EDWARD ROCO TAN

and EDWIN ROCO TAN,

Petitioners vs.
BENIGNO DE LA VEGA, ANGELA
TUASON STALEY and ANTONIO
PEREZ Y TUASON,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 168809

March 10, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the February 3, 2005
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79957, which affirmed
the March 21, 2003 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
264, granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
respondents in Civil Case No. 62269. Likewise questioned is the appellate
courts July 6, 2005 Resolution[3] which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on August 3, 1992, respondents
filed a complaint for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Free
Patent No. 495269, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 711 and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 186516, against the heirs of Macario Mencias
(defendant heirs), namely, Aquilina Mencias, Aurora M. Gabat, Merlyn M.
Cadete, Myrna M. Quirante; and the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the Director of the Land Management
Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina. The complaint was later
amended to implead herein petitioner purchasers of the disputed lot and to
nullify TCT No. 272191 issued in their name.
The Amended Complaint averred that respondents are the coowners of a 159,576 square meter parcel of land located in Marikina, Rizal,
Metro Manila and covered by TCT No. 257152, issued on June 20,
1969. Said title was a transfer from TCT No. 22395 in the name of J.
Antonio Araneta as trustee of the children of Angela I. Tuason. Among the
lots covered by TCT No. 257152 is the controverted Lot 89 containing an
area of 54,197 square meters.[4]
Sometime in April 1992, respondents learned that the defendant
heirs are causing the ejectment of the occupants of a 29,945 square meter
portion of Lot 89; and that Macario Mencias was able to obtain Free Patent
No. 495269 on July 31, 1971, and OCT No. 711 on August 11, 1971, over
said portion. Upon Macario's death, OCT No. 711 was canceled and TCT
No. 186516 was issued to the defendant heirs on July 5, 1990. [5] By virtue
of a Deed of Sale inscribed on November 14, 1994, TCT No. 186516 was
further cancelled and TCT No. 271604 was issued on the same date in
favor of New Atlantis Real Estate & Development, Inc., (Corporation)
represented by its President, Victor C. Salvador, Jr. The questioned lot was
thereafter sold by the Corporation to petitioners. TCT No. 271604 was thus

cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 272191 was issued to petitioners on
November 17, 1994.[6]
Respondents contended that Macarios OCT No. 711 and its
derivative titles-TCT No. 186516, in the name of defendant heirs and
petitioners TCT NO. 272191, are void because the area they cover is
entirely within their (respondents) land, specifically, Lot 89, as shown by
the notation in the said titles, i.e., This survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III1) 4496; and This survey is entirely inside No. 89, II4755.[7] Respondents further averred that since the controverted lot is
already a private land, the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, had no jurisdiction to approve Macarios
application and to issue Free Patent No. 495269. The pendency of this
action was allegedly inscribed in the defendant heirs title (TCT No.
186516) on August 4, 1992 and carried over to the petitioners' TCT No.
272191.[8]
In their Answer,[9] the defendant heirs contended that Lot 89 was
never part of respondents TCT No. 257152 which originated from OCT No.
730. Respondents own exhibits, i.e., the documents purportedly issued
by the Bureau of Lands (Exhibits E and F), show that Lot 89 was
covered by OCT No. 734 and not OCT No. 730. Defendant heirs further
stated that respondents TCT No. 257152 was issued in lieu of TCT No.
22395 which is a mere reconstitution of TCT No. 45046. Upon verification
with the Register of Deeds of Rizal, TCT No. 45046, covers a different
parcel of land situated in San Juan, Rizal, and measuring about 356 square
meters only. The defendant heirs also raised the defenses of laches and
prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that they are
purchasers in good faith and for value and that they have no knowledge of
any defect in the title of the Corporation from whom they purchased the
controverted lot. The notice of lis pendens alleged to have been inscribed
in TCT No. 186516 on August 4, 1992 does not appear in the Corporations
title, TCT No. 271604 nor in their title, TCT No. 272191. Absent said notice,
petitioners claim that they cannot be charged with knowledge of any
defect in the Corporation's title. Neither does the note This survey is
covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496; and This survey is entirely inside No.
89, II-4755, serve as sufficient warning to third persons because said
notes do not indicate that the property is covered by another title. [10]
For failure to file their Answer, defendant Aurora M. Gabat, [11] public
defendants Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Director of Land Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds
of Marikina,[12] were declared in default.
On March 4, 2003, respondents filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings which was granted by the trial court. It was held that the
disputed lot is within Lot 89 covered by respondents TCT No. 257152,
issued on June 20, 1969. Said lot therefore became a private land long
before the Free Patent was issued to Macario on July 31, 1971. Hence, the

Page 1 of 34

titles derived or issued on the basis of said Free Patent are void because
Public Land Act applies only to public lands and not private lands. On the
theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source, the trial court
concluded that petitioners cannot be purchasers in good faith considering
that their title was derived from Macario who acquired the property by
virtue of a void title. It further ruled that petitioners defense of good faith
must fail because they were forewarned of the notice indicating that the
questioned lot is inside Lot 89. The dispositive portion of the March 21,
2003 order, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiffs [respondents herein]
Motion is hereby Granted and judgment rendered as follows:
1.
Plaintiffs Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 257152 is
declared valid and superior to defendants [petitioners] TCT No. 272191;
2.
Free Patent No. 495269 issued by then Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to Macario Mencias on July 21, 1971 is
declared null and void;
3.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 711, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 271604/T-1358 and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 272191, TCT No. 186516 and TCT No. 272191, all derivatives [sic]
title of Free Patent 495269 issued by Registry of Deeds of Marikina, are also
declared null and void;
4.
The Bureau of Lands and Land Registration Administration
are directed to enter into their technical files the findings in this order;
5.
The Registry of Deeds of Marikina is directed to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) NO. 272191 in the names of Edward and
Edwin Roco Tan.
SO ORDERED.[13]

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the

assailed order of the trial court. They filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied in a resolution dated July 6, 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for resolution is whether a judgment on the
pleadings is proper in the instant case.
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, states:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. x x x.

Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the

essential question is whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys
answer to raise an issue.[14] The answer would fail to tender an issue, of
course, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or

admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by

confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at
all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material
averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses
(allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations
of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar
recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be
improper.[15]
In this case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering judgment
on the pleadings because the pleadings filed by the parties generated
ostensible
issues
that
necessitate
the
presentation
of
evidence. Respondents action for declaration of nullity of Free Patent No.
495269 and the titles derived therefrom is based on their claim that the lot
titled in the name of petitioners, is a portion of a bigger tract of land
previously titled in the name of their (respondents) predecessors-ininterest. The documents presented in support thereof were the photocopy
of respondents TCT No. 257152 which shows that the land it covers,
including lot 89, originated from OCT No. 730; and photocopies of the
documents alleged to have been issued by the Bureau of Lands and
confirming that the disputed lot is a portion of respondents Lot
89. Pertinent portions of the Amended Complaint, state:
5.
Sometime in early April, 1992, plaintiff de la Vega was
informed by one of the occupants of the above-described lot No. 89 that the
heirs of Macario Mencias, the defendants herein, were causing the
ejectment of said occupants and claiming to be the owners of an area of
29,945 sq. ms. (sic) which is within, or part of, Lot No. 89 covered by
plaintiffs T.C.T. No. 257152. It was only then that the plaintiffs heard of
Macario Mencias and of his encroaching into plaintiffs Lot 89.
6.
The plaintiffs later learned that, unknown to them, Macario
Mencias had applied with the then Bureau of Lands for, and obtained on 31
July 1971, Free Patent No. 495269 which was granted under the signature of
the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and covering an
area of 29,945 sq. ms. (sic) as described in Plan F (III-1) 4496-D. On 11
August 1971, Original Certificate of Title No. 711 (Rizal) was issued to him
based on the said Free Patent, and upon his death, said OCT No. 711 was
cancelled and transferred to his heirs, the defendants herein, to whom T.C.T.
No. 186516 (Marikina) was issued on 5 July 1990. The plaintiffs were never
notified of said application of Mencias for free patent nor of the issuance of
Free Patent No. 495269 and OCT No. 711 to him and T.C.T. No. 186515 to his
heirs, the defendants herein. Photocopies of OCT No. 711, which
incorporated Free Patent No. 495269, and T.C.T. No. 186516 are hereto
appended as Annexes B and C, respectively.
xxxx
8.
A letter dated 29 October 1971 of Mr. Amando A. Salvador
as Chief of the Survey Division of the then Bureau of Lands and addressed
to Macario Mencias, 1st Indorsement, dated 15 February 1974, signed by Mr.
Daniel C. Florida as Acting Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of
Lands, a report dated 17 December 1976 by Mr. Jose B. Isidro as Hearing
Officer addressed to the Director of Lands, and the 1st Indorsement, dated 3
January 1977, also addressed to the Director of Lands by Mr. Claudio C.
Batiles as the District Land Officer, photocopies of which are appended
hereto as Annexes D, E, F and G, respectively, unequivocally
confirmed that the area of 29,945 sq. ms. (sic) covered by the Free Patent
based on Plan F (III-1) 4496-D and issued to Macario Mencias was entirely

Page 2 of 34

inside Lot 89 of Plan II-4755, which was covered by T.C.T. No. 22395 in the
name of J Antonio Araneta, Trustee of the children Angela I. Tauson, and
since 20 June 1969, by T.C.T. No. 257152 in the plaintiffs names.
9.
There can be no doubt that the area of 29,945 sq. ms. (sic)
covered by Free Patent No. 495269, which was incorporated in OCT No. 711
issued to Macario Mencias, was within Lot 89 of Plan II-4755 covered by
T.C.T. No. 22395 and, since 20 June 1969, by T.C.T. No. 2597152 (sic) in the
plaintiffs names, because the technical description of said area embodied in
the said Free Patent itself and in OCT No. 711 disclosed the following
information:

12.
Plaintiffs own exhibits (Annexes E, F, in relation to
Annex A) show that lot 89 was never part of Original Certificate of Title
(O.C.T.) No. 730 from which plaintiffs alleged title was derived (T.C.T. No.
257152, Annex A). In Annexes E and F, Lot No. 89 of II-4755 is
covered by O.C.T. No. 734 and not 730;
13.
T.C. T. No. 257152 is spurious, falsified, hence, null and
void. This certificate of title was issued in lieu of T.C.T. No. 22395/T 389 as
per Annex A of the Complaint. T.C.T. No. 22395/T 389 was in turn issued
in lieu of T.C.T. No. 45046 as shown in a document (T.C.T. No. 22395) hereto
attached as Annex 2;

NOTE: This survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496.

This survey is entirely inside No. 89, II-4755 (See
Annex B hereof). (See Annex B hereof).

14.
It also appears that T.C.T. No. 22395 is a mere
reconstitution of a lost/destroyed T.C.T. No. 45046 as shown on page 3 of
T.C.T. No. 257152;

10.
In fact the very same notes were carried over in T.C.T. No.
186516 issued to the heirs of Mencias, the defendants herein, thus
forewarning all those who dealt or may have dealt with the private
defendants regarding the area therein described that there was something
anomalous in said title (See Annex C hereof).

15.
Upon verification with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, T.C.T. No. 45046 covered a different parcel of land situated in San
Juan, Rizal and measuring about 356 square meters only, photo copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex 3 hereof;

xxxx
14.
The records of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Metro
Manila, disclosed that TCT No. 186516, Annex C, was cancelled and T.C.T.
No. 271604, covering the same parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 186516,
was issued on November 14, 1994 by the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Mr.
Artemio B. Caa, to the New Atlantis Real Eastate & Dev., Inc. represented
by its President, Victor C. Salvador, Jr., based on a sale in its favor inscribed
on the same date; and that T.C.T. No. 271604 was thereupon cancelled and
in lieu thereof T.C.T. No. 272191 was issued by the said Register of Deeds to
private defendants Edward and Edwin Roco Tan on November 17, 1994
based on a sale in their favor inscribed on the same date. A photocopy of
T.C.T. No. 272191 is hereto attached as Annex H.
xxxx
16.
Neither New Atlantis Real Estate & Dev. Inc., nor Edward
Roco Tan and Edwin Roco Tan could claim to be purchasers in good faith not
only because their titles are void and inexistent and could not possibly have
any legal effect whatsoever but also because the NOTE cited in
paragraphs 9 and 10 above, which likewise appears on T.C.T. No. 272191
itself, discloses the very basis for its nullity.
17.
The notice of the pendency of this action (Notice of Lis
Pendens) was duly inscribed on T.C.T. No. 186516 on August 4, 1992 under
Entry No. 274711, which notice has been carried over to T.C.T. No. 272191,
a photocopy of which is hereto appended as Annex H.
x x x x.[16]

The foregoing averments were specifically denied by defendant

heirs who raised, among others, the affirmative defense that respondents
TCT No. 22395 is void and that lot 89 is not found inside respondents
land. Thus
11.
Lot 89 was never a part of the Mariquina Estate as shown
in subdivision plan PSD 29965 as surveyed in December, 1950 up to June,
1951. This fact is also certified by the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal as early as 1967, a photo copy of said certification is hereto attached
as Annex 1;

x x x x.[17]

Petitioners asserted, inter alia, the affirmative defense of good

faith and denied the material allegations of the complaint relating to the
origin of the title of respondents; and the latters claim that Lot 89 is
covered by TCT No. 257152. Pertinent portions of the Answer state:
In further support of the Specific Denials and Affirmative
Allegations herein set forth, and by way of Affirmative Defenses, defendants
allege:
xxxx
4.2
Defendants are innocent purchasers for value of the
subject property. They had no knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
alleged defect in their title, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 272191, or of the
title of their predecessor-in-interest, the Corporation.
4.2.1 Plaintiff's (sic) notice of lis pendens alleged to have been
duly inscribed on TCT No. 186516 on August 4, 1992 under Entry No,
274711 did not appear or was not annotated on the corporations title, TCT
No. 271604, which was issued on November 14, 1994 or long after the
alleged inscription was made on the said title. Attached and made integral
part hereof as Annex A is a copy of Corporation's title, TCT No. 271604.
4.2.2 Neither did said inscription appear or annotated on
defendants title, TCT No. 272191, which was issued on 17 November
1994. Attached and made integral part hereof as Annex B is a copy of TCT
No. 272191.
4.2.3 It bears stressing that if the said inscription was duly made
on 4 August 1992 as plaintiffs alleged, the same would have been
annotated on TCT Nos. 271604 and 272191 which were issued long after the
said entry was allegedly made. Obviously, if said entry does appear today
on TCT No. 272191, it was made only recently or at the earliest, after the
latter title was issued on 17 November 1994. But certainly said entry could
not have been possibly made on 4 August 1992.
4.2.4 With the absence of the notice of lis pendens, defendants
could not be charged with notice of any defect in their title No. 272191 nor
their status as innocent purchasers for value be adversely affected by the
same.

Page 3 of 34

4.2.5 Neither does the note, this survey is covered by F.P.A. No.
(III-1) 4496; This survey is entirely inside No. 89 II-4755. serve as sufficient
notice to defendants of any defect in their title. Said note does not indicate
or disclose that the subject property is covered by another title.

only about 356 square meters and located in San Juan, Rizal. These
allegations were never refuted by respondents, hence, they cannot be
simply brushed aside by the trial court.

4.2.6 Moreover, the fact that the subject property was covered
by TCT No. 271604 duly issued by the Registry of Deeds in the name of the
corporation without any encumbrance, liens or adverse claims annotated
thereon negates any possibility that the subject property belongs to any
person other than the corporation.[18]

Moreover, even assuming that the title of respondents

predecessors-in-interest (TCT No. 22395) is valid, the evidence at this
stage is still insufficient to sustain the conclusion of the trial court that Lot
89 is inside respondents land now covered by TCT No. 257152. The title
appended
by
respondents
in
their
complaint
is
a
mere
photocopy. Likewise, the document allegedly issued by the Bureau of
Lands and presented by respondents to prove that Lot 89 is inside their
land are also mere photocopies and not authenticated by said
office. Furthermore, the title referred in the said documents as the origin
of TCT No. 257152, is a different title, that is OCT No. 734 and not OCT No.
730. There is thus a need to present evidence to settle the issues in a full
blown trial.

It is clear from the foregoing that the pleadings filed in the instant
case generated the following issues: (1) whether respondents TCT No.
257152 is valid; (2) whether Lot 89 is covered by TCT No. 257152; and (3)
whether petitioners are purchasers in good faith. This is clearly not a
proper case for judgment on the pleadings considering that the Answers
tendered factual issues. The trial court rendered a summary judgment on
March 21, 2003 and not a judgment on the pleadings.
In Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Court
explained the distinction between a proper case of summary judgment and
judgment on the pleadings, in this wise:
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings,
on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are
what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a
judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings,
there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending
partys answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a
summary judgment, issues apparently exist i.e. facts are asserted in the
complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or
qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out
in the answerbut the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham,
fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
x x x.

In any case, a summary judgment is likewise not warranted in this

case as there are genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. A
genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then
there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary
judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has
the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of
fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so
as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited
authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for
summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.[20]
In the instant case, presentation of evidence is necessary to
determine the validity of TCT No. 22395 from which respondents title (TCT
No. 257152) was derived. As alleged by defendant heirs, TCT No. 22395
was a mere reconstitution of TCT No. 45046, which per verification from
the Register of Deeds of Rizal pertain to a different piece of land measuring

If the evidence show that the Free Patent and the OCT issued to
petitioners predecessors-in-interest is valid and or Lot 89 is not inside TCT
No. 257152, then judgment should be rendered in favor of petitioners; and
whether the latter acted in good or bad faith will no longer be a decisive
issue in this case. On the other hand, if the title of petitioners
predecessors-in-interest is declared void, the defense of good
faith may still be available to petitioners who claim to be purchasers in
good faith and for value. The rule is that a void title may be the source of
a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. [21] An innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the
property.[22]
Since good faith is always presumed, [23] it was premature for the
trial court to conclude that petitioners are not purchasers in good
faith. Note that the complaint did not state that the notice of the pendency
of this action was inscribed in the title of the Corporation from whom
petitioners purchased the property. Petitioners even denied the presence
of said inscription in their own title and in the title of the Corporation.
[24]
Neither the presence of the notation This survey is covered by F.P.A.
No. (III-1) 4496; and This survey is entirely inside No. 89, II-4755, in the
title of the Corporation automatically make petitioners purchasers in bad
faith. In the absence of other evidence to explain said notation, bad faith,
which is never presumed, cannot be charged against petitioners. The
notation that the disputed lot is covered by Free Patent Application No. (III1) 4496, will not place the title in dubious light because the same is the
number of the application for Free Patent of Macario Mencias,
[25]
petitioners predecessor-in-interest. The same is true with respect to
the notation in the title that the questioned lot is inside Lot
89. Considering that the title presented is a mere photocopy and that the
notes appearing thereon do not indicate that the subject property is
covered by any title, the trial court should have directed the parties to

Page 4 of 34

substantiate
their
respective
allegations
instead
of
rendering
judgment. Indeed, in determining the propriety of rendering a motion for
summary judgment, the lower court should take that view of the evidence
most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such party
the benefit of all favorable inferences.[26]
In sum, we find that respondents failed to prove that presentation
of evidence may be dispensed with in the present controversy. The instant
case is neither a proper case for rendition of judgment on the pleadings
nor of summary judgment. A full blown trial should therefore be conducted
to resolve the issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition
isGRANTED and the February 3, 2005 Decision and the July 6, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79957
areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264 for further
proceedings.

Page 5 of 34

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC,

G.R. No. 130974
- versus
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA
TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate
of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO,
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid
service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to
it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending action against
him and assured of the opportunity to present his defenses to the
suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect ones right to due
process.
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 presents the
core issue whether there was a valid substituted service of summons on
petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction. Petitioner Manotoc
claims the court a quo should have annulled the proceedings in the trial
court for want of jurisdiction due to irregular and ineffective service of
summons.
The Facts
Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled Agapita
Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v.
Imelda Imee R. Marcos-Manotoc[2] for Filing, Recognition and/or
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano seeks the
enforcement of a foreign courts judgment rendered on May 1, 1991 by the
United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America,
in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a.
Imee Marcos, Civil Case No. 86-0207 for wrongful death of deceased
Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the
Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision,
tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a
Summons[3] on July 6, 1993 addressed to petitioner at Alexandra
Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.

On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of counsel,

filed a Motion to Dismiss[6] on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of
summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of
defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her
dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in
the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the
place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and
substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident
of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be
ineffective and futile.
During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Manotoc
presented Carlos Gonzales, who testified that he saw defendant Manotoc
as a visitor in Alexandra Homes only two times. He also identified the
Certification of Renato A. de Leon, which stated that Unit E-2104 was
owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc.; and at the time the Certification was
issued, the unit was not being leased by anyone. Petitioner also presented
her Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card [7] issued
by the Immigration Service of Singapore to show that she was a resident
ofSingapore. She claimed that the person referred to in plaintiffs Exhibits
A to EEEE as Mrs. Manotoc may not even be her, but the mother of
Tommy Manotoc, and granting that she was the one referred to in said
exhibits, only 27 out of 109 entries referred to Mrs. Manotoc. Hence, the
infrequent number of times she allegedly entered Alexandra Homes did not
at all establish plaintiffs position that she was a resident of said place.
On the other hand, Agapita Trajano, for plaintiffs estate, presented
Robert Swift, lead counsel for plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos
Human Rights Litigation, who testified that he participated in the
deposition taking of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.; and he confirmed that Mr.
Marcos, Jr. testified that petitioners residence was at the Alexandra
Apartment, Greenhills.[8] In addition, the entries[9] in the logbook
of AlexandraHomes from August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993, listing the
name of petitioner Manotoc and the Sheriffs Return, [10] were adduced in
evidence.
On October 11, 1994, the trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to
Dismiss on the strength of its findings that her residence, for purposes of
the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the documentary evidence of
respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the presumption that the
sheriffs substituted service was made in the regular performance of official
duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.
[11]

On July 15, 1993, the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were
allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of
petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. [4] When petitioner
failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default through an
Order[5] dated October 13, 1993.

On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded Manotocs plea for
reconsideration for lack of merit.[12]
Undaunted, Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition[13] before the Court of Appeals (CA) on January 20, 1995,

Page 6 of 34

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36214 seeking the annulment of the October

11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of Judge Aurelio C. Trampe.

III. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS

ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE RESIDENCE OF THE HUSBAND IS
ALSO THE RESIDENCE OF HIS WIFE CONTRARY TO THE RULING
IN THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. DE COSTER, G.R. NO.
23181,MARCH 16, 1925, 47 PHIL. 594.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On March 17, 1997, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The court a
quoadopted the findings of the trial court that petitioners residence was
atAlexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro
Manila, which was also the residence of her husband, as shown by the
testimony of Atty. Robert Swift and the Returns of the registered mails sent
to petitioner. It ruled that the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card and the
Certification dated September 17, 1993 issued by Renato A. De Leon,
Assistant Property Administrator of Alexandra Homes, were hearsay, and
that said Certification did not refer to July 1993the month when the
substituted service was effected.
[14]

In the same Decision, the CA also rejected petitioners Philippine

passport as proof of her residency in Singapore as it merely showed the
dates of her departure from and arrival in the Philippines without
presenting the boilerplates last two (2) inside pages where petitioners
residence was indicated. The CA considered the withholding of those
pages as suppression of evidence. Thus, according to the CA, the trial
court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid
substituted service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules
of Court.
On April
2,
1997,
petitioner
filed
a
Reconsideration[15]which
was
denied
by
the
Resolution[16] dated October 8, 1997.

CFI OF BULACAN, BR. IV, G.R. NO. L-55869, FEBRUARY 20, 1984, 127
SCRA 632 WHICH DEFINES THE PROPRIETY OF SUCH SERVICE UPON
MERE OVERSEERS OF PREMISES WHERE A PARTY SUPPOSEDLY
RESIDES.

Motion
CA
in

for
its

Hence, petitioner has come before the Court for review on

certiorari.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors for the Courts
consideration:
I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS
ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN
QUESTION (ANNEXES A AND B) IN DEFIANCE OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER THROUGH A
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 8, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.

II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS

ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS A VALID SERVICE
OF SUMMONS ON AN ALLEGED CARETAKER OF PETITIONERS
RESIDENCE IN COMPLETEDEFIANCE OF THE RULING IN CASTILLO VS.

IV. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS

ERROR IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE ON EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
SERVICE OF SUMMONS UNDER SECTIONS 17 AND 18, RULE 14 OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.[17]

The assigned errors bring to the fore the crux of the disagreement
the validity of the substituted service of summons for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We GRANT the petition.
Acquisition of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in
court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts
jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of
the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null
and void.[18] In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the
defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of
the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable
reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period,
then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of
summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in derogation
of the usual method of service.[19] Hence, it must faithfully and strictly
comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by
the rules. Indeed, compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of
jurisdiction.[20]
Requirements for Substituted Service
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies
to this case provides:
SEC. 8. [21] Substituted service. If the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Page 7 of 34

We can break down this section into the following requirements to

effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show
that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service.[22] Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the
sheriff is given a reasonable time to serve the summons to the defendant
in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. Reasonable time is
defined as so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the
rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party. [23] Under the
Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the
court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of
the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the
validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias
summons if the service of summons has failed. [24] What then is a
reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to
demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, reasonable
time means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing
of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, reasonable time
means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for
the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the
summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides
data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of
Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the
first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the
issuance of summons can be considered reasonable time with regard to
personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of
summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and
speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus,
they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on
defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to
avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the
defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must
be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within
a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to
prove impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts means at least
three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the
sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. [25] The efforts

made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be
clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts
on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the
name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant
and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant
must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on
Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the
Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires
a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the
fact of failure.[26] Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5
dated November 9, 1989requires that impossibility of prompt service
should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the failure of such efforts, which should be made in the
proof of service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or
residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein.[27] A person of suitable age and discretion is one
who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a
summons. Discretion is defined as the ability to make decisions which
represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is
lawful, right or wise may be presupposed. [28] Thus, to be of sufficient
discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to
deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest
possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person
must have the relation of confidence to the defendant, ensuring that the
latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the
summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the
alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
recipients relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty
to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant
of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or
regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person
in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service
will be made must be the one managing the office or business of
defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must
have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in
the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the
Return.

Page 8 of 34

Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar

Let us examine the full text of the Sheriffs Return, which reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several
attemptswere made to serve the summons with complaint and
annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above entitled case,
personally upon the defendant IMELDA IMEE MARCOSMANOTOC located
atAlexandra
Condominium
Corpration [sic] or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29
Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours
of the day but to no avail for the reason that said defendant is
usually out of her place and/or residence or premises. That on the
15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons was resorted
to in accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving
copy of said summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic](Mr)
Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of the said defendant, according to
(Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and Telephone Operator of the said
building, a person of suitable age and discretion, living with the said
defendant at the given address who acknowledged the receipt
thereof of said processes but he refused to sign (emphases
supplied).
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this
Honorable Court of origin, duly served for its record and
information.
Pasig, Metro-Manila July 15, 1993.[29]

A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals

the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons
on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the
Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that
personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the
generally couched phrases of on many occasions several attempts were
made to serve the summons x x x personally, at reasonable hours during
the day, and to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually
out of her place and/or residence or premises. Wanting in detailed
information, the Return deviates from the rulingin Domagas v.
Jensen[30]and other related cases[31]that the pertinent facts and
circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally
must be narrated in the Return. It cannot be determined how many times,
on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were
made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be
assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative
that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the service of
summons be described with more particularity in the Return or Certificate
of Service.
Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the
Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff
Caelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to
locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only
states that respondents were informed, and so [they] allege about the
address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted
service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the

defendant through more direct means. [32] More so, in the case in hand,
when the alleged petitioners residence or house is doubtful or has not
been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to
have been pursued persistently.
In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr.,[33] it may be true that the Court
held that a Sheriffs Return, which states that despite efforts exerted to
serve said process personally upon the defendant on several occasions the
same proved futile, conforms to the requirements of valid substituted
service. However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in
substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of
unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts,
resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court
rules in the case at bar that the narration of the efforts made to find the
defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will
not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal
service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant,
names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure
should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts
undertaken. That such efforts were made to personally serve summons on
defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of
prompt personal service.
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances
in inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their precise
duties relating to substituted servicefor it would be quite easy to shroud
or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly, considering
that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by a defendant
because of an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only fair that
the Sheriffs Return should clearly and convincingly show the
impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate,
there is still a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the
summons must be left with a person of suitable age and discretion
residing in defendants house or residence. Thus, there are two (2)
requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable
age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence
of defendant. Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs
Return lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky
de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is the
resident caretaker of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn
Jacinto,
alleged
receptionist
and
telephone
operator
of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with
petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married
woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to
reside in her dwelling. With the petitioners allegation that Macky de la
Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to
have additional information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky
de la Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong
indication that he did not have the necessary relation of confidence with

Page 9 of 34

petitioner. To protect petitioners right to due process by being accorded

proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons
must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.
It has been stated and restated that substituted service of
summons must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and in the circumstances authorized by the rules. [34]
Even American case law likewise stresses the principle of strict
compliance with statute or rule on substituted service, thus:
The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted
or constructive service must be strictly pursued.[35] There must be
strict compliance with the requirements of statutes authorizing
substituted or constructive service.[36]
Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is
in certain situations authorized in the place of personal service
when the latter is inconvenient or impossible, a strict and literal
compliance with the provisions of the law must be shown in order to
support the judgment based on such substituted or constructive
service.[37] Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and exercised on the
general ground that the subject matter of the suit is within the
power of the court. The inquiry must be as to whether the
requisites of the statute have been complied with, and such
compliance must appear on the record.[38] The fact that the
defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not
render the service effectual if in fact the process was not served in
accordance with the requirements of the statute.[39]

Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to

demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements of the
then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).

In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, [41] it was held that x

x x the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is
patent that the sheriffs return is defective (emphasis supplied).
While the Sheriffs Return in the Venturanza case had no statement on the
effort or attempt to personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff
Caelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts in
general terms lacking in details as required by the ruling in the case
of Domagas v. Jensenand other cases. It is as if Caelas Return did not
mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted
service is void.
On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident
of AlexandraHomes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our
findings that the substituted service is void has rendered the matter moot
and academic. Even assuming that Alexandra Homes Room 104 is her
actual residence, such fact would not make an irregular and void
substituted service valid and effective.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED and the assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October
8, 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and the October 11, 1994 and
December 21, 1994 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted

service, the proceedings held before the trial court perforce must
be annulled.
The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty. It reasons out that [t]he certificate of
service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out
herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the
evidence must be clear and convincing.[40]
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid
doctrine. However, for the presumption to apply, the Sheriffs Return must
show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the
summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically
narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that the
substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and
discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the
Return is flawed and the presumption cannot be availed of. As previously
explained, the Return of Sheriff Caelas did not comply with the stringent
requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.

Page 10 of 34

HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA,

G.R. No. 158121

SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHAPARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA,

JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO
P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS
LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P.
CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA,
BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA

The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr. [7] and his
children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Eduardo, Alberto, Bernardo,
Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha, filed a complaint for
Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses
Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free
Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot
No. 6195. The case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended Complaint,petitioners
prayed that judgment be rendered:
1.
Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as null and void ab
initio;

P. CONCHA-NUNAG,
- versus SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO

Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil
Case No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of the
subject lots.

[1]

and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA

J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND
SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO
and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,[2]

PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the decision[3] and resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59499, annulling the resolutions [5] and order[6] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and
5434 which denied the separate motions to dismiss and Joint Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the respondents.
The relevant facts are undisputed.
Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr.,
claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188), a
one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case No. 5433), and a onehectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A (Civil Case No. 5434), all
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land
Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5188), Cristita

2.
Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private
property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 otherwise known
as the Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942;
3.
Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the
properties (sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122 hectares in favor of
the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case and
if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to
execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed
by the defendant[s] themselves;
4.
Ordering defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for the
21 forest trees illegally cut; P50,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for
Attorneys fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of
the proceedings;
5.
Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in the
area of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total volume of
2000 board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff [they] being cut, collected and
taken from the land possessed, preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;
6.
The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and
remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises.[8]

On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for Reconveyance

with Damages were filed by petitioners,[9] this time against "Cristita
Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and
"Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso" for a one-hectare
portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two complaints were also
raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 5433 and 5434, respectively. In Civil Case No. 5433, petitioners
prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT (P23527)
4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the western portion of Lot 4888
as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B) CA 141 otherwise
known as Public Land OCT (sic) as amended by RA No. 1942;

Page 11 of 34

2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1)

hectare forested portion of her property in question in favor of the plaintiffs
within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one
hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888, located at its Western portion and if she
refuse (sic), ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute
the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by the
defenda[n]t herself;
3. Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees
illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's
fees;P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the
proceedings.[10]

In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be

rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT (P-23207)
12870 and Lot 6196-B OCT (P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one hectare
located as (sic) the western portion of said lots as private property of the
plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.] 141 otherwise know[n] as the
[P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended by RA 1942;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of one
(1) hectare forested portion of their properties in question in favor of the
plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case
segregating one hectare from OCT (P-23207) 12870 and OCT (T-20845)4889 all of defendants, located at its Western portion and if they refuse,
ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of
reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendants
themselves[;]
3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 for the six (6) forest
trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for
Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of
the proceedings.[11]

The three complaints[12] commonly alleged: a) that on May 21,

1958, petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea Concha)
acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land situated in Cogon,
Dipolog City;
b) that since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly
preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4)
hectares "untitled forest land" located at its eastern portion; c) that they
possessed this excess 4 hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195,
one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos.
6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely,
peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the (sic) owner since 1931;" d)
that they continued possession and occupation of the 4-hectare land after
the death of Dorotea Concha on December 23, 1992 and Valeriano Sr. on
May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses "have preserved the forest trees
standing in [the subject lots] to the exclusion of the defendants
(respondents) or other persons from 1931" up to November 12, 1996 (for
Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434)
when respondents, "by force, intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly entered
the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil
Case No. 5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case
No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land or that even assuming it was

part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired imperfect title
thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1942; g) that respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees
felled in Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the
subject lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber dealer
in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents "surreptitiously"
filed free patent applications over the lots despite their full knowledge that
petitioners owned the lots; i) that the geodetic engineers who conducted
the original survey over the lots never informed them of the survey to give
them an opportunity to oppose respondents' applications; j) that
respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were issued "on
account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation"; and k) that the
lots in question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the
respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a) lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b)
failure to state causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d)
waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel. [13] On the issue of jurisdiction,
respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the
subject lots are less than P20,000.00.
Petitioners opposed,[14] contending that the instant cases involve
actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation
which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended
that they have two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for
recovery of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the
totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of
respondents.[15] The respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration,
[16]
to no avail.[17]
Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of
Restraining Order Ex Parte[18] with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
59499. In its Decision,[19] the CA reversed the resolutions and order of the
trial court. It held that even assuming that the complaints state a cause of
action, the same have been barred by the statute of limitations. The CA
ruled that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in ten
(10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed as they
involve titles issued for at least twenty-two (22) years prior to the filing of
the complaints. The CA found it unnecessary to resolve the other issues.
Hence,
issues, viz:

this

appeal

in

which

petitioners

raise

the

following

Page 12 of 34

FIRST WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

(FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE
COURT A QUO DENYING THE MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CONSIDERING THE
DISMISSAL OF A PARTY COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE AND TRIAL ON THE
MERITS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO THRESH OUT EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.
SECOND WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
(FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS'
COMPLAINTS ON [THE] GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.
THIRD WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
(FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS OWN
THE SUBJECT FOREST PORTION OF THE PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY
INCLUDED IN THE TITLES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
FOURTH - WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FILED WITH THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
(FORMER FIRST DIVISION) SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHTLY
FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' THEREIN FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1 RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT TO SUBMIT CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF
THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RENDERED THEIR PETITION (CA G.R. 59499)
DEFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE CITING THE CASE OF CATUIRA VS.
COURT OF APPEALS (172 SCRA 136).[20]

In their memorandum,[21] respondents reiterated their arguments in

the courts below that: a) the complaints of the petitioners in the trial court
do not state causes of action for reconveyance; b) assuming the
complaints state causes of action for reconveyance, the same have already
been barred by prescription; c) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the instant cases; d) the claims for reconveyance in
the complaints are barred by waiver, abandonment, or otherwise
extinguished by laches and estoppel; and e) there is no special reason
warranting a review by this Court.
Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution of
the instant case yet the CA skirted the question, we resolved to require the
parties to submit their respective Supplemental Memoranda on the issue of
jurisdiction.[22]
In their Supplemental Memorandum,[23] petitioners contend that
the nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as borne by
their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or cancellation
of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve more than just the issue
of title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents
and the reconveyance of the subject properties were also raised as issues.
Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which
provides that the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners
cited:
a) Raymundo v. CA[24] which set the criteria for
determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation;
b) Swan v. CA[25] where it was held that an action for annulment of title is
under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c) Santos v. CA[26] where it was similarly
held that an action for annulment of title, reversion and damages was

within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and d) Commodities Storage and ICE
Plant Corporation v. CA[27] where it was held that "[w]here the action
affects title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property
is located." Petitioners also contend that while it may be argued that the
assessed values of the subject properties are within the original jurisdiction
of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have included in their prayers "any
interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled natural grown trees
illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the
properties as shown by their respective tax declarations and the estimated
value of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC
has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong.[28] It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground
cannot be waived by the parties. [29] To determine whether a court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine
the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought. [30]
The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions
for reconveyance.[31] An action for reconveyance respects the decree of
registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to
its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.
[32]
There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough
that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that
of the registered owner[33] and that the property has not yet passed to the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.[34]
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an
action for reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in
the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for
reconveyance, viz:
(a)
That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his
spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing
in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares
untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931
when they were newly married, the date they acquired this property by
occupation or possession;[35]
(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha
have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the
exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to
November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil
Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and]
stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed
a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22)
trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of
various sizes;[36]
(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land
or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had
already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No.

Page 13 of 34

141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No.
[7691];[37]
(d)
That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew
when they] surreptitiously filed[38] [their respective patent applications and
were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title
[that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners];[39]
(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding
original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad
faith and misrepresentation;[40] and
(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent
purchaser.[41]

These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on

one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an
instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used
to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title. [42]
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to
remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court
has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691,viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
x x x.

In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are

situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less
than P20,000.00, to wit:
Civil Case No.
5188

Lot No.
6195

Assessed Value
P1,030.00

5433

6196-A

4,500.00

5434

6196-B

4,340.00

7529-A

1,880.00.[43]

Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.

Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of

pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for
reconveyance[44]of or for cancellation of title[45] to or to quiet title[46] over
real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that
involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its
forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,[47] as amended, gave the RTCs
(formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n
allcivil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296,
as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on
jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was
incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one
involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the
two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No.
7691[48] in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the
present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which
involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level
courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the
benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded
dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of
justice."[49]
The cases of Raymundo v. CA[50] and Commodities Storage
and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA, [51] relied upon by the petitioners, are
inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for
mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The
bone of contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary
estimation considering petitioner's contention that the pecuniary claim of
the complaint was only attorney's fees of P10,000, hence, the MTC had
jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining whether an
action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the
issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and
Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental
to the principal action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the

Page 14 of 34

court's jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant

Corporation provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by
the Court in said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein
was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which was
filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In
resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action
affects title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the
property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-727076 was therefore
improperly laid."
Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA[52] and Santos v. CA[53] cited by
the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature of the instant
cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The complaints
in Swan andSantos were filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
7691. In Swan, the Court held that the action being one for annulment of
title, the RTC had original jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P.
129. In Santos, the Court similarly held that the complaint for
cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title
to and possession of real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus,
while the Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified
actions for "annulment of title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and
damages" as civil actions that involve "title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the
subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject
properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective
assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of
B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise
jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value
of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term
"any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining
which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty
involved that should be computed. [54] In this case, there is no dispute that
the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax
declarations are less thanP20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant
cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, has no jurisdiction in Civil
Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.

SO ORDERED.

Page 15 of 34

METROPOLITAN BANK, & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.Hon. FLORO T. ALEJO, in His Capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela; and SY TAN SE, represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, SIAN SUAT NGO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In a suit to nullify an existing Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real

estate mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee is an indispensable party. In such suit,
a decision canceling the TCT and the mortgage annotation is subject to a petition for
annulment of judgment, because the non-joinder of the mortgagee deprived the
court of jurisdiction to pass upon the controversy.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the March 25, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR SP No. 50638, which states in full:

Despite being the registered mortgagee of the real property covered by the
title sought to be annulled, petitioner was not made a party to Civil Case No. 4930-V96, nor was she notified of its existence.
[9]

Because the spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan, extrajudicial

foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property were initiated on April 19,
1997.
On June 17, 1997, the sheriff of Valenzuela conducted an auction sale of the
property, during which petitioner submitted the highest and winning bid. On July
15, 1997, a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor. This sale was entered in the
Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela on July 28, 1997.
[10]

[11]

When the redemption period lapsed exactly a year after, on July 28, 1998,
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership to enable the Registry
of Deeds of Valenzuela to issue a new TCT in its name.

[1]

Upon presentation to the Register of Deeds of the Affidavit of Consolidation of

Ownership, petitioner was informed of the existence of the August 12, 1998 RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96, annulling TCT No. V-41319. The dispositive
portion of the Decision stated:
[12]

This resolves the petition for annulment of judgment based on

external (sic) fraud filed by petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company seeking to annul the Decision dated August 12, 1998
rendered by respondent judge, Honorable Floro T. Alejo, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96 entitled Sy Tan Se, represented by his
attorney-in-fact Sian Suat Ngo v. Raul Acampado, et al.
This Court has observed that petitioner knew of the questioned
Decision sometime [i]n October 1998 (Petition, Rollo, p. 3). This being
the case, petitioner should have first sought recourse by way of
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the petition for annulment of judgment is
DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED outright for being insufficient in
form and substance (Section 2, Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as null and void

Transfer Certificate of Title No.V-41319 in the name of defendant Raul
Acampado for having proceeded from an illegitimate source. With
costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
On January 27, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of the RTC Decision.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
For being insufficient in form and substance, the Petition for Annulment was
outrightly dismissed by the CA. It ruled that petitioner ought to have filed, instead, a
petition for relief from judgment or an action for quieting of title.
Hence, this Petition.

[13]

Also challenged is the January 27, 2000 CA Resolution denying petitioners

Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
[2]

On November 21, 1995 and January 30, 1996, Spouses Raul and Cristina
Acampado obtained loans from petitioner in the amounts of P5,000,000
and P2,000,000, respectively. As security for the payment of these credit
accommodations, the Acampados executed in favor of petitioner a Real Estate
Mortgage and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land
registered in their names. The land was covered by TCT No. V-41319 in the Registry
of Deeds of Valenzuela City, where the contracts were also registered on November
20, 1995 and January 23, 1996, respectively.
[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues:
I

x x x [W]hether or not a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule

47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the proper remedy available
to petitioner under the circumstances.

[7]

On June 3, 1996, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of TCT No. V-41319 was
filed by Respondent Sy Tan Se against Spouses Acampado. In the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Branch 172, it was docketed as Civil Case No. 4930-V-96,
the progenitor of the present controversy.
[8]

II

x x x [W]hether or not the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No.
4930-V-96 should be annulled.
[14]

Page 16 of 34

The Courts Ruling

Third, private respondent cites a last remedy: the intervention by petitioner in

Civil Case No. 4930-V-96. The availability of this remedy hinges on petitioners
knowledge of the pendency of that case, which would have otherwise been alerted
to the need to intervene therein. Though presumed by private respondent, any such
knowledge prior to October 1998 is, however, emphatically denied by petitioner.

First Issue: Proper Remedy

The Petition for Annulment before the Court of Appeals precisely alleged that
private respondent purposely concealed the case by excluding petitioner as a
defendant in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96, even if the latter was an indispensable
party. Without due process of law, the former intended to deprive petitioner of the
latters duly registered property right. Indeed, the execution of the Decision in Civil
Case No. 4930-V-96 necessarily entailed its enforcement against petitioner, even
though it was not a party to that case. Hence, the latter concludes that annulment
of judgment was the only effective remedy open to it.

The Petition is meritorious.

Respondents aver that a petition for annulment is not proper, because there
were three different remedies available but they were not resorted to by petitioner.
We are not persuaded. First, a petition for relief, the remedy pointed to by the
Court of Appeals, was not available to petitioner. Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court, states:

Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.-When a

judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside. (Italics supplied)
It must be emphasized that petitioner was never a party to Civil Case No. 4930V-96. In Lagula et al. v. Casimiro et al., the Court held that -- relative to a motion for
relief on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence -- Rule 38
of the Rules of Court only applies when the one deprived of his right is a party to
the case. Since petitioner was never a party to the case or even summoned to
appear therein, then the remedy of relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court was not proper. This is plainly provided in the italicized words of the
present provision just quoted.
[15]

Second, in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision

dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment, the Court of Appeals reasoned
that another remedy, an action for quieting of title, was also available to petitioner.
We do not agree. It should be stressed that this case was instituted to ask for
relief from the peremptory declaration of nullity of TCT No. V-41319, which had been
issued without first giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner focused
on the judgment in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96 which adversely affected it, and which it
therefore sought to annul. Filing an action for quieting of title will not remedy what it
perceived as a disregard of due process; it is therefore not an appropriate remedy.
Equally important, an action for quieting of title is filed only when there is a
cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. As defined, a cloud on title is
a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded. In this case, the subject judgment cannot be considered as a cloud on
petitioners title or interest over the real property covered by TCT No. V-41319,
which does not even have a semblance of being a title.
[16]

It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would
warrant the filing of an action for quieting of title, because to do so would require
the court hearing the action to modify or interfere with the judgment or order of
another co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that a
court has no power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously
hinder the administration of justice. Clearly, an action for quieting of title is not an
appropriate remedy in this case.
[17]

The allegation of extrinsic fraud, if fully substantiated by a preponderance of

evidence, may be the basis for annulling a judgment. The resort to annulment
becomes proper because of such allegation, coupled with the unavailability of the
other remedies pointed to by respondents.
[18]

Second Issue: Lack of Jurisdiction

It is undisputed that the property covered by TCT No. V-41319 was mortgaged
to petitioner, and that the mortgage was annotated on TCT No. V-41319 before the
institution of Civil Case No. 4930-V-96. It is also undisputed that all subsequent
proceedings pertaining to the foreclosure of the mortgage were entered in the
Registry of Deeds. The nullification and cancellation of TCT No. V-41319 carried with
it the nullification and cancellation of the mortgage annotation.
Although a mortgage affects the land itself and not merely the TCT covering it,
the cancellation of the TCT and the mortgage annotation exposed petitioner to real
prejudice, because its rights over the mortgaged property would no longer be known
and respected by third parties. Necessarily, therefore, the nullification of TCT No. V41319 adversely affected its property rights, considering that a real mortgage is a
real right and a real property by itself.
[19]

Evidently, petitioner is encompassed within the definition of an indispensable

party; thus, it should have been impleaded as a defendant in Civil Case No. 4930-V96.

An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the

controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made,
in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest[;] a party who
has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but
also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made
without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an
indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a
determination between the parties already before the court which is
effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is
one who must be included in an action before it may properly go
forward.

Page 17 of 34

A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the

controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the
other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously
affected by a decree which does complete justice between them.
[20]

The joinder of indispensable parties to an action is mandated by Section 7,

Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedures, which we quote:

SEC 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in

interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Aside from the above provision, jurisprudence requires such joinder, as the
following excerpts indicate:

Indispensable parties must always be joined either as plaintiffs or

defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them. x x x.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy
that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the
courts cannot proceed without their presence.
[21]

From the above, it is clear that the presence of indispensable parties is

necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and
determine a cause, the right to act in a case. We stress that the absence of
indispensable parties renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void,
because of that courts want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
[25]

It is argued that petitioner cannot possibly be an indispensable party, since the

mortgage may not even be valid because of the possible absence of compliance
with the requirement that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
mortgaged. It should be emphasized, however, that at the time the mortgage was
constituted, there was an existing TCT (No. V-41319), which named the mortgagors,
the Acampado spouses, as the registered owners of the property. In Seno v.
Mangubat this Court held as follows:
[26]

[27]

The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a

registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry.
xxx

"x x x. Without the precence of indispensable parties to a suit or

proceeding, a judgment of a Court cannot attain real finality."
[22]

Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that

an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court
to stop the trial and to order the inclusion of such party. (The Revised
Rules of Court, Annotated & Commented by Senator Vicente J.
Francisco, Vol. I, p. 271, 1973 ed., See also Cortez vs. Avila, 101 Phil.
705.) Such an order is unavoidable, for the general rule with
reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder
of all necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, the presence of
those latter parties being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial
power. (Borlasa vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, at p. 347.) It is precisely
when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action
should be dismissed. (People vs. Rodriguez, 106 Phil. 325. at p.
327.) The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (emphasis
supplied)
[23]

The evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of
indispensable and necessary parties is a complete determination of all
possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as
regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A
valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of
indispensable parties.
[24]

xxx

xxx

Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of the

certificate of title issued, acquire rights over the property, the court
cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate for that would impair public confidence in the certificate of
title; otherwise everyone dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether
the title ha[s] been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Indeed
this is contrary to the evident purpose of the law.
The peremptory disregard of the annotations registered and entered in TCT No.
V-41319 constituted a deprivation of private property without due process of law and
was therefore unquestionably unjust and iniquitous. This, we cannot countenance.
Clearly, it was the trial courts duty to order petitioners inclusion as a party to
Civil Case No. 4930-V-96. This was not done. Neither the court nor private
respondents bothered to implead petitioner as a party to the case. In the absence of
petitioner, an indispensable party, the trial court had no authority to act on the
case. Its judgment therein was null and void due to lack of jurisdiction over an
indispensable party.
In Leonor v. Court of Appeals and Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, we held thus:
[28]

[29]

A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It

cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void:x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.

Page 18 of 34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of the

Court of Appeals are REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 4930-V-41319 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Page 19 of 34

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs.

RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.

storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the
shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed onethird (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the petitioners petition
under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings
No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent
Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the
motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.

The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement.

Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort
Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The
petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in
the said property.

This case arose from the following facts:

After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent
resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their
coverture, whose names and dates of births are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA born October 29, 1965

In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5,

1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite,
Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was
already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite,
he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at
No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias,
Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of
court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the
petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by
substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioners son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of
Service to the court stating that the summons and a copy of the petition
were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B.
Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:

f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA born March 6, 1967

RETURN OF SERVICE
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA born November 19, 19703
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and
abandoned the petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994,
petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for
support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM
Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila.4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where
some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her
eight children, including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and
TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in
the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No.
310882, together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-

This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint
and its annexes was received by the herein defendant thru his son
Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the
summons. Service was made on June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the
respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default"
setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on
the said date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public
prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no objection to the motion of
the respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the
motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent
to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and
adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an
Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void

Page 20 of 34

ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of

the court on July 16, 1996.12

d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;

e. Costs of suit.14

On February 14, 1998, Valentines Day, the respondent and Teresita H.

Rodil were married in civil rights before the municipal mayor of Indang,
Cavite.13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the
respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special
Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550.
The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross
misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the
respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso,
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner, the respondent did
so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately
secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner
also alleged that the respondent caused the service of the petition and
summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the
respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to
deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to
the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was
null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the
extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that
there was no factual basis for the trial courts finding that she was
suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that
she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to
the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio
M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in
her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render
Judgment granting the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).

On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the
following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the
absence of any clear and specific averment by petitioner that the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is
there any averment or allegation that the present petition is based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the
assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was
not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial,
or petition for relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution,
appending thereto an amended petition in which she alleged, inter alia,
that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period
after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have
been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies were no longer available through no fault of
petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This petition
is the only available remedy to her.16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying
her and the respondents marriage was null and void for the court a quos
failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on
whether there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor
General to appear for the State.

2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner

a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every
hearing;

On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said

motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court
alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought
to be annulled.

Page 21 of 34

2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.

3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioners Motion to Admit the
Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17
The petition is meritorious.
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or final order or resolution in civil
actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b)
lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a
condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the
petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available
through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the
petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from
judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition
with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47
of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no
longer available through no fault of her own. The petitioner must also
explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was
incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy.20 Access
to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto. Once a
litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to sue
anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21

apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material
allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic
fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on
her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No.
NC-662 were not served on her. While the original petition and amended
petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed
order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a
sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner,
notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of
the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature
or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that
the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of
her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by
the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time
either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final
order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred
by laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of
Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, were based not only on
extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the
person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her
the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons
and complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,
who, however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition
and its annexes will show that it is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it
should have been given due course by the Court of Appeals.

In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for relief, were no
longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein
that she received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000.
The petitioners amended petition did not cure the fatal defect in her
original petition, because although she admitted therein that she did not
avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from
judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.

In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction

is acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by
service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the
defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed against him and,
thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the
demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the
absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the
defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly
served with summons.26

We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original
petition and denying admission of the amended petition. This is so because

Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by

handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and

Page 22 of 34

sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there is impossibility of

prompt service of the summons personally on the defendant despite
diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be effected by
substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of defendants office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should
be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be
served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be
made by stating the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him
the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This
statement should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and
filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted service is
a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that
substituted service of summons is a method extraordinary in character;
hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the
annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June
6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons was served on and received by
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,33 the petitioners son. When the return of
summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no
statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein
within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to
locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio Mariano
Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was
allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had
been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely
showed him the summons and the complaint and was made to affix his
signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of
the said summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining land consisting of
two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the conjugal
partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated
on my fathers lot), my father came to see me and then asked me to sign
and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did not allow me
to read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in
the case for annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was

not given any copy of the Summons and/or copy of the

complaint/petition.34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the
original petition of the petitioner and the amended petition for annulment
of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of
the final order of the trial court. However, we cannot but express alarm at
what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the records. The records
show that for the petitioners failure to file an answer to the complaint, the
trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in
default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he
interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court
forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered
judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the
public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public
prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of
the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see
to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family
Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court

Page 23 of 34

such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.38

Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its

pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals,40 regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not
sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the Rules of Court and
the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense
of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught
with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration
of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to
answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose
the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation
of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a
basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage
is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members
alone.43 Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family
should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only
one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance,
incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27,
2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let
the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Page 24 of 34

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner, vs.

ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed
PABALE, respondents.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking
the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,2 dated 10 April 2001, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution,3
dated 19 December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its
aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,
upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984,
executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin,
Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece
of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set
aside the Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2
December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales
agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with
different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the
Pabale siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to
Alamayri, as Naves successor-in-interest.
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present
Petition, determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by
Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation
[Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as
Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of
land located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604).
[Fernando] alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa
Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between him and
[Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their
agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment he
tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not want to sell her
property to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits,
[Nave] be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor,
and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages.
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to
execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on
the following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of the nature of the
piece of paper [Fernando] handed to her for her signature on January 3,
1984. When she was informed that it was for the sale of her property in
Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately
returned to [Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time
repudiating the same. Her repudiation was further bolstered by the fact
that when [Fernando] tendered the partial down payment to her, she

refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold the property in good
faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale
[the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint was filed
against her but before she received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged
that [Fernando] has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in
behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to the
alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party in
interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the corporation
there being no evidence to show that he was duly authorized to do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that
they are now the land owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint
was amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an
Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied [Naves] Motion to
Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she
was adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to
[Fernandos] amended complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her
defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she was
made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married at the
time of the transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and
[the Pabale siblings], the trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended
Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed
a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and
Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings], this time including the fact of her
incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on the
psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra.
Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion
unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in
Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she raised
therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive factor to
determine once and for all whether the contract entered into by [Nave]
with respect to the subject property is null and void, the Second Amended
Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings]
should be admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the
proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the
filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was
rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

Page 25 of 34

"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides
with the Brosas spouses has categorically refused to be examined again at
the National Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the NeuroPsychiatric Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986 submitted by Dra. Nona
Jean Alviso-Ramos and the supporting report dated April 20, 1987
submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental Hospital
and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within the purview of Rule
92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of age, disease,
weak mind and deteriorating mental processes cannot without outside aid
take care of herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby an easy
prey for deceit and exploitation, said condition having become severe since
the year 1980. She and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship.
Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her regular guardian
without need of bond, until further orders from this Court. Upon his taking
his oath of office as regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate
actively in the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of
protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales of her real properties,
from the overpayment in the foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong,
and in recovering her lost jewelries and monies and other personal effects.

Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same was already revoked by him
on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution should be denied.
On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot
make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the merits, the trial court rendered
its Decision on December 2, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3, 1984
executed by Nelly S. Nave and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no
force and effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984 executed
by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and void and
of no force and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property covered
by TCT No. 111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna;

SO ORDERED."
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, while
the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was
dismissed by this Court for failure to pay the required docketing fees within
the reglementary period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20,
1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an orphan and
childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his
inherited properties from [Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant
case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision dated June
22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for guardianship) was filed by Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale
siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were
not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be
bound by the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in their favor was never raised in
the guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997, Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts permission for his
substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the instant case. Not long after
the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, a motion for
substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that
since the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his
stead. In refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating
that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute

4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over the

property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of reconveyance
because the sale in their favor has been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the property
to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its income from the time they took
over possession to the time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita
[Alamayri], and thereafter pay the said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and severally, to
pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely
to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC
ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay Alamayri
the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133
averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave
in their favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was found
incompetent since the year 1980.

Page 26 of 34

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the
appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It
ruled thus:

Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following
assignment of errors:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando

Realty Corporation, represented by its President, Sesinando M. Fernando as
well as the appeal interposed by Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and
Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding the
VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.

No pronouncements as to costs.7

II

Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the

appellate court, invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in
the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which
found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980; and
thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision
already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom.
Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be
an incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered
into should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20
February 1984, which she executed over the subject property in favor of
the Pabale siblings.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN

SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING
ON RESPONDENTS PABALES.

According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings

of the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having
participated in the said guardianship proceedings through their father Jose
Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose
Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October
1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus
filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits
in Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence certain documents
to establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Naves incompetence since 1980 as found
by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the subject property
as owner upon Naves death in accordance with the laws of succession. It
must be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the
supposed transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the
court a quo refrained from ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for
lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty.
Gesmundo.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING THAT

NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C
ON JUNE 22, 1988 CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE
DEED OF SALE SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS PABALES.

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO
SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF
RESPONDENTS PABALES.9
It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated
22 June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave
incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated
in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more
particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays
the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits,
and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the
first suit.10
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section
47, Rule 39, which read:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx

Page 27 of 34

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be
stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action before a competent court in which a
judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and
their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject
matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the
distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which
a judgment may operate as evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the
first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted
paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as
"bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule, which is
embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as
"conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the
following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar
by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed
upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in
any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court
or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different
cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can
be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same
parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will

be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
(197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179
[1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by former judgment which
bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or
cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation
of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties
on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions
which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied
to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the
litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final
judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference
thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the
pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if
the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been
rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as
having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and
if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as
conclusive as the judgment itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking
Corporation, further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as
follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or
suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not
as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata
known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact,
or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or
not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.13

Page 28 of 34

In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case

of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second case,
however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the
same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of
judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes
of action.

(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or
incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.

Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no

application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and
issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo
for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late
wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a
minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of
unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation."14
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment
of a guardian, to wit:
Rule 93

The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification

shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for
the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time
and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the
province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent
himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may, by filing a
written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of the
alleged minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability
of the person for whom letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition
be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any
suitable person named in the opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the
petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it
must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon the
court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective
allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or incompetent it shall
appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the
powers and duties hereinafter specified.

APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
xxxx
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident.
Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or
incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor himself if
fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court having jurisdiction for
the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of
such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the
United States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward
thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane person who should
be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general
guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or
convenient;

SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments under this rule

shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the
minor or incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof
is situated.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without
the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil
case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re:
Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y
Banayo, petitioner, with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the
petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the
supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that
those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can
be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.

Page 29 of 34

The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian

under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person
is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for
himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be
appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people
who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who
are closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent,
namely, his relatives living within the same province and/or the persons
caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of
the minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is
simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for
appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so,
that they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually
capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said
contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to
comply therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice
and actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves
relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the
RTC to direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings
on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that
the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and 19 November
1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning
the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of the Pabale
siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. However, the said
Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the
father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to
appear in the said hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to
submit and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the
father of the Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials
or further proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts
hearings and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for
judgment.17 It must be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her
Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November
2001. She thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of
Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for

judgment, but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its
Decision in said case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and
available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court
before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional
circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered
judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the
parties may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence.
Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her
evidence earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been
best served if she was allowed to present additional evidence is not
sufficient to justify deviation from the general rules of procedure.
Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties
are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.19
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.
And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only to proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure
an orderly and speedy administration of justice.20
Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not
deny her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely
for being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of
Appeals also denied the said motion on the following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents
Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship proceedings considering
that the Jose Pabale mentioned therein is their late father, [herein
petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentary evidence to prove
their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot
bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their father is not notice to
them there being no allegation to the effect that he represented them
before the Calamba Court.21
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to
submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30
October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the
father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to
represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact
that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20
February 1984 over the subject property, which was executed by Nave in
favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabales
presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his

Page 30 of 34

children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the

subject property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil
Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil
Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment,
from ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of
Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was
incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings
in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an
incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in
favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said
sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must
be established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A
finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean
that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite
the fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial
court only nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not
prove that she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the
significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves
mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the
intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so
long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his
acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden of
proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person
who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will
be presumed.24

of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do,
having relied entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22
June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition "having become
severe since the year 1980."25 But there is no basis for such a declaration.
The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision, prepared by: (1)
Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,26 and (2) by Dr. Eduardo
T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon their examination,
Nave was suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral
arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which impaired her judgment.
There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which may shed
light on when Nave began to suffer from said mental condition. All they
said was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and again
in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which made
him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable of being
manipulated, on the occasions when Nave visited the court from 1987 to
1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves incompetency from
1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than
invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was
mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of
Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to
render the said deed void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the
former on Naves incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had
capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the
Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld
the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
SO ORDERED.

Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally

incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June
1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in
the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to
1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into
contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she
executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden

Page 31 of 34

PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR - v e r s u s PNOC EXPLORATION

CORPORATION,
This is a petition for review [1] of the September 22, 2005
decision[2]and December 29, 2005 resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 82482.
On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation
filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr.
in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167. The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 69262, sought to collect the amount
ofP698,502.10 representing petitioners unpaid balance of the car
loan[4]advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its
board of directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could
not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of
summons by publication.
Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, on May 20, 2003.
Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the
advertising manager of Remate[5] and an affidavit of service of
respondents employee[6] to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons
by registered mail to petitioners last known address.
When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed
period, respondent moved that the case be set for the reception of its
evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated
September 11, 2003.
Respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal
offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for
decision on October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. He sought reconsideration
of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service
submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed
that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the September
11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondents evidence ex partebe stricken
off the records and that his answer be admitted.
Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that it complied
with the rules on service by publication. Moreover, pursuant to the
September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in default for
failure to file an answer within the prescribed period.

In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied petitioners

motion for reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order. It held that
the rules did not require the affidavit of complementary service by
registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due
process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was
actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also denied the
motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed way
beyond the reglementary period.
Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003 and February
6, 2004 orders of the trial court in the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari. He contended that the orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. He imputed the following errors to the trial court: taking
cognizance of the case despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper service
of summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes,
particularly the September 11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over
equity and justice.
During the pendency of the petition in the Court of Appeals, the trial
court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 69262. It ordered petitioner to
pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit. [7]
Meanwhile, on September 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision[8] sustaining the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004
orders of the trial court and dismissing the petition. It denied
reconsideration.[9] Thus, this petition.
Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of
Appeals, namely, lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper
service of summons, failure of the trial court to furnish him with copies of
its orders and processes including the September 11, 2003 order and
preference for technicality rather than justice and equity. In particular, he
claims that the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in
personamlike a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the
affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared
by the clerk of court, not respondents messenger.
The petition lacks merit.
PROPRIETY
OF
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION

Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts
are unknown. In any action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave

Page 32 of 34

of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of

general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court
may order. (emphasis supplied)

Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons

despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and
was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was
properly served with summons by publication.
Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an
action in personam and claims that substituted service may be availed of
only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in
personamdistinction was significant under the old rule because it was
silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. [10] Because
of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in
rem actions only.[11]
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it
applies [i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action,
whetherin personam, in rem or quasi in rem.[12]
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant
portion of Section 19,[13] Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the
following:
an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address.

Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the

printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or
advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The
service of summons by publication is complemented by service of
summons by registered mail to the defendants last known address. This
complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit
of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office,
postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last
known address.
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of
complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial
court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the
duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on
the party who resorts to service by publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was
defective,the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against
him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary

appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the

Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer.[14] This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial
court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
ENTITLEMENT
TO
NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS

The trial court allowed respondent to present its evidence ex

parte on account of petitioners failure to file his answer within the
prescribed period. Petitioner assails this action on the part of the trial court
as well as the said courts failure to furnish him with copies of orders and
processes issued in the course of the proceedings.
The effects of a defendants failure to file an answer within the
time allowed therefor are governed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9 (on Effect
of Failure to Plead) of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to
answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon
motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party,
and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its
discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of
evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
SEC. 4. Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in
the trial. (emphasis supplied)

If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared

in default upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In
case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment
granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the
court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The
defaulting defendant may not take part in the trial but shall be entitled to
notice of subsequent proceedings.
In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that he failed
to file his answer on time. That was in fact why he had to file an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. But
respondent moved only for the ex parte presentation of evidence, not for
the declaration of petitioner in default. In its February 6, 2004 order, the
trial court stated:
The disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing the
presentation of evidence ex-parte precisely ordered that despite and

Page 33 of 34

notwithstanding service of summons by publication, no answer has been

filed with the Court within the required period and/or forthcoming.
[] Effectively[,] that was a finding that the defendant [that is,
herein petitioner] was in default for failure to file an answer or any
responsive pleading within the period fixed in the publication as
precisely the defendant [could not] be found and for which reason, service
of summons by publication was ordered. It is simply illogical to notify the
defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on account of the
reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known
address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of the
summons. In other words, it was reasonable to expect that the defendant
will not receive any notice or order in his last known address. Hence, [it was]
impractical to send any notice or order to him. Nonetheless, the
record[s] will bear out that a copy of the order of September 11,
2003 was mailed to the defendant at his last known address but it
was not claimed. (emphasis supplied)

As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit
itself to permitting respondent to present its evidence ex parte but in effect
issued an order of default. But the trial court could not validly do that as an
order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party.
[15]
Since no motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default
order should have been issued.
To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party declared in
default is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, all the more should
a party who has not been declared in default be entitled to such notice. But
what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not
known or he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way
notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him.
The law does not require that the impossible be done.[16] Nemo tenetur ad
impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. [17] Laws and

rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic,
common sense, reason and practicality.[18]
Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in default, he
could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be
furnished him. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order
was nonetheless still mailed to petitioner at his last known address but it
was unclaimed.
CORRECTNESS
OF
NON-ADMISSION OF ANSWER

Petitioner failed to file his answer within the required period.

Indeed, he would not have moved for the admission of his answer had he
filed it on time. Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying its admission.
Petitioners plea for equity must fail in the face of the clear and
express language of the rules of procedure and of the September 11, 2003
order regarding the period for filing the answer. Equity is available only in
the absence of law, not as its replacement. [19] Equity may be applied only
in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.

Page 34 of 34