Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

Narratives
Constitutional Law II
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola
2005
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Table of Contents
United States vs. Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7 Septmber 1912] 1

United States vs. Ong Siu Hong [GR 12778, 3 August 1917] 2
People vs. Otadora [GR L-2154, 26 April 1950] 2
Villaflor vs. Summer [GR 16444, 8 September 1920] 3
Bermudez vs. Castillo [Per. Rec. 714-A, 26 July 1937] 3
Beltran vs. Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929] 4
People vs. Tranca [GR 110357, 17 August 1994] 5
South Dakota vs. Neville [459 US 553, 22 February 1983] 6
Schmerber vs. California [384 US 757, 20 June 1966] 7
People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999] ... 8
People vs. Gallarde [GR 133025, 17 February 2000] 9
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26 May 1969] 10
Galman vs. Pamaran [GRs 71208-09, 30 August 1985] 11
Brown vs. Walker [161 US 591, 23 March 1896] 14
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968] 15
This collection contains fifteen (15) cases

summarized in this format by
Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student)
during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006
in the Political Law Review class
under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012.
Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002
and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006.
He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
333 United States vs. Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7 Septmber 1912]
First Division, Johnson (J): 5 concur
Facts: Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September 1910, staying in the house of her sister,
located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila. On said day, a number of Chinamen were gambling in or
near the said house. Some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the house of Oliva's sister. Oliva
Pacomio, on said day, after having taken a bath, returned to her room. Tan Teng followed her into her room
and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him. After using some of the face powder upon his
private parts, he threw Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in the position
for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the
latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that
Oliva related to her sister what had happened upon the morning of September 15. The sister at once put on
foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called
upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first. Later he arrived and
Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was
arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who
examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal
disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of Tan
Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the
same. The result of the examination showed that Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng was
charged with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among others, that the result of the
scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the
time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from
gonorrhea; as that to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. After
hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense of
abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to be
imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prison correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng
appealed.
Issue: Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he has gonorrhea, cannot be used as
evidence against Tan Teng on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against selfincrimination.
Held: As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle,
would forbid a court to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover the
Court is not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is
exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is
competent. Verily, the prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the
Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the
purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.
Herein, the substance was taken from the body of Tan Teng without his objection, the examination was made
by competent medical authority and the result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from said disease. As was
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been found with stolen property upon his person, there certainly
could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence
against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished
evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the
purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )
clothing in the case indicated, taken from Tan Teng, could not be used against him as evidence, without
violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself.
334 United States vs. Ong Siu Hong [GR 12778, 3 August 1917]
En Banc, Malcolm (J): 5 concur
Facts: Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth. Ong Siu Hong appears to have
been convicted by the lower court, based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who were members of
the Secret Service. Ong Siu Hong's counsel raised the constitutional question that the accused was compelled
to be a witness against himself.
Issue: Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness against himself when the morphine was forced
from his mouth.
Held: By analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S. vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil.
145[1912]), following leading authorities, and the persuasive decisions of other courts of last resort, are
conclusive. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him
to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an
accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used
in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in
question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given
in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral
examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a
crime.
335 People vs. Otadora [GR L-2154, 26 April 1950]
First Division, Bengzon (J): 6 concur
Facts: Due to a family quarrel, Apolonia Carreon (sister of Hilaria) filed in August 1946, a criminal
complaint for serious threats against Hilaria and her husband Francisco Galos. These were arrested and had to
file a bond. The case was later withdrawn by Apolonia upon the advice of friendly mediators. In December of
1946, Leon Castro as guardian ad litem of some minors surnamed Carreon filed a civil complaint for partition
of real property and damages against Hilaria Carreon. This suit was set for hearing on 24 June 1947. Antonio
Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April 1947, through Amando Garbo. Thereafter they conversed on
several occasions. In the early part of May 1947, she saw him going to barrio Matica-a and then she told him
that if he would liquidate the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon she would give him P3,000. He did
not agree. In the last week of May he was invited to Hilaria's house. The proposal was renewed, better
conditions being offered. (1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.) Hilario supplied the gun, procured from
one Benigno Baltonado. Hilaria also gave Otadora a bolo, a pair of trousers of her husband Francisco Galos, a
hat and a flashlight. Early in the morning of 16 June 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon were
shot dead in their house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of 21 June 1947, Antonio Otadora was
arrested in Ormoc City while preparing to escape to Camotes Islands, Cebu. The next day he confessed in an
extra-judicial statement wherein he implicated Hilaria Carreon asserting that, with offers of pecuniary gain,
the latter had induced him to commit the crime. On 25 June 1947, a complaint for double murder was filed
against Otadora and Carreon in the justice of the peace court of Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary investigation was
waived and the record was forwarded to the court of first instance, where on 3 September 1947, Otadora
pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. Hilaria Carreon pleaded not guilty, and asked for a separate
trial, which was immediately held, with Otadora as the first witness for the prosecution. Hilaria Carreon's
criminal connection with the bloody affair was collaborated, among others, by Otodoras possession of the
pants of Francisco Galos and the latter's hat. When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was
ordered to put it on; and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly. Hilaria Carreon was found guilty and
sentenced to death and other accessory penalties. Otadora, who confessed, was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Hilaria Carreon appealed.
Issue: Whether Galos fitting of the pants is contrary to the constitutional protection against selfincrimination.
Held: When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on, and the judge found
that it fitted him perfectly; this gave the defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional
protection against self-incrimination had been erroneously disregarded. No timely objection was made,
however, upon that specific ground. It is doubted whether the accused could benefit from the error, if any.
Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege against self-incrimination. Nor is the
removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to
enable the foregoing things to be done.
336 Villaflor vs. Summer [GR 16444, 8 September 1920]
En Banc, Malcolm (J): 5 concur
Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor
and Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion,
Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered
Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she
was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person
was a violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to
Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if
she is pregnant, violates that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure, providing that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Held: Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of the
Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is
extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the
person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and
especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is
an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal
considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice
cannot hesitate. Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first
impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this
jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once
again the Court lays down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial
court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall
be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be
decided as cases arise. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested
physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is
absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the
accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
337
Bermudez vs. Castillo [Per. Rec. 714-A, 26 July 1937]

First Division, Diaz (J): 4 concur

Facts: In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the Solicitor-General
against Leodegario D. Castillo, in connection with this administrative case, Castillo filed, in addition to other
evidence in support of his defense, the six letters. He contended that said six letters are Maria Bermudez's.
Bermudez denied that the letters were hers. Bermudez, however, admitted that three others were in her own
handwriting. As Castillo believed that the three letters admitted by Bermudez to be hers were insufficient for
purposes of comparison with the six letters questioned in the case and as he was determined to show that the
letters were Bermudez's, he required her to copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the
investigator. Bermudez, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to which it was desired to
subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that the three other letters and the other
letters already in Castillos's possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to do. The
investigator, upholding Bermudez, did not compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying
Castillo's petition. As Castillo did not agree to the decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings
praying that the investigator and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted, be ordered to require
and compel Bermudez to furnish new specimens of her handwriting by copying the 6 letters for that purpose.
Issue: Whether Bermudez can refuse not to duplicate the letters in Castillos possession which were allegedly
in her handwriting.
Held: The reason for the privilege is evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby
the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any
other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the
evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he
must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be
asked, once for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is of the opinion
that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a
dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it. Thus,
Bermudez is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her.
338 Beltran vs. Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929]
First Division, Romualdez (J): 6 concur
Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered Francisco Beltran to appear before the
Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in his own handwriting from the latter. The
purpose for such was for the fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he who wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified. Beltran filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.
Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes
evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
Held: The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the
fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power
must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The privilege is
found in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this
privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. Writing is
something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers. Writing is not a purely mechanical and
attention. Herein, writing means that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the present case is similar to that
of producing documents of chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels,
which is not so serious as present, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4,
page 864): "2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows that the production of
documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a subpoena, or
to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a witness (i. e. as a person
appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be
refused under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded." Thus, for the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish
evidence against himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of
writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended
that if permission to obtain a specimen of Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult
matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to
obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained of, that is not reason for trampling
upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may
succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of
the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. Hence, the Court
ordered the judge and the fiscal and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling Beltran to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for
comparison.
339 People vs. Tranca [GR 110357, 17 August 1994]
First Division, Davide Jr. (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a "confidential agent" or informer went to the office of the National
Capital Region NARCOM Unit (NCRNU) and proceeded to the desk of their superior, Capt. Jonathan Miano.
Sgt. Jose Latumbo, SPO3 Oliver Tugade, SPO2 Albert San Jose, SPO1 Francisco Matundan, and PO3 Lilia
Ochia were summoned by Capt. Miano to a briefing. The latter told them that the informer had revealed that a
certain "Jon-Jon" (later identified as Carlos Tranca y Arellano) was selling shabu along Kalayaan Avenue,
Makati, Metro Manila. Capt. Miano then former a buy-bust team with himself as the team leader, Sgt.
Latumbo as the poseur-buyer, and the rest, including the informer, forming the support group. Capt. Miano
gave to Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill with serial number SN886097 and which had been dusted with fluorescent
powder to be used in the buy-bust operation. The team, riding in two cars, then proceeded to the target area.
At the corner of Kalayaan Avenue and J.B. Roxas Street, the informer spotted Tranca, who was standing in
front of the house, and pointed him out to the team members. The team then circled back and alighted from
their vehicles. As planned, Sgt. Latumbo and the informer approached Tranca while the rest of the team took
vantage points so as to observe the operation and close in at the opportune time. The informer introduced Sgt.
Latumbo to Tranca and told the latter that his companion was interested in buying shabu. The informer then
asked Tranca if he had any for sale. Tranca answered in the affirmative and asked for the quantity to be
bought. Sgt. Latumbo replied, "Pare, tapatan mo na lang itong piso ko." (In illegal drug parlance, "piso"
means one hundred pesos) Tranca emerged, he gave a package to Sgt. Latumbo who in turn handed to Tranca
the P100 marked money. Sgt. Latumbo examined the package he received and upon ascertaining that it was
really shabu, gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. Capt. Miano and the rest of the police
officers then closed in on Tranca. They introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and arrested Tranca. Upon
interrogation by Capt. Miano, Tranca voluntarily surrendered one plastic bag of shabu and the P100 marked
money . Tranca was handcuffed and taken to the NARCOM headquarters. On 7 May 1991, SPO1 Matundan
requested Teresita Alberto, the Chief Chemist of the Physical Identification Division of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, to examine the person of Tranca and a P100 bill with serial number
SN886097. She exposed the P100 bill to ultraviolet radiation and found the presence of fluorescent powder
thereon. She likewise exposed the person of Tranca to ultraviolet radiation and discovered flourescent power
on his hands, face and on the opening of the left-side pocket of the white shorts that he was then wearing. In
an information filed on 10 May 1991 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Tranca was charged
with the violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (Criminal Case 2574). The case was assigned to Branch 136 of the said court. Tranca
pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 25 October 1991. Tranca denied the allegations against him and
contended that he was framed by the police officers. On 23 March 1993, the trial court promulgated its
decision finding Tranca guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P30,000.00. Tranca appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The defense contends that the
rights of Tranca against self-incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an ultraviolet ray
examination.
Issue: Whether the subjection of Trancas body to ultraviolet powder violates Trancas right against selfincrimination.
Held: What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when
it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can
the subjection of Tranca's body to ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant
the presence of counsel.
340 South Dakota vs. Neville [459 US 553, 22 February 1983]
O'Connor (J): 6 concur, 1 filed a separate dissenting opinion to which 1 joined
Facts: Two Madison, South Dakota, police officers stopped Neville's car after they saw him fail to stop at a
stop sign. The officers asked Neville for his driver's license and asked him to get out of the car. As he left the
car, Neville staggered and fell against the car to support himself. The officers smelled alcohol on his breath.
Neville did not have a driver's license, and informed the officers that it was revoked after a previous drivingwhile-intoxicated conviction. The officers asked Neville to touch his finger to his nose and to walk a straight
line. When Neville failed these field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest and read his Miranda rights.
Neville acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed to talk without a lawyer present. Reading from
a printed card, the officers then asked Neville to submit to a blood-alcohol test and warned him that he could
lose his license if he refused. Neville refused to take the test, stating "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." The
officers again read the request to submit to a test, and then took Neville to the police station, where they read
the request to submit a third time. Neville continued to refuse to take the test, again saying he was too drunk
to pass it. Neville was thereafter charged. South Dakota law specifically declares that refusal to submit to a
blood-alcohol test "may be admissible into evidence at the trial." Nevertheless, respondent sought to suppress
all evidence of his refusal to take the blood-alcohol test. The Circuit Court granted the suppression motion for
three reasons: the South Dakota statute allowing evidence of refusal violated Neville's federal constitutional
rights; the officers failed to advise Neville that the refusal could be used against him at trial; and the refusal
was irrelevant to the issues before the court. The State appealed from the entire order. The South Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the act of refusal on the grounds that 32-23-10.1, which allows the
introduction of this evidence, violated the federal and state privilege against self-incrimination. The court
reasoned that the refusal was a communicative act involving Neville's testimonial capacities and that the State
compelled this communication by forcing Neville "to choose between submitting to a perhaps unpleasant
examination and producing testimonial evidence against himself."
Issue: Whether the the admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to such a test likewise
offend the right against self-incrimination.
Held: As part of its program to deter drinkers from driving, South Dakota has enacted an "implied consent"
law. This statute declares that any person operating a vehicle in South Dakota is deemed to have consented to
a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for driving while intoxicated. In Schmerber v.
California (384 U.S. 757 [1966]), the Court upheld a state-compelled blood test against a claim that it
infringed the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized that a coerced blood test infringed to some degree the
"inviolability of the human personality" and the "requirement that the State procure the evidence against an
accused `by its own independent labors,'" but noted the privilege has never been given the full scope
suggested by the values it helps to protect. The Court therefore held that the privilege bars the State only from
compelling "communications" or "testimony." Since a blood test was "physical or real" evidence rather than
testimonial evidence, the Court found it unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.
South Dakota further discourages the choice of refusal by allowing the refusal to be used against the
defendant at trial. As the Court recognized in Schmerber, the distinction between real or physical evidence, on
the one hand, and communications or testimony, on the other, is not readily drawn in many cases. The
situations arising from a refusal present a difficult gradation from a person who indicates refusal by complete
inaction, to one who nods his head negatively, to one who states "I refuse to take the test," to Neville here,
who stated "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." Since no impermissible coercion is involved when the
suspect refuses to submit to take the test, regardless of the form of refusal, the Court prefer to rest its decision
on this ground, and draw possible distinctions when necessary for decision in other circumstances. The
values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered when the State offers a suspect the choice of submitting
to the blood-alcohol test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test is so safe,
painless, and commonplace, that Neville concedes, as he must, that the State could legitimately compel the
suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is
clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the
test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced
Neville into choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice. To the contrary,
the State wants Neville to choose to take the test, for the inference of intoxication arising from a positive
blood-alcohol test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test. Therefore, a refusal to take a
blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus
is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.
341 Schmerber vs. California [384 US 757, 20 June 1966]
Brennan (J)
Facts: Schmerber had been arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for injuries suffered in an accident
involving the automobile that he had apparently been driving. At the direction of a police officer, a blood
sample was then withdrawn from Schmerber's body by a physician at the hospital. Schmerber was charged in
Los Angeles Municipal Court of the criminal offense of driving an automobile while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. The chemical analysis of this sample revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in his blood
at the time of the offense which indicated intoxication, and the report of this analysis was admitted in
evidence at the trial. Schmerber objected to receipt of this evidence of the analysis on the ground that the
blood had been withdrawn despite his refusal, on the advice of his counsel, to consent to the test. He
contended that in that circumstance the withdrawal of the blood and the admission of the analysis in evidence
denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights secured against the States by that Amendment: his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment; his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and his right not to be subjected to
unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Appellate Department of the
California Superior Court rejected these contentions and affirmed the conviction.
Issue: Whether Schmerber was thus compelled "to be a witness against himself."
Held: In requiring Schmerber to submit to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of his blood the State
compelled him to submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might be used to prosecute him for a criminal
offense. He submitted only after the police officer rejected his objection and directed the physician to proceed.
The officer's direction to the physician to administer the test over Schmerber's objection constituted
compulsion for the purposes of the privilege. If the scope of the privilege coincided with the complex of
values it helps to protect, the Court might be obliged to conclude that the privilege was violated. However, as
the passage in Miranda implicitly recognizes, the privilege has never been given the full scope which the
values it helps to protect suggest. History and a long line of authorities in lower courts have consistently
limited its protection to situations in which the State seeks to submerge those values by obtaining the evidence
against an accused through "the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. In sum, the
privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak
in the unfettered exercise of his own will." It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's
communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also
communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers. On the other hand, both
federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to
fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to
stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction which has emerged, often
expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony,"
but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of "real or physical evidence" does not
violate it. Schmerber's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as a
donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the
blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither Schmerber's testimony nor
evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by Schmerber, it was not inadmissible on privilege
grounds.
342 People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999]
En Banc, Per curiam: 15 concur
Facts: On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed
that his 9-year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's
whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor,
Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a
Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to look
for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 a.m. of 26 March 1994. They scoured the
campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and
inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he
was about 5 meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin Rondero
pumping the artesian well about 1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was
washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw
without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong continued
their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided to go home. After some time, a
restless Maximo began to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay
secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylene's lifeless body lying on
a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed,
and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and had several
contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair
strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body while the other slipper
was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5 policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot
investigation. They found a pair of shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers.
Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen Rondero earlier washing his
hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the
policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed
that before they found Mylene's body, he saw Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well.
Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero. Some policemen took the newly
washed undershirt and short pants of Rondero from the clothesline. The policemen brought Rondero's wife,
Christine, with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked about the blood on her husband's
clothes, Christine told them about their quarrel the night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which
were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with hair specimens taken from
the victim and Rondero, were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination.
Meanwhile, on 30 March 1994, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to the hair specimen sent to the NBI,
comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right
hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while the hair specimen taken
from the crime scene showed similar characteristics to those of the victim's. On 13 October 1995, the trial
court rendered judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to death. Rondero
moved for reconsideration. On 10 November 1995, the trial court issued an order modifying its earlier
decision, convicting Rondero of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act 7610, otherwise known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is
reclusion perpetua when the victim is under 12 years of age. Rondero appealed.
Issue: Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are admissible as evidence.
Held: Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution, what is actually proscribed is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from Rondero and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair samples were forcibly
taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
343 People vs. Gallarde [GR 133025, 17 February 2000]
First Division, Davide Jr. (CJ): 4 concur
Facts: In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera,
Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin,
all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and
Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and
invited Jaime and Gallarde to dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime,
too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha talking to
each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading
to his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and
asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to
where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose
regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them
that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan informed his uncle,
Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son
Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses,
dikes and fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he saw
talking to Editha, the searchers went back to the house of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde squatting
with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's house; his hands and knees covered with
soil. Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." To the question,
"where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" Gallarde answered "I was with
Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that Gallarde's
statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the toilet, Exkagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde
was the last person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the
field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a
wide hole among the disheveled grass. When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside
and then Editha's hand pitted out. Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard
shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain
Mendoza decided to bring Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on
board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in
the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you." The policemen
together with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil
aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken
without any counsel present. On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape
with homicide. During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pretrial conference. On 12 February 1998, the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a
decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide
because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His motion
for reconsideration, having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28 February 1998, Gallarde
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against selfincrimination.
Held: The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical
act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an
accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt,
hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial
act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination
and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his
foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
344 Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26 May 1969]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part, 2 on official leave
Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbontons counsel announced that he would present
Pascual as his first witness. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners, took note of
such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual would
be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority. Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. On 9
February 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board
commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the
judicial disposition of the matter upon Pascual posting a bond in the amount of P500.00. There was a motion
for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed to file an
answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on 23
March 1965 sustaining the power of Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the
stand, to be distinguished from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. A decision was rendered
by the lower court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the
Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation
without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board and the Gatbontons appealed.
Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.
Held: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to allowing a witness to object to
questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one
aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American decision, is the protection against "any
disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which
could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, the Court had occasion to
declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of
his guilt." Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of
a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness standwith
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with other
rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is
given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
is the respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Thus, in an administrative
hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent.
345-346
Galman vs. Pamaran [GRs 71208-09, 30 August 1985], also People vs. Sandiganbayan
[GRs 71212-13]
En Banc, Cuevas (J): 1 concur, 1 on leave, 8 filed separate concurring opinions, 3 filed separate dissenting
opinion, 1 voted to dismiss (thus concur) before leaving for abroad
Facts: on 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside the
premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the
tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly
known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by PD 1886, the Board conducted public
hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence
either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses
who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were General Fabian C. Ver, Major General
Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt.
Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another
one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado
Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to
the Tanodbayan for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the
Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for murder one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S.
Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and another for the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who
was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day.
In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one
accomplice. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the
prosecution represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan, marked and thereafter offered as part of its
evidence, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through their
respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude
Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases"
contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886,a nd thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for
the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate motions to
exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same ground. The Tanodbayan opposed said
motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their
respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against selfincrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. On 30 May 1985, The Tanodbayan having no further
witnesses to present and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing, the Sandiganbayan,
without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of
the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in
support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the
Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. On 3 June
1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the
testimonies of Ver, et. al. and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been
previously marked in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al. objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence
on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion. On 13 June 1985, The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the
testimonies and/or other evidence produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. The
Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the reconsideration of the said
Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in the
proceeding before the Agrava Board.
Held: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and
to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and
circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons
criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation
therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination
of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the
Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage
of the proceedings." Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course
of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those
suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to
testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is
undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts
and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and
extent of his participation therein. Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said
assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time
they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886
denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves.
Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence,
under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars
even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a
witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law.
Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself were
right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they
were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. It must be noted that initially
the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows
"That no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." As now worded,
Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion
of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to
cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to
Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a
criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but also the
right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the pleadings and their annexes, together
with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and
compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of
the constitutional standards both under the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section
20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al.
cannot be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of
constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law.
Issue (2): Whether the right against self-incrimination need to be invoked before the board in order to prevent
use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Held (2): Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the
other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows:
"Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with
the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the
witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. Presidential Decree 1886,
more specifically Section 5 thereof, belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity
from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the
basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from
prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from
the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being
prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the
hallmark of due process, demands that Ver, et. al. should have been informed of their rights to remain silent
and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied,
under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
Hence, the right against self-incrimination need not be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of
any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation
is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. Said provision
renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. This exclusionary rule applies not only to
confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a
criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. In fine, in view of
the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of PD 1886, the
testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of
the immunity granted by PD 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against selfincrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness.
347 Brown vs. Walker [161 US 591, 23 March 1896]

Brown (J)
Facts: Brown had been subpoenaed as a witness before the grand jury, at a term of the district court for the
Western district of Pennsylvania, to testify in relation to a charge then under investigation by that body against
certain officers and agents of the Alleghany Valley Railway Company, for an alleged violation of the interstate
commerce act. Brown appeared for examination, in response to the subpoena, and was sworn. After testifying
that he was auditor of the railway company, and that it was his duty to audit the accounts of the various
officers of the company, as well as the accounts of the freight department of such company during the years
1894 and 1895, he was asked the question: "Do you know whether or not the Alleghany Valley Railway
Company transported, for the Union Coal Company, during the months of Jul , August, and September, 1894,
coal, from any point on the Low Grade Division of said railroad company to Buffalo, at a less rate than the
established rates in force between the terminal points at the time of such transportation?" To this question he
answered: "That question, with all respect to the grand jury and yourself, I must decline to answer, for the
reason that my answer would tend to accuse and incriminate myself" He was then asked: "Do you know
whether the Alleghany Valley Railway Company, during the year 1894, paid to the Union Coal Company any
rebate, refund, or commission on coal transported by said railroad company, from points on its Low Grade
Division, to Buffalo, whereby the Union Coal Company obtained a transportation of such coal between the
said terminal points at a less rate than the open tariff rate, or the rate established by said company? If you
have such knowledge, state the amount of such rebates or drawbacks or commissions paid, to whom paid, the
date of the same, and on what shipments, and state fully all the particulars within your knowledge relating to
such transaction or transactions." He answered "That question I must also decline to answer, for the reason
already given." The grand jury reported these questions and answers to the court, and prayed for such order as
to the court might seem meet and proper. Upon the presentation of this report, Brown was ordered to appear
and show cause why he should not answer the said questions or be adjudged in contempt, and, upon the
hearing of the rule to show cause, it was found that his excuses were insufficient, and he was directed to
appear and answer the questions, which he declined to do. Whereupon he was adjudged to be in contempt and
ordered to pay a fine of 5 dollars, and to be taken into custody until he should have answered the questions.
He thereupon petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was issued, Brown was
produced in court, the hearing was had, and on 11 September 1895, it was ordered that the petition be
dismissed, the writ of habeas corpus discharged, and Brown remanded to the custody of the marshal. Brown
appealed.
Issue: Whether the Brown, as a witness and not an accused, can refuse to answer the questions about the
anomalies in the Alleghany Valley Railway Company, in light of the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination.
Held: The Act of Congress of 1 February 1893 is supposed to have been passed in view of the opinion of the
US Supreme court in Counselman v. Hitchcock (142 US 547), to the effect that section 860 of the Revised
Statutes, providing that no evidence given by a witness shall be used against him, his property or estate, in
any manner, in any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, did not afford that complete
protection to the witness which the a endment was intended to guaranty. The inference from the language of
said decision is that, if the statute does afford such immunity against future prosecution, the witness will be
compellable to testify. So also in Emery's Case (107 Mass. 172, 185) and in Cullen v. Com. (24 Grat. 624),
upon which much reliance was placed in Counselman v. Hitchcock, it was intimated that the witness might be
required to forego an appeal to the protection of the fundamental law, if he were first secured from future
liability and exposure to be prejudiced, in any criminal proceeding against him, as fully and extensively as he
would be secured by availing himself of the privilege accorded by the constitution. To meet this construction
of the constitutional provision, the act in question was passed, exempting the witness from any prosecution on
account of any transaction to which he may testify. The danger of extending the principle announced in
Counselman v. Hitchcock is that the privilege may be put forward for a sentimental reason, or for a purely
fanciful protection of the witness against an imaginary danger, and for the real purpose of securing immunity
to some third person, who is interested in concealing the facts to which he would testify. Every good citizen is
bound to aid in the enforcement of the law, and has no right to permit himself, under the pretext of shielding
his own good name, to be made the tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter behind his privilege.
The act of congress in question, securing to witnesses immunity from prosecution, is virtually an act of
general amnesty, and belongs to a class of legislation which is not uncommon either in England or in this
county. Although the constitution vests in the president "power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses
against the United States, except in cases of impeachment," this power has never been held to take from
congress the power to pass acts of general amnesty, and is ordinarily exercised only in cases of individuals
after conviction, although "it extends to every offense known to the law, and may be exercised at any time
after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction
and judgment." It is entirely true that the statute does not purport, nor is it possible for any statute, to shield
the witness from the personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to the exposure of his crime; but the
authorities are numerous, and very nearly uniform, to the effect that, if the proposed testimony is material to
the issue on trial, the fact that the testimony may tend to degrade the witness in public estimation does not
exempt him from the duty of disclosure. The design of the constitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in
vindicating his character, but to protect him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a
criminal charge. If he secure legal immunity from prosecution, the possible impairment of his good name is a
penalty which it is reasonable he should be compelled to pay for the common good. If it be once conceded
that the fact that his testimony may tend to bring the witness into disrepute, though not to incriminate him,
does not entitle him to the privilege of silence, it necessarily follows that, if it also tends to incriminate, but at
the same time operates as a pardon for the offense, the fact that the disgrace remains no more entitles him to
immunity in this case than in the other. Herein, the grand jury was engaged in investigating certain alleged
violations of the interstate commerce act. Brown, the witness, was the auditor of the road, whose duty it was
to audit the accounts of the officers, and the money paid out by them. Having audited the accounts of the
freight department during the time in question, he was asked whether he knew of any such discrimination in
favor of the Union Coal Company, and declined to answer upon the ground that he would thereby incriminate
himself. As he had not apparent authority to make the forbidden contracts, to receive the money earned upon
such contracts, or to allow or pay any rebates, drawbacks, or commissions thereon, and was concerned only in
auditing accounts, and passing vouchers for money paid by others, it is difficult to see how, under any
construction of section 10 of the interstate commerce act, he could be said to have willfully done anything, or
aided or abetted others in doing anything, or in omitting to do anything, in violation of the act, his duty being
merely to see that others had done what they purported to have done, and that the vouchers rendered by them
were genuine. But, however this may be, it is entirely clear that he was not the chief, or even a substantial,
offender against the law, and that his privilege was claimed for the purpose of shielding the railway or its
officers from answering a charge of having violated its provisions. To say that, notwithstanding his immunity
from punishment, he would incur personal odium and disgrace from answering these questions, seems too
much like an abuse of language to be worthy of serious consideration. But, even if this were true, he would
still be compelled to answer, if the facts sought to be elucidated were material to the issue. If witnesses
standing in Brown's position were at liberty to set up an immunity from testifying, the enforcement of the
interstate commerce law, or other analogous acts, wherein it is for the interest of both parties to conceal their
misdoings, would become impossible, since it is only from the mouths of those having knowledge of the
inhibited contracts that the facts can be ascertained. While the constitutional provision is justly regarded as
one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory
immunity, that the witness was compellable to answer.
348 Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968]
En Banc, Sanchez (J): 7 concur
Facts: A few days before 12 November 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a
Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the
market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his
address with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop, informed him about the
Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told
Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City.
Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car
mortgages and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Asistio
however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo
Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and,
after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a
third person for a profit. Chavez, known to be a car agent, was included in the plan. He furnished the name of
Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson
Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the afternoon, Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his
Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected
the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price (P21,000.00), they
went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter,
they went to see a lawyer-notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of the deed of sale.
After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and
Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto. As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant
in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other papers
remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated
that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should
be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the
note bearer. Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table to
pose for pictures with some fans and came back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared
after he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They
went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately
reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang
P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On November 14, the
registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the
name of Asistio in Caloocan. Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual
alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias
"Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe were charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, a
Thunderbird car (Motor H9YH-143003, Plate H-16648, Pasay City 1962) together with its accessories worth
P22,200.00, belonging to Dy Sun Hiok y Lim. Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who
have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty. On 23 July 1963, trial commenced before the
judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City. When trial opened, the
prosecution called upon Roger Chavez to testify as an ordinary witness (not a State witness). The trial
proceeded, with "Fiscal Grecia" conducting the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez. On 1 February 1965,
the trial court rendered judgment which acquitted all other accused except Roger Chavez, who was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of not less than 10 years, 1 day, as minimum and not more than 14 years, 8 months and
1 day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to
pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo
Sumilang, who was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay
P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car. The sentence was promulgated on 8
March 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 14 May 1967, the Court of Appeals
resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing as, on 21 June 1968, the Court of
Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal,
directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the
Court of Appeals, to the turn him over to Muntinglupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment
below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment. Chavez filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and in the alternative, prayed for grant of the alternative remedies of
certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file
brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to the Supreme Court for the reason that
he was raising purely questions of law.
Issue: Whether a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the proper remedy for the courts disregard of Chavez
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
Held: The course which Chavez took is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was
violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed
of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not
preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For the writ of habeas
corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty
is at stake. Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to Chavez whose case presents a clear picture
of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto." Further, a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights
can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither
binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. Still, since Chavez is still serving under a final and
valid judgment of conviction for another offense. he is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect
to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was
prosecuted and convicted.

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United States vs. Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7 Septmber 1912] 1

This collection contains fifteen (15) cases

Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

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Bermudez vs. Castillo [Per. Rec. 714-A, 26 July 1937]

Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

First Division, Diaz (J): 4 concur

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Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 )

Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

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347 Brown vs. Walker [161 US 591, 23 March 1896]

Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

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Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 )

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