hello

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES GREGORIO and G.R. NO. 155868
JOSEFA YU,
Petitioners,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
NGO YET TE, doing business
under the name and style,
ESSENTIAL MANUFACTURING, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 6, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the March 21, 2001 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52246[2] and its October 14, 2002 Resolution.[3]
The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu (Spouses Yu) purchased from Ngo Yet Te
(Te) bars of detergent soap worth P594,240.00, and issued to the latter three
postdated checks[4] as payment of the purchase price. When Te presented the
checks at maturity for encashment, said checks were returned dishonored and
stamped ACCOUNT CLOSED.[5] Te demanded[6] payment from Spouses Yu but the
latter did not heed her demands. Acting through her son and attorney-in-fact,
Charry Sy (Sy), Te filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, a Complaint,[7] docketed as Civil Case No. 4061-V-93,
for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Attachment.
In support of her prayer for preliminary attachment, Te attached to her
Complaint an Affidavit executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were guilty of fraud in
entering into the purchase agreement for they never intended to pay the contract
price, and that, based on reliable information, they were about to move or dispose
of their properties to defraud their creditors.[8]
Upon Tes posting of an attachment bond, [9] the RTC issued an Order of
Attachment/Levy[10] dated March 29, 1993 on the basis of which Sheriff
Constancio Alimurung (Sheriff Alimurung) of RTC, Branch 19, Cebu City levied
and attached Spouses Yus properties in Cebu City consisting of one parcel of land
(known as Lot No. 11)[11] and four units of motor vehicle, specifically, a Toyota
Ford Fierra, a jeep, a Canter delivery van, and a passenger bus.[12]
On April 21, 1993, Spouses Yu filed an Answer[13] with counterclaim for
damages arising from the wrongful attachment of their properties, specifically,
actual damages amounting to P1,500.00 per day; moral damages, P1,000,000.00;
and exemplary damages, P50,000.00. They also sought payment of P120,000.00 as
attorneys fees andP80,000.00 as litigation expenses.[14] On the same date, Spouses
Yu filed an Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Attachment. [15] They
also filed a Claim Against Surety Bond[16] in which they demanded payment from
Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety), the surety which
issued the attachment bond, of the sum ofP594,240.00, representing the damages
they allegedly sustained as a consequence of the wrongful attachment of their
properties.

While the RTC did not resolve the Claim Against Surety Bond, it issued an
Order dated May 3, 1993, discharging from attachment the Toyota Ford Fierra,
jeep, and Canter delivery van on humanitarian grounds, but maintaining custody of
Lot No. 11 and the passenger bus. Spouses Yu filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[18] which the RTC denied.[19]
[17]

Dissatisfied, they filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari,[20] docketed as

CA-G.R. SP No. 31230, in which a Decision[21] was rendered on September 14,
1993, lifting the RTC Order of Attachment on their remaining properties. It reads
in part:
In the case before Us, the complaint and the accompanying affidavit in
support of the application for the writ only contains general averments. Neither
pleading states in particular how the fraud was committed or the badges of fraud
purportedly committed by the petitioners to establish that the latter never had an
intention to pay the obligation; neither is there a statement of the particular acts
committed to show that the petitioners are in fact disposing of their properties to
defraud creditors. x x x.
xxxx
Moreover, at the hearing on the motion to discharge the order of
attachment x x x petitioners presented evidence showing that private respondent
has been extending multi-million peso credit facilities to the petitioners for the
past seven years and that the latter have consistently settled their obligations. This
was not denied by private respondent. Neither does the private respondent contest
the petitioners allegations that they have been recently robbed of properties of
substantial value, hence their inability to pay on time. By the respondent courts
own pronouncements, it appears that the order of attachment was upheld because
of the admitted financial reverses the petitioner is undergoing.
This is reversible error. Insolvency is not a ground for attachment especially when
defendant has not been shown to have committed any act intended to defraud its
creditors x x x.
For lack of factual basis to justify its issuance, the writ of preliminary attachment
issued by the respondent court was improvidently issued and should be
discharged.[22]

From said CA Decision, Te filed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no

avail.

[23]

Te filed with us a Petition for Review on Certiorari[24] but we denied the

same in a Resolution dated June 8, 1994 for having been filed late and for failure to
show that a reversible error was committed by the CA. [25] Entry of Judgment of our
June 8, 1994 Resolution was made on July 22, 1994.[26] Thus, the finding of the CA
in its September 14, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 31230 on the wrongfulness
of the attachment/levy of the properties of Spouses Yu became conclusive and
binding.
However, on July 20, 1994, the RTC, apparently not informed of the SC
Decision, rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the plaintiff has
established a valid civil cause of action against the defendants, and therefore,
renders this judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, and
hereby orders the following:
1) Defendants are hereby ordered or directed to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P549,404.00, with interest from the date of the filing of this case (March 3,
1993);
2) The Court, for reasons aforestated, hereby denies the grant of damages
to the plaintiff;
3) The Court hereby adjudicates a reasonable attorneys fees and litigation
expenses of P10,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff;
4) On the counterclaim, this Court declines to rule on this, considering
that the question of the attachment which allegedly gave rise to the damages
incurred by the defendants is being determined by the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.[27] (Emphasis ours)

Spouses Yu filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration [28] questioning
the disposition of their counterclaim. They also filed a Manifestation [29] informing
the RTC of our June 8, 1994 Resolution in G.R. No. 114700.
The RTC issued an Order dated August 9, 1994, which read:
xxxx
(2) With regard the counter claim filed by the defendants against the plaintiff for
the alleged improvident issuance of this Court thru its former Presiding Judge

(Honorable Emilio Leachon, Jr.), the same has been ruled with definiteness by the
Supreme Court that, indeed, the issuance by the Court of the writ of preliminary
attachment appears to have been improvidently done, but nowhere in the
decision of the Supreme Court and for that matter, the Court of Appeals
decision which was in effect sustained by the High Court, contains any ruling
or directive or imposition, of any damages to be paid by the plaintiff to the
defendants, in other words, both the High Court and the CA, merely declared the
previous issuance of the writ of attachment by this Court thru its former presiding
judge to be improvidently issued, but it did not award any damages of any kind to
the defendants, hence, unless the High Court or the CA rules on this, this Court
coud not grant any damages by virtue of the improvident attachment made by this
Court thru its former presiding judge, which was claimed by the defendants in
their counter claim.
(3) This Court hereby reiterates in toto its Decision in this case dated July 20,
1994. [30] (Emphasis ours)

The RTC also issued an Order dated December 2, 1994,[31] denying the
Motion for Reconsideration of Spouses Yu.[32]
In the same December 2, 1994 Order, the RTC granted two motions filed by Te, a
Motion to Correct and to Include Specific Amount for Interest and a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal.[33] The RTC also denied Spouses Yus Notice of
Appeal[34] from the July 20, 1994 Decision and August 9, 1994 Order of the RTC.
From said December 2, 1994 RTC Order, Spouses Yu filed another Notice of
Appeal [35] which the RTC also denied in an Order[36] dated January 5, 1995.
Spouses Yu filed with the CA a Petition[37] for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36205, questioning the denial of
their Notices of Appeal; and seeking the modification of the July 20, 1994
Decision and the issuance of a Writ of Execution. The CA granted the Petition in a
Decision[38] dated June 22, 1995.
Hence, Spouses Yu filed with the CA an appeal[39] docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 52246, questioning only that portion of the July 20, 1994 Decision where the
RTC declined to rule on their counterclaim for damages. [40] However, Spouses Yu

did not dispute the specific monetary awards granted to respondent Te; and
therefore, the same have become final and executory.
Although in the herein assailed Decision[41] dated March 21, 2001, the CA
affirmed in toto the RTC Decision, it nonetheless made a ruling on the
counterclaim of Spouses Yu by declaring that the latter had failed to adduce
sufficient evidence of their entitlement to damages.
Spouses Yu filed a Motion for Reconsideration[42] but the CA denied it in the
herein assailed Resolution[43] dated October 14, 2002.
Spouses Yu filed the present Petition raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that the writ of
attachment was procured in bad faith, after it was established by final judgment
that there was no true ground therefor.
II. Whether or not the appellate court erred in refusing to award actual, moral and
exemplary damages after it was established by final judgment that the writ of
attachment was procured with no true ground for its issuance.[44]

There is one preliminary matter to set straight before we resolve the foregoing
issues.
According to respondent Te,[45] regardless of the evidence presented by
Spouses Yu, their counterclaim was correctly dismissed for failure to comply with
the procedure laid down in Section 20 of Rule 57. Te contends that as Visayan
Surety was not notified of the counterclaim, no judgment thereon could be validly
rendered.
Such argument is not only flawed, it is also specious.
As stated earlier, Spouses Yu filed a Claim Against Surety Bond on the same
day they filed their Answer and Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary
Attachment.[46] Further, the records reveal that on June 18, 1993, Spouses Yu filed
with the RTC a Motion to Give Notice to Surety.[47] The RTC granted the Motion in
an Order[48] datedJune 23, 1993. Accordingly, Visayan Surety was notified of the

pre-trial conference to apprise it of a pending claim against its attachment bond.

Visayan Surety received the notice on July 12, 1993 as shown by a registry return
receipt attached to the records.[49]
Moreover, even if it were true that Visayan Surety was left in the
proceedings a quo, such omission is not fatal to the cause of Spouses
Yu. In Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. v. Salas,[50] we held that x x x if the
surety was not given notice when the claim for damages against the principal in the
replevin bond was heard, then as a matter of procedural due process the surety is
entitled to be heard when the judgment for damages against the principal is sought
to
be enforced against
the
suretys
replevin
bond.[51]This
remedy is applicable for the procedures governing claims for damages

on an attachment bond and on a replevin bond are the same.[52]

We now proceed to resolve the issues jointly.
Spouses Yu contend that they are entitled to their counterclaim for damages
as a matter of right in view of the finality of our June 8, 1994 Resolution in G.R.
No. 114700 which affirmed the finding of the CA in its September 14, 1993
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 31230 that respondent Te had wrongfully caused the
attachment of their properties. Citing Javellana v. D.O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc.,
[53]
they argue that they should be awarded damages based solely on the CA finding
that the attachment was illegal for it already suggests that Te acted with malice
when she applied for attachment. And even if we were to assume that Te did not
act with malice, still she should be held liable for the aggravation she inflicted
when she applied for attachment even when she was clearly not entitled to it.[54]
That is a rather limited understanding of Javellana. The counterclaim
disputed therein was not for moral damages and therefore, there was no need to
prove malice. As early as in Lazatin v. Twao,[55] we laid down the rule that where
there is wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant may recover actual
damages even without proof that the attachment plaintiff acted in bad faith in
obtaining the attachment. However, if it is alleged and established that the
attachment was not merely wrongful but also malicious, the attachment defendant

may recover moral damages and exemplary damages as well. [56] Either way, the
wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic award of damages
to the attachment defendant; the latter must first discharge the burden of proving
the nature and extent of the loss or injury incurred by reason of the wrongful
attachment.[57]
In fine, the CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu
was wrongful did not relieve Spouses Yu of the burden of proving the factual basis
of their counterclaim for damages.
To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment,
the attachment defendant must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of
loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof.[58] Such loss or injury must be of the
kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. As to its amount, the same must be measurable
based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. [59] In particular, if the
claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized
profits must be estalished and supported by independent evidence of the mean
income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure. [60]
Spouses Yu insist that the evidence they presented met the foregoing
standards. They point to the lists of their daily net income from the operation of
said passenger bus based on used ticket stubs [61] issued to their passengers. They
also cite unused ticket stubs as proof of income foregone when the bus was
wrongfully seized.[62] They further cite the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu that,
in the day-to-day operation of their passenger bus, they use up at least three ticket
stubs and earn a minimum daily income ofP1,500.00.[63]
In ruling that Spouses Yu failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support
their counterclaim for actual damages, the CA stated, thus:
In this case, the actual damages cannot be determined. Defendantappellant Josefa Yu testified on supposed lost profits without clear and
appreciable explanation. Despite her submission of the used and unused ticket
stubs, there was no evidence on the daily net income, the routes plied by the bus
and the average fares for each route. The submitted basis is too speculative and
conjectural. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other evidence of
profitability necessary to prove the amount of actual damages were presented.

Thus, the Courta quo did not err in not awarding damages in favor of defendantsappellants.[64]

We usually defer to the expertise of the CA, especially when it concurs with
the factual findings of the RTC.[65] Indeed, findings of fact may be passed upon and
reviewed by the Supreme Court in the following instances: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3)
where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the lower court, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the factual
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings of
fact are themselves conflicting; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions made
without a citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; (10) when the findings of fact of the lower court are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.[66]However, the present case does not fall under any of the
exceptions. We are in full accord with the CA that Spouses Yu failed to prove their
counterclaim.
Spouses Yus claim for unrealized income of P1,500.00 per day was based on their
computation of their average daily income for the year 1992. Said computation in
turn is based on the value of three ticket stubs sold over only five separate days in
1992.[67] By no stretch of the imagination can we consider ticket sales for five days
sufficient evidence of the average daily income of the passenger bus, much less its
mean income. Not even the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu can add credence to
such evidence for the testimony itself lacks corroboration.[68]
Besides, based on the August 29, 1994 Manifestation[69] filed by Sheriff Alimurung,
it would appear that long before the passenger bus was placed under preliminary
attachment in Civil Case No. 4061-V-93, the same had been previously attached by
the Sheriff of Mandaue City in connection with another case and that it was placed
in the Cebu Bonded Warehousing Corporation, Cebu City. Thus, Spouses Yu

cannot complain that they were unreasonably deprived of the use of the passenger
bus by reason of the subsequent wrongful attachment issued in Civil Case No.
4061-V-93. Nor can they also attribute to the wrongful attachment their failure to
earn income or profit from the operation of the passenger bus.
Moreover, petitioners did not present evidence as to the damages they suffered by
reason of the wrongful attachment of Lot No. 11.
Nonetheless, we recognize that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary
loss when their properties were wrongfully seized, although the amount thereof
cannot be definitively ascertained. Hence, an award of temperate or moderate
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is in order.[70]
As to moral and exemplary damages, to merit an award thereof, it must be
shown that the wrongful attachment was obtained by the attachment plaintiff with
malice or bad faith, such as by appending a false affidavit to his application.[71]
Spouses Yu argue that malice attended the issuance of the attachment bond
as shown by the fact that Te deliberately appended to her application for
preliminary attachment an Affidavit where Sy perjured himself by stating that they
had no intention to pay their obligations even when he knew this to be untrue given
that they had always paid their obligations; and by accusing them of disposing of
their properties to defraud their creditors even when he knew this to be false,
considering that the location of said properties was known to him.[72]
The testimony of petitioner Josefa Yu herself negates their claim for moral and
exemplary damages. On cross-examination she testified, thus:
Q: Did you ever deposit any amount at that time to fund the check?
A: We requested that it be replaced and staggered into smaller amounts.
COURT: Did you fund it or not?
Atty. Ferrer: The three checks involved?
Atty. Florido: Already answered. She said that they were not able to fund it.
Atty. Ferrer: And as a matter of fact, you went to the bank to close your account?
A: We closed account with the bank because we transferred the account to
another bank.

Q: How much money did you transfer from that bank to which the three checks
were drawn to this new bank?
A: I dont know how much was there but we transferred already to the Solid
Bank.
Q: Who transferred?
A: My daughter, sir.[73] (Emphasis ours)

Based on the foregoing testimony, it is not difficult to understand why Te

concluded that Spouses Yu never intended to pay their obligation for they had
available funds in their bank but chose to transfer said funds instead of cover the
checks they issued. Thus, we cannot attribute malice nor bad faith to Te in applying
for the attachment writ. We cannot hold her liable for moral and exemplary
damages.
As a rule, attorneys fees cannot be awarded when moral and exemplary
damages are not granted, the exception however is when a party incurred expenses
to lift a wrongfully issued writ of attachment. [74] Without a doubt, Spouses Yu
waged a protracted legal battle to fight off the illegal attachment of their properties
and pursue their claims for damages. It is only just and equitable that they be
awarded reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
In sum, we affirm the dismissal of the counterclaim of petitioners Spouses
Yu for actual, moral, and exemplary damages. However, we grant them temperate
damages and attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The March 21, 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
petitioners counterclaim is PARTLY GRANTED. Gregorio Yu and Josefa Yu are
awarded P50,000.00 temperate damages and P30,000.00 attorneys fees.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo, p. 26.
Entitled Ngo Yet Te, doing business under the name and style ESSENTIAL MANUFACTURING, represented by
her attorney-in-fact Charry N. Sy, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sps. Gregorio and Josefa Yu, doing business under
the name and style ARCHIES STORE, Defendants-Appellants.
[3]
Rollo, p. 45.
[4]
Exhibit Envelope, Exhibits A, B, and C, envelope of exhibits.
[5]
Exhibits A-1, B-1, and C-1, envelope of exhibits.
[6]
Exhibit H, envelope of exhibits.
[7]
Records, p. 1.
[8]
Id. at 10.
[9]
Id. at 18.
[10]
Id. at 19.
[11]
Id. at 48.
[12]
Id. at 47.
[13]
Id. at 20.
[14]
Id. at 22-23.
[15]
Id. at 30.
[16]
Id. at 28.
[17]
Id. at 69.
[18]
Id. at 88.
[19]
Id. at 94.
[20]
Id. at 230.
[21]
Penned by Associate Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (now a retired member of this Court) and concurred in
by Associate Justices Vicente V. Mendoza (now a retired member of this Court) and Pacita Canizares-Nye
(deceased).
[22]
Records, pp. 226-227.
[23]
Id. at 229.
[24]
Docketed as G.R. No. 114700.
[25]
Records, p. 340.
[26]
Id. at 409-410.
[27]
Id. at 336-337.
[28]
Id. at 371.
[29]
Id. at 339.
[30]
Id. at 345-346.
[31]
Id. at 404.
[32]
In the same December 2, 1994 Order, the RTC granted two motions filed by Te, a Motion to Correct and to
Include Specific Amount for Interest and a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. (Id.) Spouses Yu filed a
Notice of Appeal from said Order but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1995.
(Id. at 411 and 423) Spouses Yu filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 36205, questioning the denial of their Notice of Appeal, the modification of
the July 20, 1994 Decision and the issuance of a Writ of Execution. (Id. at 427) The CA granted the Petition
in a Decision dated June 22, 1995. (Id. at 515)
[33]
Id.
[2]

[34]

Id. at 353 and 423.

Id. at 411.
[36]
Id. at 423.
[37]
Id. at 427.
[38]
Id. at 515.
[39]
CA rollo, p. 43.
[40]
Id. at 48.
[41]
Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
(now a member of this Court) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., id. at 120.
[42]
Id. at 131.
[43]
Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now a
member of this Court) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., id. at 162.
[44]
Petition, rollo, p. 12.
[45]
Id. at 111-112.
[46]
See notes 13, 14 and 15.
[47]
Records, p. 160.
[48]
Id. at 172.
[49]
Id. at 171-b.
[50]
G.R. No. L-48820, May 25, 1979, 90 SCRA 252.
[51]
Id. at 258-259. Emphasis ours.
[52]
RULES OF COURT (1964), Rule 60, Sec. 10, reads:
The amount, if any, to be awarded to either party upon any bond filed by the other in accordance
with the provisions of this Rule, shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted under the same procedure as
prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 57.
[53]
143 Phil. 129 (1970).
[54]
Rollo, pp. 13-16.
[55]
112 Phil. 733 (1961).
[56]
Calderon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74696, November 11, 1987, 155 SCRA 531, 539.
[57]
MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 634, 666 (2002). See also Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No.
135830, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 266, 296.
[58]
Carlos v. Sandoval, supra; MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra; Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation,
G.R. No. 163269, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 512, 546.
[59]
Saguid v. Security Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 159467, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 256, 275; Villafuerte v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 134239, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 58, 69.
[60]
Public Estates Authority v. Chu, G.R. No. 145291, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 495, 503; Villafuerte v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 59.
[61]
Exhibits 11-A to 11-C, 12-A to 12-C, 13-A to 13-C, 14-A to 14-C and 15-A to 15-C, envelope of exhibits.
[62]
Rollo, p. 17.
[63]
Id. at 18-21; TSN, March 8, 1994, pp. 56-63.
[64]
CA rollo, pp. 129-130.
[65]
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc., G.R. No. 159831, October 14, 2005,
473 SCRA 151, 162.
[66]
Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagario, G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 236, 241-242.
[67]
There were 15 ticket stubs presented in evidence. Given that Spouses Yu issue three tickets stubs each day of
operation, it follows that the 15 ticket stubs represent sales for five separate days.
[68]
Saguid v. Security Finance, Inc., supra note 59.
[69]
Records, p. 362.
[70]
Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals, supra note 59, at 77.
[71]
MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 57; Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy
Corporation, G.R. No. 153535, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 409, 429; Philippine Commercial International
Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73610, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 29, 36.
[72]
Petition, rollo, pp. 13-16.
[73]
TSN, April 26, 1994, pp. 14-15.
[74]
Carlos v. Sandoval, supra note 57, at 299-300; MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 57, at 667.
[35]