HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO

MILITARY, SECURITY, AND STRATEGIC ISSUES IN CENTRAL

ASIA
Central Asia lies at the nexus of three great culture regions: Asia, the Middle East, and
Europe. This geographical position has profoundly guided the regions historical
development, as various peoples, ideas, goods, and technologies have flowed into Central
Asia from the surrounding areas for at least the past 3,000 years. Located at the crossroads
of the Eurasian landmass, the historical narrative of Central Asia is one of successive waves
of invasion from various points of the compass, interspersed by periods of trade, cultural
exchange, and intellectual and artistic advancement. The various Central Asian peoples were
influenced by predominantly Persian and Turkic civilization in ancient times, with occasional
contact from South Asia and China, and finally a strong Russian cultural patina was imposed
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The result is a historical and social mlange of
modern and traditional that provides a unique dynamism to the region.
Civilization in Central Asia is quite ancient. There is evidence that a settlement existed at
the modern site of the city of Samarkand as long as 5,000 years ago, and other locations in
the region, primarily along the rivers, also feature sites that may be dated to several
thousand years before the modern era. From an early date, a cultural dichotomy developed
in Central Asia based on geographical location and lifestylethis was the division between
the settled, agrarian populations, typically clustered along streams; and the pastoralists,
who followed a nomadic existence by either herding their animals across the vast plains in
search of grazing land, or like the ancestors of the modern Kyrgyz, employed a system of
transhumance between lowland pastures and those higher up the slopes. The relationship
between these two cultures was at times cooperative and at other points hostile and
destructive. The cities established by the agriculturalists were alluring concentrations of
goods and food that frequently attracted raids from local nomadic tribes, or became the first
targets of external armies entering Central Asia on a quest for wealth, for an expansion of
empire, or for religious conquest. The polarity in culture represented by the contrasting
ways of life between the nomadic and sedentary would persist until well into the twentieth
century.
The first Central Asiatic people discussed extensively in a Western source are the Scythians
and Sakas, two related groups whose social customs and history are covered by the Greek
historian Herodotus in the fifth century B.C.1 These nomads were very much like the peoples
who would follow them out of the Eurasian steppes over the centuries: master horsemen,
often aggressive and brutal toward the settled peoples they encountered, but also capable
of superb artistic achievement. The Scythians and Sakas, for example, were reported to
fashion drinking cups from the skulls of their enemies, yet also made exquisite and detailed
gold ornaments and costumes.2 Kazakhstans Golden Man, a Saka warrior found in 1969,
was buried with a spectacular golden headdress and a jacket embroidered with numerous
golden ornaments. Many kurgans, or grave sites, of the Saka people and related groups
remain scattered across the Central Asian landscape, a reminder of both the antiquity and
the complexity of their society.3
By around 400 B.C. a series of city-states, centered on Samarkand, had arisen in the basins
of the Amu Darya, Zeravshan, and Syr Darya rivers, in what today is central Uzbekistan.
Collectively known as Sogdiana, the inhabitants were an Iranian-speaking people who
primarily followed Zoroastrianism, and whose territory served as a province of the
Achaemenid Empire. Lying between the eastern margin of this great Persian empire and an

expanding Chinese civilization to the east, the Sogdian city-states derived their wealth from
agriculture and trade. The forces of Alexander the Great took Maracanda (Samarkand) in
329 B.C., bringing for the first time a strong Western influence to the region, and for a brief
while linking Greece, Persia, and Central Asia together into a single political and economic
space.4 Greek control of Central Asia would be short-lived, but the connections established
with Western civilization persisted and the influence of Greek culture in the region held for
several more centuries. Moreover, in the century or so before the birth of Christianity, the
Central Asian oasis states built ties to the massive Chinese state lying to the east. Despite
periodic invasions of nomadic armies from the east, Central Asias role as a great crossroads
for economic and cultural exchange was dawning.
By the time the Roman Empire had reached its greatest extent, the Sogdian traders of
Transoxiana, or the land beyond the Oxus River (the Greek name for the Amu Darya), had
developed a lucrative trade network between China in the east and the Roman and Parthian
empires lying to the west and south. This was the famous Silk Road, which carried not only
that valuable fabric, but also many other commodities. The many cultural elements which
diffused in multiple directions along the various branches of the Silk Road were perhaps
more important than the economic goods transported along the route.5 Buddhism very likely
entered Chinese society from south Asia in this manner, and by the fifth century A.D.
Nestorian Christianity had taken root in many of the settlements of Central Asia. Nestorian
believers would eventually establish communities as far away as central China. The
Sogdians, who were mostly followers of Zoroaster, were accepting and tolerant of these
faiths and many others. Cultural exchange also took place in the form of linguistic diffusion,
with Sogdian serving as a general lingua franca, and Persian and Chinese becoming
disseminated via the trade routes as well. Periodic invasions, mostly from the east, did little
to damage this vast commercial network, as conquerors had nothing to gain by destroying
the cities and system that provided the very riches that attracted them.6 Even the
depredations of the western branch of the Huns in the first century did little to disrupt the
emerging trade relationships cultivated by the Sogdian merchants, whose cities of Bukhara,
Samarkand, Talas, and many others grew rich from their near monopoly. For nearly a
millennium the city-states of Central Asia, either independently or as part of a larger
imperial state, would control the worlds first global trading route.
In the centuries following the collapse of the western portion of the Roman Empire, Turkic
peoples migrated into Central Asia from southern Siberia and Mongolia. By 600 A.D., a
Turkic state extended across the heart of Eurasia, stretching from north-central China to the
Aral Sea, a distance of about 3,000 miles. The Sogdian cities lying between the Aral Sea and
the Tien Shan mountains were vassals of this empire, and the Persian Sassanid Empire met
the western boundary of the Turkic state in what is today Turkmenistan. In the century
between 600 and 700 A.D., the fall of the Sassanid Empire would herald the arrival of a new
force on the western boundary of Transoxiana, a religious movement that would completely
transform the cultural landscape of Central AsiaIslam.
The Islamic conquest of Central Asia began in earnest in 706, when the Arab general
Qutayba ibn Muslim pushed his forces across the Amu Darya to attack the outer reaches of
the Sogdian city-state of Bukhara. Bukhara quickly submitted to the demands of the Muslim
chief, one of which was the abandonment of Zoroastrianism and the complete conversion of
the citys population. Khorezm, the district lying to the west in what is today eastern
Turkmenistan and western Uzbekistan, and Samarkand, the strongest of the Sogdian citystates, both provided a more vigorous resistance to incorporation into the Dar-ul-Islam, or
realm of Islam.7 Samarkand managed to form an alliance with some principalities in the
Fergana Valley, but the combined force was destroyed by the Muslim army, and Samarkand

surrendered to Qutayba. In the meantime Khorezm had been brought to heel as well,
although revolts against the Muslims in both that region and elsewhere continued to plague
the new Islamic overlords for the next several decades. The new rulers set about remaking
much of the urban landscape of the places they absorbed: Existing structures were
destroyed, especially if they were utilized for religious purposes, while mosques and
medressehs were quickly erected to satisfy both the piety of the victors and the numbers of
new converts. The transformation was extensive, and very little of pre-Islamic Bukhara,
Samarkand, or other Central Asian cities remains today. By 900 A.D., the oasis centers of
Central Asia had been fully incorporated into the Muslim world, although the nomadic
peoples who lived on the vast steppes to the north and south of the Silk Road maintained
their religious traditions, with only marginal influence from wandering Sufi adepts and other
representatives of Islam.
The Arab drive to the east was finally halted in 751 A.D., when Muslim forces met a Tang
Dynasty army on the banks of the Talas River in what is today Kyrgyzstan. The battle had
three important historical outcomes. First, it halted for the time being the expansion of
Islam eastward, although the Muslim army is generally agreed to have carried the day.
Secondly, it halted a Chinese move to absorb the Fergana Valley and other parts of Central
Asia. This westward extension of the Chinese border would have represented the deepest
penetration of Chinese authority into Central Asia to that date, and Central Asia would have
a radically different cultural history had such conditions ensued. The third crucial outcome of
the battle was that the Muslim forces captured several Chinese fighters who knew the art of
papermaking, a secret the Chinese had guarded for centuries. These artisans taught their
Islamic captors the technique, and the ability to make paper diffused throughout the Muslim
realm, eventually reaching Europe.8
A century after the Muslim penetration of Transoxiana, a new dynasty appeared in the
region. The Samanid Empire was ruled by Persian-speaking emirs (princes), who were
devoutly committed to the Islamic faith, and it was their zeal for proselytizing and
converting that solidified Central Asia as part of the Muslim world. The previous faiths of
Zoroastrianism, Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism, and others almost entirely disappeared
under Samanid rule, and Sogdian gradually gave way to Persian as the dominant tongue in
the oasis cities. The new language, a forerunner to modern Dari and Tajik, became the
medium of the first great wave of literary genius to emerge in Central Asia. Two of the
foremost poets of classical Persian, Rudaki and Firdawsi, both lived in the Samanid domain,
although the latter would spend part of his life outside the region.9 Moreover, early in the
Samanid period the scholar al-Bukhari produced in Arabic a seminal collection of the hadith,
a work that is still quoted and studied by Islamic scholars. Nominally subject to the Abbasid
caliph in Baghdad, the Samanid emirs were in fact quite politically independent, and like
their Sogdian forebears, promoted trade through their realm between East and West.
Bukhara was the Samanid capital, and at its greatest territorial extent, the Samanid state
included Samarkand, Tashkent, and much of the Fergana Valley. The Samanid rulers pushed
the influence of Islam somewhat further to the east, converting a number of Turkic peoples
who had settled the region in the previous centuries. The region of southeastern Kazakhstan
and northwestern Kyrgyzstan known today as the Semireche (seven rivers) region was
brought into the Islamic fold, when at the end of the ninth century a Samanid army
captured Talas, near the site of the famous battle of almost a century and a half before. This
opened the way for the spread of Sunni Islam to the peoples living there and to the
southeast, a Turkic-speaking people known as the Karakhanids. Within a century they would
not only adopt Islam, but would develop into a formidable military power that would
permanently impose a Turkic dominance on the Persian remnants of the Samanid culture.

At the end of the first millennium, the Samanid Empire found itself sandwiched between two
increasingly aggressive Turkic states. To the east stood the Karakhanid Turks, and to the
south, centered in what is today Afghanistan, lay the Ghaznavid Empire, which stretched for
a time deep into the Indian peninsula. In 999 A.D. a Karakhanid army captured Bukhara and
ended the Samanid reign in Central Asia. The following century in Central Asia was one of
general political and military chaos, as the Karakhanids and Ghaznavids waged war on one
another, and ultimately both would give ground to yet another emergent Turkish culture, the
Seljuks.10 Surprisingly, despite the nearly constant political turmoil during the first century of
the new millennium, Central Asia would again produce some of the greatest minds of the
Muslim world, or for that matter, the entire world. Both Ibn Sina (Avicenna), the great
polymath who specialized in medicine and philosophy, and his contemporary al-Biruni, who
was a geographer, astronomer, and mathematician, appeared in the first decades of the
century. Ibn Sina was originally from Bukhara, while al-Biruni hailed from Khorezm, today
located in western Uzbekistan. Several decades after both men had passed, Mahmud
Kashgari, a Karakhanid Turk who was living in Baghdad, wrote a Turkic-Arabic dictionary,
considered a masterpiece of Islamic literature. That Central Asia produced thinkers of such
caliber in a highly unsettled political landscape speaks volumes about the intellectual climate
that had developed under the Samanids and their successors.
The Seljuks were a loose confederation of nomadic Turkic peoples living along the northern
margins of the Samanid state. During the tenth century they converted to Islam and began
to shift southward into the Persian province of Khurasan, the boundaries of which
corresponded roughly with the modern country of Turkmenistan. Indeed, the Seljuks
belonged to a branch of the Turkic peoples known as the Oghuz, who are considered the
ancestors of the modern Turkmen people.11 By the end of the eleventh century, this cluster
of nomadic tribesmen had carved an empire that reached from Damascus and Baghdad to
the Amu Darya in Central Asia. The Seljuk state encompassed most of modern Syria, Iran,
Turkey, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan, and by 1089 the Karakhanid ruler of Transoxiana
had been reduced to the position of a Seljuk vassal. Although Turks, the Seljuk rulers
supported the Persian cultures they conquered in Khorasan, Iran, and western Afghanistan,
and became great patrons of the arts. Omar Khayyam, probably the best-known Islamic
poet in Western society, lived and wrote as a subject of the Seljuk empire.
The last of the Seljuk sultans, Sanjar, died in 1157, but his empire was unraveling well
before his demise. Several insurrections in Khorezm and Transoxiana plagued the last
decade and a half of Sanjars reign, and the latter region was lost entirely to a new power
that arrived on the fringes of Central Asia around 1140. Historians label this group the Kara
Khitay, and their appearance presaged a much more calamitous invasion that would occur
nearly 80 years later, when the hordes of Genghis Khan would pour across the Silk Road all
the way to Eastern Europe. The Kara Khitay were also nomadic and of Mongol stock, and
appear to have been mostly Buddhist. Their army smashed Sanjars Seljuk force outside of
Samarkand in 1141, and most of Transoxiana was brought under their control. The Kara
Khitay constructed a state that was mostly a loose grouping of vassal states, and they used
some of the existing Karakhanid aristocracy to rule much of Transoxiana while they settled
in the foothills of the Tien Shan in modern Kyrgyzstan. Although Buddhist, the Kara Khitay
leadership apparently tolerated the Muslim faith of their new subjects, and there was no
attempt to either convert the masses or to eradicate the Islamic landscape in favor of a
Buddhist cultural topography.
At the same time the Kara Khitay were establishing suzerainty over the eastern reaches of
Central Asia, to the west of the Amu Darya the Khorezm shahs were busily expanding into
the weakened margins of the Seljuk empire. The first decade of the 1200s witnessed the

expansion of the Khorezm Empire into Afghanistan, which was almost entirely absorbed by
1215. In the east, the Khorezm leader, Ala al-Din Muhammad, attacked the Kara Khitay
after initially securing an alliance with them against the Ghaznavid regime in Afghanistan,
and by 1210 he had pried Transoxiana and most of the Fergana Valley away from them.
Having secured his eastern flank, Muhammad set about conquering Persia and the Middle
Eastern holdings of the old Seljuk realm, and by 1217 he had taken most of Persia. The
following year the remnants of the Kara Khitay state, located mostly in the area just west
and northwest of Lake Issyk Kul in modern Kyrgyzstan, fell victim to nomadic raiders from
western China. These conquerors were almost immediately removed themselves by yet
another group of mounted warriors pouring in from Chinathe Mongols.
The Mongol conquest of Central Asia represents one of the most catastrophic events in the
regions history.12 Perhaps the process might have been less violent and destructive had the
local vassal of Muhammad, the Khorezm shah, not infuriated Genghis Khan by executing a
group of diplomats and merchants sent to Otrar, a Silk Road city on the Syr Darya, in 1218.
Historians puzzle over why this action was taken, but it is clear that neither Muhammad nor
his underling in eastern Central Asia had any understanding of the nature of the new enemy
they faced. Within a year the Mongol army had penetrated the eastern marches of the
Khorezm Empire, sacked Otrar and several other cities, and put Muhammads forces to
flight. The path through Transoxiana now open, the Mongol army methodically attacked the
regions major cities, pillaging and killing on an unprecedented scale.
The Mongol army first attacked Bukhara, sealing off the city and crushing the resistance in
only a few days. After the fall of Bukhara, the Mongols sacked the city, put some of the local
leadership to the sword, and may have set fire to part of the settlement, although the blaze
may have been an accident. Regardless, the residents of Bukhara paid a heavy price for
their failure to surrender immediately to the Mongol horsemen. Samarkand fared no better
a few weeks later, falling to Mongol forces after only a few days. Many of the people of that
ancient city were executed as a result, although artisans and many of the intelligentsia
appear to have been spared. No major city in the region escaped the wrath of the Great
Khan, but perhaps the most horrific destruction took place at Merv, an ancient Silk Road
metropolis, located in what is today southeastern Turkmenistan. There the entire population
was killed, a total of perhaps over a million people, according to some estimates.13 Many of
those butchered were not soldiers, but women and children. Some accounts from Muslim
sources hold that the slaughter required several days of virtually continuous beheadings,
carried out by Mongol warriors who were each assigned a quota of victims. Other cities in
Central Asia, most notably Herat in modern Afghanistan, met similar fates at the hands of
the new conquerors.
It took decades for Central Asia to recover from the Mongol onslaught. The region shortly
fell under the rule of Genghis Khans second son, Chagatay, and the dynasty he established
in the heart of Central Asia ruled Transoxiana and a good-sized portion of the surrounding
territory for over a century. Ironically, Mongol control of Central Asia and the surrounding
regions eventually allowed for a freer cultural and economic exchange between East and
West, and the various khanates that emerged from the conquest in theory, if not always in
practice, represented segments of one continuous empire stretching from Europe to China.
As the late Daniel J. Boorstin has noted, during the height of the Mongol empire, the
curtain was lifted between Western and Eastern civilization.14
The Pax Mongolica, the century and a half of relative peace and prosperity following the
conquest, was abruptly broken in 1370 by the rise of a native world conqueror, Amir Timur,
or as he is known in many Western sources, Tamerlane. With the emergence of Timur,

Central Asia now produced its own great general, one to rival Alexander and Genghis Khan
himself.15 Timur chose Samarkand as his base, and in three decades he built an empire that
stretched from India to Iraq, encompassing all of the heart of Asia and the Middle East. The
Timurid Dynasty, as his legacy is known, barely lasted a century beyond his death, but he
and his immediate successors left an indelible imprint on Central Asia. Shahrukh, his son,
and Ulug Beg, his grandson, were great builders and patrons of the arts, and the latter was
himself one of the worlds foremost astronomers. The Timurid rulers who followed them in
the second half of the fifteenth century continued the generous patronage of art and
literature, and the Timurid period may be viewed as the zenith of Central Asian cultural
achievement and learning.16 The last Timurid prince, Babur, although driven from Central
Asia, would

Dome of Guri Amir,

final resting place of Amir Timur, in Samarkand.
(Photo courtesy of Reuel Hanks)

establish the Mogul Dynasty in India, continuing the empire-building tradition of his
forebears.
Those who displaced the Timurids in Transoxiana were a Turkic tribal confederation known
as the Shaybanids, who were in fact the ancestors of the modern Uzbeks and Kazakhs, the
two largest ethnic groups in Central Asia today. The tribes who would become Uzbeks
became mostly sedentary and urbanized; those who would form the core of the Kazakh
ethnicity remained nomadic, patrolling the expansive steppe lands between the southern
Ural Mountains and the Tien Shan. In the 1700s the latter would face yet another
devastating invasion from the east. In this case the invaders were the Kalmyks (also called
the Jungars), a confederation of Buddhist Mongols who would create chaos and calamity
among the Kazakh tribes for half a century.17 The three great divisions of the Kazakhs,
known as the Lesser Horde, Middle Horde, and Great Horde, were all threatened by the
Kalmyks, but the latter two in particular. The disruptions brought about by the persistent
raids of the Kalmyks opened the way for external powers to gain a foothold in Central Asia.

Primary among the new players in the region was the Russian Empire, which had shown
interest in expanding into Central Asia from the time of Peter the Great.
Thus, the nineteenth century would witness yet another penetration of Central Asia by an
outside power. In this case the process of intrusion and conquest would be slow but
inexorable and would come not from the east, but the northwest. For a number of centuries
the Russian Empire had been pushing eastward and southward across the Eurasian
landmass, and the Russians and Central Asian peoples had actively traded with each other
for almost as long. The destructive invasions of the Kalmyks in the 1700s had forced some
of the Kazakhs to seek protection from the Russians, and this alliance provided the
opportunity for the Russian Empire to gradually secure control of the steppe east of the
Caspian Sea. In the latter years of the reign of Catherine the Great, the Russian military
established a line of fortress towns reaching from the southern Ural Mountains to the Irtysh
River in southern Siberia, garrisoned by Cossack troops. This defensive line would serve in
coming decades as a front that would be steadily pushed southward, absorbing the
traditional grazing lands of the Kazakhs.
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Russians quite literally bought the loyalty
of various Kazakh khans, or leaders, by bribing them and promising the protection of the
Tsar in the event of another hostile invasion by the Kalmyks or some other enemy. Between
1800 and 1865 the majority of the Kazakh tribes acknowledged allegiance to the Russian
crown, and Slavic settlers were moved onto vacant grasslands that Kazakh herders had
used for centuries. Occasionally there were uprisings against the persistent incursions, but
the Kazakhs were outgunned and lacked the organization and leadership necessary to
mount a united and sustained resistance. The most serious challenge to Russian hegemony
was brought by Kenesary Khan, a brilliant strategist and popular leader who fought the
Russians to a standstill between 1837 and 1844, but eventually Kenesary too was reined in
his would be the last widespread revolt among the Kazakhs.
To the south of the Kazakh grazing lands lay three city-states: the Khanates of Khiva and
Kokand, in the west and the east respectively, separated by the Emirate of Bukhara. All
three had traded with the Russian Empire for centuries, especially merchants from Khiva,
but the relationship had not been entirely peaceful and cooperative. The Central Asians
occasionally raided Russian commercial caravans and also supported an active slave trade,
using in many cases Russian captives taken from the towns and farms of the southern
Russian steppe. The taking of Russian slaves had been a sore point especially between
Russia and Khiva, and in 1839 the Russian military launched a punitive expedition with the
goal of deposing the khan of Khiva, liberating Russian slaves, and replacing the khan with a
ruler who would be loyal to the Tsar. This effort ended in complete failure, as harsh weather
forced the column to retreat without ever reaching the city. Despite such setbacks and the
distraction of the Crimean War in the early 1850s, the government in St. Petersburg
continued to push its line of control southward across the steppe to the margin of the citystates. The desire for additional resources, ready markets for Russian goods, and concern
over British activities in the region all drove Russian ambitions. The establishment of a
garrison at Aralsk in 1848, deep in the heart of the Kazakh steppe, gave the Russians
strategic control of the Syr Darya and put Russian troops at the very doorstep of both the
Khivan Khanate and the Emirate of Bukhara.
The construction of the Russian fort at Verny (Almaty) in 1854 completed a line of such
settlements across the southern Kazakh steppe lands, and serves as a historical benchmark
in the Russian colonization of the Kazakhs.18 From the 1820s, the Russian authorities had
progressively forced the relocation of many of the Kazakh nomads, replacing them on the

steppe with Slavic settlers. This policy led to periodic insurrections like that of Kensary
Khan, but these did little to deter the influx of sedentary agriculturalists and the massive
loss of Kazakh grazing lands. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, hundreds of
thousands of Slavs would pour onto the northern steppe in Central Asia, changing the ethnic
landscape permanently, a phenomenon that would be repeated during the Soviet era. 19 But
in the 1850s, the Russians found themselves competing for control of the southern portion
of the Kazakh lands with the Kokand Khanate. The Khanate of Kokand had expanded its
territory in the first part of the century, but in the 1850s had become weakened by internal
strife and conflict with Bukhara. The Russian advance gradually plucked away sections of the
Khanate in the 1850s, including the settlement of Bishkek, today the capital of Kyrgyzstan.
Provocations by both sides, the continuing political instability in Kokand, and persistent
Russian fears of British involvement in Central Asia set the stage for the Russian campaign
of conquest of the three city-states of Central Asia.
The catalyst for the annexation of the oasis states by Imperial Russia was an extremely illadvised attack in 1861 on the Russian outpost at Verny by troops from Kokand. This event
convinced the Tsar to support those who advocated the military conquest of Kokand, and in
1863 Tsar Alexander II issued a decree ordering a campaign against the Khanate. The initial
prize that the Russian generals in Central Asia sought was the city of Tashkent, and after an
unsuccessful attempt to take the city in 1864, the commander of the Russian force, General
Mikhail Chernaiev, again led an assault against Tashkent in June of 1865. After a five-day
battle the walls of Tashkent were breached and fell to Russian forces. Although hailed as a
hero in St. Petersburg, Chernaiev was recalled from Central Asia. The territories taken from
Kokand were formed into the Governor Generalship of Turkestan and placed under the
administration of General Konstantin von Kaufman, who quickly embarked on a campaign
against the Emirate of Bukhara in 1868, taking Samarkand, and against Khiva in 1872,
absorbing significant land from both into Turkestan. Both Bukhara and Khiva were forced to
become Russian vassal states, and in 1875 what was left of the Kokand Khanate was
absorbed into the Russian Empire. By 1880 nearly all of Central Asia was directly or
indirectly under the control of the Russian Empire, and British concerns over the Tsars
ambitions toward South Asia had reached critical levels. As a result, the two empires agreed
to establish Afghanistan as a buffer state between their colonies, an event that not only
reduced tensions, but also confirmed Russias colonization of Central Asia.
Thus, the Tsar found himself the sovereign of a vast new territory, much of which had been
only loosely governed and administered since the time of the Mongol conquest. The court in
St. Petersburg was intent on quickly organizing and exploiting its new colonial holdings for
several reasons. First, the threat of revolt by the indigenous Central Asians remained a
threat to security, along with the potential of meddling by British agents. Secondly, the
agricultural promise of the region was enormous, and the U.S. Civil War had resulted in a
global shortage of cotton. The Russian administration aimed to rapidly expand the irrigated
land in the southern reaches of Turkestan and plant thousands of new hectares of land in
wheat in the more arid northern area, on the former grazing lands of the Kazakh hordes.
The political geography employed focused on dividing the huge territory between southern
Russia and Afghanistan into two large administrative units, which were then subdivided into
smaller units, or oblasts. The land situated between southern Siberia and a line extending
roughly from the northern end of the Caspian Sea, connecting to the northern shore of the
Aral Sea and then to Lake Balkash in the east, was formed into the Governorate General of
the Steppe, equivalent to the northern two thirds of modern Kazakhstan. In the south the
Governorate General of Turkestan was created, which ultimately reached from the southern
Caspian in the west to the border with China in the east, and included the rich irrigated land
of Transoxiana and the Fergana Valley. Over the next century, this territory would become

arguably the worlds greatest cotton-producing region, and of vital economic importance to
the empire.
One final piece of territory remained to be added to Russian colonial possessions in Central
Asiathe stretch of land, mostly foreboding desert, that lay between Transoxiana and the
southern margin of the Caspian Sea. This was the home of warlike, nomadic tribesmen
known as the Turkmen. In 1869 the Russians had built the port city of Krasnovodsk on the
eastern shore of the Caspian, a clear sign of their intentions to add this final piece of Central
Asia to their holdings, and by doing so, gain a common border with Persia. The Turkmen,
however, resisted fiercely. When a Russian army ventured into the region in 1879 and
attacked the fortress city of Geok Tepe in the foothills of the Kopet Dag mountains, it was
driven off in a crushing defeat. But the Russians returned with a larger and better-armed
force two years later, and after several weeks, penetrated the city walls and destroyed
Turkmen resistance.20 The Russian conquest of Central Asia was complete.
The Tsars new Muslim subjects frequently chafed under Russian rule, however, and
uprisings occasionally broke out in the latter nineteenth century.21 The most serious of these
erupted in 1898 in the Fergana Valley, originating in the old Silk Road city of Andijan. There,
a local Islamic leader, Madali, declared a jihad on the Russian authorities and attacked the
Russian soldiers stationed in Andijan with about 2,000 supporters. The attack took place
along with assaults against Russian forces in the cities of Osh and Margilan as well, a
circumstance that implies the revolt was not completely spontaneous and had been planned.
However, the Muslim rebels were quite lightly armed in comparison to the Russians and took
heavy losses.22 Madali was captured and subsequently executed, but the incident revealed to
the Tsarist administration the discontent that many in the region felt toward both the
government and the increasing numbers of Russian immigrants.
The Russian occupation of Central Asia sparked new movements among the local
intelligentsia, many of whom were shocked at both the ease of the conquest and the
obvious technological and social backwardness of their society. Some intellectuals sought
mechanisms designed to modernize Central Asian culture. Calling themselves Jadids, a
moniker that meant new method, by the early years of the twentieth century they were
urging local leaders to implement educational and social reform.23 At the time, probably less
than 10 percent of the native Central Asian population was literate, and among women the
figure was even lower. Composed mostly of young writers and journalists, the reformers
made little headway in changing the antiquated regimes in the remnants of the Bukharan
and Khivan oasis states, which now were no more than quasi-independent satellite states of
the Russian court. Some of the more prominent reformers, such as Abdurruaf Fitrat24 and
Munawwar Qari, would become quite active in revolutionary politics in the decades just
before and after the Bolshevik Revolution.
The Russian Revolution of 1905 was welcomed by many of the native elite in Central Asia,
who felt that the autocratic rule of the Tsar was stultifying both economically and
intellectually. The failure of the revolt only intensified the discontent many felt toward the
government and a sovereign who they viewed as alien as well as manipulative. Even many
Central Asians who had visited Moscow, and in some cases had been educated in Russianlanguage schools, saw the Russian administration in this light. Reaction to World War I was
initially largely ambivalent, as the draft among Muslim males in the region was not instituted
immediately. However, when the Tsars government did impose conscription in 1916, the
Central Asians rose in a massive revoltat one point the rebels had more than 20,000
troops in the field.

The 1916 rebellion was crushed by the end of the year with heavy losses among the
Kazakhs and other Central Asian peoples. But few would have imagined that the region, and
indeed the entire Russian Empire, was on the brink of a protracted period of political chaos
and destruction. The next year, 1917, brought revolution to the entire empire, and in
Central Asia, local Muslim activists competed with Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries for
control. A Kazakh nationalist movement, Alash Orda, briefly governed portions of the
Kazakh steppe before being suppressed by Bolshevik forces, but there was widespread
opposition to the Bolshevik agenda, especially among the native Central Asians.25 In the
protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva, the revolution found support among some of the
Jadids, who began calling themselves Young Khivans and Young Bukharans, after the
Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire. But anti-Bolshevik forces held most of Turkmenistan
and sizable swaths of territory elsewhere in the region, and it was not until the arrival of
Bolshevik reinforcements under a capable general, Mikhail Frunze, that the Communists
gained the upper hand. Frunze routed the poorly-organized units of the White Army in
Central Asia, and after two years had solidified Bolshevik control.26 In 1920, Soviet troops
drove the old leadership from both Khiva and Bukhara, establishing peoples republics in
both cities. Many of the Muslim intelligentsia supported these moves, believing that the new
Communist rulers would back their goal of national self-determination. But in fact, they had
simply traded one master for another.27
The rise of Bolshevik power in Central Asia was not widely welcomed by much of the local
population. The atheistic provisions of Marxism, and the fact that the Bolsheviks drew most
of their support from Russian settlers, turned many Central Asians away from the
revolution. A large number in the early 1920s joined an armed uprising known as the
Basmachi revolt. The Basmachi resistance was most active in the Fergana Valley, and at the
height of its influence had possibly 60,000 troops, although there was no supreme
leadership and many of the Basmachi simply conducted raids on their own against Bolshevik
targets.28 Soviet historians claimed that this antirevolutionary group was composed mostly
of Muslim officials, wealthy land owners, and other enemies of the people, but in truth it
was a diverse movement drawing fighters from many social classes, and in some parts of
the region enjoyed broad support from the local population.
But by 1924 the Basmachi were losing ground to Soviet forces, which were better organized
and armed and outnumbered the rebels. A softening of Soviet policies toward the national
aspirations of the indigenous peoples of Central Asia, and the improving economic situation
there, weakened popular support for the Basmachi, and many of them eventually fled to
northern Afghanistan. It required another decade to completely eradicate their activities
however, as some isolated units of the rebels apparently were still operating against the
Soviet regime as late as the mid-1930s, and could not have done so without local support.
The advent of Soviet control of Central Asia would completely change the regions political
geography and set the stage for the eventual emergence of nation-states based on ethnolinguistic identity. In 1920 officials of the Bolshevik Party in Russia had suggested that the
region be organized on the basis of linguistic commonalities, but the exact nature of these
groups was a source of considerable confusion. Russian and Soviet ethnographers, for
example, confused the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz, and in most cases literary languages had to
be created for the groups identified. Many Central Asians did not identify themselves as
Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks, or others, and many of the local elite favored the establishment of
a single territorial unit for the entire region. The Tajiks, who spoke a language distinct from
the Turkic languages of most others living in the region, were easily labeled as a separate
group, but the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, for example, were separated on the basis of rather fine,
and some would argue imaginary, linguistic detail. Some urbanized residents, collectively

known as Sarts, were multilingual and frequently did not identify with the ethnic
categories supplied by the Soviet government. But beginning in 1924, the old Governorates
General were systematically divided into Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) or smaller units
based on nationality. The Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs appeared first in 1924, the Tajik SSR
in 1929, and the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSRs in the 1930s.29
The late 1920s and 1930s was a catastrophic period for the people of Central Asia, primarily
because of two Soviet policies that cost millions of lives. The first of these, and the most
devastating, was the collectivization of agricultural land. The second was the drive by the
regime of Josef Stalin to purge the Communist Party, and Soviet society as a whole, of
anti-Soviet elements. This latter movement resulted in the infamous show trials of the
1930s and the nearly wholesale extermination of the Central Asian elite, many of whom
were former Jadids who had joined the Communist Party during or after the revolution.30 The
forced confiscation and collectivization of land was fiercely opposed across the whole of
Central Asia, but the traditionally nomadic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were especially resistant to
having their animals appropriated by the newly formed collective farms. Instead of turning
their livestock over to Soviet control, they slaughtered them en mass: The number of cattle
and sheep on the Kazakh steppe in the early 1930s dropped from a combined total of more
than 29 million head in 1929 to less than 4 million in 1933. This calamitous decline in
livestock was accompanied by famine and disastrous losses among the Kazakhs themselves
perhaps as many as one and a half million Kazakh lives were lost in the 1930s, out of a
total population of under five million reported in 1926.31 In total in Central Asia,
collectivization cost probably in excess of two million lives, but by 1935 almost all the
productive land in the region was under the control of the Soviet government.
The Soviet regime pursued a policy of economic and social modernization in the new Central
Asian republics. Electrification was a major goal, and by the 1940s much of the region was
connected to the national power grid. Industrialization was promoted on a grand scale,
especially in the urban centers of northern and central Kazakhstan and the larger cities of
the southern republics. This process was accelerated during World War II, when entire
factories were relocated to the region and away from the European republics of the USSR,
in order to prevent their being captured or destroyed by the invading Germans. The
irrigation system was greatly expanded as well, sometimes on a massive level, such as the
construction of the Kara Kum Canal.32 Begun in 1954, the Kara Kum is the largest manmade
water supply canal in the world, stretching for more than 1,300 kilometers across southern
Turkmenistan, enabling a huge expansion of irrigated crop production. Cotton was the
primary irrigated crop, but the acreage devoted to food crops also increased substantially.
Literacy rates increased dramatically under the Soviet educational system, and large
numbers of women were allowed access to educational opportunities for the first time in
Central Asian history. But at the same time, Islam was severely repressed and the use of
the indigenous languages discouraged in favor of Russian. Conformity to Soviet norms was
required of anyone who wished to rise socially or economically, and obtaining a higher
education without a solid knowledge of Russian was impossible. The economic
modernization of Central Asia would also carry with it a high environmental price.
The death of Josef Stalin in 1953 heralded a new era of Soviet government, but although
Nikita Khrushchev and those who followed him to the post of General Secretary of the
Communist Party would not repeat the excesses of the Stalinist terror, their policies had a
profound impact on Central Asia. An example is the Virgin and Idle Lands program
articulated by Khrushchev in 1953. Khrushchevs goal was to boost agricultural output in the
USSR, and toward that end he ordered that huge sovkhozy or state farms be established in
the steppes of northern Kazakhstan, land that the Soviet leader viewed as under-utilized

because it was still being used for grazing. By 1956 more than 74 million acres of additional
farmland had been put to the plow.33 The farms needed massive numbers of new workers,
so Khrushchev encouraged the migration of hundreds of thousands of young Slavic
volunteers to settle in northern Kazakhstan. In just the first two years of the program,
650,000 new arrivals settled in the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan. This had the effect of
dividing the ethnic geography of Kazakhstan into a Slav-dominated north, and a Kazakhdominated south and west, with the exception of the city of Alma Ata (Almaty) in the south,
which maintained a large Russian population. The change was dramaticthe 1926 Soviet
census indicated that 35 percent of Kazakhstans population consisted of non-Muslim
nationalities; the 1959 census showed that this share had risen to 65 percent, making the
Kazakhs a minority in their own titular republic. The losses in the Kazakh population under
Stalin and the Virgin and Idle Lands program were largely responsible for this shift.
Some Soviet development policies had catastrophic, long-term effects on the environment
and people of Central Asia. A number of disaster zones now appear on the landscape of the
region due to the carelessness and mismanagement of Soviet policies implemented in the
decades after World War II. Of particular note are the nuclear polygon in eastern
Kazakhstan and the collapse of the Aral Sea. In the 1950s, the Soviet administration chose
the steppe lands of eastern Kazakhstan to develop and test their nuclear arsenal. The main
test site was located only 100 miles due west of the city of Semipalatinsk (Semey), which
lay directly in the fallout pattern carried by the winds eastward. In the 40 years between
1949 and 1989, more than 450 nuclear tests were conducted on this territory, more than
100 of them above ground.34 The effects of this testing on the people living to the east of
the site was, and continues to be, tragic. An environmental disaster on an even grander
scale occurred with the Aral Sea, once the fourth-largest lake in the world (see Chapter 4,
Energy and Water in Central Asia). Soviet planners, driven to fulfill production quotas for
cotton, siphoned off ever-increasing amounts of water from the rivers supplying the sea, to
the point that the entire ecosystem collapsed. Today the Aral Sea is a dead body of water,
and most of the marine life has vanished. Those living in its immediate vicinity suffer from a
variety of maladies, including high rates of certain cancers, blood disorders, and many birth
defects.
The last chapter in the saga of Soviet Central Asia began in 1985 with the ascension of
Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of the Communist Party of the USSR. Gorbachev was
hailed as a new type of Soviet leader, one who would bring change to a country and
political system that appeared to be rambling off the tracks. Gorbachev promised reform,
and in the first few years of his administration he set about replacing many of the
Communist Party leaders in Central Asia and elsewhere. The decision to replace the longtime Kazakh First Party Secretary, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, with Gennady Kolbin, a nonKazakh, in December 1986 initiated violent protests in the Kazakh capital of Alma Ata that
resulted in dozens of deaths.35 Some commentators consider this open and angry defiance of
Soviet authority to be the first serious crack in the facade of Soviet unity. In the Uzbek SSR
a corruption scandal over the falsification of cotton production, first brought to light in the
years just prior to Gorbachevs leap to power, led to widespread resentment of Moscows
authority among the Party elite.36 Gorbachevs policies of glasnost (openness) and
perestroika (restructuring) had cleared the way for direct criticism of the Soviet system and
of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In the Central Asian republics of the USSR reception of the new
policies was cautious, but by the end of the 1980s many had lost their fear of questioning
not only the strategies of the authorities, but their motivations as well. Ironically, the ethnonational identities created in Central Asia by the Communist regime in the 1920s, had by
the 1980s firmly taken root and Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and others came to see themselves as
colonized and exploited peoples.

As the fabric of the USSR began to disintegrate in 1989 and 1990, the Central Asian
republics slowly followed the lead of the Baltic states and others in pursuing autonomy, if
not outright independence. Most of the Central Asian republics issued declarations of
sovereignty in the year before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it is fair to say that
when the end came, the Central Asian leadership was the least prepared for sudden
independence. Whereas in the Baltic states and even in Russia alternatives to the
Communist Party had been allowed to form by the late 1980s, in Central Asia the
Communist authorities retained a tight grip on power, while allowing a limited devolution of
political power. Nevertheless, alternative political movements had appeared in several of the
Central Asian republics, with many of their platforms focused on the environmental damage
wrought by Soviet rule (such as Nevada-Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan), or the issue of
returning the native language to an equivalent status with Russian (as with Birlik in
Uzbekistan). The Communist Party leaders in the region reacted quite cautiously to the
attempted coup of August 1991, and in fact most of the remaining Soviet republics declared
independence before the Central Asian states did so. But as it became evident that the
Soviet experiment had run its course, the Central Asian SSRs officially became sovereign
countries. Kazakhstan was the last Soviet republic to declare independence from the Soviet
Union, on December 16, 1991.

Notes
1. An excellent discussion of the Scythians and their later relatives, the
Sarmatians, may be found in A.I. Melyukova, The Scythians and Sarmatians,
in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, edited by Denis Sinor, Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
2. For additional discussion of Scythian artistic achievement, see Rene Grousset,
The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970, pp. 1115.
3. See A.I. Melyukova, The Scythians and Sarmatians, in The Cambridge History
of Early Inner Asia, edited by Denis Sinor, Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 1990, passim.
4. Wilfrid Blunt, The Golden Road to Samarkand, New York: Viking Press, 1973.
5. An excellent account of the Silk Road is Frances Wood, The Silk Road: Two
Thousand Years in the Heart of Asia, University of California Press, 2004.
6. A brief but engaging coverage of the Sogdians is offered in Richard Frye, The
Heritage of Central Asia, Princeton, New Jersey: Markus Wiener Publishers,
1996, especially the chapter entitled The Merchant World of the Sogdians.
7. Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, Cambridge, England: University of
Cambridge Press, 2000, 5761.
8. Jonathan Bloom, Paper Before Print: The History and Impact of Paper in the
Islamic World, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2001.
9. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge, England: University of
Cambridge Press, 1988, 153156; Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia,
Cambridge, England: University of Cambridge Press, 2000, 7275.
10. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge, England: University of
Cambridge Press, 1988, 141146.
11. Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, Cambridge, England: University of
Cambridge Press, 2000, 9396.

12. David Morgan, The Mongols, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers,

1986, 7383.
13. Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, Cambridge, England: University of
Cambridge Press, 2000, 114116.
14. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Discoverers, New York: Random House, 1983, 124128.
15. One of the most comprehensive studies of Amir Timur available in English is
Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
16. Thomas W. Lentz and Glenn D. Lowry, Timur and the Princely Vision, California:
Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1989.
17. The Kalmyks are typically referred to as Jungars in Central Asia. Some regions
were almost entirely depopulated as a result of the battles between these
nomadic peoples. The period is still known among the Kazakhs as the Aktaban
Shubyryndy, literally, fleeing the enemy down to the bone of the feet.
18. Geoffrey Wheeler, Russian Conquest and Colonization of Central Asia, in
Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution, edited by Taras
Hunczak. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974.
19. George Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 18961916,
Bloomington, Indiana: Mouton, 1969. Also see Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond
Russia: The Politics of National Identity, London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1995, 103105.
20. Helene Carrere dEncausse, Systematic Conquest, 1865 to 1884, in Central
Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989, 147148.
21. For a short discussion of the Tsars approach to his Muslim subjects, see Daniel
Brower, Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan, in Russias
Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 17001917, edited by Daniel R.
Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1997. A much more extensive study is provided by Robert D.
Crews, For Prophet and Tsar, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 2006.
22. Ann Sheehy, The Andizhan Uprising of 1898 and Soviet Historiography,
Central Asian Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 139150.
23. For more on the Jadidist movement in Central Asia, see Adeeb Khalid, The
Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia, Berkeley,
California: University of California Press, 1998.
24. An excellent overview of the role Uzbek literary figures played in the years
leading up to and after the Bolshevik Revolution in Central Asia may be found in
Tahir Qahhar, Uzbek Literature, World Literature Today, Vol. 70, No. 3.
25. Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, 2nd edition, Stanford, California: Hoover
Institution Press, 1995, 133156.
26. For most of the Soviet era, the capital of the Kyrgyzstan Soviet Socialist
Republic was called Frunze. Mikhail Frunze himself was quite an interesting
historical figure, and appeared to be a rising star in the Bolshevik Party when he
died at the young age of 40 during surgery. Some historians hold that Josef
Stalin, also an emerging young leader in the Party at that time, had Frunze

secretly murdered.
27. Michael Rywkin, Moscows Muslim Challenge, revised edition, Armonk, New
York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990, 1932.
28. One of the most detailed studies of the Basmachi available in English is Glenda
Frasers lengthy two-part article BasmachiI and BasmachiII, which
appeared in Central Asian Survey, Vol. 6, Nos. 1 and 2. For an interesting
perspective on how Bolshevik soldiers viewed the Basmachi, see Helene Aymen
de Lageard, The Revolt of the Basmachi According to Red Army Journals
(19201922), Central Asia Survey, Vol. 6, No. 3.
29. Helene Carrere dEncausse, The National Republics Lose Their Independence,
in Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989, 256257.
30. The benchmark work in English on these events is Robert Conquests The Great
Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1990. See
especially pages 356359.
31. Additional statistical data and a detailed discussion of this tragedy may be
found in the chapter entitled Central Asia and the Kazakh Tragedy, in Robert
Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow, New York and Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
32. Ann Sheehy, Irrigation in the Amu Darya Basin, Central Asian Review, Vol. 15,
No. 4.
33. See the chapter The Virgin Lands and the Creation of a Socialist Kazakhstan in
Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, 2nd edition, Stanford, California: Hoover
Institution Press, 1995.
34. Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Astana Takes the Lead in Lobbying for Nuclear-Free
World, Eurasia Insight, July 15, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav071509
.shtml.
35. Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, 2nd edition. Stanford, California: Hoover
Institution Press, 1995, 252253.
36.

EMERGENT CENTRAL ASIAN STATES AND SECURITY ISSUES

The newly independent states of former Soviet Central Asia share much in common, but as
each set forth on the path of independence, it became clear that each of the new countries
also faced unique challenges to their security and development. After almost two decades of
independence, the five emergent states have evolved in distinctive ways, partly as a result
of the character of the individual challenges that each must address, and also due to the

various methods and pathways that each has chosen to deal with such challenges. This
chapter will outline the major security issues that each of the five has encountered over the
last 18 years, few of which have been resolved, and many of which continue to represent
potential or actual threats to stability in the region. Subsequent chapters will address a
number of the more serious security issues in greater detail.

Kazakhstan
Nursultan Nazarbayev was elected to the new position of president of Kazakhstan on
December 1, 1991, just over two weeks before the country officially became independent,
and only three and a half weeks before the official resignation of the Supreme Soviet,
marking the official collapse of the state apparatus of the USSR. But the collapse had
transpired so swiftly and unexpectedly that Nazarbayev was skeptical that Kazakhstan was
prepared to function as an independent state.1 Many of the institutions that were necessary
to such status were either entirely unformed or only in the initial states of formation.
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus had begun crafting a Slavic union in the weeks before the
complete decline of Soviet authority, and it was at Nazarbayevs urging that the organization
was enlarged to include almost all of the former Soviet republics. Narzabayev therefore
immediately displayed his credentials as a capable foreign policy figure, and one who had
the skills to cobble together beneficial coalitions in the post-Soviet space that could spur
economic development and enhance the mutual security interests of the participating
countries. The Commonwealth of Independent States was enlarged on December 21, 1991
to include not only Kazakhstan, but the other four Central Asian countries as well. 2
One of the largest differences between Kazakhstan and the remaining four Central Asian
countries was that Kazakhstan emerged from the USSR as a nuclear-armed statethe
republic had been one of only four where Soviet atomic weapons were stationed. This gave
Kazakhstan an elevated status, but also created yet another security problem for
Nazarbayev. In the United States, significant concern arose over the fact that the Muslim
territory of Kazakhstan now had its own nuclear arsenal, and about the security of the
weapons-grade material the country controlled. An even greater concern quickly developed
in regard to limiting the transfer of technical information for the making of weapons of mass
destruction from former Soviet territory to rogue states and terrorist groups.
To compound the various security dilemmas he faced, Nazarbayev also had to contend with
Russian nationalism, both domestic and from inside Russia itself. Here too he faced a
situation unique to Kazakhstan, in that his new country contained a large, geographicallyconcentrated Slavic minority, many of which were quite anxious about the rising tide of
Kazakh nationalism that had been evident since the late 1980s.3 The Soviet census of 1989
had shown that five of the oblasts of northern Kazakhstan held Russian pluralities, and two
more contained an absolute majority of ethnic Russians (Northern Kazakhstan and Eastern
Kazakhstan). Prominent Russian nationalists in Russia, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, openly suggested that the border between Russia and Kazakhstan was
artificial and should be redrawn to include the Russian zone within the Russian
Federation.4 Thus, almost immediately, Nazarbayev was forced to confront a serious
challenge to his new countrys spatial integrity. He understood perfectly that to acquiesce to
such demands would spell the end of an independent Kazakhstan, for two reasons. First, on
a practical level, the northern oblasts represented the industrial heart of Kazakhstan, and
their loss would reduce the country to the economic status of an agrarian, underdeveloped
state. Secondly, if Russia were allowed to bully his country into relinquishing such an
enormous swath of land, Kazakhstans independence would be an obvious fiction to the

remainder of the world, and the country would simply be viewed as a docile satellite of its
larger, more powerful northern neighbor.
The Nazarbayev administration attempted to deal with the dual issues of nuclear armament
and the border with Russia as swiftly as possible, and to some extent successfully linked the
two issues in its early foreign policy. Both the United States and Russia had concerns about
the security of the nuclear weapons that were positioned on Kazakh territory, and the
Kazakh governments willingness to part with these weapons, employing both Russian and
American assistance, improved the relationships with both countries. Between 1994 and
1996 Kazakhstan and Russia negotiated the removal of launchers, strategic bombers, and
nuclear warheads from Kazakh territory, and by 1997 the country had forsaken virtually all
the nuclear weapons capability it had inherited upon Soviet collapse. Kazakhstan also
readily entered into mutual security pacts with Russia, including the CIS Collective Security
Treaty signed in 1992, and this high level of cooperation with Russia on security issues
served to reduce tensions over the border and the status of the Russian minority in
Kazakhstan.5 But at the same time, authorities in Kazakhstan openly courted a close
security relationship with the West and with NATO. Indeed, American specialists were invited
to Kazakhstan to participate in and verify the removal of nuclear weapons and assist in the
dismantling of missile silos. In 1994 Kazakhstan was one of four Central Asian states to join
the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace initiative, and the country quickly cultivated
closer linkages to NATO than any of the other states in the region.6 This laid the early
groundwork for the multi-vector foreign policy that Kazakhstan has employed for the past
15 years.
Domestically, Nazarbayev treaded quite carefully on the issue of supplanting the use of
Russian language with Kazakh, a language which only a tiny percentage of the Slavic
population could speak.7 On the other hand, he remained absolutely opposed to Russian
suggestions that the Russians living in the near abroad be awarded dual citizenship,
making the Russian population of northern Kazakhstan citizens of both countries. Nazabayev
rejected such an arrangement, viewing it as a means of only further weakening the loyalties
of his Slavic subjects to their new country. His concerns were well-founded, as even in the
late 1990s surveys showed that many Russian residents in Kazakhstan felt greater affinity
toward Russia than Kazakhstan.8
Indeed, the status of Kazakhstans Russian minority was a question that the Kazakh
government was forced to confront throughout the 1990s. Nazarbayev devised a strategy
aimed at solidifying the countrys hold on its northern oblasts, rooted in modifications of
Kazakhstans political geography. First, in 1994 Nazabayev announced that the country
would relocate the capital, including all governmental bodies and agencies, from Almaty to
the city of Akmola (formerly Tselinograd) by 1997. Akmola, whose name in Kazakh was
frequently translated in Western sources as white grave, was renamed Astana. Over the
past decade this old industrial center has been transformed into the second-largest city in
the country. The rationale behind the move of the capital has been much debated: Almatys
frequent seismic activity, its location close to the border with Uzbekistan and China, and
various other reasons have been offered by the Kazakh government, but to many observers
the purpose of the relocation was clear. By shifting the center of political authority and
power to the Russian steppe lands

Bayterek tower in
Astana. The tower symbolizes the countrys rapid growth.
(Photo courtesy of Reuel Hanks)

of northern Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev was bent on securing his countrys territorial

integritycountries cannot be expected to negotiate away lands that hold their
national capital.
During the first years of independence Kazakhstans economic policy was tightly linked to
Russia, due to the continuation of the use of Russian currency in Kazakhstan and other
former Soviet states that remained with the so-called ruble zone. This meant that the
Russian administration effectively dictated the macroeconomic policy of Kazakhstan, and
also that any crisis in the Russian economy was, by default, a crisis in Kazakhstan as well.
For example, the Russian economic crisis of 19921994, characterized by hyperinflation and
an abrupt fall in the rubles value in international currency markets, precipitated similar

economic decline in Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev was reluctant to introduce a national currency,

fearing that such a move would damage relations with Russia and possibly lead to instability
in the fragile Kazakh credit market, as well as worsening the inflationary pressures already
present in the economy. But Russias demand late in 1993 that all member states of the
ruble zone deposit their gold reserves in Russian banks forced the Kazakh presidents hand,
and he called for the introduction of the tenge, the new currency.9 The tenge initially lost
value against most global currencies, but eventually stabilized by 1995, and Kazakhstan was
free to craft an independent economic policy. This was soon reflected in an ambitious
program to privatize state-owned assets in Kazakhstan. Industrial production in the country
declined alarmingly in the early 1990s, and in order to attract foreign direct investment
(FDI), the Kazakh administration began leasing and selling inefficient factories and firms,
still in government hands from the Soviet period, to private investors.
The driving force behind the move to attract FDI was the countrys large oil reserves. Even
before the Soviet collapse, large deposits of petroleum had been discovered in western
Kazakhstan, in the basin of the Caspian Sea. The largest of these deposits was the Tengiz
field. The American oil company Chevron and the Kazakh government formed a joint
venture, Tengizchevroil, in 1993 in order to exploit the hydrocarbon wealth of the country,
and similar agreements with other international oil companies quickly followed.10 Within a
few years Kazakhstan became an oil state, certainly not on par with many of the oilproducing countries of the Persian Gulf, but nevertheless an important secondary source of
petroleum to the global market. An enormous amount of investment in infrastructure,
especially pipelines, was required to develop the countrys potential as an oil exporter, and
the Kazakh administration set about securing as much foreign investment as possible. Just
in the 1990s, U.S. companies invested more than $1.5 billion in Kazakhstan, with the
majority of that money going towards exploiting the countrys oil riches. Kazakhstans new
role as player in the global oil market changed the countrys security situation in two
important ways. First, Kazakhstan quickly became the most economically important and
successful country in Central Asia, with real growth in GDP annually approaching 10 percent
after 2001. Secondly, being an emerging oil state provided an elevated status in the global
community, and Nazarbayev was viewed by external powers as the most capable and stable
leader in the region. The Kazakh president obviously welcomed this reputation, and from the
early 1990s used his countrys rising geopolitical importance as a centerpiece to spur
regional cooperation, with mixed results.
Nursultan Nazarbayev had been the central figure behind the expansion of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991 to include the Central Asian states, and he
continued efforts to enlarge regional economic linkages in the years that followed.
Kazakhstan, along with the other Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, had sought and
received membership in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1992, providing a
potential umbrella for coordination of economic policy from the Middle East (Turkey and Iran
were members already) to south Asia (Pakistan was a charter member). In 1994
Kazakhstan took a leading role in the formation of the Central Asian Union, an organization
designed to foster mutually-beneficial economic policies among the Central Asian countries.
The same year Nazarbayev called for the formation of a Eurasian Union, but this effort failed
to gain traction, and was rebuffed by Uzbekistan and Russia.11 However, Nazarbayev was
more successful in his push for the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or
EurASEC), a customs union formed in 2000 between Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Uzbekistan joined the organization in 2005). The EAEC merged
with the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) in 2006, with the ultimate aim of
creating a single economic space using a common currency. Whether this goal is achieved
remains to be seen, but the Kazakh regime continues to play a pivotal role in efforts at
regional economic integration and cooperation.

Uzbekistan
The collapse of Soviet authority in Central Asia resulted in a vacuum in both functional state
institutions and ideology. In Uzbekistan, the former First Party Secretary, Islom Karimov,
had been elected to the office of president the year prior to the demise of Moscows control,
but in fact there had been little movement toward the development of an independent
governing structure. Soviet institutions were simply converted into national governing
bodies. The Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR became the Oliy Majlis, a national legislature
that according to the countrys new constitution held the most political authority in the new
state. In reality, Karimov quickly moved to establish an authoritarian regime with nearly all
power concentrated in the executive branch, with both the legislature and court system
merely acting as supporting mechanisms of his policies.12 Karimov assumed the leadership of
the Peoples Democratic National Party, the successor to the Communist Party, and in the
presidential election of 1991 his administration prevented the main opposition group, Birlik
(Unity), from fielding a candidate. Muhammad Solih, an opposition figure from Erk (Will), a
splinter group from Birlik, was allowed to run against Karimov but was provided only limited
access to the media. Within two years both Birlik and Erk were banned, and Karimov had
established a complete monopoly of political power in the country. A key provision in the
Uzbek Constitution allows the president to directly appoint the hakims, or governors of the
countrys provinces, and for almost two decades Karimov has used this authority quite
effectively to control the regions and prevent anyone from challenging his rule.13
Like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan faces a spectrum of issues that threaten the security of the
state, although the ethnic and demographic landscape in Uzbekistan differs significantly
from its northern neighbor. At the time of independence Russians and other Slavs accounted
for only about 6 percent of Uzbekistans population, but many of those who held positions in
education, business, medicine, and engineering were from this group, and their departure
during the course of the 1990s damaged the Uzbek economy. The Slavic exodus from
Uzbekistan had begun in the 1970s, but accelerated after independence primary because of
two social issues that many Slavs perceived as threatening: the elevation of Uzbek to the
status of an official language, and the rise of Islamic observance among Uzbeks and other
Muslims.14 The departure of tens of thousands of highly-trained professionals since
independence has contributed to the slow pace of economic advancement, an issue that is
increasingly seen as undermining the countrys stability.
Environmental damage from the Soviet era also threatens Uzbekistans security and future.
The most devastating ecological damage occurred to the Aral Sea, now an international
body of water divided between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The rivers feeding the Aral were
so over-utilized as sources of irrigation water during the last decades of Soviet control that
the Aral simply evaporated at an unprecedented rate, destroying the entire ecosystem and
resulting in massive health and economic problems among the Karakalpak minority who live
in western Uzbekistan. Little has been done since Uzbekistan gained independence to
ameliorate either the environmental devastation caused by Soviet mismanagement of the
countrys water resources or the catastrophic impact on the local people.
Uzbekistan is one of the worlds leading countries in the production of cotton, has
substantial deposits of gold and other precious metals, and produces considerable amounts
of natural gas and petroleum. Given the resource base alone, Uzbekistan should be a
relatively wealthy state, but since independence standards of living there have declined, and
economic growth in many years has been stagnant. Official figures on unemployment
indicated that no more than about 1 percent of the labor force is out of work in 2008,15 but
few observers outside the country believe such rosy numbers are accurate, and independent

estimates for unemployment run as high as 20 percent. Moreover, because Uzbekistan has a
relatively high rate of population growth, there is pressure on the economy to steadily
expand and create jobs for the growing labor force. Some of this pressure is relieved
through labor migration to surrounding countries, primarily to Kazakhstan and Russia, and
remittances from these workers provide an important boost to the Uzbek economy.16 The
amount of FDI into Uzbekistan since the early 1990s has been modest compared to
neighboring Kazakhstan, and political violence since 1999 has resulted in many international
companies limiting their capital investment or avoiding the Uzbek economy all together. The
country possesses little domestic capital, and as economic conditions continue to decline,
the attractiveness of radical Islamic groups may become greater for disaffected youth.
Karimov early on pursued a policy of so-called gradualism, which delayed much-needed
economic reforms and the establishment of a convertible currency.17 Gradualism was crafted
in an effort to cushion the shock of converting a command-style economy to a free market
system, but the policy has done little to address Uzbekistans growing economic crisis.
Uzbekistans relations with its Central Asian neighbors have frequently been tense. During
the civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s, Uzbek aircraft conducted bombing raids against
targets inside Tajikistan, an action that drew protests from the Tajik government. In 1998
the government in Dushanbe accused the Karimov administration of supporting a rebellion
in northern Tajikistan led by Mahmud Khudoiberdiev, an ethnic Uzbek who had the backing
of many among the predominantly Uzbek population of the region, a charge that generated
considerable friction between the two states.18 Tensions have also periodically arisen with
Kyrgyzstan over payments for natural gas and delivery of waterKyrgyzstan controls the
upstream sources of the Syr Darya river, which supplies most of the water to Uzbekistans
portion of the Fergana Valley (see map in Appendix). Both Tashkent and Bishkek have
sometimes cut the supply of gas, in the case of Uzbekistan, or water, in the case of
Kyrgyzstan, in an effort to pressure the other side. Disputes have also arisen with
Kazakhstan over demarcation of the border and other issues, and with Turkmenistan over
alleged Uzbek involvement in an assassination attempt on Turkmenistans leader,
Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) in 2002.19 Since independence Uzbekistans neighbors
have frequently charged the Tashkent regime with meddling in their internal affairs and on
occasion violating their sovereignty.20
Terrorism is a major threat to Uzbekistans stability. Over the past decade the country has
been rocked by several destructive and destabilizing incidents carried out by Islamic
extremists. The most serious of these attacks took place in February of 1999, when a series
of explosions rattled Tashkent, killing more than a dozen people, most of them innocent
bystanders. Islom Karimov declared that the bombs were a coordinated attempt on his life,
and Uzbek authorities blamed Islamic terrorists, especially the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU was formed in the late 1990s by two Uzbeks from Namangan, a
city in eastern Uzbekistan. Tahir Yuldash was allegedly the ideological leader of the group,
while Juma Namangani, a veteran of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coordinated the
IMUs military activities. Although the IMU never officially took credit for the violence, a
number of commentators both inside Uzbekistan and abroad believe the group was behind
the bombings.21 In the months following the explosions, a number of alleged members of the
organization were arrested and tried on terrorism charges. The IMU was later linked to alQaeda and Osama bin Laden, and in the late 1990s operated from bases in northern
Afghanistan with the support of the Taliban. The group was well organized and funded, and
in the late summer of 1999 and 2000 sent groups of insurgents into Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan in an attempt to overthrow the Uzbek government. The Islamic guerillas were
repelled, but the incidents highlighted the tenuous control of the borders in the region and
shook the confidence of foreign investors and regional allies alike in the Uzbek government.
During the American bombing campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, many IMU soldiers were

killed, including Namangani himself, but in 2004 Islamic terrorist cells in Bukhara and
Tashkent, linked to an IMU splinter group called the Islamic Jihad Union, once again set off
explosions and engaged in gun battles with police.22
The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States gave Uzbekistan and America
a common adversary, the Taliban. Besides supporting al-Qaeda, the Taliban had been
providing sanctuary and support to the IMU, and the elimination of the Taliban regime
suddenly became a foreign policy goal shared by both countries. In the fall of 2001, the
Karimov government agreed to allow American military forces access to the former Soviet
base at Khanabad, located in southern Uzbekistan. American criticism of human rights
abuses in Uzbekistan notwithstanding, Uzbekistan became by dint of its strategic location a
key ally in the war on terror. Relations between Uzbekistan and the United States had
been strained in the 1990s, but by late 2001 the two countries were cooperating closely as
NATO forces began the military campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
This new relationship was not well received in Moscow, where authorities in the Kremlin
viewed the stationing of American troops in Central Asia (American forces were also allowed
to use an airbase in Kyrgyzstan) as undermining Russian influence in the region, although
the Russian government shared the goal with the United States and the Central Asian states
of removing the Taliban. The military action in Afghanistan was of great benefit to the
Karimov regime, as it eliminated the IMU as an effective fighting force in the region without
any engagement on the part of Uzbek forces, and it provided the Karimov government
justification for further curtailing human rights and political pluralism under the guise of
fighting Islamic radicalism.
In May of 2005 Uzbekistans relations with the United States and Europe took a dramatic
turn for the worse. The incident that sparked this shift was the massacre of perhaps as
many as 400 people in the city of Andijan by Uzbek soldiers.23 Those who were shot had
been protesting the arrest of several members of a local business group, Akromiya, which
the Uzbek authorities alleged was a front organization for Islamic extremism. The evidence
appears to support the claims of journalists and others on the scene that few if any of the
protestors were armed, and that the government forces fired indiscriminately into the
crowd, which included many children and unarmed civilians. Western governments
condemned the shooting and called for an independent investigation, while Kyrgyzstan
accepted several dozen refugees from the violence who had fled across the border in the
Fergana Valley. The Uzbek government rejected any outside investigation and claimed that
those killed were supporting Islamic extremism. As American criticism mounted, relations
with Uzbekistan rapidly deteriorated, and the Karimov administration terminated the
agreement allowing American use of the Khanabad base. Political and cultural contacts
between Uzbekistan and many democratic countries were curtailed, and investment from
the West declined. On the other hand, relations with the Russian government immediately
improved, as Moscow was quite content to see the American presence in the region
diminished, since the Taliban regime had been toppled and Russia sought to reassert its
dominant international role in Central Asia, especially in regard to controlling its
hydrocarbon resources.
In 2008, after several years of tense standoff, the frozen relationship between Uzbekistan
and the United States began to show signs of thawing. Several high-ranking American
military officials and diplomats visited the country, and the Uzbek regime agreed to allow
the transit across its territory of non-lethal military supplies bound for the NATO forces in
Afghanistan. Moreover, in early 2009 rumors were circulating that the new American
administration was in the process of negotiating a return of American soldiers to the
Khanabad base.24 The resurrection of American-Uzbek relations has the potential to not only

to improve Uzbekistans status as a regional leader, but also to spur the flow of foreign
investment, a source of capital badly needed in the faltering Uzbek economy. Tashkents
shift toward the West may have been signaled by its withdrawal from EurASEC in late
2008,25 an economic organization dominated by Moscow, although Russian companies
remain firmly engaged in Uzbekistan, especially the Russian governmentcontrolled gas
conglomerate Gazprom. For the present, the Karimov administration appears to be content
to cultivate both Russia and the West, as both sides offer possibilities for expanding the
Uzbek economy and, perhaps reluctantly, both must shore up the stability of the
entrenched, authoritarian government in a social and economic environment that appears to
be steadily declining. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state that borders on all the
remainder, and chaos there could quickly spread to the other countries in the region.

Kyrgyzstan
For the people of Kyrgyzstan, 1990 was a year of momentous tragedy and change. The
Soviet system was already beginning to fray along the margins, but few in Kyrgyzstan could
imagine that their tiny republic would be the stage for the most horrific example of how
weakened the bonds of socialist brotherhood had become. In late May of that year, ethnic
riots between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in the southern city of Osh, Kyrgyzstans second
most populous city.26 It took several days for the violence to run its course, and when order
was restored, officials revealed that several hundred people had been murdered, although
unofficial accounts held that the toll was much higher, possibly several thousand. Within a
year and a half Kyrgyzstan would declare its independence from the USSR, but the
underlying social and ethnic tensions in the small, mountainous country would remain.
Today it is common for citizens of the country to refer to one another as northerners and
southerners, in a way oddly reminiscent of the regional division in the United States in the
nineteenth century. The separation of society in Kyrgyzstan along this geographical divide is
based in the countrys ethnic composition: The north is dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz, who
historically have resisted more conservative Muslim doctrine and practices, while the south
has a large Uzbek population that has for many centuries followed a stricter interpretation of
Islam.27 Even ethnic Kyrgyz in the south tend to be more strictly Islamic than their
counterparts in the north, a characteristic that likely is the result of contact with their Uzbek
neighbors. This difference in worldviews represents a fundamental split in social attitudes
and behaviors in the country.
A second momentous event in 1990 was the election in October of Askar Akayev to the
position of president of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic. Akayevs election was
groundbreaking in that he was not a career politician in the Communist Party, but a scientist
who had few ties to the party. After the collapse of Soviet power, Akayev was so popular
that he ran unopposed for the presidency of his newly-independent country. This meant that
Kyrgyzstan was unique among the Central Asian statesthe remaining four were all led by
the former Communist Party leaders who were in place when the USSR disintegrated.
Akayev initially promoted democratic reforms, not only allowing opposition political parties
and media to organize, but even encouraging such changes in the political landscape.
Kyrgyzstans commitment to an open, pluralistic system quickly earned the country a
reputation as Central Asias only real democracy, and although the country lacked the large
deposits of hydrocarbon fuels of some of its neighbors, it attracted a fair amount of foreign
investment on the basis of its perceived political and social stability.28 Akayevs reputation as
a progressive reformer also brought a good deal of support from the West, and the United
States and its allies began to view political developments in Kyrgyzstan as a model for the
region.

Along with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is one of Central Asias upstream countries, meaning that
it controls the headwaters of many of the rivers that supply fresh water to the downstream
countries of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Water is an increasingly scarce
resource in Central Asia, and the agricultural sectors of the downstream countries are
almost completely reliant on the rivers pouring from the upstream countrieswithout this
flow, production of cotton and other crops is impossible in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,
and would be greatly limited in Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan possesses an enormous potential
capacity for generating hydroelectricity, but representatives of its neighbors, particularly
Uzbekistan, have sternly criticized efforts to expand the number of hydroelectric dams in
Kyrgyzstan, with one Uzbek official claiming in 2009 that planned hydroelectric projects
there might adversely affect the living conditions of tens of millions of people.29 In
recent years both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have experienced severe shortages of electrical
power during the winter months, and officials in both have indicated that in the future they
may institute fees for delivery of water to the downstream states. The potential for conflict
over water between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan appears to be growing on a yearly basis,
and no legal structure is in place to deal with Central Asias water issues.
A key component of Kyrgyzstans security is economic development. Landlocked and lacking
the hydrocarbon wealth of its downstream neighbors, Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest
nations to emerge from the former Soviet Union, and its economy was highly dependent on
trade with the other Soviet republics. After independence, the Kyrgyz economy struggled to
modernize, reform, and develop new markets. Yet the country, under the leadership of
Akayev, aggressively pursued a path of economic advancement and integration with the
global economy. This policy on occasion created friction with some of the countrys
neighbors, as was the case in 1993 when Kyrgyzstan left the so-called ruble zone (Central
Asian states at the time were still using the Russian ruble as their currency) and introduced
a national currency, the som. Uzbekistan reacted quite negatively by limiting deliveries of
natural gas to Kyrgyzstan and refusing to accept the new currency, requiring payments in
dollars and forcing travelers and merchants entering Uzbekistan to use dollars instead of
som.30 Kyrgyzstans entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1998 also generated
problems with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which both felt that the move was premature
and would damage their economies. As a result, Uzbekistan almost immediately terminated
deliveries of natural gas to Kyrgyzstan, just as winter was arriving in Central Asia.31
Hailed by many in the West as an island of democracy in Central Asia, the Kyrgyz
administration progressively slipped toward authoritarianism through the 1990s. President
Akayev requested a national referendum in 1995 that would have extended his term in
office for five years without a competitive election, which the parliament, the Jogorku
Kenesh, rejected as unconstitutional.32 Akayevs willingness to sidestep the democratic
process alarmed observers of Kyrgyz politics both inside and outside the country, and
coupled with charges of widespread corruption and harassment of political opponents, began
to tarnish his image as a committed proponent of democratic reform. In addition, the
countrys stability was severely tested in 1999 when insurgents of the IMU penetrated into
remote areas of Batken oblast adjacent to the border with Uzbekistan. The militants took
control of several small villages and captured hostages, whom they apparently ransomed for
several million dollars. This incident and another the following summer highlighted the
insecurity of Kyrgyzstans borders, which were easily penetrated by the rebels, and led to
friction with Uzbekistan, the real target of the insurgents. The Uzbek air force bombed some
positions held by the insurgents, resulting in civilian casualties within Kyrgyzstan, and in the
months after the invasions the Karimov administration in Uzbekistan mined sections of the
border with Kyrgyzstan. Several innocent people were killed by these mines, and the Kyrgyz
government issued a stern protest to Tashkent, to no avail. The embarrassing sequence of

events underscored the porous nature of the regions borders and the low quality of military
intelligence and combat preparedness of the Kyrgyz armed forces.
Having faced attacks by terrorists on its own soil, Kyrgyzstan became a strategic partner of
the United States virtually overnight in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. Within a month of the attacks, U.S. officials were negotiating with the Akayev regime
with the goal of establishing a forward airbase in the country, designed to support the
campaign against the Taliban. The Kyrgyz government agreed to lease land and facilities
adjacent to Manas International Airport near Bishkek to the United States in November, and
combined with the base at Khanabad in Uzbekistan, the Ganci Airbase (named after a New
York firefighter who died in the attacks on the World Trade Center) provided the U.S. and
NATO forces with a vital foothold for launching missions against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Several thousand foreign military personnel were stationed at the base by late 2002, and
the base played a key role in operations in Afghanistan. However, several incidents between
NATO soldiers and local residents soured Kyrgyz views of the base, and in 2009 the Kyrgyz
administration revoked the lease, requesting that the foreign forces vacate the facility. This
policy signaled a shift in Kyrgyz foreign policy toward Russia, which continued to operate its
own airbase at Kant, and which had pressured the Kyrgyz administration to expel the
Americans. Russia also promised large amounts of financial assistance in the event the base
at Manas was closed to offset the inevitable losses in aid from the United States and other
NATO countries. Yet despite Russian pressure and enticements, the administration in
Bishkek eventually renewed the lease of the base to the Americans and NATO, albeit at a
higher rate.
The alignment of Kyrgyz foreign policy with Russian interests had been largely pursued by
Akayevs successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was elected president after President Akayev
was forced from office in early 2005 by widespread protests against his regime. Bakiyev was
elected president in July of 2005, three months after Akayev fled the country in the wake of
the so-called Tulip Revolution. Bakiyevs election did not bring immediate stability to the
country, as a constitutional crisis ensued over the next year and a half, culminating in the
signing of a new constitution in November of 2006, which placed greater limitations on
presidential power.33 The day after his election, Bakiyev announced in a press conference
that he considered the situation in Afghanistan stabilized and saw little reason for the
American base to remain operational. This was in line with an earlier statement from the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), calling for a withdrawal of American and NATO
forces from Central Asia, a development high on the list of foreign policy priorities of
Moscow. Both Russia and Kyrgyzstan are charter members of the SCO, and the organization
is frequently critical of U.S. policy in the region. This unexpected alignment with Moscow
came at a particularly unwelcome time from the perspective of Washington, as relations
with Uzbekistan were also deteriorating as a result of the Western response to the massacre
of civilians in the city of Andijan in May of 2005. On the other hand, almost four years
passed between Bakiyevs election and the formal request from the Kyrgyz government to
close the Manas base, indicating that the new Kyrgyz president was in no hurry to see the
Americans depart. Moreover, the Kyrgyz government has maintained its relationship with
NATO through the Partnership for Peace initiative, which it joined in 1994. The Bakiyev
governments policy favored Russia in some instances, but Kyrgyzstans leadership did not
wish to sever ties with Washington completely. Ironically, Bakiyev was forced from office in
April 2010, almost exactly five years after Askar Akayev was removed from the presidency
by popular unrest. Approximately two months later, and almost exactly twenty years after
the horrific ethnic riots of 1990, the city of Osh once again exploded in violence between
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. By the end of June, 2010, thousands of Uzbeks had fled southern
Kyrgyzstan into Uzbekistan, and several hundred people had been killed. Many hoped that a

new constitution, approved by popular vote on June 27, 2010, would bring the reforms and
stability so desperately necessary to the countrys future.34
Kyrgyzstans geopolitical weight in Central Asia is magnified far beyond the countrys
physical size or population, both of which are small even when compared to most other
Central Asian states. What makes Kyrgyzstan of greater importance is its control of much of
the regions water resources; its central location, which makes it a key component of
transport corridors running through the heart of Asia; and its recent history of turbulent
democratic reform. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan has been a founding member of a number of
the international organizations focused on enhancing security and military cooperation that
have emerged recently in the post-Soviet space. These include the aforementioned SCO,
and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a mutual defense pact formed in 2002
between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, Tajikistan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan
joined the pact in 2008. In addition, as of this writing (2010), Kyrgyzstan remains the only
Central Asian state to hold membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus, this
small mountainous state in the heart of Asia plays a pivotal role in the regions political
stability.

Tajikistan
Tajikistan is the poorest, most remote, and least developed country to emerge from the
former USSR. It is the only post-Soviet state in Central Asia to have suffered a prolonged
and devastating civil war, and the country remains probably the least stable in the region,
excluding Afghanistan. Tajikistan is divided into four distinct regions (see map in
Appendix): Sughd province in the north, which includes part of the Fergana Valley and
borders Uzbekistan; the Region of Republican Subordination, which includes the capital of
Dushanbe, running laterally across the central part of the country; the Khatlon region in the
southwestern portion of the country; and Gorno-Badakhshan, a mountainous and remote
area making up most of the eastern half of the country. Geography alone presents
challenges to the countrys stability, as the landscape makes the construction of
transportation and communications infrastructure extremely difficult and expensive, and
presents serious barriers to the economic and political integration of the Tajik state. The
geographical divisions are mirrored by rifts in the ethnic fabric of society. Slightly more than
15 percent of the population is Uzbek, and this large minority is concentrated in the Sughd
region, near the border with Uzbekistan. In the mountain settlements of Gorno-Badakhshan,
many smaller groups speak Pamirian languages that are distinct from Tajik, and a significant
number of people are Ismaili Muslims who recognize the Aga Khan as their spiritual leader.35
Since most Tajiks are Sunni Muslims, this linguistic and religious differentiation means that
the eastern portion of Tajikistan is in many ways culturally distinct from the more heavily
populated western reaches of the country. Coupled with extreme poverty and economic
hardship, these various divisions create a volatile political environment, a condition that
quickly became evident immediately upon Tajikistans establishment as an independent
nation.
For the first five years of independence (19921997), Tajikistan was embroiled in a
sequence of political violence that threatened to tear the new state apart (see Chapter 3).
In 1990 the Communist Party dominated the governing structure of the Tajik SSR, but new
organizations were appearing, requesting access to the political process. The Islamic
Renaissance Party (IRP) was one of the most influential of these emerging groups, and in
the fall of 1990 demanded the status of a recognized and legal political party with the same
rights and privileges as the Communist Party. The Tajik government reacted by attempting
to ban the IRP, but after prolonged street demonstrations relented and allowed the party to

register. As the Soviet Union crumbled, the former first party secretary of the Tajik
Communist Party, Rakhman Nabiev, won the presidential election in Tajikistan in December
of 1991.36 Nabiev attempted to purge his political opponents in Dushanbe in May of 1992
and distributed weapons to his supporters in the capital. The rioting that resulted initiated a
civil war that ultimately cost between 50,000 and 100,000 lives and seriously damaged
Tajikistans already limited infrastructure and industrial capacity. Nabiev was forced from
office in 1992 and replaced by Emomli Rakhmonov (whose surname later was truncated to
Rakhmon), another former CP official.
The opposing sides in the civil war were differentiated not only by ideology, but geography
as well. The government forces, backed militarily by Russian troops and on occasion by air
strikes from Uzbekistans air force, consisted in large part of former Communist Party
officials and supporters, while the opposition was provided some support from Afghanistan
and was made up of a coalition of those seeking democratic reform and Islamist groups. By
1994 the opposition had joined forces as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) led by Said
Abdullah Nuri, the head of the IRP. Ideology, however, was only one factor that divided the
antagonists in the conflict: Tajikistans disparate regional and clan loyalties also played a
major role. Most of the support for the Tajik government came from Sughd province (then
called Leninabad oblast) and the Khatlon region, while the majority of the opposition was
based in the region of Garm, a city in north central Tajikistan, and Gorno-Badakhshan. In
1997 the Rakhmonov regime and the UTO signed a treaty ending the long conflict, and a
fragile peace has held in the country for the last 12 years.
One of the most serious challenges to Tajikistans long-term stability is the countrys
economic underdevelopment. The least industrialized Soviet republic, Tajikistan was made
poorer by the damage resulting from the civil war and the loss of thousands of highly-skilled
Russian professionals who fled the country in the first several years of independence.
Although the economy grew steadily in the early 2000s, this expansion was from a very low
level, and shortages of commodities remain commonplace to the current day, including on
occasion food shortages. Energy is also frequently in short supply, and in the winter of
20072008 electricity was rationed, with many rural communities not receiving electrical
power for months.37 Tajikistan is dependent on Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for imports of
natural gas and electricity, and deliveries are often reduced or delayed by disputes between
the countries. Ironically, like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan has a huge potential to generate
hydroelectricity, and with sufficient investment in this sector could become a major supplier
of electrical power to the entire Central Asian region, as well as to China and south Asia.
Tajikistan has been attempting to build an enormous hydroelectric dam at Rogun on the
Vakhsh River for more than 30 years, but the project is hampered by a lack of investment
capital and opposition from some of Tajikistans neighbors, primarily Uzbekistan. The
planned 3,600-megawatt facility would produce enough electricity for Tajikistans current
needs and a significant surplus that could be exported. Downstream countries like
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are concerned that the dam will restrict water flow to the Amu
Darya (the Vakhsh is a major tributary to the Amu Darya), thus impacting their ability to
produce cotton and other agricultural commodities. Control of water resources remains a
potential flashpoint between Tajikistan and its downstream neighbors, and no multilateral
agreement has been reached in the region on the use of this increasingly precious
resource.38
In recent years labor has become a major export of Tajikistan. Thousands of migratory
workers have left the country to take employment in Russia, where they work in the service
and construction sectors for the most part. The wages these workers receive are then sent
home to families in Tajikistan and account for an enormous percentage of personal income

some sources estimate that fully half the money in the country originates from remittance
of foreign earnings, which would be the highest rate in the world.39 Many of the Tajik
laborers in Russia live in squalid conditions, work long hours, and are frequently the target
of discrimination and even physical assault, but the money they return to the country is vital
to supporting the tottering Tajik economy. On the other hand, this labor structure retards
the domestic development of Tajikistan, as there is little to attract substantial foreign
investment in such a distorted economic environment.
Social problems contribute to the countrys instability. Tajikistan is a major transit point for
drug trafficking, with narcotics moving across the porous border with Afghanistan. Opium,
heroin, and hashish are smuggled into the country and then distributed throughout Central
Asia and into Russia, Ukraine, and even as far as western Europe. The lucrative drug trade
is of course mostly in the hands of organized crime syndicates, who not only traffic in illegal
drugs and weapons, but also human beings. Young women in Tajikistan are lured abroad by
promises of work or marriage and then forced into work as prostitutes, or into low-paying,
menial jobs that are the virtual equivalent of slavery. All of these issues are at least
indirectly related to the poverty and lack of economic opportunity that plagues the country
and that threatens to give rise to political forces that may destabilize the country.

Turkmenistan
For most of the post-independence period, Turkmenistan was ruled autocratically by the
eccentric former Communist Party boss Saparmurat Niyazov, better known as
Turkmenbashi, a title meaning Father of the Turkmen. Niyazov died in 2006, but his
influence on Turkmen society and the countrys political policies remains evident. Although
as large as California in area, the country is almost entirely desert and is wholly dependent
on the waters of the Amu Darya to provide water to its oasis agriculture. In spite of its
extreme aridity, the country has been a major producer of cotton until quite recently.
Turkmenistan is blessed with substantial, and possibly enormous, reserves of natural gas,
which it exports to other Central Asian states as well as to markets further abroad.
Furthermore, as one of the countries occupying the littoral of the Caspian Sea, Turkmenistan
has a claim to any resources that lie within its territorial waters. Lying at the nexus of
Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, Turkmenistan could reprise its historical role as a
major conduit between East and West, although Niyazovs policy of pragmatic neutrality 40
limited connections to other regions, while bureaucratic and legal obstacles to travel make
Turkmenistan the most difficult country in Central Asia to visit, even for other Central
Asians. The country has the fewest people of any of the Central Asian states, at just under
5 million, and is also the most ethnically homogeneousTurkmen make up 85 percent of the
population, with small groups of Uzbeks and Russians accounting for most of the remainder.
Like other indigenous Central Asian groups, the Turkmen are divided into tribes and clans,
and this social structure can frequently be reflected in political relationships. As is true
elsewhere in the region, patronage and clan connections are key to achieving and holding
power at all levels in Turkmen society.
Turkmenbashi led independent Turkmenistan for 15 years, and during that period created a
cult of personality that could only be rivaled by that of Kim Jong Il of North Korea. Images
of the leader and his family members were ubiquitousthe capital of Ashgabat alone had
several dozen gold statues of Niyazov, and gigantic portraits of him graced the faade of
nearly every government building. His visage even hung in the aircraft of Turkmenistans
national airline. In 2002 he decreed that two of the months of the year would be renamed
after him and his mother, and others would be called after some of the national symbols of
Turkmenistan. He constructed a massive monument to his book Rukhnama, a history and

spiritual guide for the Turkmen people that was immediately made compulsory reading in
Turkmenistans schools.41 Fiscal mismanagement and poorly conceived development policy
resulted in a serious economic decline in the 1990s, but Turkmenbashi continued to spend
massive amounts of money on questionable projects.42 But Niyazovs odd and comical
behavior was in contrast to the ruthlessness with which he crushed his political opponents,
almost all of whom were forced into exile or imprisoned in the first few years of his rule.
Turkmenistan was made into a highly centralized, authoritarian state in which the
government controlled virtually all aspects of life. Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, who
replaced Niyazov as president in December of 2006, has gradually attempted to shed the
influence of his predecessor in Turkmenistan society. For example, in early 2009 the
government revalued the manat, the Turkmen currency, and replaced the old banknotes and
coins that featured the likeness of Turkmenbashi, although his image was retained on one

Rukhnama
monument in Ashgabat.
(Photo courtesy of Reuel Hanks)

of the new bills. Yet the eccentric dictator continues to cast a long shadow on
Turkmenistans society, and poverty, corruption, and lack of transparency all remain
serious problems.
43

Turkmenistan is rapidly emerging as a strategic partner in supplying energy to surrounding

countries and regions. This is due to the large natural gas deposits the country controls.
Although the total amount of gas reserves on Turkmen soil remains a state secret, recent
investigations confirm that the country is poised to become a major supplier to western
Europe, and possibly western China and south Asia.44 An independent assessment conducted
by a British firm in late 2008 revealed that the Yolotan gas field in eastern Turkmenistan
probably contains close to six trillion cubic meters of gas, making it one of the largest
deposits in the world.45 Several other fields, although somewhat smaller, nevertheless
already produce abundant gas for export. In total, Turkmenistans gas reserves may be

somewhat in excess of 20 trillion cubic meters, meaning it ranks in the top five countries
globally.
Russias conglomerate Gazprom has worked closely with Turkmen suppliers since
independence, and Turkmenistan has used Russian-controlled pipelines for the most part to
export its gas resources. Moscow has discouraged the development of alternative routes for
delivery of Turkmenistans gas to consumers abroad, but since the demise of Turkmenbashi,
the new regime in Ashgabat has illustrated a willingness to work more independently.
President Berdymukhamedov has declared an open door approach to foreign investment,
and the regime appears ready to engage in additional partnerships with Western
companies.46 Arguably the most strategic project under discussion is the Nabucco pipeline,
which would stretch more than 2,000 miles from Turkey through southeastern Europe,
bringing an alternative to Russian gas. European energy companies are hopeful that
Turkmenistan will be a major supplier to the pipeline, since Iranian gas supplies remain off
limits due to that countrys political isolation and pursuit of nuclear weapons. Moreover,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan concluded agreements with China to construct a
pipeline to supply China with approximately 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually by 2009.
Although it is unlikely gas will flow toward China until somewhat later, Turkmenistan has
positioned itself to be a major energy supplier to both East and West.
The geopolitical importance of Turkmenistan continues to rise. Situated between Russia, the
Middle East, Europe, and Asia, and possessing large reserves of gas, the country appears
positioned in the next decade to emerge as an energy broker that will be quite literally
connected to all of those regions. Turkmenistans relationships with Russia and Iran, the
other major gas suppliers in the region, therefore acquire not only a major economic vitality,
but also render a key strategic importance to the country. If Turkmenistan remains largely
independent of Russian influence and develops export routes that bypass Russian territory,
Turkmenistan could dramatically undermine Moscows leverage with western Europe,
Ukraine, and other large gas consuming regions. On the other hand, close cooperation with
Russian interests, along with a dependency on Russian infrastructure, would likely result in
increasingly high energy prices in Europe, accompanied by both the economic and political
decline of the European Union.
Ironically, despite its hydrocarbon wealth, Turkmenistan remains a poor country. GDP per
capita amounts to only about $500 per month, and unemployment levels remain quite high.
Foreign investment has been almost entirely directed at the energy sector, and cotton
production, once a mainstay of the economy and a significant source of employment, has
dropped precipitously in the past few years. The country is virtually completely dependent
on rivers and canals flowing from abroad for water, a situation that makes agricultural
production quite vulnerable to natural drought conditions upstream, as well as the
development and usage policies of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, the neighbors
who supply Turkmenistan. As the Turkmen people emerge from the Turkmenbashi era, they
must face many challenges in advancing their strategically vital nation.

Notes
1. Martha Brill Olcott contends that President Nazarbayev considered
independence to be economic suicide for the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
and therefore supported a continuation of the USSR until late in 1991. See her
work The Kazakhs, 2nd edition, Palo Alto, California: Hoover Institution Press,
1995, 268.

2. Ibid., 270.
3. For a highly-critical discussion of the Nazarbayev regimes policies toward
Russians and other minorities, see Alexandra George, Journey into Kazakhstan:
The True Face of the Nazarbayev Regime, Lanham, Maryland: University Press
of America, 2001, 123156.
4. Tom Everett-Heath, Instability and Identity in a Post-Soviet World: Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan, in Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, edited by Tom EverettHeath, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, 186187. Zhirinovsky,
who in the early 1990s was the enfant terrible of the Russian political scene,
frequently called for a common border between Russia and India, obviously
implying that Russia should absorb the Central Asian countries. See
Zhirinovsky says Russia will Move SouthBy Invitation, Reuters News Service,
January 30, 1994.
5. V. Zemskii, Collective Security in the CIS, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.
45, No. 1 (1999), 97. The CIS treaty later evolved into the Collective Security
Treaty Organization in 2002.
6. Elizabeth Wishnick, Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia, Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, 3.
7. In the early 1990s, surveys showed that a large majority of the Russian
population was opposed to legislation requiring them to learn Kazakh. Moreover,
many felt that the language law passed in 1997, giving the Kazakh language an
official status equal to that of Russian, was an effort to discriminate against
ethnic Russians. Marth Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise,
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, 73.
8. United States Information Agency, USIA Opinion Analysis, December 10, 1997.
This survey revealed that approximately 65 percent of the ethnic Russian
population in Kazakhstan favored unification with Russia.
9. Eskender Trushin and Eshref Trushin, Basic Problems of Market Transition in
Central Asia, in Central Asia and the New Global Economy, edited by Boris
Rumer, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000, 102103.
10. Pinar Ipek, The Role of Oil and Gas in Kazakhstans Foreign Policy: Looking
East or West? Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, 11851186.
11. Roy Allison, Structures and Frameworks for Security Policy Cooperation in
Central Asia, in Central Asian Security: The New International Context, edited
by Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
2001, 223.
12. Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence, Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, 121.
13. Neil Melvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road,
Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000, 32.
14. After a visit to Tashkent in the summer of 1991, just six months prior to the
collapse of the USSR, an experienced observer of Uzbekistan described the
Russian population there as being in a virtual state of panic. James Critchlow,
Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republics Road to Sovereignty, Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1991, 205.
15. This figure is reported in the World Fact Book, produced by the Central

Intelligence Agency, and is available at

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/uz.html.
16. Deirdre Tynan, Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan Confront a
Financial Disaster, Eurasia Insight, November 10, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav111008
.shtml.
17. Islom Karimov, Uzbekistan: Along the Road of Deepening Economic Reform,
Tashkent, Uzbekistan 1995, 1013. Karimov is especially fond of quoting the
aphorism Never destroy the old house before you build the new one in
support of his policy of incrementally implementing economic reform.
18. Rustam Burnashev, Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects, in
Central Asia: A Gathering Storm, edited by Boris Rumer, Armonk, New York: M.
E. Sharpe, 2002, 157.
19. Martha Brill Olcott, Taking Stock of Central Asia, Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 2, 14.
20. In addition to the aforementioned alleged support of the rebellion in northern
Tajikistan, the Karimov regime has been accused by authorities in Kyrgyzstan of
kidnapping Uzbek dissidents living in their country, and the Kazakh government
has charged Tashkent with unilaterally advancing Uzbek claims along disputed
sections of their border.
21. Vitaly V. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle,
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005, 7683.
Regarding the bombings, Naumkin makes the dubious claim that it is clear
that IMU militants were involved (page 81). For a different perspective, see
Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia,
Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2007, 158.
22. Reports surfaced in the fall of 2009 that both Tahir Yuldash and Najmiddin
Jalolov, the leader of the Islamic Jihad Union, a group affiliated with the IMU,
were both killed in separate missile attacks by U.S. drones against targets
inside western Pakistan. As neither man has appeared publicly since news of
their demise was released, it appears likely that they are indeed dead.
23. Bullets Were Falling like Rain, The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005. Human
Rights Watch, June 2005, Vol. 17, No. 5(D). Available at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uzbekistan0605/uzbekistan0605.p
df.
24. David Trilling, Exploring American Military Base Alternatives in Central Asia; Is
Uzbekistan an Option? Eurasia Insight, February 13, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav021309
f.shtml.
25. Uzbekistan: Tashkent Announces Withdrawal From Moscow-dominated
Economic Group, Eurasianet Business and Economics, November 12, 2008.
Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav111208
c.shtml.
26. Nancy Lubin et al., Calming the Fergana Valley: Development and Dialogue in
the Heart of Central Asia, New York: The Century Foundation Press, 1999, 46

48.
27. Joshua Kucera, Kyrgyzstan: Southern Region More Likely to Experience
Election TroubleExperts, Eurasia Insight, December 14, 2007. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121407.
shtml.
28. Tolkun Namatbaeva, Democratic Kyrgyzstan: What Lies Ahead? in Central
Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change, edited by Roald Z. Sagdeev and Susan
Eisenhower, Chevy Chase, Maryland: CPSS Press, 1995, 169170.
29. Bruce Pannier, Battle Lines Drawn in Central Asian Water Dispute, April 19,
2009, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Available at: http://www.rferl.org.
30. John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asias Island of Democracy? Amsterdam:
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999, 70.
31. Bruce Pannier, Waiting for the Gold Rush, in Holding the Course: Annual
Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, edited by Peter Rutland,
Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 418.
32. John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asias Island of Democracy? Amsterdam:
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999, 53.
33. Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing No. 55, International Crisis Group,
Bishkek/Brussels, November 9, 2006.
34. Joanna Lillis and David Trilling, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks Turn Out to Vote For
Stability, June 27, 2010. Available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61416.
35. The Ismailis are a branch of Shia Islam commonly known as Seveners, which
distinguishes them from the followers of mainstream Shia Islam, who are called
Twelvers. The figures refer to the number of imams recognized by each group.
Imams are considered to be descendants of Ali, Muhammads first cousin, who
Shia Muslims believe was the rightful first caliph.
36. Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence, Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, 103110.
37. Konstantin Parshin, Tajikistan: Citizens Ponder Bleak Future Amid Harsh
Winter, Eurasianet Business and Economics, January 24, 2008. Available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012408.
shtml.
38. David Trilling, Tajikistan: Rogun Dam a Hot Topic as Tajiks Make it Through
Another Winter of Shortages, March 13, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav031309
f.shtml.
39. As a number of commentators have pointed out, the remittances that young
migrant workers send home are not the only factor providing some stability to
the Tajik regime. The migration of young, unemployed men to Russia,
Kazakhstan, and other countries removes a potentially explosive social element
from the countrys streets.
40. An in-depth analysis of Turkmenistans foreign policy is offered in Luca
Anceschi, Turkmenistans Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the
Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime, London: Routledge, 2008.
41. Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy,

Asia Report No. 85, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels, November 4,

2004, 14.
42. Alexander Cooley, The Faltering Oil State, in Holding the Course: Annual
Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, edited by Peter Rutland,
Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 424.
43. Farangis Najibullah, Turkmenistan Redenominates Currency, Further
Dismantles Niyazov Personality Cult, Eurasianet Business and Economics,
January 3, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav01030
9.shtml.
44. Najia Badykova, Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: A View From
Turkmenistan, Problems of Economic Transition, Vol. 48, No. 8, 63.
45. Bruce Pannier, Independent Audit Shows Turkmen Gas Field World-Class,
Eurasianet Business and Economics, October 19, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp101908.s
html.
46. Turkmenistan: Leader Proclaims Open Door Investment Policy, Eurasianet
Business and Economics, March 27, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032708.
shtml.

ISLAM, TERRORISM, AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

It is somewhat misleading to write of Islam in Central Asia, because this phrase implies a
uniformity that not only does not exist under current cultural and political conditions, but
has never been the case in the long history of Islam in the region. The character and
influence of Islam among the major ethnic groups in Central Asia varies greatly. The
ancestors of the Tajiks lived primarily in cities from an early date, and by around the end of
the sixteenth century the Uzbeks were also settled and mostly urbanized. The influence of
Islam on these groups was much more profound than upon the traditionally nomadic

peoples of the region, like the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen. These herders, who moved
across the vastness of the Eurasian steppes with their flocks, were outside the range of
ecclesiastical authority for much of their lives, and displayed little interest in adopting the
more rigid and dogmatic aspects of Islam, preferring instead to meld the faith with animistic
beliefs and customs resulting in what is still often referred to in the region as folk Islam.
This heritage is a source of some pride today among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, many of
whom point out that their women were never compelled to wear the veil or in many cases to
adopt hijab, concealing dress worn as a sign of modesty throughout the Islamic world.
Among the Tajiks and Uzbeks, however, stricter adherence to Islamic social norms was the
rule, along with a greater devotion to the everyday rituals of the faith, from the Middle Ages
down to the Soviet era. In contemporary Central Asia these two peoples, and the
eponymous states they occupy, are considered to be the most Islamic in the region, because
of the historical inculcation of Muslim dogma and practice they experienced.
Yet even among the Tajiks and Uzbeks, rigid, doctrinaire, intolerant currents in Islam found
little support. Rather, more moderate, open approaches typically held sway, and Central
Asian Muslims were frequently among the most cosmopolitan and best educated people in
the world. Sufism represented a key influence on Islam in the entire region, and today is
experiencing resurgence in Uzbekistan and other countries. Sufism, often somewhat
simplistically labeled Islamic mysticism in the West, is an aesthetic movement that
originated in the centuries immediately after the founding of Islam. Although it is easy to
over-generalize about Sufism, certain common characteristics may be found across the Sufi
community. For example, followers typically seek a direct communion with God and over the
centuries have evolved into distinct tariqa, or orders, which have each developed practices
unique to their specific brotherhood. Sufis employ the practice of dhikr, or recitation of the
names of God, as a means of concentrating spiritual awareness and energy.1 One of the
most influential Sufi orders was founded in Central Asia in the fourteenth century by Khoja
Bahauddin Naqshband, whose followers are known as the Naqshbandi. Naqshbands tomb is
located only a short distance from Bukhara in Uzbekistan, and for centuries has been a
place of pilgrimage for his followers. In independent Uzbekistan, the Naqshbandi order has
been revived, and this revival has been supported and even promoted by the Karimov
regime.2 Because of its historical moderation and rejection of more fundamentalist
perspectives, Sufism is viewed by Central Asian governments as an acceptable alternative to
more radical, politicized Islamic movements, such as Wahhabism, Salafism, Deobandism,
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and others.3 All of these philosophies emerged outside Central Asia, and
many Muslims in Central Asia view them as intolerant and archaic, a perspective reinforced
by the modernization of the Russian and Soviet periods. Sufism is viewed as an inherently
Central Asian variant of Islam free of external distortions and misinterpretations, although
this perspective itself is not entirely accurate.
In order to understand the social, cultural, and political standing of Islam in Central Asia
today, it is essential to examine the historical context of Central Asian Islam in the twentieth
century. The Soviet period represented an intensely antagonistic ideological struggle
between Islam and Marxism-Leninism, a battle of philosophies and worldviews that
continues to resonate today in these new states. In the 1920s and 1930s, when Islam did
not simply fade away as predicted by Marxist theory, Soviet authorities attempted to
physically eradicate the faith by closing mosques, forbidding the printing of Korans, and
even making it illegal to privately instruct students in the requirements of the religion. In an
extreme case from the 1920s, the government promoted the khudjum campaign, a
movement that encouraged women to voluntarily discard the paranja, as the veil is called in
the Turkic-speaking regions, but also brought gangs of militant young atheists to Central
Asia who physically assaulted women, often tearing the veil from their faces in the streets of
Tashkent, Samarkand, and other cities.

Only during the years of the World War II was the antireligious propaganda appreciably
relaxed, when Josef Stalin required the loyalty of his Central Asian subjects in the struggle
against Germany. In order to secure the loyalty of Soviet Muslims, Stalin created Muslim
Spiritual Boards in several regions of the USSR, including Central Asia. These boards
established what became known as official Islam in the Soviet Union, and while they
represented an official acknowledgement of the widespread survival of the faith under
Marxism-Leninism, they also provided an administrative framework for controlling and
limiting the reach of Islam. No other colonized Islamic region has a similar history, as the
British, French, and other imperial powers did not pursue policies designed to completely
eliminate the faith within their domains. The effort to purge Central Asia of its religious
culture, extending over almost seven decades, had a negative impact. In the early 1990s,
many Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other Central Asians were ignorant of the basic rituals and beliefs
of Islam, and few regularly prayed, observed Ramadan, or planned to conduct the haj to
Mecca. But interest in Islam has increased in Central Asia since the Soviet collapse, as many
people attempt to reconnect to their cultural and spiritual heritage and fill the void left by
the jettisoning of the failed directives of Marxism.
The surge in Islamic religiosity in Central Asia that began in the late 1980s. after Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced his policy of glasnost or openness, could be
measured partially by the large number of new mosques and other structures connected to
the faith that rapidly appeared on the Central Asian landscape. In addition, some buildings
that had been confiscated during the Soviet period were returned to Islamic authorities. In
1988, 26 mosques were returned to the faithful across the Soviet Union, with the majority
of them located in Central Asia.4 According to some sources, in Uzbekistan more than
3,000 mosques had been opened by 1994, and the number of Muslims from Uzbekistan
making the haj increased seven-fold, rising from 500 in 1990 to 3,500 in 1993.5 Medressehs
(Islamic theology colleges) experienced a similar expansion, rising in number from only two
in Uzbekistan (the only two in all of Central Asia at the time) in the last years of Soviet
control to well over 300 in Uzbekistan alone by the early 1990s. 6 Some of the funding for
this remarkable expansion came from outside sources, especially wealthy Muslim countries
like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but a significant portion of the financial support was generated
within Central Asia. In the city of Namagan, an ancient oasis center in Uzbekistans portion
of the Fergana Valley, more than 20,000 people formed an Islamic foundation dedicated to
collecting funds for the construction of mosques in the region.7 Given the repression of Islam
under the Soviet administration, the growing interest in Islam and the expansion of its
infrastructure were logical consequences of the newly found freedoms Central Asians
suddenly enjoyed in the very early years of independence. Although it was largely true that
the international community feared the emergence of political Islam in Central Asia at least
as much as it did the Central Asian leaders,8 the Islamic recovery was in no way a rejection
of the West and of modernity or a manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism.
While Islam was emerging at the grass-roots level in Central Asian society, it was also
employed by the leaders of the newly-independent states as a basis for crafting a national
identity.9 Yet there were three problems with this strategy. First, the Islamic credentials of
almost all the presidents of the new states were suspect in the minds of many people, since
all of them, with the exception of Askar Akayev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, were former
First Party Secretaries of the Communist Party, and therefore had officially declared
themselves to be atheists (Akayev himself was also a member of the Party). Secondly,
although they sought to use Islam to promote the political identity of their new countries,
each leader was forced to guard against the politicization of Islam by other groups, since
they feared that the faith could be used as a cause clbre to organize opposition to the
political status quo, as indeed occurred in the case of Tajikistan. Thirdly, praising and
promoting an Islamic heritage threatened to further alienate non-Muslim groups, especially

the Slavic population, who had been emigrating from most of the Central Asian republics
since the 1970s, and many of whom already felt ostracized by the elevation of indigenous
Central Asian languages to official status.
These issues were partially addressed by legally restricting the political reach of Islam in
each new state. All of the constitutions adopted by the Central Asian countries state
unequivocally that the form of government is to be secular, while allowing for the freedom of
religious expression and observance. This is the case even in Tajikistan, the only Central
Asian country to allow an Islamic party, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT),
to participate in elections. Article 1 of the Tajik Constitution states that the government
must be secular, and article 8 specifically declares that no single ideology, including a
religious ideology, may be adopted as the ideology of the state. But at the same time, the
political leadership across the region has attempted to co-opt the Islamic past in the effort
to reinforce identity, resulting in a somewhat contradictory message. Concerning the Kazakh
people, President Nursultan Nazarbayev has stated, We are a Muslim nation, our faith is
Islam, our book is the Koran, and we must treasure this heritage.10 In the first chapter of
the Rukhnama, the work that allegedly encapsulates the entire history and corporate
identity of the Turkmen, Saparmurat Niyazov repeatedly invokes the name of Allah and in
fact on the first page credits the deity with creating the Turkmen people: Allah made the
Turkmens [sic] prolific and their numbers greatly increased. God gave them two special
qualities: spiritual richness and courage.11 Islom Karimov early in his tenure made a point to
make the haj and proclaim that he consumed only meat that was halal,12 clearly in an effort
to legitimize his standing as a Muslim.13

Political Dimensions of Islam in Tajikistan

In spite of the efforts of Central Asian leaders, Islam and politics have not remained
compartmentalized in Central Asia, and it should come as no surprise that the recovery of
Islam acquired political dimensions early on after the independence of the Central Asian
states. Indeed, this process began even before the final demise of the Soviet state. In June
of 1990, several Central Asian delegates attended the founding congress of the All-Union
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of the Soviet Union, convened in the city of Astrakhan in
southern Russia. In the months after this meeting, republican branches of the IRP were
constituted in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The IRPT was formed in October of 1990, but was
quickly banned by the Tajik Communist government.14 After the attempted coup against
Mikhail Gorbachev in August of 1991, however, pressure mounted on the new Tajik regime
to recognize opposition parties, and the IRPT was allowed to register as an official political
party. Over 1,000 people attended the first meeting of the new party in October of 1991,
and two months later the IRPT was officially recognized as a legal political party in
Tajikistan, claiming more than 20,000 members.15 The geographical base of the organization
was the Garm Valley in central Tajikistan, as well as pockets of residents from this region
who had been relocated to other parts of the country during Soviet times.
The IRPT fielded a candidate for president, Davlatnazar Khudonazarov, in the election held
in November of 1991 and garnered more than 30 percent of the vote, a surprisingly strong
showing for a party that had only just been organized and registered. The IRPT was one of
the main targets of the government crackdown in May of 1992 and quickly formed an armed
resistance movement against the regime of Rahmon Nabiev.16
The Tajik government under Nabiev, and after December 1992 Emomoli Rakhmonov, gained
the upper hand and forced much of the leadership of the IRPT to seek refuge in northern
Afghanistan, where they were provided sanctuary and support by Ahmad Shah Massoud, a

Tajik warlord who was battling the Soviet-installed government of that country. After the
rise of the Taliban, Massoud became a leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and
was assassinated by agents of al-Qaida in 2001.
While coordinating a guerilla war from Afghanistan, several of the IRPT leaders, including
Said Abdullo Nuri and Khoji Akbar Turajonzoda,17 formed the Movement for Islamic Revival in
Tajikistan (MIRT), a group joining the IRPT with several other Islamic factions in Tajikistan
and functioning in some ways as a shadow government.
The MIRT joined the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in 1994 and played a key role in
eventually forcing a negotiated settlement to the conflict in 1997. The IRPT was allowed to
register as a political party after the conclusion of the peace treaty, but in 2006 it along with
several other opposition parties boycotted the presidential election to protest against
Rakhmons (Rakhmonov) increasingly tight grip on power and what they viewed as an unfair
election process. Rakhmon frequently denied rival parties and candidates access to the
media, and his security forces regularly intimidated opposition supporters. During the
balloting, election observers for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and other international monitoring groups identified many irregularities and
violations of standard voting procedures. Today the IRPT remains politically marginalized, as
Rakhmon has consolidated power and reduced the ability of opposition groups to challenge
his authority.

Islam and Politics in Uzbekistan

A branch of the IRP also formed in Uzbekistan as a result of the All-Union convention in
1990. In January of 1991, just a month after the first presidential election in Uzbekistan,
the IRP of Uzbekistan attempted to hold an organizational congress in Tashkent. The
meeting was attended by representatives of several other groups, including Birlik, the
largest opposition organization in Uzbekistan at the time. The meeting was disrupted by
agents of the National Security Bureau (NSB), the Uzbek secret police, who arrested several
members of the IRP. Shortly thereafter the group was declared an illegal organization in
Uzbekistan and driven underground, even though the leadership had declared that their
methods would be nonviolent.18 Thus from the very beginning the Karimov regime ruthlessly
crushed any manifestation of politicized Islam in the country. This approach was simply a
continuation of Soviet policy and eventually proved to be self-defeating. Karimovs
brutalization of Muslims who simply wished to form alternative political parties in the wake
of Soviet repression only served to radicalize them, although only a small minority
eventually resorted to violence in an effort to achieve their political goals.
From the early 1990s, the policy of the Uzbek government was to eliminate its potential
rivals, whether secular or Islamic. In the case of the unofficial Islamic leadership, many
were arrested on false charges of drug or weapons violations or were simply taken into
custody and disappeared. In the 1990s the most common charge against Muslim believers
was that of following Wahhabism, a fundamentalist sect of Sunni Islam that originated in
Saudi Arabia. The Chairman of the IRP of Uzbekistan, Adullah Otaev, disappeared in
December of 1992, but Uzbek authorities deny having arrested him. In 1995 Abduvali Qori
Mizarev, a popular Islamic leader from Andijan, was taken into custody by government
security officials with his assistant, Ramazon Matkarimov, at the airport in Tashkent in front
of several witnesses. As in the case of Otaev, the Uzbek administration refuses to
acknowledge that it is holding these men or to allow relatives or legal representatives to
learn their whereabouts. In 1998, Imam Obidkhon Nazarov, one of the most popular
mullahs in the country, vanished and was presumed under arrest by Uzbek authorities, but

resurfaced in 2006 in Kazakhstan, where he had been hiding for eight years.19 Nazarov had
been an outspoken critic of Karimovs policies toward Islamic believers and had been
detained for a while in 1997. His voluntary exile highlights the atmosphere of intimidation
the Uzbek government created against any independent Muslim leaders after 1991. Human
rights abuses were so commonplace in Uzbekistan throughout the 1990s that the Chairman
of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe declared in 1999 that the country
is one of the most repressive new independent states.20 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International estimate that as many as 6,000 people are imprisoned in Uzbekistan simply
for being devout Muslims.
The event which almost certainly accelerated the Karimov governments aggressive
crackdown against independent Islamic organizations was the rise of Adolat21 (Justice in
Uzbek) in the city of Namangan in 1991, along with Islom Lashkari (Warriors of Islam),
the latter a group linked to several martial arts clubs in the city. Founded by a group of
young Muslim radicals that included Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani,22 Adolat
established an informal governing structure that threatened to usurp the authority of local
administrators. Adolats leaders in fact openly challenged Karimovs legitimacy, and in late
1991 took over a government building with the intent of converting it into an Islamic
meeting house. In February 1992 Karimov, fresh from his victory in the presidential election
two months before in which he had restricted his opposition to a single candidate, flew to
Namangan to meet with the local representatives of Adolat to hear their demands. The
event apparently degenerated into a shouting match, and Karimov was heckled and
ridiculed by Adolat supporters, who viewed his Islamic credentials as less than legitimate,
challenged his commitment to religious freedom, and in particular questioned his policies
toward Islam.23 Rebuffed and alarmed by the popular support Adolat evidently enjoyed in
Namangan, Karimov ordered a crackdown. Within the next few weeks Uzbek security forces
carried out several late-night raids against the group, forcing both Yuldashev and
Namangani to flee to Tajikistan and eventually to Afghanistan. Both would later play key
roles in creating a violent extremist group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), in
the late 1990s.
The Uzbek Constitution promulgated in 1992 enshrines the principle of freedom of religion
and freedom of expression. Article 31 explicitly states that freedom of conscience is
guaranteed to all. More directly, the status of religious groups in Uzbek society is covered in
Article 61, which holds that religion and religious associations are separate from the state.
The state does not interfere with the activities of religious associations. But other clauses
open the way for the Uzbek regime to prohibit virtually any kind of informal or unsanctioned
group, religious or otherwise.24 By 1997, perhaps because of the success of the IRP in
challenging the former Communist leadership in Tajikistan, the Uzbek government was
pursuing a comprehensive policy to suppress any unofficial religious activity. Mosques and
medressehs were closed in many cities, and in the mahallahs, or traditional neighborhoods,
a network of informants was set up to report on any suspicious behavior, including anyone
who might show unusual piety or devotion to Islam. In part, the intensification of the antiIslam campaign was triggered by the 1997 murder of a policeman in the Fergana Valley who
was allegedly beheaded by Muslim extremists, but whether this crime was actually
committed by religious radicals or criminals involved in the illegal drug trade still remains in
question.
The most sweeping effort to contain Islamic activity came in the form of a highly restrictive
new religious law passed in 1998. The law, officially called the Law on Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organizations, is considered one of the most restrictive statutes
governing religious behavior in the world. While repeating much of the legal wording of the

constitution in regard to religious rights, the legislation also contains numerous clauses that
allow the Uzbek administration to ban activity that is designed to attract new converts to the
faith, restricts the wearing of so-called religious clothing except in the case of clerics or
other officially-sanctioned religious figures, and requires a license from the government in
order to publish and disseminate religious literature. Moreover, every religious organization
must register with the government and provide a list of all members, enabling the regime to
track and harass potential critics and opponents. The law applies to all religious groups in
the country, but is clearly aimed at controlling unofficial Islam. The law was immediately
enforced, and its effect was felt first in several universities. A number of students were
expelled for wearing Islamic dress, several of them students at the prestigious Institute of
Oriental Studies in Tashkent. Some of the students brought suit against the government,
but the case was thrown out, a result that was not surprising given that the judiciary in
Uzbekistan is under the control of Karimov. In some instances young men have been
harassed by police for growing a beard, and threatened with arrest unless they shave. A
second piece of legislation, passed in conjunction with the larger law, revised the existing
criminal code and enacted much stricter penalties for unauthorized proselytizing and
teaching of religious ideas. The legislation effectively criminalizes teaching the Koran to
ones own children or grandchildren.
In conjunction with draconian religious legislation, the Karimov government moved to bring
Islamic education in the country completely under state control, employing a strategy quite
similar to that used by the Soviet regime. In 1999, the Tashkent Islamic Institute named for
al-Bukhari was established. The institute accepts a limited number of students, generally
around 100 each term, and trains them to become Islamic scholars and leaders. The
Tashkent Islamic University, built the same year on the site of an ancient mausoleum
complex in the oldest section of Tashkent, is a secular, coeducational higher education
institution that trains specialists in Islamic history, law, foreign languages, and other
subjects. There are also several smaller government-run medressehs in the country that
train a few hundred Islamic scholars and teachers, but all are under the control of the Uzbek
government, insuring that those who receive training are loyal to the state.

Men attending
Friday prayer at the Juma Mosque, Tashkent.
(Photo courtesy of Reuel Hanks)

Radical Islam in Uzbekistan

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
On February 16, 1999, a series of bombs exploded in several locations in Tashkent. Most of
the explosions were detonated as car bombs and killed several innocent bystanders. In
total, 16 people died in the incident and several dozen were injured, making it the worst act
of terrorism in Uzbekistan since the country achieved independence. President Karimov
immediately labeled the attack an assassination attempt on his life, but if so, it seems to
have been a rather unprofessional effort. The bombs were placed at a number of points
around the city, but detonated before Karimov arrived at work from his residence on the
outskirts of the city. According to a statement from Karimov several days afterward, 25 at
least two cars arrived at the Cabinet of Ministers building in downtown Tashkent some time
before President Karimov was scheduled to speak there. A number of men exited one
vehicle, pretending that the vehicle had broken down, and were followed by security
personnel. The men then produced automatic weapons and began firing rifles at the guards,
while another car was parked a hundred yards away and detonated a few moments after the
initial attack. Incredibly, Karimov, whose motorcade was still some distance away, continued
on to the site of the attack, and the president even exited his car and inspected the
damage. Over the next hour or so, several other bombs exploded in other sections of
Tashkent. The same morning the Uzbek government stated that Islamic terrorists were
behind the attacks, but in fact no group has ever claimed responsibility for the bombings.
Some commentators have speculated that the attacks were the work of organized crime
syndicates, terrorists from Tajikistan, Russias intelligence service, or even the Uzbek
government itself, in order to justify the mass arrests that followed.

The Tashkent bombings were followed by a series of incursions into eastern Uzbekistan
during the next two years. These invasions, conducted by small groups of armed militants,
were the work of a new organization, the IMU. The IMU was likely formed in 1998 and was
led by Tahrir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani, the two radicals who had formed Adolat in
Namangan during the early 1990s and who had been forced to flee Uzbekistan as a result of
the government crackdown. Both men had joined with the forces of the IRPT and had fought
in the Tajik civil war in the mid-1990s. In the late 1990s it is likely that they began
cooperating closely with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and were even receiving financial
support and training from al-Qaida. As disaffected young Uzbeks from the Fergana Valley
drifted into IMU camps in northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan after 1997, the ranks of the
group likely swelled to several thousand fighters.
In August of 1999 the IMU launched a raid from bases in southern Tajikistan into the Batken
region of Kyrgyzstan. The purpose of the incursion appears to have been to initiate a local
uprising among the Uzbek population in the southern Fergana Valley, but in fact, the
militants received little support from local people. They did manage to kidnap several
officials and some foreign nationals, including several Japanese geologists, whom the
Japanese government evidently ransomed. After several weeks of sporadic fighting with the
Kyrgyz military, under pressure from the Tajik government the IMU forces agreed to
abandon their bases in southern Tajikistan and, in an ironic twist, were flown by the Russian
military to sanctuaries in northern Afghanistan.26 By early 2000 the cooperation between the
IMU and the Taliban appears to have evolved into a full military alliance, and the IMU was
reportedly supplying several hundred soldiers to the Taliban in the struggle against the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. In the summer of 2000, IMU units once again entered
Tajikistan and penetrated briefly into Surkhandarya Viloyat (Province) in eastern Uzbekistan.
One group kidnapped a team of American mountain climbers, resulting in the U.S.
Department of State classifying the IMU officially as a terrorist organization. But just as was
the case in the previous year, the IMU lacked both the numbers and the weaponry to hold
any territory against the military forces of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and after only a few
weeks was forced to withdraw. The incursions in fact achieved very little and represented no
real military threat to any of the governments in Central Asia. They did however expose how
porous and poorly guarded the regions borders were, and in response Uzbekistan mined
much of its border with Kyrgyzstan despite protests from the latter.
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, although
they transpired half a world away from Central Asia, would ultimately have an enormous
impact on the region, and especially on the fate of the IMU. Having thrown in its lot with the
Taliban, the IMU found itself facing the brunt of American military power in the fall of 2001.
The American assault on Taliban positions in northern Afghanistan reportedly killed
hundreds of IMU insurgents, and most importantly, resulted in the death of Juma
Namangani, dealing a devastating blow to the group. Tahrir Yuldashev avoided the American
bombing campaign, but went into hiding along with the surviving Taliban leadership, hiding
in the Waziristan border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan until he was reportedly
killed in a U.S. drone strike in the fall of 2009.27
From 2001, Yuldashev periodically issued statements claiming that the IMU remained a
potent force in Central Asia, but since the bases the group operated from in northern
Afghanistan and Tajikistan were largely eliminated, and apparently most of the militants
killed, the scale of the groups activities were reduced to occasional isolated, random acts of
violent defiance. In March and July of 2004, in the cities of Bukhara and Tashkent, there
were several incidents of shootings and bombings, including what was apparently a wellcoordinated suicide bomb attack on the Israeli and American embassies in Tashkent on

July 30 that killed several Uzbek police officers. At least two previously unknown groups
claimed responsibility for these attacks: Jamoat and Islamic Jihad. The origins of these
groups are obscure, and many analysts assume that they are remnants of IMU forces that
were either sleeper cells or returned to Uzbekistan after 2001. Small numbers of IMU
soldiers apparently continue to fight alongside Taliban units in Afghanistan, and probably
train in bases along the AfghanPakistan border. There is no evidence that a significant
number of Uzbeks or other disaffected Central Asian Muslims have joined the IMU in
Afghanistan in recent years, nor has the group been able to mount any large-scale
operations in any of the Central Asian states since the shoot-outs of 2004.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HUT) is a pan-Islamic group that originated in Palestine in 1953. It was
founded by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a Muslim cleric from Haifa, and the organization was
active in politics in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s, allegedly becoming involved in
attempted coups in Jordan and Syria. The ultimate aim of HUT is the resurrection of the
caliphate, which has stood vacant since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Followers of HUT
believe that this may be achieved through nonviolent political action, and that only by
reestablishing a unified ummah (global community of Muslims) can the faith of Islam regain
its rightful glory and influence in the face of globalization and Western materialism. The
party is extremely anti-Semitic and condemns the establishment and survival of the state of
Israel in its propaganda. The group first appeared in Central Asia in the early 1990s, but
because of its secretive nature and organizational structure it is quite difficult to accurately
gauge the number of its followers. Regional units of HUT are formed into cells of several
individuals, but each cell operates independently and only the leader of each cell is aware of
others.
Many observers hold that the organization is most active and has the largest following in
Uzbekistan, especially in the Fergana Valley region. In the early 2000s, independent
agencies were reporting that law enforcement officials in Uzbekistan estimate that HUT
among the Uzbek population had attracted no more than perhaps 7,000 committed
members and that a significant portion of this group was already imprisoned in the
country.28 Vitaly Naumkin, a Russian specialist on Islam in Central Asia, argues that the
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 actually had the effect of
weakening the appeal and unity of HUT in Uzbekistan and that the group is losing influence
due to lower membership, disagreements among the leadership over tactics and strategy,
and divisions among members over doctrine and philosophy.29
Much has been made by some commentators of the potential of HUT to evolve into a mass
movement in Central Asia and destabilize the entire region. The evidence for such a turn of
events appears thin at best. For example, there is very little indication that HUT has gained
much of a following at all in either Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, in spite of periodic reports
of arrests of small numbers of activists there or discoveries of caches of the organizations
literature. In general, Central Asian law enforcement officials typically estimate the total
number of HUT members at around 15,000, with the majority of those in Uzbekistan. If
accurate, this figure then represents far less than 1 percent of the regions population,
belying the notion that HUT is gaining the support of the general public. In fact, the
organization remains a fringe group in Central Asia and does not appear to have successfully
presented itself as a viable or attractive political alternative to most people. Furthermore, it
may well be the case that the estimates of HUT support in Central Asia are inflated, as
authorities there usually make the assumption that anyone found with HUT literature is a

member of the group. Of course, simply having a leaflet from a banned organization hardly
is solid evidence of serious commitment to that organizations ideology or political goals.
In assessing the threat of HUT, it should be noted that after almost 15 years of activity in
Central Asia, the group has yet to acquire more than a few thousand supporters, and the
number of truly committed followers may well be considerably below that meager figure.
Many of those who initially joined the group likely did so out of despair over poor economic
conditions or as a reaction to the political repression by Islom Karimov, rather than from
zealous commitment to reconstructing the Islamic caliphate in the region. The HUT
leadership sometimes complains about the lack of ideological devotion of members in the
region.30 This is borne out by the limited number of interviews with Central Asian HUT
members gathered by Western scholars, which show that frequently the primary motivation
behind joining the group is disappointment or anger over the lack of economic opportunity,
or as an outlet to express political opposition to the status quo, since bona fide alternative
parties are nonexistent in Uzbekistan. Returning to the fundamentals of Islam appears to
motivate only a small percentage of followers.31 In addition, some scholars have detected a
close organizational and even philosophical similarity between HUT and Marxism, a curious
connection for an Islamic group that portrays itself as the path to fundamental Muslim
values.32 The repression of the Karimov regime, including the arrests of thousands of HUT
followers, appears to have damaged the organizations ability to expand its membership.
HUT may have been reduced to recruiting new members mostly through personal contacts,
a technique that is unlikely to result in a significant enlargement of the number of
supporters.33

Massacre in Andijan
Andijan is an ancient Silk Road city that sits at the eastern end of Uzbekistans Fergana
Valley. The city was at the heart of a revolt against the Russian colonial administration in
1898 (see Chapter 1), and its residents have long held a reputation as being particularly
devout Muslims. On May 13, 2005, Uzbek security forces fired on a large crowd of
demonstrators who had gathered in Bobur Square in the center of the city. Independent
human rights organizations concluded that several hundred people were killed, many of
them women and children, as the government troops used machine guns and other
automatic weapons to fire indiscriminately into the crowds.34 The incident began when a
group of armed men attempted to free about two dozen prisoners from the local jail. The
men in custody had been arrested the year before and charged as Muslim extremists
belonging to Akromiya, an informal organization composed mostly of local businessmen. As
the jailbreak failed, the gunmen took numerous hostages, while at the same time sending
word to local supporters and relatives to gather in the square in front of the jail.
Within a few hours a crowd of several hundred, and possibly several thousand, protestors
had clustered together, almost none of whom were armed, according to many eyewitness
accounts. Units of the Uzbek army and SNB surrounded the square with armored vehicles,
and by late in the afternoon of May 13 launched an assault on the people gathered there.
The Uzbek government version of events claimed that the number killed was much lower
than reported, no more than 175, and accused all those who demonstrated of being in
league with Islamic extremists, primarily Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Several hundred survivors of the
violence were able to flee across the border to Kyrgyzstan and eventually were relocated to
camps in eastern Europe.
The Uzbek government denied requests from international agencies and other countries for
an independent investigation into the shootings. A small group of journalists was allowed to

visit the city several days afterward but were not allowed to move about independently or
speak with local people. Andijan became a closed city, off limits to foreigners, and even
telephone connections with the rest of Uzbekistan were cut for several weeks. Regardless of
the differences between official numbers killed and outside estimates of the carnage, the
fact appears incontrovertible that the Uzbek authorities, including allegedly President
Karimov himself, ordered more than 100 innocent civilians shot down. Such a brutal
response to a large popular demonstration would not be a surprising strategy for the Uzbek
regime, given events in other former Soviet states in the months leading up to the
massacre. Islom Karimov had watched popular demonstrations bring down unpopular
governments in Ukraine and then, most alarmingly, in next-door Kyrgyzstan during the socalled Tulip Revolution only a month before the events in Andijan. Unlike the leadership in
Kiev and Bishkek, however, Islom Karimov would readily order the execution of hundreds of
demonstrators in order to maintain his position. The foreign relations fallout from the
massacre was swift and dramatic: The United States and numerous EU countries
condemned the use of excessive force against unarmed civilians, and in response, the Uzbek
government ordered the U.S. and NATO forces to withdraw from the base at Khanabad.
Uzbekistan continues to experience periodic but relatively minor incidents of violence, some
of which may be tied to Islamic extremism. In May of 2009 a suicide bomber detonated
himself in Andijan, killing a policeman, and the same day a shooting incident was reported
at the Kyrgyz border. As some specialists have observed, these episodes are more indicative
of desperation on the part of the public rather than a representation of support for radical
Islam.35 Unfortunately, Islom Karimov has made it clear that he intends to hold on to power,
regardless of the level of frustration and suffering his people feel. This is most assuredly a
recipe for continued violence in Uzbekistan.

Political Islam in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan

For most of their histories, the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen were all traditionally nomadic
peoples living on the fringe of Islamic civilization, and as such had much less contact with
the daily ritual and other manifestations of the faith. In addition, many in each group were
not converted to Islam until the eighteenth century or even somewhat later. For these
reasons scholars consider them to be less Islamic than the Uzbeks and Tajiks. Yet this is not
to suggest that Islam has little relevance either culturally or politically in the modern states
that now represent the eponymous territorial homelands for these peoples. The qualities of
politicized Islam differ considerably in these formerly nomadic societies from that in
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and each state faces different challenges.
Islamic faith in Kyrgyzstan is for the most part divided along ethnic lines. Kyrgyz typically
identify themselves as Muslims, but are much less devout and religiously observant than the
Uzbek minority, which is clustered in the Fergana Valley.
A survey of Islamic religiosity in Central Asia conducted in the early 1990s found that the
Kyrgyz were more Islamic than Uzbeks, a result that many scholars of the region find highly
suspect and that is contrary to other findings.36 On the other hand, a significant proportion
of the Kyrgyz population appears to hold a favorable opinion of Islamic fundamentalists or at
least do not view them as a significant threat to Kyrgyz society. A study done in 2003
indicated that approximately 22 percent of ethnic Kyrgyz have a very or somewhat
favorable opinion of Islamic fundamentalists, while 56 percent saw Muslim fundamentalists
as somewhat or very unfavorable.37 Only three years after the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) invaded southern Kyrgyzstan for the second time, nearly 59 percent of the
ethnic Kyrgyz surveyed responded that they did not know or had no opinion as to whether

the IMU represented a threat to the countryonly 27 percent felt the IMU was a big or
fairly big threat.38 Of course, such figures do not necessarily indicate support for Islamic
extremism, but likely indicate the historically tolerant and respectful posture Kyrgyz have
adopted toward other Muslims and, for that matter, other faiths.
Militants from the IMU penetrated remote areas of Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, before
American military action in 2001 eliminated many of the IMU soldiers (see the section on
Uzbekistan). In the summer of 2006, Kyrgyz security forces killed several alleged militants
in the southern city of Jalalabad, a signal that the new administration of Kurmanbek Bakiyev
was adopting a more aggressive policy toward extremists, including not only the IMU and
Wahhabis, but also Hizb-ut-Tahrir.39 More evidence that the country was implementing a
crackdown on Islamists came when Kyrgyzstans Prime Minister Victor Chudinov announced
in early 2008 the start of an intensified effort to eradicate religious extremism, and stated
that Hizb-ut-Tahrir represented a specific threat to the countrys stability.40 This was followed
later in the year by the introduction of a controversial new law on religion patterned quite
similarly to the repressive legislation adopted by Uzbekistan in 1998. In addition, Jamaat-ut
Tabligh, a fundamentalist sect that originated in South Asia in the early twentieth century,
and which has proselytized in Kyrgyzstan since the mid-1990s, was identified as radical
and faced persecution. The Tabligh group eschews political action, preferring to interact with
potential converts via individual contact and conversation, and has been officially registered
in Kyrgyzstan since 1996.41
Before 2008, Kyrgyzstan was considered the most open and democratic state in the region,
and religious believers of all faiths were allowed to operate more or less unrestricted by
government authorities. After independence, many religious groups began actively
recruiting new followers in the country, with Muslim and Christian Evangelical organizations
being especially energetic, leading to some friction with the Russian Orthodox and official
Islamic structures, who viewed the new movements as unwelcome competition. Religious
organizations were required to register with the State Agency for Religious Affairs (SARA),
but few applications were denied, and only 10 members were needed for a group to be
accepted for registration. In the late 1990s activities by foreign religious workers were
limited, especially those from more conservative Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia,
although Islamic foundations, many of them funded from outside sources, continued to
freely operate. Many of the more than 1,000 mosques constructed in Kyrgyzstan since
independence, especially in the northern part of the country, were built using financial
support from Turkey or wealthy Persian Gulf states. The Law on Religious Freedom and
Religious Organizations, passed in 1997, specifically prohibited government interference
with religious groups that follow Kyrgyz law, although it did contain provisions that banned
religious political parties in the country.42 Although the new constitution promulgated in 2007
clearly articulates a division between church and state, a government edict issued in the
previous year recognized Islam and Russian Orthodoxy as traditional religions in
Kyrgyzstan, although this status does not confer any special legal standing for these faiths.
The ouster of Askar Akiyev in 2005 ushered in a new administration and a new approach to
religious activity in Kyrgyzstan. The new law on religion passed in January of 2009 supplants
previous statutes and appears to violate provisions of the Kyrgyz Constitution, as it places
severe limits on religious activity. Kyrgyzstans Ombudsman for Human Rights, Tursunbek
Akun, observed that the law did not appear to conform to international standards, and
international human rights organizations have expressed deep concerns about the
legislation, which goes much further in limiting religious rights than any previous law. The
law denies believers the right to distribute religious literature, prohibits the involvement of
children in religious movements and organizations, strictly limits the ability to proselytize

new members, and requires all religious organizations to re-register with the Kyrgyz
government.43 However, the minimum number of members required for registration is
greatly increased in the new law, rising to 200 from only 10 previously, and all members
must be Kyrgyz citizens. Although Kyrgyz officials staunchly claim that the law is designed
to quell religious extremism and destructive actions,44 this final requirement is obviously
designed to prevent new groups from establishing a network of supporters in Kyrgyzstan,
and may be directed more at stopping the efforts of Christian missionary groups than
Islamic radicals. Both the Russian Orthodox Church in Kyrgyzstan and the official Islamic
governing body, the Muftiate, supported the law, citing the need to limit the chaos that
had entered the religious life of many in Kyrgyzstan.
The drive of the Kyrgyz government to limit religious pluralism follows an alarming trend in
the region. Unfortunately, the track record of using repressive religious laws to limit violence
and control the spread of religious extremism in Central Asia is extensive, but it is unlikely
to have any significant effect on radical groups. Indeed, it is more apt to result in further
radicalization of some portions of the population. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the IMU, and any other
extremist organizations already operate under the radar in Kyrgyzstan, and the new law will
have little impact on their recruitment tactics and in fact may drive more potential members
to them, as other less pernicious alternatives are reduced by the more restrictive law. In
neighboring Uzbekistan, widespread violence associated with Islamic radicalism was virtually
unknown until 1999, but the Uzbek regime had begun cracking down on unregistered
Islamic groups in the early 1990s and had passed a highly restrictive and prejudicial law on
religion in 1998. The same pattern of events may await Kyrgyzstan, especially in the
southern reaches of the country among the Uzbek minority. The close cooperation of the
Bakiyev government with Tashkent on the threat of Islamic extremism was designed to
serve several purposes. First, it strengthened what has often been a tense relationship
between the two states by providing a common policy goal; in addition, it justified the
authoritarianism that has characterized Uzbekistan since independence and increasingly
marked the behavior of the Bakiyev administration in its last several years.
The drift toward dictatorship in Kyrgyzstan may have led to considerable discord, but even
in the wake of the collapse of the Bakiyev regime, it is unlikely that radical Islamists have
any hope of generating a sufficiently large enough mass following to secure control of the
government. As is the case in Uzbekistan, there is no evidence that the IMU, Hizb-ut-Tahrir,
or any other extremist group enjoys a significant popular following, and since 2000 acts of
violence associated with Islamic terrorism in Kyrgyzstan have been isolated and quite small
in scale, typically only involving a handful of individuals. The threat of an Islamic takeover
may be used to justify the erosion of Kyrgyzstans fragile democratic institutions and
undermine the foundations of civil society and political dissent. If so, Kyrgyzstan will no
longer be the emerging democracy that many in the West have long acclaimed, but will
simply join most of its neighbors as a repressive, single-party state, increasingly isolated
from the global community.
Among the Kazakhs, Islam was inculcated as a component of cultural identity from the
seventeenth century on, but was less rigorously observed than in Central Asias urban
areas. In the nineteenth century the Kazakh polymath Cholkan Valikhanov famously
observed that Islam had failed to enter the flesh and bones of his people in the way that it
had for the Uzbek and Tajik populations, and today Kazakhs note that the faith was
implanted to a very shallow degree.45 In modern Kazakhstan, a geographic pattern of
Islamic religiosity similar to that encountered in Kyrgyzstan may be found, in that the
southern reaches of the country tend to hold a higher proportion of devoted Muslims. This is
the case for at least three reasons. First, the southern margin of the country adjacent to

Uzbekistan contains a significant minority of Uzbeks and Karakalpaks, both of whom tend to
show greater Islamic religiosity than Kazakhs. Urban areas such as Turkistan and Shimkent
have large Uzbek populations, and these groups are much more devout than their Kazakh
cousins further to the north. Secondly, historically this region had more frequent contact
with the Silk Road oasis cities of Central Asia lying immediately to the south, and therefore
Kazakhs living here, mostly belonging to the Middle Juz or Horde, tended to accord more
importance to Islam than other groups. Finally, fewer Slavic immigrants settled in this
region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, resulting in less cultural influence from
Russia, except in larger cities such as Almaty (Alma-Ata) where large numbers of Slavs took
up residence. In the northern oblasts (regions) of Kazakhstan, on the other hand, waves of
Slavic migrants settled among the Kazakh communities, and during the Soviet era, a
significant number of Slavs intermarried with the indigenous Kazakhs. These northern
Kazakh clans had never been dogmatic concerning their faith, and the arrival of the Slavs
further enhanced the cultural tolerance that characterized their worldview; in some cases
they adopted decidedly un-Islamic behaviors from the new arrivals.46 Thus, a spatial
gradation of Islam exists in Kazakhstan, with the intensity of belief generally diminishing
from south to north. But even among Kazakhs in the south, religiosity is generally lower
than in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan.47
In addition, there is the question of religious identity and what it means to be a Muslim in
Kazakhstan. Since independence, there has been a massive expansion of the physical
expression of Islam in Kazakhstan, although perhaps not to the same extent as in
Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. Hundreds of mosques have been constructed in the country,
including a huge white marble mosque in the new business and administrative district of
Astana. But this does not necessarily indicate a significant surge in devotion or religious
observance. Surveys show that most ethnic Kazakhs will identify themselves as Muslim, but
also remain quite ignorant of the characteristics of the faith, even almost a decade after
independence. For example, a large sample of Kazakhs taken in 1997 found that well over
70 percent self-identified as Muslims, but less than 50 percent of this group could correctly
describe any of the obligatory rituals or observances associated with Islam. A study a year
later conducted in Shimkent, a city in southern Kazakhstan with a significant Uzbek
population, showed that 80 percent of a sample of young people labeled themselves as
Muslim but only attended mosque about once a year. In spite of the missionary activity of
Muslims from other countries in the early 1990s in Kazakhstan, there is little evidence that
any significant portion of the

Kazakh women
outside a mosque in southern Kazakhstan.
(Photo courtesy of Reuel Hanks)

indigenous population has been radicalized, or for that matter, has even adopted
the basic behaviors and ritual of Muslims in most of the remainder of the Islamic
world.
This is not to suggest that there has been no effort among Kazakhs to recover their Islamic
heritage, as has occurred in the other Central Asian states. When Kazakhstan became
independent in 1991, an official Islamic governing body was established, the Muslim
Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan, often simply referred to as the Muftiate. Most of the
working mosques in the country fall under the control of this organization, and most Islamic
imams, or teachers, receive their appointments through it.48 Certainly the process of reIslamization is occurring among the Kazakhs and other Muslims in Kazakhstan, both within
the official structure of the Muftiate and government-sponsored institutions, but also on an
informal, unofficial level.49 Yet the recovery of the Kazakh Islamic heritage has been
endorsed by the Nazarbayev government only in a muted, restrained manner to avoid
alarming the large Slavic population, many of whom view any emphasis on Islamic heritage
as a signal that they are interlopers and unwelcome in the new state. Kazakh authorities,
including frequently President Nazarbayev himself, emphasize the inter-ethnic nature of
the Kazakh state, and promise to reject any manifestation of Islam based on an intolerant,
exclusionary doctrine.
Unlike neighboring Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan since independence
has not experienced a single significant incidence of violence that may be attributed to
Islamic radicalism, another reflection of the moderate and tolerant character of Islam in the
country. The number of extremists arrested has been quite small, amounting in many
years to only a few dozen, in a country of more than 17 million people. In a number of
cases, those accused of fomenting violence or promoting radicalism were foreigners who

were quickly deported, and the extent of their guilt is not clear. In some instances,
especially after 1999, Kazakh authorities drew a harder line against anyone who arrived in
the country to perform missionary work, which might mean simply distributing literature
about Islam or holding informal meetings in private homes to teach about the faith. Yet
some commentators present an exaggerated picture of the influence of radical Islam in the
country. In 2001 an analyst found the arrest of five members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in southern
Kazakhstan an indication that the situation is really alarming.50 Such hyperbole serves only
to distort the actual level of extremist sentiment, which remains low, but does provide a
convenient rationale for those in the Nazarbayev regime who wish to impose harsher
restrictions of the activities of believers, Islamic or otherwise. A more sober assessment
written two years later acknowledged that it is thus unlikely that the dissemination of
pamphlets by Hizb-ut-Tahrir will be able to capitalize on the countrys economic and social
conditions.51 and called for a more subtle approach on the part of the Kazakh government
in curtailing any influence of Islamic extremists. But for the most part such advice has fallen
on deaf ears in the administration.
Rather, since the late 1990s the Nazarbayev government has developed an increasingly
repressive policy toward religion in general and Islam in particular, at least in regard to any
manifestation of the faith outside the official structure. This approach may be seen in the
successive implementation of legislation designed to curb religious liberty and consign ever
greater authority to the state over the activities of believers. In November of 2008 the
Kazakh parliament adopted a highly controversial amendment to the existing statute on
religion that would dramatically restrict religious freedom for all faiths in the country, in
spite of the concerns expressed by international organizations, including the OSCE. 52 The
new legislation curtailed the importation of religious literature, subjecting such writing to the
review of a religious expert assessment, a restriction reminiscent of Soviet-era bans of the
importation of religious literature. In February of 2009 Kazakhstans Constitutional Council,
a body that reviews the constitutionality of new legislation, ruled that the new law did not
conform to the requirements of the constitution.53 President Nazarbayev subsequently
declined to challenge this finding, and the law was rescinded, even though the president had
earlier signed it.
Kazakhstan has experienced a minimum of activity by Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Salafists, followers of
Wahhabism, and other extremist Islamic organizations since independence. The antiWestern, anti-modern message of such groups has gained little traction among Kazakhs,
whose history as an Islamic people is marked by tolerance, a perspective reinforced by the
inter-ethnic character of society in modern Kazakhstan. Perhaps a greater danger to stability
in the country is the tendency of some in the government to erode the fragile rights
religious believers enjoy there and push the regime more in the direction of its authoritarian
neighbors. This formula has not brought security to those states, and is unlikely to do so in
Kazakhstan as well.
Most of the Turkmen are Sunni Muslims, and like their traditionally nomadic counterparts in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, they historically followed a kind of folk Islam that was nondogmatic and employed many pre-Islamic beliefs and practices. As is the case across the
region, Sufism has strong roots among the Turkmen tribes, but this tradition of openness
and tolerance has not continued in independent Turkmenistan. Freedom of religion, as with
all internationally recognized human rights, has been ruthlessly crushed since the countrys
independence. As was true in the cases of the other Central Asian states, an official
government organization designed to control and regulate religious activity was immediately
implemented by the regime. This Muslim Spiritual Administration, patterned very much on
its Soviet predecessor, is under the direct control of a branch of the government, the Council

for Religious Affairs, which names the Head Mufti of Turkmenistan (the highest Islamic
official in the country) and approves the appointments of all other Muslim officials.
According to a statute passed in 1991, all religious organizations must register with the
government, and until 2004 religious minority groups, meaning any group other than the
officially recognized Muslim and Russian Orthodox communities, were not allowed to
register, and therefore were technically illegal and saw their activities banned. Yet a new
Law of Religion in 2004 still required that in order to receive official registration by the
government, a religious group was required to have at least 500 members, until this
stipulation was lifted by presidential order. Nevertheless, both Muslim and Christian groups
that are outside the mainstream denominations continue to be denied official recognition
and are subject to frequent harassment by Turkmen authorities.
Although Islam was firmly controlled by the regime of Turkmenbashi, he also utilized the
faith to build a national myth, as well as his own personality cult. In the first decade of
Turkmen independence, Turkmenbashi presided over the construction of more than
300 mosques, including the largest in the country built in his home town of Kipchak. But the
touchstone of his efforts to co-opt Islam for his own purposes is the Rukhnama, a rambling
tome that purportedly presents both the history and the destiny of the Turkmen people. The
book invokes the name of Allah in many passages, even crediting the Almighty with
providing Turkmenistans independence. Yet Turkmenbashi attempted to raise the work
almost to the equivalent of the Koran. For example, he required that Rukhnama be publicly
displayed alongside the Koran in the countrys mosques, essentially equating the two books
in terms of importance to the faithful. This runs completely counter to the respect accorded
the Koran in the remainder of the Muslim world, where no written work is considered equal
to the holy word of Allah as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. The Rukhnama is careful to
state that the [Koran] is sacred and cannot be replaced or compared to any other book,54
but the policies forced upon the countrys mullahs during the Turkmenbashi era clearly
indicate that the goal was to elevate Rukhnama to the level of scripture. Imams giving
sermons were pressured to quote from the book as though it were Islamic scripture, and to
use the mosque as a venue for classes on the work.55 At least one Head Mufti may have
been sacked and sent to prison for, among other reasons, his less than enthusiastic support
for the integration of the Rukhnama in Turkmenistans mosques.56 Since Turkmenbashis
death in 2006, the requirements to employ the Rukhnama in Islamic services have been
relaxed.
However, the end of the Turkmenbashi administration has not brought fundamental change
in religious policy in the country, although the regime of Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov has
promised there will be a liberalization of the laws governing religion. The new president
visited Mecca in 2007, making the lesser haj, or umrah, thereby reinforcing his Islamic
credentials, and some observers expect that he will allow more Turkmen to make the haj
than under Turkmenbashi, who personally approved all participants from Turkmenistan and
limited the number visiting Mecca to only around 200 each year.57 A relaxation of the
controls on Islam would seem to be logical policy in post-Turkmenbashi Turkmenistan, since
the faith has been placed squarely at the center of an emergent Turkmen identity,58 and
there appears to be virtually no activity by Hizb-ut-Tahrir or other extremist groups in the
country. Even more moderate Islamic political organizations such as the Islamic Renaissance
Party never gained a foothold among the Turkmen, although given the repressive political
environment after 1991, it is unlikely any effort to found a branch of the IRP would have
met with success. Turkmenbashi himself downplayed the threat of fundamentalism: When
we are asked about fundamentalism, we honestly dont understand the question.Yes, now
we are trying to restore our religion, but there is no threat.59 Radical Islam appears to have
little appeal to the average Turkmen citizen, and represents virtually no challenge to the
security of the Turkmen state. As in Kazakhstan, there have been no serious incidents of

violence at the hands of Islamic extremists since Turkmenistans independence. Allowing

greater religious freedom, along with granting other basic democratic rights, would likely
bring greater stability and security and further solidify Turkmenistans ties to the West. It
remains to be seen if the Berdymuhammedov regime will make serious, profound changes
in the countrys stance toward human and religious rights.
It may be the case that American policy regarding the Islamic threat in Central Asia will
undergo a revision during the Obama administration.60 Such a policy shift is perhaps
overdue, but it should be noted that it was the actions of the administration of George W.
Bush that led to the destruction of the only armed, anti-Western Islamic faction in the
region, the IMU. Moreover, the Bush administration condemned the massacre of civilians by
Uzbek forces at Andijan in 2005, even though its strong criticism eventually led to a serious
rift in AmericanUzbek relations and the loss of the American base at Khanabad.
Nevertheless, an emphasis away from the supposed security threat to the region
represented by radical Islam and toward advancing economic development,
democratization, and civil society will more accurately reflect the most serious challenges
facing the region today. Continued poverty, repression of basic human rights, corruption,
and lack of economic opportunityespecially in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and southern
Kyrgyzstanare problems that have become chronic and drive at least some people toward
radical, utopian solutions offered by the likes of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and others. The certain path
to undermining their appeal, even if only to the most marginalized, is through economic
development and political pluralism.
There is no doubt that some Central Asian Muslims have been radicalized and find the tenets
of Wahhabism, HUT, or other anti-Western approaches attractive. What is most remarkable
in the Central Asian context is not that such radical philosophies find some support, but that
the level of support they receive remains abysmally low in the face of extreme economic
hardship and harsh political repression. Policies seeking to secure the stability of the region
that do not incorporate this corollary of the Islamic equation in Central Asia are unlikely to
succeed, and in an ironic twist, may ultimately lead to the social and political chaos they
seek to circumvent.

Notes
1. One of the best guides to Sufism is Carl W. Ernst, Sufism, Boston: Shambhala
Publications, 1997.
2. Vernon Schubel, Post-Soviet Hagiography and the Reconstruction of the
Naqshbandi Tradition in Contemporary Uzbekistan, in Naqshbandis in Western
and Central Asia, edited by Elizabeth Ozdalga, Istanbul: Swedish Research
Institute, 1999.
3. Wahhabism is a ultra-conservative variation of Sunni Islam founded on the
Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century and in recent years has become
associated with extreme anti-Western attitudes and rejection of modernism,
since Osama bin Laden and the terrorists who attacked the U.S. on
September 11, 2001, are all Wahhabis. Salafism is a fundamentalist movement
related to Wahhabism, which seeks to return the nature and practice of Islam to
those observed by the salafi, or ancestors. Salafis generally believe that over
the centuries Islam has become corrupted by the imposition of dogma and ritual
that are counter to the original intent of Muhammad and his immediate
followers. Deobandism arose in British India in the late nineteenth century as a

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

10
.

11
.
12
.
13
.
14
.
15
.

response to British colonial policy, Christian proselytizing, and reformist

movements within Hinduism. The Taliban movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan
has its roots in Deobandi philosophy. Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a modern radical
movement found throughout the Muslim world that seeks a return of the
caliphate. It is banned in the Central Asian states, as well as in a number of
other countries.
V tolko odnom godu, [In Just One Year], Moskovskie Novosti, April 9, 1989, 8.
Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia. New York: St. Martins
Press, 1995, 9699.
Ibid.
Abdujabar Abduvakhitov, Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan, in Russias Muslim
Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis, edited by Dale F.
Eickelman, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, 88.
Marth Brill Olcott, The Rebirth of Religion and Ethnonationalism in the Soviet
Successor States, in Religion, Ethnicity and Self-Identity: Nations in Turmoil,
edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Hanover, New Hampshire:
University Press of New England, 1997, 80.
In the case of Uzbekistan, for example, the British scholar Tom Everett-Heath
argues that President Karimov understood from an early date that Islam and an
emergent Uzbek identity were tightly connected, and that the former could not
be completely divorced from the latter. Tom Everett-Heath, Instability and
Identity in a Post-Soviet World: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in Central Asia:
Aspects of Transition, edited by Tom Everett-Heath, London: RoutledgeCurzon,
2003, 193.
This statement is featured on a plaque at the mausoleum of Ahmad Yasavi in
Turkistan, Kazakhstan. The location draws many Islamic visitors from southern
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but few non-Muslims attend the shrine. The
quotation appears in Kazakh, and no translation in Russian is provided. The
author possesses a photograph of the plaque, taken in 2005.
Saparmyrat Turkmenbashy, Rukhnama, Ashgabat, 2005, 910.
Meat that satisfies Islamic dietary and preparatory requirements.

Meryem Kirimli, Uzbekistan and the New World Order, Central Asian Survey,
Vol. 16, No.1, 58.
Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence, Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, 104.
Kamoludin Abdullaev and Shahram Akbarzadeh, Islamic Renaissance Party of
Tajikistan, in Historical Dictionary of Tajikistan, Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow
Press, 2002.
16 For a detailed description of the events leading to the Tajik civil war, see
. Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence, Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, 103110.
17 Turajonzoda is one of the more intriguing figures from the Tajik civil war. He had
. served as the highest ranking Islamic official in the Tajik SSR during latter
1980s and after independence initially supported the government, but in 1993

fled to Afghanistan and joined forces with the IRPT. In the late 1990s he once
again broke with the IRPT, accusing the groups leadership of lacking motivation
and focus.
18 This view was proclaimed by Davlat Usmon, one of the early leaders of the IRP
. in Uzbekistan, in an interview in late 1990. See Komsomolets Tadjikistana,
November 21, 1990, 2.
19 The Journal of Turkish Weekly, March 17, 2006.
.
20 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe News Release, October 18,
. 1999. Eurasianet.org.
21 This group should not be confused with the political party in Uzbekistan of the
. same name. The two organizations are completely unrelated.
22 Namangani is a pseudonym that he allegedly adopted while fighting in the
. Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980s. His real name was Jumaboi Khojayev.
23 Allegedly, a video tape of this encounter exists. Some details of the exchange
. are recounted in Alec Rasizade, Dictators, Islamists, Big Powers and Ordinary
People: The New Great Game in Central Asia, Internationale Politik und
Gesellschaft, Vol. 3, 2002, 95.
24 Article 57 is particularly notorious for open-ended and vague language allowing
. the government to prohibit any political group that encroaches on the health
and morality of the people and any organizations that advocate socialand
religious hostility. A copy of the constitution in English is availablesee A.
Blaustein and G. Flanz, editors, Constitutions of the Countries of the World
Uzbekistan, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1994.
25 Uzbek Head Tells Press in Kazakh Capital About Tashkent Blasts, BBC
. Monitoring Service, February 22, 1999.
26 Russia at the time had been battling for years its own Islamic-based insurgency
. in Chechnya, and the Russian government regularly condemned any support for
Islamic extremism.
27 Bill Roggio, Tahir Yuldashev Confirmed Killed In US Strike In South Waziristan,
. Long War Journal, October 4, 2009.
28 Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, ICG Asia Report
. No. 58, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003, 17.
29 Vitaly Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle, Lanham,
. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005, 158160.
30 B. Bjelajac, Uzbekistan Special Report: How Strong is the Islamic Opposition?,
. Keston News Service, December 12, 2001.
31 Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, ICG Asia Report
. No. 58, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003, 16.
32 See Cheryl Benard, Hizb ut TahrirBolsheviks in the Mosque, Journal of
. Central Asian Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2001).
33 Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, ICG Asia Report
. No. 58, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003, 23.
34 Bullets Were Falling Like Rain: The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005, Human
. Rights Watch report, Vol. 17, No. 5(D), June 2005. Available at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uzbekistan0605/uzbekistan0605.p

35
.

36
.
37
.

df.
See the comments by the Kyrgyz scholar Nur Omarov, quoted in Uzbekistan:
Suicide Bombing in Andijan Ups the Ante for Karimov, Eurasia Insight, May 27,
2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav052709
.shtml.
Richard Dobson, Islam in Central Asia: Findings from Recent Surveys, Central
Asia Monitor, No. 2, 1994.
Regina Faranda and David B. Nolle, Ethnic Social Distance in Kyrgyzstan:
Evidence from a Nationwide Opinion Survey, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 31, No. 2
(June 2003). See Table 11 for the statistics cited.
Ibid.

38
.
39 Daniel Kimmage, Analysis: Extremist Threats, and Doubts, in Kyrgyzstan,
. Tajikistan, Eurasia Insight, July 24, 2006. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp062407.s
html.
40 Bruce Pannier, Kyrgyzstan: New Effort Aggressively Counters Hizb ut-Tahrir,
. Religious Extremism, Eurasianet Civil Society, February 15, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp021508.s
html.
41 See Central Asia: Islam and the State, ICG Asia Report No. 59, Brussels:
. International Crisis Group, July 10, 2003, 23.
42 Kyrgyz Republic, International Report on Religious Freedom 2008, United States
. Department of State. Available at:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108502.htm.
43 Felix Corley, Kyrgyzstan: Presidents Signing of Restrictive Religion Law
. Condemned, Forum 18 News Service, January 13, 2009. Available at:
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1240.
44 Kyrgyzstan: Religious Freedom Under Siege in Bishkek, Eurasianet.
. October 28, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav102808
a.shtml.
45 Sally N. Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite, New York: I.B. Tauris,
. 2005, 93.
46 One such behavior was the Slavic penchant for strong drink. Kazakhs who self. identify as Muslims also frequently drink alcohol. One study found that twothirds of Kazakh Muslims sometimes drink alcohol, not a behavior that is
associated with strong Islamic mores. See Richard Rose, How Muslims View
Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4,
105.
47 See Raushan Mustafina, Predstavleniia, kulty, obriady u Kazakhov [Perceptions,
. Cults, and Ceremonies among the Kazakhs], Alma Ata: Kazakhstan University,
1992.
48 Central Asia: Islam and the State, ICG Report No. 59, Brussels: International
. Crisis Group, July 10, 2003, 32.

49
.
50
.

Azade-Ayse Rorlich, Islam, Identity and Politics: Kazakhstan, 19902000,

Nationalities Papers, Vol. 31, No. 2 , 157161.
Marat Yermukanov, Kazakhstan Updates the Law on Religious Freedom, CACI
Analyst, June 20, 2001. Available at:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/461.
51 Mike Redman, Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Making Inroads into Kazakhstan?, CACI Analyst,
. June 4, 2003. Available at:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/newsite/?q=node/1203.
52 Mushfig Bayram, Kazakhstan: OSCE Legal Opinion Seriously Criticises Draft
. Law, Forum 18 News Service, February 4, 2009. Available at:
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?
query=&religion=19&country=29&results=10.
53 Ibid.
.
54 Saparmyrat Turkmenbashy, Rukhnama, Ashgabat, 2005, 21.
.
55 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Central Asia: Regional Leaders Try to Control Islam (Part
. 2), August 5, 2005. Available at:
http://www.rferl.org/specials/religion/archive/central-asia2.asp.
56 Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy,
. ICG Asia Report No. 85, Brussels: International Crisis Group, November 4,
2004, 6.
57 Christopher Boucek, Berdymukhammedov Burnishes Muslim Credentials on
. Visit to Saudi Arabia, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, available at:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/4594/print.
58 See the discussion in S.M. Demidov, Religioznye protsessy v post-Sovetskom
. Turkmenistane, [Religious Processes in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan],
Tsentralnaya Azia i Kavkaz, Vol. 4, No. 16.
59 Quoted in Ahmet T. Kuru, Between the State and Cultural Zones: Nation
. Building in Turkmenistan, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 1, 83.
60 Joshua Kucera, Obama Administration Adopting New Views on Possible Security
. Threats in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Eurasia Insight, February 17, 2009.
Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav021709
f.shtml.

ENERGY AND WATER IN CENTRAL ASIA

Resource Issues and Regional Stability
Natural resources play a crucial role in the security and development of Central Asia.
Specifically, large deposits of petroleum and natural gas in the western reaches of Central
Asia contribute to the geopolitical relevance of the region; regionally, the access and

management of limited water supplies loom as a growing source of conflict among the
Central Asia states themselves and potentially with neighboring states such as China and
Afghanistan. The regions importance as a supplier of hydrocarbon energy to the global
marketplace continues to rise as new sources of both petroleum and natural gas are
discovered and as additional routes for delivering these products are negotiated, financed,
and constructed. The hydrocarbon wealth clustered in the basin of the Caspian Sea,
primarily oil and gas in Kazakhstan and gas in Turkmenistan, has spawned numerous
pipeline projects over the past decade and attracted massive foreign investment. Both
countries stand to become major suppliers of energy to Europe, and it remains unclear
whether they will do so as close partners with, or as competing rivals to, the dominant
hydrocarbon producer of EurasiaRussia. Transportation of energy in the region has
acquired geo-strategic dimensions, as for the past 20 years Europe and the United States
have pushed for more pipeline options, while Russia has sought to limit the number of such
outlets. In addition, within the region the geographic distribution of gas and oil in Central
Asia is quite uneven, and two states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are dependent on their
neighbors to supply them with natural gas and refined petroleum products, adding yet
another strategic element to Central Asias energy dynamics.
Ironically, those very countries that are poor in hydrocarbons are rich in the other crucial
resource in the regionfresh water. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control the headwaters of the
major streams that provide most of the water to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and a
significant portion of the flow that waters southern Kazakhstan. Commercial agricultural
production in these regions would be impossible without the water delivered by the Amu
Darya and Syr Darya, and it is the overuse of these streams that has led to the demise of
the Aral Sea, an environmental catastrophe of unparalleled magnitude and a problem
demanding regional cooperation and coordination. A secondary area of potential
international friction over water resources is eastern Kazakhstan and Xinjiang in China.
Chinese projects to utilize greater amounts of water from the Ili and Irtysh rivers, which
both flow into Kazakhstan and provide vital water to the eastern part of the country, have
generated considerable concern among Kazakh scholars and government officials.1 As the
population of all the Central Asian countries continues to grow and their economies expand,
demand for water will inevitably rise, placing greater strain on the regions limited supplies
of fresh water. How much water the upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are
obligated to deliver to their downstream neighbors is a question that remains to be
answered almost 20 years after the Central Asian states became independent. Furthermore,
the answer to this question will determine to a large degree how much of the vast
hydroelectric potential of the hydrocarbon-poor but water-rich countries will be developed, a
potential that could turn them into energy exporters in their own right.

The Geopolitics of Oil, Gas, and Pipelines

Kazakhstans potential as a major oil supplier became evident in 1990, one year before the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The Tengiz field, a large deposit in the northwestern corner of
the Kazakh SSR, was identified in the 1980s, and by 1990 the multinational oil company
Chevron was negotiating with the Soviet administration to develop the field. The collapse of
the USSR put the talks on hold for a couple of years, but by 1993 Chevron and the new
government of independent Kazakhstan had formed a joint venture, Tengizchevroil, and
work was underway to exploit Kazakhstans newfound oil wealth.2 The Tengiz discovery was
followed by others in the following decade, and today there are four sizable areas of oil
production being developed, all of them in or along the Caspian Basin: Tengiz,
Karachaganak, Kashagan, and Kurmangazy. The largest of these in terms of reserves is
Kashagan, estimated to be the largest single oil field outside of the Middle East and believed

to hold around 13 billion barrels of recoverable petroleum, although the total amount of oil
there may be over 30 billion barrels. Most of the oil is located offshore in the north Caspian
and is therefore more expensive and difficult to pump, and the deposit is not expected to
produce significant amounts of petroleum until 2011. However, some estimates hold that
the Kashagan field could eventually deliver twice the volume of oil the Tengiz field currently
produces, making Kazakhstan into a major global supplier.3
The four oil deposits mentioned above clearly lie within Kazakhstans sovereign territory, but
the Caspian Basin may hold even greater pools of black gold and abundant natural gas.
The ownership status of these offshore reserves stands as a serious potential source of
conflict in the region, as the Caspian is bordered by five countries, all seeking a share of the
seabeds potential hydrocarbon wealth. The main issue is whether the Caspian should be
legally considered a lake or a sea. According to the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), concluded in 1982, each littoral state around a sea is allowed
to declare a territorial sea, as well as an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in which the
country has exclusive rights to any natural resources. The entire body of water would thus
be divided into five EEZs if the Caspian is considered a sea.4 If the Caspian is considered a
lake, there are several important differences. International shipping would not have the
same right of passage that would be required if the Caspian is declared a sea, meaning that
Russian ports would not have to grant open access to vessels flying the flags of other
Caspian littoral states. In addition, the center of the Caspian would be considered
international waters, and no single state would have jurisdiction there, nor would any
country be able to exploit any mineral resources in that zone without the consent of the
other bordering states. Russia and Iran favor the concept of the Caspian as a lake and hold
that a treaty concluded between the USSR and Iran in 1921 still applies to its legal and
geographical status.5 Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan all support the concept of a
Caspian sea. The question of whether the Caspian is a sea or a lake is not only crucial to
resource developmentit also has a direct bearing on any underwater pipelines that might
traverse the bed of the Caspian.
Kazakhstans oil wealth has been an economic boon, drawing massive amounts of foreign
direct investment (FDI) from an array of Western companies, as well as Russian investors,
and the Kazakh government and private companies have shared in the profits reaped from
the countrys energy resources. This influx of petro dollars has made the country the
wealthiest state in Central Asia, and Kazakh citizens enjoy one of the highest levels of GDP
per capita among the former Soviet republics. After almost a decade of high inflation,
currency reform, and economic difficulty following independence, economic growth from
2000 through 2007 averaged close to a robust 9 percent a year, fueled by large inputs of
FDI. From 1991 Kazakhstan attracted more than $30 billion from foreign investors, a larger
figure than the other four Central Asian countries combined. Acquiring the status of an oil
state enabled the Kazakh government to embark on a building spree in the new capital of
Astana, spending hundreds of millions of dollars on numerous government structures,
including an enormous headquarters for KazMunayGaz (the state-owned oil and natural gas
conglomerate), subsidized apartments, and spectacular monuments, making the new part of
the city into a showcase for foreigners and residents alike. The oil bonanza also allowed for
an expansion of social services, pensions, and support for higher

Headquarters of
KazMunayGaz, the national oil and gas company in Kazakhstan.
(Photo courtesy of Reuel Hanks)

education unmatched in the region, but still leaving some cities and regions
underdeveloped. President Nazarbayev released an ambitious strategic plan,
Kazakhstan 2030, aimed at converting the Kazakh economy into one of the 50
most-developed economies in the world and raising living and educational
standards to match those found in the most advanced countries.
But the emergence of Kazakhstan as a petro-state also has had negative consequences.
Unfortunately, the massive influx of investment has led to widespread corruption, even at
the highest levels of government. Just in 1996 alone the country may have lost half a billion
dollars to graft and illegal payoffs in the petroleum industry.6 Some reports indicate that
Nursultan Nazarbayev himself has become fabulously wealthy as a result of bestowing
political and economic favors on foreign investors, and may have a personal fortune of over
$1 billion, much of it hidden in Swiss bank accounts. Transparency is often lacking in the
multi-million dollar deals that characterize foreign investment in Kazakhstan, and although
many officials have been fired for corruption and some have been prosecuted, illegal deals
and bribery appear to be rampant. A second detrimental aspect of Kazakhstans booming oil
industry is that the heavy dependence on petroleum extraction makes the Kazakh economy
quite vulnerable to the rise and fall of international oil prices. With the dramatic decline in
the price of crude oil in late 2008, the Kazakh government suddenly experienced a steep
decline in revenues, and economic growth dropped to its lowest level of the decade.7
Moreover, some observers argue that hydrocarbon wealth can itself be the source of
instability if the resource is poorly managed and benefits are not sufficiently dispersed
across social strata.8

The successes and failures of the Kazakh petroleum industry have ramifications not only for
security and growth domestically, but resonating across the entire Central Asian and
Caucasus region. Kazakhstans wealth has allowed the country to become a major foreign
investor in the struggling economies of its neighbors, and thereby emerge as a key
supporter of economic development in Central Asias poorer countries. For example,
between 2004 and 2007, when global oil prices were skyrocketing, Kazakh investors
pumped almost half a billion dollars into investments in Kyrgyzstan, amounting to about
40 percent of the total investment in the country during that period. Kazakh investors have
put approximately $100 million into the Tajik banking system in recent years, and Kazakh
money plays a significant role in investment and trade with Uzbekistan.9 Proceeds from the
development of Kazakhstans oil resources therefore not only play a crucial role in driving
economic expansion within the countrys borders, but also contribute to regional stability by
fueling development and financing projects in surrounding states. In this sense, all the
states of Central Asia have a stake in Kazakhstans petroleum resources, and the oil and gas
industries, under the right circumstances, could serve as anchors of stability there.
Kazakhstan is landlocked and initially possessed little transport infrastructure that would
allow its hydrocarbon fuels to reach the global market. For the last two decades, the politics
of pipelines has played a large role in Kazakhstans international relations. At independence,
any oil exported from Kazakhstan was dependent on the old Soviet pipeline system, which
was not oriented toward global export and which was focused mostly on moving crude oil
toward refining capacity located in western Russia. Just after the USSR disintegrated, the
new government in Russia had a virtual monopoly over any oil moving out of Kazakhstan to
the international market, and the Russian government, which controlled access to the
pipelines, drove a hard bargain with the Kazakh administration in regard to the transport of
Kazakhstani crude. One of the hallmarks of Kazakhstans evolving foreign policy in the
1990s, the so-called multi-vector approach, was developed in response to the early
attempt by Russia to dominate the flow of Kazakh oil to the international markets and
thereby neutralize a potential competitor.10 The Kazakh government continued to work with
the Russian government and private companies, but in addition has sought to develop
alternative outlets beyond Russias reach, with the help of foreign investors.
To date, four pipelines that will carry Kazakh oil to external markets are either completed or
well into the developmental stage. Two of these are integrated northward with the Russian
pipeline system, while the remaining two will skirt Russia by running through the Caucasus
to the west and across Kazakhstan eastward to the border with China. The most significant
link completed thus far is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) project, which runs from
the Tengiz field through southern Russia north of the Caspian Sea, eventually terminating at
the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. Stretching almost 1,000 miles through
rugged terrain, the pipeline was constructed by the governments of Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Oman, along with a group of multinational petroleum companies, including Exxon Mobil and
Chevron. By February of 2007 CPC was delivering 800,000 barrels of oil per day to the
terminal at Novorossiysk, where the oil is loaded onto tankers and shipped out through the
Turkish Straits. Ultimately, it is expected to carry close to 1.5 million barrels per day, most
of which will originate in Kazakhstan, with some supplemental flow from Russian sources. 11
Transneft, the Russian state-owned pipeline company, controls a 24 percent share of the
CPC, and some existing Russian transport assets were merged into the project at the
outset. Moreover, the Russian government receives millions of dollars annually from
transport fees and taxes.12 The CPC is expected to be one of the main transport pathways
for oil moving from the Tengiz and north Caspian deposits to customers in the world market
for the foreseeable future.

A second pipeline to the Russian system connects Atyrau on the north coast of the Caspian
to Samara in southern Russia. This link dates from the Soviet period, but has been
refurbished with new pumping stations that have increased the total carrying capacity of the
pipeline to about 600,000 barrels per day, although Kazakhstan has committed to sending
only 340,000 barrels per day, on average, via this route. This connection eventually joins
Russias famed Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline, currently the worlds longest export
petroleum pipeline, which takes oil from western Siberia to Eastern Europe. 13
In the summer of 2006 the Kazakhstan-China pipeline project was completed, an effort that
allows petroleum from western Kazakhstan to reach Chinese refineries in Xinjiang. 14 The line
currently carries about 85,000 barrels a day to western China from fields in central
Kazakhstan, but a spur due to be completed in late 2009 will connect the pipeline to
Kenkiyak in western Kazakhstan and bring supply from the Tengiz and Kashagan deposits.
Ultimately the connection to China could transport as much as 400,000 barrels a day.15 The
pipeline is a joint venture solely between the Kazakh state pipeline company and Chinaoil,
the Chinese state-owned petroleum company. The pipeline utilized a number of existing
segments, but these required renovation and upgrading, and about 600 miles of new
pipeline will eventually be constructed. When completed, oil will be transported a distance of
approximately 2,000 miles across central Kazakhstan, making the pipeline one of the
longest in the world.
Over the past decade, Western governments and oil companies have invested billions of
dollars into new pipeline connections that will feed Caspian oil to the West, while
circumventing Russian territory. To date, the most important project that has been
completed is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a hugely expensive project that links
oil terminals in Baku with the Turkish port city of Ceyhan, situated on the southern Black
Sea coast. The BTC covers slightly more distance than the CPC, but cost more than
$3.5 billion to complete. Oil started to flow through the BTC in 2006, but Kazakhstan did not
ship oil through the pipeline until the fall of 2008.16 The Russian government was strongly
opposed to the construction of the BTC, and the participation of both Azerbaijan and Georgia
in the project damaged relations for those countries with their powerful northern neighbor.
Pressure from Russia may have diminished the Kazakh governments enthusiasm for
employing this export route initially, but the biggest barrier to Kazakh oil entering the BTC is
economic. Oil from Kazakhstan must be transported by tanker across the Caspian to Baku,
where is delivered to the eastern terminal of the line. This method of transport is more
expensive, slower, and less efficient than moving petroleum via pipeline. Nevertheless,
KazMunayGaz has invested in a small fleet of tanker ships, and in late 2008 began hauling
crude from the Tengiz field to the terminal at Baku. It is possible that once all the tanker
ships are operational, the total volume of Kazakh oil supplied to BTC may reach 98,000
barrels per day, a sizable amount given the obstacles to transport. Yet Kazakhstan appears
determined to increase its capacity to send oil westward via Azerbaijan. This is clearly
illustrated by talks concerning the construction of a joint Kazakh-Azeri pipeline across
Azerbaijan, designed to supplement existing routes.17
From the perspective of Western consumers, if not from the Kazakh point of view, the ideal
solution to the challenges of transporting Kazakh petroleum to the BTC would be a pipeline
running from Aktau in western Kazakhstan directly under the Caspian to Baku, resulting in a
Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP). In fact, such a project has been proposed and supported by
the French oil conglomerate Total, which holds a major share in both the BTC pipeline and
the Kashagan oil deposit in western Kazakhstan. The estimated cost of the project is
currently around $4 billion, but should the project come to fruition, this price tag will most
likely be considerably higher. Such a connection would completely circumvent the Russian

transport network, and at an estimated maximum flow capacity of 400,000 barrels of oil per
day would represent a serious competitor to the CPC and other delivery routes in Russia. A
central motivation behind Russian insistence on legally declaring the Caspian a lake instead
of a sea is to block the construction of such a pipeline. If the Caspian is considered a lake
when determining the zones of sovereignty of littoral states, the center portion of the body
of water is shared by the adjoining countries, and in the case of the Caspian, Russia could
use this as a basis to deny permission to construct the TCP. The Russians have raised
concerns about the possible environmental damage such a project might do to the fragile
Caspian ecosystem, and while this is certainly a problem that must be addressed, the
motive behind Russian opposition is primarily economic and not ecological. Blocking routes
that are not dependent on Russian infrastructure is also the driving force behind Russian
resistance to a proposed trans-Caspian gas pipeline (see discussion below).
The Nazarbayev administration signaled in April of 2008 that Kazakhstan is seriously
interested in expanding its energy relationship with Azerbaijan and the BTC, an evolution of
policy that is quite welcome in Washington and European capitals. At the urging of the
Kazakh president, the parliament ratified a treaty with Azerbaijan to create the Kazakhstan
Caspian Transportation System (KCTS), which carries a commitment to invest as much as
$10 billion in upgrading the port city of Aktau to a state-of-the-art oil export center. At the
same time, Dusenbay Turgenov, Kazakhstans deputy minister for energy, while on an
official visit to Azerbaijan indicated that the Kazakh government remains seriously
interested in constructing the TCP, if technical challenges can be met and costs are not
prohibitive.18 As it is becoming increasingly apparent that Kazakhstans goal of becoming a
major petroleum exporter in the next decade cannot be achieved by simply expanding the
CPC, an alternative delivery route to world markets is attractive, since it would provide more
leverage when negotiating transit fees and other costs with the CPC consortium. Indeed, as
a major stakeholder in the TCP, Kazakhstan could avoid many of the additional costs of
using the Russian transport system to move oil to the global market.
Whether the TCP oil pipeline is to become a reality depends a great deal on how willing
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are to challenge Russian pressure, as well as whether a
resolution to the legal, territorial status of the Caspian is forthcoming in the near future. The
leadership in both countries appears ready to disregard Russian objections and move
forward with the project if sufficient investment is obtained. In the wake of a summit of the
Caspian states in Tehran, Iran in October of 2007, Azerbaijani officials as well as
Kazakhstans President Nursultan Nazarbayev took issue with Russian President Vladimir
Putins statement that all five Caspian states must approve any future pipeline projects,
arguing that such efforts were domestic issues of the countries involved and not subject to
veto by the other states in the region.19 If the Russian government decides to take a hard
line against the TCP oil pipeline, tensions in the region could escalate. Russias brief but
destructive war with Georgia in the summer of 2008 served notice that Moscow will not be
reluctant to use force against neighbors who align themselves too closely with the West and
who openly provoke Russias leadership. Nazarbayev must be mindful of his large and
occasionally restive Russian population, many of whom are sympathetic to Russian
geopolitical goals and interests, and directly defying Russia could generate domestic
problems for the Kazakh president. Developing access to world markets for Kazakhstans oil
resources may remain a festering strategic issue for some time.
In addition to petroleum, western Central Asia contains vast deposits of natural gas.
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan all possess significant gas reserves.
Turkmenistan holds the largest deposits, and although the total amount of gas in the
country is a state secret, several fields have recently been confirmed to be quite large. An

independent audit by the British consultants Gaffney, Cline & Associates determined that the
Yolotan field near the border with Afghanistan is likely one of the largest gas deposits in the
world, holding possibly 14 trillion cubic meters of gas.20 Added to other deposits in
Turkmenistan, Yolotan probably makes Turkmenistans total gas reserves approach
20 trillion cubic meters, meaning that the country has the fourth largest reserves in the
world after Russia, Iran, and Qatar. Kazakhstan has proven reserves of almost 3 trillion
cubic meters, and Uzbekistans deposits are almost 2 trillion cubic meters. Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan are currently the regions leading producers, but Kazakhstan is expected to
increase production substantially in the next decade. Central Asia has emerged as one of
the worlds most important sources of natural gas, a hydrocarbon fuel that burns more
efficiently and more cleanly than oil or coal and is easier to transport in many cases.
The European Union represents an enormous potential market for Central Asian gas.
European consumption is expected to exceed 500 billion cubic meters by 2015, an increase
of about 40 percent from the current level. In addition, some countries in Eastern Europe
that lie outside the EU, especially Ukraine, also are eager to develop alternative suppliers to
Russia, which now provides the lions share of imported natural gas to the European region.
The central question is, of course, how to move Central Asian gas to the European market.
This dilemma has led to a second variation of pipeline politics in the Caspian Sea region, this
time involving not oil, but natural gas. Just as is the case with petroleum, Russia controls
most of the transport infrastructure that moves Central Asian gas to the rest of the world,
since the pipeline network inherited from the Soviet era was designed to carry gas from
Central Asia northward to other parts of the USSR. The distribution of gas within the Central
Asian region also is a security and developmental issue of some concern, since suppliers,
mostly Uzbekistan, have used gas supplies for political leverage against the consumer
countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are almost entirely
dependent on Uzbekistan to provide gas to their citizens, and disputes over pricing, delivery,
and payments have erupted frequently since 1991, leading to tensions between these
countries and spurring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to seek alternative sources of energy,
especially the development of domestic hydropower.
Thus, under current conditions, most of the gas produced by Central Asian countries for
export outside the region is transported through Russias pipeline network. This system was
in place when the Soviet Union collapsed, and therefore at independence Central Asias gas
exporters were entirely dependent on Russia to carry their production to international
consumers, with the exception of direct bilateral business conducted between the states in
the region. The main artery for export is the Central Asia Center Pipeline, which draws
supply from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and then traverses Kazakhstan northward to link
with the Russian gas pipeline network. A second smaller, older pipeline, the Bukhara-Urals
route, takes gas from Uzbekistan to southern Russia. For most of the past 20 years, Russia
has purchased Central Asian gas at discounted prices in exchange for access to Russias
transport system. Gazprom, the Russian state-controlled gas company, has struck lucrative
deals with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, holding substantial stakes in joint
ventures for gas production and transport. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, the
Russian administration has made quite clear that it hopes to gain complete control of
Central Asias gas supplies, most notably in calls for the formation of a gas cartel in the
region.21 Such an arrangement would guarantee Russian dominance in the European market
by removing the Central Asian states as potential competitors, and would allow for both
higher prices and increased political leverage. The EU and the United States, on the other
hand, have pushed hard to develop new pipelines that circumvent Russia, for both economic
and strategic reasons. The outcome of this battle of the pipelines will have profound
consequences for the economic and political independence of the Central Asian producers,
as well as for economic conditions in Europe.

Russia has moved aggressively to negotiate contracts that guarantee large deliveries of
Turkmen gas to Gazprom and to develop alternative pipelines to handle the larger volume of
flow. A key to Russias geopolitical goals in the energy market is the Prikaspissky Pipeline
project, which was signed in May of 2007 by Russian President Putin, Turkmen President
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev.22 The
Prikaspissky project would enlarge an existing pipeline that currently runs from
Turkmenistan, through Kazakhstan along the eastern margin of the Caspian Sea, and into
southern Russia. Under the conditions specified in the project, Turkmenistan would deliver
much of its gas exports via this route, and Kazakhstan would also utilize the pipeline to
export gas from the Kashagan field in northwestern Kazakhstan once those sources come
into production. Projections hold that completion of the Prikaspissky project would nearly
double Russian gas imports from Central Asia, effectively sending most of Central Asias
output into the Russian pipeline system for re-export and undermining the necessity of
constructing additional transport infrastructure that circumvents the Russian system.
However, the project has fallen behind schedule almost from its inception, and recent
developments in the regions energy politics cast considerable doubt on whether the
Prikaspissky project will be completed. A major setback to Russian plans came in April 2009
when the Turkmen government called for an open, international competition to build the
spur that would connect Turkmen pipelines to the Prikaspissky project, meaning that
Gazprom must now compete with other companies for rights to the Turkmen branch. 23
The most serious blow to Russian ambitions in controlling Central Asias gas resources came
on April 9, 2009, when a mysterious explosion occurred in a pipeline in eastern
Turkmenistan under the supervision of Gazprom.24 The Turkmen government accused
Gazprom of negligence and failing to properly notify the Turkmen authorities that the
volume of gas being sent through the pipeline was being diminished. The incident created a
serious rift in the relationship between Gazprom and the Turkmenistan regime. At a
conference in Ashgabat later in the month, President Berdymukhamedov declared a
quantum shift in Turkmenistans energy policy, in what many analysts view as a devastating
blow to Russian policy in the region. The Turkmen leader stated that Today we are looking
to diversify energy routes and the inclusion of new countries and regions in regard to
delivering Turkmen gas to the world market.25 This geopolitical shift has revived momentum
for at least three pipeline projects favored by the United States and the Europeans,
designed to enhance the energy security of Europe.
The so-called White Stream pipeline would supply Ukraine, Romania, and other eastern
European countries, lessening the dependence this region now has on Russian gas. The
route of the pipeline would extend from Georgia and run under the Black Sea to terminals in
Ukraine and Romania, and once fully implemented could carry as much as 32 billion cubic
meters of gas a year if additional supply is provided by Central Asian producers.26 The
pipeline would run for approximately 600 miles, most of that distance underwater, and has
an estimated price tag of $4 billion. Initially supplied by Azerbaijani gas, it would eventually
be gas from Turkmenistan that would make the route economically viable.
A second transport project is the Nabucco gas pipeline. The Nabucco pipeline would extend
for a distance of over 2,000 miles, running from the Turkish-Georgian border across Turkey
and terminating in Austria. The cost of building the pipeline is estimated at approximately
$10.5 billion, a hefty investment and one of the stumbling blocks to the projects success. 27
If completed, Nabucco would represent a major supplement to European supplies, since it is
designed to carry close to 31 billion cubic meters of gas per year. As in the case of the White
Stream project, a central issue is whether there will be sufficient gas supplies originating in
the Caspian Basin to justify construction of the pipeline.28 A possible solution to the potential

shortage of gas would be to have Iran contribute to the supply by linking to Iranian sources
at the Turkish-Iranian border, but given Irans isolation in the international community and
continued development of a nuclear weapons program, European governments and the
American administration are reluctant to involve Iran in the project. A second sticking point
is the transit fees Turkey will receive and how much gas Turkey will be allowed to remove
from the pipeline for domestic use. In spite of setbacks and details that remain unclear,
Turkmenistans stated policy of developing additional routes and partners has breathed new
life into the Nabucco project, especially with the confirmation of large gas reserves in
Turkmenistan. Even though Kazakhstan has recently signaled that it would not likely
contribute gas to Nabucco, many analysts hold that there is sufficient gas in western Central
Asia to support several pipelines.
Russia has attempted to counter the Nabucco project with an alternative pipeline that would
traverse the length of the Black Sea and connect to pipeline networks in Serbia, Bulgaria,
Greece, and Italy. This is the so-called South Stream project, and in May of 2009, officials
from the five participating countries concluded talks to initiate construction of the pipeline.29
The main artery of the planned pipeline would run from Russias coastline on the eastern
Black Sea to the Bulgarian port of Varna, a distance of almost 600 miles, and from Bulgaria
would branch into two spurs, one continuing westward to Greece and Italy, and the other
directed north, servicing Serbia, Hungary, and Austria. In spite of all the planning and
negotiations backing the project, it is questionable whether South Stream will ever be
completed, given the prohibitive costs of the pipeline. Gazproms own estimates for the total
cost of the project in early 2009 approached $34 billion on the high end, and even the best
cost estimate reached $27 billion. Technical and political challenges also plague the project,
as the pipeline would most likely require cooperation from Ukraine in order for the route to
pass through that countrys territorial waters in the Black Sea. Given tensions in recent
years over Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine, the government in Kiev is unlikely to provide
any support without demanding serious concessions from Moscow, a position the Russian
government would rather avoid.
Even with abundant gas reserves and the willingness of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to
commit to supplying the Western-backed pipelines, the problem of how to move the gas
across the Caspian remains. The White Stream and Nabucco pipelines could not provide
sufficient gas using just sources from Azerbaijan and other suppliers from the western side
of the Caspian Basinall planners agree that Turkmenistan, and to a lesser degree
Kazakhstan, must supply the pipelines with sizable quantities of gas. The solution to this
dilemma, from the perspective of the EU and the United States, is to construct a transCaspian gas pipeline. Western governments have been courting Turkmenistans support for
such a pipeline for years, and should Ashgabat and Astana seriously commit to the idea,
Russias hold on Central Asian gas would be seriously shaken, if not completely broken.
However, the same obstacles exist to a trans-Caspian gas pipeline as those that hinder an
oil pipeline: the legal status of the Caspian, ecological concerns, and the expense of building
an underwater pipeline. If Turkmenistan makes a firm commitment to such a linkage,
however, it is unlikely that any of these problems will prevent Western companies and
governments from quickly moving forward with the project, which would completely alter
the dynamic of energy politics in the Caspian region.
Indeed, cracks in Gazproms monopoly on Turkmen gas had already begun to widen, even
prior to the explosion in April of 2009. Ashgabat concluded an agreement with China in 2006
to construct a pipeline running across the breadth of Central Asia to transport gas to
western China. Construction on the various segments in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan began almost immediately in partnership with Chinas state energy company, but

the long stretch through Kazakhstan is behind schedule, and it is likely that Turkmen gas,
supplemented by sources in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, will not begin flowing to China until
some point in 2010. Ultimately, however, Turkmenistan is committed to sending 30 billion
cubic meters of gas per year toward its large customer in the east. And in the late 1990s,
Iran built the Korpeje pipeline, which carries a modest amount of Turkmen gas to northern
Iran. Although Iran has massive reserves of natural gas, the country is forced to import
Turkmen gas into its northern territory due to lack of sufficient domestic infrastructure.
Ashgabat has also expressed support for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP)
pipeline, although this project remains on the drawing board and probably will not reach
fruition until the military situation in Afghanistan stabilizes. If all the proposed pipeline
projects involving Turkmen gas were to be financed and constructed, the country could
become a major supplier of energy to Europe, South Asia, and Chinabut this will depend
on how committed the Berdymukhamedov government is to pursuing alternatives to
Gazprom and Russian interests.

Energy and Security within Central Asia

An abundance of energy resources in a state does not necessarily lead to uniform economic
development or political stabilitythere are many developing countries well endowed with
petroleum deposits or other valuable energy sources that suffer repetitive episodes of social
and political strife, widespread poverty, and even economic decline. Central Asias oil and
gas producers are experiencing many of the same distortions that other petro-states have
suffered. Within the region, the reliance on oil and gas revenues has the potential to
generate internal instabilities in these states, along with friction between states. Critics of
the governments of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan point to the fact that much of the newfound wealth of these countries has been directed toward ostentatious new construction in
the capitals, while investment in outlying regions has lagged, and spending on social
services and education in some regions is inadequate. In Uzbekistan, some regions have
suffered from gas shortages, even though the country has continued to export gas to
Russia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in order to earn revenue. In some instances, accessibility
to gas is used as leverage for social control and punishment, as was the case in Andijan in
the winter of 2006, when more than half of the homes, schools, and hospitals in the city did
not receive gas. Some Uzbek citizens have protested periodic deficits of gas they
experience, and should the situation worsen, energy shortages could lead to civil unrest.
Central Asias hydrocarbon-poor countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are dependent on the
other three energy-rich states for gas and oil. Both are particularly beholden to Uzbekistan
for natural gas supplies, and in the nearly 20 years since independence, the Karimov regime
has shown a ready willingness to shut off or reduce the flow of gas to both countries as a
means of forcing payment. In 2001 Tashkent closed down gas deliveries during the winter to
Kyrgyzstan in an effort to pressure the Kyrgyz government to make payments on a
mounting debt the country had built up in previous years. This meant that many
apartments, hospitals, and government buildings had no heat in the midst of the winter and
was viewed as a particularly cruel method of bargaining by the Kyrgyz. The Kyrgyz
government responded by limiting the amount of water it allowed into Uzbekistans portion
of the Fergana Valley, in an exchange that threatened to explode into a full-fledged resource
war. But the Uzbek government has continued to use energy, both gas and electricity, as a
lever in foreign policy. Most recently, in the winter of 2009 Uzbekistan provided only half the
amount of natural gas that Tajikistan required in an effort to force Dushanbe to pay off an
$18 million debt for previous gas purchases. Uzbekistan also cut off electricity to Tajikistan
from Turkmenistan in a payment dispute, forcing rationing of electrical power in Tajikistan
for several months. Tajik officials claim that the Uzbek authorities promised not to disrupt

electrical flow if Dushanbe agreed to pay a higher price for gas deliveries, and then reneged
on the agreement after the Tajik regime signed a contract pledging to meet the new price.
The tensions over energy between Uzbekistan on the one side, and Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan on the other, at best fuel the perception widely held in the region that the Uzbek
regime is an unreliable, untrustworthy partner. At the worst Tashkents strong-arm tactics
could result in social and political instability in its neighbors, as residents of Tajikistan have
recently suffered through long, cold winters due to energy shortages, and further
deprivation might prove a spark for organized unrest. Fomenting instability in its neighbors
is not in Uzbekistans national interest, nor is playing hardball with countries that represent
long-term customers for Uzbekistans energy exports. Although Uzbekistan is not an energy
player on the same geopolitical scale as Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan, it still occupies a
crucial place in the energy politics of Central Asia as a regional supplier and a conduit for
pipelines going to the east and south. As the Central Asian region enlarges its position as a
supplier of hydrocarbon energy to the global economy, the importance of maintaining
stability and security there also increases. The energy wealth of the Caspian Basin
represents a potential engine of economic development for all the countries of Central Asia,
and thus may play a vital role in enhancing stability. Ironically, it is another scarce resource
in the region, water, which represents perhaps the most difficult challenge to Central Asias
long-term prospects for peace and security.

Central Asias Looming Water Crisis

Most of Central Asia is marked by arid climateseither true deserts or dry grasslands,
known as steppe, that receive little precipitation on a yearly basis. The water that makes
agriculture possible in most of this region originates as snowfall in the mountains that line
its southeastern margin, occupying the better part of the countries of Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. In the case of water resources in Central Asia, the pattern of haves and havenots is directly reversed from that for hydrocarbon energy resources. The headwaters of
the major rivers that provide water to the downstream states, (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan) all originate either within or along the territory of the upstream countries,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Two rivers represent the lifelines for the region: the Amu Darya
and the Syr Darya (see map of Central Asia in the Appendix). The Naryn River, the main
tributary of the Syr Darya, originates in the mountains of eastern Kyrgyzstan and flows
westward into the Fergana Valley, the most productive agricultural region in Central Asia.
Kyrgyzstan alone holds approximately 40 percent of the regions water, and most of the
farms in eastern Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan are dependent on water that
originates there. The Amu Darya is a larger stream that begins in the Pamir Mountains in
eastern Tajikistan as the Panj River. A host of tributaries flow into the river as it flows
generally westward, forming the international border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
Almost all of these contributing streams originate in Tajikistan, and a number of
hydroelectric stations are located on some, meaning that the Tajiks can control to a large
degree the amount of flow reaching the agricultural oases of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
further downstream.
Soviet economic policy in Central Asia emphasized an expansion of agricultural production,
especially of cotton. This resulted in an enormous increase in demand for water in those
areas where irrigated crops were grown. As a result, Uzbekistan emerged by the mid-1960s
as one of the worlds leading regions for the production of cotton, and coupled with adjacent
areas in Turkmenistan and southern Kazakhstan, remains one of the worlds most important
sources of cotton fiber. However, these tremendous gains in output were only achieved by
extracting huge volumes of water from the regions watershed, primarily the Amu Darya and

Syr Darya. Some irrigation projects drew vast amounts of water, transporting it across some
of the driest terrain on earth. The Karakum Canal, constructed from 1954 to 1988, stretches
860 miles from the lower reaches of the Amu Darya across the Kara Kum desert into
Turkmenistan and is the largest water transport canal in the world.30 Immense new tracts of
irrigated land were brought into production as a result of the canal, as it pulled an estimated
12 cubic kilometers of water annually from the Amu Darya in the late 1980s. 31 Water usage
was so high that in the late 1970s a grandiose plan called Sibaral was formulated to build
even longer canals from Siberia to Central Asia, which would tap into unused water from
several rivers in western Siberia. Never implemented, the collapse of Soviet authority
ensured that Sibaral remained only another unrealized example of the Soviet penchant for
efforts to manipulate the environment on a massive and grossly inefficient scale.
It is quite important to consider the legacy of Soviet water management in Central Asia if
one wishes to comprehend the current situation in the region. Under the Soviet
administration, water planners (many of whom are still in positions of authority today)
approached water as a virtually limitless resource, with little if any consideration of
conservation, efficiency, or the consequences of overuse. Water was a free and limitless
commodity, to be used with reckless abandon in the process of meeting production quotas
assigned by the state. There was virtually no metering to gauge residential or agricultural
use, and the transport system, from pipes in apartment buildings to the local araq, or
irrigation ditch, was porous and wasteful. This approach to water management persists in
Central Asia today and is one of the major obstacles to restructuring both the practices and
infrastructure inherited from the Soviet era.32
The environmental consequences of Soviet mismanagement were devastating. The most
publicized catastrophe brought on by Soviet policy is the collapse of the Aral Sea and the
associated ecosystem. In 1960, the Aral Sea was the worlds fourth-largest lake and
supported a sizable commercial fishing fleet, as well as other related economic activities,
such as processing of the catch and manufacturing and maintenance of fishing vessels. The
Aral was fed by both the Amu Darya, flowing in from the south, and the Syr Darya, entering
the sea from the northeast. Through the 1960s and 1970s a huge amount of additional land
was brought into production in both the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR, and all the water
to support agriculture (mostly cotton) in this new area was drawn from the Amu Darya and
the Syr Darya. By the late 1970s no flow at all from the Syr Darya was reaching the
northern Aral, and the recharge from the Amu Darya was severely reduced as well. The Aral
shrank at an unprecedented rate between 1960 and 1990, and the entire ecosystem and
economy associated with the sea virtually disappeared.33 This process continues today. When
the Central Asian states achieved independence in 1991, the Aral Sea became an
international body of water (although only half the size it had been in 1960) divided
between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The tragedy of the Aral Sea stands as the most
prominent, but far from the only, international water problem in the region.
Tensions over water in Central Asia have the potential to increase for several reasons. As
the region develops economically, demand for water is likely to increase in all states, putting
more pressure on existing resources. Certainly some of this pressure could be alleviated via
the implementation of improved conservation and management techniques and the
imposition of a fee system for all users. But the Central Asian states have failed to introduce
meaningful reforms in water management and economics for the past 20 years, and there is
little evidence that significant progress on these issues is on the horizon. Moreover,
population growth rates remain relatively high in the Fergana Valley, the region that
consumes the greatest amount of Central Asias irrigation water, and agriculture, especially
cotton production, is likely to remain the chief sector of employment there for the

foreseeable future. Uzbekistan, Central Asias most populous country, currently has a
population growth rate of about 2 percent per year, and much of this growth is centered in
the eastern section of the country, where water consumption is the highest. In Tajikistan
population growth is even higher, at almost 3 percent per year, and although the population
in Tajikistans portion of the Fergana Valley is considerably smaller than that in Uzbekistan,
demand for additional water will nevertheless inevitably increase.
At independence, officials from the five new countries in Central Asia agreed to simply
continue the water allocation system that had been in place under the Soviet regime. While
this decision contributed to stability in the region in the uncertain days after the collapse of
centralized authority, it was problematical in that it did not take into account that rather
than operating within a single governing framework, the new states would now pursue
national interests and programs of economic development that might not necessarily
integrate with the interests and goals of neighboring states, and that the status quo would
not serve as a solution in the longer term. A governing body, the Interstate Coordinating
Water Commission (ICWC), was charged with managing the various needs and demands for
water among the Central Asian countries. But several problems render this organization
mostly ineffective. First, the ICWC has the authority to set delivery quotas, but consensus
among the representatives from each state is required, a situation that often simply leads to
inflexibilityeach country attempts to hold onto its quota, as it fears that in the future it will
not be able to regain any concessions made in the short term. Secondly, although water
allocations are considered, there is no sharing of the costs of maintaining water control
structures, built mostly during the Soviet era but which now are national assets of each
country.34 A prime example is the huge Toktogul reservoir and dam at the head of the Syr
Darya in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz government must fund the maintenance of the dam and
reservoir, amounting to more than $20 million per year, without help from the downstream
states of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, although these countries benefit much more from the
flood control provided by the dam than Kyrgyzstan does.35
Another problem leading to increased tensions over water resources is the lack of accurate
data and monitoring. Reliable and trustworthy data are necessary because of the bilateral
barter agreements that exist between several of the countries. These deals are simple
trades of commodities, usually exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan providing
water to the downstream countries, with the latter then delivering coal, gas, or oil to the
upstream partner. Problems arise when there is drought, as a reduction in flow will result in
the upstream countries holding water in their reservoirs to ensure they have enough for
irrigation, electrical production, and other uses, and thus often reneging on the agreement
they have made with the downstream partner. Such situations have occurred several times
since independence, and especially generate friction with Uzbekistan, which uses 50 percent
of the irrigation water available in the entire watershed of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya.36
Another factor contributing to potential conflict over water are the disparities in military
power between countries. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have much larger armies and betterequipped air forces than either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, and although neither state has ever
seriously threatened armed action against its upstream neighbors over the water issue,
Uzbekistan has shown a propensity to intervene militarily in both countries when it felt its
national interests were threatened. And it is not always the case that conflict is between
downstream and upstream statesUzbekistan and Kazakhstan have recently seen tensions
rise over water regulation along their border, and Uzbekistan frequently complains that
Turkmenistan takes too great a share of the Amu Darya, especially given the much greater
area of irrigated land in western Uzbekistan. Tashkents threatened withdrawal from the
Central Asian electricity grid in November of 2009, effectively cutting off electrical supplies
to Tajikistan, resulted in the Tajik authorities suggesting that they would shut down the

water flow into Uzbekistan from their country, a clear sign that energy and water have both
become political weapons in the region.37
Indeed, conflict over water has already erupted at both the international and the local level
in Central Asia. Even under the Soviet regime, tensions over water allocation and access
boiled over into violence in isolated cases. Some of the most serious incidents at the local
level were the so-called Isfara events in 1989. Isfara is a small town located on the border
between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the Fergana Valley, and the district it occupies is one
of the most densely populated regions in all of Central Asia. In the summer of 1989,
disagreements between the Kyrgyz and Tajiks over water allowances provided to collective
farms in Isfara erupted into ethnic rioting in which possibly a dozen people were killed, and
as many as 50 injured.38 Although no fatalities have been recorded since Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan became independent, tensions remain high in the region. In March of 2008 a
group of Tajiks, allegedly accompanied by the district governor and members of local law
enforcement, crossed into Kyrgyzstan and attempted to tear down a dam on the Aksay
River, built partially with World Bank funding, in an effort to increase the volume of water
flowing into Tajikistan.39 While deaths over water issues are rare in Central Asia, arguments
and claims of overuse are certainly not, and the potential for additional serious incidents,
especially along borders, is quite significant.
At the international scale, disagreement over water policy exists to some degree between all
the Central Asian states, but the most intense and sustained conflict has been between
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Since the late 1990s, the two countries have engaged in
disputes over payments for gas (delivered to Kyrgyzstan) and water (delivered to
Uzbekistan), and several times one side has cut off or diminished supplies to the other in an
effort to gain political leverage. In 1997 Kyrgyzstan reduced the amount of flow leaving the
Toktogul reservoir and entering Uzbekistan. Tashkent responded by amassing troops near its
border with Kyrgyzstan in the Fergana Valley, only a few miles from the Toktogol reservoir,
in an obvious attempt to intimidate the Kyrgyz government. Negotiations eventually defused
the crisis, but tensions have continued to arise, as Uzbekistan has attempted to force
payment for gas deliveries from its poorer neighbors. In 2001 the Kyrgyzstan legislature
passed a law identifying water as a legal commodity, opening the way for the imposition of a
pricing structure, and within a few months the government declared that it would soon
develop a fee scale by which it would charge the downstream recipients for water usage.40 In
retaliation, the Karimov administration in October, just as winter was arriving in Central
Asia, shut off natural gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan, resulting in serious shortages for the
remaining winter months. Officially the cessation of gas delivery was because the
Kyrgyzstan state gas entity, Kyrgyzgas, was behind in making payments to Uzbekistan and
because Kyrgyzstan had defaulted on an earlier deal to provide electricity. But the cutoff of
gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan at the onset of winter also was designed to send a clear message
to Bishkek that any unilateral decision regarding water would be countered by a reduction in
the flow of Uzbek gas. Tashkent has continued this policy of withholding energy to gain
political leverage with its upstream water suppliers. In the winter of 2008 Uzbekistan cut the
flow of electricity passing from Turkmenistan to Tajikistan, resulting in complete electrical
blackouts in some parts of Tajikistan for almost two months.41 The two countries entered
into an agreement in February of 2009 that resolved the crisis, in which Uzbekistan would
receive a larger amount of water from reservoirs in northern Tajikistan in return for
resumption of electricity to Tajikistan.
Water in Central Asia is not solely used for irrigationit is a major source of electrical
generation for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as several hydroelectric dams were built in both
countries while they were part of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the potential of both countries

developing into major electricity exporters is quite high. Tajikistan has the highest per capita
hydroelectrical generation potential in the world, and Kyrgyzstan also ranks high for
potential production. The United States Department of State and international development
agencies have in recent years been encouraging both countries to expand their electrical
production capacities. The economic geography of electrical demand in the Eurasian region
is particularly conducive to such development, because a large market for electricity is
emerging in South Asia, in Pakistan and especially in India. In theory, electricity generated
in the mountains of Central Asia could be transported by high-voltage lines to this region,
where the demand for electrical power is predicted to rise exponentially. A second
advantage is that the seasonal demand regimes in both regions are complementarypeak
demand in South Asia occurs during the summer months, when demand in Central Asia is
the lowest, and demand declines between October and March in South Asia, when demand
in Central Asia is greatest. Several significant geopolitical obstacles stand in the way of
transferring electricity on such a scale between the regions, including the cost and difficulty
of building the necessary infrastructure, militancy and political instability in Afghanistan, and
the frequently difficult relationship between Pakistan and India. However, if these challenges
can be met, the possibility of creating a Eurasia-wide electrical grid seems high, as the
economic logic behind the network appears compelling.42
In 2005 the U.S. administration developed the Regional Electricity Market Assistance Project
(REMAP), a program designed in part to foster the development of energy trade between
Central and South Asia. The rationale for such development lies in the enormous benefits to
all countries involved in the effort. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would acquire substantial
revenues that could lead to additional economic development and investment in social
services, while electricity importers such as Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and India would have
access to reasonably cheap and environmentally friendly electrical power, which these states
also require for economic advancement.43 The Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and other international funding
agencies are all pursuing pilot projects and funding feasibility studies on various aspects of
creating a region-wide electrical system. For example, in 2007 ADB provided $3 million in
grant assistance to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to analyze the
possibilities of establishing a transportation network that would enable Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan to export up to 1,000 megawatts of electricity to their southern neighbors. Money
has flowed from the private sector into several projects in the region that would contribute
to REMAP, such as the rehabilitation and expansion of existing electricity transmission
infrastructure in Central Asia, and some investment has been made in new generating
capacity. The Russian government and private Russian firms have also shown interest in
investing in the hydroelectric potential of both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but to date, most
of these plans have not come to fruition. The Russian company Rusal, for example, closed a
deal to complete the massive Rogun dam in Tajikistan in 2004, but later withdrew from the
project.44 But lack of capital is not the biggest problem that the upstream countries face in
trying to develop their hydroelectric resources.
Additional hydroelectric projects on the streams of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would affect
the flow of water to the downstream states, and Uzbekistan in particular has been critical of
plans to construct more dams and accompanying reservoirs upstream. The Rogun dam, for
example, if completed would be the worlds highest dam, at 335 meters, and would
generate approximately 3,600 megawatts of electricity if operating at full capacity, creating
a large surplus of electricity that Tajikistan could export and still satisfy domestic needs. The
reservoir behind the structure would hold about 17 billion cubic meters of water (about
4.5 trillion gallons), and engineers estimate that almost a decade would be required for the
lake to completely fill.45 Located on the Vakhsh River, a major tributary of the Amu Darya,
there can be little doubt that completion of the Rogun dam would significantly reduce the

amount of water reaching Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz government is promoting the construction
the Kambarat-1 project, a large hydroelectric dam and reservoir on the Naryn River, and in
early 2009 secured a commitment of almost $2 billion dollars in assistance for construction
of the dam from Russia.46 A second power station, Kambarat-2, is also in the works. The
Russian offer, widely seen as an inducement to the Kyrgyz administration to close the
American airbase at Manas (see Chapter 6), indicates how geopolitical policy and
development of hydropower in Central Asia are becoming increasingly intertwined. While
gaining leverage with Kyrgyzstan, Russias relationship with Uzbekistan immediately
suffered damage, as Uzbekistans President Islom Karimov publicly belittled the notion that
Russian leadership was required to solve Central Asias water conflicts. Karimov instead
favors an independent audit and review of Central Asias water resources by the United
Nations, and has stated that Uzbekistan will remain opposed to any major dams built
upstream unless it can be certified that the flow to Uzbekistan will not be seriously affected.
In reality, such assurances would be meaningless, as even moderate hydroelectric
development in the upper basins of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya would inevitably result in
substantial, if not catastrophic, reductions in the volume of water downstream. Just the
Rogun reservoir alone would cut the amount of water reaching Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
markedly, and there are at least three other hydro projects in various stages of construction
on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan alone. The choice seems clear: Either Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan must dramatically scale back their plans to develop their hydropower potential, or
the downstream countries, especially Uzbekistan, must accept a decline of their agricultural
sectors. For Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, reductions in agricultural output might be offset
by exporting larger quantities of gas and oil, but Uzbekistan does not enjoy this alternative.
The rhetoric on both sides has become more bellicose in recent years. President Bakiyev of
Kyrgyzstan stated in May of 2009 that both phases of the Kambarat power project will be
built, regardless of who likes it or not, a clear challenge to the objections of Tashkent and
Ashgabat.47 A compromise is possible, but it seems likely that both upstream nations will
pursue a policy that will grant them as much energy independence as possible. This means
building dams. The Uzbek regimes tactic of cutting electricity and gas deliveries to pressure
both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on policy issues seems to have ultimately backfired, as it has
provided a strong rationale for both countries to make full use of the one crucial resource
they control and Uzbekistan desperately needswater.
Natural resources have the potential to make Central Asia a wealthy and well-developed
region. The oil and gas deposits scattered throughout the eastern margin of the Caspian
Basin could make Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into rich, influential states, and Nursultan
Nazarbayevs goal of building Kazakhstan into one of the 50 wealthiest countries in the
world is not an unattainable mark for his country. The economic success of Central Asias
hydrocarbon powers would represent a boon to the entire region, as richer Central Asians
invest a portion of their wealth in the economies of their neighbors. But serious obstacles
stand in the way of this scenario: geographic, economic, and political. The region must
overcome its disadvantageous location vis--vis global energy markets and must develop
new access routes to those markets or accept a subservient role as an energy supplier to
Russia, who otherwise will control the regions resources by controlling the pipelines that
carry them. Perhaps just as importantly, the governments of the region must make
substantial progress toward developing the institutions of civil society and democracy,
reduce corruption and foster transparency in their business environments, and work toward
a unified energy market and strategy for the entire region. Energy relations between those
states that export and those that import must be established on a stable, consistent
framework that takes into account the long-term interests of all parties, rather than the
short-term gains of a single country. Oil and gas may indeed be a blessing to Central Asia,
but the benefits of these resources can be squandered by conflict and poor management.

An even more difficult issue is represented by management of the regions water resources,
a festering problem that to this point has been largely ignored by the governments in
Central Asia. As is the case with energy, a comprehensive, region-wide management
strategy is needed in order to avoid future conflicts. A central part of the strategy must
involve emphasis on establishing a pricing structure and implementing conservation
measures that will reduce the amount of water that is simply wasted. The approach that
water is a valueless and bountiful resource must be abandoned, and Central Asians must
coordinate their water policies and consumption with the surrounding states. Failure to do so
will eventually lead to pressures that may generate strife and discontent across the entire
region, and at the very least result in stunted economic development and chronic poverty in
many regions. This in itself is a recipe for instability in one of the worlds most important
energy-producing regions. Western governments must see the water issue in Central Asia
not only in economic and environmental terms, but in a strategic context as well, and can
and should play a pivotal role in seeking solutions along with donor agencies, NGOs, and
other entities.

Notes
1. Gulnoza Saidazimova, Kazakhstan: Environmentalists Say China Misusing
Cross-Border Rivers, Eurasianet Civil Society, July 16, 2006. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp0716
06.shtml.
2. Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002, 145147.
3. Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003, 7476.
4. A short discussion of this issue may be found in Pinar Ipek, The Role of Oil and
Gas in Kazakhstans Foreign Policy: Looking East or West?, Europe-Asia
Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, 1183.
5. James Fishelson, From the Silk Road to Chevron: The Geopolitics of Oil
Pipelines in Central Asia, Vestnik: The Journal of Russian and Asian Studies,
Issue 7, Winter 2007. Available at:
http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia.
6. Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002, 160. A comprehensive study of the
elite class in Kazakh society, which touches on the issues of graft and nepotism,
is offered by Sally Cummings in Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite, London and
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005.
7. Kazakhstan: GDP Growth Slows Dramatically, Eurasianet Business and
Economics, January 7, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/briefs/eav010708e.shtml.
8. Central Asias Energy Risks, ICG Asia Report No. 133, Brussels: International
Crisis Group, May 24, 2007.
9. Ustina Markus, Kazakhstan: Investor Status, ISN Security Watch, October 20,
2008, Zurich, Switzerland: International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
10. See Reuel Hanks, Multi-vector Politics and Kazakhstans Emerging Role as a
Geo-strategic Player in Central Asia, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2009).

11. Country Analysis Briefs: Kazakhstan. Energy Information Administration,

Department of Energy, February, 2008, 5.
12. This data is taken directly from the informational brochure on the CPCs Web
site, and is available at:
http://www.cpc.ru/_press/documents/cpc_a4_0303_en.pdf.
13. Country Analysis Briefs: Kazakhstan.Energy Information Administration,
Department of Energy, February, 2008, 6.
14. Ian Pryde, Another Big Player for a Neighbor, Eurasianet Business and
Economics, March 23, 2006. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/pp032306
.shtml.
15. Country Analysis Briefs: Kazakhstan. Energy Information Administration,
Department of Energy, February, 2008, 6.
16. John C.K. Daly, Analysis: Kazakhstan and the BTC pipeline, UPI.com,
October 15, 2008.
17. Possible New Kazakh-Azeri Pipeline,, UPI.com, September 25, 2009.
18. Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Astana Set to Make an Energy Export Break with
Russia, Eurasianet Business and Economics, May 2, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050208.
shtml.
19. Rovshan Ismayilov, Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan Differs with Russia on Pipeline
Construction, Eurasianet Business and Economics, October 22, 2007. Available
at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav102207a
.shtml.
20. Bruce Pannier, Independent Audit Shows Turkmen Gas Field World Class.
Eurasianet Business and Economics, October 19, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp101908.s
html.
21. Stephen Blank, Russia Takes a Step Toward the Formation of a Natural Gas
Cartel, Eurasianet Business and Economics, May 17, 2007. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav051707.
shtml.
22. Sergei Blagov, Russia Celebrates Its Central Asia Energy Coup, Eurasianet
Business and Economics, May 16, 2007. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav051607.
shtml.
23. Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Sends Shot Across Gazproms Bow, Eurasianet
Business and Economics, April 3, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/040309.sh
tml.
24. Turkmenistan: Gas Blast Ignites Turkmen-Russian Row, Eurasianet Business
and Economics, April 10, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav041009
b.shtml.
25. Deirdre Tynan, Turkmenistan: The Bell Tolls for Gazproms Dominance of

Caspian Energy Market, Eurasianet Business and Economics, April 24, 2009.
Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav04240
9.shtml.
26. Nino Patsuria, White Stream: Georgias Ticket to the Pipeline Big Time?,
Eurasia Insight, April 22, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav042209
b.shtml.
27. Details on the pipeline project may be found at: http://www.nabuccopipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en.
28. Russia on Nabucco: If You Cant Beat Them, Join Them, Eurasianet Business
and Economics, January 20, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/briefs/eav012009b.shtml;
and Nabucco Pipeline May Be Operating by 2015EU Official, Eurasianet
Business and Economics, January 12, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/briefs/eav011209a.shtml.
29. Ariel Cohen, Caspian Basin: Which Way Is Up for Regional Energy
Development?, Eurasia Insight, May 15, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav051509
c.shtml.
30. See the entry Garagum Canal in Rafis Abazov, Historical Dictionary of
Turkmenistan, Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 2005.
31. This is twice the annual extracted volume agreed upon during the Soviet period.
See Kai Wegerich, Water: The Difficult Path to a Sustainable Future for Central
Asia, in Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, edited by Tom Everett-Heath, New
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, 256.
32. The author has personally witnessed on several occasions outdoor water spigots
in Uzbekistan that were left running continuously for many days, with literally
thousands of gallons of water going to waste. There is no incentive to fix leaky
faucets or toilets, since most people do not pay for their water consumption.
33. A great deal of material has been published on the Aral Sea disaster over the
past 15 years. One of the most detailed indictments of Soviet policy toward the
sea and its consequences is the chapter entitled A Sea of Troubles in Murray
Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., Ecocide in the USSR, New York: Basic Books,
1992.
34. Central Asia: Water and Conflict, (ICG) Report No. 34, May 30, 2002,
OshBrussels: International Crisis Group, 78.
35. Ibid., 8.
36. Zainiddin Karaev, Managing the Water Resources in Central Asia: Is Cooperation
Possible? Unpublished paper presented at the workshop entitled Resources,
Governance and Civil War, European Consortium for Political Research Joint
Sessions of Workshops, University of Uppsala, Sweden, April 1418, 2004, 9.
37. Konstantin Parshin, Tajikistan: Dushanbe May Stop Water Flow as Uzbekistan
Pulls Plug on Power, Eurasia Insight, November 30, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav113009.
shtml.

38. Rafis Abazov, Historical Dictionary of Kyrgyzstan, Lanham, Maryland: The

Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2004, 142.
39. Alisher Khamidov, Ferghana Valley: Harsh Winters Legacy Stokes Ethnic
Tension, Eurasia Insight, June 2, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav060208.
shtml.
40. Central Asia: Water and Conflict, International Crisis Group (ICG) Report No.
34, May 30, 2002, Osh/Brussels, 15.
41. Tajikistan: Hoping to Reconnect to Turkmen Power Supplies, Eurasianet,
January 26, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/briefs/eav012609a.shtml.
42. Reuel Hanks and Gregory Gleason, Regional Electrical Integration: Panacea for
Central Asias Economic Woes?, Eurasia Insight, December 7, 2006. Available
at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav120706.
shtml.
43. Ibid.
44. David Trilling, Tajikistan: Rogun Dam a Hot Topic as Tajiks Make it Through
Another Winter of Shortages, March 13, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav031309
f.shtml.
45. Ibid.
46. David Trilling and Deirdre Tynan, Kyrgyzstan: President Bakiyev Wants to Close
US Military Base Outside Bishkek, Eurasia Insight, February 3, 2009. Available
at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav020309
b.shtml.
47. Kyrgyzstan: Bakiyev Stands up to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on
Hydropower Projects, Eurasia Insight, May 7, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav050709
d.shtml.

DRUGS, MIGRATION, AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Drugs in Central Asia
The illicit trade in drugs in Central Asia represents a major challenge to the regions longterm stability. Illegal trafficking in drugs is linked to a host of social problems, including a
rising incidence of HIV infection, higher crime rates, corruption, and connections to terrorist
groups and organized crime. These challenges inhibit efforts toward increasing stability via
economic and political reform by diverting resources and funding into interdiction and
control. Furthermore, drug addiction is not only a threat to the states of Central Asia
themselves, but the countries of the region also serve, to varying degrees, as conduits for
the movement of opiates to the broader Eurasian region, including Russia and western
European countries. The head of Russias Drug Control Agency asserted in March of 2009

that 60 percent of the heroin consumed in his country arrived via Tajikistan, and although
the claim was hotly disputed by Tajik authorities, there is little question that the estimate is
likely close to the mark.1 Law enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom estimate that
approximately 90 percent of the heroin smuggled into their country has been refined from
opium produced in Afghanistan. Much if not most of this traffic moves through the Central
Asian countries, is then carried into Russia, Bulgaria, or other eastern European states, and
eventually reaches the large markets in Western Europe. Combating drug traffic in Central
Asia therefore is a process that carries not only ramifications for regional security, but
represents a struggle to counter a problem of international dimensions that fuels social
problems far afield from the region itself.
The transportation and use of drugs in Central Asia are connected to other social problems,
especially crime and poverty. The low level of economic development and employment
opportunities across much of rural Central Asia, but especially in Tajikistan, makes the trade
in illegal drugs attractive to many who would otherwise shun such business. Since the late
1990s, the growing involvement of women in the narcotics trade has alarmed officials in
Central Asia. Women in Tajikistan in particular have been drawn into this nefarious practice
because of the countrys poor economic situation, where in rural areas the average income
in 2003 remained less than $10 per month. Payment for just a single instance of
transporting even a small amount of opium exceeds this figure by several times over,
making the economic benefit far outweigh the perceived risk in the eyes of many poor
women. Women who lost a husband during Tajikistans civil war are particularly vulnerable,
as they are frequently in the position of having to provide for children as well as themselves
and perhaps other relatives.2
In addition, the connection between radical Islamic groups in the region and drug trafficking
is well known.3 Militant Islamic groups have become more involved in narcotics trafficking
since the Taliban were removed from power, and the financial support given by al-Qaeda to
local insurgents dramatically declined as a result of American and NATO military action in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan has historically been a significant source for opium and its
derivatives, due to the ease with which the opium poppy is cultivated in highland fields in
the countrys mountainous terrain. Under the Taliban, opium use by Muslims in Afghanistan
was discouraged by Mullah Omar and other leaders of the regime, but until 2000 the Taliban
collected significant amounts of revenue from the taxation of the poppy crop, and in the late
1990s evidence indicated that the regime did little to inhibit the growth on laboratories in
Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan that were processing opium into its higher-value
derivative heroin. In 1999, however, the Taliban leadership implemented a ban on poppy
cultivation throughout the provinces it held, meaning that only the northern fringe of the
country, under the control of the Northern Alliance, continued to produce opium. 4 In 2000
opium production in the country had nearly ground to a complete halt, although according
to some sources, heroin still flowed out of Afghanistan from reserve supplies of more than
200 tons built up over the previous several years. The decline in supply also led to higher
prices and more intensive competition among Central Asias organized crime syndicates, in
what one analyst described as a razborka, or sorting out, of the local narcotics markets.5
This shift away from opium production was only temporary, however. The destruction of the
Taliban regime in 2001 allowed for a resurrection of opium production in the first half of the
decade, as Afghan producers returned to the opium poppy, the cash crop that generated the
largest amount of revenue.
Between 2003 and 2004 for example, the acreage devoted to poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan increased from 80,000 hectares to 131,000 hectares, or 64 percent in a single
year.6 Total volume of production rose 17 percent over the previous year. The area dedicated

to poppy growing was expanding geographically as well, as four provinces produced opium
in 2004 that had not been involved in the trade the previous year, and in fact every single
province in the country produced some opium that year.7 By 2004 the country was
responsible for 87 percent of the entire worlds illegal opium crop, and it was estimated that
fully 10 percent of the Afghan population was engaged in growing opium poppies. The
economic motivation was obvious: The gross income from a hectare of opium was well over
$4,000, while a hectare of wheat paid less than $400. Shockingly, the figure for a hectare of
opium in 2004 was 64 percent lower than that for 2003 ($12,700), yet opium production
was still more than 10 times more profitable than growing wheat.8 These increases in both
acreage and total production occurred in spite of an intensive eradication program carried
out by the Afghan government with the encouragement and support of the Bush
administration. Moreover, demand for the drug was increasing in Central Asian markets, as
well as in Russia and Europe, fueling the expansion in production. Law enforcement officials
in the region claim that almost 100 percent of illegal drug use in the five Central Asian
states is supplied from Afghanistan, underlining the destabilizing effect the regions southern
neighbor has on these emergent countries.
Trends in 2009 indicate that opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan have seen a
significant decline, but whether this drop is temporary or signifies a longer-term shift toward
other crops remains unclear. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) figures
show that the area devoted to poppy production fell by 22 percent from the previous year,
while actual production dropped by 10 percent.9 The reduction in production was lower than
that for cultivation because opium farmers were able to more intensively extract the sap
from the opium poppy bulb on the land growing poppies. In other words, yields of opium
sap per hectare actually increased in 2009, although total acreage dramatically declined.
The reduction in acreage producing opium in 2009 followed a similar decline in the previous
year, when the amount of land in opium cultivation shrank 19 percent. Another sign of
progress in the Afghan governments struggle against opium cultivation is the marked
decline in cultivation in Hilmand Province, where the area committed to opium production
contracted by a third in only one year.10 Hilmand has long been one of the leading provinces
in poppy cultivation and remains a stronghold of Taliban militancy. Success in this region of
the country may be a harbinger of success in the long term, since the southern provinces of
Afghanistan account for a disproportionate share of the countrys total opium production,
and most provinces in the north have been poppy free for several years. Perhaps most
importantly, it is likely the decline in Hilmand Province may undermine the revenue gathered
by the Taliban from the drug trade, weakening the insurgency.
Ironically, just when Bush administration policies focused on eradication appear to have
born some fruit after years of little progress, the Obama administration, along with the
United Nations, has shifted policy regarding control of the opium trade in Afghanistan. The
previous policy of eradication, promoted and funded by the United States from 2002 to
2008, was replaced in mid-2009 by a focus on interdiction. Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special
Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, declared at the G-8 summit in late June that the
previous policy had been a failure that had alienated farmers in Afghanistan, and
actually contributed to support for the Taliban.11 This change of focus has been coupled with
a more aggressive effort to track down Afghan drug kingpins and prosecute them, along
with disrupting the planning and distribution networks that support the opium trade. The
new direction in American policy was echoed by Antonio Maria Costa, the executive director
of the UNODC in Afghanistan, who also characterized the previous effort at eradication as a
failure and called for more economic and technical support for local farmers. 12 Costa
claimed that from 2006 to 2008 only 10,000 hectares of opium were destroyed, a small
percentage of the total acreage in the country. He also warned of the emergence of narcocartels in Afghanistan, which are syndicates of drug lords and insurgents, primarily

remnants of the Taliban, who have combined their forces against the antidrug agencies of
both the Afghan government and international organizations like UNODC and NATO.13
At the same time that opium production has been expanding in Afghanistan, the movement
of illegal drugs into and through the Central Asian states also greatly increased. The Tajik
government established a State Drug Control Agency, an organization somewhat akin to the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), in 2001 in an effort to stem the tide of drugs,
especially opium and heroin, flowing into the country.14 By 2003 some officials there were
identifying drug trafficking as a greater threat to the countrys security than Islamic
militancy, in spite of government claims of success at interdiction. Tajik President Imomali
Rakhmon noted that his country ranked fourth in the world in confiscating drugs, and that in
the Central Asian region Tajik authorities were responsible for 85 percent of all drug
shipments apprehended among the former Soviet Central Asian countries.15 Yet international
monitors estimated that no more than 10 percent of the total volume of narcotics was being
stopped by these efforts. In 2002 Tajik authorities had intercepted in excess of seven tons
of illicit drugs, mostly opium and heroin, and just in the first week of May 2003 customs
officials at the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border had seized almost 450 pounds of heroin.16 If the
international estimates were accurate, then this translates into almost 11 tons of heroin
moving through Tajikistan in a single year and onward to users in Russia, Europe, and the
United States. For a poor country like Tajikistan, the sheer volume of drug traffic alone was
overwhelming, and Rakhmons characterization of the issue as a headache for the
countrys law enforcement organs was surely an understatement.17
The most disturbing aspects of the surge in the Afghan opium trade is evidence that
remnants of the Taliban have been using profits from the drug as a source of funding for
their continued insurgency, and that militant groups from Central Asia, like the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), are also engaged in narcotics trafficking. Prior to its
decimation at the hands of the American military in 2001, the IMU appears to have been
actively acquiring funds by running heroin from Afghanistan into Central Asia and delivering
it to criminal organizations. Some analysts see the coordination between terrorists, drug
smugglers, and organized crime as potentially explosive in Central Asia, as such networks in
other regions, notably Latin America, have seriously undermined the stability of states like
Colombia.18 Should the IMU successfully regroup in the region, it is likely that income from
drug trafficking would be the primary source of funding for the organizations militant
activities, since it is unlikely that Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network are able to
provide consistent monetary support any longer.
In the case of the Taliban, there appears to be little doubt that the opium trade is a major
source of revenue for the insurgents. An assistant secretary of the U.S. State Department
declared in 2008 that there is incontrovertible evidence that the Taliban use drug trafficking
proceeds to fund insurgent activities,19 and in September of 2009 Antonio Maria Costa, the
executive director of the UNODC in Afghanistan, stated at a news conference in Kabul that
increased linkages among drug smugglers and militants in Afghanistan, so-called narcocartels, represent a major challenge to efforts against the Afghan drug trade and terrorism. 20
The war on drugs in the Central Asian region is increasingly connected to the war on
terror there, and many commentators now recognize that progress in one of these wars
is unlikely without significant advances in the other. Costa summarized this approach by
declaring that controlling drugs in Afghanistan will not solve all of the countrys problems,
but the countrys problems cannot be solved without controlling drugs.21 He also
emphasized the necessity of a regional approach to drug interdiction and control, especially
including Afghanistans Central Asian neighbors. UNODC has followed up on this rhetoric by
developing a strategy to foster cooperation in the effort against narcotics trafficking,

including the recent establishment of a Central Asia Intelligence Center located in Almaty, a
facility designed to streamline the sharing of information among the various drug
enforcement agencies in the region. Afghan officials themselves have called for greater
regional and international cooperation in the battle against the drug trade, and the Central
Asian countries, because of geography alone, stand on the front line of any regional strategy
to control the narcotics trade. In order for increased coordination to succeed as a policy, the
Central Asian governments must come to view interdiction as a matter directly related to
their own national security.
Drugs not only transit Central Asia, but supply the growing number of addicts there. In
Tajikistan, the number of drug users began to skyrocket in the late 1990s, and there is little
sign of the trend leveling off. Some suggest that increased drug use in the country is one of
the unintended effects of the civil war that ravaged Tajikistan in the 1990s.22 By 2001 media
reports from Tajikistan were claiming that the population of heroin addicts there had
reached a figure of 100,000.23 Alarmingly, officials also noted in 2001 that more than
30 percent of the addicts in Tajikistan were women, a high percentage in a region where
substance abuse among women was traditionally quite rare.24 In neighboring Uzbekistan the
number of officially registered drug addicts, a figure that is widely held to represent only a
fraction of the real number of drug users in the country, nearly doubled between 2000 and
2001, to 26,000.25 In Kyrgyzstan drug use appears to be concentrated in urban areas and in
the southern portion of the country. One analyst estimated that in 2003 the country held
approximately 70,000 addicts, with more than 20 percent of that number living in the city of
Osh in the Fergana Valley.26 The large volume of narcotics flowing into Central Asia from
Afghanistan after 2001 served to depress the price of a dose of heroin or opium, a factor
that also contributed to the rise in the number of addicts across the region. A dose of heroin
in 2001 cost about $1, a price that of course is relatively much higher for local users in a
region where average monthly incomes are only $20 to $30.27 Brown heroin, a lower grade
of the drug, may be had for a cheaper price and is usually smoked, but as the price of highgrade white heroin has dropped, the injected variant of the drug has gained prominence.
The massive increase in the volume of narcotics transiting Central Asia naturally has
attracted the attention of the regions neighboring states, as they too witnessed a marked
boost in the amount of drugs reaching their societies. Russia is a destination for much of
this contraband, and from the early 2000s Russian officials began proposing a cooperative
strategy to combat the trade. Boris Gryzlov, the interior minister of the Russian Federation,
called for a belt of security between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan, not to shield
the region from Islamic radicalism, but rather to reverse the flood of illegal substances
pouring into the region and on to Russia.28 Russian concerns about the flow of narcotics
entering the country from Central Asia were not misplaced, as the number of addicts in the
Russian Federation had expanded exponentially since the collapse of the USSR. A Human
Rights Watch report issued in 2004 noted that there is no doubt that drug use and heroin
use particularly have risen meteorically in Russia since 1990.The total number of drug
users had risen 900 percent in the decade ending in early 2004.29 This explosion of
dependency has brought with it a wide spectrum of problems and affects aspects of Russian
society ranging from the declining quality of military recruits to a jump in crime and a
frightening increase in the incidence of HIV infection, as many heroin users in Russia share
needles.
The connection between drug trafficking and the transmission of HIV is becoming
increasingly obvious in Central Asia as well. Some investigators have been able to track the
spread of certain strains of the AIDS virus directly along the routes employed by heroin
smugglers in Central Asia. One study found that the infection rates for HIV in the cities of

Timertau in Kazakhstan, Yangi Yul in Uzbekistan and Osh in Kyrgyzstan were among the
highest in the Central Asian region, and these same urban areas lie along well-established
heroin transit routes.30 Since independence, the nature of drug abuse in the region has
shifted toward narcotics that are frequently injected, primarily opium and heroin. In 1991,
for example, more than 80 percent of known drug addicts in Kyrgyzstan used hashish, a
drug that is smoked, but by the end of the decade a wholesale shift to more addictive
narcotics had occurred, with almost 70 percent of drug users hooked on opium or heroin.31
The sharing of needles, a primary means of transmission for the HIV virus, is commonplace
among Central Asian injectors as needles are difficult to obtain, and the HIV virus spreads
easily through the addict population via such practices. Kyrgyz officials have recently
estimated that about 80 percent of the countrys HIV cases are intravenous drug abusers
who share needles, and Kyrgyzstan is one of the few countries in the region to have initiated
a needle exchange program.
Official statistics on the number of people infected in the Central Asian countries are
notoriously suspect, making estimates of the magnitude of the problem difficult. Uzbekistan
claimed in 2008 that there were less than 17,000 individuals who were HIV positive in the
country, a number widely believed to be far below the true figure. 32 The increasing
involvement of addicts in the commercial sex trade is a major concern regarding HIV
infection rates in Central Asia, and could lead to a sudden eruption of the virus across the
social spectrum. Compounding the danger is the large-scale migration of labor between
Russia and some Central Asian states, especially Tajikistan, which also contributes to the
spread of the virus. Central Asian migratory workers, most of whom are male, engage sex
workers in Russia who are HIV positive, and then bring the disease home when they return
to their countries.
A related problem with HIV and drug addiction in Central Asia is the dearth of treatment and
prevention programs and the low quality of health care in general. In recent years there
have been several cases of inadvertent infection of children and others in Central Asian
hospitals, through the reuse of needles and poor sterilization of surgical instruments.33 As is
true elsewhere, in Central Asia a strong social stigma is attached to HIV infection, and those
individuals who are known to carry the virus often are ostracized not only by the general
public, but often by their own family members. For drug addiction, intervention and
treatment programs are poorly developed and administered. For example, Kyrgyzstan is the
only Central Asian country that offers a methadone treatment program, but even this
limited effort has been hampered by uncooperative law enforcement officials.34
Drugs are also tied to increased criminality and corruption in Central Asian countries, further
weakening the foundation of civil society and social stability. The low salaries of many
officials make the lure of bribes from those engaged in illegal drug smuggling and
distribution attractive. The average law enforcement officer in the regions poorer states like
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan receives less than $100 per month in salary, and
widespread bribe solicitation among the police has been a problem since the Soviet collapse.
A quite modest gift from illegal sources can easily triple or quadruple the monthly income
of a typical police officer of lower rank, while more powerful officials can command much
larger and more lucrative largess. Corruption among law enforcement and in the judicial
system may seriously undermine the stability of the state, as the public loses faith in the
government institutions that are responsible for personal safety and security and the
protection of basic property rights. If corruption is sufficiently pervasive, such a state may
experience a breakdown into a so-called narco-state, as happened in Colombia in the 1980s.
The economic conditions and culture of corruption now emerging in some Central Asian
countries appear to be following the same pattern as in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru in

the1980s and early 1990s, when the leadership of these countries was confronted with the
near breakdown of the state due to ubiquitous corruption and violence tied to the cocaine
trade. Transparency International, an agency which tracks corruption through the calculation
of an index for individual countries, reported a steadily decreasing figure for Kyrgyzstan
from 1999 to 2003, although this number is a reflection of general corruption in the
government and is not specific to graft connected to drug trafficking.35
The corruption linked to drug smuggling extends throughout the entire interdiction
apparatus in Central Asia, from border guards to highly placed officials in government
ministries. According to some Central Asian authorities, the standard cost to smugglers of a
free pass from customs agents for a truck moving across the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border
is only $300, when a cargo of a ton of heroin has a street value easily a hundred times
higher. Obviously it is quite cost effective for drug runners to simply pay such low transit
fees to carry their product across international borders in Central Asia, and such examples
illustrate why the smuggling routes via the Central Asian states have become more popular
over the past decade. Yet it is not only poorly paid border guards who have been implicated
in drug-related corruption. In a spectacularly scandalous example, the ambassador of
Tajikistan to Kazakhstan was discovered to be smuggling 62 kilograms of heroin into his
host country, and only a few weeks later Tajikistans trade representative to Kazakhstan was
apprehended with 24 kilograms of the drug.36 Because of his diplomatic immunity, the
ambassador was simply expelled by the Kazakh authorities, while the trade representative
was given a prison sentence. In some instances, representatives of law enforcement not
only fail to intercept drug shipments or arrest those involved due to bribery; they may
actively engage in the drug trade, even becoming dealers themselves. A study conducted by
an NGO in Kyrgyzstan in 2007 found that more than a third of heroin addicts surveyed
indicated that their main supplier of the drug was a police officer, and that police officers
regularly recruited new customers from raids on locations where addicts gathered to
purchase a hit of heroin.37
As has been the case elsewhere, criminality is increasing in Central Asia in general. Much of
this crime is not directly tied to drug smuggling, but nevertheless is the result of drug use
as those dependent on heroin and other highly addictive narcotics turn to robbery,
embezzlement, and petty theft to secure money for their habit. Drug-related crime rates
have risen rapidly in urban centers that function as hubs for the drug trade, such as Osh in
Kyrgyzstan, where in the early 2000s drug-related criminal activity was skyrocketing. Even
small-scale economic crime is a drain on the law enforcement resources of the Central Asian
countries and harms economic development in multiple ways, from inhibiting tourism to
reducing the quantity and quality of the labor force. Potential investors then decline to help
capitalize the region except in instances where returns are likely to be highly lucrative, as in
the oil and gas industries. Violent crime has an even greater effect, since it is frequently
reported by international news agencies, thereby providing a wider exposure. Frequent
shoot-outs between organized crime gangs and Central Asian militia, such as those along
the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border in the summer of 2009, are often reported in Western
media and serve to reinforce the impression of instability and lawlessness in the region. 38
The instability brought on by the drug trade and its ramifications in Central Asia represents
a serious threat to political stability and social and economic development. Somewhat
belatedly, the Central Asian nations and their strategic partners have recognized the erosion
of their social institutions that is the first sign of devolution toward narco-state status. The
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2006 declared the goal of building an antidrug belt around Afghanistan, according to a Chinese assistant foreign minister,39 although
the rhetoric of the organizations leadership to date has been stronger than its commitment

of resources and strategy. In recent years officials of the SCO have suggested that a
regional center devoted to the coordination of intelligence and policy, similar to the Regional
Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) located in Tashkent, might be established to combat the
growing sophistication of the illegal drug industry.40 But in fact there has been little progress
among SCO members in developing a unified approach to the problem of drug smuggling,
and without this element it is difficult to see how an anti-drug belt can be a successonly
a common set of policy objectives, tightly coordinated among all the SCO members, would
seem to have a reasonable chance of success at limiting the activities of Central Asias drug
lords.
American efforts to assist the Central Asian states in the war on drugs has come mostly in
monetary aid and training aimed at interdicting the movement of drugs through the region.
These programs have been administered primarily in coordination with UNODC. In February
of 2004 the Kyrgyz foreign minister raised the issue of additional funding to combat the
drug problem with then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, and indeed the previous year
the United States had committed more than $6 million to found the Kyrgyz Drug Control
Agency, with additional money going toward establishing a similar organization in
Tajikistan.41 In addition, the expertise of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was shared with comparable law enforcement
structures in Central Asia in the form of training and advisement. But the levels of
corruption in those very bodies and agencies responsible for implementing and enforcing the
interception of narcotics in Central Asia reduce the effectiveness of external support. Even
with advanced training and technology, it remains a simple matter for drug networks to
bribe border guards and customs officials in order to move drugs into and through the
region, because wages among law enforcement officials are so low. Some experts advocate
a more holistic approach, emphasizing not only interdiction but also educational programs
on the dangers of drug use and increased economic development, which they hold will
undermine the attraction of making easy money in the drug trade for the average citizen in
Central Asia. Thus far, the levels of financial support that such a broad strategy would
require have not been forthcoming from Washington or European capitals, and it is unlikely
this will change in the foreseeable future.
A drug culture is emerging across the Central Asian region, and this development is a
direct threat not only to the societies themselves, but also represents a more serious
challenge to the interests of the United States, Russia, China, and other powers than the
specter of one or more Islamic theocracies appearing there. While violence and instability in
the region may occasionally be linked to Islamic terrorism, the broader decline of law and
order in Central Asia is directly or indirectly tied to the narcotics trade. Crushing this
business must become a central focus of security policy, both by the Central Asian
governments and by those external powers that have vital interests in the region. Stopping
the flow of drugs in Central Asia is a policy goal that Russia, China, and the United States all
share, and therefore logically a unified, effective strategy should be easily developed. But as
is frequently the case in Central Asia, strategic goals and logical action do not always take
precedence in the foreign policies of both internal and external players in the region.

Issues of Migration and Human Trafficking

In the Soviet Union, large-scale migration of indigenous Central Asians to other parts of the
USSR was rare. Uzbeks, Tajiks, and the other non-Slavic peoples of the region tended to
stay in their home regions, except for those who moved to Moscow or other large Russian
cities in service to the Communist Party, to study at one of the prestigious universities in
Russia, or for some other reason. Large-scale, voluntary migration in search of greater

economic opportunity was unusual in the Soviet context, since both employment and wages
tended to be standardized across Soviet space and mobility of the work force was restricted
by the Soviet government. Even in the late 1990s, a leading scholar on Kyrgyzstan could
report that in regard to labor, there were no serious reports of illegal emigration for work.42
The introduction of a free market of both capital and labor in the former Soviet republics
eventually led to differentials in economic opportunity between countries and between
regions. After the economic crisis of 1998, Russias economy began to expand, especially as
global oil prices rose and investment capital flowed into the country. By the early 2000s,
thousands of workers from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states began to migrate to
Russia, where employment opportunities were more plentiful, at least in lower-wage jobs,
and wages were generally higher than in their home countries. These guest workers
readily took menial work that was frequently avoided by Russians and were able to function
quite well in Russia due to the fact that many possessed a working knowledge of the
Russian language. Some of the migration continues to take place illegally, but by the mid2000s, Russia was granting thousands of work permits to Central Asian laborers. The World
Bank estimated in 2005 that Russia had the worlds second largest immigrant population,
standing at slightly more than 12 million.43 The great majority of these are workers from
former Soviet republics, and at least 50 percent of them are from Central Asia, especially
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The wages earned by Central Asian guest workers are vital to the
economies of the countries there, with the possible exception of Kazakhstan, which sends
fewer migrant workers abroad. Remittances sent back to relatives in Tajikistan by Tajik
laborers in Russia accounted for approximately 50 percent of Tajikistans GDP in 2008 as
estimated by the World Bank, and such transfer payments represented almost 30 percent of
total GDP in Kyrgyzstan.44 In contrast, remittances sent home by migrant workers from
Mexico in the U.S. account for only about 3 percent of Mexican GDP. The total amount of
officially registered money sent from Russia to Central Asia was nearly $13 billion in 2008, a
year in which the global economy and the Russian economy began a significant downturn by
late summer.45 The total amount of money transferred to the Central Asian economies might
be twice the official estimate, according to some sources. Thus, the Central Asian migrant
workers in Russia have been effectively propping up the economies of Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, and to a large part Uzbekistan as well. The downturn in the Russian economy in
late 2008 meant a stark drop-off in money sent back to Central Asia, as fewer migrants are
now working in Russia, but the number is likely to swell again once global economic
conditions improve.
Within Central Asia, Kazakhstan has become an important secondary destination for migrant
workers, both legal and illegal. In 2009, GDP per capita in Kazakhstan was more than six
times higher than the figure for Tajikistan, and Kazakhstans GDP per capita was also
significantly higher than that found in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Due to the high rate of
growth of the Kazakhstani economy from the late 1990s to 2008, and the relatively limited
domestic labor supply, employment opportunities for immigrant workers were abundant
there and Kazakhstan has become a magnet for workers from the surrounding countries.
Migration has been encouraged by the Nazarbayev government as a means of addressing a
shortage of labor that stands as a significant impediment to sustained economic expansion,
due to persistently low rates of natural increase among both the Russian minority and the
ethnic Kazakhs, although the latter have a somewhat higher birth rate and average family
size than their Slavic counterparts. Indeed, in 2003 President Nazarbayev called for a rapid
increase in the labor force, suggesting that by 2006 the country would require an additional
100,000 workers per year to sustain the countrys rapid economic expansion. 46 Authorities
are especially keen to attract ethnic Kazakhs who reside in surrounding countries, who
number by some estimates close to four million. By encouraging the immigration of ethnic
Kazakhs, not only is the labor supply question addressed, but also the percentage of ethnic
Kazakhs in the countrys population is increased, a matter that has security ramifications in

the view of the government. In fact, Astana has committed sizable amounts of funding to
promoting the migration of ethnic Kazakhs. In 2009 the government launched a special
initiative to attract Kazakh immigrants, the Nurly Kosh program, backing the effort with
$1.3 billion.47 Ethnic Kazakhs who arrive in the country on this program are typically sent to
targeted regions of Kazakhstan, officially for economic reasons but frequently to offset the
demographic preponderance of Russians in such areas. For Kazakhstan, immigration of
ethnic Kazakhs therefore is not only a means of fostering continuing economic expansion,
but also a tool for securing territorial claims in the event of any irredentist tendencies on the
part of Russia.
Other immigrants to Kazakhstan include Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks. Much of this migration
is seasonal, especially during the planting and harvest times for the cotton production,
which is concentrated in southern Kazakhstan near the borders with Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan. The Uzbeks and Kyrgyz tend to take work in the construction and agricultural
sectors, and the exact number of immigrant workers in Kazakhstan remains unclear due to
a large but still undetermined number of illegal workers. In 2006 government prosecutors in
Astana placed the number of illegal immigrants at approximately one million, which if
accurate would equal almost 12 percent of the countrys labor force.48 Although economic
growth in Kazakhstan slowed to a standstill in 2009 because of the global recession, it is
likely that growth will once again reach double-digit rates in the foreseeable future. With its
limited domestic labor pool, the Kazakh government can ill afford to curtail external sources
of labor if the administration wishes to fuel economic expansion and develop the countrys
resources. Kazakhstans labor dilemma was highlighted in late 2009 when the government
floated a proposal to lease approximately two million acres of uncultivated farmland to
Chinese farmers.49 Given Kazakhstans labor supply issues, it is a foregone conclusion by
many in the country that the land would be worked by Chinese laborers, a situation that
generated protests even before the details of the Chinese proposal were made public. While
leasing Kazakh territory to a foreign power is a prospect many Kazakh citizens may reject, it
seems certain that at least in the near term, the emerging labor shortage must be
addressed via increased immigration. How this may affect Kazakhstans relations with
surrounding countries, as well as the potential impact on factors that influence domestic
stability such as crime rates and inter-ethnic relations, is still unclear.
Despite obvious benefits, the situation with migratory labor flowing from Central Asia to
Russia and other countries is not entirely positive. While in the short term the wages
remitted to home countries serve to stabilize those economies, the long-term effects may be
quite detrimental to some Central Asian states. For some countries, the migratory nature of
the labor shift to Russia threatens to eventually become permanent, resulting in a
significant loss of population and economic viability. For example, Kubanychbek Isabekov, a
Kyrgyz government official who heads the labor migration committee of the Kyrgyz
legislature, indicated in 2006 that the number of ethnic Kyrgyz who were permanently
emigrating had tripled in recent years, and that almost 100,000 were in the process of
applying for Russian citizenship.50 This is in stark contrast to the ethnic pattern of emigration
in the 1990s, when it was mostly Slavs who were leaving Kyrgyzstan and other Central
Asian countries. But with large numbers of citizens leaving to take work in Russia and
Kazakhstan, and many obtaining citizenship abroad, in the long term the Kyrgyz economy
may itself suffer from severe labor shortages. Kyrgyz officials already have noted that the
working-age population has declined dramatically in some regions in the southern part of
the country. Ironically, some of the labor losses in Kyrgyzstan from emigration to Russia and
Kazakhstan are compensated for with seasonal immigrant labor from Uzbekistan, where
employment opportunities are even harder to find. The arrival of large numbers of so-called
mardikerlar, or day workers, has not thus far exacerbated ethnic tensions between Uzbeks

and Kyrgyz, but a further decline in the Kyrgyz economy could result in a backlash against
the Uzbek immigrants.51
The economic vulnerability of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan due to the reliance on
remittances from abroad also may influence the stability of these states. Before the
economic downturn in the latter half of 2008, over a third of Kyrgyzstans GDP was derived
from such remittances, close to half of Tajikistans GDP came from external cash transfers,
and according to official statistics, about 8 percent of Uzbekistans GDP also arrived from
abroad. By early 2009 remittances to Central Asia had nearly collapsed, with declines of
greater than 90 percent in Uzbekistan, according to Group Rapid Response, an NGO
headquartered in Tashkent.52 This dependency on the flow of external cash flows to prop up
the economies of Central Asias three poorest states makes these countries highly
vulnerable to both shifts in the immigration policies of their neighbors and vagaries in the
global economy and the domestic economies of states hosting large numbers of their labor
migrants.
In addition, conditions for Central Asian workers in Russia are frequently harsh. Many live in
poor housing conditions, crowded into cramped living quarters due to the high cost of
apartment space in large cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, and also in an effort to save
as much income as possible to send back to families in Central Asia. Abuse of foreign
workers is a common practice by Russian employers, who force the migrants to work longer
hours than legally mandated, refuse to pay wages on time or sometimes not at all, and take
advantage of the increasing number of female guest workers. Those who are in Russia
illegally are especially vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, and Russian officials recently
estimated that there might be as many as one million illegal migrant workers just in
Moscow. Females make up an increasing percentage of the migrant labor pool, in particular
young females, and this segment of the migrant population often falls victim to human
traffickers and sexual exploitation, typically connected to Russian organized crime groups. A
representative of an NGO in Russia that works against human trafficking noted in late 2009
that the problem of exploitation of women was worsening due to the global economic
crisis.53 Many of the women who are victimized by traffickers in Russia are from Central Asia,
although a significant number of those who fall into the hands of criminals are ethnic
Russians or belong to other ethnic groups. Central Asian women are easier to exploit
because they typically lack familial connections and social support that Russian women often
benefit from, are sometimes in the country illegally, and are blackmailed by their employers.
Russia, of course, is not the only location where women from Central Asia are trafficked.
Many women are recruited within the Central Asian countries themselves by criminal
enterprises, frequently under false pretenses of working overseas, and are then forced into
prostitution or hired into positions where they are paid very low wages and kept almost as
slaves. Women are frequently the targets of traffickers, but men and children are also
victims and are often pushed into circumstances of forced labor in construction or
agriculture. Some trafficking occurs inside Central Asia itself, especially in the agricultural
sector in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where children are frequently forced to labor in the
cotton fields,54 and university students from Tashkent and other urban areas are bused to
the fields to pick the crop, sometimes for two or three weeks of unpaid work. In other
instances, both women and men are misled into taking jobs as maids, nannies, or household
servants in the Middle East or Southeast Asia, only to find that they are held as virtual
slaves to employers. Wealthy Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and
Bahrain are common destinations for people from Central Asia who are trafficked in this
manner.

The numbers of victims of sexual trafficking in Central Asia are shocking. In the early 2000s
the United Nations International Office for Migration (IOM) estimated that as many as 4,000
people from Kyrgyzstan alone were being exploited by traffickers.55 Much more disturbing
was the estimate that 200,000 women in an average year are moved through Kyrgyzstan
for the purpose of prostitution. In some cases, a single female sold into this form of work
may be worth as much as $2 million to her employers.56 Other estimates suggest that a
single female sex worker in the United Arab Emirates may earn as much as $20,000 a
month for her owners, if she is able to consistently service clients at the appalling rate of
15 to 20 per day.57 Some reports suggest that virgin girls from Tajikistan have been sold by
their parents to buyers in the Persian Gulf states for as much as $3,000. 58 Many victims
have not even reached their early teen years, and in fact may be sold to prostitution rings
by women, sometimes even by female relatives. This activity is not confined to Central
Asias poorest countries, but has appeared even in Kazakhstan.59 While the number of
trafficked women from Turkmenistan may be relatively small, the figure for Uzbekistan is
likely at least several thousand each year, making the total for the Central Asian region
close to 10,000 annually.60
As is the case with the drug trade, one of the primary reasons women fall victim to
traffickers is poverty. Economic hardship, especially in the regions poorer countries, often
forces women to seek employment opportunities outside the region, and the promise of
higher wages and better living conditions abroad add to the attractiveness of offers
advertised by traffickers to attract unsuspecting women. Once entrapped and abroad, the
victims are often threatened and physically abused, and have their passports confiscated by
their handlers. These criminals then inform the women that they are in the foreign country
illegally, and that if they fail to cooperate they will be turned over to the authorities and
receive long prison terms for violating the visa laws. In many cases the victims do not speak
the local language and therefore cannot even verify the claims of the traffickers, and thus
become entirely dependent on them for shelter, food, and protection. Those in control may
even threaten violence against the families of the women they have kidnapped in order to
maintain them as employees. The economic decline in Central Asia after 2008 appears to
have exacerbated the problem. With the reduction in money flowing in from migrant
relatives abroad, trafficking gangs have found it much easier to lure potential victims with
promises of lucrative employment abroad.
As is the case with the drug trade, corruption, especially in law enforcement and
government agencies, along with the lack of adequate laws and enforcement plays a large
part in facilitating trafficking of human beings. It was only in 2004 that Central Asian
governments began to enact legislation designed to combat trafficking. Tajikistan passed the
first such statute in that year, and finally in 2008 the Uzbek regime also passed an antitrafficking law.61 However, as of this writing (2010), the Kyrgyz government still had not
implemented laws against the practice. Furthermore, it appears that law enforcement and
other officials in some Central Asian countries either accept bribes from criminal
organizations who are recruiting and transiting victims, or are engaged directly in the trade
themselves. In Kazakhstan, for example, crackdowns against prostitution related to
trafficking in rural regions have reduced the practice, but few criminal operations in the
large urban areas of Astana and Almaty have been shut down, although it is widely known
that these cities have sizable numbers of prostitutes composed primarily of illegal
immigrants from Uzbekistan. Traffickers are able to pass through border checkpoints across
the region by paying modest bribes to border guards or other officials, a fact that makes
controlling the nefarious practice of human trafficking virtually impossible.

Rising Social Instability?

The movement of both illegal drugs and human beings across the space of Central Asia
brings associated social problems. Rising rates of crime and HIV infection in nearly all the
Central Asian countries may be directly tied to increases in the volume of narcotics
transiting the region from Afghanistan and a rise in the number of drug users in the region.
As economic development remains stalled in the poorer countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
and Kyrgyzstan, both drug trafficking and drug use by Central Asians are rising.
Accompanying this disturbing trend is widespread corruption, fueled by the enormous profits
generated by the drug trade, which in turn undermines the trust of the general public
already weak in many casesin civic institutions and the rule of law. More successful
interdiction strategies are needed, along with a more effective program in Afghanistan to
eradicate poppy production and the heroin dealers who control production, processing, and
distribution. If the Central Asian states do not find a successful, unified policy to address
these issues, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and potentially Kyrgyzstan run the risk of social
breakdown and becoming narco-states.
The movement of human resources across the Central Asian space has Janus-like qualities,
harboring both positive and negative outcomes. The scourge of human trafficking is a
challenge much like that presented by the drug trade, in that the exploitive and criminal
nature of the business undermines the fabric of society and robs these emerging countries
of much of their social capital. Central Asian governments are only beginning to seriously
address this problem and must develop a comprehensive strategy that addresses the
problem at the regional level in order to counter the abusive business of illegal trafficking of
Central Asian women, children, and men. Labor migration, on the other hand, holds the
potential of ameliorating some of the developmental distortions in the region and reducing
the emerging imbalances between the wealthier and poorer countries. But this movement
must also be regulated and monitored through a regional strategy designed to lessen ethnic
tensions and protect the human and economic rights of immigrant workers. To date, the
Central Asian governments have shown little willingness to seriously cooperate in
confronting these problems, a reluctance that will only serve to undermine the regions
development and stability.

Notes
1. Konstantin Parshin, Tajikistan: Drug Control Agency Draws Praise and
Criticism, Eurasia Insight, June 2, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav060209
.shtml.
2. A comprehensive study of the involvement of Tajik women in the drug trade is
T.N. Bozrikova et al., Zhenshchina i narkotik, Dushanbe, Tajikistan: Open
Society Institute, 2000.
3. See the table in Christopher M. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S.
Policy, in Illegal Drugs and Governmental Policy, edited by Lee V. Barton, New
York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007, 110.
4. Christopher M. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, in Illegal
Drugs and Governmental Policy, edited by Lee V. Barton, New York: Nova
Science Publishers, 2007, 104.
5. Gregory Gleason, Central Asian Razborka: Fallout from Afghanistans Opium
Ban, Eurasianet, May 29, 2001. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav052901.
shtml.

6. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, November 2004, United Nations Office on

Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 3.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 6.
9. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009, December 2009, United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 25. Available at:
http://www.unodc.org/documents/cropmonitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2009_summary.p
df.
10 See Table 3 in Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009, December 2009, United Nations
. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 27. Available a:t
http://www.unodc.org/documents/cropmonitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2009_summary.p
df.
11 Abubaker Saddique, Shift in Afghan Antidrug Policy Draws Mixed Reaction,
. Eurasia Insight, July 11, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp071109.s
html.
12 Afghan Opium Market Plummets, Says UNODC, Available at:
. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2009/September/af
ghan-opium-market-plummets-says-unodc.html.
13 Ibid.
.
14 Konstantin Parshin, Tajikistan: Drug Control Agency Draws Praise and
. Criticism, Eurasia Insight, June 2, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav060209
.shtml.
15 Drug Trafficking Emerging as Top National Security Threat to Tajikistan,
. Eurasia Insight, May 8, 2003. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050803.
shtml.
16 Ibid.
.
17 Ibid.
.
18 See the arguments presented in Svante Cornell and Niklas I.P. Swanstrom, The
. Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security, Problems of PostCommunism, Vol. 53, No. 4.
19 Charley Keyes, U.S.: Afghan Drug Trade Funds Taliban, Cable News Network
. (CNN) Available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/02/29/narcotics.report/.
20 Aunohita Mojumdar, Afghanistan: Narco-Cartels a Growing Threat, UN Drug
. Agency Warns, Eurasia Insight, September 2, 2009. Available
at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav0902
09.shtml.
21 Ibid.

.
22 Tajikistan Faces Addiction Crisis. Available at
. http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/tajikistan/hypermail/200205/00
33.shtml.
23 Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, ICG Asia Report no. 25, Brussels:
. International Crisis Group, November 26, 2001, 10.
24 Nancy Lubin, Central Asias War on Drug Takes a High Human Toll, Eurasia
. Insight, May 14, 2001. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav051401.
shtml.
25 Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, ICG Asia Report no. 25, Brussels:
. International Crisis Group, November 26, 2001, 10.
26 Marai Madi, Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan: Structure, Implications and
. Countermeasures, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 23, Nos. 34, 265.
27 Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, ICG Asia Report no. 25, Brussels:
. International Crisis Group, November 26, 2001, 11.
28 Bruce Pannier, Central Asia: Russia Urges Cooperation in Fight Against Drug
. Trafficking, Eurasia Insight, November 16, 2002. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp111602.s
html.
29 Lessons Not Learned: Human Rights Abuses and HIV/AIDS in the Russian
. Federation, Human Rights Watch, April 2004, Vol. 16, No. 5(D), 15.
30 Julie Stachowiak and Chris Beyrer, HIV Follows Heroin Trafficking Routes,
. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/health.security/presentations/hiv_traffick
ing.shtml.
31 Robert Ponce, Rising Heroin Abuse in Central Asia Raises Threat of Public
. Health Crisis, Eurasia Insight, March 29, 2002. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032902a
.shtml.
32 Uzbekistan: Activists Strive to Raise Awareness About HIV/AIDS, Eurasia
. Insight, August 3, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080309.
shtml.
33 Uzbekistan: Tashkent Disputes Report on HIV Scandal, Eurasia Insight,
. November 14, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav111408
c.shtml.
34 Marai Madi, Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan: Structure, Implications and
. Countermeasures, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 23, Nos. 34, 255.
35 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2004: Special Focus
. Political Corruption. London: Pluto Press, 2004.
36 Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, ICG Asia Report no. 25, Brussels:
. International Crisis Group, November 26, 2001, 15.
37 Erin Finnerty, Krygyzstan: Drug Users Find a Kyrysha in the Yama,
. Eurasianet, October 4, 2007. Available at:

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav100407f.
shtml.
38 Uzbekistan: Suicide Bombing in Andijan Ups the Ante for Karimov, Eurasia
. Insight, May 27, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav052709
.shtml.
39 China Daily, June 12, 2006.
.
40 Jacob Townsend, The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
. and Kazakhstan, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, 90.
41 Kyrgyzstan Confronted by Narcotics Nightmare as Drug Trade Booms, Eurasia
. Insight, March 19, 2004. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav031904.
shtml.
42 Rafis Abazov, Migration of Population, the Labor Market and Economic Changes
. in Kirghizstan, in Migration in Central Asia: Its History and Current Problems,
edited by Komatsu Hisao, Obiya Chika, and John Schoeberlein, Osaka: The
Japan Center for Area Studies, 2000, 232.
43 See the chart Migration and Remittances: Top 10 post at
. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/33493
4-1199807908806/Top10.pdf.
44 Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis, ICG Asia Report No. 183,
. Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 5, 2010, 3.
45 Masha Charnay, Central Asia: Russia Grapples with Labor-Migrant Dilemma,
. Civil Society, March 5, 2010. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav030
510.shtml.
46 Bruce Pannier, Kazakhstan: President Urges Population Increase to Meet Work
. Force Demands, Eurasia Insight, August 27, 2003. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav082703.
shtml.
47 Joanna Lillis, Mongolia: Ethnic Kazakhs Eye Land of Opportunity to the West,
. Eurasia Insight, November 4, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav110409
a.shtml.
48 Kazakhstan Daily Digest, February 13, 2006. Available at:
. http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kazakhstan/hypermail/200602/
0007.shtml.
49 Bruce Pannier, Prospect of Chinese Farmers Brings Controversy to Kazakh Soil,
. Eurasia Insight, December 19, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav121909
.shtml.
50 Emigration from Kyrgyzstan Is Surging, Eurasianet.org, March 21, 2006.
. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav032
106.shtml.

51 Chinghiz Umetov, Kyrgyzstan: Desperate Uzbek Labor Migrants Seeking Work

. in Job-Strapped Kyrgyzstan, Eurasia Insight, January 22, 2010. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012210.
shtml.
52 Uzbekistan: Remittances Plummet, NGO Reports, News Briefs, March 12,
. 2009. Available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav031209.sh
tml.
53 William OConnor, Russia: Central Asias Female Labor Migrants Grapple with
. Uncertainty. Eurasia Insight, August 12, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav081209
.shtml.
54 Uzbekistan: Tashkent Relies on Child Labor during 2008 Cotton Harvest,
. Eurasia Insight, November 12, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav111208
b.shtml. Also see Erica Marat, Labor Migration in Central Asia: Implications of
the Global Economic Crisis, Washington, D.C.: The Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute, 2009, 37.
55 Aigul Rasulova, Kyrgyzstan Struggles to Stop Slave Trade, Eurasianet.org,
. June 29, 2004. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav062904.s
html.
56 Ibid.
.
57 Liz Kelly, A Conducive Context: Trafficking of Persons in Central Asia, in
. Human Trafficking, edited by Maggy Lee, Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing,
2007, 78.
58 Erica Marat, Labor Migration in Central Asia: Implications of the Global
. Economic Crisis, Washington, D.C.: The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2009,
39.
59 Gulnoza Saidazimova, Kazakhstan: A New Destination for Trafficked Women,
. Eurasianet.org, March 19, 2006. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp0319
06.shtml.
60 Ibid.
.
61 United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2009,
. 293. Available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123357.pdf.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND CHINA

In the early 1990s it was fashionable among scholars of Central Asia to refer to a new
Great Game in the region, a phrase immortalized by Rudyard Kipling and an allusion to the
geopolitical struggle for influence undertaken by the British and Russian empires in the
nineteenth century in Eurasia. While the characterization is an oversimplification of the
complex geopolitical dynamics that have dominated the Central Asian space since
independence, it nevertheless serves as a useful reminder that larger powers have
frequently vied for control of the core of the Eurasian landmass for a variety of motives. The
British political geographer J. Halford MacKinder even considered Central Asia to occupy the
largest portion of the heartland, a location MacKinder claimed was the key to global
domination. Occupying the center of the worlds largest landmass, Central Asia holds
geopolitical significance just by dint of geography, and this coupled with the regions energy
resources and position at the nexus of Russia, China, the Middle East, and Europe serves to
enlarge its presence on the international stage. This chapter will address the geopolitical
strategies, motives, and concerns of the three most influential global powers in Central Asia:
Russia, the United States, and China. In some cases the interests of these states diverge
and are generally in opposition to one another, but in other instances all three share
common goals in the region, although the means of securing such goals by one player are
not necessarily encouraged or supported by the others.
Russia has profound security and economic interests in Central Asia. It shares the worlds
longest continuous border with Kazakhstan, and sizable communities of ethnic Russians
remain in all of the Central Asian states. Russian policy-makers still conceive of these
groups as lying in the so-called near abroad, although that specific term is not widely used
any longer due to its hegemonic implication and imperialistic overtones. The welfare of
ethnic Russians in surrounding states is a concern for Moscow, especially in the Central
Asian nations where the Russian minorities find themselves living in societies that now
emphasize cultural characteristics and histories that are decidedly alien to the oncedominant Russian culture.
Beyond the welfare of their fellow Russians living in the surrounding countries, the Russian
administration has many policy concerns in Central Asia. Connections to the region are
extremely important to the Russian economy, as several of the Central Asian states are
important trading partners for Russia, and until recently Russia hosted thousands of
temporary workers from Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries who traveled to Russia
to take jobs in construction, food service, and other lower-paying work. These migrant
workers frequently encountered discrimination and hostility, especially from extreme
Russian nationalists who regard Central Asians and other non-Slavs as racially inferior and
as unwanted competition for employment. Yet in spite of the social barriers to them, Tajiks
in particular have migrated in huge numbers to Russia in the past decade, and the money
they send home to relatives plays a vital role in supporting the shaky Tajik economy. In
2008 the official number of Tajik guest workers in Russia was estimated at 1 million, or
nearly 15 percent of Tajikistans population, and these laborers remitted the majority of
approximately $2.6 billion to relatives in Tajikistan.1 The decline of the Russian economy in
the latter portion of 2008 meant that many of these workers either returned home or are
unemployed and living in poverty in Russia.
Russias primary economic interests in Central Asia are concerned with the regions large
energy reserves. From the perspective of Russian geo-strategic policy, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan in particular represent either vital collaborators or serious competitors in
providing oil and gas to markets in Europe. Since the early 1990s Russian foreign policy in
Central Asia has been centered on directing the development of hydrocarbon resources
there and controlling the transport infrastructure of these resources to external markets.

Russian strategy at times has followed somewhat more subtle tactics, such as attempting to
channel the bulk of Central Asian oil and gas through Russian-controlled pipelines, and at
other points has resorted to more overt and obvious efforts, such as calling for the
formation of a gas cartel with Central Asian producers.2 Under the Putin and Medvedev
administrations, Russia has attempted to use its position as the regions major supplier of
natural gas to other former Soviet states to force changes in their foreign policy and win
higher profits. The most publicized case of this strategy has been the shut-down of Russian
gas deliveries to Ukraine in the winters of both 2006 and 2009, a situation that in both
instances resulted in serious declines in gas supplies in Eastern Europe, since Russian
deliveries to that region transit Ukraine.3 The Ukrainian governments pro-Western positions,
especially its close cooperation with NATO and its expressed desire to join the European
Union, are opposed in the Kremlin, and the Russian leadership clearly wishes to strengthen
its bargaining position by bringing Central Asian supplies of gas under its control. With the
election of Victor Yanukovych to the Ukrainian presidency in 2010, Moscow may find a more
pliable partner in Kiev, but this change will have little impact on Russias long-term strategy
toward Central Asias energy resources.
In addition to its economic interests, the Russian government is concerned about limiting
the influence of radical Islam emanating from Central Asia and influencing Russias restive
Muslim populations in Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan, and other regions; and stemming the
flow of illegal drugs into Russia from the region. There is little evidence of systematic
coordination between Central Asian Islamic extremists and radical groups in Russias Islamic
regions, but some contact took place in the late 1990s between Chechen rebels and groups
in Central Asia, and Russian authorities worry that such linkages could expand if radical
groups gain a foothold in one or more of the Central Asian states. In addition, Central Asia
is the primary source for hashish, opium and its derivatives including heroin, and other
narcotics that supply a growing number of addicts in the Russian Federation. The bulk of
these drugs are produced in Afghanistan and moved through Central Asia by middlemen to
Russia and Europe. Russian law enforcement agencies have worked with those in Central
Asia since the early 1990s to interdict the flow of drugs to Russia, with limited success.

Russian Efforts at Security Integration in Central Asia

Ironically, even before the final collapse of the USSR, efforts to create new integrative
structures were underway among some of the newly independent states. Equally ironic was
the fact that it was the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who urged the
leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, who had formed a Slavic Union, to enlarge their
organization and include other former Soviet republics.4 The result was the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), a grouping that included nearly all of the newly independent
states, with the exception of the Baltic republics and Georgia, although the latter country
joined the CIS two years later. The formation of the CIS was necessary because the Soviet
collapse had transpired so unexpectedly and rapidly that few of the newly independent
countries, especially those in Central Asia, were prepared to function as sovereign,
independent governments. For example, none of the new countries had a national currency
in circulation, and all continued to use the Russian ruble, the only banknote that could be
used for economic transactions across the region.5 The only alternative was to use a simple
barter system, which had serious limitations in regard to economic effectiveness. Russias
influence in Central Asia thus remained quite high, as Moscow could effectively dictate
macroeconomic policy for all the new countries and consequently could exert political
pressure on leaders in Central Asia via modifications of monetary policy and requirements,
such as demanding that Central Asian governments maintain gold deposits in Russian
banks.

The CIS also provided the framework for Russian intervention in the Tajik civil war in 1993,
and CIS peace-keeping troops remain in the country today. In 1993, Russian military units
were deployed to Tajikistan in a peace-keeping capacity to protect the countrys border with
Afghanistan, but in reality they actively supported the government of Emomli Rakhmonov
against the opposition. At the height of the conflict Russia had 25,000 troops in Tajikistan,
and early in the war Moscow established a permanent border guard unit, the Russian Border
Guard Force, that is under the control of the Russian military, although many of the rank
and file soldiers are ethnically Tajik. Indeed, the pervasive Russian military presence in
Tajikistan, lasting for almost 18 years now, casts doubt on Tajikistans sovereignty and
viability as a functional state. Russia negotiated with Dushanbe for rights to establish a
significant military base in the country, arguing that a larger Russian military force there
would bring about greater stability, but unlike in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, the Russian
military was not required to pay rent for the use of the base. Although the collapse of the
Taliban regime in 2001 undermined the necessity of the Russian border force, Moscow
maintains its troops there because they achieve a number of vital goals by intercepting drug
shipments, preventing the free movement of insurgents into the region, and providing the
Russian military with the status of guarantor of stability in the region. Moreover, from the
Kremlins perspective, Russian soldiers in Tajikistan serve as a partial counterweight to
American forces in Afghanistan.
In fact, Russia has expanded its military presence in Central Asia in response to the
positioning of American and NATO forces in Central Asia after the terrorist attacks on the
United States in September of 2001. Two years after the establishment of the Ganci airbase
at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, a facility that houses NATO war planes that fly combat missions
over Afghanistan, the Kremlin negotiated a similar arrangement for a Russian airbase at
Kant, only a short distance away from the Ganci base.6 The motivation for a Russian air
force facility in Kyrgyzstan was purely geopolitical and strategically symbolic: Moscow
wished to serve notice that while it tolerated NATO actions in the region against remnants of
the Taliban and other Islamic radical groupsa campaign that Russia would likely have to
fight were it not for American and NATO interventionRussian leaders nevertheless have no
intention of conceding any of their Central Asian sphere of influence to the Western powers.
Russian aircraft have not flown a combat sortie from the Kant base in the six years of its
existence, but the troops stationed there are a reminder to both the U.S. and Central Asian
governments that Russia has not withdrawn strategically or militarily from the region. A
recent agreement between Bishkek and Moscow to award Russia a second base in the
country only reinforces this point, although this has heightened tensions between Bishkek
and Tashkent.7 Established within the context of the Collective Security Treaty (CST), a
security alliance derived within the framework of the CIS, the Kant facility also represents a
tangible measure of success for Moscow in coordinating security policy with Central Asian
partners after a decade of limited progress. For the Kyrgyz government, the Kant base
brings a number of benefits, including a much-needed economic boost (the base is leased
for $4.5 million a year and provides jobs for local residents), and augments the limited
firepower of the Kyrgyz air force.8
From the early 1990s the Russian government has sought to create a defensive alliance with
the other remnant states of the USSR. Initially, this goal was pursued within the framework
of the CIS, with a separate agreement (the CST), signed by Russia, Armenia, and four of
the five Central Asian states, with only Turkmenistan following a policy of neutrality and
remaining outside the organization. Formalized in May of 1992, the CST was partially a
response to the deteriorating security situation in Tajikistan, which was poised to erupt into
full-fledged civil war. However, even in the face of the political crisis in Tajikistan, a situation
that threatened to destabilize the entire Central Asian region, the CST failed to take
collective action. Russian troops were eventually committed to Tajikistan as a peace-keeping

force, but this was achieved in the framework of a bilateral agreement between Moscow and
Dushanbe, and no other member state of the CST sent troops to the country in a similar
effort. The CST suffered from internal disagreements and mistrust of Russian motivations in
many cases, as various member states, who were themselves faced with the task of crafting
national identities and securing sovereignty, resisted cooperating with a Russian behemoth
they had only recently separated from. In the absence of a clear external threat to their
collective security and in spite of three additional countries (Belarus, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia) joining the treaty in 1993, the momentum behind the formation of the CST rapidly
declined through the 1990s, and by the end of the decade Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia all withdrew, weakening the treaty further.
As the CIS and its security component the CST ossified in the 1990s, some countries lost
faith in the efficacy of these organizations and began to form alternative groups that
avoided the burden of Russian domination, a frequent complaint by some members of the
CIS. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, most of which had serious territorial
disputes with Russia, in 1997 began to coordinate their common security and economic
interests in GUAM, an acronym of the first letters of member states names. From its
inception, GUAM was accused by Moscow of being a Washington-inspired effort designed to
gain American geopolitical advantage in the post-Soviet space. In 1999, after withdrawing
from the CST, Uzbekistan joined this group, expanding the name to GUUAM and becoming
the only Central Asian state to link with the organization. This was a clear signal from
Tashkent that the Karimov regime was dissatisfied with Russian policy in the region, and
Uzbekistan remained in the organization until May 2005, when public criticism from other
members and the United States as a result of the Andijan massacre resulted in Uzbekistan
leaving GUUAM and rejoining a Russian-led alliance, the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO).
The CSTO represents a new incarnation of the previous CST, but with expanded powers.
Officially chartered in October of 2002, the CSTO illustrates a level of coordination and
military support that extends well beyond that achieved by the CST. Russian President
Vladimir Putin declared that the CSTO was created to preserve member states security and
sovereignty, and it quickly became clear that the Russian leadership envisioned the
organization to be a geopolitical foil to the expansion of the American military presence in
Central Asia after the attacks of 9/11, as well as an instrument to head off any expansion of
NATO into the region. Thus, a key provision of the CSTO charter is that member states may
not join other military alliances, effectively blocking any member country from joining the
Western alliance. On the other hand, the provision does not preclude CSTO members from
cooperating with NATO and establishing linkages to the rival organization, something all the
CSTO member states had done in the 1990s. Russia has recently led efforts to establish the
CSTO as a major alliance that would have responsibilities beyond the Central Asian region. 9
In 1996 representatives of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan met in
Shanghai, China, to discuss primarily official boundary demarcation and the positioning of
military assets along their mutual borders, but the negotiations quickly expanded to include
a spectrum of security issues in the Eurasian region. This group was dubbed the Shanghai
Five, and their annual meetings held during the late 1990s resulted in a number of treaties
that reduced tensions and improved protocols along their boundaries. In 2001 Uzbekistan
joined the group, and within a few months the member states formalized the gathering into
the SCO, passing a charter and establishing an administrative structure for the organization.
The SCO is governed by the Council of Heads of State, which consists of the political leaders
of each member country. The SCO specifically identifies terrorism, separatism and
extremism as threats to the Eurasian regions security that the organization seeks to

counter, and although original motivation behind the SCO was border security, the group
now has evolved a larger mission, including efforts at economic and cultural cooperation. In
recent years member states of the SCO have conducted joint military exercises, and the
organization periodically issues position statements regarding regional or international
issues, giving the impression that the foreign policies of its members are closely coordinated
although in reality this has rarely been the case. The SCO members also established RATS,
which was originally slated to be headquartered in Bishkek, but was then shifted to Tashkent
in 2004.10 The RATS operation is designed to coordinate policy and responses to terrorist and
criminal threats in the region and, according to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev,
serve as a databank in combating these threats.
The SCO was formed as a response to a rising tide of security concerns that emerged in the
late 1990s in Central Asia, Russia, and China, leading to the emphasis of combating
terrorism, separatism and extremism. Russia had spent most of the 1990s fighting a
separatist movement in Chechnya, rooted allegedly in Islamic extremism, and the SCO
provided a platform for advancing the Russian agenda against its domestic extremists both
domestically and internationally. Tajikistans long civil war during the same period, coupled
with incursions in 1999 and 2000 by the IMU into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, provided the
rationale for the Central Asian states involvement, and China also faced an emerging
separatist movement among a restive Uighur population in Xinjiang. It should be noted that
three of the members of the SCO, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, all share a border with
Afghanistan, and in June of 2001 the Taliban was still in power in that country and was
openly providing support and refuge to radical Chechens, Uighurs, and the IMU, potentially
destabilizing the entire Eurasian region. Ironically, while the Taliban would be removed from
power within a year of the formation of the SCO, the agent responsible for that removal, the
United States military, would replace the Taliban as the primary motivator for SCO
cooperation.
This shift in the agenda of the SCO was made evident in the so-called Astana Declaration of
July 2005, in which the member states of the SCO called for the withdrawal of U.S. military
forces from Central Asia.11 There is little doubt that Russias president, Vladimir Putin, was
the driving force behind the Astana Declaration, and using the platform of the SCO
appeared to indicate that the Central Asian member states had adopted the Russian position
that it was time for the American forces to go home. The Astana Declaration was
promulgated during the same month that Uzbek-American relations reached their nadir, as
the Karimov government demanded that NATO forces leave the Khanabad airbase in
southern Uzbekistan in the aftermath of American criticism of the massacre of civilians in
the city of Andijan. But the unity of the anti-American position was not as solid as it
appeared; although Kyrgyzstan supported the Astana Declaration, Bishkek did not demand
that the American base at Manas, a key installation in the campaign in Afghanistan, be
closed, and in fact renewed the lease with the American military only a few months
afterward. Moreover, Russian attempts to use the SCO to undermine American influence in
Central Asia are inhibited by shortcomings in the basic structure of the organization. In spite
of the fact that SCO states have held joint military exercises several times since 2001, there
are no provisions for member states of the SCO to act collectively against external threats,
no unified command structure exists to coordinate such a response, and there are no
mechanisms for the projection of joint military action outside the SCO region.
Indeed, a series of recent setbacks to Russian policy objectives has called into question the
level of influence Moscow actually wields in the SCO, and how effective the organization may
be as a response to American interests in the region. Despite strong pressure from the
Kremlin, Kazakhstan in 2006 solidified ties to NATO, and other countries continued to court

a closer relationship to the American-led alliance. But the most serious setbacks to Russian
status in the SCO occurred in 2008 and 2009. In August of 2008, after a brief border war
with Georgia, Russia attempted to gain legitimacy for its policy by requesting just before the
SCO summit meeting in Dushanbe that the SCO member states recognize the independence
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two break-away regions of Georgia that lay at the heart
of the Russian-Georgian conflict. The proposal was rejected outright by China and the
Central Asia members and resulted in a foreign relations blunder that seriously embarrassed
the Russian leadership. Rather than endorsing Russian actions, the SCO declaration from
the Dushanbe meeting emphasized that a peaceful resolution of the conflict should be
pursued, and in a direct slap to Moscow, called for the respect of the territorial integrity of
the states involved.12
But the biggest blow to Russian efforts to employ the SCO as a mechanism for advancing its
geopolitical agenda in Central Asia came in June of 2009. As a result of political pressure
and economic enticements from Vladimir Putin and his successor, Dmitri Medvedev, the
Kyrgyz government had publicly declared in 2008 that it would not renew the lease on the
American base at Manas after 2009, dealing a severe setback to American military efforts in
Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the Russian administration offered an economic aid package of
nearly $1.2 billion to Kyrgyzstan in return for ousting the American presence, a sum far
greater than the fees paid by the United States to use the base. Yet after several months of
negotiations, the Kyrgyz government agreed to renew the American lease in June of 2009,
obtaining a fee of $60 million for rent of the facility and an additional $117 million in aid for
various development and security projects.13 While the new rental rate was much higher
than previously paid, the total package was only one fifth of the amount offered by Moscow,
a clear sign that despite public pronouncements to the contrary, the Kyrgyz administration
had few qualms about the Americans remaining in the country, at least in the short term,
and intended to pursue a security policy independent of Moscows influence. Shortly after
striking the deal with Washington, the Bakiyev administration did agree to allow the
establishment of a second Russian base in Kyrgyzstan for the stationing of a CSTO Rapid
Deployment Force, but this would seem to be little solace to the Kremlin. Furthermore,
Uzbekistan, a CSTO member state, was vehemently opposed to the additional Russian base
in Kyrgyzstan. Russias effort to employ the SCO as a counterweight to NATO and as a
platform to force an American retreat from Central Asia appears to have failed, at least to
date.
The second pillar of Russian geopolitical strategy in Central Asia has consisted of an effort to
join with the economies of the region to create a supranational organization that would
represent, in theory at least, a single unified economic space. As the state with the largest
economy in such a grouping, Russia would have substantial influence over the economic
policies of its Central Asian partners, assuming that individual member states adhered to
the agreements and positions adopted by the organization as a whole. Several of the
Central Asian states have energetically pursued greater economic integration from the early
1990s, with rather limited success. The Central Asian Economic Union was formed by
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in 1994, but achieved little toward the goal of
economic integration and coordinated policy. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan remained outside
this structure, which also limited its effectiveness. Tajikistan eventually joined the group in
1998 after the conclusion of the civil strife in that country, and the organization became
known as the Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CACE), which underwent yet another
name change in 2002 when it became the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO).
Russia was admitted into this group in 2004.

Russias membership in CACO was simply a formality designed to augment a Russiansponsored effort at economic integration, represented by EurASEC. In fact, CACO was
absorbed into the EurASEC group in 2005, only a year after Russia joined the former,
indicating that Moscows admittance was only procedural, setting the stage for the merger
of the two organizations. The EurASEC structure provides much more influence for Russia
than the country enjoyed as a member of CACO, and Russia hopes its commanding position
in EurASEC will allow it to play a leading role in the process of economic integration in
Central Asia. EurASEC was formed in 2000 by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan, with Uzbekistan joining the organization in 2006. The number of votes assigned
to each member state in EurASEC is determined by the magnitude of the financial
contribution that state makes to the EurASEC budget, and Russia has more than twice the
number of votes in the organizations governing bodies as any other member. EurASEC has
successfully usurped previous efforts among the Central Asian states to create a unified
market and to dismantle barriers to trade among them.
However, EurASEC has failed to move rapidly forward in creating a single economic space
among its members, one of the main goals of the organization, although Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan were successful at creating a customs union in 2008, at least in a formal, if
not a functional, sense. Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the group the same year,
with Islom Karimov complaining that the organization was ineffective, and suggesting that
EurASEC would be better served by merging with the CSTO.14 In conjunction with EurASEC
expansion, Russia and Kazakhstan established the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) in
2006, as an alternative to other international finance institutions such as the ADB, World
Bank, the ERDB and others. Russia contributed two-thirds of the EDBs founding capital, but
as of 2009 the EDB had only four member states: Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and
Armenia. The number of development projects supported by the EDB is miniscule compared
to many other international lending agencies, and the banks capitalization was seriously
undermined by the decline of both the Russian and Kazakh economies in 2008 due to the
abrupt fall in international petroleum prices.
The lack of progress in creating a common economic space incorporating Russia and the
Central Asian economies, and indeed forming any viable groupings in the region directed at
economic integration, is explained by a number of serious obstacles to such development.
Even Russian economists have observed that the preconditions for stimulating trade among
the Central Asian states are absent, and in fact the great majority of commodities traded by
these countries are directed at external markets beyond Central Asia and often beyond the
post-Soviet market, leading to the conclusion that there is no economic basis for
transforming the post-Soviet space into a trading bloc modeled after the EU or NAFTA.15
Furthermore, neither EurASEC nor its predecessors have made any concrete progress
toward resolving the fundamental economic development issues in Central Asia, centered on
the allocation of water and the distribution of energy among the five states. As the
economies of the Central Asian states become ever more reliant on the export of energy
resources and other unprocessed commodities such as cotton, there is little likelihood that
Moscows ambitions to gain geopolitical leverage in the region through the creation of a
unified economic bloc will come to fruition. The economic fortunes of the Central Asian
states lie not in trading with each other or Russia, but in building stronger economic
relationships with the global economy.

American Security Interests in Central Asia

The United States security interests in Central Asia have witnessed several shifts since the
independence of these countries in 1991. Initially, American policymakers had one

overriding concern regarding the region: the safety and security of the nuclear weapons and
weapons-grade material located in Kazakhstan. The United States was especially concerned
about the material and weapons in Kazakhstan since it was the only nuclear-armed state to
emerge in the Muslim regions of the former USSR, and many specialists feared that either
weapons-grade nuclear material or information regarding the construction of a so-called
suitcase bomb could be passed to more radical elements in the Islamic realm via this
channel. Under the Lugar-Nunn Act, named for the U.S. senators who sponsored it, experts
from the United States played a key role in dismantling many of the weapons in Kazakhstan
and cataloging and destroying fissionable material, even transporting some to the United
States for processing. The United States had some strategic interest in the regions energy
resources as well, but the full extent of the oil and gas reserves in Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan were not evident until several years after independence. Under the Clinton
administration, American policy focused mostly on promoting market reforms and
democratization in the Central Asian states and encouraging investment by Western
companies. The United States had no compelling strategic military interest in the region,
although by the mid-1990s the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan was generating
concern among some Washington policy-makers that the tier of states lying along
Afghanistans northern boundary might be vulnerable to the influence of anti-Western,
Islamic radicalism emanating from that country.
By the mid-1990s the potential for Central Asia to emerge as a significant energy supplier to
both the regional and global economies had become apparent to American policy-makers,
and the primary focus of American interests in the region was toward insuring the political
stability and security of the states that held the lions share of hydrocarbon wealth,
especially Kazakhstan, where Western firms were already heavily invested by 1994. A
related security concern involved the routes by which the oil and gas would exit the region
and reach markets abroad. Although one of the easiest pathways would be by pipeline
through Iran to the Persian Gulf, the United States was adamantly opposed to such an
outlet, since it would obviously provide Iran, a persistent nemesis of American interests in
the region, with significant control over the transport infrastructure and therefore a strategic
advantage. The Clinton administration promoted the development of a pipeline project that
would transit the Caucasus and Turkey, the BTC pipeline. The construction of the BTC was
formalized in Clintons final year in office and completed in 2005.16 But the pipeline politics
between the West and Russia did not appear to seriously damage their overall relationship.
Under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin the Russian Federation appeared to be building close
ties to western Europe and the United States, especially in the areas of reducing nuclear
weapons and limiting nuclear proliferation, promoting a market economy and political
pluralism, and pursuing joint cooperation on a wide range of security concerns. The old
geopolitical antagonisms of the Cold War era appeared to be quickly fading.
The American administration made use of soft diplomacy during the 1990s in an attempt
to steer the new governments of Central Asia in the direction of pluralism, respect for
human rights, and economic reform. Those states that indicated the greatest progress in
this regard were rewarded with public praise and closer economic, cultural, and educational
contacts. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, viewed as the most democratic of the regions
regimes, received strong U.S. support on the international stage, as when Washington
backed Kyrgyzstans application to the WTO. Western investment in Kazakhstans oil fields
also elevated the importance of relations with Nursultan Nazarbayevs government. On the
other hand, the human rights violations of Uzbekistans authoritarian administration
frequently brought harsher criticism from the American leadership, but cultural, educational,
and economic ties were energetically cultivated with Tashkent as well, due to the countrys
key location, large population, and powerful military. Only Tajikistan, due to the disruption

and confusion of its civil war, and Turkmenistan, which pursued a policy of strict neutrality,
maintained quite limited relations with the United States and Western countries in general.

Texaco service
station in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
(Photo courtesy of Reuel Hanks)

The end of the 1990s would signal a shift in American interests in Central Asia.
1999 was in many ways a benchmark, with a series of events occurring during that
year that would eventually lead to fundamental changes in U.S. policy. Not only was
the BTC pipeline agreement concluded, but in February a series of car bombs
exploded in Tashkent, marking the first sophisticated and large-scale terrorist
attack in the region, and later the same year extremists from the IMU entered
Kyrgyzstan from bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan with the stated goal of
overthrowing the Karimov government in Uzbekistan and establishing an Islamic
state. Within a short time, the U.S. Department of State placed the IMU on its
official list of terrorist organizations, and cooperation with the Karimov regime on
military and intelligence issues was increased, along with military aid. A second
change in the political dynamic occurred at the end of 1999, when Vladimir Putin
replaced Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation, a change that would
eventually alter the relationship between Russia and the West in Central Asia.
Through the 2000s, the Putin government initiated a number of steps designed to
counter what it viewed as an increasing American and NATO military presence in
Central Asia. Simultaneously, Russia developed a general strategy to control the
regions energy resources by opposing any pipelines that would compete with those
transiting Russian territory. As a result, Central Asia once again became the object
of great power rivalry.

Western military and security linkages with the nascent Central Asian states were initiated
immediately upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, when in December of 1991 NATO formed
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC, later transformed into the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council), a group designed to foster relations with former Warsaw Pact countries
in eastern Europe and the former USSR.17 In March of 1992 all the Central Asian states, as
well as the Russian Federation, joined the NACC. This move established a basis for
expanded cooperation, and in 1994 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan
all entered NATOs Partnership for Peace program (Tajikistan would join in 2002).
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan all took part in Central Asia Battalion
(CENTRASBAT) exercises beginning in 1995, which involved joint training and deployment of
Central Asian and American troops. Military officers from these three countries were trained
at bases in Europe and the United States in disaster response and management, intelligence
gathering and analysis, military-civilian relations, and other topics. The relationships and
cooperation in military and security activities developed during the 1990s, although limited
in scope, would pay enormous dividends for American security interests after
September 2001.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed American strategic
interests in Central Asia. The region went, almost literally overnight, from being of marginal
military significance to standing on the frontline of a major military campaign to oust the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, destroy the bases of al-Qaeda in that country, and bring
those responsible for the destruction of the World Trade Center, the attack on the Pentagon,
and the hijacking and crash of another aircraft to justice. The logistical challenges of
conducting such a war were extremely daunting, as initially the United States had no
significant forces within the region and no way to mount any strikes against targets without
flying risky long-range missions from Europe or from aircraft carriers. The Central Asian
states were immediately approached as potential allies in the newly declared war on terror.
Already in early October of 2001, three weeks after 9/11, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld made an official visit to Tashkent to secure the cooperation of the Karimov
government in providing facilities for U.S. forces. Uzbekistan was viewed as the most
receptive potential ally in the region, since relations between the Taliban and Tashkent had
been tense since the mid-1990s. Rumsfelds initial foray was soon followed by others
between October 2001 and April 2002, he visited the Central Asian region four times on
official visits. This effort instantly paid off, as the Uzbeks agreed to lease a former Soviet air
facility at Khanabad, only about 100 miles from the Afghanistan border, to American troops.
Many of the earliest raids launched against Taliban positions in October of 2001 originated
from the Khanabad base. Within a few weeks Kyrgyzstan had also agreed to allow the
establishment of an American base on its soil at Manas (informally known as the Ganci
base). Although Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan did not host an American military
facility, all three quickly granted transit and overflight privileges to the United States, and
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan pledged to provide substantial humanitarian support to
Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were especially receptive to American action, since the attacks
of 9/11 had given those countries and the United States two common adversaries: the
Taliban and the IMU. The IMU was receiving financial assistance from Osama bin Laden and
sanctuary, weapons, and training from the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The group had
sent insurgents into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during the summers of 1999 and 2000 in an
attempt to destabilize the Karimov government and set up a regime based on Islamic law.
Fighters from the IMU, numbering perhaps 2,000, now found themselves facing the air
power of the United States. The battle was decidedly one-sided. American bombers struck
Taliban and IMU positions in northern Afghanistan in October of 2001, killing the military
leader of the IMU, Juma Namangania key adversary of Uzbekistans President Islom

Karimovand possibly hundreds of IMU fighters. Moreover, the removal of the Taliban from
power in Afghanistan was also a shared goal of the Central Asian states and Washington.
The Taliban leadership had supported the IMU insurgents and had itself made periodic
threats against Uzbekistans territorial integrity, such as when it claimed that Samarkand
and Bukhara rightfully belonged to Afghanistan. The Karimov regime in turn had been
supporting the Northern Alliance, a coalition of groups that opposed the Taliban and that
was mostly made up of ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks from northern Afghanistan. The strategic
benefits of having the American military eliminate the Taliban were apparent to all the
Central Asian governments, as well as to China and Russia. The latter two countries,
however, expressed concerns early on about an open-ended American military presence in
the region, which might challenge their growing influence there.
Between 2001 and 2005, the American military, along with forces from NATO partners and
other allied countries, used the bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the continuing effort
to support the new Afghan government and clear the country of militants. The U.S.
Department of State softened its criticism of human rights violations by the Uzbek
government in response to Tashkents continued support, and the strategic relationship
between the Central Asian states and the United States solidified, much to the dismay of the
Russian administration under Vladimir Putin. Putin repeatedly demanded that the United
States indicate a concrete date for the withdrawal of its troops from not only Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan, but also from Afghanistan, a commitment the Bush administration refused to
make. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were not only reaping additional security
benefits from the presence of the Americans, but the United States was paying a substantial
amount of rent for each facility, resulting in a boost to the sagging economies in both
countries. In addition, the foreign soldiers provided considerable support to the local
economy, and the bases offered local residents jobs that paid lucrative salaries by Central
Asian standards. Kyrgyzstan assuaged Russian concerns about the Manas base somewhat
by allowing the administration in Moscow to establish a similar facility at Kant in December
of 2002, only a few miles from the American base. The Russian aircraft were part of a
Rapid Deployment Force of the Collective Security Organization, organized to counter
Islamic insurgency. Yet the number of combat and support aircraft stationed at the Russian
base were only about half the number housed at the Ganci base during the height of the air
campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002.
The abrupt decline of close military cooperation between the United States and Uzbekistan
began in May of 2005 when Uzbek security forces opened fire on a group of demonstrators
in the city of Andijan. Possibly 400 people were killed in the massacre, which the Karimov
regime blamed on Islamic extremists who had escaped from a local jail. Although some of
the demonstrators were armed, many of those shot were innocent bystanders or unarmed
protestors, and a sizable number were women and children. Several hundred people were
able to flee the city and eventually cross the border into Kyrgyzstan, where they were
allowed to take refuge. As reports of the shootings circulated in the global media, and
interviews with many of the victims clearly showed that they were not radicals, pressure
mounted on the Karimov government. Within a few days both the Bush administration and
the European Union called for an independent investigation of the killings, but the Uzbek
government responded by sealing the city off from foreign visitors (except those who were
accompanied by Uzbek officials) and rejecting any attempt to interfere in Uzbekistans
domestic politics. Karimov also accused the United States of being behind the so-called Tulip
Revolution in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, which toppled the regime of Askar Akayev only a little
over a month before the events in Andijan occurred. Relations between Washington and
Tashkent quickly went downhill, as the Bush administration now found itself saddled with an
ally in the war on terror that appeared to be as brutal to its own citizens as the Taliban had
been in Afghanistan. When Donald Rumsfeld made yet another visit to the region in the

summer of 2005, he did not pay a visit to Uzbekistan, a clear sign that relations between
the two countries were disintegrating.
The Uzbek government denied that excessive force had been used against the crowd in
Andijan, and for the first time the Karimov regime imposed restrictions on the use of the
base. By July Tashkent requested that the American forces vacate the Khanabad base within
six months. At the same time, Uzbekistan shifted toward a much closer relationship with
Moscow. The Putin administration, which had said virtually nothing in defense of the Andijan
protestors, was eager to take advantage of the sudden rift between the United States and
Uzbekistan. Within a few months of the cancellation of the American lease at Khanabad,
Russia and Uzbekistan had signed a treaty establishing a mutual defense agreement, with
the possibility of Moscow building its own base in Uzbekistan. Tashkent had also withdrawn
from the GUUAM organization as a result of Western criticism, another move strongly
approved in Moscow, and joined the CSTO. Some analysts saw this shift as a major blow to
American interests and prestige in Central Asia, and came to view Uzbekistan as a platform
for Russian interests in the region.
In fact, a Russian base has not been established in Uzbekistan, and the only actual military
access Uzbekistan granted to Moscow was the use of an isolated facility near the city of
Navoi, and then only for emergency use. The past several years have witnessed a gradual
but steady warming in the damaged American-Uzbek relationship, and the Karimov regime
has consistently kept Russian efforts to further integrate the countries military structures at
arms length. Ironically, in early 2009 Tashkent agreed to allow NATO aircraft transporting
non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan to utilize the facility at Navoi, which is being upgraded by
a South Korean firm into a major transit hub for the region.18 Indeed, Moscow seems to have
missed an opportunity to firmly place Uzbekistan within its sphere of influence in the
aftermath of the Andijan debacle, and the tension between Uzbekistan and the United
States appears to fading, although the removal of President Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan in
April 2010 may have driven Karimov into the arms of Moscow once again, at least
temporarily.
The rapprochement between Tashkent and Moscow does not signify that the United States
has backed away from efforts to increase democratization and economic reform in the
region. On the contrary, former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, while speaking in
Astana in 2005, stated forcefully that the United States believes that liberty, and dignity,
and justice are within reach of everyone in this regionand we are committedin helping
you to realize this vision.19 Liberalization of the authoritarian regimes that hold power in all
of the Central Asian states except Kyrgyzstan remains a cornerstone of American policy and
is seen as a key to the regions long-term stability. But this goal is tempered by the need to
maintain a strategic alliance with those same authoritarian leaders and to promote the
peaceful transition to democracy. A single formula is unlikely to work across the region, as
each state has different social and political conditions. For example, institutions supporting
the development of civil society, such as NGOs and opposition political parties, are well
established in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are somewhat less anchored in Tajikistan, and
are virtually nonexistent in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
Central Asias energy resources represent a second security interest for the United States.
The central issue is how the oil and gas of Central Asian producers, primarily Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan, will be transported to regional and global markets. The pipeline politics
referenced earlier encapsulates this problem. Russia has pursued a strategy aimed at
directing the flow of the hydrocarbon energy resources into pipelines that traverse its
territory and that are completely or at least partially under the control of Russian

companies. The American response has been to support the construction of alternative
routes that circumvent Russian control. Although the United States imports only a small
amount of oil from the region and virtually no gas, the United States nevertheless has a
strategic interest in the transport issue since Europe is increasingly dependent on gas from
Eurasia, much of it provided by Russia. Since the late 1990s, the Russian administration has
shown a ready willingness to use its position as a major energy supplier as leverage against
neighboring countries that are dependent on Russian gasUkraine is a prime example.
Controlling Central Asias gas and oil via its pipeline system would provide Russia enormous
advantage in dictating prices, as well as significant influence in shaping the foreign policies
of the European states.
The American response has been to encourage the development of as many pipeline routes
as possible that avoid Russian control (see Chapter 4). The successful completion of the
BTC pipeline, which at one million barrels per day has greater capacity than any Russiancontrolled pipeline in the region, represents a major achievement in American geopolitical
strategy in Central Asia. The Kazakh governments recent willingness to supply the eastern
terminus of the BTC via tanker and its openness to the possible construction of a transCaspian pipeline also signal a major victory in the American drive to diversify the outlets for
Central Asian petroleum. To date, there has been less tangible success in regard to securing
alternative routes for the regions gas resources, although the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE)
gas pipeline, which generally follows the route of the BTC to the city of Erzerum in eastern
Turkey, if linked with the Nabucco pipeline would compete with Russian-controlled pipelines.
Should the Nabucco pipeline and the White Stream routes both move forward, these
projects would seriously undermine any attempt by Russia to establish control over
transportation of Central Asias natural gas resources.
Much of the success of American security strategy for the Central Asian region depends on
the degree of success of American strategy in Afghanistan. An improving security situation
in that country would open the way for improving the transportation and trade linkages
between Central and South Asia, especially the selling of electrical power from Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan to Pakistan and India and the transfer of gas from Turkmenistan to South
Asian consumers. Road and rail linkages running through Afghanistan and connecting
Central Asian economies to ports in Pakistan and India would help to alleviate the
disadvantageous geography suffered by the landlocked Central Asian states. Perhaps most
importantly, the establishment of a stable, politically pluralistic regime in Afghanistan would
also serve to reduce the threats of Islamic radicalism and drug trafficking that continue to
destabilize the region, as well as providing an example of democratic governance in a region
where despotism has long been the norm. The achievement of these objectives will take
years of struggle and billions of dollars of investment, but what is certain is that the United
States cannot afford to ignore this distant but vital region.

China and Central Asia

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has strategic interests in Central Asia that parallel to
some degree those of the United States, in that Beijing seeks to contain separatism and
terrorism in the region and secure access to the hydrocarbon energy sources of the Caspian
Basin. A fundamental distinction between the strategy and goals of China and the United
States in the region is that the Chinese position has little focus on modifying the domestic
policies of the Central Asian states, especially by pushing those regimes toward
democratization and the construction of civil society. As an authoritarian state itself, the
administration of the PRC cares little about human rights violations by the governments of
its neighbors in Central Asia. What does concern the regime in Beijing is the potential for

instability in Xinjiang among the Uighur minority, who are close ethnic cousins to the
Uzbeks. The ethnic riots that rocked Urumchi in July 2009 clearly illustrated the discontent
many Uighurs experience under Chinese administration.20 A significant number of Uighurs
live in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, and China has concerns that these groups,
albeit small in number, could provide material and moral support for separatism in Xinjiang.
Several violent incidents targeting Chinese nationals in Kyrgyzstan in the early 2000s led to
tighter border control and the banning of some Uighur nationalist organizations in
Kyrgyzstan.21 Cooperation with the Central Asian states to control the activities of separatist
movements and terrorists represents one of the primary strategic interests of China in the
Central Asian region. The Chinese administration was insistent on the inclusion of the socalled three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism in the charter of theSCO (see
Appendix C), primarily to secure the cooperation of the Central Asian states in limiting
cross-border support for its unruly Uighur population.
From the Chinese perspective, Central Asia is an important component of Beijings energy
strategy. Due to a steady increasing demand for energy, China is becoming more dependent
on imported petroleum to fuel its burgeoning economic expansion. Most of the oil that China
currently obtains from abroad comes from sources in the Middle East, and the Chinese
administration has sought alternative suppliers for years, primarily because the long
distances between Middle Eastern countries and China increases costs. In addition, the
supply routes would be vulnerable to blockade in the event of war, especially transport via
the Strait of Malacca or Lombok Strait in southeast Asia. In addition, the Chinese
government is obviously aware of the strategic weakness inherent in being dependent on a
region that suffers from considerable volatility. Thus, Chinese energy security depends on
securing alternative sources, and Central Asia, along with Russia, represents the best
options available.
Like Russia and the West, China is eager to tap into the hydrocarbon energy sources offered
by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and potentially Uzbekistan. Even in the early 1990s
Kazakhstan was shipping modest amounts of oil to China by rail, but the total volume
transported was quite small and even then accounted for only a tiny fraction of Chinas
energy requirements. By 2003 construction was underway, partially underwritten by
investment from the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), on a pipeline that would
carry oil from Kazakhstans Caspian Basin deposits across the entire country to the Dushanzi
petroleum refinery in Xinjiang. Built in three segments, the project was completed in
July 2009 and has a total length of almost 1,400 miles.22 In the future, the line may be
expanded and upgraded to deliver as many as 400,000 barrels of crude oil to the refinery, if
the Kazakh supply is supplemented by Russian petroleum in the final stretch between Atasu
in Kazakhstan and the border with China. Although this source currently represents only
about 10 percent of Chinas petroleum imports, the pipeline nevertheless serves as an
important secondary supply, and Beijing clearly expects that it will be a vital boost to the
economic development of Xinjiang. In 2008 the CNPC struck a deal with the Uzbek
government to extract petroleum from the Ming-bulak oil field in eastern Uzbekistan,
signifying Chinas increasing recognition of Central Asias potential as a secondary source of
imported petroleum.23 The CNPC has recently become a major shareholder in Kazakh
petroleum ventures, as well as an important creditor to Astana, providing the Kazakh
government with a $10 billion loan.24
In addition to its investments in Central Asias petroleum supplies, China has also committed
massive amounts of money to developing and securing access to the regions natural gas
resources. China has invested more than $7 billion in the Central Asia-China Pipeline, which
will carry gas primarily from Turkmenistan across Central Asia to western China. The

pipeline will have a total annual capacity of 40 billion cubic meters and is scheduled for
completion in 2011.25 Moreover, China has become a major investor in the production of gas
in Turkmenistan, pumping several billion dollars into the Yolotan field in southeastern
Turkmenistan and thereby further insuring that abundant gas will be available for the
pipeline project.
The Central Asian states have become important trade partners to the Chinese economy,
resulting in almost $20 billion in trade by 2008, and expansion in trade relations has been
exponential in the 2000s. China has provided large sums of investment for numerous
infrastructure projects throughout the region, most of which are designed to further
integrate western China with its Central Asian partners. A remarkable and highly
controversial proposal floated by the Kazakh government in 2009 even suggested that the
country might be willing to lease as much as one million hectares of farmland to Chinese
immigrant workers to grow soybeans. The proposed program generated several public
protests in Kazakhstan, yet the government appears intent to move forward with a test
program.26 Whether Chinese farmers are eventually allowed to work land in Kazakhstan or
not, over the past decade Beijing has positioned itself as a major economic player in the
Central Asian region for decades to come, despite the perception among many residents of
Central Asia that China represents a threat to their security.27These economic interests,
coupled with Chinas security worries over possible instability and separatism in its western
provinces, will result in a greater level of Chinese engagement with the region over the next
20 years than has been the case for centuries.

Notes
1. Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis, ICG Asia Report No. 183,
Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 5, 2010, 3.
2. Carl Mortished, Dont Rule Out a Gas Cartel; It Makes Sense to Russia,
Timesonline, April 26, 2006. Available at:
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article709
312.ece.
3. Sergei Blagov, Russia and Ukraine Battle Over Gas Deliveries, Business and
Economics, January 3, 2006. Available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav01030
6.shtml.
4. See the discussion in Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise,
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, 3642.
5. Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov, Between Two Gravitational Poles: Russia
and China, in Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence, edited by Boris
Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, 154.
6. Russia to Establish Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, Deals Blow to US Strategic Interests
in Central Asia, Eurasia Insight, December 3, 2002. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav120302.
shtml.
7. Alisher Khamidov, Kyrgyzstan: New Military Base Plans Fuel Uzbekistans Ire,
Eurasia Insight, September 10, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav091009
a.shtml.
8. Kyrgyzstan: Russians Kant [sic] Leave[] Military Airbase for 49 Years, News

9.

10
.

11
.

12
.

13
.

14
.

15
.
16
.

17
.
18
.

19
.

20

Briefs, May 29, 2009. Available at:

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav052909.sh
tml.
Sergei Blagov, CSTO: Moscow-led Security Group Harbors Aspirations of Going
Global, Eurasia Insight, March 24, 2010. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032410.
shtml.
Roger N. McDermott, Shanghai Cooperation Organization Takes Significant
Step Towards Viability, Eurasia Insight, September 5, 2003. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090503b
.shtml.
Daniel Kimmage, SCO: Shoring Up the Post-Soviet Status Quo, Eurasia
Insight, July 9, 2005. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp070905.s
html.
Mark Katz, Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Moscows
Lonely Road from Bishkek to Dushanbe, Eurasia Insight, September 3, 2008.
Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp090308f.s
html.
Deirdre Tynan, Kyrgyzstan: US Armed Forces to Remain at Air Base for Afghan
Resupply Operations, Eurasia Insight, June 23, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav062309
b.shtml.
Uzbekistan: Tashkent Announces Withdrawal from Moscow-Dominated
Economic Group, Business and Economics, November 12, 2008. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav111208
c.shtml.
S. Zhukov and O. Reznikova, Economic Integration in the Post-Soviet Space,
Problems of Economic Transition, Vol. 50, No. 7.
Caspian Basin Leaders Hail Opening of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, Business
and Economics, May 25, 2005. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav05250
5.shtml.
See the chapter The North Atlantic Cooperation Council in the NATO
Handbook, available online at
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb020201.htm.
Deidre Tynan, Uzbekistan: Karimov Gives Washington the Air Base it Needs for
Afghan Operations, Eurasia Insight, May 11, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav051109
a.shtml.
Rice Urges Kazakhstan to Lead Central Asia on Democratization, Kazakhstans
Echo (published by the Embassy of Kazakhstan in the United States),
October 13, 2005. Available at:
http://melodiesandsongs.org/echo19.html.
Austin Razmy, After Deadly Riots, Ethnic Tensions Heat Up in Urumqi,

.
21
.
22
.
23
.

24
.

25
.

26
.

27
.

TIME.COM, July 7, 2009. Available at:

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1908969,00.html.
Rollie Lal, Central Asia and Its Asian Neighbors: Security and Commerce at the
Crossroads, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2006, 46.
Country Analysis Briefs: Kazakhstan. Washington, D.C.: Energy Information
Administration, Department of Energy, February, 2008, 6. Available at:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/pdf.pdf.
Chinese Energy Giant to Expand into Uzbekistan, News Briefs, March 25,
2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav032509g.s
html.
Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Chinas Deep Pockets Make Beijing a Potent Energy
Player in Central Asia, Eurasia Insight, April 20, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav042009
.shtml.
Kazakhstan: Workers Complete Section of Turkmenistan-China Pipeline, News
Briefs, July 10, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav071009a.s
html.
Bruce Pannier, Prospect of Chinese Farmers Brings Controversy to Kazakh Soil,
Eurasia Insight, December 19, 2009. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav121909
_pr.shtml.
In the mid 1990s, a survey conducted by the Kazakh scholar Nurbulat Masanov
found that more than 50 percent of ethnic Kazakhs saw China as a threat, and
more than 40 percent of ethnic Russians shared the same view. Tsentr
monotoringa mezhetnicheskikh otnoshenii v Kazakhstane, Etnopoliticheskii
monitoring v Kazakhstane, Almaty: Arkor, winter 1995.

CONCLUSION
Quo Vadis, Central Asia?
Central Asias geopolitical significance has become increasingly evident since the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. The regions potential as a secondary supplier of hydrocarbon
fuels to global markets was obvious to most policy-makers in Washington, Beijing, and
Moscow by the early 1990s. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, relations
between the Central Asian countries and the United States acquired a new dimension, as all
five to some degree became partners in the war on terror.1 This relationship will be vital to
American military interests as long as the United States remains dedicated to battling the
Taliban in Afghanistan and to controlling the spread of Islamic extremism in general
throughout the Muslim realm. Russia and China have essentially the same policy goals in
this regard as the West, and therefore the potential for a considerable level of cooperation
on the issue of eliminating Islamic extremism between the three great powers vying for
geopolitical leverage in Central Asia remains high, although such cooperation to date has
been quite limited.

On the other hand, some strategic goals of Russia, China, and the United States in Central
Asia are diametrically opposed and prevent the geopolitical heavyweights from coordinating
policy and strategy in the region. Under such circumstances, it is therefore likely that the
Central Asian states will continue to find themselves courted by all three. Russias main
economic interest in the region lies in securing control of the hydrocarbon resources of the
Caspian Basin and therefore neutralizing potential competitors who might challenge Russian
supremacy as a gas supplier to the European market, as well as gaining influence over
Kazakhstans oil production by directing that supply through Russian pipelines. American
strategic efforts in the region are directed at insuring that Moscow does not monopolize
Central Asias energy resources and thus establish a virtual stranglehold on its European
allies, as well as stabilizing the political environment through the development of civil
society, democratic governance, and free markets. Chinas main interests lie in procuring a
portion of the energy resources for the expanding Chinese economy and further developing
markets in the Central Asian countries, while also insulating the western border region of
Xinjiang against the destabilizing effects of Islamic radicalism and separatism.
Russian and Chinese interests and influence in Central Asia in some instances work to
weaken the modest level of influence the United States and Europe have in directing these
states toward greater liberalization of their political, economic, and social systems. A key
element of Western strategy is the fostering of economic integration not only among the five
Central Asian economies, but across the heart of the Eurasian landmass from Delhi to Kiev,
in what former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice once characterized as an arc of
opportunity. However, in the absence of genuine democratic systems and institutions of civil
society, long-term cooperation between the Central Asian governments remains a difficult if
not unattainable objective, although it seems clear that both democratization and regional
cooperation are the cornerstones of long-term stability and development for these emerging
states. Indeed, coordination of policy across a wide range of issues, including battling the
drug trade, managing water resources, developing transportation and communications
infrastructure, and combating poverty and extremism, requires a multilateral approach to
insure the interests and needs of all states are considered and addressed.
Unfortunately for those promoting democratization, present circumstances appear to favor
the political status quo in Central Asia, at least in the short term. In those states where a
transition of leadership has occurred since the early 1990s (Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan),
representative, pluralistic systems of governance have not gained traction, resulting in
either continued one man, one party rule (Turkmenistan), or chaotic coups against
unpopular leaders (Kyrgyzstan). As long as Russian and Chinese strategic agendas exclude
reforms in the effort to secure a stronger position vis--vis the West, Central Asia will
remain a zone of either benign or malevolent dictatorship, where the personal rivalries and
greed of leaders take precedence over the welfare of citizens. This system will be
sustainable, and for the most part tolerable, in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan where
abundant natural resource wealth and relatively small populations will allow for economic
development and rising per capita incomes coupled with limitations on political freedom.
Kazakhstan in particular may enjoy relative stability for some time, due to its curious
mixture of authoritarianism tempered by limited democratic reform.
In the poorer tier of states composed of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, declining
standards of living, pervasive corruption, and social stresses stoked by ethnic and regional
conflicts may well lead to episodic violence and instability for a decade or longer. It is no
coincidence that two presidents have been violently driven from office (and the country) in
Kyrgyzstan in the past five years; that after more than a decade Tajikistan has failed to
surmount the political and economic degradation of the destructive civil war of the 1990s; or

that the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan continues to overtly employ fear, violence, and
repression to remain in power. Nor is it by chance that over the past decade, millions of
people have left all three countries in search of economic opportunity. The main export of
both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has become migrant laborers, a clear indication of the dismal
conditions many people face in both countries. In Uzbekistan, more than two million
citizens, close to 12 percent of the working age population, have sought work in Russia and
Kazakhstan in recent years, and only the countrys substantial natural gas, gold, and cotton
exports sustain its faltering economy.
Given the many challenges facing the region and its increasing geopolitical importance,
some reasonable speculation on future directions seems in order. Kazakhstan has taken on a
pivotal role in the region.2 The country is now second only to Russia as a destination for
migrant workers from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and there is reason to expect
this trend to continue, at least in the near term. Although the Kazakh economy showed
virtually no growth during the global economic downturn of 2008 and 2009, this is a
temporary decline, and it is likely that with the return of increasing global demand for
energy annual economic growth in Kazakhstan will return to double-digit percentages. Both
Russia and Kazakhstan face a future of domestic labor shortages, and the Kazakh economy
may function to reduce poverty levels and social stresses in other Central Asian states by
siphoning off, or at least diminishing, the ranks of unemployed in those countries. This
complimentary dynamic in labor demand and supply in Central Asia may therefore serve to
minimize, at least to some degree, regional volatility. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has recently
emerged, again before the global recession, as a significant source of investment in its
poorer neighbors. If this trend were to continue, Kazakh revenue could become an
important secondary source of long-term investment in the region and offset the lack of
external capital flow, especially from Western investors, that has plagued Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and to a lesser degree Kyrgyzstan. Of course, this scenario presumes that
Kazakhstan itself will avoid any major political or economic upheavals, an assumption that is
by no means guaranteed. Kazakhstans assumption of the presidency of the OSCE for 2010,
while in practical terms having little impact on the regions development, nevertheless
carries a powerful symbolic message of the countrys leadership role in the region.
But long-term stability and economic development in the region depend on genuine and
dedicated cooperation among the five states. The most serious issues that must be resolved
including management of water resources, integrating energy and transportation systems,
and pursuing a coordinated regional economic development planare unlikely to be
seriously addressed by current leaders, with the exception of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who
has called for a region-wide economic union since the 1990s, and perhaps the new
leadership in Kyrgyzstan.3 Islam Karimov, Emomli Rakhmonov, and Gerbanguly
Berdymukhamedov, the leaders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan respectively, all
maintain control through political patronage systems, and the personal relationships among
this group suffer from suspicions and rivalries.4 Moreover, the relationship between Karimov
and Nazarbayev, Central Asias most powerful politicians, has long been marred by personal
jealousy, especially on the part of Karimov, who views himself as the regions most
influential political figure and Central Asias natural leader. So long as these personal
peccadilloes hamper cooperation between governments, there is little reason to expect that
workable solutions based on unified regional strategies will be forthcoming. The present
crop of rulers will continue to place their political ambitions and survival ahead of the longterm interests of their countries. Twenty years in the wake of Soviet collapse finds the
region still struggling to cope with both the legacy and the leadership inherited from the
communist era.

It is therefore vital that the United States and its allies remain engaged in the heart of Asia.
Strategic interests will compel such engagement. Central Asia borders on regions and
countries that present the most daunting challenges to American foreign policy since the
end of the Cold War. Stabilizing Afghanistan, limiting the reach of Islamic extremism in the
Muslim world, containing both the state-sponsored terrorism and nuclear ambitions of Iran,
securing a reliable and independent supply of energy to Europe, and limiting Russias
hegemonic aspirations are all at the forefront of U.S. policy goals. The successful attainment
of these objectives will hinge, to varying degrees, on the nature of American policy in the
five Central Asian states. Central Asia is no longer terra incognita to American policymakers,5 but greater familiarity must be translated into a practical and effective approach to
the region and its myriad challenges. The call for the democracies of the West to
perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism on the map of Eurasia,6 made now almost
15 years ago, still remains largely unheeded. The security and global status of the Central
Asian states in the future will depend a great deal on whether cooperation or conflict is the
hallmark of regional politics, and on the will of the West to remain engaged in a region that
only 20 years ago was considered marginal to its interests.

Notes
1. Even Turkmenistan, officially adopting a position of neutrality, allowed military
flights to transit its territory and cooperated with NATO operations in other
limited ways.
2. Gulnoza Saidazimova, Kazakhstan Likely Leader in Regional Cooperation,
Eurasia Insight, January 30, 2005. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp013005.sh
tml.
3. As of this writing (April 2010), the political situation in Kyrgyzstan remains in
flux. Rosa Otunbaeva, the leader of the opposition forces that ousted President
Bakiyev, appears to have achieved political control over most of the country,
although sporadic demonstrations against the new government continue to occur.
4. The relationship between Islam Karimov and Saparmurat Niyazov, before the
latters death (see Chapter 2), was notoriously frosty and volatile. Niyazov,
among other things, accused Karimov of attempting to assassinate him.
5. Karl E. Meyer, The Dust of Empire: The Race for Mastery of the Asian Heartland,
New York: The Centruy Foundation, 2004, 172.
6. Zbigniew Brzezinski, A Geostrategy for Eurasia, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No.5.

BIOGRAPHIES
Uzbekistan
Rustam Azimov
Rustam Azimov (born 1958) is an Uzbek politician. He was born in Tashkent and holds a
doctorate in economics, as well as a degree in engineering. He started work in the late
1970s as the chief economist of a collective farm near the city of Dzizhak in central

Uzbekistan. When Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, Azimov was named to the post
of chairman of the board of the newly formed National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of
the Republic of Uzbekistan. In 1994 he entered politics and was elected to the Oliy Majlis,
the Uzbek parliament. In 1998 President Islam Karimov appointed Azimov to the post of
minister of finance, a position he held for two years until his appointment as deputy prime
minister of macroeconomics and statistics for the Karimov administration. In 2002 Azimov
was awarded the portfolio of deputy prime minister of economy, a powerful ministry-level
position, a promotion that some observers interpreted as indicating that Azimov was being
groomed to ultimately replace Karimov himself. In early 2005 Azimov accepted yet another
career advancement, this time to the rank of minister of finance, while continuing to hold
the position of deputy prime minister. Azimov is believed to be one of the most influential
members of the Karimov regime, primarily because of his longevity as well as the key posts
in which he has served.

Islom Abduganiyevich Karimov

Islom Abduganiyevich Karimov (born January 30, 1938) is the president of Uzbekistan.
Islom Karimov was born in the city of Samarkand in central Uzbekistan. He was raised in an
orphanage, joined the Communist Party as a young man, and obtained a degree in
economics. Rising through the ranks, by 1989 Karimov had become the first party secretary
of the Uzbek Communist Party, the most powerful political position in Uzbekistan. Karimov
aggressively dealt with any political movements that might challenge his authority, and
when the USSR dissolved in 1991, he was the only figure in a position to assume power in
independent Uzbekistan. He was elected president in 1991, extended his term in 1995, and
was reelected in 2000in each of these contests, no serious challenge was allowed. In 2002
the Uzbek constitution was changed to extend his term in office to 2007. Although he was
barred by law from seeking another term, the body governing elections in Uzbekistan ruled
that he could run again in 2007, and he was elected yet again, in a race that was widely
criticized by international organizations as being unfair and undemocraticbut these were
not new charges to the Karimov regime. Karimovs relationship with the United States and
other Western nations has been rocky. In 2001 he agreed to allow NATO forces to use an
airbase in southern Uzbekistan to attack Taliban positions in Afghanistan, but after his
soldiers shot dozens of protestors in the city of Andijan in 2005, relations soured. His
current term as president will not expire until 2014, when he will be 77 years old.

Gulnara Islamovna Karimova

Gulnara Islamovna Karimova (born July 8, 1972 ) is the eldest of two daughters of President
Islom Karimov and currently serves as Uzbekistans representative to the United Nations
Office in Geneva, Switzerland. She was born in the city of Fergana in eastern Uzbekistan.
Karimova is a highly controversial figure in Uzbekistan and is believed to have accumulated
a personal fortune of several hundred million dollars through her control of various
businesses and political connections. She holds degrees from Tashkent State Economics
University, Harvard, and the University of Economics and Diplomacy located in Tashkent and
has served in several diplomatic posts for the Uzbek government. She has an outstanding
warrant for her arrest from the state of New Jersey, since she illegally fled the United States
with her children in 2001 after a bitter divorce from her husband, who was a U.S. citizen.
She is believed to have large investments in the Uzbek mining and telecommunications
sectors and also is believed to own several nightclubs and other businesses in Tashkent. Her
fiercest critics allege that her nightclubs are used as recruiting grounds for prostitutes who
are then sent to locations abroad, but these allegations cannot be verified. In 2006 she
released a music video that was aired on Uzbek television in an effort many believe was

designed to raise her standing and popularity with the Uzbek public. Some commentators
hold that she is the heir apparent to the Uzbek presidency once her father retires or dies.

Mohammad Solih
Mohammad Solih (born December 20, 1949) is one of Uzbekistans most outspoken
dissidents and has the distinction of mounting the only legitimate challenge to Islom
Karimov in a presidential election in Uzbekistan. Solih is a poet who rose to prominence in
1988 when he was elected secretary of the Uzbekistan Writers Union, a platform he used to
criticize Soviet policy in Central Asia. He was an early member of the opposition group Birlik
but withdrew from that organization in 1990 and formed an alternative party, Erk. In the
1991 elections for president, Solih was allowed to run against Karimov but was given
virtually no access to the mass media. Despite limited exposure, Solih still captured almost
13 percent of the vote. He later fled Uzbekistan and has lived in exile for most of the last
15 years. The Karimov government accused Solih of involvement in terrorist acts against
Uzbekistan in 1999, but no evidence has been produced to support such claims. He
currently lives in exile in Norway.

Sanjar Guiess Umarov

Sanjar Guiess Umarov (born April 7, 1956) is an Uzbek businessman and prominent
opponent of the Karimov regime. He was born in Tashkent and earned degrees in
engineering and physics (a doctorate), before taking a teaching position in Algeria during
the early 1980s. In 1988 he returned to Uzbekistan and started several businesses,
including a highly successful cell phone company. He developed partnerships with a number
of Western companies, but was not active in politics, although he had numerous contacts in
the government due to his business interests. After the Andijan massacre in 2005, Umarov
formed an opposition group with other dissidents called Sunshine Uzbekistan, and began
to criticize the policies and actions of the Karimov regime. He was arrested on charges of
corruption and illegal business dealings in 2005 and the following year was sentenced to
10 years in prison. Human rights organizations have called for his release, and reports
indicate that he is held in poor conditions.

Kazakhstan
Karim Kazhimkanovich Massimov
Karim Kazhimkanovich Massimov (born June 15, 1965) is the prime minister of Kazakhstan
and considered to be one of President Nursultan Nazarbayevs closest advisors. Massimov
was appointed minister of transport and communications in August of 2000, and before that
had held the post of chief of the Kazakhstan National Savings Bank. He served as deputy
prime minister in 2006, has close relations with many major political figures in China, and
as head of the National Bank negotiated a number of trade agreements with the Chinese.
Massimov became prime minister in January of 2007 after the abrupt resignation of Daniyel
Akhmetov. Massimov has strong credentials in the area of foreign policy and is fluent in at
least six languages. He has lived in China and studied economics there. His appointment as
prime minister was expected by some specialists to shift Kazakhstans foreign policy
favorably toward China, but there is scant evidence that this has indeed been the case in
the two years of Massimovs tenure. As deputy prime minister Massimov presided over
several key agreements with Russia involving the export of Kazakh oil and natural gas using
Russias pipeline infrastructure, but as prime minister he has courted ties to the United

States on a number of issues as well, and appears committed to maintaining Kazakhstans

multi-vector foreign policy.

Nursultan Abiishevich Nazarbayev

Nursultan Abiishevich Nazarbayev (born July 6, 1940) is the president of Kazakhstan. He
was born in the village of Chemolgan in southern Kazakhstan and in his late teens began
working in the steel works in the city of Timurtau, where he joined the Young Communist
League (Komsomol). During the 1970s and 1980s Nazarbayev rose rapidly through the
ranks of the Communist Party, reaching the position of chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Kazakh SSR by 1984. In 1989 Nazarbayev was promoted to the highest political office
in the Kazakh SSR, first party secretary of the Communist Party, and in April of 1990 he was
elected president of the Kazakh SSR by the Supreme Soviet. Although this election was not
by popular mandate, in December of 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Nazarbayev ran
for the presidency again unopposed and this time carried more than 90 percent of the vote.
His term as president was extended in 1995 by referendum, and in the election of 1999 he
captured 81 percent of the vote. He ran again in 2005 and took 91 percent of the vote, but
some international observers questioned the fairness and validity of the electoral process. In
2007 the Kazakh parliament approved a measure that allows Nazarbayev to circumvent the
Kazakh Constitutions clause on term limits and run indefinitely for the presidency, a move
that some have argued gives him dictatorial powers. According to the law, this constitutional
change applies only to Nazarbayev, and future presidents will be subject to the two-term
limit.

Dariga Nursultanova Nazarbayeva

Dariga Nursultanova Nazarbayeva (born May 7, 1963) is the eldest daughter of Nursultan
Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan. She is outspoken and from the mid-1990s has
taken an active part in the countrys politics. In 1995 her father appointed her to head the
state television company, Khabar, and later she helped to form a new political party, Asar,
that merged with the government Otan party in 2006. A number of analysts believe that she
is being groomed to succeed her father as Kazakhstans leader when he leaves office.
However, it is unclear that she is indeed her fathers political heir, as she has sometimes
been openly critical of his policies. Moreover, she had a high-profile divorce in 2007 from
Rakhat Aliyev, who had served in several high positions in the Nazarbayev administration,
including vice foreign minister and ambassador to Austria. Aliyev was accused of misprision,
corruption, kidnapping, and other charges after he criticized what he viewed as his fatherin-laws assumption of dictatorial powers. Aliyev claims that his divorce from Dariga was
carried out without his consent, and he remains in exile in Austria. In addition, Dariga and
her ex-husband were accused of involvement in the assassination of a popular opposition
politician, Altynbek Sarsenbaev. The entire bizarre episode is believed to have damaged
Darigas political currency and popularity among the Kazakhstani electorate, diminishing her
prospects for replacing her father. Yet some specialists of Kazakh politics hold that she is still
a significant force behind the scene and remains in favor with her father.

Olzhas Omaruli Suleimenov

Olzhas Omaruli Suleimenov (born May 18, 1936) is an environmental activist, political
figure, and Central Asias most famous living writer. He was born and raised in Alma-Ata
(Almaty) and attended Kazakh State University, where he studied geology. But Suleimenov
soon turned his interests to writing and was accepted at the prestigious Maxim Gorky

Institute of Literature in Moscow in 1960. He had joined the Komsomol as a student and was
awarded membership in the Communist Party in 1969. Suleimenov took a position as a
journalist with the daily Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (Kazakhstan Truth) after he returned to
Alma-Ata in the early 1960s. He began writing fiction and poetry and in 1975 published his
most famous and controversial book, Az i Ya, a work that was condemned as anti-Soviet by
officials in the Communist Party. Suleimenov was nearly expelled from the party, but the
work gained him enormous notoriety and respect among the literati of the USSR. He was
elected to head the Kazakhstan Writers Union in 1983. In 1989 he resigned his membership
in the Communist Party and formed the environmental organization Nevada-Semipalatinsk,
a group committed to stopping nuclear testing in both Nevada and Kazakhstan.
Suleimenovs criticism of Soviet ecological policy catapulted him to international prominence
and made him a national hero in Kazakhstan. After Kazakhstans independence he formed
an opposition party and represented the most serious political challenge to Nursultan
Nazarbayev, but he declined to run for president. He was eventually co-opted by the
Nazarbayev regime and sent abroad as Kazakhstans ambassador to Italy. He has served in
several other ambassadorships, including his current position as ambassador to the United
Nations.

Jarmakhan Aytbayuli Tuyakbay

Jarmakhan Aytbayuli Tuyakbay (born November 22, 1947) is an opposition politician who
currently leads the Social Democratic Party and the social movement known as For a Fair
Kazakhstan. Some observers consider him to be the most serious political challenger to the
current regime of Nursultan Nazarbayev. As a young man during the Soviet era, Tuyakbay
was active in the Komsomol and later was promoted to full membership in the Communist
Party. He studied law and after graduation embarked on a long and successful career as a
prosecutor. He served in this capacity in Shymkent Oblast in the early 1980s and later rose
to the position of general prosecutor for all of the Kazakh SSR. After Kazakhstans
independence, Tuyakbay held several high-ranking investigative posts in the new
government, and in 1999 he was elected to the Majlis, the Kazakhstan parliament, as a
member of the Otan party, the most powerful political organization in the country. But in
2004 he suddenly condemned corruption in the election process in Kazakhstan, resigned
from Otan, and helped to form an umbrella group of opposition parties, the Coordinating
Council of Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan. The following year he was instrumental in
forming the organization For a Fair Kazakhstan, and was also nominated to run against
Nursultan Nazarbayev in the 2005 election. He was not registered as a candidate until two
months before the election, but still won nearly 5 percent of the vote in spite of having only
limited access to the media.

Kyrgyzstan
Askar Akayevich Akayev
Askar Akayevich Akayev (born November 10, 1944) was the president of Kyrgyzstan from
1991 to 2005. He was born on a collective farm in the Kyrgyz SSR and after completing his
secondary education began working in a factory in Frunze (Bishkek), the capital of the
Kyrgyz SSR. His intellectual talents were soon noticed, however, and in 1962 he traveled to
Leningrad to study mathematics and physics at the Leningrad Institute of Precision
Engineering and Optics. After earning his degree he was hired as a researcher and lecturer
at the institute and did not return to Kyrgyzstan until 1977, when he took a senior position
at the Frunze Polytechnical Institute. In the 1980s he joined the Communist Party and

earned a doctoral degree in physics from Moscow Institute of Engineering and Physics.
Subsequently he was elected to the Academy of Sciences in the Kyrgyz SSR, and by 1989
he had embarked on a political career, as he was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR. In 1990 he was elected president of the Kyrgyz SSR, and with the disintegration of
the USSR the next year, he was elected resident of independent Kyrgyzstan. Initially, Akayev
was quite popular and was viewed as a serious reformer. He was re-elected in 1995 but
began to take a harder line with his political opponents in the late 1990s. In 2000 he was
again re-elected, but the election process was strongly criticized by independent observers,
and his administration was accused of widespread corruption and mismanagement. In the
spring of 2002 a wave of protests against Akayev swept through several cities in Kyrgyzstan
and in some instances were violently suppressed. Akayevs popularity declined rapidly and
many people believed he would attempt to stay in office beyond the end of his last term,
which expired in 2005. In March of 2005 protests erupted in Bishkek during the so-called
Tulip Revolution, driving Akayev from the country and forcing his resignation. He currently
works as a professor at Moscow State University.

Kurmanbek Saliyevich Bakiyev

Kurmanbek Saliyevich Bakiyev (born August 1, 1949) is the president of Kyrgyzstan. He was
born near the city of Jalalabad in the southern portion of the Kyrgyz SSR, and after finishing
his secondary education went to the city of Kuibyshev in Russia (then part of the USSR) to
study at a polytechnical institute. He earned a degree in electrical engineering and lived in
Russia for most of the decade of the 1970s. In 1979 he took a job in a factory in his home
region of Jalalabad Oblast, and by 1990 he had been promoted to general manager of the
firm. But the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Kyrgyzstans sudden independence
steered him toward a career in politics, and his managerial skills paved the way for him to
quickly become the deputy hakim (governor) for Jalalabad Oblast. By 1995 he was
promoted to hakim of Jalalabad Oblast and then moved to Chui Oblast, where he also
served as hakim. In December of 2000 Askar Akayev appointed him to the post of prime
minister, and Bakiyev stayed in that position until May of 2002. He stepped down due to the
so-called Aksy incident, in which a number of unarmed demonstrators were shot by Kyrgyz
security police. But in the aftermath of the Tulip Revolution in 2005, Bakiyevs political
fortunes took a turn for the better, and he was elected president in the summer of 2005. His
tenure as the countrys leader was marked by controversy and frequent anti-government
demonstrations, and in April 2010 he was driven from office and forced into exile by mass
demonstrations against his government.

Felix Sharshenbayevich Kulov

Felix Sharshenbayevich Kulov (born October 29, 1948) is a Kyrgyz politician. Kulov has been
quite active in Kyrgyz politics for almost three decades and has held numerous posts within
the government, both during the Soviet era and after Kyrgyzstans independence. He was
born in Frunze (Bishkek) and was trained as a police officer. He was promoted rapidly
through the ranks and by the late 1980s was serving as the minister of internal affairs of
the Kyrgyz SSR. Kulov supported Kyrgyzstans declaration of independence and served as
President Askar Akayevs vice president in 1992 and 1993. He resigned that position due to
a scandal involving the countrys gold reserves, but almost immediately re-entered politics
by becoming the hakim of Chui Oblast until 1997. He then was elected mayor of Bishkek
and formed an opposition party, Ar-Namys, in 1999. In 2000 Kulov ran on the presidential
ticket with Omurbek Tekebayev against Akayev but lost the election. He was arrested on
charges of corruption the following year and sentenced to seven years in prison. Many in
Kyrgyzstan felt the charges were politically motivated, and Kulovs trial and conviction

partially set the stage for the Tulip Revolution in 2005, although they were far from being
the sole cause of the collapse of the Akayev regime. After Akayev resigned, Kulov was
released and was appointed prime minister in September of 2005. He served in that post
until the end of 2006, when his re-nomination was rejected by the Kyrgyz parliament. From
2007 he was an outspoken opponent of the government of Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

Rosa Isakovna Otunbayeva

Rosa Isakovna Otunbayeva (born August 23, 1950) is a Kyrgyz politician and academic. She
was born in southern Kyrgyzstan in the city of Osh. After completing her secondary
education, she was accepted to Moscow State University, where she majored in philosophy.
In 1975 she began teaching at Kyrgyz State University in Frunze (Bishkek) and became a
member of the Communist Party of the Kyrgyz SSR. In 1981 she entered the leadership of
the local party in Frunze and was appointed to the post of second secretary of the raikom,
or district Communist Party organization. Later in the 1980s she began working in the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in 1991 was tapped to serve as the USSRs
representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). After Kyrgyzstans independence, she served in several diplomatic posts for the
new government, including ambassador to the United States and ambassador to the United
Kingdom. Otunbayeva returned to Kyrgyzstan in 2004 and with several partners formed the
opposition party Ata-Jurt. She became a vocal critic of the Akayev regime and played an
instrumental part in the Tulip Revolution that brought down the Akayev government. She
served briefly as acting foreign minister but then was barred from running for a seat in the
Kyrgyz parliament due to her long residence overseas. In 2006 she and other opposition
leaders supported the adoption of a new constitution, but this document was later annulled;
a new version of the Kyrgyz Constitution was finally approved by referendum in October of
2007. In April 2010 Otunbayeva, who was serving in the Kyrgyz parliament, became acting
president when Kurmanbek Bakiyev was removed from office.

Tajikistan
Said Abdullah Nuri
Said Abdullah Nuri (born March 15, 1947; died August 9, 2006) was an Islamic leader and
opposition politician. He was born in the Garm region of central Tajikistan, and his family,
along with many others, was forcibly relocated by the Soviet government to the Vakhsh
Valley in 1953. He grew up working on a Soviet state farm and completed his secondary
education in 1964. Nuri was secretly trained to read the Koran in Arabic by his father and
became a devout Muslim. He received an informal Islamic education from several
underground mullahs who were working outside the official Soviet Islamic establishment. In
1974 he formed a secret Islamic society called Nahzati Islami, which in 1986 was exposed
by informers to the Soviet KGB, and he and his supporters were arrested and convicted of
illegal religious activity. He spent almost two years in prison, but by the time of his release
the Soviet regime under Mikhail Gorbachev was allowing Soviet Muslims more religious
freedom. Nuri began editing an Islamic newspaper and in 1990 was a key figure in the
formation of the IRPT. During the Tajik civil war he fled to Afghanistan to avoid arrest, and
he was one of the key figures in the formation of the UTO. He was also the chairman of the
Commission for National Reconciliation in Tajikistan after the peace accords ending the civil
war were concluded. In 1999 he became the leader of the IRPT. He died of cancer at the age
of 59.

Emomali Rakhmon (Rakhmonov)

Emomali Rakhmon (Rakhmonov) (born on October 5, 1952) is the president of Tajikistan.
He has governed Tajikistan since 1992 and officially as president since 1994. He was born in
the city of Dangara, about 75 kilometers to the southeast of Dushanbe, and grew up on a
collective farm. He attended a trade school and became an electrician, and after working a
few years in a factory he served for three years in the Soviet navy. After his discharge, he
earned a diploma in economics and in the late 1980s became the director of a collective
farm in his home town. In 1990 Rakhmons rise to political power began when he was
elected to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR. In 1992, when political chaos swept
Tajikistan, he was elected chairman of the Tajik Supreme Soviet after the resignations of the
president, Rahmon Nabiyev, and the previous chairman, Akbarsho Iskandarov. This made
Rakhmon the de facto leader of Tajikistan, and he was then elected to the office of president
in 1994. He governed Tajikistan through the five years of civil war from 1992 to 1997 and
helped to bring the war to a close by signing a peace treaty with the UTO. He was re-elected
in 1999 and 2006 in elections that were controversial and strongly criticized by international
observers. In 1998 he joined the Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan and now is the
leader of the party. Rakhmon has survived several attempts on his life, and his
administration is frequently accused of corruption, ineffective policies, and human rights
violations.

Khoji Akbar Turajonzoda

Khoji Akbar Turajonzoda (born 1954) is an Islamic leader and politician. He was born near
the capital of Dushanbe and began studying Islam as a child. In his late teens he was
accepted as a student at the Mir-Arab medresseh in Bukhara in the Uzbek SSR, one of only
two functioning medressehs at the time in the entire Soviet Union. He then studied in
Tashkent for a period of time before traveling to several countries in the Middle East. When
he returned to the USSR in the mid-1980s he was given a job with the Muslim Spiritual
Board for Central Asia, based in Tashkent, and by 1988 he was appointed to the position of
qazi in the Tajik SSR, making him the supreme Soviet Islamic official for Tajik Muslims. But
many Muslim believers did not trust the official Islamic leadership because they served the
atheistic Soviet regime. When Tajikistan gained independence in 1991, Turajonzoda initially
criticized unofficial Islamic movements like the IRPT, but after the outbreak of the civil war
he fled to Afghanistan to join forces with the IRPT and other Islamic groups and played an
important part in the formation of MIRT. After the end of the civil war he took a position with
the government of Emomali Rakhmon and later broke with the IRPT, leaving the party in
1999 over a dispute involving the direction and focus of the organization.

Turkmenistan
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov (born June 29, 1957) is the president of Turkmenistan. He
was born in the south-central part of the country and was an excellent student from an
early age. His academic prowess earned him admission to the State Medical Institute in
1975, where he specialized in oral surgery and dentistry. After practicing for a few years, he
studied in Moscow in the 1980s, receiving a doctorate in medicine. Just after the collapse of
the USSR, he was hired as a teacher at the Medical Institute in Ashgabat. In the early years
of Turkmenistans independence, Berdymukhamedov moved up rapidly through the ranks of
the government. By 1997 he was appointed minister of health of Turkmenistan, and in 2001

became the deputy prime minister. It has been suggested that he served as Saparmurat
Niyazovs (Turkmenbashi) personal dentist and this may have aided in his political
advancement. It has been rumored as well that Berdymukhamedov is Niyazovs illegitimate
son, due to a close physical resemblance between the men. After Niyazovs sudden death in
2006, Berdymukhamedov served as acting president, although a provision of the Turkmen
Constitution disallowed anyone in that capacity from subsequently running for the office.
This obstacle to his climb to power was circumvented by a special meeting of the Turkmen
legislature, which voted to eliminate this part of the constitution. Berdymukhamedov was
elected president in February of 2007 and began to gradually dismantle the cult of
Turkmenbashi. He retains tight control of the media, however, and to date has not allowed
the formation of opposition political parties.

Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov (Turkmenbashi)

Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) (born February 19, 1940; died
December 21, 2006) was the president of Turkmenistan from 1991 to 2006. Before
Turkmenistan gained independence, Niyazov was the first party secretary of the Turkmen
Communist Party, a post he was elected to in 1985. He was born in Ashgabat, the capital
city, and was orphaned in a destructive earthquake that struck Ashgabat in 1948. He joined
the Communist Party in 1962 and in the 1970s he rose steadily through the party hierarchy,
reaching the pinnacle of party power in the Turkmen SSR with his election as first secretary.
When Turkmenistan became independent in December of 1991, Niyazov was elected
president the following June, allegedly garnering more than 99 percent of the vote. He
quickly set about constructing one of the most authoritarian, controlled societies in the
world and built a bizarre personality cult that permeated all aspects of life in Turkmenistan.
He adopted the title Turkmenbashi (Father of the Turkmen) and decreed that his account of
the history of the Turkmen people, Rukhnama, be required reading for all students in the
country. His portrait and statues adorned thousands of locations in the capital city of
Ashgabat alone, and many of the statues were made of gold. All opposition parties were
banned, and critics of the regime were imprisoned or harassed, while the media were
censored by the government. Niyazov himself allegedly became immensely wealthy from
Turkmenistans gas revenues, amassing billions of dollars in banks outside the country.
Despite the tightly controlled police state he created, an attempt was reportedly made on
Niyazovs life in 2002, although some commentators argue that the effort was staged. The
Turkmen media reported that he died from heart failure, but rumors persist that he was
poisoned by members of his own government.

Boris Orazovich Shikhmuradov

Boris Orazovich Shikhmuradov (born 1949) is a former member of the Turkmenistan
government and now the countrys most famous political prisoner. Currently it is unclear
whether Shikhmuradov remains alive, as nobody has been allowed to visit or interview him
since he was sentenced to life in prison. He was born in Ashgabat and after high school went
to study journalism at Moscow State University. Afterwards he received diplomatic training
and was hired as a foreign correspondent for the Soviet news agency TASS in the early
1970s. Over the next two decades he traveled widely and held diplomatic posts in Pakistan
and India. After Turkmenistans independence in 1991, he returned to the country and
accepted a position as deputy minister of foreign affairs. In 1995 he was promoted to
minister of foreign affairs, a post he served in until 2000. That year he was dismissed as
foreign minister and later became Turkmenistans ambassador to China. In late 2001,
Shikhmuradov suddenly announced that he was leaving the regime and joining the Turkmen
opposition and went into exile in Moscow. A year later he was arrested in Ashgabat after a

failed assassination attempt against President Niyazov and charged with treason. The
Turkmen police claimed that he had been secretly smuggled into the country with the
assistance of Uzbekistan. He was given a life sentence, although the law at the time in
Turkmenistan limited any sentence to no more than 25 years. His wife and nephew, also
imprisoned, were released in 2007.

CHRONOLOGY
Regional History
First millennium City-states of the Sogdian and Khorazmian empires emerge in
B.C.
what is today Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Sophisticated
irrigation works are developed, along with regional trade systems.
329 B.C.
Alexander the Great invades Central Asia and conquers the
Sogdians. Alexander makes Samarkand his temporary capital,
establishes a number of cities, and according to legend leaves
behind a sizable contingent of troops in the Fergana Valley who
intermarry with local women.
Circa 150 B.C.
Caravans carrying goods between the Chinese and Roman empires
begin to regularly transit the oasis settlements of Central Asia.
One of the most valuable commodities is silk, which the Romans
prize highly. Much later in history the route will be labeled the
Great Silk Road.
552 A.D.
Turks migrating into Central Asia from the east establish the Turk
Khanate, which stretches from the foothills of the Tien Shan
mountains to the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea in what is now
Kazakhstan.
710 A.D.
Muslim general Qutaiba captures Bukhara and Samarkand and
forces mass conversion of the local population. In spite of periodic
insurrections, over the next century Islam displaces the
established religions of Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Buddhism,
and Christianity in the urban areas of Central Asia.
1219 A.D.
Mongol forces under the leadership of Genghis Khan enter eastern
Central Asia and within one year conquer most of the oasis centers
in Transoxiana. Much of the population and trade infrastructure is
destroyed by the invaders, but the region later recovers.
13701405 A.D. Amir Timur (Tamerlane) establishes an empire stretching from
India to Russia, with his capital at Samarkand. The Timurid
dynasty that followed profoundly influenced the economic
development and culture of the heart of Asia and fostered Central
Asias connections with surrounding regions.
1600s
Jungars (Kalmyks) invade the steppe regions of Central Asia. The
result is almost half a century of constant warfare over grazing
lands with Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribes, which results in large losses

1865

18801915

1898
Early 1900s

1916

1917
19181924

Kazakhstan
19281932

1936
19411945

19491989

in population among the Kazakh Greater and Middle Juz.

Tashkent falls to Russian imperial forces. Russias acquisition of
this vital city leads to the subjugation of the three city-states in
Central Asia: Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva. The former is absorbed
into the Russian Empire by 1876, while the latter two become
protectorates of the Tsar.
Large-scale migration of Slavic settlers into steppe region of
Kazakhstan occurs. Russians and other Slavs eventually
outnumber Kazakhs in many northern areas.
Andijan uprising erupts in the Fergana Valley.
Jadidist reform movement emerges in Central Asia. The movement
patterns itself after the Young Turk organization in Turkey and
strives for first educational, and then general social and political,
reform. The various groups name themselves after the city-states
in which they originate, becoming the Young Bukharans and Young
Khivans. They play a central role in undermining the stability of
the despotic regimes prior to the Bolshevik Revolution.
Widespread revolts against the Russian government break out
across Central Asia. The resistance is triggered by the
implementation of a military draft by the Russian administration.
Attacks against Russian garrisons are especially numerous across
the Kazakh steppe lands, where tensions between Kazakhs and
Slavic settlers have been building for several decades.
The Bolshevik Revolution topples the Tsars government.
Basmachi (Bandits) rebels organize against the Bolshevik
authorities in several locations across the Central Asian region.
Armed resistance is especially strong in the Fergana Valley. The
revolt is not completely suppressed until the 1930s in some areas
of the region.
Agricultural collectivization is imposed upon the Kazakhs, many of
whom follow a nomadic lifestyle. Rather than surrender their
livestock to governmental control, the Kazakh herders slaughter
millions of animals and leave them to rot in the pastures. Famine
subsequently kills approximately one million Kazakhs.
The Kazakh SSR is created.
Germany attacks the USSR, bringing the country into the World
War II. Stalin deports large numbers of ethnic minorities from the
Caucasus region to Central Asia. Large numbers of entire factories
are relocated to parts of Kazakhstan from western Russia and
Ukraine, resulting in a rise in the industrial capacity and output of
the Kazakh SSR.
Soviet military conducts extensive nuclear tests near the city of
Semipalatinsk. Before 1962 most tests were conducted above
ground. By the late 1980s reports of exceptional rates of cancer of
the thyroid and other organs among the local population result in

1954

1985

1986

1988

1989
1991

1992

1998

2007

2010
Kyrgyzstan
1925

1930

the formation of independent environmental groups seeking to

close the region to further testing.
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev initiates the Virgin and Idle Lands
program. Hundreds of thousands of young Slavic volunteers
migrate to the steppe lands of Kazakhstan to work the enormous
state farms being established there.
Mikhail Gorbachev becomes general secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev articulates two new policies
in his first year of office: glasnost, or openness, and perestroika,
or restructuring.
Alma-Ata riots erupt over the appointment of Anatoly Kolbin to the
post of first party secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party.
Mikhail Gorbachevs announcement of the ouster of Kunaev, the
previous party leader, and his replacement by Kolbin result in large
student demonstrations.
Kazakh writer Oljas Suleimenov founds the Nevada-Semipalatinsk
Anti-Nuclear Movement with American colleagues. The group is
committed to stopping the testing of nuclear weapons within the
so-called Polygon, the region near the city of Semipalatinsk. Within
a year the testing site is closed.
Nursultan Nazarbayev is elected first secretary of the Kazakh
Communist Party.
Kazakhstan becomes an independent state. President Nazarbayev
pushes immediately for the formation of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, and the organization is formalized in Almaty.
The Kazakh government signs a multi-year agreement with the
American oil company Chevron to develop the large Tengiz oil field
located in western Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstans national capital is moved from Almaty to Astana.
Costs of the move are estimated by some critics to reach more
than a billion dollars. Various reasons are provided for the move,
but many observers believe the shift is designed to secure the
countrys hold on its Slav-dominated northern regions.
Kazakhstans parliament approves a constitutional amendment
allowing President Nazarbayev an unlimited number of terms, in
contravention of the constitutions clause limiting anyone holding
the presidency to two terms. The amendment applies only to
Nazarbayev.
Kazakhstan assumes the presidency of OSCE.
Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast is established. This represents the first
time a specific territory is associated with a specificly Kyrgyz
nationality.
Soviet administration collectivizes agricultural holdings. Many
traditionally nomadic Kyrgyz are forced onto governmentcontrolled collective farms.

1936
1937

1989

1990

1991

1993

1998
1999

2001

2002
2005

2006

2007

2009

The Kyrgyz SSR is founded.

Stalin initiates a massive purge of the Kyrgyz Communist Party. In
one evening, nearly the entire leadership of the Kyrgyz Communist
Party is executed in secret near Chong Tash, including the father of
the late Chinghiz Aitmatov, one of Central Asias most famous
authors and public figures.
Controversial language law passes Kyrgyz parliament, making
Kyrgyz the official language of the republic. The law is vigorously
opposed by representatives of the Russian minority.
In June riots erupt in and around the southern city of Osh. Most of
the violence takes place between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks over
control of farmland. After more than a week of violence, several
hundred people are reported killed, along with widespread
property damage. In October Askar Akaev is elected president.
Kyrgyzstan declares independence in August in the wake of the
attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. In December the
country joins the CIS.
Kyrgyzstan withdraws from the so-called ruble zone and introduces
a national currency, the som. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan impose
quotas on Kyrgyz goods and other economic penalties, but
introduce their own national currencies within a year.
Kyrgyzstan joins the WTO.
Militants of the IMU enter Batken province in southern Uzbekistan
and take several hostages. Kyrgyz soldiers expel the rebels with
assistance from Russian special forces troops after several months
of fighting.
Kyrgyzstan agrees to lease a military base at Manas to NATO
forces during the campaign to oust the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Informally called Ganci after a New York firefighter,
the installation plays a central role in the battle against Taliban
forces in Afghanistan.
Kyrgyz government agrees to lease a base located at Kant to the
Russian military.
After controversial elections for parliament early in the year, the
so-called Tulip Revolution results in the ouster of President Akayev,
who flees to Russia. In July, Kurmanbek Bakiyev is elected
president and appoints Felix Kulov, previously a prominent
member of the opposition to Askar Akayev, to the post of prime
minister.
Large protests take place in Bishkek against the Bakiyev regime,
especially over alleged corruption and abuse of power by
government officials.
Kyrgyz voters approve a controversial new constitution for the
country. The Bakiyev government is again beset with large-scale
protests and demands for the presidents resignation.
After several months of negotiations, the Kyrgyz government

2010

2010

Tajikistan
1924

1929
19301932

1937

1940

1990

1991

1992

agrees to extend the lease on the NATO base at Manas, albeit for a
much higher fee. Kurmanbek Bakiyev is re-elected as president in
an election the opposition charges is rigged and unfair. Relations
with Uzbekistan deteriorate over payment for natural gas,
Kyrgyzstans plans to construct a new dam on the Naryn River, and
a proposed new Russian base in Kyrgyzstan.
President Bakiyev is forced from power by violent demonstrations.
Rosa Otunbaeva, a prominent leader of the opposition and former
ambassador to the United States, assumes leadership of the
country.
In April Kurmanbek Bakiyev is forced from power by antigovernment demonstrations across the country. This is followed in
June by ethnic rioting in Osh that results in hundreds of deaths,
and thousands of Uzbek refugees cross the border into Uzbekistan.
Later in the month a new constitution is approved by popular
mandate.
The Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) is
established under the jurisdiction of the Uzbek SSR. The mostly
Tajik cities of Samarkand and Bukhara are not included in the new
ASSR and remain part of the Uzbek SSR.
The Tajik ASSR is elevated to full republic status, becoming the
Tajik SSR, with its capital at Dushanbe.
Agricultural production is collectivized in Tajikistan. Wealthier
producers are declared to be kulaks who exploit the peasants
and have their property and livestock confiscated. Others flee
across the border into China or Afghanistan.
Stalin purges Communist Party of the Soviet Union; many
members of the party in Tajikistan are arrested and either
liquidated or sent to labor camps.
Soviet regime officially switches the Tajik language from Latin to
Cyrillic script. Earlier the written language had been shifted to
Latin from Arabic script.
Founding meeting of the IRPT is held. The party is quickly declared
illegal by Soviet authorities, but shortly over a year later the party
convenes a congress of several hundred delegates.
The Tajik SSR declares its independence in September. In
November Rahmon Nabiev is elected as Tajikistans first president.
At the end of the year the central authority of the USSR collapses;
Tajikistan joins the CIS.
Massive demonstrations in Dushanbe and other parts of the
country against the Nabiev government result in military clashes.
Nabiev is forced from office and Emomali Rakhmonov becomes
head of state. Rakhmonovs government and opposition forces
engage in fierce fighting in several parts of the country, and tens
of thousands of Tajiks flee the violence by crossing into
Afghanistan. Russian troops are sent to aid the government.

19931996

1997

1999

2003

2010

Civil war destroys much of the countrys infrastructure. Numerous

leaders and public figures are killed or flee the country, and most
educational institutions are closed. The economy comes to a
standstill, and widespread shortages of food and energy are
common. Several opposition groups form the UTO in an attempt to
present a unified front against the Rakhmonov regime.
Rakhmonov and the UTO meet in Moscow and sign the General
Agreement of the Establishment of Peace and National Accord,
officially ending the civil war.
In August militants of the IMU cross Tajik territory into Kyrgyzstan
in an attempt to destabilize the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments.
President Rakhmonov is elected to a second term as president in
November. An agreement on theestablishment of a Russian
military base in Tajikistan is approved by the parliament at the end
of the year.
President Rakhmonov wins a controversial referendum that allows
him to circumvent the term limits articulated in the Tajik
Constitution and run for two more consecutive seven-year terms
after his second term expires in 2006. Opposition leaders declare
this is tantamount to becoming president for life.
The Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan wins a large majority in
general election for parliament, but the vote is widely criticized by
independent observers.

Turkmenistan
1881
Russian forces defeat Turkmen troops at Geok Tepe, effectively
incorporating the Turkmen tribes into the Russian Empire.
1924
The Turkmen SSR is created, with its capital at Ashgabat.
19301932
Nomadic Turkmen are forced onto collective farms with widespread
resistance and loss of life.
1948
Earthquake strikes the capital of Ashgabat, killing approximately
30,000 people. Among the dead are the parents of Saparmurat
Niyazov, who will later rise to be the first president of
Turkmenistan.
1954
Construction begins on the Karakum canal. The additional water
brought to Turkmenistan by the canal opens up thousands of acres
of new farmland but also is a major contributor to the demise of
the Aral Sea.
1985
Saparmurat Niyazov is elected first party secretary of the Turkmen
Communist Party with the support of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet
leader.
1990
The Turkmen SSR declares itself sovereign, and Niyazov is elected
to the post of president of Turkmenistan.
1991
The Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan votes to establish an
independent state, the Republic of Turkmenistan, two months
before the Soviet Union is officially disbanded.
1993
President Niyazov begins to use the title Turkmenbashi, meaning

1994

1995

1999
2001

2002

2006

2008

Uzbekistan
1924
1940
1983

19801986

1988

Father of the Turkmen. His behavior becomes increasingly

eccentric, and clear signs of his cult of personality begin to emerge
in the country.
Niyazov cracks down on opposition groups and independent media,
concentrating virtually all political power in the person of the
president. A national referendum extends President Niyazovs term
to 2002. Many critics and opposition figures are arrested later in
the year.
The United Nations grants Turkmenistan an official status of
neutrality. The country remains officially a member of the CIS, but
limits interaction with the organization.
President Niyazov is made president for life by the Peoples
Council, a body made up entirely of Niyazov supporters.
Rukhnama, President Niyazovs description of Turkmen history and
the place of Turkmenistan in the world, is published. The book is
quickly made required reading in the countrys public schools.
President Niyazov survives an assassination attempt. He accuses
the Uzbek government of being behind the effort to eliminate him,
and relations between the two states become strained.
President Niyazov suddenly dies of an apparent heart attack. He is
replaced by Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, who wins the
presidential election the following year after Turkmenistans
parliament changes the countrys constitution, allowing him to run
for the office.
An independent audit of Turkmenistans Yolotan gas field indicates
that the region holds at least four trillion cubic meters of gas and
potentially much more. If accurate, this deposit, along with others
in the country, make Turkmenistans reserves of gas some of the
largest in the world.
The Uzbek SSR is created. The capital of the republic is initially
located at Samarkand, but is moved to Tashkent in 1930.
Cyrillic script is employed for Uzbek language, replacing the Latin
alphabet.
Sharaf Rashidov, first party secretary of the Communist Party of
the Uzbek SSR since 1959, dies. Rashidovs death occurs at the
height of the so-called cotton scandal and results in widespread
changes in the Uzbek Communist Party. Rumors persist that
Rashidov was in fact murdered by the KGB.
Cotton scandal rocks the party elite in the Uzbek SSR.
Investigators sent from Moscow uncover massive corruption
among officials responsible for reporting the republics cotton
production. Over the course of the inquiry, numerous Communist
Party officials are forced to resign or are charged with crimes.
Formation of Birlik (Unity), the first major opposition group to
challenge the dominance of the Communist Party. Birliks platform

1989

1990
1991

1998
1999

19992000

2001

2010

2005

2009

MAPS

calls for addressing the Uzbek SSRs environmental problems and

for elevating the Uzbek language to official status.
Ethnic riots break out in the Fergana Valley between Uzbeks and
Meskhetian Turks, a minority group deported to the region by
Stalin. Several hundred people are murdered by mobs and
hundreds of buildings are set afire.
The Uzbek SSR. declares itself a sovereign territory. Uzbek is made
a state language with the same status as Russian.
In the aftermath of the failed coup against the administration of
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Supreme Soviet declares the countrys
independence. Later in the year, Islom Karimov is elected as the
president of the new country, although only one opposition
candidate is allowed to run against him in a tightly controlled
election.
The Uzbek regime passes a highly restrictive law on religion, and
begins a crackdown on alleged Islamic extremists.
In February, a series of armed attacks and bombing occur across
Tashkent, resulting in the deaths of more than a dozen people.
President Karimov declares the episode to be an assassination
attempt and claims Islamic extremists are behind the violence.
Militants from the IMU enter into southern Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan. In several instances the raiders take hostages and
reportedly receive substantial ransoms in return.
American and other NATO forces are allowed to use Khanabad
airbase, located in southern Uzbekistan, to launch strikes against
the Taliban.
Juma Namangani, the military mastermind behind the IMU, is
killed during an American air strike in Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan joins the SCO.
Uzbek troops fire on protestors in the city of Andijan, killing
hundreds. The Karimov regime blames the violence on Islamic
extremists but refuses to allow an independent inquiry into the
massacre. Later in the year, Uzbekistan withdraws from GUUAM, a
regional security organization supported by the United States.
Tensions escalate between Uzbekistan and its neighbors over gas
and electricity deliveries. Uzbekistan withdraws from the Central
Asian Unified Electrical Grid.

Central Asia, Map

No. 3763, Rev 6, June 2005
(Courtesy of the UN Cartographic Section)

Kazakhstan, Map
No. 3771, Rev 6, January 2004
(Courtesy of the UN Cartographic Section)

Uzbekistan, Map
No. 3777, Rev 6, January 2004
(Courtesy of the UN Cartographic Section)

Kyrgyzstan, Map No
3770, Rev 6, January 2004
(Courtesy of the UN Cartographic Section)

Tajikistan, Map
No. 3765, Rev 11, October 2009
(Courtesy of the UN Cartographic Section)

Turkmenistan, Map
No. 3772, Rev 6, January 2004

GLOSSARY
Akromiya
An alleged terrorist organization, centered in Andijon, Uzbekistan. The nature of the
group and indeed whether it actually even exists is disputed, although the Uzbek
regime claims militants from Akromiya were responsible for the Andijon massacre in
2005.

Aksakal
Literally, white beard. This term is used in Central Asia to refer to an elderly man
who is respected for his experience and wisdom and who is typically sought out by
younger people for advice.

Alpamish
Turkic dastan, probably dating from at least the sixteenth century. Some Uzbek
scholars claim the tale as their national epic, although it is widely known among
other Central Asian groups as well.

Basmachi
Insurgents who battled Bolshevik forces in Central Asia during and after the
establishment of Soviet power in the region. The rebels were composed of
disenfranchised land owners, Islamic believers, and others who were opposed to
communism.

Cossack
An ethnic group frequently used as mercenaries and irregular cavalry by the Russian
empire. Many forts built by the empire in the Kazakh steppe were garrisoned by
Cossacks, who represent a small but vocal minority in Kazakhstan today.

Dastan
A genre of epic tales, usually describing the exploits of a hero who defends himself,
his love, and his honor. Various dastans are associated with specific ethnic groups.
For centuries such stories were transmitted orally from one generation to the next by
bards known as dastanchi. Alpamish and Manas are two well-known examples.

East Turkestan Islamic Movement

A terrorist organization composed mostly of Uighur militants that seeks to drive the
Chinese government out of Xinjiang and establish an independent, Islamic state
there.

Eurasianism

A political philosophy that holds that Russia has a unique destiny and must pursue an
independent path from the West. A key component of this view is that Russia must
be the dominant foreign influence in the so-called near abroad, including Central
Asia.

Gradualism
Economic policy pursued by government of Uzbekistan emphasizing a gradual
transition to a free market system, land ownership reform, and integration with the
global economy.

Hakim
A governor of an oblast or province in Central Asia.

Hanafi School
One of the four major schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam and the tradition
followed by most Central Asian Muslims.

Hizb-an-Nusra
An alleged terrorist splinter group from Hizb-ut-Tahrir that operates in Uzbekistan.
Little is known about the organization, its membership, and whether it continues to
function.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir
A transnational Islamic group dedicated to the reconstruction of the Caliphate.
Membership in Hizb-ut-Tahrir is outlawed in all the Central Asian states, but it
apparently has several thousand followers, mostly in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Islamic Jihad Union (Jamaat al-Jihad al-Islami)

A terrorist splinter group from the IMU, Islamic Jihad Union claimed responsibility for
a series of violent acts in Uzbekistan in 2004. The groups leader, Najmiddin Jalolov,
was killed in Pakistan by a drone missile strike in 2009.

Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT)

An Islamist political party created in 1990. The IRPT formed the core of the
opposition during the Tajik civil war of 1992 to 1997.

Jadids
A group of Central Asian intellectuals who pursued reform of the educational system,
and later society in general, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Kalym

The traditional bride-price expected of a groom or his family.

Kazakhification
The policy of promoting Kazakh culture as the core of national identity in Kazakhstan.
This includes utilizing traditional Kazakh symbols as icons of the state, requiring
knowledge of the Kazakh language, and other strategies.

Kishlak
A village or small settlement.

Kolkhoz
A collective farm. The kolkhoz was created under the Soviet regime, but due to the
absence of privatization continues as the basic agricultural land unit in some of the
Central Asian countries.

Mahalla
Neighborhood. The mahalla is the basic unit of collective social organization,
support, and control in many urban areas in Central Asia.

Manas
The national epic of the Kyrgyz people. The poem describes the adventures and
exploits of Manas, who allegedly battled Buddhist invaders during the seventeenth
century. The international airport at Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan is named after the epic.

Medresseh
An Islamic school where young scholars study the Koran and other Islamic teachings.

Meros
Heritage or legacy in the Turkic languages of Central Asia. A concept frequently
invoked by Central Asian leaders in the construction of national identity.

Mullah
An Islamic scholar and teacher, often associated with a specific mosque or
medresseh.

Multi-vector policy
A strategy in foreign policy that emphasizes cooperation with multiple partners and is
devoid of ideological bias while maintaining positive relations with all potential
partners. The foreign policy of Kazakhstan is most closely associated with this

strategy, but other Central Asian states have also indicated to some degree a multivector approach since achieving independence.

Oltyn
In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, a female who informally educates young women about
Islamic beliefs, practices, and standards.

Oralmandar
Ethnic Kazakhs who have returned to Kazakhstan since 1991. Many are from
Mongolia and western China and have had difficulty integrating into society due to
language and cultural barriers.

Paranja
The veil that most Uzbek and Tajik women wore in public prior to the Bolshevik
Revolution. Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen women typically did not wear the paranja.

Salafism
A globalized, reformist movement within Sunni Islam that emphasizes the idealized
behavior and standards of the first three generations of Muslims. Wahhabism is
generally considered to be a variation of Salafism.

Tablighi Jamaat
An Islamic reformist movement that emerged in India in the 1920s. Tablighi Jamaat
evolved from the broader revivalist, anti-imperialist philosophy of Deobandism, which
had originated in north India in the late nineteenth century.

Tariqa
Literally, the way in Arabic. A Sufi order or brotherhood.

Tengrism
A pantheistic, traditional faith of the Kazakh nomads, which was gradually supplanted
by Islam in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Tengri was the supreme sky
god.

Tulip Revolution
A political upheaval that resulted in the ouster of Kyrgyz President Askar Aliyev in
2005. Aliyev is the only Central Asian leader to be driven from power by popular
demonstrations since the collapse of the USSR.

Wahhabism

A fundamentalist, conservative Islamic movement that originated on the Arabian

Peninsula in the 1700s. Wahhabis reject Sufism as a deviation from the original
message of the Prophet and adhere to a strict interpretation of the Koran.

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REUEL R. HANKS is professor of geography at Oklahoma State University and serves as

the editor of the Journal of Central Asian Studies. Dr. Hanks was a Fulbright Scholar in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 1995 and has published more than a dozen articles and book
chapters on Central Asia on Islam, nationalism and national identity, foreign policy, and
political geography. He is the author of Uzbekistan, an annotated bibliography in the World
Bibliographical Series, and Central Asia: A Global Studies Handbook, both published by ABC-

CLIO, LLC. He has given over 20 public lectures in Central Asia and has taught at Tashkent
State Economics University, Samarkand State Institute for Foreign Languages, KIMEP
(Almaty, Kazakhstan), and Eurasian National University (Astana, Kazakhstan). He resides in
Stillwater, Oklahoma with his wife Oydin Uzakova and daughter Kamila.