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Philosophical Review

Review
Author(s): Elizabeth Asmis
Review by: Elizabeth Asmis
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Oct., 1978), pp. 620-623
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184467
Accessed: 05-02-2016 09:56 UTC

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BOOK REVIEWS
used. It seems futileto discuss thejustificationforpolitical violence without considering Marx's view that depression is endemic to capitalism,
Lenin's thesis that interimperialistrivalry inevitably engenders world
war, or Rupert Palme Dutt's argument that capitalism must lead to
fascism.Only by evaluating these argumentscan we determinewhether
the use of considerable violence by revolutionariesis justified.
When it comes to discussingmoral issues relevant to violence Honderich argues fora moralitywhich takes as self-warrantingsuch principles
as the one that societyshould striveforequal satisfactionof its members.
For Honderich moralityis not grounded in objective reality.He does not
considerthe Marxist view that principlesof equality gain prominence in
human thought when social development in the direction of equality
becomes an objective necessityif the species is to flourish,a view that
bases moral principles in the interestsof the species. In Honderich's
thinkingmoral idealism prevails.
In sum, then,Honderich expands the domain of legitimatediscussion,
but not far enough. While he is effectivein criticizingthose who would
readily condemn left-wingviolence, he does not consider revolutionary
violence, for which there is the most justification.
PAUL GOMBERG

University
ofMissouri,St. Louis

THE ORIGINS OF STOIC COSMOLOGY. By DAVID

E. HAHM. Columbus, Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 1977. Pp. 292. $17.50.

This book is an attempt to satisfythe "need fora systematicstudy of


all the evidence" (p. xiv) relating to the origin of two selected areas of
Stoic physics,Stoic corporealism and Stoic cosmology. the author excludes fromconsideration the Stoic theoriesof mixtureand of time,and
announces that he will not give a detailed account of "god, providence,
and fate" (p. xv). In the course of his study,the author does offera large
amount of evidence. He concludes that the Stoic doctrines are, as a
whole and in detail, a "synthesis" of current scientificideas and especially of Aristotelianideas. This "synthesis,"the author claims, is something wholly original in spite of its indebtedness.
A question which immediately arises is: has the author drawn the
limitsof his inquiry too tightly?Above all, is it appropriate to exclude
the Stoic theoryof mixture? Mixture is a key concept of Stoic physics,
and it seems hardly possible to obtain an understanding of what is
derivedand what is original in Stoic cosmology or corporealism without
giving serious attention to it. Time is obviously relevant to a study of
cosmic change. As for "god, providence, and fate," god is one of the
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BOOK REVIEWS
principles ( pxa), to which the author devotes a chapter, and god is
identical with the world; on either score, god deserves detailed
treatment.
In his firstchapter, "Corporealism", the author discusses the Stoic
view that there are only bodies. The discussion would have been much
improved ifthe author had set out at the beginning the Stoic distinction
between "being" (tv) and "something" (Tt), according to which "being"
applies only to bodies (acaTa), and "something" applies to both bodies
and nonbodies. This would have avoided such cases of verbal imprecision as "the only things that really exist are material bodies" (p. 3),
"all real thingsare bodies" (p. 5), "the corporealityof anything" (p. 17),
and so on. There is also imprecision in the use of the word "mark." The
author offerstwo "definitions"of body, as well as additional "marks" of
body. Are "marks" not definitions,and ifnot, why not? As forone of the
alleged definitionsof body, "that which is capable of acting or being
acted upon" (p. 3), thisis cited later by the author as a definitionof being
(derived by the Stoics fromPlato). Do "being" and "body," then, have
identical definitions?The evidence suggests rather that body is, to be
exact, something withoutwhich nothing can act or be acted upon, and
that the alleged definition is properly a definition of being. (Incidentally, it is not correct that the Epicureans agreed with the Stoics that
"only bodies exist", p. 12). As forinfluences,the author rightlypoints to
Plato's Sophist,and he rightlyviews Aristotle'sontology as a precursorof
Stoic ontology. However, when he proceeds to give examples of Aristotle's influence,he makes claims which are unconvincing. The Stoic
distinctionbetween significant,significate,and external thing is different enough from Aristotle's distinction between sound, thought, and
thingsto make it doubtful whether the Stoics had studied the Aristotelian distinction,as the author claims. Also, it's not at all clear how
Chrysippus needs Aristotlefor the distinctionbetween "touching" and
"being apart" in his proof for the corporeality of the soul. And are the
Stoics really "operating" with Aristotelian concepts in ascribing corporealityto the virtues(p. 18)? The author does provide a valuable analysisof Aristotle'snotion of contact; but he goes too far in the claim that
the Stoics "seem to have derived their most important mark of body
fromAristotle"(the "most important mark" is the capacity to act or be
acted upon; p. 14),-a claim which he subsequently hardens to the view
that the Stoics "universalized" an Aristotelian bias.
In his examination of the Stoic principles (QpXat), which makes up
the second chapter, the author assigns two "roles" to the principles: one
is thatof providinga motive and a material cause forthe presentorderof
the world; the other is that of providing the same two causes for the
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BOOK REVIEWS
originof the world. The author defends this division as reflectinga differencein emphasis: in the present world order one of the principles,
matter,has a dominant role,whereas in the creation of the world the two
principles,matterand logos(or god), are evenly balanced. Considering
that the two principles occur inseparably in all things,this division of
rolesis inappropriate. The author commits the fallacy of individualizing
the principles,and as a result(and by stressingthe cosmogonical role) he
comes to the conclusion that Aristotle's distinction between an active
cause (the male) and a passive cause (the female) in biological reproduction formsthe very "kernel" of the Stoic doctrine of principles (p. 47).
This view is elaborated in the chapter on cosmogony, though with no
more plausibility (since it is clear that the process of creation is one of
self-transformation).What is needed is an analysis of the concept
"principle" to begin with, togetherwith a study of the relationship of
logosand matter.
Throughout the next four chapters, on cosmogony, cosmology,
cosmobiology, and the cosmic cycle, the author distinguishesbetween
physical and biological explanation, devoting separate sections to each.
Is thisprocedurejustified? The Stoics thought that the world is a living
thing; for them, physical and biological explanation coincide. The
danger inherent in the author's method is that in focusing on partial
explanations he will ignore the whole, and so give wrong estimates of
influence. This has, I think, happened to a large degree, although it
should be said immediately to the author's credit that he is sensitiveto
thecomplexitiesof the doctrinesthat he discusses.On the "physical" side
of cosmology,the author elaborates the view that the Stoics followPlato
and Aristotle with certain exceptions, one major exception being the
Stoic claim that the world is surrounded by an infinitevoid. The author
argues that in spite of the apparent differencethe Stoic concept of the
void is basically in agreement with that of Aristotle. This, however,
depends on assigning to Aristotle a non-Aristotelianconcept of place,
as well as attributingto Aristotlea definitionof void which belongs to his
opponents (De Caelo 279al3-14, cited on p. 105). Turning to cosmobiology,the author makes the bold claim that "everythingknown about
Zeno's cosmobiology is found also in Plato" (p. 137). An obvious difference would seem to be that Zeno's cosmos is god, who has attributesnot
shared by Plato's world (or world soul). The author proposes that
Cleanthes supplemented Zeno's cosmobiology with the notion that the
world soul is a kind of heat having the threeAristoteliansoul functions
of nutrition, sensation, and reason; and he further suggests that
Chrysippus later separated out the function of hexisfromthe nutritive
functionof the soul, thus adding a fourthpsychic function.It is part of
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thisproposal that Cleanthes thought of the inorganic components of the
world as nourished,and not just held together,by the cosmic soul. This
is, I think,a misinterpretationof the text (Cicero's De Natura Deorum
2.23-28), in particular of the termsustineri
which is simply"to be held together." Cicero's text (always supposing that Cicero is here recording
Cleanthes' views) contains good evidence that Cleanthes subscribed to
the four-folddivision, attested for the Stoics in general, of (1) cohesion
(ets), (2) nature, (3) soul, and (4) mind or reason. According to this
classification,the nutritivefunctionbelongs properlynot to soul, but to
nature, and the cohesive function is equally not a proper function of
the soul. Is the soul then deprived of eitherof these functions?Not if we
suppose that each successive category is a distinction introduced into
the preceding category. It follows that the soul's functions include a
nutritiveas well as a cohesive function,and that the world soul, which
is investedwith reason, exercises all four types of function.All this is, I
think,quite farremoved fromAristotle'sthreesoul functions.
The book ends with an epilogue which includes an examination of the
Stoic concept of nature, and six detailed appendices. To sum up the
study,the criticismsthat have been made here should not be allowed to
obscure the fact that the author brings much learning and much perspicacity to his enterprise.The chief problem is that he does not give sufficient attention to what is distinctive in Stoic physics. The author disavows the view that Stoic cosmology is nothing but the sum of so many
conceptual linkswith other thinkers,but it is thisveryreductionismthat
guides the selection and weighing of evidence throughout the book. As
a result,the book has considerable value in illuminating the general
background of Stoic thought,but fails to achieve itsmore specificgoals.
ELIZABETH

ASMIS

CornellUniversity

PERCEPTION: A REPRESENTA TIVE THEORY. By

FRANK JACKSON.

New York, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1977. Pp. 180. $13.95.

In this book Frank Jackson develops and defends a version of the


Representative Theory of Perception (henceforth RTP). The central
tenet of Jackson's theory is the claim that the immediate object
of perceptionis always mental. In addition he holds that thereis a world
of material objects existing independently of us, that these objects possessprimaryqualities only, and that to perceive one of these objects is to
immediatelysee a sense-datum caused by that object and functionally
dependent on it in specifiable ways. Jackson uses linguisticanalysis as a
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