1. Boudard vs.

Tait Appellant Emilie Boudard, widow of Marie Theodore Boudard (Tait's EE killed in Hanoi by co emps) obtained a
judgment in their favor from the CFI Hanoi IndoChina, Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial. Filed to
enforce in PH court but was dismissed because of lack of juris of Hanoi as the deceased not a res and domiciled. Boudard failed to show
that such was in accordance with the laws of France. Although the documents were original, they are not sufficient to authorize deviation
of an already established rule.The best evidence of a foreign judicial proceeding is a certified copy with all the formalities required.
As for the Summons, it was not validly served. French law states: those no known residence in France shall be served summons in their
present residence; if unknown, writ shall be placed at the main door of the hall of the court where the complaint is filed. Case at bar,
summon served in Manila to Shotwell an agent of an entity separate from that of Tait. The decision is not conc, only prima facie evidence,
can be contested/rep by want of jurisdiction, want notice to the party collusion, fraud, clear mistake of law or fact.
2 NORTHWEST VS. CA AND SHARP
On May 9, 1974, Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency
Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales
made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said agreement, NW sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages. Summons served at its office at the, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa
Prefecture. But unsuccessful as Dinozo (auth to receive court orders ) in Manila. When bailfiff returned to office, Dinozo refused to receive
as he is no longer EE. So the judge decided to have the summons served at Manila office of Sharp. Also the District court of Tokyo
requested SC Japan to serve through diplomatic channels. Sharp received summon but failed to appear at hearing so Tokyo cort
proceeded and rendered judgement ordering to pay Nortwest. Sharp received copy but did not appeal so judgement final and exec.
Plaintiff unable to execute the decision in Japan so suit for enforcement filed at Manila RTC. Sharp aver that judgement null and void for
want of juris and contrary to Phil law. CA sustained TC in reliance of the case of Boudart v Tait . Process of the court has no extraterritorial
effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. ISSUE: WON
Jap Court can acquired Juris over Phil Corp not doing business in Jap by service summons thru diplomatic channels. Yes, Lex Fori applies.
Japan court processes det the validity of xtraterritorial service. There is a presumption of regularity and it is incumbent upon Sharp to
prove otherwise. Since the law of Japan not properly proved, pros presumption applies. Servce to corp: Agent, Gov Officer, Any agent or
ee in Phil.
3. NAGARMULL VS. BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
Contract between FC in India and Dom Corp Binalbagan Isabella to sell 1,7000,000 pcs of Hessian Bags. Shipments of this bag will be on
installment July October. Nagarmull defaulted and failed to deliver the agreed number of bags due to suppliers delay. Meanwhile Gov of
India increased export duty of such bag so Nargarmull wrote to BInalbagan to increase LC to cover the shipment of those that should
have been inc in July to Sept shipments. Binalbagan refused and later received notice from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce Tribunal of
Arbitration in India advising them of the claim and asked to submit own version of the claim . Def said it should have been Nagar who will
pay the increase because of the delay but tribunal refused to sustain defendant's contention and decided in favor of the plaintiff, affirmed
by the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta. ISSUE: WON it is enforceable in PH. No, although it is a presumptive evidence of right but it
can be rep. In the case at bar, the India Arb failed to apply to the facts of this case fundamental principles of contract, the same may be
impeached, as they have been sufficiently impeached by appellant, on the ground of clear mistake of law. We can not sanction a clear
mistake of law that would work an obvious injustice upon appellant.
4. PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC., petitioner, vs. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC., respondent
PAWI and FASGI entered into contract whereby former will deliver wheels. Former delivered and latter paid however latter later found out
that wheels are defective and did not comply with US Std. FASGI filed in California courts for breach of contract. Second agreement made
( return in installment) but PAWI remised. FASGI sought enforcement of agreement and rec favorable judgement in CA court ordering PAWI
to pay P252 K plus damages. PAWI did not comply so FASGI filed in Ph court for enforcement. TC court ruled against FASGI as such was
tainted with Fraud as the latter was not ordered to ret the wheels and PAWIs American Lawyer entered into agreements without its
consent. CA reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced here in the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. The judgment is valid. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. PAWI was
very well represented in the California court. PAWIs insistence that its American lawyer colluded with FASGI; that he entered into the
compromise agreement without PAWIs authority is belied by the fact that PAWI initially complied with the agreement. It did not disclaim
the agreement. It sent two installments (though belatedly) but failed to comply on the rest. It cannot now aver that the agreement is
without its authority. Further, it is just but fair for the California court not to order FASGI to return the remaining wheels because of PAWIs
arrears.
5. Renato Tayag vs Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Domiciliary Admin v Anciliary Admin
Perkins died in NYC , left properties here and abroad. One left in the PH is a Stock Cert covering 33,002 shares of stocks in BCI which is in
possession of the Country Trust Compnany of NYC the domicilary admin of perkins. Tayag was appointed anciliary admin. Dispute as to
who is entitled to possess. TC ordered returned of StckCert but NY refused. Tayag then filed petition to declare such SC lost and comple
BCI to issue new sc, granted. BCI assailed coz there is no lost of SCs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. are correct.
HELD: No. Benguet Consolidated is a corporation who owes its existence to Philippine laws. It has been given rights and privileges under
the law. Corollary, it also has obligations under the law and one of those is to follow valid legal court orders. It is not immune from judicial
control because it is domiciled here in the Philippines. BCI is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts.. It will leave Tayag without any remedy simply because CTC-NY, a foreign entity refuses to
comply with a valid court order. The final recourse then is for our local courts to create a legal fiction such that the stock certificates in
issue be declared lost even though in reality they exist in the hands of CTC-NY. This is valid. As held time and again, fictions which the law
may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important part in its development.
6. OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v CA
Contract between FC and DC to deliver oil well cement but DC failed although there was already payment of the FC. Latter said it will
refer its claim to arbitration based on Clause 16 in the contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
Arbitration decided in favor of FC and filed for petition before Civil judge in India to make such decision part of rule of india. Objected by
DC but such obj refused to be admitted by India court because of failure to pay required filing fees.
FC filed a complaint with (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the judgement of foreign court. DC moved to dismiss for lack of
cause of action and such dismissal was affirmed by CA. Arbitrator did not have juris over the dispute therefore India court cannot validly
adopt the award. ISSUE : WON the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between ONGC and Pacific Cement under Clause 16? YES
WON the non-delivery of the Oil Well Cement is a proper subject for arbitration under Clause 16)? NO
*Under the Arbitration Clause: 3 matters may be submitted for arbitration:
(1) all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned
and as to quality or workmanship of the items ordered; or
(2) any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing,
specification, instruction or these conditions; or

(3) otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during stipulated/extended period or after the
completion/abandonment thereof.
WON the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction even if it does not state the facts and the law upon which the
award was based? YES
-The Order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator as contained in the Award Paper. The
Award Paper contains an exhaustive discussion of the representative claims and defenses of the parties, and the arbitrator's evaluation of
the same
-the consti mandate DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE VALIDITY OF "MEMORANDUM DECISIONS"
7. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad vs Court of Appeals
Asiavest filed rec suit againts PNCC for failure to complete construction project despite payment. PNCC failed to comply with Malaysia
judgement so filed at RTC for enforcement. RTC denied complaint and such denial affirmed by CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian
Court judgment should be enforced against PNCC in the Philippines. HELD: Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare allegations
of want of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion and/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On the contrary, Asiavest was able to present evidence
as to the validity of the proceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest presented the certified and authenticated copies of the
judgment and the order issued by the Malaysian Court. It also presented correspondences between Asiavests lawyers and PNCCs
lawyers in and out of court which belied PNCCs allegation that the Malaysian court never acquired jurisdiction over it. PNCCs allegation
of fraud is not sufficient too, further, it never invoked the same in the Malaysian Court. The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign
judgment the party must present evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Otherwise, the judgment enjoys the presumption of validity so long as it was duly certified and authenticated. In this case, PNCC
failed to present the required evidence.
8. Wang Lab v CA
Wang is s US Based company engaged in manufacturing and selling of computers worldwide. EXXBYTE is Wangs sole distributor in the country
although the latter denies the former as its representative but was later on proven by the ACCRA Law through evidence that Ex is Wangs agent. Accra and
Wang entered into contract for the latter to supply computer to the office of the former. 2 nd contract involved ISLA or contract for the development of a data
processing software program
But it did not materialize for some reasons. Accra now files for damages againts WANG but latter filed motion to dismiss as courts in the Phil do not have
juris also because wang is not engaged in business in the county. It was later on explained that such was involved in business in the country. ACCRA filed
motion for leave for extra territorial service. Issue : whether or not respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, a foreign
corporation. Yes. As to the contention of WANG that our courts have no juris because they are not engaged in business in phil and the summon to Ex is not
summon to them as they are separate the court finds it unmeritorious. Court disc 3 modes of service to Foreing Corpo : 1. Agent 2. Gov off designated by
law to such office 3. Any officer of agent in the Phil. Summon was served to Ex as their agent. ****Furthermore, even though petitioner objects to the
jurisdiction of the Court over its person, the fact that it alleged non-jurisdictional grounds in its pleadings indicates that it has waived lack of jurisdiction of the
court.
As noted by the trial court, defendant Wang (petitioner herein) in its Motion to Dismiss sought affirmative reliefs requiring the exercise of jurisdiction, by
praying: (1) for authority to take testimony by way of deposition upon oral examination; (2) for extension of time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion to effect
Extraterritorial Service of Summons; (3) to hold in abeyance any and all proceedings relative to plaintiffs' foregoing motion and (4) to consider as a mere
scrap of paper plaintiff's motion to strike out Deposition (Rollo, p. 111).
In addition, the records show that petitioner also prayed for: (1) authority to reset date of taking of deposition; (2) admission of the formal stenographic notes
and (3) suspension of time to file responsive pleadings, not to mention its various participation in the proceedings in the court other than for the purpose of
objecting to lack of jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 169).
In fact, it is well settled that "A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of formal notice." Thus, it has been held that when the appearance is by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the Court. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an
appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person (Flores v. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746 [1918]). Clarifying further, the Court has likewise ruled that even
though the defendant objects to the jurisdiction of the Court, if at the same time he alleges any non-jurisdictional ground for dismissing the action, the Court
acquires jurisdiction over him (Far East International Import & Export Corporation v. Nankai Kogyo, Co., Ltd., 6 SCRA 725 11962]).
9. ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE VS NLRCGR NO. 78085OCTOBER 16, 1989
Royal Crown deployed Virgillio for employment wih ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman. Service agreement for a period of one year from date of arrival in
SA but ZAMEL terminated employment on grounds of poor performance. Detained for 3 days and was later made to board plane to PH where he filed comp
for illegal termination. Royal contended there is no 3 rd party liability in Labor Code or IRR of an agency like itself for violation of afreement abroad, or that it is
an agent of the ER so cannot be held solidarily liable. ISSUE: WON petitioner as a private employment agency may be held jointly and severally liable with
theforeign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with the implementation of theemployment contracts of the employees recruited and
deployed abroad. HELD: Yes, Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary liability u nder the various contractual
undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment
and placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper
use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment. It was also
required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for
the former, which contained a provision empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the
recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. Petitioner was required as well to post such cash and suretybonds as determined by the Secretary
of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitmentprocedures, rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment as appropriate.
Thesecontractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and
severally with its principal, the foreign-based employer, for allclaims filed by recruited workers which may arise in connection with the implementation of the
serviceagreements or employment contracts.
10. Lingner v CA
DMW and PhilChem entered into contract whereby the latter will be the exclusive importer of their chem prod in the Phil. Also in the agreement is a royalty
clause whereby Philchem will be getting 10% royalty on sales of PRODUCTS in the Philippines. They have also agreed that any settlements will fall under
Phil
courts Juris. Lingner took over the interest of DMW. Former is a subsidiary company of BEECHAM who has an office in the Phil. After the termination of the
contract, PHILCHEM presented a claim to LINGNER for P1,055,000.00 under the ROYALTY CLAUSE but no settlement so Philchem filed a complaint
against BEECHAM but later on ammended such because the latter is not a reg company in the Phil nor a res- ammended complaint now includes Lingner
as Co Def. Lingner filed motion to dismiss because its not a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines therefore cannot be sued locally and that it
could not be served summons through the law firm.
Trial Court denied motion for dismissal, held that summons were validly served. Lingner went on certiorari same issue but CA held summon to lawyer valid.
As regards the question on WON it is doing business in the Phil, court held its immaterial because two parties have contract and provided expressely the
venue of settlements which is Phil court. A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to
conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed

against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant For the expeditious determination of this controversy,
therefore, in view of the insufficiency of evidence that LINGNER is doing business in the Philippines, which is a sine qua non requirement under the provision
of Section 14, Rule 14 1 of the Rules before service of process can be effected upon a foreign corporation and jurisdiction over the same may be acquired, it
is best that alias summons on LINGNER be issued, in this case under the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14, 2 in relation to Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,
which recognizes the principle that venue can be agreed upon by the parties. If a local plaintiff and a foreign corporation have agreed on Philippine venue,
summons by publication can be made on the foreign corporation under the principle of liberal construction of the rules to promote just determination of
actions.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment under review of the Intermediate Appellate Court (Third Special Cases Division) is hereby upheld insofar as it sustained the
Orders, dated August 24, 1981 and December 18, 1981, of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XI, Pasig, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, albeit on grounds different from those relied upon by the Intermediate Appellate Court. The now Regional
Trial Court, to which the case below has been assigned, is hereby directed to allow private respondent Philippine Chemical Laboratories, Inc., to apply for the
issuance of alias summons on petitioner Lingner and Fischer GMBH by publication under the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14 in relation to Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, and after issues have been joined, to proceed to trial and judgment accordingly.

11 SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA 125 SCRA 522

SAUDI hired FA MORADA based in Jeddah. Was attempted rate by co Fas after disco. Was adviced to returned to Jeddah and was asked to go back to
Jakarta to help arrange the realse of 2 Fas. She did not cooperate. She was later on convicted of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to
the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition, sentencing her to five months imprisonment
and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with the 2, for what happened in Jakarta. SAUDIA denied her the
assistance she requested, But because she was wrongfully convicted, Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi
Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause. On November 23,
1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (Al-Balawi), its country manager.
SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondents claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign
element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule. ISSUE: WON
the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the case HELD: YES. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent
Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the
petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.
COURT disagrees with MORADA that his is purely a domestic case. However, the court finds that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
12 . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. WONG CHENG ()
FACTS: Appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The demurrer filed by said appellee alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court,
which so held and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdiction waters.
HELD: There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United
States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United
States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States (we were still a US territory when this was decided in 1922).
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding.
Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established,
because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in
enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with law.
13. P V BULL (Objective)
accused H. N. Bull, master of vessel, willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from
the port of Ampieng, Formosa, 677 head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing the animals while in transit, so as to avoid
cruelty and unnecessary suffering. Animal Cruelty
Bull(Norweigan): Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof so it is not within
the jurisdiction of the Philippines
ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the
time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States
HELD: The defendant was found guilty
YES. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other
country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters,
and a new set of principles became applicable.
Note: when it comes in our territory it has the discretion to prosecute or not.
If it choose to prosecute must be justified.
2. The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local
authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction.
The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the
statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate"
means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that
the word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, we determine this
point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to
provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."

14. P v Tulin (Subj Ter) Hijack In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation,
loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates including the accused Roger P. Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and completely took over the vessel.
The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong
San Hiong. Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the Philippines. A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the accused were charged with
qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this
appeal. Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed
by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and
sentence. ISSUE: WON the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the Philippine waters and territory?
RULING: We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo
were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred,
and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the
attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The
same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since
its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA
761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lollo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
15. Liang
Petitioner is an economist working with the ADB. for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC judge received
an "office of protocol" from the (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. So, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. courts cannot
blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination
that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. Third, slandering a person could
not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the
name of official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in
the receiving state outside his official functions.
16. US V FOWLER ( Stolen Champagne Bottles)
The counsel for defendants alleged to the Court of First Instance that they were without jurisdiction over the crime charged . Since it happened in the high
seas and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the case be dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas on board of transport not registered in the
Philippines. HELD: No. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in
teh Philippines. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take a cognizance of a crime committed on
board the same.
17. Eastern Shipping Lines vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: On June, 1977 M/S ASIATICA, a Vessel operated by Eastern Shipping Lines was bound for Manila from Kobe, Japan. It loaded , 5,000 pieces of
colorized lance pipes in 28 packages valued at P256,039.00 consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare parts valued at
P92,361.75, consigned to Central Textile Mills, Inc. Both were insured from marine risks with Development Insurance and Surety Corp. It also took 128
cartoons of garment fabrics and accessories in 2 containers consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corp and 2 Cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman
Enterprises and General Merchandise. The shipments were insured with DOWA Fire and Marine Insurance Co. and Nisshin Fire and marine Insurance Co.
respectably. En Route from Kobe to Manila the vessel caught fire and sank losing all its shipment. The insurance companies paid for the insurance of the
above mentioned shipments. They Then instituted a case to redeem the insurance that they paid to the various companies against Eastern Shipping Lines.
They contend that Eastern should not be exempted from liability because it was not able to exercise due diligence in preventing the occurrence of the fire as
well as its unseaworthiness.
Eastern Shipping invoked the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act as a defense wherein it is said to be exempt from the said liability. The Fire was said to be one
of the exempting circumstance under the act. It also contended that it the fire occurred as a fortuitous event such as a natural disaster or calamity which
leads them to conclude that they should not be made liable. Issues: Which law should govern the case is it the Civil Code provisions or the specific law
which is the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act? Who has the burden of proof to show the negligence of the carrier? Held: It is the law of the country to which the
goods are to be transported which shall apply in this case. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act will be supplementary to the Civil Code provision.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence when transporting goods. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods unless it is due to the ff events: flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity. In this case fire may not be
considered a natural disaster or calamity. This is because the occurrence may be due to an act by man or the actual fault of the carrier. The common carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or have acted negligently unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. Evidence
presented by the witness failed to establish the extraordinary diligence which was required of the carrier. The fire started 24 hours before discovery and upon
discovery it was already too big to suppress. It appears that after the cargoes were stored no regular inspections were done to see to it that the cargoes are
well kept. The crew could not even explain how the fire started. Because of this the carrier was not able to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence
making it liable of the costs and damages. Even if fire were to be considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the Civil Code, it is
required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the "natural disaster" must have been the "proximate and only cause of the loss," and that the carrier has
"exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during or after the occurrence of the disaster. " This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to
establish satisfactorily. They are bound to pay the insurance companies as well as 5K for attorneys
18 Fujiki v Marinay (Conflict of Laws)
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry a] special

proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify
facts of a person's life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law. A critical difference between the case of a
foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35 (4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines;
and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment. Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry
19. CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a
naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional
commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about
the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the
divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig
City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics
Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a
competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is
a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the
Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
20.MIJARES V RANADA
Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their
favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of
international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees
based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the
non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved
a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign
judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.

Ruling:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in
concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners
Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the
Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might
lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are
not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over
property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment
even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one
capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of
Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other
actions not involving property.