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#1 Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, RTC, Br. 121, Caloocan City in Crim.

Cases
Q-97-69655 to 56 for Child Abuse, 543 SCRA 196 , January 31, 2008
Case Title : RE: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
121, CALOOCAN CITY IN CRIMINAL CASES NO. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD ABUSE
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Indirect Contempt and Suspension.
Syllabi Class : Courts|Judges|Contempt|Words and Phrases|Attorneys|Presumption of Innocence|
Administrative Law|Preventive Suspension
Division: THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC
Ponente: NACHURA
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Nevertheless, respondent Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch 121, is hereby REPRIMANDED for her use of intemperate language in her pleadings and is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall merit a more severe
sanction.Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the Department of Justice is hereby WARNED
that he should be more circumspect in the statements made in his pleadings and that a repetition of
the same shall be dealt with more severely. The motion to cite him for contempt is DENIED for lack of
merit.The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resolve CA-G.R. CR No. 30260 involving respondent Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles with dispatch.
A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC. January 31, 2008.*
RE: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 121,
CALOOCAN CITY IN CRIMINAL CASES NO. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD ABUSE
Courts; Judges; Contempt; Words and Phrases; Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority,
justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the
law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
In Pilar Barredo-Fuentes v. Judge Romeo C. Albarracin, 456 SCRA 120 (2005), we held: Contempt of
court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant
or their witnesses during litigation. There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct
contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehaviour
in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or
to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.
Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court.
Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice would constitute indirect contempt.
Same; Same; A petition for indirect contempt petition is in the nature of a special civil actioncertified
true copies of related documents must be submitted with the petition and appropriate docket fees must
be paid.A charge of indirect contempt must be filed in the form of a verified petition if it is not
initiated directly by the court against which the contemptuous act was committed. On previous
occasions, we clarified that such petition is in the nature of a special civil action. Certified true copies of
related documents must be submitted with the petition and appropriate docket fees must be paid. The
requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. As Justice Florenz D. Regalado has explained: This new
provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings.
While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the
heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without
paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of [Section 4].
Same; Same; Attorneys; A lawyers remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do
not necessarily assume the level of contempt that justifies the courts exercise of the power of
contempt.On the charge of indirect contempt of court, we therefore find that SSP Velascos
statement, while irresponsible, did not necessarily degrade the administration of justice as to be
considered contumacious. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised
on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. A lawyers remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily
assume the level of contempt that justifies the courts exercise of the power of contempt. We note that
SSP Velascos statement was made in support of his argument for the imposition of preventive
suspension, i.e., to prevent the respondent from using her current position to alter the course of the
investigation and the disposition of the appealed criminal cases.
Same; Same; Same; It is a lawyers sworn and moral duty to help build and not unnecessarily destroy
the peoples high esteem and regard for the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
SSP Velasco must bear in mind that as a lawyer, he must be circumspect in his language. We remind

him of our admonition to all lawyers to observe the following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read: Canon 8. Rule 8.01A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others. A lawyer is an officer of the Court. It is a lawyers sworn and moral duty to help build and not
unnecessarily destroy the peoples high esteem and regard for the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice. A lawyers language may be forceful but should always be dignified; emphatic
but respectful, as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to
both court and opposing counsel, and should use such language as may be properly addressed by one
person to another.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; A judges conviction by the Regional Trial Court does not
necessarily warrant her suspension while her appeal from such conviction is pendinguntil the
judgment has attained finality, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence.In Nuez
v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, 452 SCRA 353 (2005), the Court held that the mere existence of pending
criminal charges against the respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of
the latter. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of
numerous criminal cases against them. By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondents conviction by
the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree with respondents argument that since
her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet
attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be
remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself
destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with
all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accuseds guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Until the accuseds guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues. In Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 681 (1986), the Court held that respondent
Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion, correctible by certiorari, when it ruled that
despite her convictions, Preagido has still in her favor the constitutional presumption of innocence x x
x (and until) a promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails. The
Court therein further held that such ruling is not bereft of legal or logical foundation and cannot, in any
sense, be characterized as a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment. So also must we hold in this
case.
Same; Administrative Law; Preventive Suspension; Any administrative complaint leveled against
a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their
nature, highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or
disbarment; While it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of
judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best.It is
established that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. As aforementioned, the filing
of criminal cases against judges may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long run create
adverse consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other than the fact that a
judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered against the respondent, which is still on appeal,
there are other lawful grounds to support the imposition of preventive suspension. Based on the
foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspension
pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a
penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules
of Court, are amorphous at best. Likewise, we consider respondents argument that there is no urgency
in imposing preventive suspension as the criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she cannot,
by using her present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to influence the CA to render a decision in
her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been rendered moot as the Court opted to
resolve this administrative case.
Same; Same; The use by respondent judge of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly
below the standard expected of an officer of the courtthe esteemed position of a magistrate of the
law demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct and in language.Even as we find
that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant the
imposition of preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in respondents
pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also against former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous
ruling involving the respondent, her use of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly below
the standard expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position of a magistrate of the law
demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct and in language. Illustrative are the
following statements: CA Locks hostile mindset and his superstar complex; In a frenzied display of
arrogance and power; (CA Locks) complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the trial

court; and when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity and misuses the full powers of his Office to
persecute the object of his fancy, then it is time for him to step down. In the attempt to discredit CA
Lock, respondent even dragged CA Locks son into the controversy, to wit: It is noteworthy to mention
that CA Locks hostile attitude was aggravated by his embarrassment when the undersigned mentioned
to him that she knew how he used his influence to secure a position for his son at the RTC Library of
Pasay City which was then managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that his son be
assigned to the library to enable the latter to conveniently adjust his schedule in reviewing for the bar
examination.
Same; Same; While the Court does not begrudge the parties the prerogative to initiate charges
against those who, in their opinion, may have wronged them, it is well to remind them that this
privilege must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the
pursuit of truth and justicethis prerogative does not give them the right to institute shotgun charges
with reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that
of two irresponsible children.The parties herein have admitted in their various pleadings that they
have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge them the prerogative to initiate
charges against those who, in their opinion, may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them
that this privilege must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in
the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give them the right to institute shotgun
charges with reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not
unlike that of two irresponsible children. Judge Angeles and SSP Velasco should bear in mind that they
are high-ranking public officers whom the people look up to for zealous, conscientious and responsive
public service. Name-calling hardly becomes them. Cognizant of the adverse impact and unpleasant
consequences this continuing conflict will inflict on the public service, we find both officials wanting in
the conduct demanded of public servants.
#2 Basa Air Base Savings & Loan Association, Inc. vs. Pimentel, Jr., 387 SCRA 542, August
22, 2002
Case Title : BASA AIR BASE SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., complainant, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT JUDGE GREGORIO G. PIMENTEL, JR., GUAGUA, PAMPANGA, BRANCH 50, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Partiality and/or Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment, and Unreasonable Delay in Rendering
Judgment.
Syllabi Class :Courts|Judges|Speedy Disposition of Cases|Gross Ignorance of the Law|Grave Partiality
Syllabi:
1. Courts; Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; The Court has always considered a judges failure
to decide a case within the prescribed period of three (3) months as gross inefficiency for which the
imposition of a penalty of fine or suspension is proper.-On the charge of delay in the rendition of
judgment, the Court has always considered a judges failure to decide a case within the prescribed
period of three (3) months as gross inefficiency for which the imposition of a penalty of fine or
suspension is proper. In the case at bar, respondent failed to observe Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and
resolve cases within ninety (90) days from the submission of the last pleading required.
2. Courts; Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Judges burdened with heavy caseloads should
request the Court for an extension of the reglementary period within which to decide their cases if they
think that they cannot comply with their judicial duty.-Respondent admitted his failure but pleads for
compassion on the ground that he was a newly-appointed judge and he merely inherited most of the
cases pending before him. We cannot consider the excuse as valid. Judges burdened with heavy
caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the reglementary period within which to decide
their cases if they think that they cannot comply with their judicial duty. This Court, aware of the
predicament of most judges, invariably grants said request for good reasons and upon proper
application. Respondent judge failed to discharge his basic duty of asking for an extension of time to
decide the subject cases and the omission is without any reason.
3. Courts; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Grave Partiality; Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Judgment; On charges of gross ignorance of the law, grave partiality and/or knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, the evidence must show that the respondent judge committed an error that was
deliberate, malicious, gross and patent; A charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
constitutes a criminal offense; A judges mere error in the interpretation or application of the law per
se will not warrant the imposition of an administrative sanction against him for no one is infallible
good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses.On the charges of gross ignorance of the law, grave partiality and/or knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, the evidence must show that the respondent judge committed an error that was deliberate,
malicious, gross and patent. A charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a
criminal offense. The keyword in said offense is knowingly. Thus, the complainant must not only
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the

evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. A judges mere
error in the interpretation or application of the law per se will not warrant the imposition of an
administrative sanction against him for no one is infallible. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will protect a judicial officer from the
charge of rendering an unjust decision. In the case at bar, the mere fact that the respondent found
that the prosecution failed to establish accuseds guilt beyond moral certainty is not an indicium of his
bias. Complainant has not shown by clear and competent evidence that respondent was moved by bad
faith, corruption, vengeance or some other ill-motive in acquitting the accused. We reiterate that not
every error of judgment renders a judge liable for no judge is beyond error.
Division: THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: Adm. Matter No. RTJ-01-1648
Ponente: PUNO
Dispositive Portion:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent Judge Gregorio G. Pimentel, Jr. guilty of failing to
render judgment in Criminal Case Nos. G-2768 and G-2772 within the prescribed period and a FINE of
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) is imposed on him. He is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
performance of his judicial functions as a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely. The charge of gross ignorance of the law, grave partiality and/or knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment against respondent is dismissed.
#3 Maylas, Jr. vs. Sese, 497 SCRA 602 , August 04, 2006
Case Title : IGNACIO E. MAYLAS, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL L. SESE, Regional Trial Court
of Masbate City, Branch 45, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Incompetence, Violation and Willful Disregard of the Rules of Court.
Syllabi Class : Judges
Syllabi:
1. Judges; As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a
judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.The error attributed to respondent
judge pertains to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liabilitycivil, criminal oradministrativefor any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with
fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies.
2. Same; To merit disciplinary action, the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious,
deliberate or in bad faith, and in the absence of a showing to the contrary, defective or erroneous
decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith.Even granting that respondent judge
erred in the issuance of the assailed Order, he could not be held administratively liable considering
that there is no proof that such error of judgment was tainted with bias or partiality, fraud, dishonesty,
bad faith, deliberate intent to do an injustice, or gross ignorance. To merit disciplinary action, the error
or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. In the absence of a showing
to the contrary, defective or erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good
faith. As noted by the OCA, the complaint did not impute malice or bad faith on the part of respondent
judge hence, he is presumed to have acted in good faith. Moreover, in his Comment, respondent
claimed that he issued the assailed Order after a careful examination of the records of the case.
3. Same; Grave abuse of discretion alone is not a ground for disciplinary proceedings; The
filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge
perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists.Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court mandates that, in a motion to quash, the court shall not
consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged. In Criminal Case No. 10911, respondent judge erred when he considered a ground not raised
by the accused. As found by the Court of Appeals, the error in issuing the assailed Order dated October
14, 2003 is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. However, grave abuse of discretion alone is not a
ground for disciplinary proceedings. The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy
for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a
sufficient judicial remedy exists.
Division: YNARES-SANTIAGO
Docket Number: A.M. No. RTJ-06-2012 [OCA-I.P.I. No. 04-2106-RTJ]
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO
Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant administrative case against Judge Manuel L. Sese of
the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 45, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
#4 Ferrer vs. Rabaca, 632 SCRA 204 , October 06, 2010
Case Title : LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ, complainants, vs. JUDGE ROMEO
A. RABACA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Dereliction of Duty, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Interlocutory Order, and Violation of the Code of
Conduct for Government Officials.
Syllabi Class : Judges|Gross Ignorance of the Law|Ejectment
Syllabi:
1. Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Ejectment; It is the ministerial duty of the judge to grant
the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution in an ejectment case upon the defendants failure to file
the sufficient supersedeas bond.Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion
for immediate execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond
despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution became his
ministerial duty upon the defendants failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule
70, of the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz.: Section 19. Immediate execution of
judgment; how to stay same.If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution
files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed
from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount
of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the
rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding
month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the
other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. x x x
2. Same; Same; A judges mere failure to perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court
sufficed to render him administratively accountable; This case is an opportune occasion to
remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of
the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient supersedeas bond.We agree with the complainants insistence, therefore, that respondent Judges omission to apply
Section 19 was inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow the clear and explicit provision of the
rule made in the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt about his
authority to grant the motion for immediate execution, as he would have us believe, he could have
easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the Rules of Court, which he well knew was the
repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his judicial action. Neither was it relevant that he did
not know any of the parties, or that he did not corruptly favor the defendant by his omission. His mere
failure to perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to render him administratively
accountable. This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere
always to the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution
upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has
appealed but has not filed a sufficient supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special civil
action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to
prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession, should always be borne
in mind.
3. Same; Same; Same; The perfection of the appeal by the defendant in an ejectment case does not
forbid a favorable action on the plaintiffs motion for immediate executiononly the filing of the
sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from
time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution; A rule as clear and
explicit as Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, could not be misread or misapplied, but should be
implemented without evasion or hesitation; Good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack of
bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or
applicability of a rule or legal provision.Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over
the case by virtue of the defendants appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of
the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal by the defendant did not forbid the
favorable action on the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. The execution of the decision could
not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and
the deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the
perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify his
omission to act according to the provision by claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack

of malice or bad faith. A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied,
but should be implemented without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of
malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on
the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so herein. And, thirdly, given that
his court, being vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to Civil Case No. 176394CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior
experience to act on the issue of immediate execution, a fact that further exposed the abject inanity of
his excuses.
Division: THIRD DIVISION.
Docket Number: A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580
Counsel: Jose F. Sao for complainants.
PonenteJ.: BERSAMIN,
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Presiding Judge of Branch 25,
Metropolitan Trial Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure, and, accordingly,
impose upon him a fine of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely.
#5 Corpus vs. Ochotorena, 435 SCRA 446 , July 30, 2004
Case Title : MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, complainant, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA, RTCBR.
11, SINDANGAN, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Bias, Partiality, and Violation of
Judicial Conduct.
Syllabi Class : Courts|Judges|Pleadings and Practice|Motions to Dismiss|Declaration of Nullity|
Defaults|Gross Ignorance of the Law
Syllabi:
1. Courts; Judges; Pleadings and Practice; Motions to Dismiss; Where the last pleading was a
defendants motion to dismiss, the judge should first resolve the motion and wait for the plaintiff s
motion to set the case for pre-trial, and not railroad the case by completely ignoring the motion to
dismiss and proceeding to trial on the merits.- In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court
that the respondent judges actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge.
Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from the records is that the
respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias
concludes that the Court should sanction him. The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of
Appeals Decision which states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias right to due
process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that
her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending
resolution. The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, which states that: After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the
duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial. Considering that the
last pleading was Mrs. Macias Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the
motion and then waited for Mr. Macias motion to set the case for pre-trial. What happened in the case
is a classic example of railroading or procedural short-cut. Instead of resolving the Motion to
Dismiss, the respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the
case by receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte.
2. Courts; Judges; Pleadings and Practice; Motions to Dismiss; In holding the trial of the case up
to its completion, the respondent judge acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for
Reconsideration of his order denying the Motion to Dismiss.- The respondent judge compounded his
blunder when, after denying Mrs. Macias Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr.
Macias evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter, considered the case
submitted for decision despite Mrs. Macias filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying
her Motion to Dismiss. In holding the trial of the case up to its completion, the respondent judge had
acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
3. Courts; Judges; Pleadings and Practice; Declaration of Nullity; Defaults; The Rules of Court
prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.- It is also worth
mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court, even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer
to the complaint after the period therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to
conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases
involving declaration of nullity of marriage.
4. Courts; Judges; Pleadings and Practice; Declaration of Nullity; The report of the Public
Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage where the defending party fails to answer.-Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure states: If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to

investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. Thus, the
report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the case.
Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule. While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo
M. Paculanag had filed a Certification dated May 04, 2001 with the respondent judges court, stating,
among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation of
plaintiffs evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T.
Zalsos, and that he had no objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the mandatory requirement that the court
should order the investigating public prosecutor whether a collusion exists between the parties. Such
directive must be made by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the
case had already been had. Notably, said Certification was filed after the respondent judge had
ordered the termination of the case.
5. Courts; Judges; Pleadings and Practice; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A judge is called upon
to exhibit more than just a modicum of acquaintance with statutes and procedural rulesit is his duty
to keep always abreast with law and jurisprudence.-Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the
respondent judge violated Mrs. Macias right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent
rules. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules, it is his duty to keep always abreast with law and jurisprudence. When the law or
procedure is so elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance.
Division: SECOND DIVISION
Docket Number: A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861
Counsel: Llego & Llego Law Office
Ponente: TINGA
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken
from the amount earlier withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the
OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons
for its further retention.
#6 Marcos vs. Pamintuan, 639 SCRA 658 , January 18, 2011
Case Title : IMELDA R. MARCOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, respondent
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law
Syllabi Class : Judges|Code of Judicial Conduct
Syllabi:
1. Judgments; Doctrine of Finality of Judgments; It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final
and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.- It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final
and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect
either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and
inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration
of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an
end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.
2. Judges; Code of Judicial Conduct; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one- not even judges.Competence is a mark of a good
judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with the rules or with settled jurisprudence,
he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly crucial that judges be
acquainted with the law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to
know, excuses no onenot even judges.
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any
official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this decision.
#7 Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division, 262 SCRA 122 , September 20, 1996
Case Title : TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents., PARAJA G.


HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Attorneys|Lawyer-Client Relationship
Syllabi:
1. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of
activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers.-It would seem that
petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as
lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used
as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these
clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and
should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
2. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant
because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client.-In modern
day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant,
because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. A lawyer is
also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior
to those of an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a
quasi-judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the Court and exercises his judgment in the choice
of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
3. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; In the creation of lawyer-client relationship there are
rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it.-Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client
relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the
fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a
very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest
based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is
fatal to the administration of justice.
4. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; Generally, a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.-As a matter of public policy, a clients identity
should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in
the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client.
5. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyers advice.-Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing
the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers
advice.
6. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
his identity is privileged.-Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,
prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyers claim to the effect that he could not reveal
the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
7. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The content of any client communication to a lawyer lies
within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks
legal assistance.-Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify
as exceptions to the general rule. For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer
lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client
seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been
previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client
has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction.
8. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyers
loyalty to his client extends even after the termination of the relationship.-The utmost zeal given by
Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyers loyalty to his client is
evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends
even after the termination of the relationship.
9. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; It is unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to compel
petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of
incrimination.-I see in the case before us, given the attendant circumstances already detailed in the
ponencia, a situation of the Republic attempting to establish a case not on what it perceives to be the
strength of its own evidence but on what it could elicit from a counsel against his client. I find it

unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and
succumb to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination.
10. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The prerogative to determine who shall be made
defendant in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff.-The prerogative to determine who shall be
made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case. The control
of the Court comes in only when the issue of interest (2, Rule 3, Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether
an indispensable party has not been joined, or whether there is a misjoinder of parties (7, 8, and 9,
Id.), is raised.
11. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client
relationship is not a cause to exclude a party.-In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners did
not, therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco. They cannot claim the same treatment, much less
compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for nothing whatsoever. They have no right to make
such a demand for until they shall have complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they
cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss based on the grounds allowed by law (e.g.,
those enumerated in 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client
relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a witness
(24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer
is under compulsion to answer as witness, as when, having taken the witness stand, he is questioned
as to such confidential communication or advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to produce,
through subpoenae duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other documents containing the same
privileged matter. But none of the lawyers in this case is being required to testify about or otherwise
reveal any [confidential] communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment.
12. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the
purpose of counsel in concocting crimes.-Communications to an attorney having for their object the
commission of a crime x x x partake the nature of a conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge
such communications, but under certain circumstances it might become the duty of the attorney to do
so. The interests of public justice require that no such shield from merited exposure shall be interposed
to protect a person who takes counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and
client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes. In the well chosen words of retired
Justice Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
13. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does not
include the right of non-disclosure of client identity.-Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the
attorney-client privilege since the PCGG is no longer proceeding against them as co-conspirators in
crimes, we should focus on the more specific issue of whether the attorney-client privilege includes the
right not to divulge the identity of a client as contended by the petitioners. As a general rule, the
attorney-client privilege does not include the right of non-disclosure of client identity. The general rule,
however, admits of well-etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan failed to recognize.
14. Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The person claiming the privilege or its exceptions has
the obligation to present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege.-Be that as
it may, I part ways with the majority when it ruled that petitioners need not prove they fall within the
exceptions to the general rule. I respectfully submit that the attorney-client privilege is not a magic
mantra whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its protection.
Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the privilege. The person claiming the privilege or its exceptions
has the obligation to present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege. When
these facts can be presented only by revealing the very information sought to be protected by the
privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in an in camera
hearing. The hearing can even be in camera and ex-parte.
Docket Number: G.R. No. 105938, G.R. No. 108113
Counsel: Manuel G. Abello, Sobrevias, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon, Roco, Buag, Kapunan & Migallos,
Mario E. Ongkiko
Ponente: KAPUNAN
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayudini as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled Repub-lic of the Philippines v.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a qualified dissent from the
majority opinion.
#8 Edao vs. Asdala, 528 SCRA 212 , July 26, 2007
Case Title : CARMEN P. EDAO, complainant, vs. JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA, RTC Br. 87, Quezon City,
and STENOGRAPHER MYRLA DEL PILAR NICANDRO, RTC Br. 217, Quezon City, respondents.

Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Grave Abuse of Discretion and
Authority, Conduct Unbecoming
Syllabi Class : Judges|Court Personnel|Bias and Partiality|Public Trials|Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 70-2003|Insubordination
Syllabi:
1. Judges; Bias and Partiality; Public Trials; The secret meeting between a judge and a litigant
cannot but invite suspicion, for no minutes or stenographic notes of the meeting have been presented,
if any existedrespondent judge cannot feign ignorance of the fact that our courts are courts of
record.-As stated in the Investigation Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice, the act
of a judge done within his judicial discretion, such as the reduction of fine for indirect contempt, should
not be subject to disciplinary action. In the instant complaint, however, the exercise of discretion by
the respondent is not impugned. Rather, it is the conduct of respondent Judge Asdala in meeting with
defendant Butler without notice or knowledge, much less the presence, of the complainant or her
representative that is assailed. The meeting was not an innocuous one for it resulted in the
cancellation of the bench warrant, the revocation of the order of imprisonment and the significant
reduction in the amount of fine from P30,000.00 to P5,000.00. Respondent Judge Asdala does not
deny the private meeting, much less explain its circumstances. As rightly observed by the
Investigating Justice, the private meeting was improper, to say the least. It deprived the com-plainant
of her right to be heard on matters affecting her vital interests. The secret meeting cannot but invite
suspicion, for no minutes or stenographic notes of the meeting have been presented, if any existed.
Respondent judge cannot feign ignorance of the fact that our courts are courts of record.
2. Judges; Bias and Partiality; Judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt
and suspicion in the dispensation of justice.-As the visible representation of the law and justice,
judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance
the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode
the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are
deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor
of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the
decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers. Clearly,
it is of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by
judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in
the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be
circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To
further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states: Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of
judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be
done but must also be seen to be done.
3. Judges; Bias and Partiality; Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 702003;Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.-As early as June 6, 2003,
OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows: In view of the increasing number of reports
reaching the Office of the Court Administrator that judges have been meeting with party litigants
inside their chambers, judges are hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other
party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that
they only act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision is made. As such, judges must ensure that their
conduct, both in and out of the court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. In the same vein, the
Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge in order to
maintain the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary.
4. Judges; Bias and Partiality; While the presiding judge can recommend and endorse persons to a
particular position, this recommendation has to be approved by the Supreme Court.-Respondent Judge
Asdala, in insisting on the designation of respondent Nicandro as OIC, blithely and willfully disregarded
the Memorandum of this Court, through the OCA, which approved the designation of Amy Soneja alone
and not in conjunction with respondent Nicandroas OIC. While the presiding judge, such as
respondent Judge Asdala, can recommend and endorse persons to a particular position, this
recommendation has to be approved by this Court. Again, the respondent judge ought to know that
the Constitution grants this Court administrative supervision over all the courts and personnel thereof.
In the case at bar, despite the Courts approval of Amy Sonejas designation, the respondent judge
allowed, if not insisted on, the continued discharge of the duties of OIC by respondent Nicandro.

10

Respondent Judge Asdala even had the gall to insist that as presiding judge she has the authority and
discretion to designate anyone who works under her, as long as that person enjoys her trust and
confidence. Coming from a judge, such arrogance, if not ignorance, is inexcusable. The memorandum
from the OCA regarding the designation of court personnel is no less an order from this Court. Court
officials and personnel, particularly judges, are expected to comply with the same. Respondent judges
gross insubordination cannot be countenanced.
5. Court Personnel; Insubordination; A court employees continued exercise of the functions of
Officer in Charge (OIC) after the disapproval of her designation is a clear defiance of the instruction of
the Supreme Court.-Respondent Nicandro, on her part, has been accused of usurping the functions of
OIC. While she acted on the strength of the memorandum of respondent Judge Asdala designating her
as such, it is undeniable that she is aware of the memorandum of this Court, through the OCA,
approving Amy Sonejas designation as OIC/Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Nicandros continued
exercise of the functions of OIC after the disapproval of her designation is a clear defiance of the
instruction of this Court.
6. Court Personnel; A court employee who acts as a collection agent of the office staff lacks the
propriety and proper decorum expected of a court personnel.-As to the charge of unauthorized
solicitation, it is clear that respondent Nicandro, at the very least, acted as collection agent of the
office staff with regard to the alleged amounts owed by complainant. Such action on the part of
respondent Nicandro lacks the propriety and proper decorum expected of a court personnel. This is not
the first time that this Court had censured respondent Nicandros behavior in dealing with party
litigants. Early this year, on February 12, 2007, she was fined for gross insubordination for her willful
failure and indifference to the orders of this Court despite having been found in contempt for her
refusal to comply with the said orders. She was also reprimanded for willful failure to pay a just debt
despite repeated demands from the complainant therein. Such infractions are conduct highly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974
Counsel: Ramon Maronilla, Teodulo M. Punzalan, Macarius S. Galutera
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Dispositive Portion:
Respondent Judge Fatima G. Asdala is found GUILTY of gross insubordination and gross misconduct
unbefitting a member of the judiciary and is accordingly DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of
all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which she may be entitled.Respondent Myrla Nicandro is found
GUILTY of insubordination in assuming the position and discharging the functions of OIC/Branch Clerk
of Court without and in defiance of proper authority and is accordingly SUSPENDED from the service
for a period of sixty (60) days, without pay, commencing on the day immediately following her receipt
of a copy of this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely. The period of suspension shall not be chargeable against her leave credits.
Respondent Nicandro is likewise ordered to immediately cease and desist from discharging the
functions of OIC/Branch Clerk of Court and from representing herself as such.Respondent Nicandro is
likewise REPRIMANDED for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and ordered to abstain
from transacting with party litigants other than for official purposes.
#9 Juan de la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) vs. Carretas, 532 SCRA 218 ,
September 05, 2007
Case Title : JUAN DE LA CRUZ (CONCERNED CITIZEN OF LEGAZPI CITY), complainant, vs. JUDGE
RUBEN B. CARRETAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 9, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Conduct Unbecoming a Judge.
Syllabi Class : Courts|Judges|A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
Division: FIRST DIVISION
Docket Number: A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043
Ponente: CORONA
Dispositive Portion:
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent judge.
#10 Re: Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel, 572 SCRA 1 ,
November 27, 2008
Case Title : RE: ENTITLEMENT TO HAZARD PAY OF SC MEDICAL AND DENTAL CLINIC PERSONNEL
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Request for Grant of Hazard
Allowance.
Syllabi Class : Public Health Workers ; Hazard Pay ;
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: A.M. No. 03-9-02-SC
Ponente: TINGA
Dispositive Portion:

11

WHEREFORE, the request of the Supreme Court Medical and Dental Services Division to amend
Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 57-2004 according to the provisions of Department of Health
Administrative Order No. 2006-0011 is DENIED. The Court DIRECTS that the payment of hazard
allowance in favor of the personnel concerned be made in accordance with A.C. No. 57-2004.
#11 Jamin vs. De Castro, 536 SCRA 359 , October 17, 2007
Case Title : MARY JANE VALLENTOS JAMIN, complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, MCTC,
JAGNA and GARCIAHERNANDEZ, BOHOL, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct and Immorality.
Syllabi Class : Courts|Judges|Immorality|Affidavits of Desistance|Administrative Law|A.M. No. 02-902-SC
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: A.M. No. MTJ-05-1616
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge MANUEL A.
DE CASTRO of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna and GarciaHernandez, Bohol, is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits,
and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from
performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this Decision.
Lastly, respondent Judge is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disbarred as a member
of the Philippine Bar.
#12 Reyes vs. Paderanga, 548 SCRA 244 , March 14, 2008
Case Title : ASUNCION REYES, complainant, vs. JUDGE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Mambajao, Camiguin, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Bias, Ignorance of the Law and
Procedure, Antedating Orders, Failure to Resolve Cases Within Reglementary Period and Refusal to
Inhibit in Several Cases Pending Before his Court.
Syllabi Class : Courts ; Judges ; Speedy Disposition of Cases ; Pleadings and Practice ;
Division: THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1973
Counsel: Lagamon Law Office
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rustico D. Paderanga is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law for, which he is fined P20,000.00; and undue delay in resolving a motion and in deciding an appeal,
for which he is fined P15,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a more severe penalty will be meted out
for the commission of similar offense in the future.
Lastest Case Provided
#1 Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases Against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., 652 SCRA 1 , June 14, 2011
Case Title : RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER
CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS in the Supreme Court. Request for Live TV and Radio
Coverage of the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases.
Syllabi Class : Courts|Rights of the Accused
Syllabi:
1. Courts; Rights of the Accused; The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to
the accuseds right to due process has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to
public information.-The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to the accuseds
right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has
left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information. The rationale for an
outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared
speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be
dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations.
2. Same; Same; Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights
herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.-Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what
advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into
the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof
that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various
rights herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.

12

3. Same; Same; Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the
courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.-The impossibility of
holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties,
whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself
commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it
takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
4. Same; Same; In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not
compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights,
and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings.-In this day and age, it
is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal
administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity,
dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right,
provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same
time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC
Counsel: Romeo T. Capulong, Rachel F. Pastores, Francis Anthony Principe, Mary Kathryn G. Sison,
Rolando Rico C. Olalia, Amylyn B. Sato, Jose Christopher Y. Belmonte, Philip D. Sawali and RomVoltaire C. Quizon
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES,J
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the
request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined.
Excerpt:
1. , recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court
against livebroadcast coverage , the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has
been limited to one reporter for each media institution. The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson
Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter [14] to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to
discuss concerns over media coverage of theproceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge
Solis-Reyes replied, however, that matters concerning mediacoverage should be brought to the Courts
attention through appropriate motion. [15] Hence, the present petitionswhich
assert the exercise of the freedom of
2. respective resolutions and statements bearing on these matters. The principal accused in the cases,
AndalAmpatuan , Jr. (Ampatuan ), filed a Consolidated Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M. No. 1011-5-SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. The President, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
and NUJP, et al. filed their respective Reply of January 18, 2011 and January 20, 2011. Ampatuan also
filed a Rejoinder of March 9, 2011. On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on livetelevision and radio coverage of court
proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re:Live TV and
Radio Coverage of the Hearing
3. Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City. Almost a year later or on November 19,
2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
GMA Network, Inc., relatives of thevictims, [1] individual journalists [2] from various media entities,
and members of the academe [3] filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and
radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras,
tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. [4]The Court
4.of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case [12] and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request RadioTV Coverage of theTrial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President
Joseph E. Estrada [13] which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on
constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when
regulation is a viable alternative. Petitioners state that the trial of theMaguindanao Massacre cases has
attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused,
and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and
searched for cameras
5.the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial , right to assembly and to
petition the government forredress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and
freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued bythe Court. The Court partially GRANTS
pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject
to the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly. Putts Law [16] states that technology is
dominated by two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage, and those who

13

manage what they do not understand. Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe
and don the experts gown, so to speak
6. , in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or risks from the use of technology
inside thecourtroom. A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced
with the same task ofstriking that delicate balance between seemingly competing yet certainly
complementary rights. The indication ofserious risks posed by live media coverage to the accuseds
right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored inthe era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has
left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information. The rationale for an
outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon ofa feared
7. docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. In a related move, the National Press
Club of the Philippines [5] (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag [6] (AFIMA) filed on
November 22, 2010 a petition praying that theCourt constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a
special court to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases
and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video
cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the court.
[7]The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC. President Benigno S. Aquino III, by
letter of November 22, 2010 [8
8. ] addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out in support of those who have petitioned [this
Court] to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial . The President expressed earnest hope
that [this Court] will, within themany considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation, attend
to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits. [9] The Court
docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010,
[10] the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. TheCourt shall treat in a
separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC. Meanwhile, various groups [11] also sent to the Chief Justice
their
9. speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be
dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations. In this day and
age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal
administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity,
dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right,
provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same
time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.
#2 Lejano vs. People, 638 SCRA 104 , December 14, 2010
Case Title : ANTONIO LEJANO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Procedure|Due Process|Presumption of Innocence|Judges|Right of Access to
Evidence|Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing
Syllabi:
1. Criminal Procedure; Due Process; Legal Research; Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the
failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage; The ruling in Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that he cites has long been overtaken by the decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 41 (1988), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not
require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless
the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police.-Still, Webb is not
entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For
one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long been overtaken by the decision in
Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the
State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is
able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical
expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same
subjected to DNA test. For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no
Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of
keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not
come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen
in the meantime.
2. Same; Same; Since the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our
democratic society u+nder the rule of law, ensuring that all those who appear before or are brought to
the bar of justice are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side, the measure of whether the
accused herein has been deprived of due process of law should not be limited to the state of mind of
the prosecution, but should include fundamental principles of fair play.-In our various decisions
relating to interlucotory orders and incidents pertaining to this case, this courts adherence to

14

instrumentalism has led to our finding in each instance that there was no due process violation
committed against petitioner, because bad faith was not shown by the prosecution or the trial judge.
However, since the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic
society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who appear before or are brought to the bar of
justice are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side, the measure of whether the accused
herein has been deprived of due process of law should not be limited to the state of mind of the
prosecution, but should include fundamental principles of fair play. Hence, as we write finis to this
case, it is time we evaluate the total picture that the prosecutions acts or omissions have wrought
upon the accuseds rights with each seemingly innocuous stroke, whatever its intention may have
been. The various violations of the accuseds rights have resulted in his failure to secure a just trial. As
such, the judgment of convictio
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing; If a negative
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) test result could not be considered as providing certainty that Webb did
not commit the crime, would it not have at least cast a reasonable doubt that he committed it?The idea that a negative DNA test result would not have necessarily exculpated Webb, because
previous sexual congress by Carmela with another man prior to the crime could not be discounted,
would unrealistically raise the bar of evidenceand for the wrong party, i.e., for the part of the
defense, instead of for the prosecution. If a negative DNA test result could not be considered as
providing certainty that Webb did not commit the crime, would it not have at least cast a reasonable
doubt that he committed it?
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Right of Access to Evidence; The accuseds right to access to
evidence necessitates in the correlative duty of the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection of
the evidence, and not to suppress or alter it.-As discussed in the preceding section, the accuseds
right to access to evidence necessitates in the correlative duty of the prosecution to produce and
permit the inspection of the evidence, and not to suppress or alter it. When the prosecution is called
upon not to suppress or alter evidence in its possession that may benefit the accused, it is also
necessarily obliged to preserve the said evidence. To hold otherwise would be to render illusory the
existence of such right. The advent of DNA technology prompted this Courts promulgation of the New
Rules for DNA Evidence. As DNA evidence provides objective proof of identification and may be
obtained from evidence left in the scene of the crime or in the victims person, it also gives new
meaning to the above duty of the prosecution. The prosecution did not fare well when measured
against this standard.
5. Same; Same; Same; Judges; Bias and Partiality; When allegations of instances of the trial
judges bias were first brought to this Court, it was understandable that the Court would accord the
judge the presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties, but her subsequent acts, as well
as her Decision-taken togethershowed a pattern now recognizable in retrospect as bias against the
accused, amounting to denial of due process.Allegations of issuance of prejudicial comments about
the accused in this case pertained to the acts of the trial judge, and not the prosecution. When
allegations of instances of the trial judges bias were first brought to this Court, it was understandable
that the Court would accord the judge the presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties.
Her subsequent acts, however, as well as her Decisiontaken togethershowed a pattern now
recognizable in retrospect as bias against the accused, amounting to denial of due process.
6. Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; The presumption of innocence of the accused is at the
center of our criminal justice system-the cornerstone, as it were, of all the other rights accorded to
the accused, including the right to due process of law; Because the accused must be presumed
innocent, and because they are entitled to due process of law, it is the duty of the prosecution not to
issue prejudicial statements about them while the trial is being conducted, a standard which applies
with even more force to the trial judge.The presumption of innocence of the accused is at the center
of our criminal justice systemthe cornerstone, as it were, of all the other rights accorded to the
accused, including the right to due process of law. In pronouncing the presumption of innocence of the
accused and their right to due process, the Constitution declares that the risk of letting the guilty walk
free would be error on the side of justice. This outcome is infinitely better than imprisoning an innocent
person. Because the accused must be presumed innocent, and because they are entitled to due
process of law, it is the duty of the prosecution not to issue prejudicial statements about them while
the trial is being conducted. This standard applies with even more force to the trial judge who must at
all times not only be impartial, but also appear to be so.
7. Same; Due Process; What is in truth referred to when expanding on the concept of fair trial is
that the rights of the accused are protected, to the extent necessary to ensure fairness for himrights of the victim are not ignored, but they are respected only to the extent that they are
consistent with the fairness of the trial for the accused.In the words of Richard Refshauge: The
adversarial system is rooted in the notion of a contest with winners and losers, yet the prosecutor is
ethically forbidden from embracing that notion. The question then, is not what will make the prospect
of a conviction more certain, but what is fair and what will contribute to justice. Thus, a criminal trial

15

is not about personal redress for the victims, but about determining the guilt and the just punishment
of the accused. What is in truth referred to when expanding on the concept of fair trial is that the
rights of the accused are protected, to the extent necessary to ensure fairness for him. Rights of the
victim are not ignored, but they are respected only to the extent that they are consistent with the
fairness of the trial for the accused.
8. Criminal Procedure; Public Prosecutors; It cannot be overemphasized that the prosecuting
officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.-At
the outset, it cannot be overemphasized that the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.
9. Same; Same; Same; The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a prosecution for
rape-the important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the unlawful
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.We thus reiterate that the vaginal smear
confirming the presence of spermatozoa merely corroborated Alfaros testimony that Carmela was
raped before she was killed. Indeed, the presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a
prosecution for rape. The important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the
unlawful penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. On the other hand, a negative result of
DNA examination of the semen specimen could not have exonerated Webb of the crime charged as his
identity as a principal in the rape-slay of Carmela was satisfactorily established by the totality of the
evidence. A finding that the semen specimen did not match Webbs DNA does not necessarily negate
his presence at the locus criminis.
10. Same; Same; Same; The source of the semen extracted from the vaginal cavity of the deceased
victim is immaterial in determining Webbs guilt-from the totality of the evidence presented by both
the prosecution and the defense, Webb was positively identified as Carmelas rapist.We hold that the
source of the semen extracted from the vaginal cavity of the deceased victim is immaterial in
determining Webbs guilt. From the totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense, Webb was positively identified as Carmelas rapist. As the records bear out, the positive
identification of appellant Webb as Carmelas rapist satisfied the test of moral certainty, and the
prosecution had equally established beyond reasonable doubt the fact of rape and the unlawful killing
of Carmela, Estrellita and Jennifer on the occasion thereof. Even assuming that the DNA analysis of the
semen specimen taken from Carmelas body hours after her death excludes Webb as the source
thereof, it will not exonerate him from the crime charged. Alfaro did not testify that Webb had
ejaculated or did not use a condom while raping Carmela. She testified that she saw Webb rape
Carmela and it was only him she had witnessed to have committed the rape inside the Vizconde
residence between late evening of June 29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991. Moreover, she
did not testify that Carmela had no sexual relations with any other man at least 24 hours prior to that
time. On the other hand, a positive result of DNA examination of the semen specimen extracted by Dr.
Cabanayan from Carmelas cadaver would merely serve as corroborative evidence.
11. Same; Rape; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing; With the great advances in forensic
science and under pertinent state laws, American courts allow post-conviction Deoxyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) testing when its application has strong indications that the result could potentially exonerate the
convict.-Appellant Gatchalian reiterates his and appellant Webbs motion for DNA testing of the
semen specimen taken from the vaginal cavity of Carmela during the autopsy conducted by Dr.
Cabanayan, which motion was denied by the RTC for lack of available scientific expertise and
technology at the time. With the great advances in forensic science and under pertinent state laws,
American courts allow post-conviction DNA testing when its application has strong indications that the
result could potentially exonerate the convict. Indeed, even a convicted felon has the right to avail of
new technology not available during his trial.
12. Same; Same; Same; Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or
assists in the escape of the principal-such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public
functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony.
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there are two (2) classes of
accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the
principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime

16

committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant Biong is one (1)
such public officer, and he abused his public function when, instead of immediately arresting the
perpetrators of the crime, he acceded to the bidding of appellant Webb to clean the Vizconde house,
which means he must help hide any possible trace or sign linking them to the crime, and not
necessarily to prevent the discovery of the bodies in such actual condition upon their deaths. Hence,
such cleaning would include obliterating fingerprints and other identifying marks which appellants
Webb, Lejano and Ventura might have left at the scene of the crime.
13. Same; Same; Accessories; Words and Phrases; Accessory is one who has knowledge of the
commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took
part in it subsequent to its commission.-The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as
one who has knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as
principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1)
profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or
destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its
discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime.
14. Same; Rape with Homicide; Conspiracy; Although only one (1) rape was actually proven by
the prosecution, as conspirators who mutually agreed to commit the crime and assisted one (1)
another in its commission, on the occasion of which the rape victim, her mother and sister, were killed,
each of the accused-appellants shall be criminally liable for rape with homicide.-The existence of
conspiracy between appellants Webb, Ventura, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez and Filart
was satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at
the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide
to actually pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Although only one (1) rape
was actually proven by the prosecution, as conspirators who mutually agreed to commit the crime and
assisted one (1) another in its commission, on the occasion of which the rape victim Carmela, her
mother Estrellita and sister Jennifer, were killed, each of the accused-appellants shall be criminally
liable for rape with homicide.
15. Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (R.A. No. 8239); The
Court takes judicial notice of reported irregularities and tampering of passports in the years prior to
the recent issuance by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of machine-readable passports-in
fact, the proliferation of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration stamps, assumed identity and
double passports, among others, have been cited as grounds to justify the necessity of amending the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996.That reasonable doubt is not engendered by the presentation of
certifications of entry into and exit from the US, passport with stamp marks of departure and
declarations of witnesses who are mostly relatives and friends of appellant Webb, can be gleaned from
the fact that passports and plane tickets indicating dates of arrival and departure do not necessarily
prove that the very same person actually took the flight. This Court takes judicial notice of reported
irregularities and tampering of passports in the years prior to the recent issuance by the DFA of
machine-readable passports. In fact, the proliferation of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration
stamps, assumed identity and double passports, among others, have been cited as grounds to justify
the necessity of amending the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (R.A. No. 8239) as proposed in the
Senate, x x x to rally for the issuance of passports using tamper proof and the latest data encryption
technology; and provide stiffer penalties against proliferators of fake passports.
16. Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Words and Phrases; Definitely, reasonable
doubt is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but such uncertainty that a
reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence.-It is the
prosecutions burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Definitely,
reasonable doubt is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but such uncertainty
that a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence.
Reasonable doubt is present whenafter the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences,
leaves the minds of the [judges] in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it.
17. Same; Same; Same; Verily, it is only when the identification of the accused as the author of the
crime charged is inconclusive or unreliable that alibi assumes importance.-Alibi cannot be sustained
where it is not only without credible corroboration, but also where it does not, on its face, demonstrate
the physical impossibility of the accuseds presence at the place and time of the commission of the
crime. Against positive evidence, alibi becomes most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the

17

positive identification of a credible witness. Appellant Webb was placed at the crime scene by Alfaro
who positively identified him as the one (1) who plotted and committed the rape of Carmela, and later
fatally stabbed her, her mother and sister, aided by or in concert with Lejano and Ventura. Gaviola and
Cabanacan gave corroborating testimonies that appellant Webb was here in the country, as he was
just in his house at BF Homes Subdivision Phase III, at least a few weeks prior to and on June 29 to
30, 1991. Verily, it is only when the identification of the accused as the author of the crime charged is
inconclusive or unreliable that alibi assumes importance. Such is not the situation in the case at bar
where the identification of the perpetrators by a lone eyewitness satisfied the moral certainty standard.
18. Same; Same; Alibi; While it is true that presentation of passport, plane ticket and other travel
documents can serve as proof that an accused was indeed out of the country at the time of the
killings, it must still be shown that the evidence is clear and convincing, and the totality of such
evidence constitutes an airtight excuse as to exclude the least possibility of his presence at the crime
scene.As to the travel documents consisting of his US passport, US INS certifications and other evidence
presented by appellant Webb in support of his alibi, while it is true that such presentation of passport,
plane ticket and other travel documents can serve as proof that he was indeed out of the country at
the time of the Vizconde killings, it must still be shown that the evidence is clear and convincing, and
the totality of such evidence constitutes an airtight excuse as to exclude the least possibility of his
presence at the crime scene. However, appellant Webb failed in this regard and the RTC and CA did
not err in giving scant weight to his arsenal of evidence, particularly so on the strength of the positive
identification of appellant Webb as Carmelas rapist and one of those who actually took part in the
brutal killing of Carmela, her mother and sister between midnight of June 29, 1991 and early morning
of June 30, 1991.
19. Same; Witnesses; The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the value
and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.-The rule is well-entrenched
in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. The testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to
convict. As to appellant Webbs voluminous documentary evidence, both the RTC and CA judiciously
examined each exhibit and concluded that these do not pass the test of admissibility and materiality
insofar as proving the physical impossibility of his presence at the Vizconde residence on June 29,
1991 until the early morning of June 30, 1991.
20. Same; Alibi; We have held in a number of cases that alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable
defense, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.-We have held in a number of cases that
alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. To
establish alibi, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when
the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between
the two places. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission
of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about it. Contrary to the
common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a
criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the
person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason
being that no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it
would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at the crime
scene, the alibi will not hold water.
21. Same; Same; Same; Same; A criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the prosecutions
case, not on the weakness of the defense.-A criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the
prosecutions case, not on the weakness of the defense. Once the prosecution overcomes the
presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as
perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense which shall
then test the strength of the prosecutions case either by showing that no crime was in fact committed
or that the accused could not have committed or did not commit the imputed crime, or at the very
least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the accused.
22. Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; It is axiomatic that a witness who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a
credible witness.-The testimony of Alfaro on its material points was corroborated by Birrer, Dr.
Cabanayan, White, Jr., Cabanacan and Gaviola. Appellants presence at the scene of the crime before,
during and after its commission was duly established. Their respective participation, acts and
declarations were likewise detailed by Alfaro who was shown to be a credible witness. It is axiomatic
that a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.

18

23. Criminal Law; Presumption of Innocence; Evidence; The Supreme Court has consistently
held that the rule on the trial courts appreciation of evidence must bow to the superior rule that the
prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.-This Court has
consistently held that the rule on the trial courts appreciation of evidence must bow to the superior
rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The law
presumes an accused innocent, and this presumption must prevail unless overturned by competent
and credible proof. Thus, we are tasked to consider two crucial points in sustaining a judgment of
conviction: first, the identification of the accused as perpetrator of the crime, taking into account the
credibility of the prosecution witness who made the identification as well as the prosecutions
compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and second, all the elements constituting the crime
were duly proven by the prosecution to be present.
24. Same; Same; Same; If we do not apply at all the sub judice rule to the present case, the reason
is obvious to those who have followed the case in the media-both parties are in pari delicto as both
have apparently gone to the media to campaign for the merits of their respective causesthe
egregious action of one has been cancelled by a similar action by the other.If we do not apply at all
the sub judice rule to the present case, the reason is obvious to those who have followed the case in
the mediaboth parties are in pari delicto as both have apparently gone to the media to campaign for
the merits of their respective causes. Thus, the egregious action of one has been cancelled by a similar
action by the other. It is in this sense that this Supplemental Opinion is independent of the merits of
the case. Their common action, however, cannot have their prejudicial effects on both; whatever the
results may be, doubts will linger about the real merits of the case due to the inordinate media
campaign that transpired. Lest we be misunderstood, our application of the sub judice rule to this case
cannot serve as a precedent for similar future violations. Precisely, this Supplemental Opinion is a
signal to all that this Court has not forgotten, and is in fact keenly aware of, the limits of what can be
publicly ventilated on the merits of a case while sub judice, and on the comments on the conduct of
the courts with respect to the case. This Court will not standby idly and helplessly as its integrity as an
institution and its processes are shamelessly brought to disrepute.
25. Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The resulting (but temporary) curtailment of speech because
of the sub judice rule is necessary and justified by the more compelling interests to uphold the rights
of the accused and promote the fair and orderly administration of justice.-In sum, the court, in a
pending litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment or influence in its all-important duty of
deciding the case. Any publication pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of
the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the
controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The resulting (but temporary) curtailment of
speech because of the sub judice rule is necessary and justified by the more compelling interests to
uphold the rights of the accused and promote the fair and orderly administration of justice.
26. Same; Same; Same; Principle of Open Justice; Words and Phrases; The peoples freedom to
criticize the government includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions-this
is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental to our democratic society and ensures that (a)
there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the publics confidence
in the administration of justice is maintained.This, of course, is not meant to stifle all forms of
criticism against the court. As the third branch of the government, the courts remain accountable to
the people. The peoples freedom to criticize the government includes the right to criticize the courts,
their proceedings and decisions. This is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental to our
democratic society and ensures that (a) there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or
idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the publics confidence in the administration of justice is maintained. The
criticism must, however, be fair, made in good faith, and not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. And to enhance the open court principle and allow the people to make fair and reasoned
criticism of the courts, the sub judice rule excludes from its coverage fair and accurate reports
(without comment) of what have actually taken place in open court.
27. Same; Same; Same; The fact that the jury system is not adopted in this jurisdiction is not an
argument against our observance of the sub judice rule-justices and judges are no different from
members of the jury, they are not immune from the pervasive effects of media.As may be observed
from the cited material, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts to insulate members of the jury
from being influenced by prejudicial publicity. But the fact that the jury system is not adopted in this
jurisdiction is not an argument against our observance of the sub judice rule; justices and judges are
no different from members of the jury, they are not immune from the pervasive effects of media. It
might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most
powerful media of public opinion. As I said in another case, in a slightly different context, even those
who are determined, in their conscious minds, to avoid bias may be affected.
28. Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The right to a fair trial is an adjunct of the accuseds right to
due process.-The right to a fair trial is an adjunct of the accuseds right to due process which
guarantees [him] a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial x x x where the

19

conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
29. Same; Same; Same; The Constitution simply gives the citizens the right to speech, not the right
to unrestricted publicized speech.-Before proceeding with this line of thought, however, let me clarify
that the sub judice rule is not imposed on all forms of speech. In so far as criminal proceedings are
concerned, two classes of publicized speech made during the pendency of the proceedings can be
considered as contemptuous: first, comments on the merits of the case, and second, intemperate and
unreasonable comments on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case. Publicized speech
should be understood to be limited to those aired or printed in the various forms of media such as
television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and internet, and excludes discussions, in public or in
private, between and among ordinary citizens. The Constitution simply gives the citizens the right to
speech, not the right to unrestricted publicized speech
30. Same; Same; Same; We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom of
speech under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution is not absolute; While the sub judice rule
may be considered as a curtailment of the right to free speech, it is necessary to ensure the proper
administration of justice and the right of an accused to a fair trial.-Persons facing charges for
indirect contempt for violation of the sub judice rule often invoke as defense their right to free speech
and claim that the citation for contempt constitutes a form of impermissible subsequent punishment.
We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom of speech under Section 4, Article III of
the Constitution is not absolute. A very literal construction of the provision, as espoused by US
Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, may lead to the disregard of other equally compelling constitutional
rights and principles. In Vicente v. Majaducon, 461 SCRA 12 (2005), this Court declared that [the
freedom of speech] needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. Courts, both within and outside this jurisdiction, have long
grappled with the dilemma of balancing the publics right to free speech and the governments duty to
administer fair and impartial justice. While the sub judice rule may be considered as a curtailment of
the right to free speech, it is necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice and the right of
an accused to a fair trial. Both these latter concerns are equally paramount and cannot lightly be
disregarded.
31. Courts; Sub Judice Rule; Freedom of Expression; The sub judice rule restricts comments and
disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings-the restriction applies not only to participants
in the pending case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and witnesses, but also to
the public in general, which necessarily includes the media.In essence, the sub judice rule restricts
comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies not only
to participants in the pending case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and
witnesses, but also to the public in general, which necessarily includes the media. Although the Rules
of Court does not contain a specific provision imposing the sub judice rule, it supports the observance
of the restriction by punishing its violation as indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71: Section
3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.x x x a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x x (d) Any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]
32. Same; Same; Witnesses; If half the world away could not even be considered to be so far
removed from the crime scene as to evince the physical impossibility of actual presence, then the
defense of alibi can only be appreciated when an accused lands in a different planet.-While alibi is,
indeed, a weak defense because the accused can easily fabricate his story to escape criminal liability,
in the present case, Webbs alibi could not have been fabricated with ease. His travel and immigration
documents showing his departure from the Philippines and arrival in the U.S.A., not to mention the
testimonial and documentary evidence on his activities while in the U.S.A. between March 9, 1991 and
October 26, 1992, deserve full credit. If half the world away could not even be considered to be so far
removed from the crime scene as to evince the physical impossibility of actual presence, then the
defense of alibi can only be appreciated when an accused lands in a different planet.
33. Same; Same; Facts decide casesconjectures and suspicions are not facts, hence, they have no evidentiary value, and they cannot be
the bases of conviction as they cannot substitute for the constitutional requirement of proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.It is now the dissenters reasoning which turns highly speculative and
conjectural, one borne out of unfounded suspicion. It suspects that the Webb family may have used its
financial resources and political influence to control all the U.S. and Philippine immigration people,
thus allowing Webb to secretly travel back to the country and again fly to the U.S. several times
between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992. It bears noting that the prosecution proffered no
evidence to establish that during the interregnum Webb had surreptitiously slipped out of the U.S.A. to
the Philippines, and that he subsequently re-entered the U.S.A. by bypassing all immigration controls
and protocols in both countries. This is the stuff of which spy novels are made, but not in the real

20

world where the lives of innocent individuals are at stake. Facts decide cases. Conjectures and
suspicions are not facts, hence, they have no evidentiary value. They cannot be the bases of conviction
as they cannot substitute for the constitutional requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Suspicions, no matter how strong they are, must never sway judgment.
34. Same; Same; Same; A testimony given four years after the occurrence of crime which gives
minute details that even contradict tales earlier given is too incredible as to draw dubiety.-A
testimony given four years after the occurrence of crime which gives minute details that even
contradict tales earlier given is too incredible as to draw dubiety. The lucid observations of Court of
Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao in his Dissent for the acquittal of the accused, and the graphic
analysis of Justice Roberto Abad in his ponencia on why Alfaros testimony can not be relied upon are
thus well taken. It bears stressing that the defenses earnest assertion that the prosecution failed to
rebut the pieces of evidence, highlighted by the defense, that seriously dent its (the prosecutions)
case has not been controverted.
35. Same; Same; Same; The prosecutions star witness appears to be a rehearsed witness-prior to
her decision to surface and claim to tell what she knew about the crimes, the crimes had already
been played out in the media, both print and broadcast, in every gory detail.Given Alfaros
confession of having for years, after the commission of the crimes, been numbed by the effects of drug
abuse, would the dissenters take as gospel truth her what they termed vivid and infallible
recollection of the minutiae surrounding the commission of the crime in June 1991, and point to the
accused as the malefactors, particularly Webb, despite evidence, documentary and testimonial,
supporting his alibi? The explanation for this feat of wizardry is within arms-lengthAlfaro appears to
be a rehearsed witness. Prior to her decision to surface and claim to tell what she knew about the
crimes, the crimes had already been played out in the media, both print and broadcast, in every gory
detail. It was a raging topic that drew intense discussions in both talk shows and informal gatherings,
and all sorts of speculations about it were rife. In fact, prior to the arrest of the accused, members of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) arrested some members of an akyat-bahay gang who were
charged accordingly. These gang members were later released upon orders of the Makati Regional Trial
Court after it was discovered that their confessions were fabricated by the PNP to conform to the
physical evidence found at the crime scene. It is not thus difficult to believe that Alfaro could have
become familiar with the evidentiary details of the crimes, given that she was practically a resident at
the offices of the NBI which was actively investigating the crimes, not to mention her being an NBI
star witness.
36. Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence derived from the
testimony of a witness who was under the influence of drugs during the incident to which he is
testifying is indeed very unreliable.-The paper of authors Burrus and Marks, Testimonial Reliability
of Drug Addicts, teaches: . . . [W]here the prolonged use of drugs has impaired the witness ability to
perceive, recall or relate, impeaching testimony is uniformly sustained by the courts. Aside from
organic deterioration, however, testimony may be impugned if the witness was under the influence of
drugs at the time of perceiving the event about which he is testifying or at the time he is on the stand.
This necessarily follows, for even the temporary presence of drugs affects the functioning of the bodys
organs, and thus bears directly on the credibility of the witness testimony (underscoring supplied)
Evidence derived from the testimony of a witness who was under the influence of drugs during the
incident to which he is testifying is indeed very unreliable. So it has been held that habitual users of
narcotics become notorious liars and that their testimony is likely to be affected thereby. We believe it
will be admitted that habitual users of opium, or other like narcotics, become notorious liars. The habit
of lying comes doubtless from the fact that the users of those narcotics pass the greater part of their
lives in an unreal world, and thus become unable to distinguish between images and facts, between
illusions and realities.
37. Same; Presumption of Innocence; In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not
whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing
to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt.In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about
the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of meat
lodged immovable between teeth. Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in
prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the
witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
38. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaros
testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to the other co-accused.-Webbs
documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaros testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with
respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the
proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold

21

together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the
others must necessarily fall.
39. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the Supreme Court were to subscribe to the extremely
skeptical view taken by the trial court and the Court of Appeals regarding travel documents like the
passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from the airports, it
might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or
speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence.-The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed
marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and
foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been
impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991,
commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26,
1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to
fourteen hours. If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear
the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons
for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what
they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webbs passport
and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S.
and back. The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower
courts minds.
40. Same; Same; Evidence; Official Documents; Passports; Webbs passport is a document
issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official
record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued, and the entries in that passport are
presumed true; The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications
of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the
arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webbs passport+
41. Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; While the best
evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse
party to examine and for the judge to see-the practice when a party does not want to leave an
important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated
among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original.The Court of Appeals rejected the
evidence of Webbs passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while
the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the
adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his
dissent, the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is
to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction
of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.
42. Same; Same; If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb,
with his fathers connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure
stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same.-If one is cynical about
the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his fathers connections, can arrange
for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27,
1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had been no indication that
such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines passenger manifest,
officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How could
Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record system those two dates in its record of his travels as well
as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the
Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these
questions.
43. Same; Same; Alibi; Requisites.-To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear,
and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of
the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
44. Same; Same; Same; Police assets are often criminals themselves.-Here, as already fully
discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria. She did not show up at the
NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency
for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police
assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecutions worst possible choice for a witness.
Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings
when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.
45. Same; Same; Witnesses; The positive identification must meet at least two criteria-first, the
positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness, and, second, the witness
story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.Rather, to be
acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria: First, the positive identification

22

of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth,
usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes
bewildering claims.
46. Criminal Law; Alibis and Denials; Judges; Impartiality; Not all denials and alibis should be
regarded as fabricated-indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but
denial and alibi; A judge must keep an open mind, guarding against slipping into hasty conclusion,
often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a casea positive declaration from a
witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accuseds
claim that he did not do it; A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness
can.The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs alibi. Their reason is
uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros positive identification of him as the rapist and killer
of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the
lower courts, Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated. But not all denials and alibis should be regarded
as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and
alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his
head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, I saw
him do it.? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to
fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the
accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet? There is only
one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion,
often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a
witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accuseds
claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness
can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, He did it! without blinking an
eye.
#3 Pesto vs. Millo, 693 SCRA 281 , March 13, 2013
Case Title : JOHNNY M. PESTO, complainant, vs. MARCELITO M. MILLO, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer of the
Court, Misleading Client, Bungling the Transfer of Title and Incompetence and Negligence.
Syllabi Class : Attorneys|Misconduct
Syllabi:
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He
must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the clients.-Every attorney owes
fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the clients interests commences from his
engagement as such, and lasts until his effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to
take every reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his clients interests may require. Atty. Millos
acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend to the transfer of
title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship between them. From
that moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render competent and efficient professional service to
them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in going about
what the professional service he had assumed required him to do. He concealed his inefficiency and
neglect by giving false information to his clients about having already paid the capital gains tax. In
reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax, rendering the clients liable for a substantial financial
liability in the form of penalties.
2. Same; Misconduct; Misconduct has no place in the heart and mind of a lawyer who has taken the
solemn oath to delay no man for money or malice, and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the
best of his knowledge and discretion.-The IBP Board of Governors recommended suspension from
the practice of law for two months as the penalty to be imposed. The recommended penalty is not well
taken. We modify the penalty, because Atty. Millo displayed no remorse as to his misconduct, and
could not be given a soft treatment. His professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from
the practice of law because he had caused material prejudice to the clients interest. He should
somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like Johnny and
Abella, who were innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer and in
his trustworthiness as a legal professional. He should remember that misconduct has no place in the
heart and mind of a lawyer who has taken the solemn oath to delay no man for money or malice, and
to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. Under the
circumstances, suspension from the practice of law for six months is the condign and commensurate
penalty for him.
3. Same; Actions; Parties; Disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are unlike civil suits
where the complainants are the plaintiffs and the respondent attorneys are the

23

defendants; The complainant or any other person who has brought the attorneys misconduct to the
attention of the Court is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.-Verily, disciplinary proceedings
against attorneys are unlike civil suits where the complainants are the plaintiffs and the respondent
attorneys are the defendants. They neither involve private interests nor afford redress for private
grievances. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, for the purpose of
preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law before
them. Every attorney is called to answer for every misconduct he commits as an officer of the Court.
The complainant or any other person who has brought the attorneys misconduct to the attention of
the Court is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
4. Same; Same; Administrative Complaints; Disbarment; Suspension; The withdrawal of an
administrative charge for suspension or disbarment based on an attorneys professional misconduct or
negligence will not furnish a ground to dismiss the charge. Suspension or disbarment proceedings that
are warranted will still proceed regardless of the lack or loss of interest on the part of the
complainant.-Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his belated response to the charge was due to the
assurances of Abella that she would be withdrawing the complaint. The Court disbelieves him,
however, and treats his claim as nothing but a belated attempt to save the day for himself. He ought
to remember that the withdrawal of an administrative charge for suspension or disbarment based on
an attorneys professional misconduct or negligence will not furnish a ground to dismiss the charge.
Suspension or disbarment proceedings that are warranted will still proceed regardless of the lack or
loss of interest on the part of the complainant. The Court may even entirely ignore the withdrawal of
the complaint, and continue to investigate in order to finally determine whether the charge of
professional negligence or misconduct was borne out by the record. This approach bespeaks the
Courts consistent view that the Legal Profession is not only a lofty and noble calling, but also a rare
privilege reserved only for the deserving.
Division: FIRST DIVISION
Docket Number: Adm. Case No. 9612
Ponente: BERSAMIN,J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. MARCELITO M. MILLO guilty of violating Canon 18,
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath; SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period of six months effective from notice, with the STERN WARNING that any
similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS him to return to the heirs of
Johnny and Abella Pesto within ten days from notice the sum of P10,000.00, plus legal interest of 6%
per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to promptly
submit to this Court written proof of his compliance within thirty days from notice of this decision. Let
copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marcelito
M. Millos personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and
guidance.
#4 Office of the Court Administrative vs. Indar, 669 SCRA 24 , April 10, 2012
Case Title : OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR,
Presiding Judge and Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City and
Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, respectively, respondent.Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty.
Syllabi Class : Administrative Cases|Judges
Syllabi:
1. Administrative Proceedings; Civil Service; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Technical
rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings.-The Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and nondisciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and
evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings. Section 3, Rule I of the Uniform Rules
states: Section 3. Technical Rules in Administrative Investigations.Administrative investigations shall
be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence
applicable to judicial proceedings.
2. Administrative Cases; Judges; Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.-This administrative case against
Judge Indar shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar,

24

in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This Resolution entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of Some
Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of
Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar, provides: Some administrative
cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special
courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for
the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches
of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers. In any of
the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against
the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be
suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
3. Same; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive
or betray.The Court defines dishonesty as: x x x a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. In this case, Judge Indar issued
Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any judicial
proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in
his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court
and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is
true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform official
duties honestly.
4. Same; Misconduct; Simple Misconduct and Grave Misconduct, Distinguished.-In Office of the
Court Administrator v. Lopez, 639 SCRA 633 (2011), the Court explained the difference between
simple misconduct and grave misconduct, thus: The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct.
5. Administrative Law; Judges; As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing
justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and
confidence of the people.-Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a judge,
like any other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at
all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. As the visible representation of the law tasked
with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the
respect and confidence of the people.
6. Same; Due Process; In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.-It is settled
that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings.
Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is
not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak,
Maguindanao, guilty of Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he is DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of
this Decision be entered into Judge Indars record as a member of the bar and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for

25

circulation to all courts in the country. The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to investigate
Atty. Umaima L. Silongan, Acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, on her
alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions on the annulment of marriage
cases issued by Judge Indar. Let copies of this Decision be forwarded to the Local Civil Registrars of the
City of Manila and Quezon City, the same to form part of the records of Decisions of Judge Indar on the
annulment of marriages filed with their offices. This Decision is immediately executory.
#5 Rodriguez vs. Blancaflor, 645 SCRA 286, March 14, 2011
Excerpt : 1. ...Page Edit Line Top G.R. No. 190171. March 14, 2011. [*] Alen Ross Rodriguez and
REGIDOr Tulali , petitioners, vs . The hon . bienvenido blancaflor , in his capacity as the Acting
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 52, and people of the philippines,
respondents. Courts; Judges; Contempt; The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent
in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of
justice.The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order
in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are
enjoined to
2. petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by Alen Ross
Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan; and Regidor Tulali (Tulali ), Prosecutor I of
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, seeking to annul and set aside the October 13, 2009
Decision [1] of respondent Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor (Judge Blancaflor ), Acting Presiding Judge of
Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan (RTC). The petition likewise seeks to prohibit
Judge Blancaflor from implementing the said decision. In his October 13, 2009 Decision,
Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to
issue a public
3. apology to the court. In the same decision, Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the
practice of law. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN
ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ and PROSECUTOR REGIDORTULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for
violation of their oath of office as member of the bar and as officer of the Court, and hereby sentence
them to suffer the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to pay a fine
of P100,000.00. Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the Court for the above
grave offenses and should
4. they fail to do so after the finality of this Sentence, a warrant for their arrest will be issued, and they
will not be released unless they comply with the order of this Court. Let a copy of this Order be
furnished the Secretary of Justice for appropriate action. IT IS SO ORDERED. [2] The Facts Previously
pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of
the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor. During the pendency of the
case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan
(Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of the
5. Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the
accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case. On June 29, 2009, a day before the
scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation
withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He
attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but
eventually withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On
June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Case Title : Alen Ross Rodriguez and REGIDOr Tulali, petitioners, vs. The hon. bienvenido blancaflor, in
his capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 52, and people
of the philippines, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Suspension|Disbarment
Syllabi:
1. Courts; Judges; Contempt; The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all
courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice.-
The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to
exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or
vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be
exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory,
idea of punishment. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted
to unless necessary in the interest of justice.
2. Same; Same; Same; Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney.-Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules

26

enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as
attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral
conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyers oath, (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority to do so.
3. Attorneys; Suspension; Disbarment; A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.-Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. His guilt, however, cannot be
presumed. It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof.
Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and
counsel.
Division: SECOND DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 190171
Counsel: Zamora, Poblador, Vasquez & Bretaa
Ponente: MENDOZA,J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2009 Decision and November 6, 2009 Order
are hereby annulled and set aside. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor is hereby permanently enjoined from
implementing the said decision and order. This injunctive order is immediately executory.
#6 Santeco vs. Avance, 643 SCRA 612 , February 22, 2011
Case Title : TERESITA D. SANTECO, complainant, vs. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
Syllabi Class : Administrative Law|Attorneys|Disbarment
Syllabi:
1. Administrative Law; Attorneys; The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a
lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.-As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to
uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is
shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes. Here, respondents conduct evidently fell
short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying
this Courts orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite the
five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order
to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law
practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this
Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution.
2. Same; Same; Disbarment; Respondent is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court
and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.-In repeatedly disobeying this Courts orders,
respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains
indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the
court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
3. Same; Same; Failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination
or disrespect which merits a lawyers suspension or even disbarment.-We have held that failure to
comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits
a lawyers suspension or even disbarment. Sebastian v. Bajar, 532 SCRA 435 (2007), teaches
Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A
Courts Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct
and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court.
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: A.C. No. 5834
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to
all courts of the land.
#7 Baculi vs. Battung, 658 SCRA 209 , September 28, 2011

27

Case Title : JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Violation of Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Syllabi Class : Legal Ethics|Attorneys|Courts|Judges
Syllabi:
1. Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Courts; Judges; Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because
of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and
disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents.-We agree with the IBPs finding that the
respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung
disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the
presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent even came back to
harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that the
respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect
for his position even after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court,
the respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were
not only against the person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well
whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts,
cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he
represents.
2. Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely
disregards the latters role, stature and position in our justice system; Incompetence of a
judge is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the
Rules of Court-an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a
bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., 527
SCRA 446 (2007), that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution;
without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations. A lawyer who
insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latters role, stature and position in our
justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he
would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a
manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to decide
cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner
provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that
puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
Division: SECOND DIVISION
Docket Number: A.C. No. 8920
Ponente: BRION,** J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondents personal record as an
attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the
country, for their information and guidance.
#8 Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Mauricio, Jr., 593 SCRA 367 , July 22, 2009
Case Title : FOODSPHERE, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
Syllabi Class : Legal Ethics|Attorneys
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: A.C. No. 7199 [Formerly CBD 04-1386.]
Counsel: Melanio L. Mauricio
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his
personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
#9 J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. vs. De Vera, 317 SCRA 339 , October
26, 1999

28

Case Title : J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., and SPOUSES JESUS and
ROSARIO K. MERCADO, complainants, vs. EDUARDO DE VERA and JOSE RONGKALES BANDALAN,
respondents., ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, petitioner-complainant, vs. ATTY. MERVYN G. ENCANTO,
ATTY. NUMERIANO G. TANOPO, JR., ATTY. JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON, ATTY. BEDA G. FAJARDO, ATTY.
RENE C. VILLA, THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its COMMISSION ON BAR
DISCIPLINE, as represented by ATTY MERVYN G. ENCANTO, incumbent National President; ATTY.
CARMEN LEONOR P. MERCADO-ALCANTARA; SPOUSES JESUS K. MERCADO and ROSARIO P. MERCADO;
and J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
Syllabi Class : Legal Ethics|Attorneys|Attorneys Liens|Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Syllabi:
1. Legal Ethics; Attorneys; While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer,
nevertheless, is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered.-While, indeed, the
practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless, is entitled to be duly compensated for
professional services rendered. So, also, he must be protected against clients who wrongly refuse to
give him his just due. In Albano vs. Coloma, this Court has said: Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy
of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his
brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time
and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a
client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to
secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this
Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by
counsels services to de- prive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves
condemnation.
2. Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Attorneys Liens; In case of a disagreement with client as to attorneys
fees, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer for being unconscionable, the
lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his feesit should
behoove the lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or the proper motion with
the proper court to fix the amount of his attorneys fees.-A lawyer is entitled to a lien over funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession. Under Canon 16,
Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility he may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client agrees with the lawyer in the amount of
attorneys fees. In case of a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the
lawyer for being unconscionable, the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to
the payment of his fees; instead, it should behoove the, lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable, the
necessary action or the proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of his attorneys fees. If
a lawyer were allowed to unilaterally apply the funds in his hands in payment of his claimed
compensation even when there is a disagreement between him and his client would not only be
violative of the trust relationship between them but can also open the door to possible abuse by those
who are less than mindful of their fiduciary duty.
3. Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; It is not an uncommon practice for
the IBP Board of Governors resolutions to be signed on different dates by the members.-A close review
of the IBP proceedings, substantially reflected in the Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Governors,
would indicate to the Court that no serious irregularity attended the adoption of Resolution No. X-9341 insofar, particularly, as it recommended the suspension of Atty. De Vera from the practice of law.
Respondents were able to adequately show why the assailed resolution of the Board of Governors
recommendation could not have been accomplished on the same day of the meeting. Evidently, it was
not an uncommon practice for board resolutions to be signed on different dates by the members of the
Board of Governors. While Resolution No. X-93-41 had been signed by some of the previous members
of the Board of Governors after the expiration of their term of office, the action attested to by the
resolution, nevertheless, would unquestionably disclose that it was adopted during their tenure. In
fact, the succeeding members of the Board of Governors affirmed, in their meeting of 18 December
1993, that the previous Board x x x already rendered a decision x x x as embodied under Resolution
No. X-93-41 dated March 23, 1993 x x x but that only some members of the previous Board had yet
to affix their signatures thereat. There might have been some inconsistencies in the assailed minutes
of the meeting of the Board of Governors, but these incongruences hardly would establish
convincingly, a concerted effort on the part of respondents to manipulate the outcome of the case
against Atty. De Vera.
Division: THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: Adm. Case No. 3066, Adm. Case No. 4438
Counsel: Alcantara & Alcantara Law Office, Eduardo C. De Vera, Arthur D. Lim, Jose Amor M. Amorado
Ponente: VITUG

29

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in Administrative Case No. 3066, Resolution No. X-93-41, dated 23 March 1993, of the
IBP Board of Governors, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and he is further DIRECTED to return to
Rosario K. Mercado the amount in his possession in excess of P350,000.00, without prejudice to
whatever judicial action he may take to recover his unsatisfied attorneys fees, if any. His suspension
stands until he has satisfactorily shown to the Court his compliance therewith. Copies of this resolution
shall be circulated to all Courts of the country and spread on the personal record of Atty. De Vera.
#10 Mecaral vs. Velasquez, 622 SCRA 1 , June 29, 2010
Case Title : ROSARIO T. MECARAL, complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral
Conduct.
Syllabi Class : Administrative Law|Attorneys|Disbarment
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; By engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which
constitute gross misconduct, respondent is disbarred.-In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are
grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the
qualifications of a lawyer. Wherefore, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his
name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
2. Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.-The practice of law is not a right
but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. When a lawyers moral
character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it
behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys.
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: A.C. No. 8392 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175]
Counsel: Womens Legal Bureau-Lawnet Lawyers Network for complainant.
Ponente: Per Curiam
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part of the
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. Let copies
of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

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