RULE 102 WRIT OF AMPARO

[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA
K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and
living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ
of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto. Slx
[1]

[2]

"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another,

commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and
place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to,
and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in
that behalf."
[3]

It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of

which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause. It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented
from exercising legal custody over another person.
[4]

[5]

The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of

Appeals and its resolution dismissing the application for habeas corpus to
[6]

[8]

[7]

have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce
consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion
of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation
rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from
enforcing the visitation rights.
[9]

The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted
matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and
at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon
Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia
(age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City
a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano
Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment.
[10]

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,

Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She
alleged that respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
[11]

After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
judgment is hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners
manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia
Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or
anywhere in its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorios staff
especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to
Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children,
notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of
contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued
be recalled and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED
DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful
restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."

[12]

Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly
decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues
to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
[13]

there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has
later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom. Jksm
[14]

[15]

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.
[16]

To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty
must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
[17]

[18]

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years
of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful
restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not
request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife
and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not
object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals observed
that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant
questions to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices.
In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he
opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his
family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to

Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and
absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano
Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will
run against his fundamental constitutional right. Es m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights
in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such
right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that
the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or
refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of
a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case
the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do
so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for
lack of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision
of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent
Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148468. January 28, 2003]

ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD

DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
POLICE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL
LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 148769. January 28, 2003]

EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 149116. January 28, 2003]

EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

(THIRD
DIVISION)
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward
Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan
denying his petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash,
and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for
plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees
and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock,
non-profit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose
of providing educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but
deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research and advance
studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.

Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received

on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200
Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson through the latters
assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned
over the said amount to the Foundations treasurer who later deposited it in the
Foundations account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then
President Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal
activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game known
as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of
several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and
petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints
were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-001754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755;
and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus
Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman,
Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-001757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21,
2001. The other respondents likewise filed their respective counteraffidavits. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation
of the complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint resolution
recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others
be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several
Informations against former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from
his post as President of the Republic of the Philippines. One of these
Informations, docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada
with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an amended
Information in said case charging Estrada and several co-accused, including
petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended for the provisional
release of all the accused, including petitioner. The case was raffled to a
special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The
amended Information reads:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by

himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE
EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series
of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as
follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with coaccused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or
less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
[P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur
under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT,
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDERED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50];

AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY

HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT
OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

[1]

On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsmans Joint

Resolution finding probable cause against him for plunder. The next day, April
6, 2001, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation. Petitioner likewise filed on said date,
this time with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in
Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b) To
Conduct a Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accuseds
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the
Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the Charges against accused
Edward Serapio.
[2]

[3]

On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioners

motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since the amended Information charging petitioner with plunder
had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.
[4]

In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April

25, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify the
issuance
of
warrants
of
arrest
for
the
accused,
including
petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the same date
for the arrest of petitioner. When apprised of said order, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National Police Chief
Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at Camp Crame
for said charge.
[5]

The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including

petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on
April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for

Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. For his part, petitioners coaccused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
[6]

During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail,
the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused
earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied
the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition
for bail can and should be heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27,
2001 and even before the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed
their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the
hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21
to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners petition for
bail, the Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail hearings of
Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner
filed a manifestation questioning the propriety of including Joseph Estrada and
Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioners) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the
hearings on petitioners petition for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the
court to resolve the prosecutions pending motions as well as petitioners
motion that his petition for bail be heard as early as possible, which motion the
prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioners April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the
issues posed by petitioner had already been resolved in its April 25, 2001
Resolution finding probable cause to hold petitioner and his co-accused for
trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001
Resolution.
[7]

On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the

attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No.
26558 during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of
cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed
with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused
to participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the
bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
[8]

However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18,
2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the
said bail hearing due to pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew
the hearing to June 26, 2001.
[9]

On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution

denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001
Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because
on said date petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the amended
Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does not
allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended Information to
have been illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth
as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended
Information charges him of bribery and illegal gambling. By way of riposte,
the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed
to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioners
motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his petition for
bail.
[10]

The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on

the petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001
to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the motion to quash of
petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the
pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution, petitioner filed with this
Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court declare void the questioned
orders, resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was
thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise
prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be
declared to have waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his
petition for bail; and, premised on the failure of the People to adduce strong
evidence of petitioners guilt of plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty
on bail after due proceedings.
[11]

Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his
bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioners motion to quash the amended Information. Petitioner, through

counsel, received on said date a copy of said resolution. The motion to fix
bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
[12]

On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558,
petitioner manifested to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion
for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash
and for the deferment of his arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however,
declared that there was no provision in the Rules of Court or in the
Sandiganbayans rules granting the right to petitioner to file a motion for the
reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to
orally argue his motion for reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead,
impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his
motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory allegations
of the amended Information against him do not constitute the crime of plunder;
and that he is charged, under the said amended Information, for more than
one offense. Jose Jinggoy Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with the
Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of a resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayans
Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus
Motion and its June 25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIOS MOTION TO
QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.

A. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a

combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a pattern
of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C. The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended Information and alleged to
have been illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as
defined in Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE.[13]

Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is

charged with plunder only in paragraph (a) which reads:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;[14]

Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the

amended Information of a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as
amended. Neither does the amended Information allege a pattern of criminal
acts. He avers that his single act of toleration or protection of illegal gambling
impelled by a single criminal resolution does not constitute the requisite
combination or series of acts for plunder. He further claims that the
consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks in furtherance of
said resolution turned over to and received by former President Joseph E.
Estrada on several occasions does not cure the defect in the amended
information. Petitioner insists that on the face of the amended Information he
is charged only with bribery or illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of
the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by former President Joseph E. Estrada in
confabulation with his co-accused is not ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section
1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information.[15]
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper
judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of
the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all
the elements of the crime in the Information is to inform an accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
for his defense. Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to
plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The
use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the
offense charged is sufficient.
[16]

[17]

[18]

In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the
accused, including petitioner, connived and conspired with former President
Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder through any or a combination or a series
of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means. And in paragraph (a) of
the amended Information, petitioner and his co-accused are charged with
receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances money in the
aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al., we held that the word series is
synonymous with the clause on several instances; it refers to a repetition of
the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We
further held that the word combination contemplates the commission of at
least any two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that
plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended information charges accused
therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of the same
predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law and that:
[19]

x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances,

money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former

President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the
offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x
x.
[20]

It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt

or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same is
evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence need not be
alleged in the Information.
[21]

The Court also ruled in Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan that the
aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged
in paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten wealth as
contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as amended,
and that all the accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended information
conspired and confederated with former President Estrada to enable the latter
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
of P4,097,804,173.17.
[22]

Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are
charged of having conspired and confabulated together in committing
plunder. When two or more persons conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation of law, the act of the
conspirator is the act of each of them. Conspirators are one man, they
breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law
says that the acts, words and declarations of each, while in the pursuit of the
common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all.
[23]

[24]

Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended Information of

bribery and illegal gambling and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held
that petitioner is not charged with the predicate acts of bribery and illegal
gambling but is charged only with one crime that of plunder:
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION
CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more
than one offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code),
malversation of public funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and
violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.

This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not
charged as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d) thereof does
not make any express reference to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No.
7080, as amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a separate crime any of the
overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of the
combination or series of act are described in their generic sense.Thus, aside from
malversation of public funds, the law also uses the generic terms misappropriation,
conversion or misuse of said fund. The fact that the acts involved may likewise be
penalized under other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as predicate
acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or
to be understood as allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished under the
Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
[25]

This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the
amended Information that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with
one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It
bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and
are not crimes separate and independent of the crime of plunder.Resultantly
then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying his April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion contending that:
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIOS URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION
DATED 31 MAY 2001),NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD
TOTALLY DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE
AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS
AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO.[26]

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of

discretion in denying his omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of

a warrant for his arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause; and to direct the
Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner
asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory
evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion in charging him with
plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable cause to support an
indictment for plunder as against him.
[27]

Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does not
even mention him in relation to the collection and receipt of jueteng money
which started in 1998 and that the Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the
conclusion that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation was a money laundering
front organization put up by Joseph Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even
though the latter presented evidence that said Foundation is a bona fide and
legitimate private foundation. More importantly, he claims, said joint
resolution does not indicate that he knew that the P200 million he received for
the Foundation came from jueteng.
[28]

[29]

[30]

Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1)

the P200 million he received does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in
Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080; (2) there is no evidence linking him to the
collection and receipt of jueteng money; (3) there was no showing that
petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200 million constitutes an overt
criminal act of plunder.
[31]

[32]

[33]

Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on

the absolute lack of evidence to support a finding of probable cause for
plunder as against him, and hence he should be spared from the
inconvenience, burden and expense of a public trial.
[34]

[35]

Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is not

beyond judicial scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily
look into the existence of probable cause to charge a person for an offense in
a given case, it may do so in exceptional circumstances, which are present in
this case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (2) for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; and (4) where
the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for a reinvestigation by
asserting that in issuing the questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman
disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder and
[36]

committed errors of law or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his

interest. He also states that during the joint preliminary investigations for the
various charges against Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the
plunder charge was only one of the eight charges against Estrada et al., he
was not furnished with copies of the other complaints nor given the
opportunity to refute the evidence presented in relation to the other seven
cases, even though the evidence presented therein were also used against
him, although he was only charged in the plunder case.
[37]

[38]

The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse

of discretion in denying petitioners omnibus motion. They assert that since the
Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of
plunder, the Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction over the case and
to proceed to try the same. They further argue that a finding of probable cause
is merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual determination of guilt or
innocence of the accused, and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose
his defenses in a full blown trial where his guilt or innocence may finally be
determined.
[39]

The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners omnibus motion asking for, among
others, a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans joint resolution did not raise the grounds
of either newly discovered evidence, or errors of law or irregularities, which
under Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds upon which a motion for
reconsideration may be filed.
[40]

The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge
petitioner with plunder as a co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada.
[41]

This Court does not agree with petitioner.

Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans
discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs.
Sandiganbayan , the Court ruled:
[42]

x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsmans

discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:
x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in
the conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for filing of information against
the supposed offender.

In Cruz, Jr. vs. People, the Court ruled thus:

[43]

Furthermore, the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly,

in assailing said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave
abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for estafa through falsification of
public documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact here. His arguments
are anchored on the propriety or error in the Ombudsmans appreciation of
facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more
so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither question of
fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is concerned, we
find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by respondents which
would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari.
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and
the Ombudsman for that matter committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing their resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner failed to
discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable cause
against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its
discretion in denying petitioners motion for reinvestigation of the charges
against him in the amendedInformation. In its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that probable cause
exists against petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of plunder, thus:
In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended
Information dated 18 April 2001 charging the accused with the offense of PLUNDER
and examining carefully the evidence submitted in support thereof consisting of the
affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses and several
other pieces of documentary evidence, as well as the respective counter-affidavits of
accused former President Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose Jinggoy
Pimentel Estrada dated February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21,
2001 and Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds
that probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants
of arrest of accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe. a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia
Rajas.
[44]

Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioners omnibus

motion, the Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary investigation was fully
conducted in accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office

of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No.

6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and that all the basic complaints and
evidence in support thereof were served upon all the accused. It was in light
of such findings that the Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the
allegation that accused therein (including petitioner) were deprived of the right
to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsmans Resolution dated April 4, 2001
finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after the conduct of
preliminary investigation in connection therewith. In addition, the
Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsmans resolution, but failed to show in his motion that there were
newly discovered evidence, or that the preliminary investigation was tainted
by errors of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for which a
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans resolution may be granted.
[45]

[46]

It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a

constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of
a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or
otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction
of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information.
If the lack of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information
invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason
can it be said that the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate
the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it
be said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the
opportunity to refute the charges against him during the preliminary
investigation.
[47]

[48]

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether

a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial. As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, [a] finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
[49]

[50]

Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any

other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule
must defer to said officers finding and determination of probable cause, since
the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the
prosecutor. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to
establish that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was
[51]

tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint resolution dated
April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was
necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayans resolution denying
petitioners motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate
petitioners claim that it gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was no
need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
[52]

The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals that an accused shall not be
deemed to have waived his right to ask for a preliminary investigation after he
had been arraigned over his objection and despite his insistence on the
conduct of said investigation prior to trial on the merits does not apply in the
instant case because petitioner merely prayed for a reinvestigationon the
ground of a newly-discovered evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary
investigation had been conducted by the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the
amended Information, and that petitioner had participated therein by filing his
counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had already denied his
motion for reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration thereon
prior to his arraignment. In sum then, the petition is dismissed.
[53]

[54]

Re: G.R. No. 148468

As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the
parties, the issues for resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first
be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; (2)
Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during
the pendency of his petition for bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition
for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused in Criminal Case No.
26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce
evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce
strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5) Whether
petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558
and should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed
a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when it deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned
him on said date and entered a plea of not guilty for him when he refused to
be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
does not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail hearings
since the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard immediately.

Petitioner maintains that his arraignment before the bail hearings are set is
not necessary since he would not plead guilty to the offense charged, as is
evident in his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the Senate
investigation of the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation before
the Ombudsman. Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced even if it
would present all its evidence before his arraignment because, under the
Revised Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt is mitigating only if made
prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, and petitioner
admitted that he cannot repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken during
the bail hearings because Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court
expressly provides that evidence present during bail hearings are
automatically reproduced during the trial. Petitioner likewise assures the
prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a bail bond
should he be granted bail.
[55]

[56]

[57]

[58]

[59]

The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may
be commenced, because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are
joined. The People stress that it is only when an accused pleads not guilty
may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, there would
be no more need for him to file said petition. Moreover, since it is during
arraignment that the accused is first informed of the precise charge against
him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from later
assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not
properly informed of the charge against him, especially considering that,
under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented
during such proceedings are considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
Likewise, the arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the
possibility of an accuseds flight from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because trial in absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he has
been arraigned. The People also contend that the conduct of bail hearings
prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the undeserved privilege of
being appraised of the prosecutions evidence before he pleads guilty for
purposes of penalty reduction.
[60]

[61]

[62]

Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a
plea of not guilty had been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf,
thereby rendering the issue as to whether an arraignment is necessary before
the conduct of bail hearings in petitioners case moot, the Court takes this
opportunity to discuss the controlling precepts thereon pursuant to its
symbolic function of educating the bench and bar.
[63]

The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused

is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A

person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by

virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his
arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
[64]

In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled on the issue of whether
an accused must first be arraigned before he may be granted
bail. Lavides involved an accused charged with violation of Section 5(b)
Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable by reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The accused therein
assailed, inter alia, the trial courts imposition of the condition that he should
first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail.We held therein that in
cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.
[65]

[66]

However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that

the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment,
because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest
or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The Courts
pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the
accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the
informations filed against him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition
the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved,
his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on
bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and
his right to bail.
[67]

[68]

It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the

conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of
right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment.
The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case
involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be
heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such
case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is
not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for
in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the circumstances. In fine,
the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to

excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before

proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion to
quash during the pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a
motion to quash and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed
independently of each other. While he agrees with the prosecution that a
motion to quash may in some instances result in the termination of the
criminal proceedings and in the release of the accused therein, thus rendering
the petition for bail moot and academic, he opines that such is not always the
case; hence, an accused in detention cannot be forced to speculate on the
outcome of a motion to quash and decide whether or not to file a petition for
bail or to withdraw one that has been filed. He also insists that the grant of a
motion to quash does not automatically result in the discharge of an accused
from detention nor render moot an application for bail under Rule 117, Section
5 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[69]

[70]

The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application

of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or
a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under
the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the
provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction
while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier,
a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty
by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
[71]

[72]

[73]

On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which

an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed
against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the Information. An accused may file a motion to
quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment.
[74]

[75]

These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to
each other. Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty
when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such
penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong,
does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging
him with such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash
a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that the same does not
charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is

ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and
academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the
hearings on the petitions for bail of petitioner and accused Jose Jinggoy
Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said case as against
former President Joseph E. Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his
right to have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said
hearings might be converted into a full blown trial on the merits by the
prosecution.
[76]

For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the court
from having to hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the
same evidence where it would allow separate bail hearings for the accused
who are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of plunder.
[77]

In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case
No. 26558 to participate in the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained
that the directive was made was in the interest of the speedy disposition of the
case. It stated:
x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused Serapio
were to be excused from participating in the hearing on the motion for bail of accused
Serapio, under the pretext that the same does not concern them and that they will
participate in any hearing where evidence is presented by the prosecution only if and
when they will already have filed their petitions for bail, or should they decide not to
file any, that they will participate only during the trial proper itself, then everybody
will be faced with the daunting prospects of having to go through the process of
introducing the same witness and pieces of evidence two times, three times or four
times, as many times as there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is
not conducive to the speedy termination of a case. Neither can such procedure be
characterized as an orderly proceeding.
[78]

There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the

Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or
more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an
accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other
accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or
more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of
said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting

to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the State,
including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the witnesses of
both the prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a speedy
trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the cases
and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other
accused. After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United States
Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded
our historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal
prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not become careless or
complacent when that fashion has become rampant over the earth.
[79]

It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe, this Court held that
in a petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing,
meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of
bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that
are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.
[80]

A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of
course avoid duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and the
courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially so if both
movants for bail are charged of having conspired in the commission of the
same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially the same evident against
them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition
for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case against former President Joseph
E. Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the participation of the
former president in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail, the proceeding
assumes a completely different dimension. The proceedings will no longer be
summary. As against former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings
will be a full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail
hearing. Moreover, following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan,
supra where we stated that Jose Jinggoy Estrada can only be charged with

conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended

Information since it is not clear from the latter if the accused in subparagraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with each other to assist Joseph
Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be charged
with having conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-paragraph (a)
by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money x
x x from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling. Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution
needs to adduce to prove that the evidence against him for the charge of
plunder is strong are those related to the alleged receipt or collection of
money from illegal gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information. With the joinder of the hearing of petitioners petition for
bail and the trial of the former President, the latter will have the right to crossexamine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the prosecution in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce evidence
in support of his petition after the prosecution shall have concluded its
evidence, the former President may insist on cross-examining petitioner and
his witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of petitioners bail petition with the
trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it
will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to
obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied
by the respondent court. The indispensability of the speedy resolution of an
application for bail was succinctly explained by Cooley in his
treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
[81]

For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with reasonable
certainty insure the attendance of the accused to answer the accusation, it would not
be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him in a
greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not
determined that he has not committed any crime.
[82]

While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is
empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines
best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,
the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the
petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of former President Joseph E.
Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself
acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the pre-eminent position and
superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the matter of his provisional
liberty resolved without unnecessary delay, only to make a volte face and
declare that after all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose
[83]

[84]

Jinggoy Estrada and the trial as against former President Joseph E. Estrada
should be held simultaneously. In ordering that petitioners petition for bail to
be heard jointly with the trial of the case against his co-accused former
President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and
unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of petitioner.In fine
then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion in ordering
a simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition for bail with the trial of the case
against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioners allegations that the prosecution tried to delay
the bail hearings by filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner
and his co-accused who caused the delay in the trial of Criminal Case No.
26558 by their filing of numerous manifestations and pleadings with the
Sandiganbayan. They assert that they filed the motion for joint bail hearing
and motion for earlier arraignment around the original schedule for the bail
hearings which was on May 21-25, 2001.
[85]

[86]

They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses. In
support thereof, they cite Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which
states that
[87]

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion

perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
[88]

The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provide:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonement, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right, exception.All persons in custody shall be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

[89]

Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely

denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the
judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right

but is discretionary upon the court. Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules
would not have provided for an application for bail by a person charged with a
capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:
[90]

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail
filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of
either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
[91]

Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the evidence
of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the
court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an application for bail by the person
charged with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted, where
the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden of
proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. The
prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it
may deems necessary for this purpose. When it is satisfactorily demonstrated
that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the courts duty to deny the application
for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a
matter of right.
[92]

[93]

[94]

In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this

stage of the proceedings. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to
present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that
the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the
records. The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to
adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be
noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for
petitioners application for bail but the same were reset due to pending
incidents raised in several motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to
be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings.The bail hearing was
eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing
did not push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application for bail is
therefore not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the
prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the
following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:

Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation;
(2) conduct a determination of probable cause as would suggest the issuance of
house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and other
proceedings pending determination of probable cause;

Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;

Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or Service of Warrant
of Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on Recognizance,
dated April 25, 2001;
Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando, Bulacan, dated
May 11, 2001;
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001, praying for
Resolution of May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail hearings be set at the
earliest possible time;
Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or Recognizance, dated May
27, 2001;
Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated
June 13, 2001, praying that he be allowed to file a Motion for
Reinvestigation; and
Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.

[95]

Motions filed by the prosecution:

Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;

[96]

Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose Jinggoy
Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;
[97]

Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion

to Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001; and
[98]

Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and Transcription in Filipino,

dated June 19, 2001.
[99]

The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the aforesaid
delay by their filing of the following motions:

Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy

Estrada, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that
the Amended Information be quashed;
Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that he be (1) excluded from the Amended Information for
lack of probable cause; (2) released from custody; or in the alternative, (3)
be allowed to post bail;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated April 25, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house
arrest during the pendency of the case;
Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;
Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada, praying by
reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of
the case;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, requesting for five (5) within which to respond to the Opposition to
Motion to Quash in view of the holidays and election-related distractions;
Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001,
filed by Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial arrangement, dated May 11,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on
house arrest;
Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada;
Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy
Estrada;

Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
praying that they be allowed to be confined in Tanay;
Motion to charge as Accused Luis Chavit Singson, filed by Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
seeking reconsideration of denial of requests for house arrest, for detention
in Tanay or Camp Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor of San Juan,
Metro Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the resolution compelling them to be present
at petitioner Serapios hearing for bail be reconsidered;
Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada stating that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house
arrest;
Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
waiving their right to be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings
and reserving their right to trial with assessors;
Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest; Production,
Inspection and Copying of Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors,
dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20,
2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, asking for free
dates for parties, claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman,
reiterating request for gag order of prosecution witnesses, availing of
production, inspection and copying of documents, requesting for status of
alias case; and
Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for
permission to attend some municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro Manila.
[100]

Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail
by an accused charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty
to conduct a hearing on said application. The rationale for such requirement
was explained in Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs.
Rapatalo:
[101]

[102]

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly
be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a
proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted
to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal.
[103]

Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until

the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve
the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the
evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is entitled to the issuance of said
writ because the State, through the prosecutions refusal to present evidence
and by the Sandiganbayans refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to
discharge its burden of proving that as against him, evidence of guilt for the
capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution
launched a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to
prevent the conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved for
petitioners arraignment before the commencement of bail hearings and
insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada despite the fact that it was only petitioner who asked for a bail
hearing; manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the
presentation of the evidence in chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be
concluded only after the prosecution presented its entire case upon the
accused; and argued that petitioners motion to quash and his petition for bail
are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only one of
these two remedies. He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its
questioned orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively
denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law.
[104]

[105]

Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new

orders canceling the bail hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot
and academic the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said
orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioners right to bail.
He argues further that the fact that he was arrested and is detained
pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate the efficacy of the remedy
of habeas corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs.
Enrile, where the Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances where
the detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.
[106]

[107]

[108]

However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because
petitioner was arrested pursuant to the amended information which was
earlier filed in court, the warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid,
and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.
[109]

[110]

As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the
person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental instrument
for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action
due to its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes. Thus,
in previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while
initially valid under the law, had later become invalid, andeven though the
persons praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty.
[111]

[112]

[113]

[114]

The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the
same applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of
arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the
Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his
co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued.
[115]

The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile that habeas corpus will lie where the
deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of
subsequent developments finds no application in the present case because
the hearing on petitioners application for bail has yet to commence. As stated
earlier, the delay in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail cannot be pinned
[116]

solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner

himself is partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not
the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail. It cannot be availed
of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the
discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing
to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse
is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is
pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
[117]

[118]

The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but
would also preempt the Sandiganbayans resolution of the pending application
for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the
hearing on his application for bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are
DISMISSED. The resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said
petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2. In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex L of the petition, ordering a
joint hearing of petitioners petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No.
26558 as against former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the
arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001]

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O.

MANCAO, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ,
P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 147781. May 10, 2001]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. ANGELO

Secretary of National Defense, et al., respondents.
[G.R. No. 147799. May 10, 2001]

REYES,

RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ,

GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIR. LEANDRO
MENDOZA and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 147810. May 10, 2001]

THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner, vs. THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ,
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL
DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
R E S O LUTIO N
MELO, J.:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed
with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulting
and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1
directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which
allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were
filed before the Court(1) G.R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an
urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction) filed by Panfilo M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G.R.
No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam
Defensor-Santiago; (3) G.R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed by Rolando A. Lumbao; and (4) G.R. No.
147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino.
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no

basis both in fact an in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered
the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant
petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of
a state of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of
Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the
rebellion. He states that what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and
military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38.Indeed, as stated in respondents Joint
Comments:

[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police
authorities to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts
committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary
investigators will henceforth be conducted.
(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No.
147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p. 16; G.R.
No. 147810, p. 24)
With this declaration, petitioners apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to
rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests
of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on
the declaration of a state of rebellion.
Moreover, petitioners contention in G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (DefensorSantiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies
of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary
investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of court, where he may adduce evidence in his
defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should
remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a
warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided
in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for
delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the
person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without
prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the
Civil Code.Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves

of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Sections 2
and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the
dismissal of the petitions at bar.
G.R. No. 147780

In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino,
and Mancao pray that the appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are
filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the
instant petition is finally resolved. This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date,
no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the
event that the same are later filed, this court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in
accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuance of
a duly issued warrant.
As regards petitioners prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared
null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of
the subject hold departure orders in their petition. The are not even expressing intention to leave
the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its
purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149
[1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.
G.R. No. 147781

The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It

is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the
performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and
complete. Mandamus will not issue the right to relief is clear at the time of the award (Palileo v.
Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time, petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown
that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the
authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant.
G.R. No. 147799

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part,
argues that the declaration of a state of rebellion is violative of the doctrine of separation of

powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional
prerogative to determine or interpret what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of
a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the
governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that
[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,
(G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):

xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides
the absence of testual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
courts. Certain pertinent information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also
prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to
verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon
which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may
be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence
network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential
or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. xxx
(at pp. 22-23)
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been
lifted.
G.R. No. 147810

Petitioner Laban ng Demoktratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires
that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can
be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and

to justify the exercise of the courts remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia,
Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which
would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it
cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members,
and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been
invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner
claiming that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the
declaration of a state of rebellion and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the
Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to
petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section
5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in
G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting
for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required
judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege
of Malacaang.
SO ORDERED.

In the matter of the Petition forHabeas

Corpus of
CEZARI
GONZALES
JULIUS MESA
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO,
Petitioner,
- versus -

and

G.R. No. 170924

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,**
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,

Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff

CHICO-NAZARIO,
of
the
Armed
Forces
of
GARCIA,
thePhilippines and all persons acting
VELASCO, JR. and
in his stead and under his authority,
NACHURA, JJ.
andGEN. ERNESTO DE LEON, in
his capacity as the Flag Officer in
Command of the Philippine Navy, and
Promulgated:
all persons acting in his stead and
under his authority,
July 4, 2007
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 which
dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Roberto Rafael Pulido
(Pulido) in behalf of Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, and imposed on petitioner
the penalty of censure,and its Resolution[2] dated 6 January 2006 denying his
motion for reconsideration.
The facts are not disputed.
At around one oclock in the morning of 27 July 2003, three hundred twentyone (321) junior officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) entered and took over the premises of the Oakwood Premiere
Luxury Apartments (Oakwood) located at the Glorietta Complex, Ayala Avenue,
Makati City. They disarmed the security guards of said establishment and planted
explosives in its immediate surroundings.
The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their
grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

(President Arroyo).They declared their withdrawal of support from the

Commander-in-Chief of the AFP President Arroyo and demanded her resignation
and that of the members of her cabinet and top officers of both the AFP and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
At about one oclock in the afternoon, President Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 427 declaring the country to be under a state of rebellion. Consequently, she
issued General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and the PNP to carry out all
reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and
quell the rebellion.
After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the government
negotiators, the former agreed to return to barracks, thus ending the occupation of
Oakwood.
Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales
and Julius Mesa, both enlisted personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in their behalf
that the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed before the Court of Appeals.
On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L. Abaya issued a
directive[3] to all Major Service Commanders and to the Chief of the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) regarding the Custody of
Military Personnel Involved in the 27 July 2003 Mutiny. On the strength thereof,
Gonzales and Mesa were taken into custody by their Service Commander.
Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of
the Articles of War. They were, however, among the soldiers charged before
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, with the crime
of Coup Detat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Said case
entitled, People v. Capt. Milo D.Maestrecampo, et al. was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 03-2784. On 18 November 2003, a Commitment Order was issued by the
RTC committing custody of the persons of Gonzales and Mesa to the Commanding
Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite City.[4]

On 8 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were discharged[5] from military

service.
On 16 December 2003, per order of the RTC, Criminal Case No. 03-2784
was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678 entitled, People v. Ramon B.
Cardenaspending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City, on the ground that
the cases are founded on the same facts and/or formed part of a series of offenses
of similar character.[6]
In
a
Manifestation
and
Motion
dated
3
March
2004,
Commodore Normando Naval, Commander of Naval Base Cavite, asked the
Makati RTC, Branch 148, to relieve him of his duty as custodian of Gonzales and
Mesa and that the latter be transferred to the Makati City Jail. [7] In an Order dated
29 April 2004, the RTC relieved him of his duty but ordered the transfer of
Gonzales and Mesa from the Naval Base Cavite in Sangley Point, Cavite City, to
the
Philippine
Marine
Brigade
Headquarters,
Philippine
Marine,
FortBonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the custody of the Commander of the
Marine Brigade of the Philippine Marines, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.[8]
In an Order dated 8 July 2004, the RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed
by the accused-soldiers. It admitted Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other coaccused to bail pegging the amount thereof at P100,000.00 each.[9]
On 19 July 2004, both Gonzales and Mesa posted bail.[10] On 20 July 2004,
the RTC issued orders directing the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine
Corps, FortBonifacio, Makati City, to release Gonzales and Mesa from his custody.
[11]
Despite said orders and their service to the marines, Gonzales and Mesa were
not released.
On 21 July 2004, the People of the Philippines moved for partial
reconsideration[12] of the order granting bail. Prior to the resolution of said
motion, Jovencito R. Zuo, Chief State Prosecutor, advised Brig. Gen. Manuel

F. Llena, Judge Advocate General, to defer action on the provisional release of

Gonzales and Mesa until the Motion for Reconsideration shall have been resolved
and attained finality.[13] On 26 October 2004, the RTC denied the motion for partial
reconsideration.
With the denial of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed
with the Court of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, asking
for the nullification and setting aside of the orders dated 8 July 2004 and 26
October 2004 of Judge Oscar B. Pimentel for having been issued without
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari was raffled to the Seventh Division and
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Hon.
Oscar B. Pimentel, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 148. The Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) did not issue a TRO and/or
preliminary injunction.
Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas
Corpus[14] was filed by petitioner Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 and raffled to the Third Division. In
support thereof, it was argued that since Gonzales and Mesa are no longer subject
to Military Law as they had been discharged from the service on 8 December 2003,
and since they are not charged before a court martial, the military authorities have
no jurisdiction to detain them, and there is no legal ground to detain them further
because a court order for their release had already been issued.
On 10 August 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) issued a Writ
of Habeas Corpus directing respondents Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and all persons acting in his stead and under his
authority, and Gen. Ernesto de Leon, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine
Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, to produce the

bodies of Gonzales and Mesa before the Court and to appear and show the cause
and validity of their detention.[15]
On 18 August 2005, a return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was made.
[16]
Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily
on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified
because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8
July 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7 th Division of
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440; and (2) petitioner is
guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order
granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before
its 7th Division.
On 9 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (7th Division) rendered its
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 88440 dismissing the petition that questioned the
propriety of the granting of bail to Gonzales, Mesa, and twenty-five of their coaccused.[17]
On 12 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) dismissed the
Petition for Habeas Corpus for violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court. It ratiocinated:
A reading of the parties submissions reveals a threshold issue the charge
of forum shopping and the related falsity in the certification supporting
the petition. We must initially resolve these issues because a finding that
the petitioner violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court can lead to
the outright dismissal of the present petition. x x x
xxxx
The records show that the present petition contained the following
certificate of non-forum shopping:
I, ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, with office address at
Unit 1601, 16th Floor 139 Corporate Center Valero Street,

Makati City, after having been duly sworn in accordance

with law, do hereby state that:
1.

I am the petitioner in the above-captioned case;

2.

I have read the Petition and caused it to be

prepared. All the contents thereof are true to my own
personal knowledge and the record;

3.

I have not heretofore commenced any action or

proceeding involving the same issues, in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency and to the best of my knowledge,
no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; except for the related cases ofEugene
Gonzales et al. vs. Gen. Narciso Abaya, et al., G.R.
No. 164007 and Humabono Adaza et al., vs. Gen.
Pedro Cabuay et al., G.R. No. 160792, both
awaiting the resolution of the Supreme Court.

5.

(sic, should be 4) If I should learn of any similar

action or proceeding filed or is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, I undertake to report such fact
within five (5) days therefrom to this Court.

The present petition and its accompanying certification likewise show

that the petitioner never mentioned the pendency before the Seventh
Division of this Court of the certiorari case, SP 88440, for the annulment
of the lower courts order granting the soldiers-accuseds petition for bail,
when this same lower court order is cited as basis for the immediate
release of Gonzales and Mesa in the present petition. All that the
certification mentioned were the related cases pending before the
Honorable Supreme Court. Neither did the petitioner comply with his
undertaking under his certification to inform this Court within five (5)
days of the pendency of any similar action or proceeding filed or is
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, as in fact the certiorari case was already pending with
this Court when the present petition was filed. The certiorari case was

only brought to our attention after the respondents filed their Return of
the Writ.
To be sure, the petitioner, who is also the counsel for the accused
Gonzales and Mesa in the criminal case before Branch 148 RTC Makati
City and who represents Gonzales and Mesa as private respondents in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88440, cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of the
certiorari case. Why he deliberately kept the pendency of the certiorari
case hidden from us, has not been sufficiently explained. We have no
doubt, however, that his deliberate act of withholding information on a
material fact directly required to be disclosed by the Rules of Court
cannot but have legal consequences.
The primary basis of the present petition is the bail granted to and posted
by Gonzales and Mesa. This is very clear from the petitioners argument
that The continued detention of the enlisted personnel constitutes
violation of the lawful orders of the civilian court. He cited in support of
this argument the grant and the posting of the bail, and the issuance of
the release orders by the lower court. He did not disclose, however, what
subsequently happened to the order granting bail. He deliberately
omitted in his narration the fact that the People moved to reconsider this
order.Thus, he gave the impression that the order granting bail
immediately became enforceable and that Gonzales and Mesas continued
detention is illegal because their constitutional rights to bail, which have
received judicial imprimatur, were continuously being violated by the
respondents.
The petitioner next omitted the fact that after the denial of its motion for
reconsideration of the order granting bail, the People filed the certiorari
case before this Court, seeking to annul the lower courts order. While we
are aware of the rule that the mere pendency of a petition for certiorari
will not prevent the implementation of the assailed order unless the court
where the petition was filed issues either a temporary restraining order
or a writ or preliminary injunction the filing of a petition for habeas
corpus while the order granting bail is being questioned on a petition for
certiorari raises issues beyond the immediate execution of the lower
courts bail and release orders. They raise questions on the propriety of
filing the habeas corpus petition to seek the release of persons under
detention, at the same time that a petition regarding their continued
detention and release are pending. Apparently, the petitioner wanted to
avoid these questions, prompting him to actively conceal the subsequent

motion for reconsideration of the bail order and the petition for certiorari
directly questioning this same order. In short, the petitioner
conveniently omitted in his narration of facts the material factual
antecedents detrimental to his cause; he chose to narrate only the
factual antecedents favorable to his cause.
That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari
case is beyond doubt as they involve two sides of the same coin. The
certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the release of
Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower courts grant of bail. The
present petition, on the other hand, was filed in behalf of Gonzales
and Mesa to secure their immediate release because the order granting
bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement
through a petition for habeas corpus the provisional release from
detention that the lower court has ordered. The question this immediately
raises is: can this be done through a petition for habeas corpus when the
validity of the grant of bail and the release under bail are live questions
before another Division of this Court?
We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is
precisely the reason why the rule against forum shopping has been put in
place. The remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i.e., the
release of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured through
separately-filed cases where issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose
rulings may conflict with one another. To be sure, we clearly heard the
petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the effectiveness of
our ruling in this petition will depend on the nature and tenor of the
ruling in the certiorari case; there is no basis for a release on habeas
corpus if this same Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of
bail is improper. For this very same reason, we should not entertain the
present petition as the matter before us is already before another coequal body whose ruling will be finally determinative of the issue of
Gonzales and Mesas release. The Decision of the Seventh Division of
this Court, heretofore footnoted, ordering the release on bail of Gonzales
and Mesa drives home this point.
To be strictly accurate, the issues of detention and immediate release that
are now before the two Divisions of this Court are likewise properly
within the jurisdiction of the lower court who has original jurisdiction
over the criminal case and who has issued the order granting bail in the
exercise of this jurisdiction. If indeed there is a question relating to the

immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa pursuant to the lower courts

order pending the determination of the certiorari issues, such question
should be brought before the lower court as the tribunal that has ordered
the release, or before the Seventh Division of this Court in the exercise
of its supervisory powers over the lower court. The Decision recently
promulgated by the Seventh Division of this Court ordering the release
on bail of the soldiers-accused effectively demonstrates this point.
The inter-relationships among the criminal case below, the certiorari case
and the present petition, as well as among the courts where these cases
are pending, show beyond doubt that the petitioner committed forum
shopping in the strict sense of that term i.e., the attempt by a party, after
an adverse opinion in one forum, to seek a favorable opinion in another
forum other that through an appeal or certiorari. The adverse aspect for
the petitioner, while not an opinion, is no less adverse as he has failed to
secure the release of Gonzales and Mesa before the lower court and
before this Court in the certiorari case (as of the time of the filing of the
present petition); thus, he came to us in the present petition. That the
Seventh Division of this Court has ordered the release on bail of the
soldiers-accused, thus rendering the present petition moot and academic
after the finality of the 7 th Division Decision, plainly demonstrates this
legal reality.[18]

The Court further imposed on petitioner the penalty of censure for the
aforesaid violation. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition
for violation of and pursuant to Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioner, Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido, is hereby CENSURED for these
violations. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Honorable Supreme Court,
to be attached to the petitioners record as a member of the Bar, as aRECORD OF
CENSURE that may be referred to and considered in any future similar act.[19]

On 5
September
2005,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
[20]
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals (Special Former Third Division)
denied in its resolution[21] dated 6 January 2006.
Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND
OF FORUM SHOPPING.
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF
THE ACTION AND LIMITED ITSELF TO THE ISSUE OF
FORUM SHOPPING.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONER THE
PENALTY OF CENSURE.
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON THE EXISTENCE
OR ABSENCE OF VALID GROUNDS TO DETAIN
JULIUS MESA AND CEZARI GONZALES.

Petitioner prays that the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals be
reversed and set aside, and an order be issued ordering respondents to immediately
release Gonzales and Mesa. He further prays that the censure against him be also
reversed and set aside.
Before respondents could comment on the petition, petitioner filed, with
leave of court, a Motion to Withdraw the Prayer for the Immediate Release of
Julius Mesa and Cezari Gonzales.[22] Petitioner informed the Court that the
Commanding General of the Philippine Marines had ordered the release of
Gonzales and Mesa and surrendered their persons to the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 148. Thus, Mesa and Gonzales are now enjoying temporary liberty by
virtue of the release orders dated 20 July 2004 issued by the RTC. Petitioner asks
that the prayer for the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa be dismissed but
asks that the other prayers in the petition be granted.
In its comment, the Solicitor General stressed that the habeas corpus petition
has been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of Mesa and
Gonzales from detention and, in the absence of an actual case or controversy, it is
impractical to consider and resolve issues involving the validity or legality of their

detention, including the alleged refusal of the Court of Appeals to resolve said
issues.
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic.[23] With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the
Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no
actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not
determine a moot question. Where the issues have become moot and academic,
there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of the
same of no practical value.[24] This Court will therefore abstain from expressing its
opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.[25]
The only remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) Is petitioner guilty of
forum shopping? (2) Should petitioner be penalized when he failed to inform the
3rd Division of the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the Petition
for Certiorari filed by respondents before the 7th Division of the same court which
asked for the annulment of the RTCs order granting Gonzales and Mesas petition
for bail?
To support his contention that there was no forum shopping, petitioner
asserts that the issues in the petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus are not
similar/identical. As to his non-disclosure of respondents filing of the motion for
reconsideration and the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner claims that the same has
no legal relevance to the Petition for Habeas Corpus because at the time he filed
said petition, the order granting bail subsisted and has not been reversed or
modified; and no TRO or injunction has been issued that would affect the efficacy
or validity of the order granting the bail and the order directing the release of Mesa
and Gonzales.
For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition
for Certiorari that questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is
precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner is guilty of
forum shopping.

It has been held that forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and
possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping
(1) when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; OR (2) if, after he has filed
a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files a motion before the Court of
Appeals, since in such a case, he deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even in
one case in which a particular allowable remedy sought for is dismissed, another
case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open; OR (3) where a party attempts
to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain the same
from the original court.[26]
The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated
the rule against forum shopping, as where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other. Stated differently, there must be between the two cases: (a) identity of
parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[27]
As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by
petitioner in both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales
and Mesa.Petitioner should not have filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because
the relief he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for in
the certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to whether
Gonzales and Mesa should be released on bail. Because of the presence of the
elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the
same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be
binding on the habeas corpus case petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping.

For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the pendency of

the certiorari case, petitioner clearly violated his obligation to disclose within five
days the pendency of the same or a similar action or claim as mandated in Section
5(c), Rule 7[28] of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 dated 12 September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175864

June 8, 2007

ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA, petitioner,

vs.
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY and THE PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 58, Cebu City, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petition praying for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam who was detained in the Cebu City
Jail for alleged violation of Section 5, Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts are as follows:
In the first week of July 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Regional Office VII,
received information that Adam was engaged in illegal drug trafficking activities in Cebu City and
neighboring cities and municipalities. After evaluating the information, Police Chief Inspector
Josefino Ligan, PDEA VII Asst. Regional Director for Administration/Operation, together with FO1
Rayford A. Yap and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao, planned an entrapment operation.
The events leading to the arrest of Adam, as summarized in the Resolution of the Department of
Justice dated November 10, 2006, are as follows:
On July 7, 2006, at about 2:00 P.M., Yap and Tuliao were able to contact the informant and
inquired from him if he was really sincere with his words and the latter replied affirmatively.
Ligan immediately composed a team and planned for an entrapment operation against
respondent and her cohorts. A short briefing was conducted where Yap was tasked to
receive the shabu while Tuliao would be the back up and at the same time the arresting
officer. They prepared a Pre-Operation Report and the same was coordinated with the
Tactical Operation Center of Cebu City Police Office. The pre-arranged signal in the
operation was that Yap would miscall them once the transaction is consummated. x x x

On or about 9:30 P.M. of the same day, the team, including Yap, Tuliao and the informant,
proceeded to Fuente Osmea, Cebu City for the said purpose. Upon arrival thereat, Yap and
the informant proceeded to Pizza Hut while Tuliao stayed behind near the parking area and
so with the members of the team closely watching them. When Yap and the informant
entered Pizza Hut, respondent was already there waiting for them. They immediately
approached her and the informant introduced Yap to respondent as his former customer.
They had a short conversation and Yap asked respondent if she has with her the item.
Respondent told him that it is in her car at the parking area. Respondent asked where the
money is. Yap told her no problem as long as she has the item, he will give her the money.
Respondent instructed Yap to go with her at the parking area so that she could give it to him
and there, she got inside her car. She took the shabu inside the compartment of her Toyota
Fortuner with plate number YCX 965 and handed to him one (1) packed medium size of heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet filled with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu.
Upon receiving the said item, Yap pressed it to determine if it was really shabu or not and
when he noticed that it was shabu, he immediately miscalled the members of the team
informing them that the transaction was consummated and subsequently held respondent.
He then introduced himself as PDEA 7 operative. Tuliao, who was just at the side of the car,
assisted Yap in apprehending the suspect. They also seized her cellular phone and the
Toyota Fortuner which she used in delivering and transporting illegal drugs. Thereafter, they
informed her that she is under arrest for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165 and
likewise apprised her of the Miranda Doctrine in the language she knew and understood but
she opted to remain silent. After which, they asked her name and she introduced herself as
Lovely Adam y Impal, 29 years old, married, businesswoman and a resident of Celiron, Iligan
City. They brought her along with the confiscated items to their office for proper disposition.
Later on, they found out that the item that Yap bought from respondent, marked "LA" dated
07-07-06 with Yaps signature, weighing 50.27 grams which was submitted before the PNP
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, yielded positive results for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a dangerous drug.
Respondent denies the charge against her. She claims that she is a trader of ready to wear
clothing. As such, she frequently travels to different Asian countries to buy goods for sale in
Cebu and in Mindanao. She supplies various boutiques in Cebu City, including Salad
Dressing at SM, D. Blaz., Beauty Land and Lovelys Closet. She also operates a beauty
parlor in Talamban.
Respondent claims that on July 7, 2006, at around 10:00 in the evening, she was at Pizza
Hut, Fuente Osmea Boulevard, together with her four children and their "yayas". A friend of
hers, Ana, had called her earlier in the day saying that she would pay off her loan to her
(respondent) at Pizza Hut that evening. Ana arrived a short time later. They were eating
when Ana received a call over her cellphone. From the gist of it, Ana was talking to a certain
Rose. Respondent did not mind them because the conversation was only between Ana and
Rose. A short time later, a woman, who was introduced to her by Ana as a certain Rose,
arrived. Ana and Rose then proceeded to talk with each other, and respondent did not mind
them. A while after, respondent saw Ana hand over a parcel to Rose, and the latter, on the
other hand, hand a green bag to Ana. Rose then left. As respondent was about to leave, Ana
requested that she be allowed to hitch a ride and respondent agreed. When they were

outside, respondent noticed a vehicle blocking her car, making it impossible for her to back
out into the road, without hitting the car. She then beeped her car. Instead of moving their
car, one of the men went down and thereafter, entered her vehicle and demanded for the
bag that was allegedly given to Ana by Rose. Respondent told them to ask Ana since they
claimed that it was given to Ana. However, the men pointed their guns at respondent,
including her children, claiming that they were elements of PDEA and they were placing her
under arrest for illegal drug trafficking. They then grabbed respondents green bag and from
then on, she was never able to recover the contents thereof, including the bag itself.
Thereafter, respondent was brought to the PDEA office where a certain Ryan Rubi was also
booked for alleged drug trafficking. During her conversation with Ryan Rubi, she found out
that he was arrested a few hours earlier likewise by the PDEA, and during his alleged arrest,
he was required to produce a drug trafficker in exchange for his release. Having been unable
to produce any, he was charged. The name of Rose cropped up, and he said that during his
arrest, the police officers informed him that they were after Rose. His wife was out to raise
money for his release, or to produce a drug trafficker so that he can be released. It was
further ascertained by Ryan Rubi that this Rose was actually arrested by the police officers
but was conditionally released on condition that she would produce someone who would
take her place. Thereafter, he claimed that he overheard them refer to a certain Ana, who
said that she would also produce respondent to take her place. The circumstances of
respondents arrest and that of the said Ryan Rubi are closely intertwined. In the police
blotter, the vehicle pertaining to respondent, which is the Toyota Fortuner was ascribed to
Ryan Rubi, while the latters vehicle was ascribed to her. x x x 1
The inquest prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City
Prosecutor. Consequently, an information charging Adam with violation of Section 5, Article 2 of R.A.
No. 9165 was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-77562 before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 58.
On petition for review before the Department of Justice, Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez found no
probable cause to hold Adam liable for the offense charged, to wit:
A very thorough and careful scrutiny of the records, particularly the affidavit of arrest, reveals
that no payment was ever made by the police officers for the supposed object of the buybust operations. The police officers have not even alleged in their affidavits that payment
was made to respondent in exchange for the shabu. No buy-bust money was ever
presented. The certificate of inventory does not show any buy-bust money. These stick out
like a sore thumb in the case at bar.
Suffice it to say that one of the essential elements to be established in the prosecution of the
drug "buy-bust" cases, that is, "the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore" is
wanting. It was aptly said in the case of People v. Alilin, 206 SCRA 773, that: "To sustain a
conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the same must be clearly and unmistakably
established."2
The Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to withdraw the information. 3 PDEA
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary on December 8, 2006. 4

In his Comment, Judge Gabriel T. Ingles, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 58, stated that at the hearing of the motion to withdraw information on January 5, 2007, it
was found that:
In the affidavit of FO1 Rayford A. Yap and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao, there is indeed no mention
of their preparation of a buy bust money before, during or after their briefing prior to the
alleged buy bust operation, nor is there any mention of the price or consideration of the sale.
What is merely stated is that they had enough money.
xxxx
Further convincing this court that there was no buy bust money prepared are the following:
a) In the "Pre-Operation Report" dated July 7, 2006, bearing Control Number 07-072006-03, there is no mention of the buy-bust money in the operational requirements;
b) In the "Excerpt From the Records of the PDEA 7 Blotter/Logbook bearing the
same date and entry number 02422;
c) In another "Excerpt From the Records of the PDEA 7 Blotter/Logbook bearing the
same date and entry number 02422 there is a mention in "Facts of the Case" the
recovery of "3 bundles of boodle money with two (2) pieces of genuine five hundred
peso bills wrapped with newspaper and packed with packaging tape." However,
while the name of the suspect is indicated in this excerpt is Lovely Adam y Impal and
the evidence enumerated are as follows:
1) one (1) medium size of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet filled with
crystalline substance believed to be shabu;
2) one (1) unit Nokia cellphone;
3) one (1) unit Toyota Fortuner with plate number XCX 956 registered under
the name of Lovely Adam;"
the narration of the facts of the case in said excerpt also included the following statement:
"Likewise, the apprehending officers seized one (1) unit cellular phone (Sony Erickson) and
the Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number GHC color black registered under the name of
Roberto Rubi, which was used by the aforementioned suspects in transporting illegal drugs."
This Roberto Rubi could not have been arrested together with accused herein because there
is no mention of such fact in the Affidavit of Officers Yap and Tuliao.
In fact, the head of the arresting team of herein accused Josefino D. Liga[n] filed a Motion to
Withdraw Said Excerpt because there was an inadvertent interchange of facts in another
case obviously against Mr. Rubi.

The problem, however, is that from the Excerpts presented, it is not clear to this court to
which case the mention of boodle money applies. This court cannot merely assume or
conclude that the boodle money has reference to the case of herein accused because as
stated, nowhere in the separate affidavits of office[r]s Tuliao and Yap can one find any
mention of such. It is not even mentioned in the other "Excerpt" also dated July 10, 2006 also
submitted by the PDEA.5
Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged, Judge Ingles issued an Order on
January 26, 2007 granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the
accused, unless otherwise held for another valid ground. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
Accordingly, the "Motion to Withdraw Information" is hereby GRANTED and the accused is
ordered immediately released unless another valid ground exists for her continued detention.
The prosecution and/or PDEA are/is ordered to turn over to this court within three (3) days
from receipt hereof the dangerous drug described in the information which shall in turn be
confiscated in favor of the state for proper disposition unless the prosecution intends to refile
or file another case against the accused which it deems appropriate as double jeopardy has
not attached.
SO ORDERED.6
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and
to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas
corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.7
In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon order of the trial judge on
January 26, 2007. Therefore, the petition has become moot.8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169482

January 29, 2008

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed

by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions2 dated February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180 denying the petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia E.
Rodriguez, filed by petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well as his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental
health and deteriorating cognitive abilities.4 She was living with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000.
He acted as her guardian.
In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took
Eufemia from petitioner Veluz house. He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but
these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a
petition for habeas corpus5 in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents
(the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He
also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian.
Thus, in a resolution dated February 2, 2005,6 the Court of Appeals denied his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. 7 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court
should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There
is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. The writ of habeas corpus is available not
only if the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the person entitled thereto but also if
the person who disappears or is illegally being detained is of legal age and is not under
guardianship. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody
of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of
liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the
court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
In their comment, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her
deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption, respondent Luisa was Eufemias halfsister8 while respondent Teresita was Eufemias niece and petitioners sister.9
Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the
other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other
household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the "encargado" or administrator of the
properties of Eufemia as well as those left by the deceased Maximo. As such, he took charge of
collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of
Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.
In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the
properties entrusted to petitioner. These demands were unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the
respondents were compelled to file a complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City. Consequently, and by reason of their mothers deteriorating health,
respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. The latter willingly went with
them. In view of all this, petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the
illegality of respondents action.
We rule for the respondents.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from
the one entitled thereto.10 It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being
prevented from exercising legal custody over another person.11 Thus, it contemplates two instances:
(1) deprivation of a persons liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2)
withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.
In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from
petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty. Significantly, although petitioner
admits that he did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents
themselves have no right to her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What
is important is Eufemias personal freedom.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must
be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. 12
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of
liberty. "The writ of habeas corpuswas devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ ofhabeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient."13(emphasis supplied)
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty.14 If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause
of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists.15 If the alleged cause is thereafter found to
be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. 16 Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory
operation on the filing of the petition.17 Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be
clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the
writ.18 It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted.19 If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the
applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 20

In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her
liberty. It found that she was not:
There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty by
respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by
respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being Eufemias adopted children, are taking
care of her.21 (emphasis supplied)
The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb this finding. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

THE
SECRETARY
OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES
OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 180906

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

RAYMOND MANALO and

REYNALDO MANALO,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
October 7, 2008
x- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world
behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of
their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its
protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first
petition for a writ ofamparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 19[1] of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and
set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court
of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled Raymond Manalo and
Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief
of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents.
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO)[2] filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein
petitioners) onAugust 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents)
and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective
Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders,
and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) [3] of the
1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution
dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons
acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them
from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing,
abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as
guaranteed under Article III, Section 1[4] of the 1987 Constitution.[5]
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition,
to
Admit
Supporting
Affidavits,
and
to
Grant
Interim
and
Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition
for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 26[6] of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the

writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period
provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be
granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed
for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing,
render judgment as required in Sec. 18[7] of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just
and equitable reliefs.[8]
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a
petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents
requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written
return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We
REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the
petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in
accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. [9]
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE
AMPARO is GRANTED.

OF

THE

WRIT

OF

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP

CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from
notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those
already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of
M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days
from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and
charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines
prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and
(sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from
February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice
of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and
oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the
latters authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the
sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as
alleged by herein respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before
February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the
CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San
Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed
of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by
the barangay hall.[11]
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts,
fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him
if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not
Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the
stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to
the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to
the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but
three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.[12]
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de
la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz, and Pula de la Cruz, who all acted as
lookout.They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he
also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and
Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.[13]
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was
blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took
him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who
drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about

40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and
abducted him was Ganata. He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another
one of his abductors was George who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30
years old.[14]
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and
made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he
recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldos. The van
stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo
were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open,
Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the
head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15
minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymonds) room and it was
his (Raymonds) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if
he was a member of the New Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was
hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how
many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each
time he answered none, they hit him.[15]
In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high officials as the
soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them sir, and treat them with
respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw
their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that
the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One
of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead
of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and
family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents
abduction.[16] While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not
manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the
guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond
was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.[17]
On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived while Raymond was
sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his
stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol,
punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning
wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they

stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before
their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day
and kill him.[18]
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get
drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still
awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand
from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and
firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his
chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia
ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked
where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.
[19]
He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run
away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to
another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed
repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on
him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly called, saying that she wanted to
see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was
returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.[20]
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds
were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed,
particularly when respondents guards got drunk.[21]
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a
room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1
x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels,
bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people[22] had been detained
in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.[23]
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained
in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a
kitchen. One room was made into thebartolina. The house was near the firing
range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They
were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the DTU.[24]

At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body
and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were
feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were
aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white
arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including
orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of
respondents urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their
medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were
sent through the master of the DTU, Master Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at
Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met
a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and
take care of them.[25]
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with
Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in
Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks
in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there,
Raymond was beaten up by Hilarios men.[26]
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel,
Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside
the compound of Kapitan for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang,
Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball
court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already
waiting, seated. He was about two arms length away from respondents. He began
by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the
affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He
then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen.
Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that
Gen. Palparan was an evil man.[27]
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba
natatakot sa akin?
Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na

mabuhay, bastat sundin nyo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa
magulang mo huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at
sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat
sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre
na sumuko na sa gobyerno.[28]
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could
not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the formers men
- the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents
house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo
because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers,
Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid,
Raymonds parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymonds parents that if they
continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children
again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.[29]

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to

leave. He was talking with the four masters who were there: Arman, Ganata,
Hilario and Cabalse.[30] When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He
was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan
told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left
for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and
would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the
side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance.
[31]
During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.[32]
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen.
Palparan. The medicine, named Alive, was green and yellow. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one
capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The
Alive made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.
[33]

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at
Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce
himself as Oscar, a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in

Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him
from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.[34]
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under
the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white
vehicle.Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute
ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the
barracks.[35]
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside
the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the
Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also
ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn
Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of
the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had
been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home
and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was
made to do the laundry.[36]
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his
arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and
Manuel were put in the room with Allan whose name they later came to know as
Donald Caigas, called master or commander by his men in the 24 th Infantry
Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times,
Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the
daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were
threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.[37]
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the
detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue
along their renewed life. Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents
were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However,
their parents had already left forManila. Respondents were brought back
to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November
2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name Oscar and holding
himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the
24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.[38]

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel,
were transferred to a camp of the 24 th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There
were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some
soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom
Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their
guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all
made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.[39]
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some
other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers
of the NPA.They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he
witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed
because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members
in his house.[40] Another time, in another Operation Lubog, Raymond was brought
to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the
old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his
son right before Raymonds eyes.[41]
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to
Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with
them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five
detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May
8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.[42]
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond,
Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the
camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na
kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng
silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig,
walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa
mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at
itoy sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga
unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng
kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga
bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang

Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na
binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng
sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila
iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa
kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga
bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong
sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain
ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas
sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel
dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala
siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog
na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o
ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong
sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3
o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay
dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o
hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami
kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw
naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama
na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong
buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami
kinakadena.[43]
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to
Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told
respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the
food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot
adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and

were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo)
and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.[44]
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where
they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00
or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00
each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted
to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to
him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had
saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in
one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted
respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents house did not have
electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the
evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At
about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the
guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the
highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a
bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.[45]
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymonds affidavit
insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that
when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of
his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers
he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond
attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and
told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With
a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he
could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang,
Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal
Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous
area. He was instructed to use the name Rodel and to represent himself as a
military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along
Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del

Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was
also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of Alive in different
houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle.Reynaldo was
blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once
outside
the
province. In
one
of
their
trips,
they
passed
by Fort Magsaysay and CampTecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board,
Welcome to Camp Tecson.[46]
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected
with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights
violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an
NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He
first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical
examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were
consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The
examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents
escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took
photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in
conducting the examination.[47]
Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged abduction and torture. In
compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return
of the Writ ofAmparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement
therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time
arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared
or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in
the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners parents before
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 th Infantry Battalion; Maj.
Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7 th Infantry Division in
Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael
dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a
return of the writ On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party

respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding

General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic)
Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7 th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva
Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their
personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision
dated June 27, 2007, it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any
capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held
that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo
brothers and ordered them to release the latter.[48]

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent
(herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed
office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers
alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military
directional operations, neither does he undertake command directions
of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP
operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National
Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the
Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of
the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable
Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to
institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of
the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance
Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I
have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP
that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event
the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any
members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may
aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning

the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the
death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. [49]

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit,
attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of
therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive,
he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the
AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the
result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct
of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching
Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding
General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO
24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX 3 of this
Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to
be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo
has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to
another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the
instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the
Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest
efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances

of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military

personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the
commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted
by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the
process.[50]
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe
Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another amparo case
in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among
others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the
24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went
to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward
incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the
24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24 th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further
inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding
the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was
reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1 st Lt. Romeo Publico to
inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a
detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel
Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse
was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to
detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino.[51]

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the
affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured
in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.[52]
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col.
Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based
in FortMagsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this
Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a

portion of Pangasinan.[53] The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry
Division.[54]
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of
the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran, [55] through his Assistant Chief
of Staff,[56]to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU
auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la
Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; exCAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He
was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.[57] Jimenez testified that this
particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual
procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of
the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was
happening within his territorial jurisdiction.[58]
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them
execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.[59] The
investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.
[60]
The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual
sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn
statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses
summoned and investigated[61] as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was
only to investigate the six persons.[62]
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.[63] The six persons
were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them. [64] During
the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the
Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons.[65]
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their
statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power
failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of
their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.[66] When the
Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his

investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and
finished it on June 1, 2006.[67] He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of
Personnel.[68]
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenezs Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for
their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and
REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14
February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly
disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case
for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela
Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29
May 2006 in (Exhibit B) states that he was at Sitio Mozon,
Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete
building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some
neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being
informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he
was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because
he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the
Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject
vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of
said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti
dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit C) states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA
member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He
claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are
active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their
elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader
operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of
the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he
claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the

concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims

further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day
(15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo
Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about
the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a
member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit O) states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based
at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much
aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also
knew their elder brother KUMANDER BESTRE TN: Rolando
Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006,
he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his
aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in
their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated
him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge
against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA
Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated
him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in
(Exhibit E) states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat,
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to
him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them
since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February
2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He
claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he
was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being
abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only
reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those
people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary
execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo
who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA
BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that
incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in

(Exhibit F) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based
at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims
further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he
vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two
(2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached
him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely
fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his
brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit G) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and
a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for
twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or
sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo
@ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of
the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the
construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only
about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan
informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly
innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and
he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that
remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular
case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and
disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14
February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to
that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as
charged in this investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the
past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @
KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a
fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of
revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming
that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA,
this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in
connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of
CAFGUs, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any
intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were
fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far
as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V.

CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged

charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not
been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them
for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore
concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela
Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and
Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed. [69]
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate courts
assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision
on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED,
AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND
MANALO.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY

ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS)
TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH
THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE
COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF
OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE
CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE
PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL
REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY
TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES
PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO
INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14,
2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.[70]

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the
recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on
Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court
on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and factbased perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,[71] hence representatives from all sides of the political and social
spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system[72] participated in
mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.[73] It was an exercise
for the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987
Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. [74] As
the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined
to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings

committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings.[75] On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.[76]
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means protection in
Spanish.[77] In 1837, de Tocquevilles Democracy in America became available
in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial
review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.[78] One of them, Manuel
Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,
[79]
which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their
constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national
constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the
exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this
Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the
Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments,
limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in
litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or
regulation that motivated the violation. [80]
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican
constitutionalism.[81] If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional
right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the officials
superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the
petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the
principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial
power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables
courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases,
but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation.[82]

The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually
evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.
[83]
It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one

piece of Mexicos self-attributed task of conveying to the worlds legal heritage that
institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived.
[84]
What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in
violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo
libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas
corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality
of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and
legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants rights
derived from the agrarian reform process.[85]
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially
committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an
all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including
socio-economic
rights.[86] Other
countries
like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the
protection of the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or
fundamental rights.[87]
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the
writ of amparo, several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our
charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The
Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by
the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo
libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions
of the 1987 Constitution.[88] The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law
tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case ofMarbury v.
Madison.[89]
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through
remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a
petition forhabeas corpus under Rule 102,[90] these remedies may not be adequate
to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a

writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs under the AmparoRule, this hybrid writ of the
common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and
Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides
rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt,
or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.[91]
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that
it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the
goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order[92] to stop petitioners and/or their officers and
agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights
on August 23, 2007,[93] prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also
sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect
on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as
an amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances
of the Manalo brothers enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners
first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:

The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and

giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted,
and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of
herein respondent Raymond Manalo.[94]

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the
ore of petitioners cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is
metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following
causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof
required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The
parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;otherwise, the privilege
shall be denied. (emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[95]
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court
of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were
continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction,

detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent

Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with
countless candid details of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to
escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few
examples are the following: Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong
sinisilaban si Manuel.[96] (N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo
ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. [97] May
naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko
iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.[98] Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit
ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena.[99] Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay
kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang
babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar.[100]
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent
Raymond Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz:
the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently
identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel
and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who
barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on
their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries,
namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and
Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza,
also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the
abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were
Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and
George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of
the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion
that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA,
considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out
to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction
were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost
Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of
the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the

fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of
military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have
refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he
perfunctorily investigated
Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also established. At the
very least, he was aware of the petitioners captivity at the hands of men in
uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer
tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen.
Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them
what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen.
Palparans direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been
shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during
their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command
bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged
and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of
law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth
Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and
Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing
evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with
the abduction or the detention. Hilarios involvement could not, indeed, be
then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario
drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following
the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings
at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L300 van in which the petitioners were brought away from their houses
on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in
subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which
was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo
and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong
materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren)
brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an
unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept
for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there
where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and
Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the
petitioners parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to

relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that
occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their
sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations.
(Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master
Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen.
Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required
Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p.
206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario
had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and
forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation
of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas,
among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally
involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their
participation is overwhelming.[101]
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements
were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.
[102]
Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of
respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by
forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical
injuries inflicted on respondents,[103] also corroborate respondents accounts of the
torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity
with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony
and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit, [104] firms up
respondents story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in
finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of
the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured
in early November 1989. The Commissions findings of fact were mostly based on
the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz
regarding her ordeal.[106] These statements were supported by her recognition of
portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military

installation where she was detained.[107] She was also examined by a medical
doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her
back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning
and torture she suffered while in detention.[108]
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on
the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and
evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of
their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or
oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify
in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are
implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as
no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ
of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from
captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in
detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not free in every sense
of the word[109] as their movements continue to be restricted for fear that people
they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of
Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These
people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of thePhilippines and are, thus,
in a position to threaten respondents rights to life, liberty and security.
[110]
(emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being
once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct
violation of their right to security of person.[111]
Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point out that
this right is often associated with liberty; it is also seen as an expansion of rights
based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual
punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights to be kept free
from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention
places[112] fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under
the writ of Amparo. They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive

recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under
Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person,
respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile[113] that the right to liberty may
be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the
exercise of that liberty[114] such as a requirement to report under unreasonable
restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty [115] or being put under
monitoring and surveillance.[116]
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their
right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed
been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to
security of personfinds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person, including the
extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and effects against government
intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the states power over a persons home and
possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.[117] The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v.
CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: [118]
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of
the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy
against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York,
192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy
is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace
and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons
and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the

Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this

great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must
be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the
serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any
interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.
[119]
(emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1[120] guarantees essentially
the right to be alive[121] - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality
of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear
that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful
ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established
and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of
security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every
aspect of mans existence.[122] In a broad sense, the right to security of person
emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life
but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to
the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.[123]

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of
the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of
the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom
from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right.[124] It is the right to security of person as the word
security itself means freedom from fear.[125] Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126] (emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides
for the right to security of person, viz:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established
by law. (emphasis supplied)

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right
and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to wellfounded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in theamparo context, it is
more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from
threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of
Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security
mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.[127]
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without
a search warrant.[128] Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the
body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical
intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against
persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.[129]
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily
integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to
admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of
both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person
includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense).Secret detention places,

solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are

prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will
- although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a
violation of the right to security in the sense of freedom from threat as aforediscussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of
persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced
disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be
protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right
against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the
recent case ofPopov v. Russia.[130] In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully
detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison,
thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ...
(emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that (n)o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Although
the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless,
the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of
domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been
expected to take measures in order to ensure hissecurity and to
investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply
with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective
investigation into his allegations.[131] (emphasis supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also
made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be
related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general
international law or under specific human rights conventions is
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These
rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of
person.[132]
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of
ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right
is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.[133] As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,[134] viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends
upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of
proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. [135]

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of

government protection has been interpreted by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee[136] in not a few cases involving Article 9 [137] of the ICCPR. While the
right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under

Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily
be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be
invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,[138] a case involving death threats to a
religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views
differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its
location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security
arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux
prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on
matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty
and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with
in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only
reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is
no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security
only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States
parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant.It
cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to
the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not
arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of
article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal
security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally
ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.[139] (emphasis supplied)

The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,[140] which involved a

political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated,
harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In
a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar
import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,[141] involving discrimination,
intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that
state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,[142] involving the abduction of the complainants
husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,
[143]
involving the murder of the complainants partner and the harassment he
(complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v.
Zambia,[144] involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition
alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the right
to security not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but

imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.
[145]
The ECHR interpreted the right to security of person under Article 5(1) of the
European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of
persons, Kurt v. Turkey.[146] In this case, the claimants son had been arrested by
state authorities and had not been seen since. The familys requests for information
and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested
that this was a violation of her sons right to security of person. The ECHR
ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in
conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but
must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over
that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts.For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into
an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has
not been seen since.[147] (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case
at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents
right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to

respondents life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their
families, including them, would be killed. In Raymonds narration, he was tortured
and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain Mam, who wanted to see him before
he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be
killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity
not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by
their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal,
sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in
Limay, Bataan, respondents captors even told them that they were still deciding

whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his

affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3
o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay
dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o
hindi.[148]

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while
they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is
apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in
the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other
persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and
Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and
security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their
movements or activities.[149] Precisely because respondents are being shielded from
the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of
overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life,
liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even
executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the
government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to
respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they
also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents
abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners own
witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and
one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated
members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the
first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was

taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain
the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or
neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a
Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in
the event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members
of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the
aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of
witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner,
location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the
person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the
suspected offenders before a competent court.[150] Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff
also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he
immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose
of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent
reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.[151] To this day, however, almost a year after the
policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October
31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation
which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion
that there is a violation of respondents right to security as a guarantee of protection
by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is
violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their
right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners
question.

First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file
with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical
reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to
include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production
order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search
warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant
must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the
application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there
exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. [152] In the case at bar, however,
petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations
made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit,
the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by
name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the
documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case
as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under
the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand
of the people such as respondents.

Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the production of

documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in
which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the
moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts,
letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in his possession, custody or control

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad, [153] the respondent

judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the
production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material
Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on
the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the
argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that cannot be
identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook to
provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned
unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in
whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been
furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure
of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is
irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition
for a writ of amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and
jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even
unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even
death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.

Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly
implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in
ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can
be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and
action for violation of the respondents rights. The list of medical personnel is also
relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and
make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these
rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns
and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
OFFICE
OF
THE
ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant,

COURT

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952

Present:

JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO,

former Clerk of Court LUIS C.
BUCAYON II, Court Stenographers
THELMA A. MANGILIT, CECILIO
B. ARGAME,
MARICAR
N.
EUGENIO, and RADIGUNDA R.
LAMAN and Interpreter PAUL M.
RESURRECCION,
all
of
the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 276,
Muntinlupa City,

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ

Respondents.

Promulgated:

- versus -

December 24, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The instant case stemmed from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) in all seven (7) branches of the Regional Trial Court
in MuntinlupaCity, including Branch 276 then presided by herein respondent Judge
Norma C. Perello (Judge Perello). The audit was prompted by reports of perceived
irregular disposition of petitions for habeas corpus by the said court.

In its Memorandum[1] dated January 25, 2004 and submitted to the OCA, the audit
team reported that for the period 1998-2004, a total of 219 petitions for habeas
corpus were assigned to Branch 276, the subject matters of which are classified
into (a) hospitalization; (b) custody of minors; (c) illegal possession of firearms;
and (d) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The records for 22 of these cases were not
presented to the audit team, while the case folders of about a hundred cases did not
contain copies of the decisions of conviction. The audit team also noted a huge
disparity in the number of petitions for habeas corpus raffled in Branch 276 as
against those raffled in the other branches, which led the team to doubt if the raffle
had been conducted with strict regularity considering the fact that Judge Perello
was the Executive Judge that time.
The audit team likewise reported several substantive and procedural lapses relative
to the disposition of habeas corpus cases in Branch 276, such as (a) failure of the
branch clerk of court to present to the audit team the case folders of 22 petitions
and to send notices/summons to the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of
the City Prosecutor; (b) lack of return of the writs issued to the officials of the
Bureau of Corrections; (c) absence of certificate of detention/confinement from the
Bureau of Corrections; (d) absence of copies of the judgment of conviction; (e)
failure of the court stenographer to transcribe the stenographic notes and attach the
transcript to the records of each case; and (f) failure on the part of the court
interpreter to prepare the Minutes of the court sessions or hearings.
Finally, the audit team observed that in some of the petitions for habeas corpus,
respondent Judge Perello erred in ordering the release of the prisoners before they
have served the full term of their sentence.
Thus, the audit team recommended to the OCA to consider the judicial audit
report as an administrative complaint against (a) Judge Perello and Clerk of Court
Atty. Luis Bucayon II for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and
grave misconduct; and (b) Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame,
Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion
for gross inefficiency.

In its Resolution dated March 2, 2005, the Court adopted the aforesaid
recommendation.[2]
The OCA, through its 1st Indorsement dated September 9, 2005, directed the herein
respondents to comment on the audit teams recommendations.[3]
In her Comment[4] dated October 10, 2005, Judge Perello opined that the Audit
Team that evaluated these Habeas Corpus cases filed with this Court are probably
not lawyers, hence, are not conversant with the Constitution, with jurisprudence,
and the Rules on the grant of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the retroactivity of
laws. She insisted that her decisions ordering the release of the prisoners who were
serving their sentence for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act were in accordance with law and jurisprudence. For those
convicted of illegal possession of firearms under the old law (Presidential Decree
No. 1866), she applied retroactively the provisions of the amendatory law or R.A.
No. 8294,[5] pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for
the retroactive application of laws that are favorable to the accused even to those
already convicted and serving sentence. Inasmuch as R.A. No. 8294 imposed the
penalty of six (6) years only, it was incumbent upon her to grant the writs to those
prisoners who have been imprisoned for eight (8) years already. For those
convicted for violation of R.A. No. 6425, she applied the said law and not the
amendatory law or R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, mainly because it aggravated the penalty and is
therefore not favorable to them.
To refute the accusations against her, Judge Perello enumerated her credentials and
qualifications and alleged that most of her decisions were upheld by the Court
attesting to her competence in applying the law. She claimed that in all the
petitions she granted, the prisoners therein were all cleared by the National Bureau
of Investigation to have no pending cases. The Bureau of Corrections was always
directed to produce the records and reason for the confinement of the concerned
prisoners. If from the records, the prisoner was found to have already served more
than the maximum of the imposable penalty, then she would order the release of
the prisoner in open court, without fear or favor. Judge Perello asserted that she
had served with utmost dedication and honesty in all her more than 40 years of
government service.

For his part, Atty. Luis Bucayon II, Branch Clerk of Court, explained in his
Comment[6] that while he failed to present the case folders and records of 22
petitions to the audit team at the time the audit was conducted at their branch, there
was an agreement between him and the audit team that the latter could pick up
these folders and records before the end of their audit. However, the audit team
failed to return to get these case records. He claimed to be baffled as to how his
alleged failure to make the records available to the audit team could constitute
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and grave misconduct. Atty.
Bucayon likewise manifested that he had transferred to the Public Attorneys Office
of the Department of Justice as of July 26, 2004 and was issued a clearance by the
OCA.
On the other hand, Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion averred in his
Comment[7] that all petitions for habeas corpus have their corresponding Minutes
but these were not attached to the records because the Branch Clerk of Court
refused to put his remarks and findings thereon. He further claims that he always
made it a point to prepare the Minutes and his co-employees could attest to this
fact.
Finally, Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda
Laman, all Stenographers of Branch 276, submitted their Joint
Comment[8] dated October
12,
2005and
Joint
Supplemental
[9]
Comment dated October 19, 2005. According to them, Branch 276 had the
heaviest case load among all the branches in Muntinlupa City. Despite this, they
allegedly religiously attended the hearings and transcribed their notes
thereafter. With respect to the petitions for habeas corpus, they saw no need to
transcribe their stenographic notes as the proceedings therein were non-adversarial
in nature. They prioritized those cases which were adversarial and on appeal.
In the Agenda Report[10] dated March 9, 2006, then Court Administrator Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr. submitted the following recommendations:
1. respondent Judge Norma C. Perello be FOUND GUILTY of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE and be meted the
penalty of SUSPENSION for three (3) months without salary and benefit;
2.

the complaint against Atty. Luis Bucayon be DISMISSED for being moot
and academic;

3.

respondents Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame,

Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman and respondent Court Interpreter
Paul Resurreccion be FOUND GUILTY ofSIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY
and be FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).[11]
The Court thereafter referred the administrative matter to Justice Conrado Molina,
Consultant of OCA, for investigation, report and recommendation.[12]

On August 1, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest their willingness to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed. [13] All the
respondents manifested that they were submitting the case for decision.
On November 21, 2007, Justice Molina submitted his report and adopted entirely
the recommendations of the Court Administrator.[14]
We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator as adopted by the
Investigating Justice, but modify the recommendation in regard to the penalty
imposed upon Judge Perello.
It is the contention of Judge Perello that the prisoners she released were all
convicted under the old law, R.A. No. 6425, and not under the new law, R.A. No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which
imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death regardless of the quantity of the
drug involved.[15] She maintains that the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
given retroactive effect insofar as these prisoners are concerned for the main reason
that it would not be favorable to them. Thus, according to Judge Perello, the
provisions of R.A. No. 6425, as interpreted in the case of People v. Simon,[16] must
be applied to the released prisoners. Citing theSimon case, she insisted that the
maximum imposable penalty for violation of R.A. No. 6425 where the quantity
involved is 750 grams or less is six (6) months only, which was the reason why she
ordered the immediate release of the prisoners because they had already served two
(2) years of imprisonment.
While we agree with respondent judge that R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
retroactively applied to the prisoners involved in the cases audited, we, however,
are not impressed with Judge Perellos justification in granting the writs. Such
ratiocination on her part betrays a lack of understanding of the rule on graduation

of penalties. Nowhere in the cited case of Simon does it state that the maximum
penalty shall be six (6) months where the quantity is less than 750
grams. The Simon case clarified the penalty to be imposed vis--visthe quantity of
the drug involved, such that prision correccional shall be imposed if the drug is
below 250 grams; prision mayor if the quantity is from 250 to 499 grams;
andreclusion temporal if the drug is from 500 to 750 grams.[17] The same case
likewise declared that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable
penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional.[18]
The penalty of prision correccional is composed of three periods
the minimum which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months,
the medium which is from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months,
and the maximum which ranges from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. As
found by the audit team, Judge Perello considered only the minimum period
of prision correccional in granting the writs for habeas corpus such that when the
prisoners had served imprisonment for a period of two (2) years, she immediately
ordered their release. This is clearly erroneous because the petition for habeas
corpus cannot be granted if the accused has only served the minimum of his
sentence as he must serve his sentence up to its maximum term.[19] The maximum
range of prision correccional is from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. This
is the period which the prisoners must have served before their applications for
writs of habeas corpus may be granted.
In obstinately granting the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted
prisoners had only served the minimum period of their sentence, Judge Perello
displayed a blatant disregard of the rule on graduation of penalties as well as
settled jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. As a trial judge,
respondent is the visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, she is expected to be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Judges are expected to keep abreast of developments
in law and jurisprudence.[20] He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his
passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of
Law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply
apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.[21]Judge
Perello must thereby have more than a cursory knowledge of the law on graduation

of penalties and the imposable penalty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.Indeed, the facts obtaining in this case speak of other dubious circumstances
affecting Judge Perellos integrity and competence too glaring to ignore.
Notably, the record shows that Judge Perello granted the writs of habeas
corpus even without the pertinent copies of detention and judgment of conviction.
[22]
This is contrary to the provisions of Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Requisites of application therefor. Application for the writ shall be by
petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, of
by some person in his behalf, and shall set forth:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be
procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; xxx.

The Rules clearly require that a copy of the commitment or cause of

detention must accompany the application for the writ of habeas corpus.
Obviously, Judge Perello deviated from the guidelines laid down in Section 3(d) of
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have
been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom
behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should therefore
administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of law itself,
remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the
sanction of law.[23] Indeed, Judge Perellos stubborn unwillingness to act in
accordance with the rules and settled jurisprudence shows her refusal to reform
herself and to correct a wrong, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Be that as it may, however, we agree with the Court Administrator that there is no
merit in the charge of grave misconduct leveled against Judge Perello. For grave
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by
an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.
[24]
Here, it appears thatshe was not motivated by any corrupt or vicious motive. As
the Court Administrator puts it:
xxx. Except for the insinuation that there has been connivance among all
court staff in railroading the process of handling these cases, there was

no showing that in releasing the petitioners prematurely, respondent was

motivated by corrupt motives. On the contrary, respondent vehemently
denies this accusation. In her comment, she stated that she protests with
pain that she has always been viewed and unjustly condemned as a
wrongdoer on an erroneous impression that she had benefited and had
reaped riches for doing her job which she did with compassion, fairness
and justice as the law and jurisprudence dictates. Indeed, if respondent
judge or a court employee should be disciplined for a grave offense, the
evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge. Charges based on mere suspicion should not be given
credence.[25]

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Judge Perello had been previously
charged with and found guilty of committing several administrative infractions,
namely: (1) gross ignorance of the law for which she was suspended for six (6)
months;[26] (2) undue delay in transmitting to the Court of Appeals the records of a
case for which she was finedP20,000.00;[27] (3) dereliction of duty for which she
was fined P5,000.00;[28] (4) conduct unbecoming a judge for which she was
admonished;[29] and most recently (5) grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of
authority, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law
and/or procedure for which she was fined in the amount ofP10,000.00.[30] It is
therefore evident that Judge Perello had a penchant for committing infractions
during her tenure.
In sum, we find Judge Perello liable for ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and
for abuse of discretion. These are serious charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Section 11 of the same Rule provides that any of the
following sanctions may be imposed upon Judge Perello:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge,
any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for

more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

The OCA imposed the penalty of suspension for three (3) months on Judge
Perello. In view, however, of Judge Perellos compulsory retirement [31] which makes
suspension impossible to impose, the proper action is to impose a fine on her in the
maximum amount of P40,000.00, deductible from her retirement pay.
With regard to Atty. Bucayons liability, the charges against him all pertained to his
duties as Branch Clerk of Court. It must be noted that during the pendency of this
administrative case against him, Atty. Bucayon had transferred to the Public
Attorneys Office of the Department of Justice on July 26, 2004 and was
accordingly issued a clearance by the OCA. Thus, we accept the OCAs
recommendation to dismiss the charges against him for being moot.
On the liability of Court Stenographers Mangilit, Argame, Eugenio and Laman,
Administrative Circular 24-90[32] imposes upon all court stenographers the duty to
transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts of such notes to the
records of each case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes were
taken. The records reveal that respondent stenographers failed to transcribe the
stenographic notes and attach them to the records of each case. By their own
admission, they did not bother to transcribe the notes as the proceedings were nonadversarial in nature. We find this explanation unacceptable considering that the
requirement under the Circular applies to all proceedings whether adversarial or
not.
For their shortcomings in the transcription of the stenographic notes,
respondent stenographers have shown their utter lack of dedication to the functions
of their office. As trial court stenographers, they know, or ought to know, that they
perform an important role in running the machinery of our trial court system and
that transcripts of stenographic notes are vital for the speedy disposition of
cases. Their dereliction of duty which may jeopardize public faith and confidence
in our judicial system should not be countenanced.We, thus, find respondent
stenographers guilty of simple neglect of duty. While said offense carries a penalty

of one month and one day to six months suspension under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, [33] we deem it reasonable and sufficient
to instead impose a fine of P5,000.00, as recommended by the OCA, considering
that it was their first offense. While this Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a
corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are
undesirable, this Court also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its
judgment with mercy.[34]
Finally, as to Court Interpreter Resurreccion, the record would show that he had
been remiss in his duty to prepare the Minutes of the sessions or hearings and
attach them to the records of each case. He cannot escape liability by passing on
the blame to the Branch Clerk of Court whom he claimed refused to put his
remarks on the Minutes. Resurreccions explanation is too flimsy to excuse him
from administrative liability. Among the duties of court interpreters is to prepare
and sign all Minutes of the session. [35] After every session they must prepare the
Minutes and attach it. The Minutes is a very important document because it gives a
brief summary of the events that took place at the session or hearing of a case. It is
in fact a capsulized history of the case at a given session or hearing, for it states the
date and time of the session; the names of the judge, clerk of court, court
stenographer, and court interpreter who were present; the names of the counsel for
the parties who appeared; the party presenting evidence; the names of witnesses
who testified; the documentary evidence marked; and the date of the next hearing.
[36]
Failure to prepare the Minutes and attach them to the records of a case
constitutes simple neglect of duty and warrants disciplinary action. Accordingly,
Resurreccion is hereby fined the same amount of P5,000.00 as recommended by
the OCA.
We take this occasion once more to impress upon all respondents that the
conduct of every person connected with the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowest clerk, is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. A public office is a public trust. Since public officers are
accountable to the people at all times, they must strictly perform their duties and
responsibilities. As the administration of justice is a sacred task, this Court
condemns any omission or act that may diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary.[37]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Norma C.

Perello GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion, for which
she is meted a fineof P40,000.00 to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and
Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion are found GUILTY of
simple neglect of duty, for which they are each meted a fine of P5,000.00, and
sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
For being moot, the charges against Atty. Luis Bucayon II are
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ESTRELITA D. MARTINEZ, G.R. No. 153795
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, CJ., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Director General LEANDRO
MENDOZA, Chief Superintendent
NESTORIO GUALBERTO, SR.,
Superintendent LEONARDO
ESPINA, SR., Superintendent
JESUS VERSOZA, and JOHN DOES, Promulgated:
Respondents. August 17, 2006

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---- -- -- -- x

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
When respondents deny custody of an allegedly
detained person, petitioners have the duty of establishing
the fact of detention by competent and convincing
evidence; otherwise, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
issued. Nonetheless, when the disappearance of a person
is indubitable, the law enforcement authorities are dutybound to investigate it with due diligence and to locate
the missing person. When the wrongdoing is attributable
to the police agencies and/or their agents, the aggrieved
may

secure

the

assistance

of

the

Peoples

Law

Enforcement Board or the Commission on Human Rights.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the

Rules

of

Court,

seeking

to

reverse

the March

22,

2002 Decision[2] and the May 30, 2002 Resolution[3]of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 68170. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is

REVERSED and the petition for habeas corpus is DISMISSED.[4]

The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts

The antecedent facts are narrated by the CA in this wise:

Petitioners are the mother and wife, respectively, of
Michael Martinez, a resident of 4570 Cattleya Road, Sun
Valley Subdivision, Paraaque City, who was allegedly
abducted and taken away by seven (7) persons around 7:30
in the morning of November 19, 2001 while he was walking
along Magnolia Street, on his way to his mother's house at
3891 Marigold Street of the same subdivision. The
abduction was reported by petitioners to the Barangay,
the Paraaque Police and the Anti-Kidnapping Task Force
at CampCrame.

It appears that in the evening of November 19, 2001, the

Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) presented before the media
a certain Phillip Medel, Jr., who allegedly executed a
statement confessing to his participation in the killing of
Dorothy Jones, a.k.a. Nida Blanca, naming Michael Martinez
as the person who introduced him to Rod Lauren Strunk, the
husband of Nida Blanca and alleged mastermind in her
killing. In a televised interview with a media reporter on
November 26, 2001, Medel narrated that he saw Michael
Martinez at the CIDG at Camp Crame where he was being
detained, and which the former allegedly reiterated when
he talked to Robert Paul Martinez, a brother of Michael, on
November 27, 2001 and he even described the clothes
Michael was then wearing, which were the same clothes
worn by him when he was abducted. Petitioners then made

representations with CIDG for the release of Michael

Martinez or that they be allowed to see him, but the same
were not granted.

In view thereof, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus

with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Quezon City
against
respondents
PNP
Director
General LeandroMendoza; Chief
Superintendent Nestorio Gualberto, Sr., Chief of the CIDG;
Senior Superintendent Leonardo Espina, Sr. and Senior
Superintendent Jesus Versoza of the CIDG and members of
Task Force Marsha, which is investigating the Nida Blanca
murder case, for them to produce before said court the
person of Michael Martinez or to justify the continued
detention of his liberty.

In an Order dated November 29, 2001, the court a quo set

the petition for hearing on December 3, 2001 and directed
respondents to show cause why the writ of habeas
corpusshould not issue.

At the hearing on December 3, 2001, respondents

submitted a RETURN wherein they vehemently and
categorically denied any participation or involvement in the
alleged abduction or disappearance of Michael Martinez as
the latter was never confined and detained by them or in
their custody at any given time. Respondents thus prayed
for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.

At the hearing conducted by the court a quo, respondents

reiterated their claim that Michael Martinez is not and was
never in their custody. On the other hand, petitioners
presented Phillip Medel, Jr. who insisted that he saw Michael
Martinez inside a room at the CIDG where he was brought
before midnight of November 19, 2001 or the wee hours
of November
20,
2001,
that
Sr. Supts. Verzosa (sic)
and Espina were also in said room and that the latter even
boxed Michael in the stomach.

Finding that respondents denial pale beside Medel's positive

assertion that Michael Martinez is in their custody, the
court a quo, in a Decision dated December 10, 2001
directed respondents to produce the body of Michael
Martinez before it on December 11, 2001 at 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon. A copy of said decision was received by
respondents onDecember 10, 2001

On December 11, 2001, respondents filed a notice of appeal

on the ground that the Decision is contrary to law and the
evidence.[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA agreed with the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) that Medels credibility was highly suspect. The
appellate court opined that he had contradicted himself
as to material facts. Further negating his testimony was
Superintendent Espinas positive testimony that he was at
home betweenmidnight of November 19, 2001, and early
morning of November 20, 2001.

The CA relied on the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duties. It held that, [a]s aptly
pointed out by respondents, the CIDG itself is equally
concerned with the safety of Michael Martinez relative to
the final resolution of the Nida Blanca slay. For he is
definitely a vital witness to his case.The PNP-CIDG has no
motive whatsoever to abduct him as it never did.[6]

Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issue

Petitioner has failed to make a categorical statement of

the issues for the Courts consideration. She has also
failed to state what relief she prays for.
Nonetheless, the Court will resolve the case on the issue
of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court and
dismissing the Petition for habeas corpus.

The Courts Ruling

The present Petition for Review has no merit.

Sole Issue:
Reversible Error of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner contends that it is the evaluation of the RTC -not the CA -- that should be upheld, because the trial
court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and
to determine whether they were telling the truth when
they testified.

On the other hand, respondents aver that their candor

and the veracity of their denial of the custody or
detention of Michael cannot be doubted by the
Court.Their argument is even strengthened in the face of
the incredible and contradictory testimony of petitioners
witness, Phillip Medel Jr.

Propriety of
Habeas Corpus

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioners anchor

for the present case is the disappearance of Michael. The
matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely
consequential to his disappearance.

Ostensibly,
his
disappearance
has
been
established. However, the grant of relief in a habeas
corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance
of a person, but on his illegal detention. Habeas corpus
generally applies to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.[8]

Said this Court in another case:

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to

relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is devised as a
speedy relief from unlawful restraint. It is a remedy

intended to determine whether the person under detention

is held under lawful authority.[9]

If the respondents are neither detaining nor restraining

the applicant or the person on whose behalf the petition
for habeas corpus has been filed, then it should be
dismissed. This Court has ruled that this remedy has one
objective -- to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person:
The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a
person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry
reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the
release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The
use of habeas corpus is thus very limited.[10]

Habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining

evidence on the whereabouts of a person, [11] or as a
means of finding out who has specifically abducted or
caused the disappearance of a certain person.

When respondents making the return of the writ state

that they have never had custody over the person who is

the subject of the writ, the petition must be dismissed, in

the absence of definite evidence to the contrary. The
return of the writ must be taken on its face value
considering that, unless it is in some way [convincingly]
traversed or denied, the facts stated therein must be
taken as true[12] for purposes of the habeas corpus
proceedings.

Forcible Taking and Disappearance

When forcible taking and disappearance -- not arrest and

detention -- have been alleged, the proper remedy is not
habeas corpus proceedings, but criminalinvestigation and
proceedings.

Abduction or kidnapping is a crime punishable by

law. Investigations with regard to crimes are first and
foremost the duty of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), not the
courts. There are instances when members of the PNP -the agency tasked with investigating crimes -- are
suspected of being responsible for the disappearance of a
person, who is the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings. This fact will not convert the courts into -- or

authorize them through habeas corpus proceedings to be

-- forefront investigators, prosecutors, judges and
executioners all at the same time. Much as this Court
would want to resolve these disappearances speedily -as in the present case, when it is interested in
determining who are responsible for the disappearance
and detention of Michael (if, indeed, he is being detained)
-- it would not want to step beyond its reach and
encroach on the duties of other duly established
agencies. Instead of rendering justice to all,[13] it may
render injustice if it resorts to shortcuts through habeas
corpus proceedings. In fine, this proceeding for habeas
corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a thorough
criminal investigation.

The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),

specifically the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB),
[14]
is tasked to investigate abuses or wrongdoings by
members of the PNP. Thus, if they or the NBI abuse or fail
to perform their duties, as indicated in this case, people
may refer their complaints to the PLEB, which should be
part of their arsenal in the battle to resolve cases in
which members of the PNP are suspected of having
caused the disappearance of anyone. Removing criminals
from the ranks of those tasked to promote peace and

order and to ensure public safety would be a big axe blow

to the mighty oak of lawlessness. Let each citizen
contribute a blow, puny though it may be when done
alone; but collectively we can, slowly but surely, rid our
society of disorder and senseless disappearances.

Going back to the present case, petitioner must establish

by competent and convincing evidence that the missing
person, on whose behalf the Petition was filed, is under
the custody of respondents. Unfortunately, her evidence
is insufficient to convince the Court that they have
Michael in their custody.Moreover, a writ of habeas corpus
should not issue where it is not necessary to afford the
petitioner relief or where it would be ineffective.[15]

Considering that respondents have persistently denied

having Michael in their custody, and absent any decisive
proof to rebut their denial, the Court is constrained to
affirm the CAs dismissal of the Petition for habeas corpus.

In view of the established fact of Michaels suspiciously

felonious disappearance, we exhort the NBI and the
National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) to continue
their investigation into the matter, so that all persons

responsible can be prosecuted for whatever crime they

have committed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. No costs in this instance.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Commission

on Human Rights and the Department of Interior and
Local Government for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL
C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B.
SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C.
SALIENTES,
Petitioners,
- versus -

G.R. No. 162734

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

LORAN S.D. ABANILLA,

HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO
SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL Promulgated:
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
203,MUNTINLUPA CITY,
August 29, 2006
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition assails the Decision[1] dated November 10, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680, which dismissed the petition for
certiorari against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No.
03-004. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals Resolution [2] dated March 19,
2004 denying reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private
respondent
Loran
S.D. Abanilla and
petitioner
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners
Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private
respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but
Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he
was prevented from seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative
of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody,[3] docketed as Special
Proceedings
No.
03-004
before
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the trial court
issued the following order:
Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners,
the Respondents Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando
B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and
bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged
from restraint.
Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized
representative of this Court, who is directed to immediately make a
return.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, but the same was dismissed on November 10, 2003. The appellate court
affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the trial court holding that its January 23,
2003 Order did not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was
simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The
appellate court held that the trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a
summary proceeding, on the cause of the minors detention and the matter of his
custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.
Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the
following grounds:
1.

The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent

judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order for the petitioner-mother
to first show cause why her own three-year old child in her
custody should not be discharged from a so-called restraint despite
no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of compelling
reasons of maternal unfitness to deprive the petitioner-mother of
her minor son of tender years. The assailed orders, resolutions and
decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals are clearly
void;

2.

The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the

respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing a writ of
habeas corpus which clearly is not warranted considering that
there is no unlawful restraint by the mother and considering
further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby

negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining or

confining her very own son of tender years. The petition is not
even sufficient in substance to warrant the writ. The assailed
orders are clearly void.
3.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the Sombong vs.

CA case supports rather than negates the position of the
petitioners.

4.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding

does violence to the tender-years-rule

5.

The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private

respondent failed to present prima facie proof of any compelling
reason of the unfitness of the petitioner-mother;

6.

The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on

Custody SUFFICES AS REMEDY.[6]

Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the
petition for certiorari against the trial courts orders dated January 23,
2003 and February 24, 2003?
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213[7] of the Family
Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They
maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling
reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the
proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but
not habeas corpus.Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the
mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there
was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was
no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very own
child.

Private respondent counters that petitioners argument based on Article 213

of the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the
custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as
the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available
against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice
versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners
really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules
on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in
the January 23, 2003 and the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner
Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He
alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as
required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have
custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23,
2003 Order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties
but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they
are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent
to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending
before it.
Under Rule 41, Section 1[8] of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is
not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under
Rule 65.The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
order.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. [9] Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over
their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In
the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still

entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause
of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.
[11]
Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code[12] unequivocally provides that in
all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare
shall be the paramount consideration.[13]
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to
any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line
with the directive in Section 9[14] of A.M. 03-04-04-SC[15] that within fifteen days
after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court
shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the
minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody
by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents
petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own
child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his
child under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23,
2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the
petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10,
2003 and the Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 167193
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
Present:

PUNO,* J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,**
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING,
Petitioner. Promulgated:
April 19, 2006
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police
Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and General Robert Delfin,[1] Philippine
National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner Ashraf Kunting before
this Court and show cause why he is illegally detained.
The antecedents are as follows:
On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for
violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal
Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG
and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of IsabelaCity, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial
Region. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and
Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC under separate Amended Informations,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-1164, and 36111165.

Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNPIG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation.
In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police
Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the
Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the
PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNPIG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed
for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order.
In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of
the RTC, replied to the request of Atty. Danipog, thus:
xxx
The undersigned referred the matter to Hon. Danilo M. Bucoy,
Presiding Judge of this Court, who issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest in
the herein mentioned case (Criminal Case No. 3674-1187) and per his
instruction, accused As[h]raf Kunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily
detained thereat by virtue of the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in this
case, however considering that the accused is a high security risk, he
should be brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary security
escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper commitment
order can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted
by the prosecution.
Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to
the Court.[2]

On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn
over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation.
On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, Department of Justice (DOJ),
requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue

of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1)
Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost
effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody
of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a
big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained
in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity
to the area of operation of the ASG.
On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioners coaccused in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 36741187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the
crime/s charged.
On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kuntings Motion to
Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned
over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003,
directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to
turn over Kunting to the court.
In
a
letter
dated February
22,
2005,
Police
Chief
Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request to Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial
of Kuntings case, citing the same grounds in the previous letter. He added that
if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of
the escapees in a jail break that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG
members were able to go scot-free.
On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of
the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the existence of a
pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No.
3537-1129 againstKunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this
Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February
11, 2005, directing the turnover ofKunting to the court, be suspended until the
motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.
On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty

since June
12,
2003 by
the
PNP-IG
led
by
Police
Chief
Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General
Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against
him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered
in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused
who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2,
2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.
Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he
promptly
filed
an
Urgent
Motion
for
Reinvestigation
on
September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo for representation to file a motion with this Court for
the transfer of venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having
no further information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action was
taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal
detention classified in the records as for safekeeping purposes only.
The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus extends to all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, [3] and if found illegal,
the court orders the release of the detainee. [4] If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.[5]
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not
allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or

judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. [6]

In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by
the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by
JudgeDanilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary
detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial
court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom
and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 36741187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the
writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged
with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals[7] holds that once the person
detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11,
2005 reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police
Superintendent
and
Chief,
Legal
Affairs
Division, PNP-IG,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court has
been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for
the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for
the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case
from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ
has indeed filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its Comment, the Office of
the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution of
the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the
Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards
action on said motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11,
2005, to turn over the body of petitioner Kunting to the trial court..

WHEREFORE,
hereby DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

the

instant

petition

for habeas

corpus is