PAOLO NAZARENO

USA LLB 1-B

ELVIRA AGULLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

FACTS:
The charge of malversation against petitioner Alvira germinated from an
audit conducted on 14 July 1986 by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result
of which a P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on petitioners accountability.
On the same date, Gerez informed petitioner of said finding of cash shortage and
required the latter, through a letter of demand, to "produce immediately the
missing funds." Further, petitioner was required to submit within 72 hours from
receipt a written explanation of the cash shortage.In the course of the pre-trial,
petitioner Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted the findings in the Report
of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In effect, she
admitted the fact of shortage in the amount stated in the Information.
Agullo, at all stages of the criminal indictment, persistently professed her
innocence of the charge and categorically denied having malversed or converted
the public funds in question for her own personal use or benefit. With petitioners
admission of the fact of cash shortage, the prosecution then rested its case. The
Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of the
crime of malversation of public funds, ratiocinating principally that no evidence has
been presented linking the loss of the government funds with the alleged sudden
heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan overlooked certain evidence of

substance which violates the petitioners constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven otherwise.

RULING:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain
evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the
adjudication of petitioners guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise, as ruled by the Supreme Court. They
hold that the petitioner has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent
proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the
charge of malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence that
satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the missing funds was used for her
own personal benefit or gain. Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner,
obviously relied more on the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by
the defense, not on the strength and merit of the prosecutions evidence This
course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution clearly cannot
sustain a conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
These serve as strong considerations that seriously impair the basis upon which is
founded the legal presumption of personal misappropriation of money or property of
accountable officers who fail to have forthcoming, such money or property when so
demanded by a duly authorized official. Verily, a finding of prima facie evidence of
accountability does not shatter the presumptive innocence the accused enjoys
because, before prima facie evidence arises, "certain facts [have still to be]
proved"; the trial court cannot depend alone on such an evidence, because
precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubtof the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak
defense the latter may adduce. The constitutional presumption of innocence is not
an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to

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balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone
individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their
command.

PAOLO NAZARENO

USA LLB 1-B

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SERGIO BATO, ET AL.

FACTS:
On or about the 9th day of May, 1988 in the Municipality of Pastrana,
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other,
with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage
of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and wound one Ernesto Flores, Sr. with deadly weapons locally known
as "sundang" which the accused had provided themselves for the purpose, thereby
hitting and inflicting upon said Ernesto Flores, Sr. several wounds on the different
parts of his body which wounds caused his death.
The prosecution contends that on May 9, 1988 at about three o'clock in the
afternoon, Ernesto Flores, Jr. together with his father Ernesto Flores, Sr., were going
home from Barangay Tingib, Pastrana, Leyte to San Agustin, Jaro, Leyte. While
passing by Barangay Hibucawan, they were called by the two appellants, Abraham
and Sergio, both surnamed Bato, to join them in a drinking spree in the house of
Paran Lescabo, which Ernesto, Sr. accepted. Ernesto, Jr. sat about two (2) meters
away from his father while the latter joined appellants for two hours drinking tuba.
When his father was already drunk, appellants tied him (father) with his hands
placed at the back. Later, he saw appellants bring his father to somewhere else.On
the other hand, the accused raised the defense of denial. They maintained that
their identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernesto's murder was merely an
afterthought, necessitated by a dearth of strong evidence on the part of the
prosecution. They presented as witness Pfc. Benjamin Montanejos, who affirmed
that the entry he made in the police blotter did not mention the accused as
suspects in the crime. He further testified that it was the barangay captain who
reported the incident to the police, contradicting Ernesto Jr. who claimed that he did
so.

ISSUES: Whether or not there is a quantum of proof required to overcome the

constitutional presumption of innocence.

RULING:
No. After a careful perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we
believe that appellant's authorship of the crime was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the doctrine that
appeals involving reclusion perpetua are subject to a review de novo, this Court
pored over the entire records of both lower courts and concluded, after careful
deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. The circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution fails to evoke moral certainty that appellants
are guilty. The totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken
chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused. The Constitution
mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State fails to meet the quantum of proof
required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense. By
constitutional fiat, the burden of proof is accordingly vested on the prosecution. In
acquitting the herein appellant, this Court is not decreeing that he did not
participate in the killing. It is merely ruling that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

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the witness established only the following circumstances surrounding the crime: (1)
that the Bato brothers invited the victim and his son for a drink; (2) that after two
hours of drinking, said brothers suddenly tied the hands of the older Flores and took
him away; and (3) that the following day, the body of the victim, which sustained
several hack and stab wounds, was recovered at the Binaha-an River, about five
kilometers away from where he was last seen by the witness.
PEOPEL OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALDO DE GUZMAN Y DANZIL

FACTS:
On June 10, 2003, a confidential informant reported De Guzmans drug
pushing activities to Alcala, Pangasinans Chief of Police, Sotero Soriano, Jr. Soriano
immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation.4 After a short briefing,
the team proceeded to De Guzmans house. At the trial, appellant denied the
charges against him. He claimed that, on the morning of June 10, 2003, he was on
the second floor of his house watching television when he was informed by his wife
that police officers were looking for him. He claimed that SPO1 Llanillo informed him
about a report that he (De Guzman) was repacking shabu, which he denied.
He also argues that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers
complied with the mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. In particular, he
points to the fact that the seized items were not marked immediately after his
arrest; that the police officers failed to make an inventory of the seized items in his
presence or in the presence of his counsel and of a representative from the media
and from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and that no photographs were taken of
the seized items and of appellant. Appellant claims that the unbroken chain of
custody of the evidence was not established. The appellant also contends that the
failure of the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the police blotter
before the said operation, the lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and the failure to observe the requirements of R.A. No.
9165 have effectively overturned the presumption of regularity in the performance
of the police officers duties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the degree of proof has been met to prosecute the accused.

RULING:
No. Even though the prosecution successfully established the first and third
elements of the crime and trial court correctly found that the buy-bust transaction
took place, there is, however, a problem in the prosecutions effort to establish the
integrity of the corpus delicti. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, the existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction.
The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime. The court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. In this case, it was
admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who marked the seized
items, and only upon seeing the items for the first time at the police station.
The failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the
seized items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody
is enough to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused. Reasonable
doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability after such investigation to let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person charged
with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof
requisite to constitute the offense. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a

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persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence
nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the failure to observe the
proper procedure negates the operation of the presumption of regularity accorded
to police officers. As a general rule, the testimonies of the police officers who
apprehended the accused are accorded full faith and credit because of the
presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. But when the
performance of their duties is tainted with failure to comply with the procedure and
guidelines prescribed, the presumption is effectively destroyed. Thus, the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.

PAOLO NAZARENO

USA LLB 1-B

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELOY MAGSI ET AL

FACTS:
On or about the 14th day of January, 1968 in the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union, Philippines the above-named accused, namely Eloy Magsi et al.
conspiring and confederating with their fellow accused mutually helping one
another with intent to kill and with treachery, while the said accused were armed
with carbine pistols and revolvers did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniusly enter the house where Jesus Gallardo and his family live and once inside
the said house, attack, assault and shoot him, inflicting multiple gunshot wounds on
the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death. Soon after
appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled
before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union.
Despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel
for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera,
who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de
parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio
counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the
second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte
counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the
next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the
accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel
was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for
arraignment purposes only. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer
the death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused.

RULING:
Yes. The conduct of the court a quo taken in the light of the foregoing
decisions clearly established the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the
herein accused, who was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty. At the outset, it
must be stated that the plea of guilty by the two accused were improvidently laid.
During the arraignment, the trial judge did not adhere strictly to the doctrine laid
down in People vs. Apduhan where the Supreme Court postulated the guideline in
cases where there is a plea of guilty by the accused. In the instant cases under
review, the court observe that the trial judge failed to explain fully to the two
accused the meaning and the far-reaching effect of their plea. It was not explained
to them the meaning of the term 'treachery,' an aggravating circumstance which
qualified the crime to murder and frustrated murder respectively. Neither did the
judge explain the terms 'evident premeditation' and 'recidivism,' both aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information which had legal significance and
consequences not ordinarily understandable to a layman.
The Supreme Court ruled that the desire to speed up the disposition of cases
should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. The trial
courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of
guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully
understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences attached
thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the
prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the
court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of

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guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely

protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged
reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries
addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of
the penalty, are not sufficient compliance.

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USA LLB 1-B

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO RIVERA

FACTS:
Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime in March 1997, her
younger sister, Zaira, was taken by their parents to the Escolastica Romero
Memorial Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga. Accused-appellant denied that he raped
Erlanie Rivera. He alleged that the rape charge was filed against him because his
wife, Evangeline, had a paramour and resented him because he hurt her. He
explained that he saw his wife talking with another man in their house and beat her
up on April 1, 1997 because he heard that she had a lover. He also said that his wife
was angry with him because he had a mistress who stayed in their house for three
weeks. He further stated that his wifes relatives were likewise angry with him
because he caused the lot owned by his father-in-law in Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga
to be registered in his name. He said that he was compelled to sign a waiver of his
rights over the land owned by his parents-in-law. The defense presented a letter to
accused-appellant written by his wife, who was asking him to sign a document so
that she could attend to it before he got out of prison.
Accused-appellant invokes his right to due process of law. He claims that he
was denied the same because the trial judge disallowed his lawyer from crossexamining Erlanie Rivera concerning the latters sworn statements on the ground of
irrelevance and immateriality; the trial court denied the motion made by accusedappellants counsel de oficio to postpone the cross-examination of Dr. Barin, the
examining physician, because of which the said counsel consequently waived the
cross-examination of Dr. Barin; the judge propounded numerous questions to
accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the prosecutor; and the trial
courts decision was promulgated just one day after accused-appellant submitted
his memorandum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rolando Rivera was denied of his right to due process of law.

RULING:
No, there was due process. The Supreme Court held that they find no merit
in accused-appellants argument that he was denied due process considering the
speed with which the trial court rendered judgment against him, which judgment
was promulgated one day after he filed his memorandum. The decision rendered by
the trial court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on which it is based. It
discusses in full the courts findings on the credibility of both the prosecution and
defense witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of both parties.
A review of the trial courts decision shows that its findings were based on the
records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes during the trial. The
speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to
the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to
study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of
diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the deadline
set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The evidence proves beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant. In reviewing rape cases, we have
been guided by the following principles: (a) An accusation for rape is easy to make,
difficult to prove, and even more difficult to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand on its own
merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the

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defense. However, the prosecution having failed to present evidence as to

complainants age, accused-appellant can be convicted only of simple rape, for
which the penalty is reclusion perpetua.

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USA LLB 1-B

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR ALCANZADO

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City finding
accused Oscar Alcanzado y Orqueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder.
However, a careful examination of the records reveals that the assailed decision will
have to be set aside and the records remanded back to the RTC for reception of
evidence for the defense. The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a
decision after denying the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave
of court, without first giving appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. The
evidence for the prosecution show that on the early morning of June 17, 1998, the
Barangay Tanods of Bel-Air, while on duty, which is adjacent to TGIF American Bar,
heard two shots; when they investigated they found a dead body of the victim with
two gunshot wounds inside the storeroom of TGIF being guarded by the accused.
The accused, who was the security guard of the TGIF, surrendered his service
firearm to policeman Bagon which was found to have spent two spent shells. The
ballistic report states that the two spent shells were fired from the gun surrendered
by the accused to policeman Bagon.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right of the accused
to be heard on his defense.

RULING:
Yes. His constitutional rights were violated. Appellant had filed a motion for
leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC and therefore
upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have
given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally astonishing is the
fact that appellants counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC or
in this Court. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process. Due to the
procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the
proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for reception of defense evidence is
warranted. The Supreme Court ruled that contrary to the RTCs assertion in its
decision that the demurrer to evidence was denied, the records of the case do not
reveal that there was any prior order denying appellants demurrer to evidence
before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently, the trial court violated the
aforequoted provisions of Section 15, Rule 119.
The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been
violated. So that appellant may be spared from further delay, the Court deems it
necessary to treat the herein assailed judgment as a mere resolution denying the
demurrer to evidence and ascertain whether the RTC has committed grave abuse of
discretion in not granting the same. Consequently, for purposes of determining
whether the demurrer to evidence should have been granted, the connection
between the service gun and appellant as the perpetrator of the shooting, without
any countervailing evidence, had been sufficiently established. Thus, the RTC did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence BUT
it committed grave abuse of discretion in outrightly convicting appellant of the
crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua when appellant
has not been given the opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, pursuant to
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

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Further, the attendant justifying, mitigating or aggravating circumstance such

as self-defense, treachery and voluntary surrender could only be ascertained fully
after the defense evidence, rebuttal and sur-rebuttal, if any, shall have been
adduced and evaluated by the RTC in the rendition of its judgment on the case. Had
Presiding Judge Rosario, Jr. not compulsorily retired from the Judiciary, he could have
been admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties.