Professional Documents
Culture Documents
3HWHU*URVV9ODGLPLU7LVPDQHDQX
Peter Gross holds the Gaylord Family Endowed Chair and is professor
of international communication at the University of Oklahoma. His
books include Entangled Evolutions: Media and Democratization in
Eastern Europe (2002). Vladimir Tismaneanu is professor of government and politics and director of the Center for the Study of
Post-Communist Societies at the University of MarylandCollege Park.
His books include Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (2003).
147
Journal of Democracy
148
TABLE 1RESULTS
2000
OF
PARTY OR COALITION
1
IN
AND
SENATE
2000
2004
2000
2004
36.6
15.9
19.5
6.8
23.0
36.6
31.3
12.9
6.2
13.0
37.1
15.1
21.0
6.9
19.9
37.1
31.8
13.6
6.2
11.2
149
Society, the Pro Democracy Association, and other civic groups and
initiatives. A few weeks before the election, the Coalition released the
names of more than 200 candidates whom it considered unsuitable as
parliamentary representatives. Over a quarter of these blacklisted candidates were removed from the party lists, in what many called an
unprecedented success for civil society.
Journal of Democracy
150
IN
1ST ROUND
2ND R OUND
36.4
28.3
11.8
3.0
66.9
33.2
1ST ROUND
2ND R OUND
33.9
40.9
12.6
51.2
48.8
nificant changes are to be expected in the near future. During the campaign, Basescu showed himself to be incisive and outspoken, and was
unafraid to tackle even the most controversial issues (for instance, he
called for the legalization of prostitution and defended the rights of
the gay community). Under his leadership, Romania is likely to see a
major offensive against corruption and a revamping of the judiciary
and other government institutionschanges that will bring the country closer to meeting the conditions for its scheduled entry into the EU
in 2007.
Many Romanians now hope that the truth about the postcommunist
leadership and its policies and actions will be revealed, and that analyses of the countrys communist past will no longer be suppressed. They
expect that there will finally be a dignified and responsible effort to
examine the nations true communist and postcommunist histories, including the still unresolved questions regarding the December 1989
revolution and its main protagonists. Some call the events of that fateful month not a revolution, but rather a revolt, a coup dtat, or a
popular riot, partly because there are still no clear, verifiable answers
to the questions surrounding the developments after the Timioara uprising, the secret military tribunal, and Ceauescus execution. Who
was shooting at the crowds? Who and what drove the evolution of
events? Was this a series of premeditated events and if so, who was
responsible?
151
peared that the crucial swing votes would be in the hands of the PRM,
which won 48 lower-house seats, and the Hungarian Democratic Union
of Romania (UDMR), which won 22 seats. In the postelection reshuffle,
however, the PUR unexpectedly abandoned the PSD and agreed to support the formation of a DA-led government.
Hence the new governing coalition, which was approved in a joint
session of Parliament on 28 December 2004, is a patchwork of the DA,
the PUR, and the UDMR. In all likelihood, this will be a short-lived
collaboration. In fact, signs of instability appeared shortly into the new
year when the parties failed to reach an agreement on the appointment
of county-level government representatives (prefecti).6
Moreover, Basescu is displeased with this coalition, which in his
opinion was an immoral alternative to forming a minority government. He has stated that he wants new elections to be held soon, so that
the DA can rid itself of the PUR.7 Indeed, reform-minded Romanians
perceive the inclusion of the PUR in the new government as a dangerous compromise, primarily because, in their view, party leader Dan
Voiculescu represents everything that has gone wrong with business
and politics in the postcommunist era.8
Basescu has also called for the creation of a single party out of the
DAs two components, the PNL and PD. As of this writing in early March,
the two parties have started discussions about a possible merger. But in
merging with the liberal PNL the PD may face an identity crisis. For
even though the PD itself has a decidedly liberal tilt that some even
consider right-of-center, it has remained a member of the Socialist Internationalas has its ideological rival, the PSD.
President B a sescu and his new prime minister, C a lin PopescuTariceanu, have assembled a young governing teamthe average age
of the ministers is 44that appears to possess the liberal instincts that
its predecessors so decidedly lacked. With the exception of PopescuT a riceanu and delegate minister Laszlo Borbely of the UDMR, no
member of the new cabinet has served in a previous government, and
most have been educated in the West or at Western-style institutions.
As a result, for the first time in its postcommunist history, Romania has
a pro-Western, democratic government that is freer than its predecessors from the legacy of communism.9
Despite the undemocratic nature of PSD rule, Romania has in the past
decade-and-a-half experienced four sets of freealbeit not so fairparliamentary and presidential elections. It was also a PSD administrations
foreign policy that resulted in Romanias accession to NATO in 2004
and the promise of EU membership by 2007. In the last four years of PSD
rule, inflation was cut from 44 to 14 percent and the countrys Gross
Domestic Product grew by an annual average of 5 percent. Moreover,
pushed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU, the PSD
government reluctantly privatized such state-owned firms as the oil com-
152
Journal of Democracy
153
Policy Expectations
Whereas the Constantinescu and Iliescu administrations only reluctantly acceded to the EUs requests for change in the areas of media
freedom, rule of law, judicial independence, and minority rights, the
new government is expected to pursue such reforms more willingly.
This will be necessary if Romania is to succeed in joining the European
Union. Under the leadership of President Basescu and Prime Minister
Popescu-Tariceanu, the new government will focus in the next few years
on fulfilling its commitments to the EU, NATO, and the IMF.
To that end, its priorities will be: 1) full transparency in government
and in the legislative process; 2) guaranteeing and respecting the independence of the media, in particular that of state radio and television;
3) raising pensions by as much as 30 percent by 2008 (while reducing
individual contributions to state pension funds), and raising the salaries of all state employees; 4) separating the judiciary from politics; 5)
recruiting the assistance of NGOs and organizations representing business in the struggle against corruption; 6) implementing laws that would
place the education system in line with European norms; 7) enacting a
law on the rights of national minorities; and 8) eliminating compulsory
military service by 2007.11
This list of priorities should be augmented to include some of the
suggestions made in the EU Foreign Affairs Commissions December
2004 report on Romania.12 That report emphasized the need to: 1) reform the police and the security services; 2) improve the countrys control
over its borders; 3) improve child protection; 4) deal with the problems
of state pensions; and 5) combat discrimination against the Roma minority, which remains widespread.
Judging by Basescus political statements, his track record as minister of transportation and mayor of Bucharest, and his reinvention of the
PD after he took over from ousted party chairman Petre Roman in 2000,
he will be an active and forceful president. It is likely that he will rapidly seek to impose his authority over the secret servicesfirst and
foremost, the Romanian Information Servicehaving learned the im-
154
Journal of Democracy
155
156
Journal of Democracy
157
audiovisual media sector, the attempts to manipulate informationespecially on the state-owned radio not to mention the self-censorship broadly
practiced among journalists (who now avoid inquiring into subjects which
are essential, but too sensitive), are all alarming signals to which the Romanian government and Parliament must attach the utmost importance.15
Postelection studies confirmed that a majority of the media, particularly the public-service media, had been biased in favor of the incumbent
administration during the election campaign.16 Journalists and editors
have attested to the PSDs extensive control over news content. For example, the Antena 1 television station, owned by PUR leader Dan
Voiculescu, eliminated all vestiges of criticism or journalistic inquiry
into the PSDs policies and actions after the PSD and PUR agreed to join
forces in the parliamentary election. Moreover, shortly before the presidential runoff, a news reporter for the public television station RTV accused
his employer of censorship, saying that the mystification and gross manipulation increased in the last few months at the order of the political
powers.17 Six of his colleagues joined him in denouncing the censorship, disinformation and propaganda of the RTV, and 11 Romanian NGOs
signed a public letter affirming their solidarity with these journalists.
Earlier in 2004, similar accusations had been made against the president
of Romanian Public Radio by that stations news editor.
It took RTVs own Ethics and Arbitration Commission until early January 2005 to admit that censorship existed at the station, and that for political
reasons some news was not broadcast or was cut . . . in order to polish the
image of the PSD.18 The Commission also admitted to an absence of
professionalism, and stated that the director, editor-in-chief, and producer were responsible for the ethical and professional problems that it
had identified. RTV still has the widest audience of any television station
in Romania, particularly in rural areas, where private television stations
are not yet accessible, and among the poor and less educated.19
The incumbent administrations control over RTVs news reporting
was by no means exceptional; the level of political control, censorship,
and self-censorship has been comparable at other broadcast media as
well as the majority of press outlets. Whereas national mediatelevision in particularhave been controlled by the political interests of the
ruling party, local media outlets have been run like mafia fiefdoms by
politicians and businessmen who meddle in editorial policies and influence the choices made by editors and journalists alike.20
After the collapse of the Ceauescu dictatorship, the Romanian
media experienced a fleeting period of freedom to broadcast and print
whatever they deemed newsworthy. Since then, however, that freedom
has been curbed by political and commercial interests, and in the past
four years by increasing government control and manipulation. During this period, it has become clear that press freedom, legal protection
for journalists, and access-to-information legislation, as well as re-
158
Journal of Democracy
spect for the working media will not be possible until the political
leadership leads by example and creates an atmosphere conducive to
making the necessary changes in political culture. 21
With a new, democratic government in place, there is reason for optimism. In all likelihood, Romania has seen the last of relentless media
repression. It is now up to President Basescu, the new cabinet, and Parliament to pass and enforce the legislation and to foster the political
culture needed to guarantee freedom of the press, access to information,
and protection for journalists. Much will depend on revamping the judiciary and setting it free of its political straightjacket.
Shortly before the November 2004 election, the Economist wrote,
[Romanias] ramshackle legal system is the biggest threat to its hopes
of joining the EU in 2007. 22 Indeed, not only does the country suffer
from a shortage of judges, but the judges who are in place lack adequate training. Moreover, the continuing problem of judicial
independence brings into question the ability of Romanias court system to sustain the processes of democratization and economic
liberalization.
As a step in the right direction, the power to promote and discipline
judges was transferred in 2004 from the Ministry of Justice to the
Supreme Council of Magistrates, which represents the judges themselves. Although this is hardly sufficient to ensure the independence
of the judiciary or to meet the standards set by the EU, at least it is a
start.
The newly appointed justice minister, Monica Macovei, will have
her hands full restructuring a system that carries a backlog of more than
two million unresolved lawsuits and criminal cases. Macovei is also
head of the PNA, whose main priority, she declared shortly after her
appointment, will be to combat corruption at the top.
Macovei is a former director of the Association for the Defense of
Human Rights in RomaniaHelsinki Committeeone of the countrys
most aggressive NGOs in combating human rights infringements, corruption, and miscarriages of justiceand has already impressed observers
with her nonpolitical approach to the judiciary. She is not affiliated
with any political party, and recently said that she accepted the appointment in order to implement the reforms I was demanding when I
was on the other side of the barricades.23 As was noted by Sorin Rosca
Stanescu, the editor of the daily Ziua, Macovei is
[T]he only member of the Tariceanu government who succeeded . . . in
meeting most of the expectations that national and international public
opinion have. . . . [She] presented a succinct program . . . that covers all
areas of interest . . . and did so with precision, courage, and prudence.24
As justice minister, Macovei is likely to spearhead a campaign of extensive judicial reforms, aimed at allowing the rule of law to take root in
159
Journal of Democracy
160
of President Basescu,
a player in the political arena. Romania
may be the one that
needs the full political spectrum reprefinally breaks with
sented in its national political
the postcommunist
dialogueincluding a modern Left that is
trend of simulated
neither rusty or dogmatic. At the same time,
change, and radithere may also be a need for reshuffling on
cally engages in the
the center-right, now that the DA has relong-delayed, proacceived a strong vote of confidence from
the most modern, liberal, and democratic
tive fostering of a
elements of society.
democratic political
As 2004 drew to a close, Romania could
culture in Romania.
no longer be described as an experiment in
prolonged Leninism or neocommunism, and for the first time it was more
closely linked to its democratic Western neighbors than to the authoritarian regimes of Belarus, Moldova, and Russia. Democratic consolidation
is a long process, but with the election of a truly democratic government
Romania has successfully completed the first phase of the transformation from an electoral to a liberal democracy.
The new government, under the leadership of President Basescu, may
be the one that finally breaks with the postcommunist trend of simulated change and radically engages in the long-delayed, proactive
fostering of a democratic political culture in Romania. 27 But there is
still a long road ahead. In order for Romania to be accepted as an equal
member of the EU and of the community of democratic nations, the DAled team must adopt the enlightened, liberal mindset and marshal the
political talent necessary to implement thorough reform. In that process, they need and deserve all the support that the West can muster.
NOTES
1. Romanian Academic Society, Mai poate fi Romania considerata un stat de
drept? (Can Romania still be considered a nation of laws?) Rapoarte asupra
guvernarii 12 (December 2004).
2. The PRM is neither a traditional extreme-right formation nor a reincarnation
of the mystical-revolutionary Iron Guard of the 1930s. Rather, it can be described
as an elusive conglomerate of communist and fascist nostalgias, hostility to mo-
161
dernity and diversity, and a militaristic, indeed phallocratic cult of the nation
(racially defined), the movement, and the leader (conductor). Historical ignorance
and amnesia have been Vadim Tudors main assets in his reinvention as a tribune
of Romanianness. See Vladimir Tismaneanu, From Ilisecu to Iliescu . . . and
Beyond: The Romanian Democratic Transition, Politique Internationale 105 (Fall
2004): 720.
3. Romania and the European Union: Brussels Beckons, Economist, 4 November 2004, 5354.
4. Romanias Judicial System: Judge and Jury, Economist, 4 November 2004,
54.
5. Adh` e sion de la Roumanie: Un message exigeant mais amical (Romanias
accession: a demanding but friendly message), European Union Foreign Affairs
Commission, 9 December 2004.
6. I.M.I., Mircea Marin, and Silviu Achim, Impartirea prefecturilor pune la
incercare coalitia guvernamentala (The distribution of local government posts
tests the governing coalition), Adevarul (Bucharest), 6 January 2005.
7. Adevarul, 5 January 2005.
8. Christopher Condon, Romanias Attempt at Clean Start Dogged by Tainted
Past, Financial Times (London), 11 January 2005.
9. Michael Shafir, Analysis: New Romanian Cabinet Ushers in Liberal-Democratic Spirit, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, www.rferl.org, 29 December 2004.
10. For Emil Constantinescus own assessment of his presidency, see his fourvolume memoir, Timpul daramarii, timpul zidirii (Time to demolish, time to build)
(Bucharest: Editura Universalia, 2002).
11. Michael Shafir, Analysis: New Romanian Cabinet Ushers in Liberal-Democratic Spirit.
12. Adh` e sion de la Roumanie: Un message exigeant mais amical, European
Union Foreign Affairs Commission.
13. Vladimir Tismaneanu and Mircea Mihaies, Schelete in dulap (Skeletons in
the closet) (Iasi: Polirom, 2004), 12324.
14. See Fara presa independenta, nu intrati in UE (Without a free press, you
will not enter the EU), Evenimentul Zilei (Bucharest), 8 July 2004.
15. Soria Blatmann and Jean-Franois Julliard, Caught between Old Habits and
Democratic Strides: Romanian Press at a Crossroads, Reporters Without Borders,
April 2004. Available at www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10082.
16. See for example, Raport de monitorizare (Election monitors report); Antena
1, B1TV, Prima TV, ProTV, Realitatea TV, TVR1; 120 September 2004; and
Raport de monitorizare; Mix FM, Radio Romania Actualitati, Europa FM, Radio
Total, BBC; 120 September 2004.
17. See Presiuni exercitate de putere la televiziunea publica (The pressures
brought on public television by the powers-that-be), Evenimentul Zilei, 7 December 2004.
18. Vlad Iorga, S-a confirmat cenzura din TVR (Censorship at TVR is confirmed), Evenimentul Zilei, 6 January 2005.
Journal of Democracy
162