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EVIDENCE
Edgar Esqueda vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 170222
Facts:
A petition for review on certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court
regarding the
affirmation of the Court of Appeals to the decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court Branch
33 of Dumaguete City on Criminal Case Nos. 14612 and 14609 of herein
respondents commonlaw spouses Gaudencio Quiquinto and Venancia Aliser respectively against
petitioner Edgar
Esqueda and one John Doe of 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide.
The private respondents were awaked on of before 11 o clock in the evening on
March
3, 1999 by the accused petitioner who concealed their identities as members of
roving patrol in
their place and asking for a drink from the household. One of the respondents,
Gaudencio
Quiquinto opened the door and went outside while his lived-in partner Venancia
Aliser followed
him and stayed by the door. They found two men outside, one is positively identified
as the
accused petitioner while the other is not identified. The accused petitioner allegedly
stabbed
Gaudencio immediately. Aliser tried to ran away but was allegedly stabbed
and fell on the
ground and was continually inflicted mortal wounds against the victims.
The defense anchored on alibi and denial. Presented three witnesses, Claudio,
Viviana
and Domingo testified before the court that the accused was out sea fishing during
the time of
the crime.
Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the latter guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
of frustrated homicide and totally disregarding the latters defense.
Held:
The Honorable Court did not disregard the defense of the accused
petitioner in
rendering its decision. The presented alibis and denial by the defense are
essentially weak
against the positive identifications made by the respondents.
For an alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he is somewhere else and it is
physically impossible for him to be in the scene for the crime. Physically impossible
refers to the
distance between the place where the crime has transpired and the
place where it was
committed, also the facility of access between the two places. Using the
testimonies of the

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witnesses as evidence, the accused petitioner failed to prove that it was physically
impossible
for him to went to the scene of the crime at the time of the incident.
In this case, the defense of alibi failed. The positive identification destroys the
defense of alibi giving to such effect to be weak, given as the identification was
made with
resound and credible

Lasquite Vs. Victory Hills

Tuesday, July 1, 2014
Facts:

1971: Jose Manahan executed a Deed of Quitclaim or Assignment of Rights in over a

parcel of land in favor of Conrado Lasquite.
Lasquite applied for a Free Patent over the lot. Pending the approval of the
application, he sold 1/2 of the land to Juanito Andrade.
Upon the grant of the patent application, OCTs were issued in their names.
1983: Prescillas filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands to question the grant of free
patent in favor of Lasquite and Andrade claiming that they have been in possession
of the lot since 1940.
Prescillas also instituted a case for reconveyance alleging that Lasquite forged the
signature of Jose Manahan in the deed since Manahan died prior to its execution.
The Manahans filed complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages.
Claiming to be the owner of the lot (OCT 380) which was allegedly registered in 1937
to to Jose Manahan by virtue of Homestead Patent, Victory Hills filed a motion to
intervene.
RTC upheld the title of Lasquite and Andrade. It disregarded OCT 380 and ruled that it
lacked the signature of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce which is a
requirement for the patent's validity.
The CA reversed the RTC's ruling and declared victory Hills as the Absolute owner of
the lot.

Issues:
1. WON Victory Hills is entitled to reconveyance of the lot since their Homestead Patent
cannot be simply defeated by the subsequent grant of Free Patent to Lasquite and Andrade.
2. WON the claim of Victoria Hills had prescribed.
Held:

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1. No. To give OCT No. 380 probative value in court would be to allow variance or an evasion
or circumvention of the requirement laid down in Section 105 of Act No. 2874. We are thus
warned that any title sourced from the flawed OCT No. 380 could be void. On this basis, we
are justified to consider with great care any claims derived therefrom.
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a
party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear
and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. It is rather obvious
from the foregoing disquisition that respondent failed to dispense such burden. Indeed, the
records are replete with proof that respondent declared the lots comprising Lot No. 3050 for
taxation purposes only after it had instituted the present case in court. This is not to say of
course that tax receipts are evidence of ownership, since they are not, albeit they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one would ordinarily be paying taxes for
a property not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
2. The action has not prescribed.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference
point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance
of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the
property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the
property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run
against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
The action assumed the nature of a suit to quiet title; hence, imprescriptible. However, in
our view, respondent Victory Hills has failed to show its entitlement to a reconveyance of the
land subject of the action.

G.R. No. 185284

June 22, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JASON SY, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 171453
June 18, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL DELPINO, Accused-appellant.
14. Lynn Maagad & Director of Lands v. Juanito Maagad
A parcel of land located in Cagayan de Oro City, referred to as Lot 6297, formed part
of the
estate of Proceso Maagad. The heirs of Proceso Maagad executed an extrajudicial
partition of
real estate dividing among themselves the estate of their father. By virtue of the
partition, Lot
6297 went to Adelo while Lot 6270, which is a parcel of land also forming part of the
estate, went
to Juanito. Juanito alleged that there was a mistake in the adjudication of the land
and that it was

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supposed to be Lot 6297 that went to him. To rectify the mistake, Juanito and the
children of
Adelo since the latter already died executed a Memorandum of Exchange, however,
an
erroneous assignment of the parties in the memorandum just led to a repeat of the
same mistake
that they are trying to correct. Lynn Maagad, a child of Adelo and acting in behalf of
his siblings,
applied for a free patent of Lot 6297 and demanded Juanito to surrender the lot,
which Juanito
didnt act on since as far as he is concerned, there was already an agreement
between them by
virtue of the memorandum. The free patent was approved and an OCT was issued in
favor of the
heirs of Adelo which led Juanito to file a complaint for annulment of title. The RTC,
upon motion
of Lynn Maagad for a demurrer to evidence, dismissed the case stating that Juanito
cannot alter
the contents of the extrajudicial partition by parol evidence under Section 9 of Rule
130 as the
parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written
instrument.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling. The Supreme Court, in upholding the CA decision,
resolved the
application of the parol evidence rule and stated that while the parol evidence rule,
as relied on by
the RTC to decide in favor of Lynn Maagad, proscribes any addition to or
contradiction of the
terms of a written agreement by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the
signing of the
document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties the rule
is not absolute
and admits of exceptions. Thus, among other grounds, a party may present
evidence to modify,
explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading a mistake
in the written agreement. For the mistake to validly constitute an exception to the
parol
evidence rule, the following elements must concur: (1) the mistake should be of
fact; (2)
the mistake should be mutual or common to both parties to the instrument; and (3)
the
mistake should be alleged and proved by clear and convincing evidence. The Court
found
that all the elements are present in the case at bar and there was indeed a mistake
in the terms
of the Partition, thus exempting respondent Juanito from the general application of
the parol
evidence rule. Karl Vincent B. Raso

G.R. No. 174141

June 26, 2009
PENTAGON STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
PERFECTO BALOGO, Respondents.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO UMANITO G.R. No. 172607 April 1
6, 2009
FACTS: The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito was
found by the RTC guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.The alleged
1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the
birth of a childhereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, as well as the
defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Courtdeemed uncovering whether or not
Umanito is the father of BBB.With the advance in genetics and the availability of
new technology, it can now be determined with reasonablecertainty whether
appellant is the father of AAA's child. The DNA test result shall be simultaneously
disclosed tothe parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to
the parties in advance the DNA testresults.The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe
the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other informationobtained
from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as
the accused hasbeen acquitted or served his sentence.The DNA analysis on the
Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and
Umanito, todetermine whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB],
showed that there is a Complete Match in allof the 15 loci tested between the
alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there is a99.9999%
probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological father of BBB. The defense
admitted that if thevalue of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there
shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the
biological father of [BBB].RULING: Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply
the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNAEvidence (DNA Rules). The DNA
testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA,Umanito
had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day
she said she wasraped by Umanito. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted andovercome by other evidence (Rule 131,
Section 3).The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA
testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the
accused did notobject to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits
"A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) norpresented evidence to rebut the same.By
filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings
of the RTC and the Courtof Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand the indemnification of
the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.Given that the results of the
Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts,
andthat no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below,
the Court sees no reason to denyUmanitos Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The instant
case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED

UNCHUAN vs. LOZADA

(G.R. No. 172671,April 16, 2009)
FACTS:
Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were the registered coowners of 2 lots in Cebu City.
The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their nephew
Antonio J.P. Lozada under a Deed of Sale. Armed with a Special Power of
Attorney from Anita, Peregrina went to the house of their brother, Dr. Antonio
Lozada (Dr. Lozada), Dr. Lozada agreed to advance the purchase price of
US$367,000 or P10,000,000 for Antonio, his nephew. The Deed of Sale was later
notarized and authenticated at the Philippine Consuls Office and new TCTs were
issued in the name of Antonio Lozada.
Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita donated an
undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed of DonationAntonio
and Anita brought a case against Marissa for quieting of title with application for
preliminary injunction and restraining order. Marissa filed an action to declare the
Deed of Sale void and to cancel the new TCTs.
At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated sworn
statement, and a videotape where Anita denied having donated land in favor of
Marissa. In a Decision dated June 9, 1997, RTC disposed of the consolidated cases,
ruling among others that:
1. Plaintiff Antonio J.P. Lozada is declared the absolute owner of the properties in
question;
2. Defendant Marissa R. Unchuan is ordered to pay Antonio J.P. Lozada and Anita
Lozada damages.
On motion for reconsideration by petitioner, the RTC issued an Order dated April 5,
1999. Said order declared the Deed of Sale void, ordered the cancellation of the
new TCTs in Antonios name, and directed Antonio to pay Marissa
damages, P100,000 attorneys fees and P50,000 for expenses of litigation.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. On July 6, 2000, Presiding Judge, the RTC
reinstated the Decision dated June 9, 1997, but with the modification that the award
of damages, and attorneys were disallowed.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 23, 2006 the appellate
court affirmed with modification the July 6, 2000 Order of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the deed of donation executed in favor of the petitioner is
void.
2.
Whether or not videotaped statement is hearsay.
RULING:
1.
NO. When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be
valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement
is absolute and indispensable. Pertinent to this, the Rules require a party producing
a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered

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after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, to account for the
alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was
otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the
meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall, as
in this case, not be admissible in evidence.
2.
NO. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on
the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it
is sought to be produced. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence:
(1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3)
absence of oath. It is a hornbook doctrine that an affidavit is merely hearsay
evidence where its maker did not take the witness stand. Verily, the sworn
statement of Anita was of this kind because she did not appear in court to affirm her
averments therein. Yet, a more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion
will show that they do not cover admissions of a party; the videotaped statement of
Anita appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if
they are hearsay. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against
interest and declaration against interest. Admissions against interest are those
made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest
with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a
witness. Declaration against interest are those made by a person who is neither a
party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence and constitute
an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness. Thus, a mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever
made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to
presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not.
However, as a further qualification, object evidence, such as the videotape in this
case, must be authenticated by a special testimony showing that it was a faithful
reproduction. Lacking this, we are constrained to exclude as evidence the
videotaped statement of Anita. Even so, this does not detract from our conclusion
concerning petitioners failure to prove, by preponderant evidence, any right to the
lands subject of this case
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 176348
April 16, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO CABUDBOD y TUTOR and EDGAR CABUDBOD y LACROA, Appellants
G.R. No. 176566
April 16, 2009
ELISEO EDUARTE Y. COSCOLLA, Accused-Appellee,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant

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PEOPLE V. MUSA - 217 SCRA 597
FACTS:
Accused seeks the reversal of his conviction for violating the Dangerous
Drugs Act. He was found guilty of selling marijuana leaves to a police
officer in an entrapment operation.
HELD:
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the
person arrested. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drugpusher, the law enforcement agents may seized the marked money
found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without
arrest or search warrants. Furthermore, it may extend beyond to include the
premises or surroundings under his immediate control