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Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill

UTILITARIANISM
by
JohnStuartMill
(1863)
Chapter2
WhatUtilitarianismIs.
APASSINGremarkisallthatneedsbegiventotheignorantblunderof
supposingthatthosewhostandupforutilityasthetestofrightandwrong,
usetheterminthatrestrictedandmerelycolloquialsenseinwhichutilityis
opposedtopleasure.Anapologyisduetothephilosophicalopponentsof
utilitarianism,foreventhemomentaryappearanceofconfoundingthemwith
anyonecapableofsoabsurdamisconceptionwhichisthemore
extraordinary,inasmuchasthecontraryaccusation,ofreferringeverythingto
pleasure,andthattooinitsgrossestform,isanotherofthecommoncharges
againstutilitarianism:and,ashasbeenpointedlyremarkedbyanablewriter,
thesamesortofpersons,andoftentheverysamepersons,denouncethe
theory"asimpracticablydrywhenthewordutilityprecedesthewordpleasure,
andastoopracticablyvoluptuouswhenthewordpleasureprecedestheword
utility."Thosewhoknowanythingaboutthematterareawarethatevery
writer,fromEpicurustoBentham,whomaintainedthetheoryofutility,meant
byit,notsomethingtobecontradistinguishedfrompleasure,butpleasure
itself,togetherwithexemptionfrompainandinsteadofopposingtheuseful
totheagreeableortheornamental,havealwaysdeclaredthattheuseful
meansthese,amongotherthings.Yetthecommonherd,includingtheherdof
writers,notonlyinnewspapersandperiodicals,butinbooksofweightand
pretension,areperpetuallyfallingintothisshallowmistake.Havingcaughtup
thewordutilitarian,whileknowingnothingwhateveraboutitbutitssound,
theyhabituallyexpressbyittherejection,ortheneglect,ofpleasureinsome
ofitsformsofbeauty,ofornament,orofamusement.Noristhetermthus
ignorantlymisappliedsolelyindisparagement,butoccasionallyincompliment
asthoughitimpliedsuperioritytofrivolityandthemerepleasuresofthe
moment.Andthisperverteduseistheonlyoneinwhichthewordispopularly
known,andtheonefromwhichthenewgenerationareacquiringtheirsole
notionofitsmeaning.Thosewhointroducedtheword,butwhohadformany
yearsdiscontinueditasadistinctiveappellation,maywellfeelthemselves
calledupontoresumeit,ifbydoingsotheycanhopetocontributeanything
towardsrescuingitfromthisutterdegradation.*
[*Theauthorofthisessayhasreasonforbelievinghimselftobethefirstpersonwhobrought
thewordutilitarianintouse.Hedidnotinventit,butadopteditfromapassingexpressionin
Mr.Galt'sAnnalsoftheParish.Afterusingitasadesignationforseveralyears,heandothers
abandoneditfromagrowingdisliketoanythingresemblingabadgeorwatchwordofsectarian
distinction.Butasanameforonesingleopinion,notasetofopinionstodenotethe
recognitionofutilityasastandard,notanyparticularwayofapplyingitthetermsuppliesa
wantinthelanguage,andoffers,inmanycases,aconvenientmodeofavoidingtiresome
circumlocution.]

Thecreedwhichacceptsasthefoundationofmorals,Utility,ortheGreatest
HappinessPrinciple,holdsthatactionsarerightinproportionastheytendto
promotehappiness,wrongastheytendtoproducethereverseofhappiness.
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Byhappinessisintendedpleasure,andtheabsenceofpainbyunhappiness,
pain,andtheprivationofpleasure.Togiveaclearviewofthemoralstandard
setupbythetheory,muchmorerequirestobesaidinparticular,whatthings
itincludesintheideasofpainandpleasureandtowhatextentthisisleftan
openquestion.Butthesesupplementaryexplanationsdonotaffectthetheory
oflifeonwhichthistheoryofmoralityisgroundednamely,thatpleasure,and
freedomfrompain,aretheonlythingsdesirableasendsandthatall
desirablethings(whichareasnumerousintheutilitarianasinanyother
scheme)aredesirableeitherforthepleasureinherentinthemselves,oras
meanstothepromotionofpleasureandthepreventionofpain.
Now,suchatheoryoflifeexcitesinmanyminds,andamongtheminsomeof
themostestimableinfeelingandpurpose,inveteratedislike.Tosupposethat
lifehas(astheyexpressit)nohigherendthanpleasurenobetterandnobler
objectofdesireandpursuittheydesignateasutterlymeanandgrovellingas
adoctrineworthyonlyofswine,towhomthefollowersofEpicuruswere,ata
veryearlyperiod,contemptuouslylikenedandmodernholdersofthedoctrine
areoccasionallymadethesubjectofequallypolitecomparisonsbyitsGerman,
French,andEnglishassailants.
Whenthusattacked,theEpicureanshavealwaysanswered,thatitisnotthey,
buttheiraccusers,whorepresenthumannatureinadegradinglightsincethe
accusationsupposeshumanbeingstobecapableofnopleasuresexceptthose
ofwhichswinearecapable.Ifthissuppositionweretrue,thechargecouldnot
begainsaid,butwouldthenbenolongeranimputationforifthesourcesof
pleasurewerepreciselythesametohumanbeingsandtoswine,theruleof
lifewhichisgoodenoughfortheonewouldbegoodenoughfortheother.The
comparisonoftheEpicureanlifetothatofbeastsisfeltasdegrading,precisely
becauseabeast'spleasuresdonotsatisfyahumanbeing'sconceptionsof
happiness.Humanbeingshavefacultiesmoreelevatedthantheanimal
appetites,andwhenoncemadeconsciousofthem,donotregardanythingas
happinesswhichdoesnotincludetheirgratification.Idonot,indeed,consider
theEpicureanstohavebeenbyanymeansfaultlessindrawingouttheir
schemeofconsequencesfromtheutilitarianprinciple.Todothisinany
sufficientmanner,manyStoic,aswellasChristianelementsrequiretobe
included.ButthereisnoknownEpicureantheoryoflifewhichdoesnotassign
tothepleasuresoftheintellect,ofthefeelingsandimagination,andofthe
moralsentiments,amuchhighervalueaspleasuresthantothoseofmere
sensation.Itmustbeadmitted,however,thatutilitarianwritersingeneral
haveplacedthesuperiorityofmentaloverbodilypleasureschieflyinthe
greaterpermanency,safety,uncostliness,etc.,oftheformerthatis,intheir
circumstantialadvantagesratherthanintheirintrinsicnature.Andonallthese
pointsutilitarianshavefullyprovedtheircasebuttheymighthavetakenthe
other,and,asitmaybecalled,higherground,withentireconsistency.Itis
quitecompatiblewiththeprincipleofutilitytorecognisethefact,thatsome
kindsofpleasurearemoredesirableandmorevaluablethanothers.Itwould
beabsurdthatwhile,inestimatingallotherthings,qualityisconsideredas
wellasquantity,theestimationofpleasuresshouldbesupposedtodependon
quantityalone.
IfIamasked,whatImeanbydifferenceofqualityinpleasures,orwhat
makesonepleasuremorevaluablethananother,merelyasapleasure,except
itsbeinggreaterinamount,thereisbutonepossibleanswer.Oftwo
pleasures,iftherebeonetowhichalloralmostallwhohaveexperienceof
bothgiveadecidedpreference,irrespectiveofanyfeelingofmoralobligation
topreferit,thatisthemoredesirablepleasure.Ifoneofthetwois,bythose
whoarecompetentlyacquaintedwithboth,placedsofarabovetheotherthat
theypreferit,eventhoughknowingittobeattendedwithagreateramountof
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discontent,andwouldnotresignitforanyquantityoftheotherpleasure
whichtheirnatureiscapableof,wearejustifiedinascribingtothepreferred
enjoymentasuperiorityinquality,sofaroutweighingquantityastorenderit,
incomparison,ofsmallaccount.
Nowitisanunquestionablefactthatthosewhoareequallyacquaintedwith,
andequallycapableofappreciatingandenjoying,both,dogiveamost
markedpreferencetothemannerofexistencewhichemploystheirhigher
faculties.Fewhumancreatureswouldconsenttobechangedintoanyofthe
loweranimals,forapromiseofthefullestallowanceofabeast'spleasuresno
intelligenthumanbeingwouldconsenttobeafool,noinstructedpersonwould
beanignoramus,nopersonoffeelingandconsciencewouldbeselfishand
base,eventhoughtheyshouldbepersuadedthatthefool,thedunce,orthe
rascalisbettersatisfiedwithhislotthantheyarewiththeirs.Theywouldnot
resignwhattheypossessmorethanheforthemostcompletesatisfactionof
allthedesireswhichtheyhaveincommonwithhim.Iftheyeverfancythey
would,itisonlyincasesofunhappinesssoextreme,thattoescapefromit
theywouldexchangetheirlotforalmostanyother,howeverundesirablein
theirowneyes.Abeingofhigherfacultiesrequiresmoretomakehimhappy,
iscapableprobablyofmoreacutesuffering,andcertainlyaccessibletoitat
morepoints,thanoneofaninferiortypebutinspiteoftheseliabilities,he
canneverreallywishtosinkintowhathefeelstobealowergradeof
existence.Wemaygivewhatexplanationwepleaseofthisunwillingnesswe
mayattributeittopride,anamewhichisgivenindiscriminatelytosomeofthe
mostandtosomeoftheleastestimablefeelingsofwhichmankindare
capable:wemayreferittotheloveoflibertyandpersonalindependence,an
appealtowhichwaswiththeStoicsoneofthemosteffectivemeansforthe
inculcationofittotheloveofpower,ortotheloveofexcitement,bothof
whichdoreallyenterintoandcontributetoit:butitsmostappropriate
appellationisasenseofdignity,whichallhumanbeingspossessinoneform
orother,andinsome,thoughbynomeansinexact,proportiontotheirhigher
faculties,andwhichissoessentialapartofthehappinessofthoseinwhomit
isstrong,thatnothingwhichconflictswithitcouldbe,otherwisethan
momentarily,anobjectofdesiretothem.
Whoeversupposesthatthispreferencetakesplaceatasacrificeofhappiness
thatthesuperiorbeing,inanythinglikeequalcircumstances,isnothappier
thantheinferiorconfoundsthetwoverydifferentideas,ofhappiness,and
content.Itisindisputablethatthebeingwhosecapacitiesofenjoymentare
low,hasthegreatestchanceofhavingthemfullysatisfiedandahighly
endowedbeingwillalwaysfeelthatanyhappinesswhichhecanlookfor,as
theworldisconstituted,isimperfect.Buthecanlearntobearits
imperfections,iftheyareatallbearableandtheywillnotmakehimenvythe
beingwhoisindeedunconsciousoftheimperfections,butonlybecausehe
feelsnotatallthegoodwhichthoseimperfectionsqualify.Itisbettertobea
humanbeingdissatisfiedthanapigsatisfiedbettertobeSocratesdissatisfied
thanafoolsatisfied.Andifthefool,orthepig,areadifferentopinion,itis
becausetheyonlyknowtheirownsideofthequestion.Theotherpartytothe
comparisonknowsbothsides.
Itmaybeobjected,thatmanywhoarecapableofthehigherpleasures,
occasionally,undertheinfluenceoftemptation,postponethemtothelower.
Butthisisquitecompatiblewithafullappreciationoftheintrinsicsuperiority
ofthehigher.Menoften,frominfirmityofcharacter,maketheirelectionfor
thenearergood,thoughtheyknowittobethelessvaluableandthisnoless
whenthechoiceisbetweentwobodilypleasures,thanwhenitisbetween
bodilyandmental.Theypursuesensualindulgencestotheinjuryofhealth,
thoughperfectlyawarethathealthisthegreatergood.
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Itmaybefurtherobjected,thatmanywhobeginwithyouthfulenthusiasmfor
everythingnoble,astheyadvanceinyearssinkintoindolenceandselfishness.
ButIdonotbelievethatthosewhoundergothisverycommonchange,
voluntarilychoosethelowerdescriptionofpleasuresinpreferencetothe
higher.Ibelievethatbeforetheydevotethemselvesexclusivelytotheone,
theyhavealreadybecomeincapableoftheother.Capacityforthenobler
feelingsisinmostnaturesaverytenderplant,easilykilled,notonlybyhostile
influences,butbymerewantofsustenanceandinthemajorityofyoung
personsitspeedilydiesawayiftheoccupationstowhichtheirpositioninlife
hasdevotedthem,andthesocietyintowhichithasthrownthem,arenot
favourabletokeepingthathighercapacityinexercise.Menlosetheirhigh
aspirationsastheylosetheirintellectualtastes,becausetheyhavenottimeor
opportunityforindulgingthemandtheyaddictthemselvestoinferior
pleasures,notbecausetheydeliberatelypreferthem,butbecausetheyare
eithertheonlyonestowhichtheyhaveaccess,ortheonlyoneswhichthey
areanylongercapableofenjoying.Itmaybequestionedwhetheranyone
whohasremainedequallysusceptibletobothclassesofpleasures,ever
knowinglyandcalmlypreferredthelowerthoughmany,inallages,have
brokendowninanineffectualattempttocombineboth.
Fromthisverdictoftheonlycompetentjudges,Iapprehendtherecanbeno
appeal.Onaquestionwhichisthebestworthhavingoftwopleasures,or
whichoftwomodesofexistenceisthemostgratefultothefeelings,apart
fromitsmoralattributesandfromitsconsequences,thejudgmentofthose
whoarequalifiedbyknowledgeofboth,or,iftheydiffer,thatofthemajority
amongthem,mustbeadmittedasfinal.Andthereneedsbetheless
hesitationtoacceptthisjudgmentrespectingthequalityofpleasures,since
thereisnoothertribunaltobereferredtoevenonthequestionofquantity.
Whatmeansarethereofdeterminingwhichistheacutestoftwopains,orthe
intensestoftwopleasurablesensations,exceptthegeneralsuffrageofthose
whoarefamiliarwithboth?Neitherpainsnorpleasuresarehomogeneous,and
painisalwaysheterogeneouswithpleasure.Whatistheretodecidewhethera
particularpleasureisworthpurchasingatthecostofaparticularpain,except
thefeelingsandjudgmentoftheexperienced?When,therefore,thosefeelings
andjudgmentdeclarethepleasuresderivedfromthehigherfacultiestobe
preferableinkind,apartfromthequestionofintensity,tothoseofwhichthe
animalnature,disjoinedfromthehigherfaculties,issuspectible,theyare
entitledonthissubjecttothesameregard.
Ihavedweltonthispoint,asbeinganecessarypartofaperfectlyjust
conceptionofUtilityorHappiness,consideredasthedirectiveruleofhuman
conduct.Butitisbynomeansanindispensableconditiontotheacceptanceof
theutilitarianstandardforthatstandardisnottheagent'sowngreatest
happiness,butthegreatestamountofhappinessaltogetherandifitmay
possiblybedoubtedwhetheranoblecharacterisalwaysthehappierforits
nobleness,therecanbenodoubtthatitmakesotherpeoplehappier,andthat
theworldingeneralisimmenselyagainerbyit.Utilitarianism,therefore,
couldonlyattainitsendbythegeneralcultivationofnoblenessofcharacter,
evenifeachindividualwereonlybenefitedbythenoblenessofothers,andhis
own,sofarashappinessisconcerned,wereasheerdeductionfromthe
benefit.Butthebareenunciationofsuchanabsurdityasthislast,renders
refutationsuperfluous.
AccordingtotheGreatestHappinessPrinciple,asaboveexplained,the
ultimateend,withreferencetoandforthesakeofwhichallotherthingsare
desirable(whetherweareconsideringourowngoodorthatofotherpeople),
isanexistenceexemptasfaraspossiblefrompain,andasrichaspossiblein
enjoyments,bothinpointofquantityandqualitythetestofquality,andthe
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ruleformeasuringitagainstquantity,beingthepreferencefeltbythosewho
intheiropportunitiesofexperience,towhichmustbeaddedtheirhabitsof
selfconsciousnessandselfobservation,arebestfurnishedwiththemeansof
comparison.This,being,accordingtotheutilitarianopinion,theendofhuman
action,isnecessarilyalsothestandardofmoralitywhichmayaccordinglybe
defined,therulesandpreceptsforhumanconduct,bytheobservanceof
whichanexistencesuchashasbeendescribedmightbe,tothegreatest
extentpossible,securedtoallmankindandnottothemonly,but,sofaras
thenatureofthingsadmits,tothewholesentientcreation.
Againstthisdoctrine,however,arisesanotherclassofobjectors,whosaythat
happiness,inanyform,cannotbetherationalpurposeofhumanlifeand
actionbecause,inthefirstplace,itisunattainable:andtheycontemptuously
ask,whatrighthastthoutobehappy?aquestionwhichMr.Carlyleclenches
bytheaddition,Whatright,ashorttimeago,hadstthoueventobe?Next,
theysay,thatmencandowithouthappinessthatallnoblehumanbeings
havefeltthis,andcouldnothavebecomenoblebutbylearningthelessonof
Entsagen,orrenunciationwhichlesson,thoroughlylearntandsubmittedto,
theyaffirmtobethebeginningandnecessaryconditionofallvirtue.
Thefirstoftheseobjectionswouldgototherootofthematterwereitwell
foundedforifnohappinessistobehadatallbyhumanbeings,the
attainmentofitcannotbetheendofmorality,orofanyrationalconduct.
Though,eveninthatcase,somethingmightstillbesaidfortheutilitarian
theorysinceutilityincludesnotsolelythepursuitofhappiness,butthe
preventionormitigationofunhappinessandiftheformeraimbechimerical,
therewillbeallthegreaterscopeandmoreimperativeneedforthelatter,so
longatleastasmankindthinkfittolive,anddonottakerefugeinthe
simultaneousactofsuiciderecommendedundercertainconditionsbyNovalis.
When,however,itisthuspositivelyassertedtobeimpossiblethathumanlife
shouldbehappy,theassertion,ifnotsomethinglikeaverbalquibble,isat
leastanexaggeration.Ifbyhappinessbemeantacontinuityofhighly
pleasurableexcitement,itisevidentenoughthatthisisimpossible.Astateof
exaltedpleasurelastsonlymoments,orinsomecases,andwithsome
intermissions,hoursordays,andistheoccasionalbrilliantflashofenjoyment,
notitspermanentandsteadyflame.Ofthisthephilosopherswhohavetaught
thathappinessistheendoflifewereasfullyawareasthosewhotauntthem.
Thehappinesswhichtheymeantwasnotalifeofrapturebutmomentsof
such,inanexistencemadeupoffewandtransitorypains,manyandvarious
pleasures,withadecidedpredominanceoftheactiveoverthepassive,and
havingasthefoundationofthewhole,nottoexpectmorefromlifethanitis
capableofbestowing.Alifethuscomposed,tothosewhohavebeenfortunate
enoughtoobtainit,hasalwaysappearedworthyofthenameofhappiness.
Andsuchanexistenceisevennowthelotofmany,duringsomeconsiderable
portionoftheirlives.Thepresentwretchededucation,andwretchedsocial
arrangements,aretheonlyrealhindrancetoitsbeingattainablebyalmostall.
Theobjectorsperhapsmaydoubtwhetherhumanbeings,iftaughttoconsider
happinessastheendoflife,wouldbesatisfiedwithsuchamoderateshareof
it.Butgreatnumbersofmankindhavebeensatisfiedwithmuchless.The
mainconstituentsofasatisfiedlifeappeartobetwo,eitherofwhichbyitself
isoftenfoundsufficientforthepurpose:tranquillity,andexcitement.With
muchtranquillity,manyfindthattheycanbecontentwithverylittlepleasure:
withmuchexcitement,manycanreconcilethemselvestoaconsiderable
quantityofpain.Thereisassuredlynoinherentimpossibilityinenablingeven
themassofmankindtounitebothsincethetwoaresofarfrombeing
incompatiblethattheyareinnaturalalliance,theprolongationofeitherbeing
apreparationfor,andexcitingawishfor,theother.Itisonlythoseinwhom
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indolenceamountstoavice,thatdonotdesireexcitementafteranintervalof
repose:itisonlythoseinwhomtheneedofexcitementisadisease,thatfeel
thetranquillitywhichfollowsexcitementdullandinsipid,insteadof
pleasurableindirectproportiontotheexcitementwhichprecededit.When
peoplewhoaretolerablyfortunateintheiroutwardlotdonotfindinlife
sufficientenjoymenttomakeitvaluabletothem,thecausegenerallyis,
caringfornobodybutthemselves.Tothosewhohaveneitherpublicnor
privateaffections,theexcitementsoflifearemuchcurtailed,andinanycase
dwindleinvalueasthetimeapproacheswhenallselfishinterestsmustbe
terminatedbydeath:whilethosewholeaveafterthemobjectsofpersonal
affection,andespeciallythosewhohavealsocultivatedafellowfeelingwith
thecollectiveinterestsofmankind,retainaslivelyaninterestinlifeontheeve
ofdeathasinthevigourofyouthandhealth.Nexttoselfishness,theprincipal
causewhichmakeslifeunsatisfactoryiswantofmentalcultivation.A
cultivatedmindIdonotmeanthatofaphilosopher,butanymindtowhich
thefountainsofknowledgehavebeenopened,andwhichhasbeentaught,in
anytolerabledegree,toexerciseitsfacultiesfindssourcesofinexhaustible
interestinallthatsurroundsitintheobjectsofnature,theachievementsof
art,theimaginationsofpoetry,theincidentsofhistory,thewaysofmankind,
pastandpresent,andtheirprospectsinthefuture.Itispossible,indeed,to
becomeindifferenttoallthis,andthattoowithouthavingexhausteda
thousandthpartofitbutonlywhenonehashadfromthebeginningnomoral
orhumaninterestinthesethings,andhassoughtinthemonlythe
gratificationofcuriosity.
Nowthereisabsolutelynoreasoninthenatureofthingswhyanamountof
mentalculturesufficienttogiveanintelligentinterestintheseobjectsof
contemplation,shouldnotbetheinheritanceofeveryoneborninacivilised
country.Aslittleisthereaninherentnecessitythatanyhumanbeingshould
beaselfishegotist,devoidofeveryfeelingorcarebutthosewhichcentrein
hisownmiserableindividuality.Somethingfarsuperiortothisissufficiently
commonevennow,togiveampleearnestofwhatthehumanspeciesmaybe
made.Genuineprivateaffectionsandasincereinterestinthepublicgood,are
possible,thoughinunequaldegrees,toeveryrightlybroughtuphumanbeing.
Inaworldinwhichthereissomuchtointerest,somuchtoenjoy,andso
muchalsotocorrectandimprove,everyonewhohasthismoderateamount
ofmoralandintellectualrequisitesiscapableofanexistencewhichmaybe
calledenviableandunlesssuchaperson,throughbadlaws,orsubjectionto
thewillofothers,isdeniedthelibertytousethesourcesofhappinesswithin
hisreach,hewillnotfailtofindthisenviableexistence,ifheescapethe
positiveevilsoflife,thegreatsourcesofphysicalandmentalsufferingsuch
asindigence,disease,andtheunkindness,worthlessness,orprematurelossof
objectsofaffection.Themainstressoftheproblemlies,therefore,inthe
contestwiththesecalamities,fromwhichitisararegoodfortuneentirelyto
escapewhich,asthingsnoware,cannotbeobviated,andoftencannotbein
anymaterialdegreemitigated.Yetnoonewhoseopiniondeservesamoment's
considerationcandoubtthatmostofthegreatpositiveevilsoftheworldare
inthemselvesremovable,andwill,ifhumanaffairscontinuetoimprove,bein
theendreducedwithinnarrowlimits.Poverty,inanysenseimplyingsuffering,
maybecompletelyextinguishedbythewisdomofsociety,combinedwiththe
goodsenseandprovidenceofindividuals.Eventhatmostintractableof
enemies,disease,maybeindefinitelyreducedindimensionsbygoodphysical
andmoraleducation,andpropercontrolofnoxiousinfluenceswhilethe
progressofscienceholdsoutapromiseforthefutureofstillmoredirect
conquestsoverthisdetestablefoe.Andeveryadvanceinthatdirection
relievesusfromsome,notonlyofthechanceswhichcutshortourownlives,
but,whatconcernsusstillmore,whichdepriveusofthoseinwhomour
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happinessiswraptup.Asforvicissitudesoffortune,andother
disappointmentsconnectedwithworldlycircumstances,theseareprincipally
theeffecteitherofgrossimprudence,ofillregulateddesires,orofbador
imperfectsocialinstitutions.
Allthegrandsources,inshort,ofhumansufferingareinagreatdegree,many
ofthemalmostentirely,conquerablebyhumancareandeffortandthough
theirremovalisgrievouslyslowthoughalongsuccessionofgenerationswill
perishinthebreachbeforetheconquestiscompleted,andthisworldbecomes
allthat,ifwillandknowledgewerenotwanting,itmighteasilybemadeyet
everymindsufficientlyintelligentandgeneroustobearapart,howeversmall
andunconspicuous,intheendeavour,willdrawanobleenjoymentfromthe
contestitself,whichhewouldnotforanybribeintheformofselfish
indulgenceconsenttobewithout.
Andthisleadstothetrueestimationofwhatissaidbytheobjectors
concerningthepossibility,andtheobligation,oflearningtodowithout
happiness.Unquestionablyitispossibletodowithouthappinessitisdone
involuntarilybynineteentwentiethsofmankind,eveninthosepartsofour
presentworldwhichareleastdeepinbarbarismanditoftenhastobedone
voluntarilybytheheroorthemartyr,forthesakeofsomethingwhichhe
prizesmorethanhisindividualhappiness.Butthissomething,whatisit,
unlessthehappinessofothersorsomeoftherequisitesofhappiness?Itis
nobletobecapableofresigningentirelyone'sownportionofhappiness,or
chancesofit:but,afterall,thisselfsacrificemustbeforsomeenditisnot
itsownendandifwearetoldthatitsendisnothappiness,butvirtue,which
isbetterthanhappiness,Iask,wouldthesacrificebemadeiftheheroor
martyrdidnotbelievethatitwouldearnforothersimmunityfromsimilar
sacrifices?Woulditbemadeifhethoughtthathisrenunciationofhappiness
forhimselfwouldproducenofruitforanyofhisfellowcreatures,buttomake
theirlotlikehis,andplacethemalsointheconditionofpersonswhohave
renouncedhappiness?Allhonourtothosewhocanabnegateforthemselves
thepersonalenjoymentoflife,whenbysuchrenunciationtheycontribute
worthilytoincreasetheamountofhappinessintheworldbuthewhodoesit,
orprofessestodoit,foranyotherpurpose,isnomoredeservingof
admirationthantheasceticmountedonhispillar.Hemaybeaninspiriting
proofofwhatmencando,butassuredlynotanexampleofwhattheyshould.
Thoughitisonlyinaveryimperfectstateoftheworld'sarrangementsthat
anyonecanbestservethehappinessofothersbytheabsolutesacrificeofhis
own,yetsolongastheworldisinthatimperfectstate,Ifullyacknowledge
thatthereadinesstomakesuchasacrificeisthehighestvirtuewhichcanbe
foundinman.Iwilladd,thatinthisconditiontheworld,paradoxicalasthe
assertionmaybe,theconsciousabilitytodowithouthappinessgivesthebest
prospectofrealising,suchhappinessasisattainable.Fornothingexceptthat
consciousnesscanraiseapersonabovethechancesoflife,bymakinghimfeel
that,letfateandfortunedotheirworst,theyhavenotpowertosubduehim:
which,oncefelt,freeshimfromexcessofanxietyconcerningtheevilsoflife,
andenableshim,likemanyaStoicintheworsttimesoftheRomanEmpire,to
cultivateintranquillitythesourcesofsatisfactionaccessibletohim,without
concerninghimselfabouttheuncertaintyoftheirduration,anymorethan
abouttheirinevitableend.
Meanwhile,letutilitariansneverceasetoclaimthemoralityofselfdevotionas
apossessionwhichbelongsbyasgoodarighttothem,aseithertotheStoic
ortotheTranscendentalist.Theutilitarianmoralitydoesrecogniseinhuman
beingsthepowerofsacrificingtheirowngreatestgoodforthegoodofothers.
Itonlyrefusestoadmitthatthesacrificeisitselfagood.Asacrificewhich
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doesnotincrease,ortendtoincrease,thesumtotalofhappiness,itconsiders
aswasted.Theonlyselfrenunciationwhichitapplauds,isdevotiontothe
happiness,ortosomeofthemeansofhappiness,ofotherseitherofmankind
collectively,orofindividualswithinthelimitsimposedbythecollective
interestsofmankind.
Imustagainrepeat,whattheassailantsofutilitarianismseldomhavethe
justicetoacknowledge,thatthehappinesswhichformstheutilitarianstandard
ofwhatisrightinconduct,isnottheagent'sownhappiness,butthatofall
concerned.Asbetweenhisownhappinessandthatofothers,utilitarianism
requireshimtobeasstrictlyimpartialasadisinterestedandbenevolent
spectator.InthegoldenruleofJesusofNazareth,wereadthecompletespirit
oftheethicsofutility.Todoasyouwouldbedoneby,andtoloveyour
neighbourasyourself,constitutetheidealperfectionofutilitarianmorality.As
themeansofmakingthenearestapproachtothisideal,utilitywouldenjoin,
first,thatlawsandsocialarrangementsshouldplacethehappiness,or(as
speakingpracticallyitmaybecalled)theinterest,ofeveryindividual,as
nearlyaspossibleinharmonywiththeinterestofthewholeandsecondly,
thateducationandopinion,whichhavesovastapoweroverhumancharacter,
shouldsousethatpowerastoestablishinthemindofeveryindividualan
indissolubleassociationbetweenhisownhappinessandthegoodofthewhole
especiallybetweenhisownhappinessandthepracticeofsuchmodesof
conduct,negativeandpositive,asregardfortheuniversalhappiness
prescribessothatnotonlyhemaybeunabletoconceivethepossibilityof
happinesstohimself,consistentlywithconductopposedtothegeneralgood,
butalsothatadirectimpulsetopromotethegeneralgoodmaybeinevery
individualoneofthehabitualmotivesofaction,andthesentimentsconnected
therewithmayfillalargeandprominentplaceineveryhumanbeing'ssentient
existence.Ifthe,impugnersoftheutilitarianmoralityrepresentedittotheir
ownmindsinthisits,truecharacter,Iknownotwhatrecommendation
possessedbyanyothermoralitytheycouldpossiblyaffirmtobewantingtoit
whatmorebeautifulormoreexalteddevelopmentsofhumannatureanyother
ethicalsystemcanbesupposedtofoster,orwhatspringsofaction,not
accessibletotheutilitarian,suchsystemsrelyonforgivingeffecttotheir
mandates.
Theobjectorstoutilitarianismcannotalwaysbechargedwithrepresentingitin
adiscreditablelight.Onthecontrary,thoseamongthemwhoentertain
anythinglikeajustideaofitsdisinterestedcharacter,sometimesfindfault
withitsstandardasbeingtoohighforhumanity.Theysayitisexactingtoo
muchtorequirethatpeopleshallalwaysactfromtheinducementof
promotingthegeneralinterestsofsociety.Butthisistomistakethevery
meaningofastandardofmorals,andconfoundtheruleofactionwiththe
motiveofit.Itisthebusinessofethicstotelluswhatareourduties,orby
whattestwemayknowthembutnosystemofethicsrequiresthatthesole
motiveofallwedoshallbeafeelingofdutyonthecontrary,ninetynine
hundredthsofallouractionsaredonefromothermotives,andrightlyso
done,iftheruleofdutydoesnotcondemnthem.Itisthemoreunjustto
utilitarianismthatthisparticularmisapprehensionshouldbemadeagroundof
objectiontoit,inasmuchasutilitarianmoralistshavegonebeyondalmostall
othersinaffirmingthatthemotivehasnothingtodowiththemoralityofthe
action,thoughmuchwiththeworthoftheagent.Hewhosavesafellow
creaturefromdrowningdoeswhatismorallyright,whetherhismotivebe
duty,orthehopeofbeingpaidforhistroublehewhobetraysthefriendthat
trustshim,isguiltyofacrime,evenifhisobjectbetoserveanotherfriendto
whomheisundergreaterobligations.
Buttospeakonlyofactionsdonefromthemotiveofduty,andindirect
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obediencetoprinciple:itisamisapprehensionoftheutilitarianmodeof
thought,toconceiveitasimplyingthatpeopleshouldfixtheirmindsuponso
wideageneralityastheworld,orsocietyatlarge.Thegreatmajorityofgood
actionsareintendednotforthebenefitoftheworld,butforthatofindividuals,
ofwhichthegoodoftheworldismadeupandthethoughtsofthemost
virtuousmanneednotontheseoccasionstravelbeyondtheparticularpersons
concerned,exceptsofarasisnecessarytoassurehimselfthatinbenefiting
themheisnotviolatingtherights,thatis,thelegitimateandauthorised
expectations,ofanyoneelse.Themultiplicationofhappinessis,accordingto
theutilitarianethics,theobjectofvirtue:theoccasionsonwhichanyperson
(exceptoneinathousand)hasitinhispowertodothisonanextendedscale,
inotherwordstobeapublicbenefactor,arebutexceptionalandonthese
occasionsaloneishecalledontoconsiderpublicutilityineveryothercase,
privateutility,theinterestorhappinessofsomefewpersons,isallhehasto
attendto.Thosealonetheinfluenceofwhoseactionsextendstosocietyin
general,needconcernthemselveshabituallyaboutlargeanobject.Inthecase
ofabstinencesindeedofthingswhichpeopleforbeartodofrommoral
considerations,thoughtheconsequencesintheparticularcasemightbe
beneficialitwouldbeunworthyofanintelligentagentnottobeconsciously
awarethattheactionisofaclasswhich,ifpractisedgenerally,wouldbe
generallyinjurious,andthatthisisthegroundoftheobligationtoabstain
fromit.Theamountofregardforthepublicinterestimpliedinthis
recognition,isnogreaterthanisdemandedbyeverysystemofmorals,for
theyallenjointoabstainfromwhateverismanifestlypernicioustosociety.
Thesameconsiderationsdisposeofanotherreproachagainstthedoctrineof
utility,foundedonastillgrossermisconceptionofthepurposeofastandardof
morality,andoftheverymeaningofthewordsrightandwrong.Itisoften
affirmedthatutilitarianismrendersmencoldandunsympathisingthatitchills
theirmoralfeelingstowardsindividualsthatitmakesthemregardonlythe
dryandhardconsiderationoftheconsequencesofactions,nottakinginto
theirmoralestimatethequalitiesfromwhichthoseactionsemanate.Ifthe
assertionmeansthattheydonotallowtheirjudgmentrespectingthe
rightnessorwrongnessofanactiontobeinfluencedbytheiropinionofthe
qualitiesofthepersonwhodoesit,thisisacomplaintnotagainst
utilitarianism,butagainsthavinganystandardofmoralityatallforcertainly
noknownethicalstandarddecidesanactiontobegoodorbadbecauseitis
donebyagoodorabadman,stilllessbecausedonebyanamiable,abrave,
orabenevolentman,orthecontrary.Theseconsiderationsarerelevant,not
totheestimationofactions,butofpersonsandthereisnothinginthe
utilitariantheoryinconsistentwiththefactthatthereareotherthingswhich
interestusinpersonsbesidestherightnessandwrongnessoftheiractions.
TheStoics,indeed,withtheparadoxicalmisuseoflanguagewhichwaspartof
theirsystem,andbywhichtheystrovetoraisethemselvesaboveallconcern
aboutanythingbutvirtue,werefondofsayingthathewhohasthathas
everythingthathe,andonlyhe,isrich,isbeautiful,isaking.Butnoclaimof
thisdescriptionismadeforthevirtuousmanbytheutilitariandoctrine.
Utilitariansarequiteawarethatthereareotherdesirablepossessionsand
qualitiesbesidesvirtue,andareperfectlywillingtoallowtoallofthemtheir
fullworth.Theyarealsoawarethatarightactiondoesnotnecessarilyindicate
avirtuouscharacter,andthatactionswhichareblamable,oftenproceedfrom
qualitiesentitledtopraise.Whenthisisapparentinanyparticularcase,it
modifiestheirestimation,notcertainlyoftheact,butoftheagent.Igrant
thattheyare,notwithstanding,ofopinion,thatinthelongrunthebestproof
ofagoodcharacterisgoodactionsandresolutelyrefusetoconsiderany
mentaldispositionasgood,ofwhichthepredominanttendencyistoproduce
badconduct.Thismakesthemunpopularwithmanypeoplebutitisan
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unpopularitywhichtheymustsharewitheveryonewhoregardsthedistinction
betweenrightandwronginaseriouslightandthereproachisnotonewhich
aconscientiousutilitarianneedbeanxioustorepel.
Ifnomorebemeantbytheobjectionthanthatmanyutilitarianslookonthe
moralityofactions,asmeasuredbytheutilitarianstandard,withtooexclusive
aregard,anddonotlaysufficientstressupontheotherbeautiesofcharacter
whichgotowardsmakingahumanbeinglovableoradmirable,thismaybe
admitted.Utilitarianswhohavecultivatedtheirmoralfeelings,butnottheir
sympathiesnortheirartisticperceptions,dofallintothismistakeandsodo
allothermoralistsunderthesameconditions.Whatcanbesaidinexcusefor
othermoralistsisequallyavailableforthem,namely,that,ifthereistobeany
error,itisbetterthatitshouldbeonthatside.Asamatteroffact,wemay
affirmthatamongutilitariansasamongadherentsofothersystems,thereis
everyimaginabledegreeofrigidityandoflaxityintheapplicationoftheir
standard:someareevenpuritanicallyrigorous,whileothersareasindulgent
ascanpossiblybedesiredbysinnerorbysentimentalist.Butonthewhole,a
doctrinewhichbringsprominentlyforwardtheinterestthatmankindhavein
therepressionandpreventionofconductwhichviolatesthemorallaw,islikely
tobeinferiortonootherinturningthesanctionsofopinionagainsuch
violations.Itistrue,thequestion,Whatdoesviolatethemorallaw?isoneon
whichthosewhorecognisedifferentstandardsofmoralityarelikelynowand
thentodiffer.Butdifferenceofopiniononmoralquestionswasnotfirst
introducedintotheworldbyutilitarianism,whilethatdoctrinedoessupply,if
notalwaysaneasy,atalleventsatangibleandintelligiblemodeofdeciding
suchdifferences.
Itmaynotbesuperfluoustonoticeafewmoreofthecommon
misapprehensionsofutilitarianethics,eventhosewhicharesoobviousand
grossthatitmightappearimpossibleforanypersonofcandourand
intelligencetofallintothemsincepersons,evenofconsiderablemental
endowments,oftengivethemselvessolittletroubletounderstandthe
bearingsofanyopinionagainstwhichtheyentertainaprejudice,andmenare
ingeneralsolittleconsciousofthisvoluntaryignoranceasadefect,thatthe
vulgarestmisunderstandingsofethicaldoctrinesarecontinuallymetwithin
thedeliberatewritingsofpersonsofthegreatestpretensionsbothtohigh
principleandtophilosophy.Wenotuncommonlyhearthedoctrineofutility
inveighedagainstasagodlessdoctrine.Ifitbenecessarytosayanythingat
allagainstsomereanassumption,wemaysaythatthequestiondepends
uponwhatideawehaveformedofthemoralcharacteroftheDeity.Ifitbea
truebeliefthatGoddesires,aboveallthings,thehappinessofhiscreatures,
andthatthiswashispurposeintheircreation,utilityisnotonlynotagodless
doctrine,butmoreprofoundlyreligiousthananyother.Ifitbemeantthat
utilitarianismdoesnotrecognisetherevealedwillofGodasthesupremelaw
ofmorals,Ianswer,thatautilitarianwhobelievesintheperfectgoodnessand
wisdomofGod,necessarilybelievesthatwhateverGodhasthoughtfitto
revealonthesubjectofmorals,mustfulfiltherequirementsofutilityina
supremedegree.Butothersbesidesutilitarianshavebeenofopinionthatthe
Christianrevelationwasintended,andisfitted,toinformtheheartsandminds
ofmankindwithaspiritwhichshouldenablethemtofindforthemselveswhat
isright,andinclinethemtodoitwhenfound,ratherthantotellthem,except
inaverygeneralway,whatitisandthatweneedadoctrineofethics,
carefullyfollowedout,tointerprettousthewillGod.Whetherthisopinionis
correctornot,itissuperfluousheretodiscusssincewhateveraidreligion,
eithernaturalorrevealed,canaffordtoethicalinvestigation,isasopentothe
utilitarianmoralistastoanyother.HecanuseitasthetestimonyofGodto
theusefulnessorhurtfulnessofanygivencourseofaction,byasgoodaright
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asotherscanuseitfortheindicationofatranscendentallaw,havingno
connectionwithusefulnessorwithhappiness.
Again,Utilityisoftensummarilystigmatisedasanimmoraldoctrinebygiving
itthenameofExpediency,andtakingadvantageofthepopularuseofthat
termtocontrastitwithPrinciple.ButtheExpedient,inthesenseinwhichitis
opposedtotheRight,generallymeansthatwhichisexpedientforthe
particularinterestoftheagenthimselfaswhenaministersacrificesthe
interestsofhiscountrytokeephimselfinplace.Whenitmeansanything
betterthanthis,itmeansthatwhichisexpedientforsomeimmediateobject,
sometemporarypurpose,butwhichviolatesarulewhoseobservanceis
expedientinamuchhigherdegree.TheExpedient,inthissense,insteadof
beingthesamethingwiththeuseful,isabranchofthehurtful.Thus,itwould
oftenbeexpedient,forthepurposeofgettingoversomemomentary
embarrassment,orattainingsomeobjectimmediatelyusefultoourselvesor
others,totellalie.Butinasmuchasthecultivationinourselvesofasensitive
feelingonthesubjectofveracity,isoneofthemostuseful,andthe
enfeeblementofthatfeelingoneofthemosthurtful,thingstowhichour
conductcanbeinstrumentalandinasmuchasany,evenunintentional,
deviationfromtruth,doesthatmuchtowardsweakeningthetrustworthiness
ofhumanassertion,whichisnotonlytheprincipalsupportofallpresentsocial
wellbeing,buttheinsufficiencyofwhichdoesmorethananyonethingthat
canbenamedtokeepbackcivilisation,virtue,everythingonwhichhuman
happinessonthelargestscaledependswefeelthattheviolation,fora
presentadvantage,ofaruleofsuchtranscendantexpediency,isnot
expedient,andthathewho,forthesakeofaconveniencetohimselforto
someotherindividual,doeswhatdependsonhimtodeprivemankindofthe
good,andinflictuponthemtheevil,involvedinthegreaterorlessreliance
whichtheycanplaceineachother'sword,actsthepartofoneoftheirworst
enemies.Yetthateventhisrule,sacredasitis,admitsofpossibleexceptions,
isacknowledgedbyallmoraliststhechiefofwhichiswhenthewithholdingof
somefact(asofinformationfromamalefactor,orofbadnewsfromaperson
dangerouslyill)wouldsaveanindividual(especiallyanindividualotherthan
oneself)fromgreatandunmeritedevil,andwhenthewithholdingcanonlybe
effectedbydenial.Butinorderthattheexceptionmaynotextenditself
beyondtheneed,andmayhavetheleastpossibleeffectinweakeningreliance
onveracity,itoughttoberecognised,and,ifpossible,itslimitsdefinedandif
theprincipleofutilityisgoodforanything,itmustbegoodforweighingthese
conflictingutilitiesagainstoneanother,andmarkingouttheregionwithin
whichoneortheotherpreponderates.
Again,defendersofutilityoftenfindthemselvescalledupontoreplytosuch
objectionsasthisthatthereisnottime,previoustoaction,forcalculating
andweighingtheeffectsofanylineofconductonthegeneralhappiness.This
isexactlyasifanyoneweretosaythatitisimpossibletoguideourconduct
byChristianity,becausethereisnottime,oneveryoccasiononwhich
anythinghastobedone,toreadthroughtheOldandNewTestaments.The
answertotheobjectionis,thattherehasbeenampletime,namely,thewhole
pastdurationofthehumanspecies.Duringallthattime,mankindhavebeen
learningbyexperiencethetendenciesofactionsonwhichexperienceallthe
prudence,aswellasallthemoralityoflife,aredependent.Peopletalkasif
thecommencementofthiscourseofexperiencehadhithertobeenputoff,and
asif,atthemomentwhensomemanfeelstemptedtomeddlewiththe
propertyorlifeofanother,hehadtobeginconsideringforthefirsttime
whethermurderandtheftareinjurioustohumanhappiness.EventhenIdo
notthinkthathewouldfindthequestionverypuzzlingbut,atallevents,the
matterisnowdonetohishand.
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Itistrulyawhimsicalsuppositionthat,ifmankindwereagreedinconsidering
utilitytobethetestofmorality,theywouldremainwithoutanyagreementas
towhatisuseful,andwouldtakenomeasuresforhavingtheirnotionsonthe
subjecttaughttotheyoung,andenforcedbylawandopinion.Thereisno
difficultyinprovinganyethicalstandardwhatevertoworkill,ifwesuppose
universalidiocytobeconjoinedwithitbutonanyhypothesisshortofthat,
mankindmustbythistimehaveacquiredpositivebeliefsastotheeffectsof
someactionsontheirhappinessandthebeliefswhichhavethuscomedown
aretherulesofmoralityforthemultitude,andforthephilosopheruntilhehas
succeededinfindingbetter.Thatphilosophersmighteasilydothis,evennow,
onmanysubjectsthatthereceivedcodeofethicsisbynomeansofdivine
rightandthatmankindhavestillmuchtolearnastotheeffectsofactionson
thegeneralhappiness,Iadmit,orrather,earnestlymaintain.Thecorollaries
fromtheprincipleofutility,likethepreceptsofeverypracticalart,admitof
indefiniteimprovement,and,inaprogressivestateofthehumanmind,their
improvementisperpetuallygoingon.
Buttoconsidertherulesofmoralityasimprovable,isonethingtopassover
theintermediategeneralisationsentirely,andendeavourtotesteach
individualactiondirectlybythefirstprinciple,isanother.Itisastrangenotion
thattheacknowledgmentofafirstprincipleisinconsistentwiththeadmission
ofsecondaryones.Toinformatravellerrespectingtheplaceofhis.ultimate
destination,isnottoforbidtheuseoflandmarksanddirectionpostsonthe
way.Thepropositionthathappinessistheendandaimofmorality,doesnot
meanthatnoroadoughttobelaiddowntothatgoal,orthatpersonsgoing
thithershouldnotbeadvisedtotakeonedirectionratherthananother.Men
reallyoughttoleaveofftalkingakindofnonsenseonthissubject,whichthey
wouldneithertalknorlistentoonothermattersofpracticalconcernment.
Nobodyarguesthattheartofnavigationisnotfoundedonastronomy,
becausesailorscannotwaittocalculatetheNauticalAlmanack.Beingrational
creatures,theygotoseawithitreadycalculatedandallrationalcreaturesgo
outupontheseaoflifewiththeirmindsmadeuponthecommonquestionsof
rightandwrong,aswellasonmanyofthefarmoredifficultquestionsofwise
andfoolish.Andthis,aslongasforesightisahumanquality,itistobe
presumedtheywillcontinuetodo.Whateverweadoptasthefundamental
principleofmorality,werequiresubordinateprinciplestoapplyitbythe
impossibilityofdoingwithoutthem,beingcommontoallsystems,canafford
noargumentagainstanyoneinparticularbutgravelytoargueasifnosuch
secondaryprinciplescouldbehad,andasifmankindhadremainedtillnow,
andalwaysmustremain,withoutdrawinganygeneralconclusionsfromthe
experienceofhumanlife,isashighapitch,Ithink,asabsurdityhasever
reachedinphilosophicalcontroversy.
Theremainderofthestockargumentsagainstutilitarianismmostlyconsistin
layingtoitschargethecommoninfirmitiesofhumannature,andthegeneral
difficultieswhichembarrassconscientiouspersonsinshapingtheircourse
throughlife.Wearetoldthatautilitarianwillbeapttomakehisown
particularcaseanexceptiontomoralrules,and,whenundertemptation,will
seeautilityinthebreachofarule,greaterthanhewillseeinitsobservance.
Butisutilitytheonlycreedwhichisabletofurnishuswithexcusesforevil
doing,andmeansofcheatingourownconscience?Theyareaffordedin
abundancebyalldoctrineswhichrecogniseasafactinmoralstheexistenceof
conflictingconsiderationswhichalldoctrinesdo,thathavebeenbelievedby
sanepersons.Itisnotthefaultofanycreed,butofthecomplicatednatureof
humanaffairs,thatrulesofconductcannotbesoframedastorequireno
exceptions,andthathardlyanykindofactioncansafelybelaiddownas
eitheralwaysobligatoryoralwayscondemnable.Thereisnoethicalcreed
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whichdoesnottempertherigidityofitslaws,bygivingacertainlatitude,
underthemoralresponsibilityoftheagent,foraccommodationtopeculiarities
ofcircumstancesandundereverycreed,attheopeningthusmade,self
deceptionanddishonestcasuistrygetin.Thereexistsnomoralsystemunder
whichtheredonotariseunequivocalcasesofconflictingobligation.Theseare
therealdifficulties,theknottypointsbothinthetheoryofethics,andinthe
conscientiousguidanceofpersonalconduct.Theyareovercomepractically,
withgreaterorwithlesssuccess,accordingtotheintellectandvirtueofthe
individualbutitcanhardlybepretendedthatanyonewillbetheless
qualifiedfordealingwiththem,frompossessinganultimatestandardtowhich
conflictingrightsanddutiescanbereferred.Ifutilityistheultimatesourceof
moralobligations,utilitymaybeinvokedtodecidebetweenthemwhentheir
demandsareincompatible.Thoughtheapplicationofthestandardmaybe
difficult,itisbetterthannoneatall:whileinothersystems,themorallawsall
claimingindependentauthority,thereisnocommonumpireentitledto
interferebetweenthemtheirclaimstoprecedenceoneoveranotherreston
littlebetterthansophistry,andunlessdetermined,astheygenerallyare,by
theunacknowledgedinfluenceofconsiderationsofutility,affordafreescope
fortheactionofpersonaldesiresandpartialities.Wemustrememberthatonly
inthesecasesofconflictbetweensecondaryprinciplesisitrequisitethatfirst
principlesshouldbeappealedto.Thereisnocaseofmoralobligationinwhich
somesecondaryprincipleisnotinvolvedandifonlyone,therecanseldombe
anyrealdoubtwhichoneitis,inthemindofanypersonbywhomthe
principleitselfisrecognised.
UTILITARIANISM
ChapterOne
ChapterTwo
ChapterThree
ChapterFour
ChapterFive
ONLIBERTY
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
JSMill:Biography
JSMillbiographicaldetails
GLOSSARY
someutilitarianterms

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