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Journal of Democracy, Volume 16, Number 2, April 2005, pp. 146-162

(Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0027

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THE END OF POSTCOMMUNISM

IN ROMANIA
Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismaneanu

Peter Gross holds the Gaylord Family Endowed Chair and is professor
of international communication at the University of Oklahoma. His
books include Entangled Evolutions: Media and Democratization in
Eastern Europe (2002). Vladimir Tismaneanu is professor of government and politics and director of the Center for the Study of
Post-Communist Societies at the University of MarylandCollege Park.
His books include Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (2003).

s 2004 drew to a close, Romania took a few determined steps toward

democratic consolidation. The countrys parliamentary and presidential elections in November and December replaced the heirs of the former
communist regime, including outgoing president Ion Iliescu (199096,
20002004), with a generation of young, pro-European democrats. This
new government is seeking to break from the semi-authoritarian, anachronistic rule of its postcommunist predecessors and to emphasize instead
such democratic principles as transparency and accountability.
Perhaps the most surprising outcome of the polling was the victory
of Bucharest mayor Traian Basescu, chairman of the opposition Justice
and Truth Alliance (DA), in the December 12 presidential runoff. Basescu
unexpectedly defeated Prime Minister Adrian Nastase of the ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD) by 51 to 49 percent, even though Nastase
had bested Basescu 41 to 34 percent in the November 28 first round. In
parliamentary elections concurrent with the first round of presidential
voting, the left-wing PSD combined with the Humanist Party of Romania (PUR) to win nearly 37 percent of the total vote, while the
center-right DA, comprising the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the
Democratic Party (PD), won 32 percent. (For complete election results,
see Table 1 on p. 148 and Table 2 on p. 150 below.) After the election,
however, the PUR switched sides and gave its support to a majority
government headed by the DA.
Journal of Democracy Volume 16, Number 2 April 2005

Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismaneanu

147

As elections in the postcommunist world go, Romanias contests were

relatively low-key, although not without the customary accusations of
fraud and some ridiculous verbal grenades lobbed by candidates in lieu
of serious debates on salient issues. Alleged voting irregularities ranged
from disappearing ballots and voting stamps (which are used to mark
voters choice of candidates on the ballots) to unlawful campaigning by
candidates at polling stations on election day. The incumbent administration was also criticized for encouraging and facilitating multiple voting
on the part of its supporters by providing transportation from one county
to another.
The PSD (known until 2001 as the Social Democratic Pole of Romania, or PDSR), has its roots in the Soviet-era Communist Party. It has been
the party of power for most of the period since the fall of communism,
save for the presidency of reformist Emil Constantinescu of the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) in 19962000, but support for the
PSD has waned since its election victory in the fall of 2000. The partys
image was further damaged in the fall of 2004 when some newspapers
published alleged transcripts of its meetings, heightening suspicions that
the party was manipulating parliament and the media and that it had not
yet shed its Leninist mentality. These transcripts, together with the various attempts at election manipulation, proved without any ambiguity
that Romanias postcommunists did not free themselves from authoritarian reflexes when they became pro-European.1
The PSDs Nastase had appeared in position to win the presidency
after his significant lead in the first round. But a reinvigorated Romanian civil society, encouraged by the Orange Revolution underway in
neighboring Ukraine, combined with disillusioned former PSD voters to
provide the victory to the opposition candidate. Unlike Nastase, Basescu
had a strong constituency in major cities, especially in Bucharest, where
he is widely admired for his performance as the citys mayor. Moreover,
some of Romanias most celebrated intellectuals supported and expressed
their admiration for Basescu, who was widely perceived as the underdog
and was continually besmirched by the PSD propaganda machine. In the
end, Basescus second-round triumph, together with the strong showing
of the DA in the parliamentary race, has given Romania a brand-new
government.
With the benefit of hindsight, one could argue that the outcome of
these national elections was forecast by the June 2004 local elections,
which indicated deep popular discontent with the PSD and witnessed
both a strong performance by the DA and the decline of the ultranationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM).
Indeed, the decreasing influence of Corneliu Vadim Tudors PRM, a
party bringing together Romanias most reactionary nationalist and radical populist forces,2 was one of the more significant developments of
the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections. For years, the PRM

Journal of Democracy

148

TABLE 1RESULTS
2000

OF

ROMANIAS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

2004 (PERCENT OF VOTE)
LOWER HOUSE

PARTY OR COALITION
1

Social Democratic Party(PSD)/Humanist Party of Romania (PUR)

Justice and Truth Alliance (DA)2
Greater Romania Party (PRM)
Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR)
Other Parties3

IN

AND

SENATE

2000

2004

2000

2004

36.6
15.9
19.5
6.8
23.0

36.6
31.3
12.9
6.2
13.0

37.1
15.1
21.0
6.9
19.9

37.1
31.8
13.6
6.2
11.2

Source: IFES Election Guide, www.electionwatch.org

1
In 2001, the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) and the Romanian Social Democratic
Party (PSDR) merged as the Social Democratic Party (PSD).
2
In the 2004 elections, the Democratic Party and the National Liberal Party ran as the Justice and
Truth Alliance (DA). In the 2000 elections, these two parties ran separately, but their results in this
table for the 2000 election are combined.
3
Parties must secure at least 5 percent of the national popular vote to enter parliament.

had engaged in slanderous campaigns against democratic politicians

and intellectuals, and its namesake weekly had carried venomously
anti-Semitic, anti-Hungarian, anti-Western, and antidemocratic articles.
The PRM has at times poisoned the public debate on such vital issues as
interethnic cooperation, modernization, and the countrys communist
past.
Nonetheless, in 1995, President Iliescu and his party entered a coalition with Tudors forces. Popular support for the PRM reached its peak in
2000, when Tudor made it into the presidential runoff against Iliescu,
and the party received more than a fifth of the seats in Parliament. With
the help of an economy in shambles, Tudor managed to transform what
had been a marginal political formation into a major opposition party. He
appealed to the discontented and the resentful among Romanias youth
who did not know much about his past as a court poet for communist
dictator Nicolae Ceauescuand to many pro-Western Romanians who
had voted for Constantinescu and the CDR in 1996 but were sorely disappointed with their blunders and weak performance in office.
In 2003, Tudor performed a startling political turnaround by ostentatiously rejecting his former anti-Semitism and even hiring an Israeli
public relations firm to work on his 2004 election campaign. Perhaps
this political volte-face is not so surprising after all, since today every
political formation in Romania declares itself to be pro-Western and
fully supportive of democratic institutions and values. But it is hard to
see how Tudor could find a way to recast himself as a democrat without
robbing the PRM of some of the chief reasons for its popular support
among some voters attracted by authoritarian populism.
Another factor in the success of the opposition in the 2004 elections
was the awakening of Romanias long-dormant civil society, and in
particular the creation of the Coalition for a Clean Parliament (see the
box on pp. 15455), a collaborative effort of the Romanian Academic

Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismaneanu

149

Society, the Pro Democracy Association, and other civic groups and
initiatives. A few weeks before the election, the Coalition released the
names of more than 200 candidates whom it considered unsuitable as
parliamentary representatives. Over a quarter of these blacklisted candidates were removed from the party lists, in what many called an
unprecedented success for civil society.

The Road Ahead

What will change in Romania now that genuinely pro-European
democrats have replaced the old postcommunist government? How will
Basescu and his team respond to the popular discontent that got them
into office?3
Much needs to change. Compared to other countries in the region in
Central Europe and the Balkans, Romania has the lowest per-capita income, the worst environmental standards and tax collection record, and
the highest infant-mortality rate. According to Freedom House, the
countrys most critical problem is rampant and pervasive corruption,
which former PSD administrations condemned rhetorically but failed to
address in any serious way. Its labor market is so dysfunctional as to
constitute a human-asset paralysis, in the words of a World Bank report.3 The Romanian judicial system, short of judges and working with
outdated laws, lacks independence and is made worse by a political
system riddled with cronyism and corruption.4 Finally, under PSD rule
the countrys media have been subject to government censorship, with
journalists and editors harassed by the political leadership.
Against this backdrop, Romanias new leaders need to create a modern, enlightened, liberal state that is equipped to deal with the countrys
deep-rooted problems. They must replace dishonesty and Byzantine
intrigues and schemes with a democratic political culture that emphasizes impersonal procedures, accountability, and staunch opposition to
corruption.
Romanias democratization process has been slower than in all the
other postcommunist countries in the region, with the exception of Albania and Yugoslavia. It has featured two major economic crises, three
instances of club-wielding coal miners descending on the capital, and a
succession of seven prime ministers. Romanias effort at democratization has been bogged down by its postcommunist legacywidespread
pessimism and apathy, political dilettantism, clientelism, and a level of
corruption that the EU Foreign Affairs Commission last fall diplomatically called a major source of concern.5
Basescus victory represents a significant parting from this legacy.
It signals a rebirth of political dynamism and a hope for change, and it
marks the beginning of democratic consolidation in Romania. If
Basescus campaign is at all indicative of his tenure as president, sig-

Journal of Democracy

150

TABLE 2RESULTS OF ROMANIAS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

2000 AND 2004 (PERCENT OF VOTE)
2000 C ANDIDATE (P ARTY )
1

Ion Iliescu (PDSR-PSDR)

Corneliu Vadim Tudor (PRM)
Theodor Stolojan (PNL)
Petre Roman (PD)
2004 C ANDIDATE (P ARTY )
2

Traian Basescu (DA)

Adrian Nastase (PSD)
Corneliu Vadim Tudor (PRM)

IN

1ST ROUND

2ND R OUND

36.4
28.3
11.8
3.0

66.9
33.2

1ST ROUND

2ND R OUND

33.9
40.9
12.6

51.2
48.8

Source: IFES Election Guide, www.electionwatch.org

1
In the 2000 elections, the PDSR-PSDR (which became the PSD in 2001) ran a coalition
candidate.
2
In the 2004 election, the PNL and the PD (comprising the DA) ran a coalition candidate.

nificant changes are to be expected in the near future. During the campaign, Basescu showed himself to be incisive and outspoken, and was
unafraid to tackle even the most controversial issues (for instance, he
called for the legalization of prostitution and defended the rights of
the gay community). Under his leadership, Romania is likely to see a
major offensive against corruption and a revamping of the judiciary
and other government institutionschanges that will bring the country closer to meeting the conditions for its scheduled entry into the EU
in 2007.
Many Romanians now hope that the truth about the postcommunist
leadership and its policies and actions will be revealed, and that analyses of the countrys communist past will no longer be suppressed. They
expect that there will finally be a dignified and responsible effort to
examine the nations true communist and postcommunist histories, including the still unresolved questions regarding the December 1989
revolution and its main protagonists. Some call the events of that fateful month not a revolution, but rather a revolt, a coup dtat, or a
popular riot, partly because there are still no clear, verifiable answers
to the questions surrounding the developments after the Timioara uprising, the secret military tribunal, and Ceauescus execution. Who
was shooting at the crowds? Who and what drove the evolution of
events? Was this a series of premeditated events and if so, who was
responsible?

The New Government

In the November 28 elections for the 143-seat Senate and 346-seat
Chamber of Deputies, the PSD and its longstanding coalition partner,
the PUR, elected 57 senators and 132 deputies, while the DA won 49
Senate seats and 113 lower-house seats. Given such a close race, it ap-

Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismaneanu

151

peared that the crucial swing votes would be in the hands of the PRM,
which won 48 lower-house seats, and the Hungarian Democratic Union
of Romania (UDMR), which won 22 seats. In the postelection reshuffle,
however, the PUR unexpectedly abandoned the PSD and agreed to support the formation of a DA-led government.
Hence the new governing coalition, which was approved in a joint
session of Parliament on 28 December 2004, is a patchwork of the DA,
the PUR, and the UDMR. In all likelihood, this will be a short-lived
collaboration. In fact, signs of instability appeared shortly into the new
year when the parties failed to reach an agreement on the appointment
of county-level government representatives (prefecti).6
Moreover, Basescu is displeased with this coalition, which in his
opinion was an immoral alternative to forming a minority government. He has stated that he wants new elections to be held soon, so that
the DA can rid itself of the PUR.7 Indeed, reform-minded Romanians
perceive the inclusion of the PUR in the new government as a dangerous compromise, primarily because, in their view, party leader Dan
Voiculescu represents everything that has gone wrong with business
and politics in the postcommunist era.8
Basescu has also called for the creation of a single party out of the
DAs two components, the PNL and PD. As of this writing in early March,
the two parties have started discussions about a possible merger. But in
merging with the liberal PNL the PD may face an identity crisis. For
even though the PD itself has a decidedly liberal tilt that some even
consider right-of-center, it has remained a member of the Socialist Internationalas has its ideological rival, the PSD.
President B a sescu and his new prime minister, C a lin PopescuTariceanu, have assembled a young governing teamthe average age
of the ministers is 44that appears to possess the liberal instincts that
its predecessors so decidedly lacked. With the exception of PopescuT a riceanu and delegate minister Laszlo Borbely of the UDMR, no
member of the new cabinet has served in a previous government, and
most have been educated in the West or at Western-style institutions.
As a result, for the first time in its postcommunist history, Romania has
a pro-Western, democratic government that is freer than its predecessors from the legacy of communism.9
Despite the undemocratic nature of PSD rule, Romania has in the past
decade-and-a-half experienced four sets of freealbeit not so fairparliamentary and presidential elections. It was also a PSD administrations
foreign policy that resulted in Romanias accession to NATO in 2004
and the promise of EU membership by 2007. In the last four years of PSD
rule, inflation was cut from 44 to 14 percent and the countrys Gross
Domestic Product grew by an annual average of 5 percent. Moreover,
pushed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU, the PSD
government reluctantly privatized such state-owned firms as the oil com-

152

Journal of Democracy

pany Petrom (whose sales amount to about 4 percent of Romanias GDP),

the Sidex Steel Mill, the Commercial Bank of Romania, and the utility
providers Distri Gas and Electrica.
In 2003 and 2004, the PSD-led Parliament tightened campaign and
election-financing laws, and revised the
While the 1996
laws regulating the conduct of public offichange of governcials (who are now bound by
ment did not amount
conflict-of-interest laws and required to
to a decisive ruptura, disclose their assets annually). In 2002, a
it did finally create a National Anticorruption Prosecution Ofculture of political
fice (PNA) was establishedalthough it has
alternation and free
yet to carry out its mandate in a meaningpublic discourse that ful wayand a year later, Parliament
most Romanians had passed a new anticorruption law. Also approved in 2003 were constitutional
never before experirevisions providing a civic definition of
enced.
the nation and firmer guarantees for private property. Thus, despite the utter mess
of corruption and mismanagement that the
PSD government left behind, it had managed to create a basic foundation on which the new DA-led government can now build a stable
democratic state.
From 2000 to 2004, the PSD administration of President Ion Iliescu
and Prime Minister Adrian Nastase succeeded in moving the country
ahead along the lines suggested by the EU, although with some delay in
the areas of economic and judicial reform, the fight against corruption,
and media independence. Some of the changes meant to prepare Romania for NATO and EU accession had begun already during the 19962000
tenure of President Constantinescu. During the 1996 campaign,
Constantinescu had criticized Iliescu for his failures in achieving economic reform and battling corruption, for the general lack of transparency
of his administration (especially regarding the truth about the revolution
of 1989), and for his reluctance to deal with such issues as citizens access to secret police files and property restitutions. Constantinescus
victory in the 1996 election resulted from mass discontent with the incumbent administration and voters hope that the opposition would be
able to bring the country out of stagnation.10
While the 1996 change of government did not amount to a decisive
ruptura, it did finally create a culture of political alternation and free
public discourse that most Romanians had never before experienced. Thus,
while the changes were still incomplete, they amounted to a genuine breakthrough akin to the real but unfinished revolution that put an end to
Ceauescus rule in December 1989. Nevertheless, the inconsequential,
indecisive, and faltering nature of the reforms initiated but not truly imple-

Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismaneanu

153

mented under the Constantinescu presidency led to the latters defeat in

the 2000 elections. Those who voted for former president Iliescu and for
first runner-up Vadim Tudor in 2000 did so out of dissatisfaction and
frustration with Constantinescus ruling coalition and its failure to deliver
on its campaign promises.
While bringing the PSD (then known as the PDSR) back into power, the
2000 elections also significantly altered Romanias political landscape.
They saw the demise of the old-fashioned, ideologically ossified Christian
and Democratic National Peasants Party and the rise of the more dynamic
and modern PNL, which in 2003 joined forces with the PD to create the DA.

Policy Expectations
Whereas the Constantinescu and Iliescu administrations only reluctantly acceded to the EUs requests for change in the areas of media
freedom, rule of law, judicial independence, and minority rights, the
new government is expected to pursue such reforms more willingly.
This will be necessary if Romania is to succeed in joining the European
Union. Under the leadership of President Basescu and Prime Minister
Popescu-Tariceanu, the new government will focus in the next few years
on fulfilling its commitments to the EU, NATO, and the IMF.
To that end, its priorities will be: 1) full transparency in government
and in the legislative process; 2) guaranteeing and respecting the independence of the media, in particular that of state radio and television;
3) raising pensions by as much as 30 percent by 2008 (while reducing
individual contributions to state pension funds), and raising the salaries of all state employees; 4) separating the judiciary from politics; 5)
recruiting the assistance of NGOs and organizations representing business in the struggle against corruption; 6) implementing laws that would
place the education system in line with European norms; 7) enacting a
law on the rights of national minorities; and 8) eliminating compulsory
military service by 2007.11
This list of priorities should be augmented to include some of the
suggestions made in the EU Foreign Affairs Commissions December
2004 report on Romania.12 That report emphasized the need to: 1) reform the police and the security services; 2) improve the countrys control
over its borders; 3) improve child protection; 4) deal with the problems
of state pensions; and 5) combat discrimination against the Roma minority, which remains widespread.
Judging by Basescus political statements, his track record as minister of transportation and mayor of Bucharest, and his reinvention of the
PD after he took over from ousted party chairman Petre Roman in 2000,
he will be an active and forceful president. It is likely that he will rapidly seek to impose his authority over the secret servicesfirst and
foremost, the Romanian Information Servicehaving learned the im-

154

Journal of Democracy

THE COALITION FOR A CLEAN PARLIAMENT

This report is by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, president of the Romanian
Academic Society, who heads the Coalition for a Clean Parliament.
On the occasion of the legislative and presidential elections in
November and December 2004, Romanian civil society organized
itself for the first time into a broad coalition for integrity in politics:
the Coalition for a Clean Parliament (CCP). Frustrated by the
governments lack of effectiveness in fighting large-scale corruption, civil society took matters into its own hands.
The CCP first determined the criteria that would make a candidate unfit for a clean parliament. These criteria were: 1) having
repeatedly shifted from one political party to another in search of
personal profit; 2) having been accused of corruption on the basis of published and verifiable evidence; 3) having been exposed
as an agent of the Securitate (Ceauescus former secret service);
4) being the owner of a private firm with important tax arrears to
the state budget; 5) being unable to account for the discrepancy
between ones officially stated assets and ones income; 6) turning a profit from conflicts of interest involving ones public
position. The second step was to discuss these criteria with the
leadership of the political parties represented in the Parliament.
The most important onesthe Social Democratic Party/Humanist Party of Romania coalition (PSD/PUR), the Justice and Truth
Alliance (DA), and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania
(UDMR)agreed with the criteria and the process that we had
designed, and they publicly announced their support for the
CCPs campaign.
Our third step was to gather information about the candidates of
these parties. We collected material published in the press over the
years and researched the websites of various public authorities in
charge of financial and commercial matters. Then we double-checked
our information. Our fourth step was to draw up lists of those candidates who met one or more of the agreed-upon criteria for being unfit
to hold a seat in the future Parliament. The resulting black lists
were then sent to the political parties, with the request that they reexamine each case and decide whether to withdraw the candidate in
question. The CCP also offered to analyze any cases where individual candidates contested its findings. Step five consisted of the
withdrawal by the political parties of significant numbers of their
initial candidates. Some of the candidates appealed to the CCP, which
approved or rejected their appeals and adjusted its lists accordingly.
Our last step was to release the final CCP black lists in the form of

Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismaneanu

155

nearly two million flyers, distributed in most of the 41 counties of

Romania. Funding was provided by the Balkan Trust, the Romanian
Soros Foundation, and Freedom House.
After the results showed that far more unfit candidates belonged to
the ruling PSD than to the opposition, that party denounced the whole
procedure and encouraged its candidates to sue Coalition members
and ask the courts to stop distribution of the flyers. In public statements and open letters, the progovernment PUR (and its private
television station Antena 1) accused the CCP of conspiracy, calling
its members civic terrorists and a bunch of criminals. The PSD
and the PUR also asked the Central Electoral Bureau, Romanias highest electoral authority, to ban the CCP flyers, but judges from both the
Bureau and the ordinary courts ruled in favor of the CCP. Opponents
of the CCP campaign found a more effective tactic, however. In many
counties, they circulated fake flyers, using the CCP format but replacing the names of PSD candidates with opposition candidates.
Local media and NGOs did their best to help the CCP campaign.
Thanks to the combined efforts of both students and grassroots organizations such as the Civic Alliance and the Pro Democracy Association
(APD), nearly two million flyers were distributed in almost every county
in Romania. More than two thousand people, from students to union
members, participated as volunteers in this campaign.
What were the results of the black-list campaign? The CCP initially documented 143 cases of unfit PSD candidates. Under pressure
from civil society, the PSD withdrew about 30 candidates from its
electoral lists. The CCP also dropped from the black lists some candidates who appealed its findings, so the final count of unfit PSD and
PUR candidates was 95. Among the other black-listed candidates
were 10 from the DA (which also withdrew some candidates), 46 from
the PRM, and 3 from the UDMR.
A final accounting shows that 98 candidates on the original
black lists lost their seats, having been either withdrawn by their
parties or defeated by the voters. At the same time, 104 blacklisted candidates (mostly from the PSD) won reelection. Measured
in this way, the CCPs rate of success was just below 50 percent.
On the other hand, the PSD fell from power.
On the downside, while the new president, Traian Basescu, and
the new DA-led government are struggling to find adequate means to
fight against systemic corruption, Romanian civil society is saddled
with defending itself against four lawsuits for defamation, filed by
two former heads of the secret service, a former minister of justice,
and a former minister of defense. If Oscar Wilde is right that one
should be judged by the quality of ones enemies, then Romanian
civil society has made enormous strides.

156

Journal of Democracy

portance of doing so from the unhappy experience of President

Constantinescu. If he does not impose significant reforms and major
reshuffles in the secret services, he may one day be forced to admit, as
has Constantinescu, that the services defeated him.
Basescu demonstrated his skills as a mediator and facilitator in putting together the DA in 2003, proving that he is capable of setting aside
personal pride in favor of political principles. Indeed, from the outset
Basescu was very open to the idea of cooperating with the PNL, and he
championed, first informally and then explicitly, the idea of a merger
between the two major parties of the democratic opposition. This was a
remarkable achievement in a country where few understand the need
for convergence and cooperation in politics.13
This is not to say that Basescu and his DA-led government do not
have serious obstacles to overcome. They are up against some deeply
entrenched political and institutional problems, such as the excessive
personalization of politics; the vanity and mutual suspicion of politicians and government officials; the temptations of the executive branch
to limit the independence of the judiciary and the media; the penchant
of politicians to change their party affiliations in midcourse, despite
their strident ideological proclamations; the absence of a common vision of the public good; and, finally, the persistence of nationalistpopulist movements and parties that recruit among those who suffer
from the negative effects of privatization and the restructuring of social-protection institutions.

The Media and the Judiciary

One significant aspect of the PSD legacy is Romanias limited press
freedom, denounced by the countrys civil society organizations as
reminiscent of the pre-1989 communist era. During the postcommunist
period, media independence has been compromised by censorship and
self-censorship, verbal and physical abuse of journalists, and the editorial interference exercised by the owners of newspapers and broadcasting
stations. At a July 2004 conference on press freedom in Bucharest, to
which the Iliescu-Nastase government chose not to send any representatives, Western ambassadors were quoted as saying, In Romania, press
freedom is in danger . . . journalists are intimidated and harassed, and
the government does not accept criticism and attempts to manipulate
information.14 Indeed, in its April 2004 report, the international organization Reporters Without Borders concluded:
The political establishment, very anxious to preserve its reputation with
the European Union, and to placate public opinion in this election year, has
been exerting insidious pressure on the Romanian media. Although there
has been no grave press freedom violation to deplore on the national level,
the state-owned medias lack of independence, the pluralism issues in the

Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismaneanu

157

audiovisual media sector, the attempts to manipulate informationespecially on the state-owned radio not to mention the self-censorship broadly
practiced among journalists (who now avoid inquiring into subjects which
are essential, but too sensitive), are all alarming signals to which the Romanian government and Parliament must attach the utmost importance.15

Postelection studies confirmed that a majority of the media, particularly the public-service media, had been biased in favor of the incumbent
administration during the election campaign.16 Journalists and editors
have attested to the PSDs extensive control over news content. For example, the Antena 1 television station, owned by PUR leader Dan
Voiculescu, eliminated all vestiges of criticism or journalistic inquiry
into the PSDs policies and actions after the PSD and PUR agreed to join
forces in the parliamentary election. Moreover, shortly before the presidential runoff, a news reporter for the public television station RTV accused
his employer of censorship, saying that the mystification and gross manipulation increased in the last few months at the order of the political
powers.17 Six of his colleagues joined him in denouncing the censorship, disinformation and propaganda of the RTV, and 11 Romanian NGOs
signed a public letter affirming their solidarity with these journalists.
Earlier in 2004, similar accusations had been made against the president
of Romanian Public Radio by that stations news editor.
It took RTVs own Ethics and Arbitration Commission until early January 2005 to admit that censorship existed at the station, and that for political
reasons some news was not broadcast or was cut . . . in order to polish the
image of the PSD.18 The Commission also admitted to an absence of
professionalism, and stated that the director, editor-in-chief, and producer were responsible for the ethical and professional problems that it
had identified. RTV still has the widest audience of any television station
in Romania, particularly in rural areas, where private television stations
are not yet accessible, and among the poor and less educated.19
The incumbent administrations control over RTVs news reporting
was by no means exceptional; the level of political control, censorship,
and self-censorship has been comparable at other broadcast media as
well as the majority of press outlets. Whereas national mediatelevision in particularhave been controlled by the political interests of the
ruling party, local media outlets have been run like mafia fiefdoms by
politicians and businessmen who meddle in editorial policies and influence the choices made by editors and journalists alike.20
After the collapse of the Ceauescu dictatorship, the Romanian
media experienced a fleeting period of freedom to broadcast and print
whatever they deemed newsworthy. Since then, however, that freedom
has been curbed by political and commercial interests, and in the past
four years by increasing government control and manipulation. During this period, it has become clear that press freedom, legal protection
for journalists, and access-to-information legislation, as well as re-

158

Journal of Democracy

spect for the working media will not be possible until the political
leadership leads by example and creates an atmosphere conducive to
making the necessary changes in political culture. 21
With a new, democratic government in place, there is reason for optimism. In all likelihood, Romania has seen the last of relentless media
repression. It is now up to President Basescu, the new cabinet, and Parliament to pass and enforce the legislation and to foster the political
culture needed to guarantee freedom of the press, access to information,
and protection for journalists. Much will depend on revamping the judiciary and setting it free of its political straightjacket.
Shortly before the November 2004 election, the Economist wrote,
[Romanias] ramshackle legal system is the biggest threat to its hopes
of joining the EU in 2007. 22 Indeed, not only does the country suffer
from a shortage of judges, but the judges who are in place lack adequate training. Moreover, the continuing problem of judicial
independence brings into question the ability of Romanias court system to sustain the processes of democratization and economic
liberalization.
As a step in the right direction, the power to promote and discipline
judges was transferred in 2004 from the Ministry of Justice to the
Supreme Council of Magistrates, which represents the judges themselves. Although this is hardly sufficient to ensure the independence
of the judiciary or to meet the standards set by the EU, at least it is a
start.
The newly appointed justice minister, Monica Macovei, will have
her hands full restructuring a system that carries a backlog of more than
two million unresolved lawsuits and criminal cases. Macovei is also
head of the PNA, whose main priority, she declared shortly after her
appointment, will be to combat corruption at the top.
Macovei is a former director of the Association for the Defense of
Human Rights in RomaniaHelsinki Committeeone of the countrys
most aggressive NGOs in combating human rights infringements, corruption, and miscarriages of justiceand has already impressed observers
with her nonpolitical approach to the judiciary. She is not affiliated
with any political party, and recently said that she accepted the appointment in order to implement the reforms I was demanding when I
was on the other side of the barricades.23 As was noted by Sorin Rosca
Stanescu, the editor of the daily Ziua, Macovei is
[T]he only member of the Tariceanu government who succeeded . . . in
meeting most of the expectations that national and international public
opinion have. . . . [She] presented a succinct program . . . that covers all
areas of interest . . . and did so with precision, courage, and prudence.24

As justice minister, Macovei is likely to spearhead a campaign of extensive judicial reforms, aimed at allowing the rule of law to take root in

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159

Romania and, most importantly, at making possible the countrys EU

accession in 2007.

A New Era of Normality?

The PSD, although ousted from the presidency and edged out of
government, is still the largest single party in both the Senate and the
lower house. It will remain a political force, but it also will have to
reexamine its ideological underpinnings and adapt to the demands of a
nation that has had its fill of ex-communist politicians. The PSDs losses
in the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections were widely blamed
on the partys lack of transparency and internal democracy, and some
have called for the resignation of all party leaders. Such demands for
internal party reform were formalized in a document entitled The Profound Reform of the PSD, released shortly after the elections by local
PSD officials in the regions of Transylvania and Banat.25 A number of
prominent figures within the party, among them former foreign ministers Mircea Geoana and Adrian Severin, are also likely to push for the
partys ideological and organizational rejuvenation.
Former president Iliescu, the PSDs founding chairman and the
standardbearer of its older generation, will also continue to play a role
in Romanias political life, continuing an uneasy collaboration with
the partys current leader, former prime minister and presidential candidate Adrian N a stase. As the intergenerational tensions within the
PSD increase, it remains to be seen if the party, under the leadership of
Nastase and his young colleagues, will be able to break with the partys
old habits of combining leftist neocollectivist rhetoric with a passion
for monopolizing economic power.
In all of its past incarnationsfrom its origins as the National Salvation Front in 1989 down through its rechristening as the PDSR and then
the PSDthe party has been criticized by the opposition for its authoritarian traits and behavior. Yet in the 2004 elections the PSD was edged
out of power despite its control over local and regional elites, its influence on electoral rules and institutions, and its manipulation of the
major electronic news mediaparticularly RTV, ProTV, and Antena 1,
which attract around 60 percent of the national audience.26
On election day, Iliescu proclaimed that Romania has reached a
state of normality, understood by Romanians in the spirit of Timothy Garton Ashs remark that communism was a state of normal abnormality and that postcommunism ushered in a state of abnormal
normality. After a carefully orchestrated attempt to revamp his image
and portray himself as a bona fide liberal democrat, however, Iliescu
ended his presidential career with two major faux pas: He honored the
ultranationalist agitator Vadim Tudor of the PRM for having contributed to a normal parliamentary life in Romania (an action meant to

Journal of Democracy

160

ensure the PRMs support for a PSD government), and he pardoned

Miron Cozma, the coal-miners leader who in 1999 had been sentenced
to 18 years in prison for organizing several violent marches on
Bucharest in 1991. Both awards struck a
blow against the democratic values of pluThe new government, ralism, tolerance, and decency.
Although the PSD in its current incarnaunder the leadership
tion
has seen its last heyday, it will remain

of President Basescu,
a player in the political arena. Romania
may be the one that
needs the full political spectrum reprefinally breaks with
sented in its national political
the postcommunist
dialogueincluding a modern Left that is
trend of simulated
neither rusty or dogmatic. At the same time,
change, and radithere may also be a need for reshuffling on
cally engages in the
the center-right, now that the DA has relong-delayed, proacceived a strong vote of confidence from
the most modern, liberal, and democratic
tive fostering of a
elements of society.
democratic political
As 2004 drew to a close, Romania could
culture in Romania.
no longer be described as an experiment in
prolonged Leninism or neocommunism, and for the first time it was more
closely linked to its democratic Western neighbors than to the authoritarian regimes of Belarus, Moldova, and Russia. Democratic consolidation
is a long process, but with the election of a truly democratic government
Romania has successfully completed the first phase of the transformation from an electoral to a liberal democracy.
The new government, under the leadership of President Basescu, may
be the one that finally breaks with the postcommunist trend of simulated change and radically engages in the long-delayed, proactive
fostering of a democratic political culture in Romania. 27 But there is
still a long road ahead. In order for Romania to be accepted as an equal
member of the EU and of the community of democratic nations, the DAled team must adopt the enlightened, liberal mindset and marshal the
political talent necessary to implement thorough reform. In that process, they need and deserve all the support that the West can muster.
NOTES
1. Romanian Academic Society, Mai poate fi Romania considerata un stat de
drept? (Can Romania still be considered a nation of laws?) Rapoarte asupra
guvernarii 12 (December 2004).
2. The PRM is neither a traditional extreme-right formation nor a reincarnation
of the mystical-revolutionary Iron Guard of the 1930s. Rather, it can be described
as an elusive conglomerate of communist and fascist nostalgias, hostility to mo-

Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismaneanu

161

dernity and diversity, and a militaristic, indeed phallocratic cult of the nation
(racially defined), the movement, and the leader (conductor). Historical ignorance
and amnesia have been Vadim Tudors main assets in his reinvention as a tribune
of Romanianness. See Vladimir Tismaneanu, From Ilisecu to Iliescu . . . and
Beyond: The Romanian Democratic Transition, Politique Internationale 105 (Fall
2004): 720.
3. Romania and the European Union: Brussels Beckons, Economist, 4 November 2004, 5354.
4. Romanias Judicial System: Judge and Jury, Economist, 4 November 2004,
54.
5. Adh` e sion de la Roumanie: Un message exigeant mais amical (Romanias
accession: a demanding but friendly message), European Union Foreign Affairs
Commission, 9 December 2004.
6. I.M.I., Mircea Marin, and Silviu Achim, Impartirea prefecturilor pune la
incercare coalitia guvernamentala (The distribution of local government posts
tests the governing coalition), Adevarul (Bucharest), 6 January 2005.
7. Adevarul, 5 January 2005.
8. Christopher Condon, Romanias Attempt at Clean Start Dogged by Tainted
Past, Financial Times (London), 11 January 2005.
9. Michael Shafir, Analysis: New Romanian Cabinet Ushers in Liberal-Democratic Spirit, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, www.rferl.org, 29 December 2004.
10. For Emil Constantinescus own assessment of his presidency, see his fourvolume memoir, Timpul daramarii, timpul zidirii (Time to demolish, time to build)
(Bucharest: Editura Universalia, 2002).
11. Michael Shafir, Analysis: New Romanian Cabinet Ushers in Liberal-Democratic Spirit.
12. Adh` e sion de la Roumanie: Un message exigeant mais amical, European
Union Foreign Affairs Commission.
13. Vladimir Tismaneanu and Mircea Mihaies, Schelete in dulap (Skeletons in
the closet) (Iasi: Polirom, 2004), 12324.
14. See Fara presa independenta, nu intrati in UE (Without a free press, you
will not enter the EU), Evenimentul Zilei (Bucharest), 8 July 2004.
15. Soria Blatmann and Jean-Franois Julliard, Caught between Old Habits and
Democratic Strides: Romanian Press at a Crossroads, Reporters Without Borders,
April 2004. Available at www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10082.
16. See for example, Raport de monitorizare (Election monitors report); Antena
1, B1TV, Prima TV, ProTV, Realitatea TV, TVR1; 120 September 2004; and
Raport de monitorizare; Mix FM, Radio Romania Actualitati, Europa FM, Radio
Total, BBC; 120 September 2004.
17. See Presiuni exercitate de putere la televiziunea publica (The pressures
brought on public television by the powers-that-be), Evenimentul Zilei, 7 December 2004.
18. Vlad Iorga, S-a confirmat cenzura din TVR (Censorship at TVR is confirmed), Evenimentul Zilei, 6 January 2005.

Journal of Democracy

162

19. Mircea Vasilescu, Echidistanta si misiunea publica a TVR (The balance

and public mission of TVR), Dilema Veche (Bucharest), 10 December 2004.
20. Discussions held by Peter Gross with local journalists in Giurgiu, Constanta,
Calarasi, and Bucharest, September 2004.
21. Peter Gross, Media Evolution in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, 1989
2000, in Donald H. Johnston, ed., Encyclopedia of International Media and
Communications (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 2003), 91101.
22. Romanias Judicial System: Judge and Jury.
23. Monica Macovei appointed Romanian Minister of Justice, International
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 20 January 2005. Available at www.ifrhr.org.
24. Sorin Rosca Stanescu, Un outsider in fruntea topului: Monica Macovei
(An outsider on top of the charts: Monica Macovei), Ziua (Bucharest), 6 January
2005.
25. See Lideri PSD Transilvania: Nu trebuie asteptat ca Iliescu sa fie mare
reformist (PSD leaders in Transylvania: Do not expect Iliescu to be a great reformer), Mediafax (Bucharest), 10 January 2005.
26. Romanian Academic Society, Mai poate fi Romania considerata un stat de
drept.
27. For the concept of simulated change, see Michael Shafir, Romania: Politics,
Economics and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated Change (Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1985); for the need to launch a radical break with patterns
of governance and new relations between state and citizens, see Alexandru Lazescu,
Indicatii de lectura pentru Raportul de tara (A manual for understanding the
[EU] country report), 22 (Bucharest), 1117 November 2003, 1.