ACCIDENTS HAVE ESSE IN ACTU BUT NOT AN ACT OF BEING (ESSE AS

ACTUS ESSENDI) OF THEIR OWN

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2016.

Although accidents have esse in actu, a secondary existence (existentia), they do not have
an act of being1 (esse as actus essendi) of their own, but rather are by reason of the act of being
(actus essendi) which belongs to the substance. Esse in actu corresponds to esse essentiae.
Accidental esse is the esse in actu in first substance (substantia prima), esse accidentale being a
secondary existence derived from the real substance. Accidental being (esse accidentale) would
indicate, explains Cornelio Fabro, the reality of the accidents insofar as they are properties and
acts or perfections of the individuated substance from which they proceed and in which they are
received; []. In other words, the accidents have and give a modus essendi according to a
proper content and this esse accidentale, which is actuated according to that temporal-plexus,
can be called existentia. accidents are attributed a proper existence, a proper specialtemporal situation in the substance, but not a proper esse as actus essendi.2
Concerning the act of being (esse as actus essendi) Fabro writes in his Partecipazione e
causalit: Esse ut actus essendi is the principium subsistendi of the substance, thanks to which
both the essence of the substance as well as that of the accidents are in act esse in the
proper sense is only actus essendi which gives subsistence to the substance. There is, therefore,
esse essentiae and esse which is actus essendi; the actualizing esse which is non-divisible
actus essendi, is so because it indicates the quality of absolute act that makes the first
discrimination of the real and the first foundation of truth, since it is inseparable and most simple
affirmation of its act and only has non-being for its contrary.3
Esse in the proper sense is actus essendi. In its intensive meaning esse as actus essendi
emerges over all other acts, formalities and perfections, it being the actuality of all acts and the
perfection of all perfections, as St. Thomas Aquinas writes in De Potentia Dei and the Summa
Theologiae: That which I call esse is among all (things), the most perfect, and this is clear
because act is always more perfect than potency. Now no signate form is understood to be in act
unless it be supposed to have esse. For humanity or fiery nature may be considered as existing
potentially in matter, or as existing in the power of an agent, or even as in the intellect: but when
it has esse it becomes an existens in act. Wherefore it is clear than when I say esse, it is the
actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections.4 Esse is the most perfect of
all, for it is compared to all as act; for nothing has actuality except insofar as it is. Hence esse is

1
If essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be what it is, the act of being (esse) is that which makes a thing
to be.
2
C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit secondo san Tommaso dAquino, SEI, Turin, 1961, p. 200.
3
C. FABRO, op. cit., pp. 201, 203-204.
4
De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9: Ad nonum dicendum, quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum:
quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi
per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in
virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod
dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum.

the actuality of all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the
receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver.5
Christian Ferraro, professor of Metaphysics at the Lateran University, explains in his
Appunti di metafisica (2013) that, although accidents do indeed have esse in actu, they do not
have an esse as actus essendi of their own (which belongs to the substance), this esse as actus
essendi being that which enters into a real composition with the essence (essentia) and is the
principle of subsistence of the suppositum. The suppositum, Ferraro stresses, has only one esse ut
actus, which is the esse suppositi, but he notes that the suppositum has a multiplicity of esse in
actu, according to the specific degree of the substantial essence and of the diverse accidental
actuations: Che gli accidenti allora non siano composti da essenza e atto di essere?
Effettivamente. Gli accidenti non hanno un esse proprio. Lesse ut actus (lessere come atto,
latto di essere, ipsum esse, actus essendi) propriet esclusiva della sostanza, principio della sua
sussistenza. Pertanto, mentre ci che appartiene al genere della sostanza per forza realmente
composto, invece ci che appartiene ad alcuno dei nove generi di accidenti non composto,
bens semplice, anche se entra in composizione con la sostanza come abbiamo appena visto.6
Se laccidente non ha lesse ut actus, non detto per che non abbia lesse in actu.
Anche la forma accidentale infatti d lesse in actu, com proprio di ogni forma. Gli accidenti
esistono, sono attuali, e questa loro attualit lesse in actu, con il quale arricchiscono la
sostanza.
Ora, questo esse accidentale, del quale parla pi volte san Tommaso, non per da
confondersi con lesse ut actus, quellesse che entra in composizione reale con lessenza ed il
principio della sussistenza del supposito.7 Si tratta invece dellattualit seconda che acquista la
sostanza sussistente in virt della forma accidentale. Infatti, cos come la forma sostanziale
specificava lesse ut actus determinandone il grado dintensit e conferendo al composto lesse
in actu, in maniera simile la forma accidentale determina ulteriormente il tutto sostanziale
conferendo un secondo esse in actu, a seconda di tutte le modalit accidentali: un esse qualis,
un esse quantum, un esse ad, ecc. Perci laccidente non ente nel senso di eseguire o di avere
esso stesso lesse ut actus, bens nel senso che per esso (eo mediante) un qualcosa in un
determinato modo secondario, che presuppone lattualit e consistenza sostanziale. Il supposito

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium,
comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas
omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis
sicut receptum ad recipiens.
6
Cf. De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.
7
Per non aver adeguatamente distinto lesse in actu e lesse ut actus, molti rappresentanti della scuola tomista
(Gaetano, Giovanni di san Tommaso, Gredt, Maritain, M.-D. Philippe, Elders, De Raeymaeker, per elencare soltanto
alcuni) hanno attribuito agli accidenti un esse (ut actus) proprio. Si sono visti costretti ad ammetterlo, sia sulla base
di certi testi di san Tommaso che sembrerebbero affermarlo (nei quali per egli parla soltanto ed esclusivamente
dellesse in actu), sia sulla base della loro fuorviante interpretazione dellesse ut actus come exsistentia, nel senso
del principio per cui la cosa messa fuori delle cause: se infatti laccidente reale, esso allora dovrebbe avere una
existentia propria. Certamente, poi aggiungevano che questo atto di essere era s debole da aver bisogno di
poggiare sulla sostanza.
chiaro che questa posizione non rispecchia fedelmente il pensiero di san Tommaso. Daltronde, un esempio
quanto mai eloquente dellessenzialismo formalista e del da Heidegger deprecato oblio dellessere.

pertanto ha un unico esse ut actus, che lesse suppositi, ma molteplice il suo esse in actu, a
seconda del grado specifico dellessenza sostanziale e delle diverse attuazioni accidentali.8
Influenced by the existential Thomism of tienne Gilson and Cornelio Fabro on this
matter, Toms Alvira, Luis Clavell and Toms Melendo explain that strictly speaking, what
properly is is that which has the act of being as an act belonging to itself, i.e., that which is by
itself, and this is true only of the substance. In contrast, since the accidents do not subsist, they
do not have being (esse) strictly speaking: it is their subject that is, in one way or another, in
accordance with these accidents.9 The weight of a horse does not exist by itself, neither does its
color or shape. Hence, it is more correct to say that the horse is heavy, or is white, precisely
because of having these accidents.
In the final analysis, accidents do not possess an act of being of their own; rather, they
depend on the act of being of the substance, which is their subject. Thus, a 5-kilo weight only
exists in a body endowed with that specific heaviness. This does not mean that the accidents are
nothing; they also are, that is, they are real, insofar as they form part of a substance, and
constitute specific determinations of that subject.
Hence, the accidents always imply imperfection, since their being consists in being in
another, on which it depends and, consequently, in being part of a composition formed with
some subject.10
We can also arrive at the conclusion that the accidents do not have an act of being of
their own by observing generation and corruption. Since generation and corruption the
acquisition and loss of being affect that which has being, these terms are only applied to the
substance. Whiteness, for instance, is neither engendered nor corrupted; rather, bodies become
white or lose their original whiteness. Accidents are neither generated nor corrupted. We can
only validly state that accidents are generated or corrupted insofar as their subject begins to
be or ceases to be in act in accordance with these accidents.11
Explaining how the act of being (esse) is the root of the unity of the substance-accidents
composite, Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo write: A being (ens) is a certain whole which is
composed of a substance and certain accidents. These are elements which form a certain unity,
and do not exist separately. No accident exists without its substance, and no substance exists
without its accidents.12 These realities lie in different levels, however, since the accidents depend
on the being of the substance and not the other way around. Therefore, the composite is by virtue
of the act of being (actus essendi) of the substance in which each of the accidents also shares.

C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica, Lateran University Press, Vatican City, 2013, pp. 282-283.
De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.
10
Idem. In I Sententiarum, d. 8, a. 4, a. 3.
11
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 50-51.
12
There are exceptions to this statement. First, in God, who is absolutely simple, no accidents are found; God cannot
be perfected by accidents because He is the fullness of being. Second, in the Holy Eucharist, as soon as
transubstantiation takes place, the accidents of the bread and wine remain present in a miraculous way they no
longer inhere, in their own substance, or in any other substance. The first exception is studied in Natural Theology,
while the second is taken up in Sacramental Theology, which presupposes supernatural faith.
9

Each thing has but one act of being. Thus, the entire substantial and accidental reality
of a being is by virtue of a single act of being, which, properly speaking, belongs to the
substance. A being has esse in accordance with the manner determined by its specific essence,
which is the essence of the substance. This substantial perfection, in turn, gives rise to a wide
range of accidental perfections in conformity with that specific manner of being. Hence, every
man is a single being which possesses the act of being according to his human essence or nature.
From that degree of perfection of being, his accidental perfections arise: for instance, a certain
bodily make-up, a complex of sense and motor powers, as well as spiritual operations.
A being has but one act of being (actus essendi), which is that of the substance. Though
lacking their own being, the accidents are also real, by virtue of the act of being of the substance.
There are some Thomists, however, who speak as though accidents had a being of their own,
distinct from that of the substance. Such statements tend to undermine the radical unity of a
being. St. Thomas Aquinas does employ at times the terms esse substantiale and esse
accidentale. Nevertheless, in these cases the term esse does not strictly signify actus essendi; it is
used in a more general sense of being real (esse in actu); every being certainly has some
accidental realities which are distinct from its substantial reality, but it has those accidents only
by virtue of a single esse, which properly belongs to the substance.13
Gilson explains in the fifth edition of his Le Thomisme (the 1948 French edition,
translated into English by Lawrence K. Shook, C.S.B. and published by Random House, New
York, in 1956): To speak of things as substances is not to conceive of them as groups of
accidents bound by some kind of copula to a subject. Quite to the contrary, it is to say that they
set themselves up as units of existence, all of whose constitutive elements are, by virtue of one
and the same act of being, which is that of the substance. Accidents have no act of being of their
own to be added to that of the substance in order to complete it. They have no other act of being
than that of the substance. For them, to be is simply to-be-in-the-substance or, as it has been
put, their being is to-be-in.1415 Gilson also maintains this position in his article, La notion
dexistence chez Guillaume dAuvergne, published in Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire
du moyen age in 1946.16 The position is also held by Louis-Baptiste Geiger, the scholar on
participation in St. Thomas Aquinas,17 Aim Forest in his La structure mtaphysique du concret
selon saint Thomas dAquin,18 and Cornelio Fabro in his Partecipazione e causalit
(Participation et causalit).19

13

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

Nam accidentis esse est inesse(In V Metaphys., 9, 894, p. 286). It has therefore only a relative and borrowed
esse. Esse enim album non est simpliciter esse, sed secundum quid,(In VII Metaphys., I, 1256, p. 377). Accidents
are not beings, but the beings of being; non dicuntur simpliciter entia, sed entis entia, sicut qualitas et motus(In XII
Metaphys., 1, 419, p. 683).
15
E. GILSON, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Random House, New York, 1956, pp. 31, 445.
16
E. GILSON, La notion dexistence chez Guillaume dAuvergne, Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du
moyen age, 15 (1946), p. 89, n. 1.
17
L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas dAquin, Vrin, Paris, 1942, pp. 269ff.
18
A. FOREST, La structure mtaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas dAquin, Etudes de philosophie
mdivale, 14 (1931), p. 89.
19
C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit, SEI, Turin, 1961. French translation: Participation et causalit selon s.
Thomas dAquin, Louvain-Paris, 1961, pp 299-302. See especially page 301.
14

And even after knowing via Louvains Louis De Raeymaeker that the Thomist
Commentator Domingo Baez20 later in life changed his mind on this issue, in opposition to the
position of Gilson, Geiger, Forest, and Fabro, this, nevertheless, did not change Gilsons position
on this matter: in the sixth and final edition of Le Thomisme (the 1965 French edition [Vrin,
Paris], translated into English by Lawrence Shook and Armand Maurer, and published by the
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto in 2002) Gilson states as his final position on
this issue: To speak of things as substances is not to think of them as groups of accidents bound
to a subject by a copula. It is rather that they present themselves as units of existence, all the
elements of which are in virtue of one and the same act of being (esse), which is that of the
substance. The accidents have no act of being of their own, which would be added to that of the
substance so as to complete it. They have no other act of being than that of the substance. Their
esse is simply to be in the substance, or, as is sometimes said, their esse est inesse.2122
In Partecipazione e causalit, Fabro explains how accidents, though having esse in actu,
have no act of being (esse as actus essendi) of their own; what has the act of being (esse as actus
essendi) is the substance and the accidents are by reason of this one act of being (esse as actus
essendi) which belongs to the substance: Una conferma ed unapplicazione dellesse essentiae
(lessenza metafisica), la divisione dellesse in esse substantiale ed esse accidentale che non
pu riguardare direttamente lesse come actus essendi, il quale latto proprio della sostanza
completa (substantia prima). Per il fatto stesso che lesse essentiae detto comune a tutti i
predicamenti, ed quindi o sostanziale o accidentale, San Tommaso usa con frequenza anche del
termine di esse accidentale23: in modo esplicito lAngelico attribuisce agli accidenti un esse
accanto a quello della sostanza24, cos che si diffusa fra i tomisti lopinione che attribuisce agli
accidenti un esse come actus essendi in senso proprio, bench dipendente dallesse principale
della sostanza. chiaro, ed ripetuto in tutte le opere da San Tommaso, che lesse in senso forte
20
Cf. B. S. LLAMSON, Supposital and Accidental Esse: A Study in Baez, The New Scholasticism, 39 (1965),
pp. 170-188.
21
Nam accidentis esse est inesse(In V Metaphys., 9, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi, p. 239, n. 894). Hence an accident has
only a relative and borrowed esse: Esse enim album non est simpliciter esse, sed secundum quid(In VII Metaphys.,
1, p. 317, n. 1256). Accidents are not beings, but beings of a being; non dicuntur simplicter entia, sed entis entia,
sicut qualitas et motus(In XII Metaphys., 1, p. 568, n. 2419).
22
E. GILSON, Thomism. The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto,
2002, p. 156.
23
In creaturis per paternitatem additur novum esse quod est esse accidentale, et non idem, quod est esse
subjecti(In I Sent., d. 21, I, 2; Parm., VI, 181 b; Mand. I, 520). Ver., XXI, 6 ad 9um: Sicut est aliud esse
substantiale et accidentale, ita constat esse aliam formam substantialem et accidentalem et utraque propium habet
modum et proprium ordinem. E prima: Sicut ens est quoddam essentiale et quoddam accidentale ita est bonum, et
eodem modo amittit aliquis bonitatem sicut esse substantiale vel accidentale(Ver. XXI, 1 ad 6um). Ancora: Forma
substantialis est principium substantialis esse, et accidentalis dat aliquod esse, scilicet accidentale(In I Sent., d. 32,
q. 11, a. 1, Parm., VI, 261 b; Mand., I, 752). Omnis forma addens aliquod esse super esse substantiale, facit
compositionem cum substantia et ipsum esse est accidentale, sicut esse albi et nigri(De Pot., IX, 5 ad 19um). Qui
sinsinua il principio forma dat esse, di cui pi avanti. Ho limpressione che la terminologia di esse accidentale si
dirada negli scritti pi maturi.
24
C. G., IV, 14: In nobis relationes habent esse dependens, quia eorum esse est aliud ab esse substantiae; unde
habent proprium modum essendi secundum propriam rationem, sicut et in aliis accidentibus contingit; quia enim
omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam superadditae, et a principiis substantiae causatae, oportet quod eorum esse sit
superadditum supra esse substantiae et ab ipso dependens. Lesse di cui si parla qui e nei testi consimili non indica
lesse come actus essendi, ma lesse in actu di una forma ovvero lattuazione che tale forma conferisce al soggetto
nellmbito formale ed in questo senso che San Tommaso, daccordo con Aristotele, parla di un esse accidentale.

 quello che fa composizione reale con lessenza latto proprio della sostanza ed alcune
volte indicato col termine speciale di subsistere, mentre agli accidenti compete linesse. Lesse
accidentale quindi la realt degli accidenti in quanto sono propriet e atto o perfezioni della
sostanza individua dalla quale procedono e nella quale sono ricevuti; lesse dellaccidente nella
formalit secondaria realt di fatto che i vari attributi e molteplici modificazioni conferiscono
alla sostanza. In altre parole, gli accidenti hanno e dnno un modus essendi25 secondo un
contenuto proprio e questo esse accidentale, che si attua secondo quel plesso-temporale, pu
essere detto lexistentia. In senso rigoroso quindi agli accidenti va attribuita al pi una esistenza
propria, una propria situazione spazio-temporale, nella sostanza, non un proprio esse come actus
essendi.
lesse in actu corrisponde allesse essentiae: come allessenza sostanziale corrisponde
un esse sostanziale, cos allessenza accidentale (la quantit, la qualit, la relazione)
corrisponde lesse accidentale.26 Ma lesse ut actus essendi il principium subsistendi della
sostanza, grazie al quale tanto lessenza della sostanza come anche quella degli accidenti sono in
atto e operano nella realt: lesse degli accidenti lesse in actu nel tutto ch la sostanza prima,
quindi unesistenza secondaria derivata dalla sostanza reale come un tutto in atto.27

25

Che si tratti dellesse essentiae, e non dellactus essendi, lo si vede chiaramente dallinterpretazione che San
Tommaso d della definizione aristotelica della relazione come predicamento nel Quodl., IX, q. 11, a. 4: U. in
Christo sit una tantum filiatio. Ob. 3: Huiusmodi relativa secundum Philosophum in Praedicamentis [cfr. Cat., 7,
6 b 36] sunt quorum esse est ad aliud se habere: Dicendum quod in illa Philosophi descriptione esse ponitur pro
ratione essendi, secundum quod definitio dicitur realis secundum genus, quod est esse; unde non oportet quod habeat
esse relatio ex respectu, sed ex causa respectus; ex respectu vero habet propriam rationem generis vel speciei(ad
3um).
26
Summa Theologiae, III, 77, 1 ad 4um. E prima ancora: Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod habet ipsum esse,
quasi in suo esse subsistens. Unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia; accidens vero non habet esse,
sed eo aliquid est et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur
quod accidens magis est entis, quam ens[Metaph., VII, 1, 1028 a 25]. Et eadem est de omnibus aliis formis non
subsistentibus(Summa Theologiae, I, 90, 2). Questa dottrina non che una conseguenza del principio della
partecipazione e si trova con ogni chiarezza negli scritti della maturit: cfr. Summa Theologiae, I, 45, 4; I-II, 55, 4 ad
1um; III, 8, 1; Pot., VII, 7 ad 7um. In VII Metaph., lect. I, n. 2157; XI lect. 3, n. 2197; XII, lect. 1, n. 2419: Ens
dicitur quasi esse habens: hoc autem est solius substantiae. Ancora: Accidentia entia dicuntur non quia in seipsis
esse habent, sed quia esse eorum est in hoc quod insunt substantiae(De subst. sep., c. 6, n. 42; Perrier 149: tertia
ratio).
27
C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit, SEI, Turin, 1961, pp. 199-201.