state
has faced periodic fluctuations, from the Independence Day till now, justifying a historical failure of political
consolidation starting from our founding fathers. I will make a short historical chronology to make this
argument more clear in a step by step explanation. First, the emblematic government of Ismail Bej Vlora, was a
short living state, but the second most important in the entire history of Albania after Gjergj Kasteriot
Skenderbeu. Since then, 1912 till 1939 the governances and monarchies were still unsuccessful in Albania, not
only because of the regular external pressures of great powers for territorial fragmentation (later on achieved),
but also for the domestic clashes between vilayets and powerful aristocratic families who pretended dominance
and hegemony. After the end of World War II, the dictatorship of Communist party, with Enver Hoxha, made an
extreme shift of the entire history of the country, leaving it totally closed from the Western World and
deteriorating it far away from development. With the fall of Communism in the entire Europe, the end came
even in Albania, freeing three most important human principal; speech, trade and education (Gj. Erebara,
History of Albanian State, 1912-2012).
The country is now living its 23 rd year under official democratic system, but with a lot of troubles for at least 15
years under democratic governances. The blame of pyramidal scheme, a nearby devastating civic war, huge
emigration waves, brain drain of elites, political instability, high criminal levels, corruption plague and extreme
poverty are the major problems which followed the Albanian State after the fall of communism, a non-merited
time also called Democracy.

However, even though with so many problems, Albania have been a major follower of European
Integration through all the times of its democracy. It is said that countries with less knowledge for the
functioning and unique form of EU, have a higher percentage of citizen will to join the union. Previous
examples of Bulgaria and Romania, which also had higher civic likeliness for EU, have shown that the reality
out there is neither easy to be achieved, nor it is to be maintained. The introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria
in December 1993, and the Amsterdam Treaty obliged EU to follow strategic political discussions with
Southeast European countries, and establishing partnership relations with each and every country.
For Albania, the process was very difficult, having in mind a dark age of political culture that the dictatorship
left behind. However, the great lunch of Stabilization and Association Pact in 1999 from EU, with specific
orientation toward Western Balkans, opened for the entire region a new page of doing politics. Seven years
later, 12 June 2006, Albania was accepted to enter the SAP, and this turned to be the biggest pact that Albania
had signed with such great importance for its developing process and EU integration future. Followed with the
IPA Project (Instrument of Pre-Accession Assessment) and the Visa Liberalization in the Schengen Zone, the
process toward the major dream is turning into a domino effect, falling one after the other, through regulation
frameworks defined by the supreme EU authority. The near future is becoming so vivid for our integration
process with the negotiations toward the Candidate Status and then the day of full accession (EU Progress
Report for Albania, 2012).

Advantages of European Integration for SEE and Western Balkan countries

European Integration is the key of every positive possibility that Western Balkans (composed of Serbia,
Bosnia Herzegovina, Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia and Kosovo) have to achieve so that they can
maintain peace among each other, but also prosperity of further development. These two main pillars of
European Integration, peace and prosperity, serve as a mechanism not only for Western Balkans but for all
countries aiming to join the Union (COM, 1999). Southeast Europe, which is a core regional focus for European
Integration, is focused mainly in Western Balkan progress, but it has also Bulgaria and Romania, countries
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which are now part of the greater family, the EU, since 2007, thanks to their progress with the integration
criteria.
Advantages of EU Integration, as a major state level process, but also as a specific implementation for
Southeast Europe (SEE) region, are tightly connected with economical, social and political developments.
Being more specific, the advantages of EU integration include regional long-term perspective, favor of domestic
ownership for candidate countries, institutional development, stability and cooperation into the region, and
softening of nationalist multi-ethnic identities (Cremona, 2000).
Xavier Solana, during his term as Secretary General of Council of European Union, in one of his
statements in the Council said: The capacity of European States, through European Integration process, to
overcome their self-national interest orientations have built a new beginning for democracy, freedom and good
governance, advantages which create once forever the uniqueness of EU (Solana, 2003).
First, creating a regional long-term perspective for Southeast Europe into EU is something that have to
be critically evaluated among various specialists. Nationalists, economists, historians, politicians, decisionmaking individuals, security and stability army generals, big corporate traders and interest groups are a cast of
people whom have to coordinate their state vision for the future with present governance situations to assist for
mutual prosperity. In addition, these visionary leadership have to be part of both sides, European Union and
SEE countries, so that the collaboration must take serious interconnected achievements (Calic, 2003). This longterm future perspective gave time to EU institutions to interfere with their multi-dimensional reforms into
domestic politics and empower countries to self-regulate their internal problems under their mentoring
supervision. In a long-run term, integration process strategy, give to the aiming EU candidate countries the
possibility to cooperate and learn from member states, but in the same time integrate their domestic level with a
wider international complex atmosphere. This process is also called self-preparatory time for EU integration
under concise rules and regulations of EU members community (Belloni, 2009).
Second, integration process of SEE countries, but also for other potential regions, is not seen as a
manipulative way to trickle down state sovereignty by EU administration. For its core unique form, EU has
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maintained a distant relationship with state sovereignty through all its existence, even when it was extremely
needed, as for example in cases like Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia or Croatia, where dramatic wars of
mass ethnic conflicts with Serbian authoritarian regimes caused huge human and material catastrophic
devastations. It is an interesting irony while we may think of EU as a factor that interferes in the domestic issues
of states, because this would terrify the SEE countries, which obviously are making war for that specific issue:
To keep untouched their territory, identity and citizenry. Furthermore, the international factor has been more
than important in countries with internal conflicts. EU have offered crucial support with its peaceful
interventions in regions where inconsistent conflict has been present with violence and destruction (Knaus and
Cox, 2005).
Yes, it is sure that there is some sovereignty derived to a higher authority, EU institutions in this case, but this
only to derogate local problems into a higher authority where a win-win strategy could be achieved from all
conflictual sides, through non-influential judgments.
Third, the consolidation of domestic institutions for further progress in administrative issues, but also for
the existence of high corruption levels in these state divisions, is the key factor where everything begins by the
EU reformative decisions toward SEE countries. Moreover, the institutional development of domestic criteria
has been established since the Copenhagen Summit, in 1993, elaborated with more sophisticated laws later own,
adopted from lessons-learned in the enlargement process. Albania, BoH, Macedonia and Montenegro are now
under serious pressure for their integration and all of them are giving to the EU authorities more lessons to learn
for their integration mistakes. Western Balkans have to adopt more international resemblance to their domestic
laws so that they can come closer to the union before being part of it (Elbasani, 2008). The EU strategy among
all member states, but especially the potential candidates, is showing more top-down power relationship,
directing rules and regulations from their core reformative ways (Raljic, 2007).
Forth, European Union can enforce rules and regulations for international boarders and regional
cooperation among countries. It is to be reminded that this role in South East European countries, especially in
Western Balkans, have been played from United States, which nowadays is less likely influential in the region.
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As I mentioned US here, it is to be noticed the decline of this big power immediately after the interference of
EU as a strong supporter of problematic conflicts. However, US got its high regional valuation with the Kosovo
and BoH intervention, breaking also international pacts, to come in help of humanitarian interventions. During
this time interval, EU has been blamed for a periodic and stagnant position vis--vis Western Balkan conflicts,
which of course, went beyond socio-political and economical cooperation. The politics of give-me-to-give-you
are now more present than ever in international arena, but it is interesting how EU have used this semidiplomatic strategy to shrink regional nationalist conflicts in past and present (Wolff & Rodt, 2007). The
Serbian cases of war crimes, during its Balkan conflict, brought in the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2005 in The Hague, gave to them the possibility to enter the negotiations for SAA
pact.
However, the fail to surrender war criminals, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, blocked shortly the
agreement implementation, which was opened again in 2008. EU give-me-to-give-you strategy had a great
success, especially with problematic countries in SEE (Del Ponte, 2009). Related to boarder criteria, the
proposition of free-trade agreement from EU toward Western Balkan forced countries into a regional
cooperation later on, signing CEFTA, Central European Free Trade Agreement.
Last, but not least, EU is providing a greater national identity, the multiple identity of the union, where a
simple citizen from Albania can have a Kosovar and a European citizenship (or identity). This cutting edge
promotion of a greater recognition, also self-orientation, creates to people a new understanding for diversity,
globalized acceptance and multi-identity formation. However, the problematic issue of borders in the Balkans
have created many difficulties in the wider identity formation. Serbs with Croats, Kosovars with Serbs,
Albanian Cameria and Greek stagnant stand, Albanians in Macedonia and their new political power in the
country, are all a complexity of conflictual cases among countries, combining nationality, patriotism and ethnic
divisions above established border lines (Gallagher, 2005). All this criteria mentioned, are the pillars of
integration process, where every country, being it in Eastern European region or elsewhere around Europe, must
fulfill in all possible directions for future prosperity.

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Politically speaking, European Integration is a long process, but it helps once forever domestic
institutions of higher socio-political importance to get through reformative steps, minimize levels of state
corruption, moderate polity in a western perspective and regulate internal affairs between parties, groups of
interest and civil society (Schimmelfenning & Sedelmeier, 2005).
Economically speaking, the integration process helps the market to regulate itself with a wide
international society. This multi-dimensional trade openness helps the country to integrate internal benefits and
also profit from external massive market production. Unification of monetary system in markets and financial
investments would give a long-run security in domestic economy for bandwagon states (less powerful states
that profit from strong countries). EU has been the most powerful generator in monetary and financial capacity
in Europe, competing with worlds biggest countries (Elbasani, 2008).
Within its complexity, EU have been a strong factor in giving assistance, internal investments and financial
support to all the countries aiming to join the union. In addition, the integration strategy during all this years
served as something in between modernization and restructuration.
Socio-culturally speaking, it has been the biggest cooperation union in the history of Europe since its
first civilizations. EU supporters think that there will be no other unique union like EU, in terms of multicultural
diversity and identity formation, which surpasses the values of this semi-federal, semi-state and semisupranational organization called European Union (Moravcsik, 2000).
Disadvantages and limitations of EU Integration. The difficulties of Southeast Europe and Western
Balkans.
It is not always true that what is strong and powerful, compared to your capacity, is also something to be
achieved as a must. This phenomenon is happening now with European Union, for it is seen from less capable
states as the ultimate factor of development and prosperity above their national or domestic capabilities.
European Integration has series of limitations in regard to SEE countries for it is a distinct collective union, with
far distant similarities between existing member states of Western Europe and SEE member states or potential
members. EU has drown differentiating lines between regions or even states in South East Europe. This tactic
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has enforced distinctive policies and financial strategies between candidate and potential candidate countries.
However, the union is still making some further decisions for the future of this community, and this can have
distant effects on states that does not contain similar projections (Wolff and Rodt, 2007).
The integration process toward EU has faced, through the spectrum of this two last decades, a lot of
changes, adoptions, regulations and stagnations. However, from the euro-skeptics point of view, there is no
possibility for a problematic region like SEE and precisely Western Balkan, to become part of the union. In
addition, there are four main reasons why integration process is not a good thing; it has no military authority,
member states and institutions reflect disagreement in between, strategies of persistent conditionality, and low
institutional development in regional level to coordinate local domestic problems of potential states.
First, the military aspect of EU has been seen not only as a failure for the process of integration, but also
as a minimal capacity over other international military organizations, the NATO for example. Critically
thinking, there is place for disagreement while we discuss the real politics of US and EU toward NATO
(Schake, 2002). The history of Balkan Wars have created a new perception for international dominances, lead
from US and followed by Russia, which still today provoke tangible relationships. It is interesting to make a
correlation for the military crisis in EU (European Community during those years, 1991) while we see Bosnia
and Kosovo cases vis--vis NATO position. It was more like the US rule of power rather than international
military force during NATO crisis of 1991 in Bosnia, for they were indifferent in front of genocide and wars
against humanity. Historical is also the fail of European Community to intervene for terrible massacres in
Bosnia, and it will be more lifelong the Kosovo case where EU institutional hierarchy prevented the union to
offer regional support, and once again US took the control, this time by braking also international conventions
for state sovereignty in Serbia, but achieving victory in a humanitarian massive crime (Hill, 2001). How can a
union give protection without military security in case of hegemonic intentions? It simply can not.
Second, institutional support and singular voice of member states is also a missing issue in EU
integration process, while major conflicts in new potential candidate countries, or even existing members,
reflect a difficult co-habitation among these collection of states. The Stability Pact introduced from EU in June,
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1999, has been a very effective facilitator for directing resources and development means to SEE, but on the
other hand, it has failed to promote security and unity into the region (Busek, 2004). In addition, the pact went
through two major complications; one, it couldnt stabilize the situation with the criminal past of leaders in
ramp-Yugoslavia because of Milosevics war crimes, which damaged the great ambitions that Stability Pact had
for the region; second, the legitimate power of the SP had very little impact in the local domestic level of
respective civil society. We can also add here the crash that SP and SAP have with one another in regard to their
coordination program, where antagonistic points are vaguely defined from decision-making specialists
(Cremona, 2000).
Three, strategies of conditionality have brought the level of European Institutions in an embarrassment
stand in front of member states and international actors.
The major case to be mentioned here is the ICTY implication with the issues brought from countries of Former
Yugoslavian Republic, particularly Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Kosovo (Belloni, 2009). Political affiliations and
legal roles used from Carla Del Ponte, head of ITCY, have compromised the real form of conditionality in
European Integration for its full cooperation involvement. The Serbian example, with regard to its relations with
Kosovo, which has been pressured under the condition for the loyalty pact of candidate status from some EU
member states (Italy, Slovenia, Austria), have emphasized its obligatory decision for Kosovos recognition.
Give us something, to give you something else, a theory that has followed European Institutions for years
(Phinnemore, 2006). There is nothing for free in the capitalist world would say Marx, and here we are today,
nothing in the sign of respectful relationships. Even though ICTY has been set to close down in 2010, the ICT in
Rome has shown the approximate tendency for conditionality among judgments, which of course have a high
civic sensitive responsibility (ICTY 2010 Report and Grabbe, 2006).
Fourth and last, the local domestic level of potential member states has taken little interest form
European Institutions thus they have integrated more the political problematic rather than being practical in
local implementation of reforms. It is interesting while we argued about ICTY, Stability Pact and SAP, core
achievements in SEE (Western Balkans also), having in mind the EU stand upon countries that dreamed a
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membership in the union. This form of integration, through three above mentioned pillars, have established
again a political direction via institutionalization processes, forgetting once forever the resources distribution for
local civil society, which of course, lacked the EU freedoms in their journey toward Western World
(Kostovicova and Bojii-Delilovi, 2008). We see a lot of disproportionality among distribution of resources,
but the major problem is raised at implementation level.
Reforms, strategies and regulations of EU for countries of Western Balkan and Southeast Europe, are created far
away from the infected lands, an issue this which brings a hierarchy of institutional framework to fail of
inconsistency (the strategies failing to be achieved in Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Albania) and
inappropriate development.

Conclusion
European integration has been a powerful dichotomy in Western Balkan and Southeast Europe. It has
gone through difficulties in implementing reforms planed somewhere else in the continent, but it has also
created a new spectrum of doing politics in a region where disaster reigned for centuries. On one hand, the
integration process initiated a geostrategic war against major conflicts in SEE by imposing rules and regulations
to be achieved in terms of development, wealth and social progress. On the other hand, this process built a
dividing mechanism for countries with different capacities setting out the limits of EU accession from the
reports of reforms implementation successes. In addition, the Balkans are seen in the European political arena as
a region full of instability and transition, far away from a real proud face of the continent, but as a piece of land
that is neither Europe, not is it outside Europe (Rehn, 2005). We, the SEE countries, are becoming the face of
somebody else, the face of a collective reformative decision-making body, which shapes, approves or denies our
own future. European Union is changing its direction from economic community into a real-politic power, not
only in the continent but also in the entire world.
Albania has been a typical example in comparison with Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, and it has
developed a different relationship with EU institutions, but the strategy used from domestic politicians have also
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diminished the strict respect for state reformative obligations vis--vis integration. In addition, Albania needs
something in particular to minimize the sufferings it has feed all this years, something different from the
processes decided in Bulgaria, Romania or Croatia.
The integration structure, set from EU, has high values on numerous implemented reforms in places
with less domestic incentive for prospering solutions. This step by step process has opened another chapter for
the entire future of EU, constructing viscous floors for the coming philosophy of the union, is it deepening or
widening? I say viscous because it has lost on the way the real form of initial stand, for it has gone into drastic
changes for full participation all over European countries. It is interesting while we argue about the position of
European Union in SEE countries, particularly in Western Balkans, looking their will for reforms and, on the
other hand, a stagnant positive position of member states.
A single union full of individual veto power and a consolidated international institutional organization that
incorporates laws for problematic regions, contradicts itself by member states that do not follow this unified
community authority. What can consolidate a reform made from a non-consolidated authority? It can provide
stereotypes of the future, experiments of socio-political cohabitation and short-run turbulent economical
transformations.
Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the architects of EU foundation, would still be in great support of
this project in integration for they were till then in full acknowledge that the story would go on with greater
engagement. Schuman has stated, while delivering his speech of glory in 9 May 1950: Europe will not be made
all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de
facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition
of France and Germany. Even though this elimination of Franco-Dutch tensions brought a peaceful Europe, it
created on the other side a very powerful cooperation of hegemony in the EU, which still dominates the
continental arena.
Large-scale conflicts produced in Western Balkan made the union consider it as no-mans land (the
great movie of Danis Tanovic in 2002 shed light on various SEE shadows), far enough from the west, civilized
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Europe, but also far from the Oriental East, violent side of the European continent. Not Europe, but also not
European, SEE and Western Balkans, have been something in between disunity and integration procedures.
Serbia have been under a lot of ethno-territorial conflicts; Bosnia-Herzegovina have gone through a lot of crisis
of efficient governance; Kosovo remains in its birth time with major inter-state conflicts from the day of
independence, 2008; Macedonia have built periodic tensions with neighboring countries; Albania have a nonconsolidated political atmosphere for reformative implementation; Montenegro is on its hard way of structural
transformation for the sake of EU. All this countries, with so many different problematic situations are studied
under a similar integration program, but all they need is specific political and economic involvements in
respective local appliance. European institutions operate in a stormy environment, without a military force to
maintain order and in total disconnection with domestic unitary issues.
EU institutions should take serious steps toward pressuring domestic politics and their political leaders
in Western Balkan, but meanwhile developing friendly partnerships with executive local branches. EU should
take in consideration a different form of directing responsibilities, apart the existing top-down ordinance. The
bottom-up strategy has to be seen also as a successful idea where the integration will steal some local
problematic guidance (In regard to Bechev and Andreev 2005 article on Institution Building Strategy). Visas
and socio-political acceptance in civic level for SEE and Western Balkans should take particular importance for
a powerful pro-European image in the region and for EU to not fail in its reformative future in the eyes of
worldwide political arena. All this suggestions would help European Integration for further successes in
regional development, specifically if we talk about Western Balkan, to apply democratic reforms for countries
willing to enter the great family of EU.

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