21. Soriano v.

Dizon
ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792
Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano
with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges
that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances
surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; [2] and
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice
dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for
June 11, 2004.[4] After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the
Complaint and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBDdirected him to file his Position Paper, which he did on
July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was
later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, [7] which involved moral
turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:
x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a
taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community
who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,
berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open
his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been
drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi
driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi
driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the
accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got
his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his
way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked
them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he
was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the
neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident
was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to
the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck, [9] complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending
surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed
an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of
the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this
particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter
also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:
1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi,
had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his
car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil
liabilities to Complainant.[12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent
has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction
has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as
follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants
disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society
in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, [15] a labor case concerning an employee who was
dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not
involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment
Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances,

the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a
crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.
[16]
(Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated
the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better
understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left
pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only
after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to
slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral
or unjust.[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral
turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and
his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend
off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent.
He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the
assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the
latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his
crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who
deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced
vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity

with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but
the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm [18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
liabilities.[19] He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that,
both in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the
land.
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He
obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it
has been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent
remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his
violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful
vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully
restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of
lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of their professional
dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon
them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.[23]
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is
an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.[24]
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the
trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants
family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was
complainants family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having
been mauled by complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each
other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if
not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants version of the
incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their
dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to
practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach.[31]
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital
yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment
should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however,
the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his
duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable
with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of
law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their
conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of
the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the
Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

22. Metrobank v. CA
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFONSO
ROXAS CHUA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

If an order leaves something to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the case, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. Once determined to be final, the order may be the subject of an appeal, as in
the present case.
The Case

Filed before this Court is a Petition for Review under rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the
December 22, 1992 Decision[1] of the Court of appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 28679. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, with costs against private respondent. [2]
The CA affirmed the April 10 and the July 23, 1992 Orders [3]of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
46), which denied herein petitioners Motion to Strike Out or Expunge from the records respondents Notice of
Appeal.
Also questioned is the May 3, 1993 CA Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:[5]

Petitioner Metrobank and Trust Company (Metrobank for short) brought an action for a sum of money against
private respondents Pacific Multi Commercial Corporation and Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. on November 25,
1982. Private respondents failed to file their answer and were, for that reason, declared in default.
On May 26, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment for Metrobank[,] ordering the private respondents jointly and
severally liable to pay the following amounts:
1. The sum of P964,377.49 representing the unpaid balance of the loan as of the date of the filing of the
complaint;
2. Interests on the unpaid balance at the rate of 14% per annum on the unpaid principal from August 10,
1982 until said principal is fully paid;
3. Penalty charges at the rate of 8% per annum on the outstanding interest, computed from the date of
default up to the full payment of the obligation;
4. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due and collectible; and
5. The costs of this suit.
After the decision had become final, Metrobank moved for the execution of the judgment in its favor. The trial
court granted Metrobanks motion and, among other things, the deputy sheriff garnished the shares of stock of
private respondent Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. in the Club Filipino.
On July 17, 1991 the sheriff sold at public auction respondent Roxas Chuas Certificate of Ownership No. 809 in
the Club Filipino to the Metrobank as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued to the
Metrobank. However, on August 12, 1991, respondent Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. filed with the respondent trial

court a motion to hold in abeyance the delivery to Metrobank of the certificate of ownership and to declare the
sale to Metrobank as null and void on the ground that the certificate of ownership was the conjugal property of
respondent Roxas Chua, Jr. and his wife Kiang Ming Chu. Metrobank opposed the private respondents motion.
On September 30, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying private respondent Roxas Chuas motion to hold in
abeyance the delivery of [the] certificate of ownership to Metrobank and to declare the sale as null and
void. Private respondent Alfonso Roxas Chua, Jr. moved for a reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
court in its order dated February 18, 1992. Accordingly, on March 26, 1992, private respondent filed a notice of
appeal from the order of the court.
On April 6, 1992, Metrobank moved to strike out or expunge from the record the notice of appeal of respondent
Roxas Chua, Jr. on the ground that private respondent, having been declared in default, ha[d] no standing to file
the notice. However, the court, in its order dated April 10, 1992 denied the petitioners motion.
Metrobank moved for reconsideration but again [its] motion was denied by the court in another order dated July
23, 1992. Hence, this petition for certiorari to set aside these orders of April 10, 1992 and July 23, 1992 [issued
by] the respondent court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Relying on Section 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, the CA ruled that a defendant may appeal a
judgment of default without need to set aside the order declaring him in default.
The CA also disallowed the new grounds raised before it by petitioner. More important, the appellate court
held that those grounds were not proper in a petition for certiorari, because they did not involve grave abuse of
discretion or jurisdiction. Ruled that CA:
It is next contended by the petitioner (1) that on the assumption that the certificate of ownership which the sheriff
had levied upon execution is conjugal property of private respondent and his wife Kian Ming Chu, nonetheless
private respondent would not have the requisite standing to question the validity of the sale insofar as his wifes
ownership is concerned because only the latter can question the sale and (2) that the order of February 18, 1992,
denying private respondents motion to set aside the sale of a certificate of ownership, is not appealable. These
grounds are being raised for the first time in the present petition. The trial court has had no opportunity to pass on
them and it is unfair to find that it committed a grave abuse of discretion for something it has not done. Moreover,
these grounds are not proper for a petition for certiorari. If at all they should be raised in defense in the pending
appeal brought by the private respondent. It is hardly necessary to state that the function of the writ of certiorari is
to keep a lower court within its jurisdiction and that, therefore, only jurisdictional questions may be raised. Mere
errors of judgment may be corrected by appeal. If, as petitioner contends, private respondent Alfonso Roxas
Chua, Jr. has no standing to question the sale of the certificate of ownership insofar as the sale of his wifes share
is concerned, and that at any rate the order denying private respondents motion to set aside the sheriffs sale is not
appealable, these questions should be raised either in petitioners brief on appeal or in a motion to dismiss the
appeal of private respondent.[6]
Hence, this recourse.[7]
Issues

Petitioner submits, for the consideration of this Court, the following issues:

a) The finding and holding of the Former Special Third Division of the respondent Court of Appeals that
the private respondent may appeal the judgment [by] default, rendered against him by the lower Court
is contrary to the facts of the case as set out in the said questioned Decision, Annex A hereof;
b) The Former Special Third Division of the respondent Court of Appeals completely evaded
[confrontation of], and thus failed to rule on, the issue raised by petitioner on the continuous loss of
standing of the private respondent throughout the entire execution stage of the judgment by default;
c) The petitioner duly raised before the lower Court the issue that the February 18, 1992 Order of the
lower Court, Annex FF hereof, which is the subject of the private respondents appeal, cannot be the
subject of an appeal as the same is merely interlocutory in nature and not appealable, so much so that
the said lower Court has had the opportunity to pass upon that issue, contrary to the finding and
holding of the former Special Third Division of the respondent Court of Appeals that said issue was
allegedly raised before it for the first time by the petitioner; and
d) The said issue that the February 18, 1992 Order, which is the subject of the private respondents
appeal, cannot be the subject of an appeal as the same is merely interlocutory in nature and not
appealable can properly be raised as a ground in a petition for certiorari.[8]
In the main, the Court will resolve the propriety of respondents appeal to the CA of the RTC Orders.
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:

Propriety of Appeal

Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts Orders allowing private
respondents appeal. Petitioner further contends that respondent had already been declared in default, and that such
status subsisted because the default order was not lifted. It adds that the appeal should have been disallowed,
since the trial court Decision had long become final and executory. What was being appealed was a mere order of
execution, which was interlocutory in nature and not subject to appeal.
For easier understanding, let us briefly restate the pertinent facts of the present case. On May 3, 1983, private
respondent was declared in default in Civil Case No. 82-14134. [9] On May 26, 1983, the trial court rendered a
Decision[10] ordering him to pay petitioner the amounts mentioned therein. The Decision became final and
executory.
After executing on the various properties owned by private respondent, the trial court directed the sheriff to
sell at public auction the Club Filipino share owned by private respondent. [11] On July 17, 1991, a Certificate of
Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as purchaser of that share. [12] Private respondent then filed a Motion to hold
in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale and to declare the sale void. [13] On September 30, 1991, the trial
court issued an Order denying the Motion of private respondent. [14] The latter then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, he filed a notice of appeal questioning the trial courts Order denying
the Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Club Filipino share and to declare the auction sale void.[15]

The subject matter of this case, therefore, is whether private respondent can appeal from the denial of the
Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale and to declare the sale void.
In its Decision, the CA stated that parties in default did not need to have the order of default against them
lifted before they could appeal. In other words, a party in default is not precluded from filing an appeal, as
provided in Section 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court (in effect at the time), which states:
Sec. 2. Judgements or orders subject to appeal. -- Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No
interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of
appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.
A judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject to appeal, and in the course thereof, a party may also assail the
judgment on the merits, upon the ground that it is not supported by the evidence or it is contrary to law.
A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.[16]
The above provision, particularly its third paragraph, clearly states that one who has been declared in default
may appeal, without need of an order lifting the default. [17] Hence, the mere fact that the trial court has not lifted
its default order does not bar herein respondent from filing an appeal.
If at all, petitioner ought to have challenged the default status of private respondent when he filed his Motion
to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale. However, the denial of that Motion being final in
character as we shall now show, he is allowed by the Rules to appeal therefrom.
Paragraph 1 of the above-quoted Rule provides that decisions and final orders are appealable. Because the
RTC Orders were final, not merely interlocutory, the CA did not err in allowing respondents appeal.
It has been held that [a]n interlocutory order does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the
case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. [18] It refers to
something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the
final decision on the whole controversy.[19] Conversely, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more
to do to resolve the case. The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it
does not, it is final.[20]
In the present case, the April 10, 1992 Order denied private respondents Motion to hold in abeyance the
delivery of the Certificate of Sale of his Club Filipino share and to declare the sale void. After rendering the
Order, the trial court did not need to do anything more to settle the rights of the parties. Upon the affirmation of
the validity of the sale, the Certificate of Sale was to be delivered to petitioner as the new owner. Indeed, while
appeal does not lie against the execution of a judgment, it is available in case of an irregular implementation of a
writ of execution.[21] This was the factual scenario in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

23. Reyes v. Gaa

A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995
WELLINGTON
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

REYES, complainant,

PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with
malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.
I
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that
he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a
complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent
P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was
scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent
to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the
entrapment.
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M.
So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business
with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see
respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita
kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to
respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended
respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands
were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was
thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed,
fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case,
invoking his right against self-incrimination.
On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019.
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the
institution of disbarment proceedings against him.

On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and disposition of
his administrative case (Case No. 74).
Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against
respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13,
1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative
Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution.
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the
marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent.
He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of
complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the
incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury
and attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.
In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge,
malice or personal ill will. He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges
filed by respondent against him.
In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the
IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994.
II
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from
complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent
filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of
extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant.
It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179
SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial
Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of
Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds
(Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]).

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other
disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and spread on the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., took no part.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

24. Ting-Dumali v. Torres

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges
respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to
advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer
and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings
are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting,
Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:
a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square
meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more
or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131 square meters, more or
less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers
and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an
illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his wife
Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11
November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante
and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was
later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and
Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature
in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she
was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the
Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law
Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment
was received and misappropriated by Felicisimaand Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy and Owners
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,
filed by complainants sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made gross
misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and
legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their
names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina
were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of
their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting
therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under
the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be
impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the
release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.
In his Comment,[2] the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take
advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by
any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All
the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If
ever complainants signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for
the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were
the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a
clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his
wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal property of

Marcelina and his wife. Anent his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would
be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr.
Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with numerous
lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for Annulment of Documents, Titles, and
Reconveyance plus Damages; and a criminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother and
allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a
sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible,
since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including
respondents wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of
Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent was not
merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation or decision.[3]
On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties, Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the
respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.[4]
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333[5] of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and
adopted Commissioner San Juans report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six
years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability.
The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and
honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge
as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:
LAWYER'S OATH
I, , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of
justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words,
drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the
lawyers oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial

dispensation of justice.[6] This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
...
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
...
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the respondent took
the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this
covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11
November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No.
1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings. [7] There was concealment of the fact that there were other
compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant.
Being married to complainants sister, he knew of his wifes siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant
stayed with them while she was in the Philippines. [8] Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register
of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife
and his sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted [9] regarding the falsification of complainants signature
in the Extrajudicial Settlement[10] dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by
the complainant of her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainants name in that
document.[11] Such act of counterfeiting the complainants signature to make it appear that the complainant had
participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document.[12]
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing
falsification, he presented[13] such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of
Marcelina and his wife.[14] He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document

to the damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs. [15] Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May
1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.[16]
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He must
have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility
underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. [17] For a lawyer is the servant of the law and
belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.
[18]
As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. [19] He should not, therefore, engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. [20] He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who
commits any such unbecoming act or conduct.[21]
Respondents argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of the other
siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not
deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and
Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.
[22]
Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and
sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads:
ATTY. TORRES:
Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita
Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.
Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir.[23]
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony[24] in court, and he never
corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case.[25] Moreover, in
knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony.[26]
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and
good faith to the court. He shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. [27] This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the
respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when
he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on
his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary
action against him.[28]

It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit
of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative case,
Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was
never in possession of the title[29] and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost.
Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the
release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs.
Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605
would be released within the month.[30]Respondents information was misleading because he presented evidence
only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter. [31] Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and
honesty on the part of the respondent.
Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal
profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the
primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[32]While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to
our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar.[33]
Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. [34] Verily,
given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondents gross misconduct calls
for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in
the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which

shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

25. People v. Tuanda

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

THE

PHILIPPINES, complainant

PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine
Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total
stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over
the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to
approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00;
(b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for
the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three
(3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding
receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of
checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a)
one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed
respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court
rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs
in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in
addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as
follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment
is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense
for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from
the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme
Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this
decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of
Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court
a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and
declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration
of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court
found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of
Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating
the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the
trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is
innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiffappellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause
damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent
Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is
to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by
the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public
order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public . The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold,
can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 3 (Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws
of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects
the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be
forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of
respondent.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes
and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.

26. In re: Elmo S Abad

A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the
Philippine
Trial
Lawyers
Association,
Inc., complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing
law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to
admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following lame explanation:
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court
En Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid
his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ...
paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, ...
and also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as
shown by Official Receipt No. 83740,... .
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme
Court, included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as
shown by a Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, ...
3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take my
Oath as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief
Justice, the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy
(Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to
answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable
Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my
Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an
Annual General Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, ... .

6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr.
Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of
my name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a
Member in Good Standing, I paid my membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official
Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official
Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... .
7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also included
the name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the
year 1981-1982, ... .
8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981,
Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and
Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with
a prayer that herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;
9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership
due and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734
and Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .
10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official Receipt
No. 3195776, ... .
11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
as well as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, ....
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the
Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming
a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in
the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)
The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)
WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten
(10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin
Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.

27. Aguirre v. Ranna

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in
the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of
the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22
May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not
sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers
oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges
that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented
himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed
him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the
MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows
the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an
attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent
that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that
on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate
for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath
as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001
elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took
the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a
ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated
when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary
and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the
MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19

May 2001, respondent signed ascounsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his
counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the
same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao
in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice
of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments,where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law
is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC
and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral
unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust [4] since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the
bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court

for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a
person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the
bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
[8]
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely:
his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as
counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vicemayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon
your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized
respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

28. In re: Atty Marcial Edillion

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity
of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with
which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as
the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good

standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to
be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to
the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as
an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.

Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution
of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by
fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus
populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the
rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726).
It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X
of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require
him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even

to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
a ready a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law
is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do
not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public
from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused
or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court.