PROPERTY

Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. NO. 155076, Jan. 13, 2009

International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the telecommunication
services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal
properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The construction by the respondents
of Article 308 of the said Code to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid international
telephone calls, telecommunication services and business is contrary to the letter and intent of
the law.

Tsai vs. CA, 366 SCRA 324

In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled as Real Estate Mortgage and
Chattel Mortgage, instead of just Real Estate Mortgage if indeed their intention is to treat all
properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate
LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT. These facts, taken together, evince the conclusion
that the parties intention is to treat these units of machinery as chattels.

Caltex Phils., Inc., vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982

SC held that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building
or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are
necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be
useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or

embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
MERALCO vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982

While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be
considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil
industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of
permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations.

Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514

Properties of public dominion is not susceptible to private appropriation and cannot be
acquired by acquisitive prescription and thus they cannot be registered under the Land
Registration Law and be the subject of a torrents title.

Manila International Airport Authority vs CA, 495 SCRA 591

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale
of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.

German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA 495 (1989)

The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession, and not when possession has already been lost.

Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM NO. P072399, Jun. 18, 2008

When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into
his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with legal
possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the
thing to its owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he
found something.

Mercado v. CA, 162 SCRA 75, 85 1988

To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on
which he builds, i.e., it is essential that he be a possessor in concept of owner and that he be
unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243, 252 (2005)

The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the
protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as
it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by
the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property) for those necessary
expenses and useful improvements made by him on the things possessed.

BPI v. SANCHEZES, G.R. No. 179518, November 11, 2014

The Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the property with the townhouses and
other buildings and improvements that may be thereon without indemnifying TSEI or the
intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the intervenors to demolish what has been built on the
property at the expense of TSEI or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay the price of
the land. As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these options within thirty (30)
days from finality of this Decision. Should the Sanchezes opt to ask from the intervenors the
value of the land, the case shall be remanded to the RTC for the sole purpose of determining
the fair market value of the lot at the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988.

Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995

Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we
believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the
primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties,
including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code
are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as toTHE
BASIS OF the indemnity.

Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996)

Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art. 457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject
land is part of the public domain.

Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989)

The accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another
person through prescription.

Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)

There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their ownership, as it is
subject thereto ipso jurefrom the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without
need of any formal act of acquisition. Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private
ownership of the owner of the land through which the new river bed passes even without any
formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser.

Bahais v. Pascual, G.R. 169272,July 11, 2012

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable requisites in an action
to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title. In this case, an action to quiet title is not
the proper remedy because petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to or interest in
the lots. The petitioners status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the final
and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary
and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and
ownership of the lots.

Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003

Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others, hence, the
relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.

Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, G.R. NO. 151016, Aug. 06, 2008

Any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way, prejudice the heirs who did not join,
even if such case was actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an action for
recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent action by a co- heir who did not join the earlier
case should not be barred by prior judgment.

Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron, G.R. No. 179011.
April 15, 2013

In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to
Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an
action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the
co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is
an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are
not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y.

GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES MANCAO, G.R. No.
182314, November 13, 2013

Only the redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable parties in an
action for legal redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/co-owner A party who is not the coowner of a land subject of a compromise agreement cannot claim that he was defrauded when
the parties in the compromise agreement entered into the same. As a third party to the
agreement, he is not indispensable for the agreement to materialize.

Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006

One whose interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary, is
not qualified to become a possessor builder in good faith.

Bunyi v. Factor, G.R. NO. 172547, Jun. 30, 2009 591 SCRA 350

For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of
every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right, possession can be acquired by
juridical acts.

EDCA Publ. V. Santos, G.R. NO. 80298, Apr. 26, 1990 184 SCRA 614

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which
he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for
them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by
the private respondents to the books.

PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON DUMADAG, ET. AL., G.R.

No. 194336, March 11, 2013

Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they
may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the

same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the
same character throughout their occupancy.

Quintanilla v. Abangan, G.R. NO. 160613, Feb.12, 2008

As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress
and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require
a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience
for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement.

Reyes v. Ramos, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015

Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law asTHE BASIS OF
setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without
imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.

Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, et. al, G.R. No. L-3422 Jun. 13, 1952

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is
always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they
are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an
artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any
new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an attractive nuisance.

Gancayco v. Quezon City, G.R. NO. 177807,Oct 11, 2011

The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and
property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make
that structure a nuisance.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET. AL., G.R. No.

166330, September 11, 2013

Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if
they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to
expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or
excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of
complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce
actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering
adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be
substantial and unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent
upon all the circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of
noise constitutes a nuisance.

Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18, 2000

The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or
(b) where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is either not given
to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance.

Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011

When the donor used the words that the gift does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I
die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels] the donor meant nothing
else than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land
until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.

Quijada vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126444, Dec. 4, 1998

Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee comply with the condition,
the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to comply with the condition within a
reasonable period. Only then when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought
to the donors knowledge that ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as
provided in the automatic reversion clause of the deed of donation.