Wise choices, Apt Feelings Allan Gibard

The question of how to live is a moral one, and reasoning and questioning is
something we all do, but how are the two related? Should we spend our live in
rational enquiry? And conversely, is it rational to be moral?

Moral judgements are judgements as to when it is appropriate or inappropriate to

feel a certain way. To say that murder is wrong is to say that a person should feel
guilty after murdering someone.
But what does it mean to say that a certain action is rational or that a certain
feeling is apt? Well, to call a thing rational is to endorse it, that is to say that
to do the thing that makes sense is to make a rational choice.
Okay, but what is it to endorse an action as rational? To call something rational
is to express ones acceptance of norms that permit it. So when we call an
action rational we arent describing a property it has, rather we are expressing
our states of mind. Thus it is non-cognitive: to call something rational is not to
state a matter of fact that could be true or false.
This isnt to say that normative talk is unimportant or second rate. It is highly
important, and the following expressive account should explain norms in a way
that fits with our experience of them. However this account wont be substantive
and will not answer questions as to what exactly rational behaviour is. Rather it
will explain what is in dispute when people argue about what is and isnt rational.
That said, it should also be usable as a tool for normative inquiry.
Why not interpret talk about rationality as descriptive? Could we not
carefully define what is constitutive of rational action?
Instrumental rationality
Hume offers such an analysis and claims that what is rational is what helps us
achieve our desires. Whatever those desires are is not up to rationality to
evaluate. Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world
to the scratching of my finger.
But others disagree, they claim that certain desires are rational regardless of
whether or not we have them. They use of the word rational seems at great odds
with Humes. For example one might argue that it is rational to care about ones
future happiness even if one is currently indifferent about it. This claim seems
intelligible.
So is Hume right about the meaning of the word rational? Should it be confined
to beliefs about means?
Ramsey furthers Humes theory and adds the requirement of a formal coherence
in your beliefs in the face of uncertainty. An action is rational if it helps maximize
the probability of getting what you want given the possible outcomes.
But in problem cases (prisinor dilemma) there are disputes about what it is
rational to do. Can this disagreement be purely linguistic (about how the word
rational should be used) or they substantive? So even instrumental rationality

leads to substantive dispute about whether its axioms can decisively delegate
certains actions as rational and offers as irrational.
Full information analyses
Other attempts to describe rationality claim that an action is rational iff we would
still want to do it had we been presented with all the relevant scientific and
factual information available in a way that was intelligible and understood.
But often what is regarded as rational is merely making the best use of the
available but limited information. For example it doesnt seem irrational to follow
the sunset in an attempt to leave the woods when you are without a map or
compass, even if given all the relevant information you wouldnt choose to do
this.
But lets apply this to desires rather than actions. An intrinsic desire (e.g. the
desire to be happy) is rational iff you would still have it after been presented with
all the relevant information.
So if a person who washes their hands 3 times an hour is told that this isnt good
for their health and that it interferes with other things they value and that its
going to kill them soon STILL decides to carry on doing it, then we must accept
their action as rational. Brandt is willing to accept this as a consequence of his
theory which isnt ideal but must be accepted because there is no better theory. I
hope to offer a better one.
Also if Brandt wishes to preserve the recommending force of rationality then we
come to further difficulties. If a complete understanding of a situation of the guts
and innards of individuals would make me want to stay away from them which
would make me lonely, then making the rational decision really recommended?
Furthermore, take the account of an egotist who deliberately avoids thinking
about the harm he causes others or the suffering he could alleviate through
sacrifice. He might think it crazy to dwell on the sort of matters that could lead
him to a life of humility and servitiude and misery, especially when hes currently
having such a great time! He will think that the rational path (as Brandt defines
it) is thoroughly unrecommendable.
2. Nature and Judgement
The problem seems to be that if we try to explain normative life in terms of
nature then we get odd and unfitting descriptions of reasons and meanings.
There are 3 elements that need to be fitted together:
1. The natural: the facts about what we are doing and thinking and feeling
2. The normative: what it is rational to do or apt to feel
3. The meaning: what we mean when we say it is rational or apt to do or feel
something
3. Analyses Broached
How are we to understand the appraisal of beliefs and feelings and behaviours as
rational? If we interpret rational as merely advantageous then we come into
some problems. For example it might be rational to belief your wife has cheated
on you if you see her fucking somebody else, but it might not be advantageous

to believe so (you might be better off believing her faithful). Likewise it might be
rational to be angry at someone whos deliberately wronged you but if you have
to live with them it might not be advantageous.
So it seems that rational also includes some sense of warranted. You anger is
rational because it is warranted by the cruel treatment of your friend. It is also
worth bearing in mind the difference between it making sense that a person is
angry and it making sense for a person to be angry. If their anger is warranted, it
makes sense that they are angry, but if their anger is going to interfere with
their work and ruin their day then perhaps it doesnt make sense for them to be
angry.
The claim that feelings can be rational or irrational implies that even the
involuntary can be rational or irrational. But this seems so, for we do not choose
the beliefs we hold, and we cannot shake them off at will, but they certainly can
be regarded as rational or irrational.
Rationality and Morality
(Two types of wrong: objective (it was a bad choice in light of all the facts)
subjective (it was bad choice given what the agent knew) The objective sense of
wrong is pretty pointless because we never know all the facts, and if we did, then
the subjective sense would do)
There are at least two conceptions of moralitys relation with rationality:
Sidgwicks interpretation in which morality is simply practical rationality and thus
all moral actions are rational and all irrational actions immoral, and a different
interpretation (adopted by Mill) in which moral considerations are just part of
what makes up rational thinking, and thus one can do something irrational that is
not immoral, or do something moral that isnt really rational.
Mill says that an action is morally wrong if one ought to be sanctioned for doing
it. He mentions legal sanctions, but lets ignore that and pluck out/create the
claim that an action is morally wrong iff it is rational for one to feel guilty for
doing it and for others to resent one for it.
But this definition is closer to capturing blameworthiness than wrongness. In a fit
of grief one may do something wrong that is not really blameworthy. What is the
difference? Morality is forward looking (agents consider whether certain possible
acts will be right or wrong) blameworthiness is backward looking.
So, when we assess whether or not someone is to blame first we assess whether
their morally desirable motivation was satisfactory, and if it wasnt then we
assess whether there are extenuating circumstances that render the agent not
responsible. Morality comes into the first part of this assessment. Thus an action
is wrong iff: it violates standards for ruling out actions. The standards are such
that if an agent in a normal frame of mind violated them because he was not
substantially motivated to conform to them, then he would be to blame.
The degree to which an action is wrong is the degree to which an agent would be
to blame if he lacked all motivation to abide by the standard.
The Norm-Expressivistic Analysis

Roughly, to think something is rational is to accept a norm that permits it. A

norm is just a possible rule or prescription that could be described by an
imperative.
So for example to think believing in aliens is rational, given that you might have
seen one, is to accept the norm believe what your eyes show you. Note that
this analyses doesnt tell us what it is for something to be rational, only what it
means for us to claim something is rational.
Combining this analyses of rational with the previous analyses of blameworthy
we come to the conclusion to call an action blameworthy is to accept norms that
prescribe guilt on the part of the person whos committed the action and
prescribe outrage and anger from other people. And to think that an act is wrong
is to accept norms for guilt and resentment that prima facie would prescribe guilt
and resentment if the action was performed. (Prima facie meaning before the
psychological situation of the agent is taken into account)
But now what sort of standards of responsibility will we use to disentangle
wrongness and blameworthiness? Take an agent with a strange psychology doing
an action that if performed by a normal agent would be regarded as warranting
guilt. Do the oddities of this agents psychology mean that he is doing something
wrong but is not responsible, or do they mean he is doing nothing wrong? The
test is to imagine the agent as suddenly normal, but aware that his peculiarities
will return after he makes his decision. If in this state you would still accept
norms that prescribed guilt for performing the action then the act is considered
wrong.
Second thoughts
Is it appropriate to use the word rational to mean a flat out endorsement of the
kind described above? That wouldnt really fit with the fact that some people
seem to endorse the irrational, the passionate and spontaneous! So perhaps it
captures a very specific use of the word rational, and in fact it may be better to
use the phrase it makes sense than the word rational.
Can one be opposed to doing what makes sense? Perhaps one can, for whilst it
might make sense to give up on a project, it also might make sense to want to be
a person who does not give up.
Morality has been defined in a rather narrow sense here, only looking at the
feelings of guilt and anger. One could broaden the scope out and look at fear and
indifference, shame and pride, &c.