India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency 2004

India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency
Author(s): Rabindra Mishra ,

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 5 (September/October 2004), pp. 627-646
Published by: University of California Press
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INDIAS ROLE IN NEPALS

MAOIST INSURGENCY
Rabindra Mishra
Abstract
This article examines India-Nepal relations, namely, Indias role in Nepals
ongoing Maoist insurgency. It argues that the insurgencys trajectory is heavily
influenced by transboundary links and should be viewed in the context of
Indias role in shaping the past 50 years of Nepals political history.
Introduction
The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and
is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.
Hans Morgenthau, The Politics Among Nations:
The Struggle for Power and Peace
Nepal is in the midst of arguably the most successful

Maoist insurgency the world has witnessed in recent decades. The so-called
Peoples War, started by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) in
1996 as a small armed movement in four remote districts (Rolpa, Rukum,
Gorkha, and Sindhuli), has now spread to all of the countrys 75 districts, taking the lives of over 9,000 people. The Maoists, who appear to model themselves on Perus Shining Path guerrillas, have shaken the countrys 14-yearold, multiparty democracy to its very foundation. Following the conspicuous
failure of the police to contain the insurgency, the army was mobilized
from late 2001, with little effect. The second ceasefire, declared in January
2003, collapsed after seven months, and a resolution of the crisis does not appear in sight. Political commentators such as Deepak Thapa have observed
Rabindra Mishra holds an MSc in International Politics from the School
of Oriental and African Studies, London, and works as a Senior Broadcast Journalist with the BBC
World Service. He is grateful to Dr. David Robson, Dr. Sudipta Kaviraj, Dr. Surya P. Subedi, Dr.
Seira Tamang, Dr. Pratyoush Onta, Dr. Saubhagya Shah, and Sudheer Sharma for their highly constructive inputs. Email: ,rabindra@ntlworld.com/rabindramishra@hotmail.com..
Asian Survey, Vol. 44, Issue 5, pp. 627646, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.
2004 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests
for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California
Presss Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.
627

628
ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER
that the conflict has evolved into the most serious internal crisis facing the
nation-state of Nepal since its founding in the mid-eighteenth century.1 This
could not be more true.
Given the magnitude of the crisis, the exploration of its causes and continued success has become a subject of interest to commentators and scholars in
Nepal and beyond. Popular wisdom holds that the insurgency is a direct result
of the increasing despondency felt by the poor and the socially marginalized
in the country. While there is an element of truth in these prevailing analyses,
evidence suggests that the underlying causes of the insurgencys origins, rapid
growth, and continuing success are far more complex. My study will focus not
on the causes of its origins or domestic factors relating to its success but on
the insurgencys transboundary links, which have heavily influenced its trajectory. This crucial aspect has been subject to little scholarly scrutiny to date.
As noted by scholars such as Saubhagya Shah, the epicenter of the insurgencythe Rapti Zone in mid-western Nepalis not the most backward region in the country. He argues that if social and economic marginalisation
alone were responsible for the emergence of the communist revolt, the hill districts of Karnali, Seti and Mahakali zones would be far more likely candidates,
not only because of their grinding poverty and chronic food shortage, but also
because of the nature of their terrain and their remoteness from state centres.2
Thus, it would be wrong to explain the causes of the Maoists continuing success only in terms of internal political, social, and economic factors. What,
then, has sustained the insurgency so effectively for so long? Departing from
the popular analytical tradition, it will be argued in this study that the answer
should be sought in Nepals inter-state relations with its giant neighbor India
and Indias role in Nepals domestic politics.
Nepal is a land-locked country, surrounded by India on three sides. The remaining northern one is separated from the economic might of China by the
Himalayas. This geopolitical situation forces Nepal to be totally dependent on
India for trade, commerce, and access to the sea. Without Indias cooperation,
Nepals engagement with the rest of the world and quest for stability and economic development will not bear much fruit. This allows Delhi to play a manipulative role in Nepali politics to serve Indias interests. For example, India
played a major role in the removal in 1951 of Nepals 104-year-old Rana
dynasty, the continuation for 30 years of a partyless monarchical rule, and the
restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990. It is important to understand
1. Deepak Thapa, The Maobadi of Nepal, in State of Nepal, eds. Kanak Mani Dixit and Shastri Ramachandaran (Lalitpur: Himal Books, 2002), p. 77.
2. Saubhagya Shah, A Himalayan Red Herring? Maoist Revolution in the Shadows of the
Legacy Raj, in Himalayan Peoples War: Maoist War in Nepal, ed. Michael Hutt (London:
Christopher and Hurst, forthcoming).

RABINDRA MISHRA
629
the political crisis Nepal is currently facing within the historical context of Indias role in Nepali politics, rather than only as a phenomenon nurtured at
home by political, social, and economic factors.
In what follows, an overview of relevant Indian-Nepali relations since Indias independence in 1947 will present evidence cataloging the extent of
Indias role in Nepals Maoist insurgency. Then, an analysis will explain why
India has continually interfered in the internal affairs of Nepal. Finally, it will
be argued that Indias role will be crucial in any future resolution of the Maoist crisis in Nepal. As countries around the world continue to act in their national interest rather than follow idealistic slogans, Nepal should reflect on its
shortcomings in its dealings with India, instead of seeking to blame Delhi for
interfering in Nepali affairs.
Historical Perspective
The decisive battles in [the power] struggle had not been fought
in the hills of Nepal but in the halls of New Delhi.
Leo E. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival
From 1846 to 1951, Nepal was ruled by a dynasty of hereditary prime ministers,
that is, the Rana family, and the monarchy was merely kept as a figurehead institution to be manipulated at the rulers whims. This dynasty maintained cordial relations with the British raj to its south and retained supremacy in Nepal
with a policy of international isolation. When the British departed from India
in 1947, the Ranas were concerned about their future. A growing anti-Rana
movement of exiled Nepali opposition groups, based on Indian territory, and
the establishment of a democratic regime in India put increasing pressure on
the Ranas to open up their polity.
Though India recognized Nepals sovereignty, Delhi was determined to
continue with British Himalayan frontier policy by keeping Nepal in Indias
sphere of influence. Nepal, which lies on the southern slopes of the Himalayas, shares 500 miles of open border with India. From the British raj onward,
Indian rulers have considered the Himalayas to be a second frontier, protecting India from military expeditions and undesirable influences from the
north (read: China).3 To keep Nepal under Indian influence, especially in the
context of Chinas declared objective to liberate Tibet just across the Himalayas, they felt it was becoming more important for India to strike a deal with
the rulers in Nepal than to please those Nepalis who, from Indian soil, were
fighting for democracy. At the same time, the Ranas were under pressure to
3. Surya P. Subedi, Indo-Nepal Relations: The Causes of Conflict and Their Resolution, in
Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia, eds. Subrata K. Mitra and Dietmar Rothermund (Delhi:
Manohar, 1997), p. 220.

630
sustain their regime. Against this background, India drafted the 1950 IndiaNepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was signed virtually as proposed in Kathmandu on July 31, 1950.4 Although the Rana regime that
signed the treaty collapsed within a year, the treaty survives even today. It provides a framework for what is described as a special relationship between
the two countries and sets out various provisions relating to security, economic, and commercial matters, in a manner conducive to Indian interests.5
Soon after the 1950 treaty was signed, events that would directly affect the
security interests of India took place across the Himalayas. Chinas October
1950 attack on Tibet greatly worried Delhi, particularly as the Tibetan plateau
was considered a buffer state between the two countries. Now, Chinas frontier extended up to Nepal, which had been listed by Sun Yat-sen in 1924 as
one of the territories that had been lost by China.6 Any further Chinese military ambition southward would directly expose India to an emerging communist power.
Meanwhile, with the help of India, Nepals King Tribhuvan, Crown Prince
Mahendra, and his eldest son Birendra sought refuge at the Indian embassy in
Kathmandu on November 6, 1950, and were flown to Delhi four days later.
After King Tribhuvan left the palace, the Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher deposed him, placing the kings four-year-old, second grandson, Gyanendra,
on the throne. But this enthronement was never recognized by the international community. India feared that the instability in Nepal could further jeopardize its own security, prompting Prime Minister Nehru to declare in the
Indian Parliament on December 6 that India could not risk her own security
by anything going wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier [Himalayas] to be crossed, or otherwise weakens our frontier.7 In this context, a compromise deal for Nepals political future was envisaged by India, which Nehru
called a middle way. The deal included a constituent assembly to draft a
new constitution and an interim government with popular (i.e., Nepali Congress Party) representation, but with a Rana prime minister and recognition of
King Tribhuvan. Surprisingly, the three Nepali parties involved in the deal
were neither consulted properly by India nor given a chance to sit together and
discuss the matter. All communication took place through Prime Minister
4. Leo E. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971),
p. 185.
5. See S. D. Muni, India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship (Delhi: Konark Publishers,
1992), pp. 18892, for the entire text of the treaty and the letter exchanged with it.
6. Michael Yahuda, The Changing Faces of Chinese Nationalism in Asian Nationalism, ed.
Michael Leifer (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 27.
7. See A. S. Bhasin, ed., Documents on Nepals Relations with India and China, 19491966
(Bombay: Academic Books, 1970), p. 25.

RABINDRA MISHRA
631
Nehru, who never spoke about terms concretely.8 Nevertheless, the Delhi
compromise was agreed upon by all parties, and the king and the Nepali
Congress leaders returned to Kathmandu to form the new government on February 7, 1951. This is how, to put it in Kumars words, India midwifed the
birth of democracy in Nepal.9
Indias influence in Nepals domestic politics has remained strong to this
day. In the early years of Nepals first experiment with democracy, Indian advice was solicited by Kathmandu on virtually all political, administrative, security, and foreign policy matters. However, with the death of King Tribhuvan
on March 13, 1955, and the succession of his son, Mahendra, Nepals domestic and international politics underwent a massive transformation. In an effort
to reduce the countrys excessive dependence on India, Mahendra took a number of measures: the Nepali government established diplomatic ties with
China and several other countries; issued an order that the medium of instruction in all schools should be Nepali, effectively barring Indians from teaching
jobs; barred all foreignersagain, aimed indirectly at Indiansfrom purchasing fixed property in Nepal; and requested that India withdraw its military
mission from Kathmandu.
B. P. Koirala, who headed the government after his party, the Nepali Congress, emerged victorious in the countrys first general election in 1959, tried
to follow King Mahendras policy of equal friendship with all countries, especially India and China. However, his strong relationship with Nepals southern neighbor was apparent on several occasions.10 When after little over a
year, on December 15, 1960, King Mahendra took over the reins of power by
dismissing and arresting the Koirala ministry, one of the charges directed
against Koirala was that his government had encouraged anti-national elements to a large degree, clearly hinting at India and its supporters.
The dismissal shocked Nehru, who described the kings action as a reversal
of the democratic process in Nepal. However, India once again appeared to be
clearly guided more by the desire to secure its own national self-interest than
by its public commitment to democracy in Nepal. Within six months of the
dismissal of the Koirala government, India had signed four aid agreements
8. Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala, Bishweshwar Prasad Koiralako Aatmabrittanta (Audio autobiography of Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala), recorded and edited by Ganesh Raj Sharma (Lalitpur:
Jagadamba Press, 1998), p. 146.
9. Dhruba Kumar, Asymmetric Neighbours, in Nepals India Policy (Kathmandu: Center for
Nepal and Asian Studies, 1992), p. 5.
10. Cf. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, pp. 21931; Ramakant, Nepal-China and India
(Nepal-China Relations) (Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1976), pp. 11161; S. K. Jha, Policy
Toward India: Quest for Independence, in Nepal: An Assertive Monarchy, ed. S. D. Muni (Delhi:
Chetana Publications, 1977), pp. 20910; Shiva Bahadur Singh, Indo-Nepalese Relations: Discord
and Harmony (Varanasi: Ganga Kaveri Publishing House, 1994), pp. 5356.

632
with Nepal,11 and after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, during which Nepal was
supposed to have followed a carefully neutral line, New Delhi ordered all antiroyal Nepali exiles in India to cease their activities. These actions virtually ensured the continuity of the kings absolute rule, and it lasted for the next 30
years, primarily as India found it conducive to support the monarchical regime. The regime only collapsed in 1990 as a direct result of its decision to ignore the wishes of New Delhi in what was, superficially, a trade and transit
dispute.
Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul have argued that Nehrus approach to foreign policy can be divided into two periods: from late 1946 to 1954, idealism
was more prominent than realism, while from 1954 to 1964, as challenges
mounted to Indias national security, realism became progressively salient.12
However, in dealings with Nepal, Nehrus policy always seems to have been
governed by realismidealism only being used as a veil to cover the sins of
inter-state relations. If he struck deals in the late 1940s with the crisis-ridden
Ranas to achieve favorable conditions for India, he did exactly the same in the
early 1960s with the royals. This approach continued to be the norm after
Nehrus death. King Mahendra wanted to ensure that the Indian government
would not help the Nepali opposition politicians based in India, and New
Delhi wanted to make sure that Nepal remained completely within its sphere
of influence. It is argued that this must be the reason why the monarchy signed
a secret arms supply agreement in January 1965. The agreement gave India
first priority for supplying arms and ammunitions to Nepal, adding that Kathmandu would be obliged to consult Delhi while purchasing such materiel from
India or transporting consignments through Indian territory.13
In 1968, Koirala and several other Nepali Congress leaders were released
from jail in Nepal. They immediately fled to India where they once again
planned for an armed revolt against the Nepali state. However, according to
the supreme leader of the Nepali Congress, the late Ganesh Man Singh,
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi not only ignored their request for arms
but, after the 1975 declaration of the state of emergency in India, asked them to
cease all their political activities.14 Once again, Indias role proved instrumental
in the unimpaired continuation of the monarchical Panchayat regime in Nepal.
The real crisis for the regime arose in 1989 when India imposed a so-called
economic embargo on Nepal after the two countries failed to reach an agreement
11. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, p. 234.
12. Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power
Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 116.
13. See Muni, Nepal: An Assertive Monarchy, pp. 19698 (emphasis added), for the full text of
the agreement.
14. Ganesh Man Singh interview, conducted by the author for the BBC series Down Memory
Lane. Interview broadcast by the Nepali Service of the BBC on April 28, 1997.

RABINDRA MISHRA
633
on the renewal of trade and transit treaties. India closed down 19 of the 21
trade routes and 13 of the 15 transit routes through India used by Nepal, causing chaos in the day-to-day life of Nepalis. Superficially, the embargo was related to trade and transit issues, but the underlying cause was Nepals
apparently hard-line moves to distance itself from Indian influence. For example, in 1975, King Birendra proposed that Nepal be declared a Zone of Peace,
and this was interpreted by India as Nepals attempt to ignore the basic security
arrangements made by the two countries through the 1950 treaty. In 1987, Nepal
tried to introduce a system of work permits for Indian nationals working in
Nepal, and most importantly, in 1988, Nepal purchased arms that were delivered directly overland from China. India argued that Nepal should have
consulted New Delhi under the 1950 treaty before purchasing the arms. However, Nepal insisted that the provision of the treaty did not require any consultation unless the import of arms was done in transit through India. This
response did not satisfy India.
In Nepal, all the mainstream political parties decided to launch a mass
movement against the monarchys Panchayat system, blaming the economic
embargo and the resultant hardship on citizens on flawed government policy.
India backed the mass movement in Nepal in several ways: 207 members of
the Indian Parliament appealed to the Indian government to help the restoration of democracy in Nepal; an all-party Nepal Fund was established to support the pro-democracy movement; and on January 5, 1990, in an address at a
convention of opposition parties in Kathmandu, Chandra Shekhar, a senior
leader of the ruling Janata Dal who later became prime minister of India, declared that while India could not give democracy to Nepal, India would stand
by the Nepali people on the question of democracy and human rights. However, once again, Indias public commitment to Nepals democracy appears to
have been an idealistic veil intended to cover its true intentions, which were
focused on securing another crucial agreement with Nepal. On March 31, India forwarded a draft treaty proposal to Nepal that
1. forbade Nepal to enter into any military alliance with any other state or
organization without prior consultation and agreement with India;
2. obliged Nepal to consult in advance with India when importing arms, training armed personnel, and raising additional military units;
3. gave India or its nationals first preference in Nepals development and
industrial projects whenever Nepal sought foreign assistance for such
purpose; and,
4. ensured Indias preferential involvement in exploiting water resources
originating from shared rivers.15
15. See Kumar, Asymmetric Neighbours, pp. 14447, for the full text of the draft proposal.

634
According to the Nepali prime minister at the time, Marich Man Singh
Shrestha, accepting these proposals would have enabled the regime to survive
but the country would have lost its sovereignty completely.16 His argument
may be true, given the fact that Nepals agreement to the proposal would have
immediately restored day-to-day normality in the country, allowing the government to focus on suppressing the growing movement for multiparty democracy. But King Birendra decided instead to give in to the demands of
the pro-democracy activists rather than surrender the countrys sovereignty
to India.17 Even after the restoration of multiparty democracy in Nepal, New
Delhis attitude to its Himalayan neighbor remained resolutely unchanged,
and it still continues to carve the path of Nepali politics as exemplified by the
contemporary case of the Maoist insurgency.
Indias Role in the Insurgency

India might have expected more from the Nepali democrats on
the basis that Nepals democratic and communist movements
were made possible only thanks to Indias support. However,
its expectations may not have been met in the new political
scenario that emerged after 1990, hence it may have
decided to use the Maoists as a bargaining tool.
Puskar Gautam, a former Maoist commander who deserted
the guerrilla war in 1999 and became a leading
commentator on the Maoists strategy, Himal Khabarpatrika
On February 4, 1996, the Maoists submitted the now-famous 40-point demands to the Nepali government, and the top three demands directly related to
India. The first demand proposed the removal of all unequal stipulations and
agreements from the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The
second urged the Nepali government to admit that the anti-nationalist IndiaNepal Tanakpur (hydro-electric) Agreement was wrong, and together with
the Mahakali (river) Treaty, which incorporated the former, should be nullified. The third demand stipulated that the entire Nepal-India border should be
systematically controlled, and vehicles with Indian number plates should not
be allowed free entry. All of these were categorized as demands related to
Nepals nationalism. However, today, they have rarely been an issue for the
Maoists, and anti-India rhetoric is practically non-existent in their official documents. They still talk in general about Indian hegemony and the danger of
Sikkimization (that is, Nepal becoming like Sikkim, which was merged into
India in 1975). But these terms have been largely emptied of meaning by their
16. Marich Man Singh interview, conducted by the author for the BBC series Down Memory
Lane. Interview broadcast by the Nepali Service of the BBC on July 23, 1997.
17. Ibid.

RABINDRA MISHRA
635
constant use in nationalist rhetoric, primarily by the Nepali left and right.
Hence, the essence of Nepals attitude toward India should be sought in deeds,
not words.
The Period of Suspicion
The public, press, and politicians first began to suspect a link between the
Maoists and India after the Maoists lukewarm reaction to the India-Nepal
Kalapani border dispute that grabbed national attention in 1998. The status of
Kalapani, an arid mountainous region on the Nepal-India-China (Tibet) trijunction in Nepals northwest, where India is alleged to have been stationing
its troops since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, was first reported in 1996. But it
only became a national issue in 1998 after several follow-up reports on the
subject. The dispute still continues. During the height of the controversy, in
1998, nationalistic sentiment in Nepal was used as political capital by several
political partiesbut not by the Maoists. Until then regarded as one of the most
vocal critics of India, the Maoists were conspicuously absent from the whole
saga. This fueled suspicion that the Maoist leadership had taken shelter in
India and hence was not in a position to engage in any anti-India activities.
In September that year, there were reports that Nepali and Indian Maoists
had held a two-week-long secret meeting in the Indian city of Kolkata. By
early 1999, concrete evidence surfaced regarding links between the Maoists
and like-minded groups in India. On the third anniversary of the Peoples
War in Nepal, Indians and thousands of expatriate Nepalis staged a solidarity rally in the Indian capital, Delhi. Following the Delhi rally, suspicion in
Nepal grew. Meanwhile, toward the end of 2000, anti-India sentiment swept the
Himalayan Kingdom after some newspapers wrongly reported that the Indian
film star Hritik Roshan had made insulting comments about Nepal and the Nepali
people. Students rioted across the countrybut the presence of the Maoistaffiliated All Nepal National Free Students Union (Revolutionary) was not
evident.
In early 2001, reports about the Nepali Maoists connections with the likeminded Indian Maoist organizations, the Peoples War Group (PWG) and the
Maoist Communist Center (MCC), were gaining prominence in the Indian
media. Quoting intelligence reports, the Times of India claimed that the PWG
was planning to create a Compact Revolutionary Zone from Hyderabad to
Kathmandu, taking Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand into its area of influence with the help of other outfits.18 Within two-and-a-half months of the
above report, a Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations
18. Cf. Kalyan Chaudhuri, A Spurt in Maoist Attacks, Frontline, April 28May 11, 2001;
Dipak Mishra, Nepalese Extremists Being Trained in Bihar, Times of India, April 16, 2001.

636
of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) was launched on July 1 to unify and coordinate

the revolutionary process in the region.
By now, there was no doubt left that the Nepali Maoists were receiving
moral and materiel support from their counterparts across the border. However, Nepals suspicion that the top Maoists leaders had been living in India
with New Delhis knowledge still remained to be substantiated by hard evidence. Such evidence is very unlikely to surface in the foreseeable future
given the sensitivity of the matter.
Interestingly, Indias attitude to Bhutans anti-establishment groups has remained diametrically opposite to its attitude toward Nepals anti-establishment groups. While Nepals anti-establishment politics has succeeded only
with covert or overt Indian support, any sign of political activities on Indian
soil that might be harmful to Bhutan, whose foreign and defense policies are
guided by Delhi under the 1949 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the
two countries, have been immediately quashed. In 1997, India arrested Rongthong Kuenley Dorji, the founder of the Druk [Bhutanese] National Congress
(DNC) and chairman of the United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD),
and initiated extradition proceedings for his return to Bhutans capital,
Thimpu. Currently, he is fighting extradition in Delhi and needs permission to
travel outside the capital.
The Beginning of Revelation
In August 2001, there was a dramatic report that the entire front rank of the
Nepali communist leadership, including the main parliamentary opposition
leader, Madhav Kumar Nepal, had met the Maoist chairman, Prachanda
(Pushpa Kamal Dahal), at Champasari, a village near Siliguri, in the Indian
state of West Bengal. It was commented at the time that such a jamboree of
top-ranking aboveground and underground Nepali communists in the socalled strategically important Chicken Neck could not have taken place without the knowledge of Indian security agencies. The argument appears valid,
given that Siliguri and the adjoining areas are regarded as a popular transit
corridor for ISI [Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence] operatives, and for
extremist groups from the northeast of India, making the security agencies extra vigilant about activities in the region.19 A couple of extracts from two of
the leading Nepali commentators below indicate Nepali thinking after the reported Siliguri meeting:
Since our southern pals claim to know everything that happens inside the smallest
madarassa (Muslim religious schools) in the tarai [plains of Nepal], it is highly
unlikely that they have not been aware of the honoured guests in their strategic
19. See Times of India, November 27, 2001.

RABINDRA MISHRA
637
Chicken Neck. The fact that the Maoists have safe havens in Indian territory has
affected their image back home. So was their rabid anti-Indianism just to hide the
shame of being at the mercy of their benefactors?. . . So, what are the many Nepalis
who believed Maoism was born out of their misery going to do now? 20
After the Siliguri meet between Prachanda and other Nepali communist leaders and
its coincidence with the Indian minister Jaswant Singhs visit to Nepal, some Nepali
analysts are already beginning to say a new kind of Delhi Agreement is in the making. In other words, it is not outrageous to surmise that the Indian ruling establishment is already making sure that whatever the outcome of the current talks between
the Government and the Maoists, both parties will follow the formers sound
advice in letter and spirit.21
Following the Siliguri revelations, no one in Nepal, except perhaps Maoist

supporters, was ready to believe that Delhi was unaware of the Maoist leaders whereabouts on Indian territory. It was also evident to Nepal that the
Maoist problem would not be resolved without Indian cooperation. The possible difficulties faced by Nepal in seeking Indian cooperation were temporarily
eased by the declaration of war on terrorism after September 11, 2001.
Against this background late that month, the Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, labeled the Maoists as terrorists and stated that India supported
the Nepali government in its fight against them. For Nepal, this was certainly a
welcome and surprising move by India. At the time of Mr. Singhs declaration,
Nepal itself had not labeled the Maoists as terrorists, and the Nepali government and the Maoists were engaged in political negotiations. It is unclear why
India wanted to outdo even Nepal in attaching the terrorist label to the Maoists. This labeling by India did not easily correspond with the fact that during
the peace talks, the leader of the Maoist negotiating team in Kathmandu,
Krishna Bahadur Mahara, traveled to and from India. On the morning of November 13, he arrived from Delhi to participate in the third round of talks held
later that day.22 The Maoists proceeded to walk away from the third round of
talks, and ten days later, to the shock of the nation, attacked the army for the
first time, killing 40 security personnel, including 14 soldiers, in the midwestern district of Dang.
The government announced a state of emergency on November 26, mobilized the army, and for the first time officially declared the Maoists to be terrorists. The following day, India extended its support to the declaration of the
state of emergency, deeming it a necessary step by a democratic government
to preserve order. The Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Nirupama Rao, prom20. C. K. Lal, The Chicken Neck, Nepali Times, August 2430, 2001.
21. Pratyoush Onta, Neighbourly Interests in Nepali Troubles, Kathmandu Post, September
7, 2001.
22. See, for example, Kantipur daily and Kathmandu Post, November 14, 2001.

638
ised that India would not allow its territory to be used by those inimical to Nepalese interests. However, the top Maoist leaders appeared to be able to
function without restriction in Delhi: they issued frequent statements and
talked to the world mediafrom Delhi.23 During the state of emergency in
Nepal, they also published their weekly, Janaawaj, from the Indian capital.
Despite this, the Indian authorities continued to insist that they had no knowledge of the Maoist leaders presence in the capital, and that action would be
taken if any evidence of their presence were found.
Delhis public stand against the Maoists was matched by military assistance
and an offer of two helicopters to Nepal. However, the feeling in Nepal was
that it would have been a more significant gesture had India also driven the
Maoists back into Nepal, where they could not evade the military and the donated helicopters so easily. In fact, when there was no external backing of any
kind to another armed campaign against the Nepali state by the Communist
Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) in the early 1970s, the Nepali government
had easily quashed it: only seven class enemies were killed before the leaders were jailed and the movement ended.24
The resumption of violence with the Maoists attack on the army prompted
great international concern, especially as it happened only two months after
September 11. Seizing the opportunity, the Nepali government began a diplomatic crusade against the Maoists. Declaring that the top Maoists are in
India,25 Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba went to Delhi in March 2002.
After returning to Kathmandu, he said India had pledged to provide full support to Nepal in curbing the Maoists activities. However, there was nothing
more to the promise than the usual diplomatic niceties. Many Nepalis found a
different news report about Deubas visit far more interesting. During his visit,
three senior Maoist leaders, Mohan Vaidhya, C. P. Gajurel, and Top Bahadur
Rayamahi, were said to have visited Kolkata to meet the Nepali prime minister. An article in the reputable Himal South Asian magazine suggested that the
three Maoist leaders were escorted by members of the Indian intelligence service.26 When I asked the prime minister during his London visit two months
later to confirm these reports, he acknowledged that the Maoists had unsuccessfully tried to meet him in Kolkata but expressed ignorance about who they
23. Interview conducted by the author with politburo member Dinanath Sharma, aired on December 18 and 19, 2001, on the BBC Nepali Service and The World Today program, respectively.
A report based on the interview can be accessed at ,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/
1718056.stm.. On May 10, 2002, Mr. Sharma again spoke from Delhi with the BBC Hindi Service.
24. See Origins of the Nepalese Maoist Insurgency, ,http://www.mypage.bluewin.ch/
raonline/pages/story/np_mao14.html., accessed July 16, 2003.
25. See interview with Prime Minister Deuba in Outlook, April 1, 2002.
26. Deepak Gyawali, Reflecting on Contemporary Nepali Angst, HIMAL South Asian, April
2002.

RABINDRA MISHRA
639
were escorted by. Regardless of who was escorting them, the Maoist leaders
attempt to meet the prime minister on an official visit could not have gone unnoticed by the Indian security agencies.
When I met Mr. Deuba, who was on his way to Kathmandu after his meeting with President Bush in the U.S., he looked delighted with the international
support Nepal was receiving for its fight against the Maoists. In a first-ever
visit by a U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell traveled to Nepal in January
2002. A series of high-level visits from American and British officials followed. A former Indian ambassador to Nepal, K. V. Rajan, says that India does
not feel comfortable about the U.S.-U.K. involvement in Nepal. He argues
that there is not much Delhi can do about it, however, and also predicts a substantial dilution of Indias influence in Nepal in the coming years.27 Publicly,
the Indian government has not expressed any displeasure at the growing U.S.U.K. influence.
Despite the international support against the Maoists, the political situation
in Nepal remained extremely grim: killings from both the army and the Maoists were growing, and the Maoists had made clear that they would disrupt the
planned general elections scheduled for November 13, 2002. When Prime
Minister Deuba recommended to King Gyanendra that the scheduled elections
be postponed for a year, the king, in a surprising move, sacked him instead
and took over executive power on October 4. In response, the Maoists intensified their anti-monarchy stance, hoping that the kings move would spark a
wave of protest against him. It did not. The mainstream political parties
strongly condemned his move but insisted that their protest was not directed
against the institution of the monarchy. The king has repeatedly emphasized
that his move is temporary, and as soon as peace is restored, elections for Parliament will be held.
The international community remained uncritical of Gyanendras move but
called for the preservation of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy. The Indian stand was exactly the same. The Indian Foreign Ministry
noted that there are two pillars for stability in Nepalmultiparty democracy
and constitutional monarchy, and both should remain strong. While Delhis
statement may appear logical and well intentioned, the question remains:
would not these two pillars of stability have become much stronger had
Delhi been more sincere in its dealings with Nepal?
After the announcement of the ceasefire in January 2003, the king traveled
to India, his second visit within nine months; in contrast, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had not made a bilateral visit to Nepal in the previous
27. K. V. Rajan, Recent US/UK Activities in Nepal, Observer Research Foundation, ,http://
www.observerindia.com., accessed July 4, 2003.

640
five years. Officially, the kings visit in March 2003 was described as a pilgrimage to a number of Hindu shrines in southern India, but most Nepalis
were convinced that he was not just seeking divine blessings, but also that of
Indias political leadership.28 If that was his real strategy, then it was certainly good diplomacy, especially since most observers in Nepal maintained
that any resolution of the Maoist crisis would only come after ensuring Indias
consent. But not only the establishment was engaged in the make India
happy mission; it was also the Maoists, who probably wouldnt have come to
talks had there been no pressure from Delhia fact later acknowledged by Dr.
Baburam Bhattarai himself. By then, the Maoists anti-India rhetoric had virtually vanished, and India was accepted as a neighbor with whom Nepal
needed to maintain cordial relations.
It is difficult to predict who will emerge victorious in this please India
competition. The resignation in late May 2003 of the India-unfriendly but devoutly royalist Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand after only eight
months in powerand the appointment of the India-friendly royalist, Surya
Bahadur Thapa, in June 2003was interpreted as a move to please Delhi. But
that does not seem to have satisfied India.
After Thapas appointment as prime minister, peace talks remained stalled
for some time, and the Maoist leaders, who had remained aboveground for the
negotiations, went underground again, and were reportedly back in Delhi. To
the astonishment of many Nepali observers, they issued an ultimatum to the
Nepali government, which included a new condition echoing the Indian concern voiced by Indian Ambassador K. V. Rajan, about the growing U.S.-U.K.
influence in Nepal. The Maoists demanded that the government annul the
Memorandum of Understanding on terrorism signed with the U.S. government and expel all U.S. security advisors currently in Nepal29 prior to any
resumption of peace talks. This might be consistent with the Maoists hatred
of the U.S. However, it was intriguing that they did not mention a word about
Indias help to the Nepali Army but argued that the U.S. presence in Nepal
was part of its wider policy to encircle China by keeping an eye on India.
This new development can be seen as Indias covert attempt to neutralize
Western influence in Nepal.
Peace talks ultimately resumed on August 17, only to be broken within a
week. Just before the breakdown, reports came in that Indian authorities had
arrested a high-profile Maoist politburo member, C. P. Gajurel, at Chennai International Airport, when he had attempted to board a flight to Frankfurt, on
his way to London, with a forged British passport. The Maoist leader,
Prachanda, immediately appealed to the Indian government, using genuinely
28. Rajendra Dahal, Everything on Hold for Two Weeks, Nepali Times, March 2127, 2003.
29. See Kathmandu Post, Kantipur daily, Himalayan Times, July 29, 2003.

RABINDRA MISHRA
641
polite language, to release Mr. Gajurel. However, the Indian embassy in Kathmandu said that it did not recognize Prachandas appeal, and added that Mr.
Gajurel may have visited Chennai to meet the leader of the PWG. This certainly
gave the impression that India was putting pressure on the Maoists by arresting its senior leader as the peace talks faltered. However, subsequent events
suggest otherwise.
Despite Mr. Gajurels arrest, the Maoists decision to end the ceasefire
clearly implied that its leadership still felt fully assured of being able to coordinate their activities from Indian soil. The famous meeting between the leaders
of the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist [UML]) and the
Maoists in the northern Indian city of Lucknow, in November 2003, was a glaring
example. Nepals largest-selling daily, Kantipur, reported in advance that the
three-member UML team, headed by the partys general secretary and former
deputy prime minister, Madhav Kumar Nepal, had gone to Lucknow for a
meeting with the Maoist leadership. The Indian government expressed ignorance about the meeting, which reportedly took place in a well-maintained
suburban house. Analysts in Nepal were baffled as to how, despite advance
reporting of the planned meeting, the Indian security agencies could be unaware of it.
After the Lucknow meeting, accusations against India of harboring the
Maoist leadership intensified in Nepal. The Indian foreign minister, Yaswant
Sinha, appeared in an exclusive interview with Nepal Television in late December to defend Indias role. Just over a month after Mr. Sinhas interview,
India arrested two senior Maoist leaders in Lucknow, Matrika Prasad Yadav
and Suresh Alemagar, and handed them over to Nepal. This was condemned
by the Maoists immediately. However, a week later, on February 15, the Nepal
Human Rights Protection Committee-India, regarded as the successor to the
All India Nepali Unity Society that was banned by the Indian government in
2002, held a public meeting in Delhi to celebrate the ninth anniversary of the
Peoples War in Nepal.
According to a Maoist news portal, the meeting was held right under [the]
Nepali Embassys nose, where thousands of Nepalis raised slogans against
the monarchy. Reportedly, the meeting was addressed by several Indians, including Jahwaharlal Nehru Universitys well-known scholar on Nepal, Professor S. D. Muni, and by several Nepalis, including the general secretary of the
Maoist-affiliated peasants organization, Chitrabahadur Shrestha, and the
president of the Maoists student wing, Lekhnath Neupane.30 Back in Nepal,
people asked why Mr. Yadav and Mr. Alemagar were arrested and handed
over to Nepal, but Mr. Shrestha and Mr. Neupane were allowed to address a
public meeting in the center of the capital.
30. See KrishnaSenOnline, ,http://www.cpnmaoist.org/index/krishnasen/newsksna.htm.,
accessed February 16, 2004.

642
The Maoists prompt high-command decisions, and their rapid and efficient communication using sophisticated email and internet technologies
would be virtually impossible to sustain from within the borders of Nepal,
given the very limited network of electronic communication outside the major
cities. Without being able to operate from Indian soil, the Maoists abilities
would be greatly hampered. Had the top Maoist leadership any doubt about
the ability to function from outside Nepal, their course of action would have
been different. So far, India has arrested and handed over around 60 Maoist
leaders and activists to Nepal.31 However, that seems to have made no difference whatsoever to the functioning of the Maoist leadership on Indian soil.
The Enigma
The quality of friendship is important. The number of treaties you
have with your neighbours is inconsequential. If friendship is
there, even one treaty suffices. If it isnt, then even a thousand
treaties will not make a difference.
Former Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral, quoted in
V. Sudarshan, Next Door Boor, Outlook
Indias interference in Nepals domestic politics is influenced by three related

factors: Indias attitude to Nepal, Nepals attitude toward India, and bilateral issues. Most analyses of the problems concerning the relationship between
the two countries focus on the third factor. However, it will be argued here that
though bilateral issues are crucial in determining the immediate nature of the
relationship, the essence of the problem in Indo-Nepali relations lies in attitude rather than issues. Obviously, attitudes are influenced by issues and
vice versa. However, attitude is much broader and reflects the overall mind-set
that is instrumental in determining the issues and the approach toward them.
Except for Bhutan and the Maldives, India has strained relationships with
all of its South Asian neighbors. An analysis in a leading Indian magazine,
conducted with the help of senior journalists from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri
Lanka, identified the main reasons for this as follows: India
takes its neighbors for granted;

insists it is always right on all issues;
does not grant concessions to its smaller neighbors;
is not serious about correcting trade imbalances created by its becoming a
regional economic power; and
is excessively paranoid about its own security, placing undue emphasis on
security at the cost of all other facets of a relationship.32
31. See Kantipur daily, February 11, 2004.
32. See V. Sudarshan, Next Door Boor, Outlook, September 2, 2002, http://www.outlookindia.
com/full.asp?fodname520020902&fname5IndiaNeighbours&sid51, accessed June 29, 2003.

RABINDRA MISHRA
643
Though such attitudes may not be new phenomena in the realm of international politics, where universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states,33 such realist approaches are coming under increasing
challenge. Notions like neo-Wilsonian idealism, idealpolitik, and neoidealism are being taken more and more seriously.34 When considered in
these theoretical contexts, it would be quite justifiable to question whether it is
appropriate, or even advantageous, for India to constantly seek a hegemonic
role in the region, rather than equitable deals with its smaller and weaker
neighbors.
But that is not how India would generally like to argue. Rather than take a
neutral viewpoint, the common Indian approach is to blame neighbor countries for not taking Indias concerns seriously. Size doesnt matter. India faces
a bagful of woes from the folks next door that puts it in a quandary, argued an
analysis last year in a leading Indian weekly, noticeably without discussing
possible grievances that neighbors might have.35 While India suffers from this
biased victim psychology, it also believes that its foreign policy has to predicate itself on realpolitik, rather than on purely moral considerations or an idealistic worldview.36 Perhaps it is the combination of the two that makes India
paranoid about its own interests. That might also explain why India has become increasingly preoccupied with what it views as the growing activities of
the Pakistani intelligence services, the ISI, in Nepal. India believes that the ISI
is taking advantage of the porous border between Nepal and India and is using
Nepal as a launching pad for anti-India activities. Circumstantial evidence
suggests that there is a degree of truth in the Indian accusation.
Following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane from Kathmandu in
1999, the Nepalese government arrested and deported a Pakistani embassy official, who allegedly served as the lynchpin of the ISI in Nepal. The plane was
flown to Kabul before the hijackers demanded the release of certain Kashmiri
militants, and the incident was generally thought to be closely linked with ISI
operations in Nepal. However, the reporting and detailed analysis of ISI activities in Nepal appearing regularly in leading Indian publications contrasts
starkly with their continued silence on Nepals main concernthe alleged
links between the Maoists and the Indian state.
33. Hans Morgenthau, The Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 12.
34. Cf. Francis Fukuyama, The Beginning of Foreign Policy, New Republic, August 17 and
24, 1994, pp. 2432; Stanley Kober, Idealpolitik, Foreign Policy, Summer 1990, pp. 324;
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., The Neoidealist Movement in International Studies? Realist Myths and
the New International Realities, International Studies, June 1993, pp. 13146.
35. Raj Chengappa, A Neighbourhood of Trouble, India Today International, February 10, 2003.
36. J. N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of Indias Foreign Policy (Delhi: Picus Books,
1998), p. 407.

644
This Indian attitude is further complicated by the Nepali attitude toward India, which has remained consistently unfavorable to Delhi from the 1950s.
Whatever the covert intentions, India helped Nepal free itself in 1951 from
104 years of autocratic rule. But by 1954, anti-India demonstrations were already taking place in Kathmandu. Anti-India feeling has continued to date,
and perhaps with more vigor. Any statement or incident originating from
across the border that is allegedly directed against Nepal or a Nepalihowever insignificant it might becan immediately trigger violent anti-India protests in Nepal. When the Indian film star Hrithik Roshan was wrongly
reported in late 2000 to have made an anti-Nepal slur, neither the Nepali press
nor the government tried to establish the truth. Rather, the government banned
his movies from cinema halls in Nepal, and several people died in violent antiIndia protests. For many Nepalis, the stronger ones hostility toward India, the
better a Nepali nationalist one is. This oppositional sense of nationalism is reflected in the Nepali press as well. Just as the mainstream Indian press only reports on Indian concerns vis--vis Nepal, the Nepali mainstream press focuses
on Nepali concerns vis--vis India.
Anti-India attitudes among Nepali leaders are even more worrying. They
try to secure support by overtly appealing to the publics anti-Indian sentiment, while covertly trying to keep India happy, reinforcing the common perception that Delhis favorable attitude helps the careers of aspiring Nepali
politicians. This duplicity on the part of the leadership, and irrational nationalism on the part of the public, coupled with the ever-suspicious approach toward Delhis motives, make the Nepali attitude toward India ever confused.
Between the twoa self-centered attitude based on principles of realism
(on the Indian part), and a suspicious and confused attitude emanating from
the lack of sincerity and rationalism (on the Nepali part)lie a number of bilateral issues. These include Nepals insensitivity toward Indias security
concerns; on-going reviews of the 1950 treaty, trade, transit, and water disputes; Indias construction of dams in the bordering region; and its alleged encroachment into Nepali territory at several places. However, such issues have
come and gone. Relations have been strained and normalized, but the attitudes
that form the root cause of these problems have remained constant for the past
half-century of India-Nepal relations.
The responsibility for changing these attitudes largely lies in the hands of
India, because of its size and power. With this realization, I. K. Gujral attempted
to change Indias regional foreign policy between 1996 and 1998, first as foreign minister and then as prime minister. The so-called Gujral Doctrine argued that India should not insist on reciprocity with its immediate neighbors
such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka but give and
accommodate what it can in good faith and trust. Gujrals time in office is often
referred to as a period of good neighborliness, and if this doctrine had continued

RABINDRA MISHRA
645
to steer Delhis foreign policy after his departure, there might have been positive changes in Indo-Nepali relations. However, since Gujrals departure, his
doctrine has largely been confined to foreign policy debates among commentators and scholars.
Because Indian interference is closely related to its attitude, Nepal has always found it difficult to identify true Indian intentions. It would have been
much easier for Nepal to deal with Delhi if Kathmandu had had a list of issues
on which India expected Nepals compliance, in return for a stop to interference in Nepali affairs. However, Indias attitude has been rather insatiable.
This puts Nepal in a difficult position, because it does not want to reduce itself
to the status of Bhutan vis--vis India, but Nepal does not know what India expects other than deference.
This is why no one has been able to explain what India may have expected
to achieve from its alleged link with the Maoists. Politicians of all persuasions, from the avowedly anti-Indian to moderates, to the allegedly pro-Indian,
have been in and out of revolving-door-governments since the Maoist insurgency began in 1996. Many of themprime ministers, deputy prime ministers, home and foreign ministers, who would have had direct access to all
confidential documents and knowledge of secret negotiationshave directly
and indirectly spoken about Indias role in the insurgency. But none has articulated a definitive understanding of Indias goals or expectations. That is not
surprising, as India has never commented on the existence or character of its
motives for maintaining secret links with Nepals anti-establishment groups.
Remaining discreet, India has used these links to keep the Nepali state in a
constant state of fear in an effort to extract continued subservience.
Conclusion
India, from the time of its independence, has played a crucial role in Nepals
domestic politics. However, Indias role has remained largely covert, except in
the early 1950s. The covertness of the Indian role appears to be characterized
by a Machiavellian pursuit of self-interest, regardless of its effect on Nepals
future or impact on Indias own image. This is probably why Delhi seems little bothered by inconsistency and duplicity in its dealings with Nepal.
The Machiavellian approach, coupled with Indias asymmetrically large
size, influence, and location vis--vis Nepal, means that any search for a motive behind Indias role has to be sought primarily in Indias foreign policy
attitude, rather than in other factors such as Nepals attitude toward India or
issues of immediate bilateral concern. Therefore, unless Nepal resolutely
focuses on developing strategies to bring about a change in Delhis attitude toward Kathmandu, India will always exercise its geopolitical supremacy and
power to manipulate developments in Nepal. Such a focused Nepali approach
would necessarily involve a realization that, though judicially both India and

646
Nepal are equal, empirically the two are vastly unequal in every sense of the
word, and a country like Nepal cannot in any way try to show brinkmanship
with a country like India. To put it in India-friendly and many-time Prime
Minister Thapas words, such brinkmanship would just be foolishness.37
Thus, Nepal should first try to change its own attitude toward India, before
expecting any good-will gestures from her. It will also be imperative for Nepal
to develop a well-woven India policy. To date, Kathmandus attitude toward
Delhi has remained consistently inconsistent and clearly flawed. This can be
attributed partly to Nepals Foreign Ministry, which, in the words of Kumar, is
regrettably useless, and partly to the politicians, who, in the words of Pandey, use nationalism opportunistically in respect of relation with India and
to seek its blessings to feel secure.38
Any solution to the Maoist problem must involve winning the hearts and
minds of the Indian authorities, perhaps more so than winning the hearts
and minds of the Maoists themselves. It would be diplomatically immature for
Nepal to expect an automatic change in Delhis attitude, unless an idealist like
I. K. Gujral were to come to power once again. However, such political idealists are rare, and Wilsonian idealism is still a feeble cry in international
politics, which continues to be governed by the rules of realism. It might be
too early to judge, but the new government of Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh in India has not appeared any different than its predecessor in dealing
with Nepal.
The only way for Nepal, then, is to reflect on its own shortcomings and put
as much effort as it can into safeguarding its national interest through a more
mature and sophisticated use of diplomacy. Because of its geopolitical location, Nepal cannot expect to completely remove itself from Indias influence,
at least in the foreseeable future. However, with more wisdom in dealing with
Delhi, the degree of that influence can be reduced. Or else Nepal will continue
to suffer more from exogenous interferences than endogenous imperatives.
37. Surya Bahadur Thapa interview, conducted by the author for the BBC series Down Memory
Lane. Interview broadcast by the Nepali Service of the BBC on June 16, 1997.
38. See Kumar, Asymmetric Neighbours, p. 32; Devendra Raj Panday, Nepals Failed Development: Reflections on Missions and the Maladies (Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Center,
1999), p. 347.


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India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency

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