UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD SHELLEY 9th Cir. Case No. 09-56133

Plaintiff-Appellant
District Court Case No. 8:09-cv-00291-CJC-MLG

vs.

QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP.; LITTON

LOAN SERVICING, LLP, Defendants-
Appellees

and

FREMONT INVESTMENT & LOAN

Defendant

APPELLANT’S INFORMAL BRIEF

1. Jurisdiction

a. Timeliness of Appeal:

(I) Date of entry of judgment or order

of lower court: 6/18/2009

(ii) Date of service of any motion made after judgment

(other than for fees and costs):__________________________

(iii)Date of entry of order deciding motion ____________________

(iv) Date notice of appeal filed 7/16/2009

 (v) For prisoners, date you gave notice of appeal
to prison authorities ______________________________

b. IF POSSIBLE, PLEASE ATTACH ONE COPY OF EACH OF THE

FOLLOWING:

1. The order from which you are appealing

2. The district court’s entry of judgment
3. The district court docket sheet

Case No. 09-56133

2.What are the facts of your case?

PARTIES

Plaintiff/Appellant Richard Shelley(hereinafter “Appellant”) is a natural person whom at all relevant times
referred to resided at and held all Legal Title to a parcel of Single Family Residential Real Property
located in the City of Westminster, County of Orange, CA commonly known as 6721 Tillamook Ave.
ZipCode 92683

Defendant/Appellee Quality Loan Service, Corp.(hereinafter “Quality”) license ID 01244892 which

expired 10/22/02 who’s mailing address as of record is 1650 E. 4th St., Santa Ana, CA 92701 allegedly
doing business out of San Diego County address 2141 5th Ave., San Diego, CA 92101

Defendant/Appellee Litton Loan Servicing LP(hereafter “Litton”) a Delaware Corporation license

#4130234 actively licensed with the California Department of Corporations as a Mortgage Banker
engaging in Interstate Commerce with no branches in the state of California with its main office address
of record 4828 Loop Central Drive; P.O. Box 570848, Houston, TX 77257

Defendant FGC Commercial Mortgage Finance, dba Fremont Investment & Loan FDIC
insured(hereinafter “Fremont”) license #6032063 no longer licensed after finally consenting to an FDIC
Cease and Desist order in 2007(see FDIC-07-035b ) after multiple warnings to stop its “unsatisfactory
lending practices” last known address of record 2727 E. Imperial Highway, Brea, CA 92821
 3.On May 17, 2006, Appellant entered into a consumer credit transaction (hereinafter "the transaction")
with Fremont in which the extended consumer credit was subject to a finance charge and which was
initially payable to Fremont secured by the Principal Dwelling at 6721 Tillamook Ave. Westminster CA
92683 (hereinafter “the Property”) of Appellant. During the course of the transaction Fremont failed to
provide Appellant two clear and conspicuous Notices of his Right to Rescind as well as failed to
properly include in the finance charge the Broker’s fee of $5,460,
The application fee of $500 which was not a "bona fide and reasonable" fee and the Processing fee
$525 within the tolerance limits as specified by the Truth In Lending Act(hereinafter “TILA”). Sometime
in May or June 2008 the loan was allegedly assigned to Defendant Litton Loan Servicing,
L.L.P.(hereinafter “Litton”), actual date of Assignment being uncertain due to Defendants failing to file
Notice of Assignment with the Orange County Recorder’s Office. A new loan was obtained on June
4,2008 in the amount of $271,587.04 and applied toward the principle amount due(as can be
referenced by copies of both Fremont’s and Litton’s transaction history that was provided to
Mr.Shelley). Apparently unsatisfied with the tender received Litton informed Mr.Shelley of their intention
to Substitute Defendant Quality Loan Service, Corporation(hereinafter “Quality”) as Trustee, actual date
of Substitution being uncertain due to Defendants failing to file Substitution of Trustee with the Orange
County Recorder’s Office. Quality declared Default November 6, 2008 then recorded November 7,
2008. Confused and displeased with the allegations made by the Defendants concerning the underlying
Deed of Trust recorded 5/26/2006, as Instrument No. 2006000359250, in Book xxx, Page xxx of
Official Records in the Office of the Recorder of Orange County, California Mr.Shelley gave Notice of
Rescission received by the assumed Trustee on December 23, 2008 as evidenced as Exhibit E of
Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion, suggesting Judicial mediation as an appropriate resolve to determine the
rights, obligations and authorities of all parties involved in the dispute. Defendants refused and
proceeded to record on February 19, 2009 a Notice of Trustee’s Sale forcing Mr.Shelley to file the
instant action in the District Court on March 9, 2009 shortly after discovery of the TILA violations giving
rise to the cause of action contained in the complaint and then served summons on Litton and Quality.
The pending sale was either postponed or cancelled for possible irregularities perhaps, in any case the
Defendants made their own decision not to go forward with the sale that was scheduled March 10,
2009.

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 Case No. 09-56133
3. What did you ask the district court to do (for example, award damages, give injunctive
relief, etc.)?Applied for a Temporary Restraining Order, asked the District Court to issue a
Preliminary Injunction enjoining Defendants from commencing the Trustee’s Sale, sought
enforcement of the declaratory right of rescission under TILA return of all profits and payments
received and given to anyone in connection with or arising from the transaction including but not
limited to third parties that was owed to Appellant, fulfillment of the steps required to be taken
to reflect that the security interest in Appellant’s home has been terminated regardless of status
as statutorily required by TILA, damages for noncompliance and a determination of any
amounts due to Defendants after the TILA’s statutory provisions have been complied with by
Defendants.

State the claim or claims you raised at the district court. A statutorily entitled claim for Extended
Rescission contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1635 for violations relating to Defendant’s failure to properly
disclose material disclosures that extends the right of rescission to 3 years, claim for additional
Rescission rights pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i)(1)(A). A claim for damages for noncompliance with
the statutorily required procedures provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). Then the District Court
suggested a possible requisite of showing that Appellant can or will fulfill his obligation of tender of
money or property following rescission, Appellant gave notice to Defendants and to the District
Court(filed and entered on the docket 5/15/2009 Docket Entry #22 Attachment #1) declaring an offer
of return or surrender of the property secured in exchange for all tender payments received and profits
gained in connection with the transaction. The property has been in my family since it was built in the
50's then purchased by me from my mother in 1985 on a VA loan, the market value from the appraisal
that was done in 2006 was more than twice the amount of the credit that was extended and additional
improvements had been made since then. Surely it was more than an adequate offer seen as the
Defendants and the District Court would not state the amount needed to satisfy whatever tender
obligation which may arise from the Rescission. The judge from the District Court never specifically
ordered anything to the contrary so the procedures set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) should govern
having not accepted the offer it would appear that interest(if any) was waived.
 4. What issues are you raising on appeal?

Before beginning even though it may not be necessary please do accept Appellant’s humble
apologies for prior counsel’s long delay in filing of the action. Attorney Stephan F. Dial was hired around
sometime in July of 2008 to file the action, was provided with everything needed to file and was well
informed of all the intended claims to be filed and how to proceed with the case. Then after the action
was finally filled the Attorney refused to cooperate with how to proceed with the case as directed,
attempted to force Appellant to dismiss the action, sign a general release of all claims under duress and
undue influence, refused to accept Appellant’s revocation of power of attorney and then purported to
file a motion of non-opposition on behalf of Appellant after being discharged as counsel. So please be
assured that had Appellant been granted Pro Se access to the CM/ECF registration system for the
California Central District Court much of this could have been avoided. That being said Great
Appreciation goes to this Honorable Court for allowing Pro Se/Appellant the privilege.

The judge from the District Court made inaccurate responsive statements regarding the facts
leaving unresolved issues and mistakes of fact in denying the requested preliminary injunctive relief. First
is the fact that the transaction in question(involving the real property Appellant held all legal title to) was
an extension of consumer credit entered into May 17, 2006 and not a loan entered into on May 26,
2006 of “funds” as the judge for the judge from the District Court mistakenly understood. See Rudisell v
Fifth Third Bank 622 F.2d 243 (6th Cir 1980) ¶ 38. The Defendants had no part in the extension of
any amounts for the Purchase Money used to pay off the original Installment Sale Contract Appellant
entered into in 1985. Thus Fremont was not secured and did not acquire an interest in the whole
property. Besides “tender of consideration received is an equitable prerequisite to rescission, the
requirement was abolished by the Truth in Lending Act...Only 'upon the performance of the creditor's
obligations under (section 1635),' must the obligor tender the property to the creditor. Section 1635(b)
expressly provides that prior to performance of the required actions by the creditor, 'if the creditor has
delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor may retain possession of it.Ӧ 5 Palmer v Wilson 502
F.2d 860 (9th Cir 1974) ¶ 6 “In the absence of any clear congressional statement.”See 114 Cong. Rec.
14398 (1968) (statement of Rep. Sullivan) “If the seller does not come back to pick up (his property)
after a 10-day period (following the notice of rescission), the buyer can keep this item and he does not
even have to pay for it . .” quoted by Sosa v Fite 498 F.2d 114(5th Cir 1974) ¶ 10.

Second is a mistake of fact made by Appellant’s former counsel(Comp. ¶ 14) but no valid
assignment has been recorded in the local county Recorder’s Office where the property is located, as
well as no Substitution of Trustee by Quality, something Quality has in fact been known to neglect doing
as required See Pro Value Properties, Inc. v. Quality Loan Service Corp., 170 Cal. App. 4th 579
See also Exhibit A ¶ 24, and seen as they do not hold valid California License or qualify for a Trustee’s
Exemption that makes their attempt to non-judicially foreclose illegal and a fraud. To add to that seen as
Litton was created in a foreign state and Quality claims their granted power of Trustee from Litton,
under the US Const Art III § 2 California non-judicial would not be available. The issue also had not

5
 been resolved as to the incorrect amount($440,000 later corrected) of the credit extended, also how
and where from the District Court and Appellant’s former counsel determined the incorrect amount
when all the evidence that were provided in discovery stated the correct amount($273,000) and while
Appellant has made a good faith attempt in the Prayer For Relief for the Court to determine as to what
amount might be due(Compl. VI ¶ 9) if equitable modification had been requested by the Defendants,
this good faith effort fell on deaf ears and the District Court allowed the Defendants to prejudice
Appellant’s rights by letting them allude discovery, delay proceedings and even grant their motion after
the Court ordered deadline had passed. While it maybe true that Appellant had not provided any
evidence of equitable tolling the limitations for the overcharges, likewise can be said for Defendants lack
of evidence of equitable tolling the limitations of the 20 days outlined in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) that they
had two opportunities from relief from the forfeiture but consequently waived them. See Hritz v Woma
Corporation 732 F.2d 1178 (3rd Cir 1984) ¶ 17 "failure to answer the complaint must be viewed in the
context of its failure over an extended period of time to answer any claim or correspondence from the
plaintiffs. It is true that, as of the day after filing, the claim had been presented to [Defendants]
considerably...before the suit was initiated...Given [Defendant's] conduct, it would have mattered little
whether plaintiff filed suit one day or six months prior...[Defendant's] failure to answer any
communication would have created a time bar to proceeding against other parties, regardless of the filing
date. Viewed in this light, the failure to answer the complaint is part of a pattern that threatens
[Appellant] with the gravest prejudice: having their claim barred completely.."

Third is the fact that there was no mortgage but a Deed of Trust where the only expressed power
of sale was granted to Fremont which made no objection, counterclaims, raised no defenses and made
no representation that any interest, principle, balance, or consideration was unsatisfied, unpaid,
uncollected due, owed or outstanding nor did Fremont claim the promissory note along with the Deed of
Trust to be valid or legally enforceable by them let alone to the other Defendants/Appellees because it
has been rescinded. Equitable Rescission which seeks to restore both parties to a contract to the status
quo ante, when actually Plaintiff’s claim was seeking statutory enforcement of his right of Rescission
arising under the TILA. Just as the 6th Circuit held in Rudisell v Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243, 40
(6th Cir. 1980) “the appellants still have a right to rescind the transaction. Congress intended the
rescission to absolutely void the transaction and return the debtor to the status quo existing before he
started the transaction, even against third party purchasers”. See 114 Cong. Rec. 14388 (1968)
(statement of Rep. Sullivan). Furthermore if there is or was to be any conditioning of repayment of
consideration then Defendants/Appellees need to prove the amount, that the consideration was in fact
theirs to give, that Appellant knowingly received a benefit from that consideration and how Appellant did
in fact benefit from this consideration. All this could have been accomplished by complying with
Discovery something Appellees have absolutely refused to do.

Forth is the District Court’s error of law as to the substantive form of the Rescission claim, See
Griggs v E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 385 F.3d 440 (4th Cir 2004) ¶¶ 22, 23 “Broadly speaking,
rescission at law occurs when the plaintiff has a right to unilaterally avoid a contract. The rescission itself
is effected when the plaintiff gives notice to the defendant that the transaction has been avoided and

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 tenders to the defendant the benefits received by the plaintiff under the contract. See Handbook on
Remedies, § 4.3 at 255.” “(23)Once the plaintiff has rescinded, he is entitled to recover back what he
gave under the contract. If the defendant does not give it back voluntarily, the plaintiff may sue for it....
Thus the court in cases of rescission "at law" does not effect the rescission and the court's only role is to
get back the plaintiff's property or its value.”Appellant has the substantive right to tender the property in
exchange for all the tender received arising out of the transaction. See Gerasta v Hibernia National
Bank 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir 1978) ¶ 15 “the forfeiture provision contained in Section 1635(b) is still a
part of the statute; it should be enforced as written in an appropriate case; but, in the absence of the
tender by the obligor that the Section specifically requires, it is not applicable.”In the complaint Appellant
sought Declaratory Relief and the Defendants had a time limit prescribed by statute and “a claim for
declaratory relief could have been resolved through another form of action which has a specific
limitations period, the specific period of time will govern." Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29,¶ 42
(2d Cir.1984).

. Fifth is the misguided reliance of the District Court in Yamamoto v. Rank of New York, 339 F.3d
1167 (9th Cir 2003) and Am. Mortgage Network v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815,821 (4th Cir. 2007) as its
controlling authority to deny Appellant the statutory right of Rescission when none of the Defendants
filed a counterclaim as would be necessary under F.R.C.P. Rule 13 for what the judge from the District
Court was proposing before granting a Rule 12(b)(6), he also unfortunately failed to recognize the
material difference in those cases to this one. In Yamamoto the court held that when the Yamamotos
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy their standing to pursue the Rescission claim in the District Court
transferred to the bankruptcy trustee and they were not the proper plaintiffs. In this case Appellant has
not filed for bankruptcy nor does he intend to due to the fact he is not insolvent and the firm belief in
paying his debts, more importantly the District Court seem to have overlooked the cautioning the 9th
Circuit advised in its conclusion in Yamamoto that “Whether the call is correct must be determined on a
case-by-case basis” seen as the decision was founded mostly on case law as opposed to statutory
procedures specified in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). In Am. Mortgage the District and Appellate both held
that Am. Mortgage Network had complied with TILA and acted in good faith when it promptly notified
the Sheltons of clerical errors and intention refund the overcharges immediately after discovery of the
unintentional non-disclosures, also the finding of fact that Mr.Shelton was not an average consumer being
employed in the real state business and apparent misrepresentation that the property in question in that
case was their primary residence which in fact it was not further supporting that absolute Rescission was
not appropriate due to Shelton’s failure to satisfy the required criteria contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)
and only applies to the consumer’s principal dwelling. Here the Appellees have taken advantage of
Appellant’s kind nature and good faith intentions to resolve the these issues reasonably and not have
everything worked a long hard 25 years earning and walk away with nothing.

Especially when the fact is that violations are apparent on the face of the documents attached to the
complaint Exhibit A and Exhibit B are both misrepresenting the date as 5/15/06 when the Notary’s
Witness and seal date evidencing execution is 5/17/06 and because they have never attempted to
correct it despite being confronted with the facts and demand for rescission that is willful Fraud. Also

7
when calculating the monthly payment schedule that begins 7/01/08 with the amount from the promissory
note interest that was scheduled to be charged monthly would have been around 13% in clear violation
of CA Const art XV § 1 making it Usurious. See Davis v. Werne. 673 F.2d 866, 14“The statutory
damages are explicitly a bonus to the successful TILA plaintiff, designed to encourage private
enforcement of the Act, and a penalty against the defendant, designed to deter future violations.” See
Williams v. Public Finance Corp., supra; Hinkle v. Rock Springs Nat. Bank, 538 F.2d 295 (10th Cir.
1976), “recovery of statutory damages by a successful TILA plaintiff is not inconsistent with other
remedies the plaintiff may have in connection with the same transaction, such as rescission of the loan
contract”, see Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975), or even forfeiture to the plaintiff, under
state usury laws, of the unpaid balance of the loan, see Williams v. Public Finance Corp., (598 F.2d 349
(5th Cir. 1979) ).
“When imposing sanctions under its inherent power to promote the orderly and just administration
of its caseload, the district court must follow its own rules”, see Peabody v Maud Van Cortland Hill
Schroll Trust 892 F.2d 772,¶ 30 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, 389 (5th Cir.1988);
make a finding of bad faith, Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67, 100 S.Ct. 2455,
2464-65, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); and afford due process, TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826
F.2d 915, 916 (9th Cir.1987). The judge from the District Court should have restrained from expressing
a judicial bias and the complete disregard in maintaining the appearance of impartiality when acting in a
judicial capacity, leaving doubt in the mind of the Plaintiff, wondering if he will have a fair and just trial
where the case is heard on the merits and none of his rights to due process will be prejudiced. How
exactly was Appellant supposed to file anything or participate in the case when the manual filing by
former counsel was rejected and Pro Se’s are not eligible for CM/ECF registration? As for the motion
and proposed order that was granted that appeared to be nothing more than a repeat of what the judge
from the District Court said, it should not have been granted as it was filed passed the court ordered
deadline, tender had already been offered therefore Appellant obviously had the ability nowhere in the
TILA statute or case law has specifically requires a completely solvent consumer to produce some sort
of definite eligibility criteria before being granted the rights they are by law entitled to. There is no such
evidence of inability in Docket #7 as Litton as alleged, that entry was one of the judges responses and
Litton should be compelled to prove they have any standing by producing the alleged assignment from
Fremont and that Appellant consented to changing the terms of the status quo so they can be penalized
for usury as well as Quality after they provide the Substitution of Trustee from Litton. An inquiry was
made into the reasonable value of the supposed consideration they gave to Appellant they never replied
with an amount, therefore it was concluded that the value was nothing. Granting it was unprofessional the
judge completely abused his discretion when he ignored the fact that there is two options to satisfying a
rescission tender claim, altering the substantive provisions of TILA like this is an assault individual civil
liberties and will cause damage to the integrity of The Judiciary for not enforcing its own rules as well as
destroy public confidence for holding a partial favoritism in “potential campaign contributors” as the
judge may see it which appears to be nothing more than Prepaid Bribes with a different name. The
Statutorily prescribed method of procedures outlined in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) which is most likely what a
natural consumer should expect when seeking to have those rights enforced and what the judge from the
District Court unmistakably had a predisposition to claims of is discernable similar if not the very same
bait and switch tactics Congress intended to provide consumers relief with when creating the right of

8
 Rescission, and because the 3 day right of rescission is absolute and does not require the determination
of a court to be effective and because the statute makes no distinction between the 3 days and 3 years
because the right is extended then such a determination is not required on the latter exercised right of
rescission. Furthermore because Appellant’s claim for rescission went unopposed and undisputed and
the last sentence added by Congress was a grant of jurisdiction not a full range of discretion to do as it
pleases. Doing so would be in direct violation of the Separation of Powers provisions in The U.S.
Constitution. "The district court, however, engaged in its balancing of the equities on an inadequate
record and to that extent abused its discretion."Northern Cheyenne Tribe v Hodel 851 F.2d 1152 (9th
Cir 1988) ¶ 25. After this case was already sent to the 9th Circuit Appellant attempted to have an illegal
fraudulent unlawful detainer and eviction action used to harass and menace Appellant that was filed in the
West Justice Center, in the County of Orange removed to the California Central District Court without
prepayment of filing fees and was denied based on the recommendation from a Magistrate Judge Arthur
Nakazato. The same Magistrate Judge Arthur Nakazato that Recused himself on Docket Entry #8 of
this Case. A copy of the former Docket is also included as a separate attachment as well as a certified
copy of notice of rescission where the property was tendered which is referred to on Docket Entry
#21of this case Attachments: #1 Declaration of Stephen F. Dial as well as the document itself along with
other documents on the record of the Docket attached to the Appendix in chronological order with a
copy of the uniform residential appraisal report evidencing the market value at the end and the Docket
Report for this case in the beginning.

All rights Reserved

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 Case No. ______________
09-56133

5.Did you present all these issues to the district court?

_______________
No If not,
why? Yes/No Denial of Court Access

6.What law supports these issues on appeal? (You may, but need not, refer to cases and
statutes.)

Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges Cannon 3 § A(3)

Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges Cannon 3 § A(4)

15 U.S.C. § 1635
CA Const art XV § 1, Cal Code Civ Proc § 335-349.4,
Cal Civ Code § 1473-1479, Cal Civ Code § 1485-1505, Cal Civ Code § 1511-1515,
Cal Civ Code § 1688-1693, Cal Civ Code § 1770, Cal Civ Code § 3412-3415
2.

Horton v California Credit Corp. 2009 US Dist (S CA), Moore v Wells Fargo 2009
US Dist (E VA), Williams v. Public Finance Corp 598 F.2d 349 (5th Cir 1979), Davis v.
Werne. 673 F.2d 866, Sharpe v FDIC 126 F.3d 1147, Sheldon v Sill 49 U.S. 441 Hodges v.
Swafford, 2007 WL 968771 (Ind. App. Apr. 3, 2007) Escher v. Decision One Mortgage
Company, LLC, 2007 WL 1683563 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 12, 2007) Williamson v. Lafferty,
698 F.2d 767, 768-69 (5th Cir.1983), .Aquino v. Public Finance Consumer Discount Co.,
606 F.Supp. 504, 507 (E.D.Pa.1985), Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, NA, 15
U.S.C. 1640(a) (1994), 15 U.S.C. 1641 (1994), Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 156
F.3d 499, 502 (3rd Cir. 1998), Shepeard, 730 F. Supp. at 1299, Gerasta v. Hibernia
National Bank, 575 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1978), Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 118-119 (5th
Cir. 1974), Velazquez v. Home American Credit Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6417 (N.D.
Ill.) (April 14, 2003), Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 791 F.2d 699, 702
(9th Cir. 1986); Reynolds v. D & N Bank, 792 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (E.D. Mich. 1992);
Johnson v. Thomas, 794 N.E.2d 919, 931 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), Blakemore v. Blakemore
(1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, Rossman, 280 F.3d at 390 (quoting Ramadan v. Chase
Manhattan Corp., 156 F.3d 499, 502 (3d Cir.1998)). Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, N.A., 163
F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir.1998) Pac. Shore Funding v. Lozo, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 8874 (Cal., July
19, 2006), Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1980); Ljepava v. M.
L. S. C. Properties, Inc., 511 F.2d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1975); Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d
860, 861 (9th Cir. 1974), Staley v. Americorp Credit Corp., 164 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584 (D.
MD. 2001), Gill v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co., 671 F. Supp. 1021(E.D. Pa. 1987),
Willis v. Friedman, Clearinghouse No. 54,564 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 2, 2002),
Robertson v. Strickland (In re Robertson), 333 B.R. 894, 898, 904 n. 14 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2005), FDIC v. Ablin, 532 N.E. 2d 379 (Ill. App. 1988); Community National Bank &
Trust v. McClammy, 525 N.Y.S. 2d 629 (App. Div. 1988); Yslas v. D.K. Guenther Builders,
Inc., 342 So. 2d 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), Butler v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban
Dev’t, 595 F. Supp. 1041, 1047 (E.D.Pa. 1984), Ruiz v. New Garder Tp., 232 F. Supp. 2d
418, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2002), Bizier v. Globe Financial Services, Inc., 654 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1981), Jackson v Grant 876 F.2d 764 (9th Cir 1989)

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 Case No. ______________
09-56133

8.Do you have any other cases pending in this court? If so, give the name and docket
number of each case. No

9. Have you filed any previous cases which have been decided by this court? If so, give
the name and docket number of each case. No

10. For prisoners, did you exhaust all administrative remedies for each claim prior to filling
your complaint in the district court?
_______________________
2/03/10 ___________________________
/s/ Richard Shelley
________ DATE _______ SIGNATURE

___________________________
6721 Tillamook Ave., Westminster, CA
_______
92683 ADDRESS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name: ____________________

SHELLEY v. __________________________
QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP.

Case No.: _____________

09-56133

IMPORTANT: You must send a copy of ALL documents filed with the court and
any attachments to counsel for ALL parties in this case. You must also file a
certificate of service with this court telling us that you have done so. You may use
this certificate of service as a master copy, fill in the title of the document you are
filing and attach it at the back of each filing with the court. Please list below the
names and addresses of the parties who were sent a copy of your document and the
 dates on which they were served. Be sure to sign the statement below. You must
attach a copy of the certificate of service to each of the copies and the copy you file
with the court.

I certify that a copy of the

_____________________________
Richard Shelley Opening Brief

and any attachments was served, either in person or by mail, on the persons listed below.

/s/_____________________
Richard Shelley
____ Signature
Notary NOT required

Name Address Date Served

McCarthy Holthus, LLP 1770 4th Avenue San Diego, CA 92101 02/04/10

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