PATRICIO TAN ET AL. V.

COMELEC (1986)
Facts: Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 (Act Creating Province of
Negros del Norte), petitioners who are residents of the Province of Negros
Occidental filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of
stopping Comelec from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in
implementation of the law. Petitioners contend that BP 885 is
unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the LGC as in Article
XI, Section 3 of our Constitution regarding the requirements in land area and
estimated annual income. Petitioners also contend that a number of voters
were excluded since the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of
three cities and eight municipalities in Negros del Norte, to the exclusion of
the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental.. Comelec contends that the
law is not unconstitutional. They claim that BP 885 does not infringe the
Constitution because the requisites of the LGC have been complied with.
They submit that the case has now become moot and academic with the
proclamation of Negros del Norte as during the plebiscite, 164,734 were in
favor of the creation of the new province while only 30,400 were against it.
Issue: WON the province of
requirements as to land area.

Negros

del

Norte

xomplied

with

the

Held: No. Ratio: The original parliamentary bill no 3644 expressly declared
that the new province contained an area of 285,656 ha. More or less.
However, when Parliamentary bill was enacted into BP 885, the province now
comprised a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers. The certification of the
provincial treasurer also indicates that there the province comprised of a
lesser area. Although the certification stated that the land area of the
municipality of Don Salvador was not available, it appeared that such is only
80.2 kilometers. This area if added to 2,685.2 square kilometers will result
in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers. The last
sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC1 (requirements) is most
revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this
particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last
sentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has
reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which
the political unit exercises control. Said sentence states that the "territory
need not be contiguous."

Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of
one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent."Contiguous", when employed as an
adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical
contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of
particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words
associated with or related to them in the statute. Therefore, in the context of
the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory"---- the
physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to
use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory"
embrace not only land area but also territorial waters, It can be safely
concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is
meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used
in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature. The
sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction. The
distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an
artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the
words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and
made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust
result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to
follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial
meaning of its words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to
be favored. Teehankee, concurring: The challenged Act is manifestly void
and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of,
viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte
and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of
the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by
Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of
the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of
Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of La Castellana,
Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan,
Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and
Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI,
section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be
created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the approval
of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. " It is
plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros
Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the
units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of

Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the

plebiscite, because the whole province is affected by its proposed division
and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the
voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as
absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the
secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to
nullify the basic principle of majority rule. The argument of fait accompli viz.
that the railroaded plebiscite of January 3, 1986 was held and can no longer
be enjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte has been
constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act. This Court has
always held that it "does not look with favor upon parties 'racing to beat an
injunction or restraining order' which they have reason to believe might be
forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and pendency of the
appropriate petition therefor. Where the restraining order or preliminary
injunction are found to have been properly issued, as in the case at bar,
mandatory writs shall be issued by the Court to restore matters to the status
quo ante." Where, as in this case, there was somehow a failure to properly
issue the restraining order stopping the holding of the illegal plebiscite, the
Court will issue the mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the
status quo ante and restore the territorial integrity of the province of Negros
Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and
nullifying the invalid proclamation of the proposed new province of Negros
del Norte and the equally invalid appointment of its officials.
Footnote 1 SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it
has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a
population of at least five hun- dred thousand persons, an average
estimated annual in- come, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less
than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation
shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or
provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two or more islands. The average estimated annual income shall
include the income alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds,
exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring in- come.
TORRALBA V. MUN. OF SIBAGAT (1987)
Facts:BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur,
is being challenged as violative of Section 3 Article XI of the 1973

Constitution2. Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with

petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local
public officials of the new Municipality.
According to the petitioners, the Local Government Code must first be
enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality,
or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted
as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly
complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created, hence,
it is null and void.
Issue:WON BP 56 is invalid
Held: No Ratio: The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its
enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative
competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the
1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of
territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It
contains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new
municipality does not preclude the enactment of a LGC. What the
Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the
creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should
conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the
enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that
the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the
people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The creation of the
new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was
conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved
the creation of the new local government unit. The officials of the new
Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing
their functions. A de jure entity has thus been created. It is a longrecognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is
essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional
limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential
for the more efficient administration of government.The creation of the new
Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested
by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. There are

significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelec and in this case: in the

Tan case, the LGC already existed at the time that the challenged statute
was enacted on 3 December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP
885 in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province"
to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the
Constitutional mandate and of the LGC that the plebiscite should be held "in
the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a
plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the
requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP
Blg. 885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been
raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended the enactment of BP Blg.
885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on the other
hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal
course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified
in that law.
Footnote 2 "Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary sub- stantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria es- tablished in the Local Government Code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
unit or units affected."
PROVINCE OF SHARIFF KABUNSUAN BAI SEMA V. COMELEC (2008)
Facts: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
apportioned 2 legislative districts for Maguindanao. The first consists of
Cotabato City and 8 municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM,
created under its Organic Act, RA 6734, as amended by RA 9054. Cotabato
City, as part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the
ARMM but of Region XII (having voted against its inclusion in November
1989 plebiscite).On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM
Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
(MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the
8 municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. Later, 3 new
municipalities were carved out of the original 9, constituting Shariff
Kabunsuan, resulting to total of 11. Cotabato City is not part of
Maguindanao. Maguindanao voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in 29
October 2006 plebiscite.On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board
Resolution No. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of

Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao

into a regular province under MMA Act 201. The COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato
City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, adopted the COMELECs Law
Department recommendation under a Memorandum dated 27 February
2007. The COMELEC issued on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating
that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City
because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 7902 (subject of these cases), amending Resolution
No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City). Meanwhile, the Shariff Kabunsuan
creation plebiscite was supervised and officiated by the COMELEC pursuant
to Resolution No. 7727. (Option Votes: In favor for creation 285,372;
Against the creation 8,802). The following municipalities seceded from
Maguindanao and formed the new province. All of them were from the first
legislative district of Maguindanao. (Barira, Buldon, Datu Blah T. Sinsuat,
Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan
Mastura, Upi) Kabuntalan was chosen as the capital of the new province. The
province was the first to be created under Republic Act No. 9054 or the
Expanded ARMM law.
Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which combined Shariff
Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single legislative district during the
Philippine general election, 2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress
representative of the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district, Didagen
Dilangalen.
Issue: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan
Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units - province, city,
municipality or barangay - must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant
of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,

under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local

legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of
the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and
city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an
Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities. Under Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative
powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the
express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative
bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to
the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to
regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and
barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to
more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it
will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city
with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a
legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a
legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than
250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the
city's population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to
one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to

create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative
district. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of
Congress Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions,
the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively
in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that Congress
of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of
legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can
enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative
bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature
like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative
body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive
authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution
and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to
create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand,
Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides,
"The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative powerx x x except on the
following matters:x x x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM
Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national
elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is
elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a
legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next
national elections" from the effectivity of the law. Indeed, the office of a
legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its
occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It
would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only
to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained
by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds.
It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local
or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM

Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers

to operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction.This violates Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the
Regional Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdictionx x
x." The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan,
recognized the exclusive nature of Congress' power to create or reapportion
legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for
Shariff Kabunsuan. First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether
Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for
congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was
unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the
apportionment provided in the Constitution." The Court answered in the
negative. Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into
existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for "each
province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives;
or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a
province.The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative
districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation
of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the
creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only
from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the
fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made
by an Act of Congress.Indeed , when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment. Second. Sema's theory also undermines the composition
and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,Article
VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities
within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of
RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum
contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of
250,000. The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: An
inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or
more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative
body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed
in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); (2) The

proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one

representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because
the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in
Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a
population of at least 250,000; and (3) Representatives from the ARMM
provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through
the ARMM Regional Assembly's continuous creation of provinces or cities
within the ARMM. Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting
the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in
enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences
that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our
Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts
cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself.
Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution
empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the
regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which
states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled
in the immediately following election to at least one Member," refers to a
province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is
that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House
of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally,
in the present 14th Congress, there are 219[38] district representatives out
of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list
members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House,
there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case
50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats
for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district
representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law
the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create
new provinces. The present case involves the creation of a local government
unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The
Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities
and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section
461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve
the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an
appropriate case In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create

provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces
and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes
the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a
district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the
ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as
provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA
Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the
Constitution Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,
preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5
of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO ET AL VS GOVERNMENT OF RP (2008)
Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace
negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group which
was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late
Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what
Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic
basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.[1] The signing of the MOA-AD
between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon
motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the
scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded
by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF

peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels
signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year,
they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27,
1998. The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the
MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment
of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human
rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the
conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue
advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are ongoing.[2] Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be
any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999
up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.[3] In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and
carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. When President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF
was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks.
The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep
reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia
through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to
return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to
seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being
facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same
date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace
Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its
military actions. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli,
Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security
Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to
the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply
agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next
meeting." A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on
August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing
Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a
ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing
Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of

the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya,
Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between
government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF
Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was
replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the
MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by
Mohagher Iqbal.[6] In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the
parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOAAD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5,
2008.
Held: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of
the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law
and the Constitution.
Ratio: The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to
consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover,
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. As the
petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest
or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus
standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. MacapagalArroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non- signing of the
MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the
present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an
exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the
situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the
fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is
a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF
back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or
another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar
provisions compared to the original. The Court, however, finds that the
prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents'

action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the
final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The people's right to information
on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in
splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28,
Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of
the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory
nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be
provided by law. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount
public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that
the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. An essential
element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process
of communication between the government and the people. Corollary to
these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public
consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights. At least
three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the
exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to
the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations
on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensusbuilding. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires
all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call
for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the

diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total

environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the
free
and
prior
informed
consent
of
the
Indigenous
Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the
general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable.
The various explicit legal respondents effectively waived such defense after it
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD,
for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. In sum, the Presidential Adviser
on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by
which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess
of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD
cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional , for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is
a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with
the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is
amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in
the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions
From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government
peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that
the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually
be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount
to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the

process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an
international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines
under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by
itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.
GEMILIANO LOPEZ JR V COMELEC (1985)
Facts: PD 824 or an act creating the Metropolitan Manila, was enacted to
establish and administer program and provide services common to" the cities
of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities in
the surrounding area. This is in response to the sharp growth in the
population of Manila and the proliferation of commercial firms and industries,
which resulted to the ever-increasing inability of the separate local
governments to cope with the ensuing serious problems. Metro Manila shall
be administered by the Commission. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
PD 824. They rely on this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or
barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The Local Government
Code was not enacted until 1983.
Issue: WON PD 824 is unconstitutional as it was enacted prior to the
creation of a local government code.
Held: No. Ratio:The challenge does not suffice to call for a declaration of
unconstitutionality. The last vestige of doubt has been removed by the
present constitutional provision regarding the Batasang Pambansa. That
provision clearly recognizes the existence of the Metropolitan Manila.
Justification as to PD 824. In PD 824, reference was made to "the
referendum held on February 27, 1975 wherein the residents of the Greater
Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local governments
into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of government.
It was then pointed out that "the rapid growth of population and the
corresponding increase of social and economic requirements in the
contiguous communities has brought into being a large area that calls for
development both simultaneous and unified. It "is vital to the survival and

growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that a workable and

effective system be established for the coordination, integration and unified
management of such local government services or functions" therein. There
is necessity for "the unified metropolitan services or functions to be planned,
administered, and operated [based on] the highest professional technical
standards." 15 The foregoing constitutes the justification for and the
objective of such Presidential Decree. Application of Paredes vs Executive
Secretary. In Paredes vs Executive Secretary, the Court did came to the
conclusion that the constitutional provision on the need for a majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied
even if "those voters who are not from the barangay to be separated were
excluded in the plebiscite." It cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite
held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila in the
referendum on February 27, 1975 was not a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional provision. With the voters in such four cities and thirteen
municipalities, now composing Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their
will, the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied.
It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February,
1975, there was no Local Government Code. Presidential Authority to Issue
the PD.At that time there was no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the
President who was entrusted with such responsibility. The legality of the law
making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law was
already established in Aquino vs Comelec. Sangguniang Bayan. The point
has been raised, however, that unless Presidential Decree No. 824 be
construed in such a way that along with the rest of the other cities and
municipalities, there should be elections for the Sangguniang Bayan, then
there is a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution. The
point is not well-taken. It is clear that under the equal protection clause,
classification is not forbidden. But classification on a reasonable basis, and
not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.The classification, however,
to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class." All such elements are present. There is no need to set forth
anew the compelling reasons that called for the creation of Metropolitan
Manila. It is quite obvious that under the conditions then existing - still
present and, with the continued growth of population, attended with more
complexity - what was done was a response to a great public need. The

government was called upon to act. PD 824 was the result. It is not a
condition for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four
cities and thirteen municipalities that the membership be identical with those
of other cities or municipalities. There is ample justification for such a
distinction Basis in the Constitution.Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution
expressly recognized the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila. Such
express constitutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law
calls for the dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal justification for
the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was
it the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the creation of
Metropolitan Manila. (Election Code of 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1396
creating the Ministry of Human Settlements, Presidential Decree No. 824,
creating the Metropolitan Manila Commission, Amendments to the
Constitution, Ordinance) Control of the President. It is undeniable that the
creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is free from any
constitutional objection. There is, however, a question that may arise in
connection with the powers of the President over the Commission. According
to PD 824: "The Commission, the General Manager and any official of the
Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control of the
President. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the President shall
have the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act
of the Commission, the General and the Commissioners." It may give rise to
doubts as to its validity insofar as it confers the power of control on the
President. That control he certainly exercises under the present Constitution
over the ministries. His power over local governments does not go that far. It
extends no further than general supervision. These doubts, however, do not
suffice to nullify such a provision. Succinctly put, that construction that
would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy. To show
fidelity to this basic principle of construction is to lend substance to the
equally basic doctrine that the constitution enters into and forms part of
every statute. Accordingly, the presidential power of control over acts of the
Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national
in character. There can be no valid objection to such exercise of authority.
That is a clear recognition that some of its attributes are those of a national
character. Where, however, the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be
considered as properly appertaining to local government functions, the
power of the President is confined to general supervision. As thus construed,
Section 13 clearly appears to be free from any constitutional infirmity. Abad

Santos, dissenting. 1. The referendum of February 27, 1975, did not satisfy
the prohibition contained in Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution. For one
thing the provision speaks of "the criteria established in the local
government code." There was then no local government code so there were
no criteria. Also the grant of power to restructure the 4 cities and 13
municipalities in the Greater Manila area "under such terms and conditions
as the President may decide" was so broad that it was in fact not an
intelligent decision on the part of the people. I submit that a grant of power
must be definite to be valid; it must not be nebulous and uncircumscribed so
as to amount to a total abdication thereof. Finally, the referendum did not
include all of the peoples of Bulacan and Rizal to ascertain if they were
willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. The
referendum suffers from the same infirmity present in the case of Paredes
vs. Executive Secretary, cited in the main opinion, where I dissented. 2. The
January 27, 1984, amendment to the Constitution providing for
representation in the Batasang Pambansa and which allocates
representatives to "districts in Metropolitan Manila" cannot be construed to
constitutionally validate P.D. No. 824 for the simple reason that the issue
before the people when the amendment was submitted for ratification was
not the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission
ALVAREZ V GUINGONA (1996)
Facts: This concerns the validity of RA 7330 converting the municipality of
Santiago Isabela into an independent component city to be known as the
city of Santiago. The law was challenged mainly because the act did not
allegedly originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated
by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Consitution. Also, petitioner claims that
the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual
income required under Section 450 of the LGC in order to be converted into
a component city. Apparently, RA 7330 originated from HB 8817 which was
filed on April 18, 1993. After the third reading, the bill was transmitted to
the Senate on January 18, 1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243 was
filed on May 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to
the senate. The committee recommended that HB 8817 be approved without
amendment, taking into consideration that the house bill was identical to the
senate bill.

Issue: WON the IRAs are to be included in the computation of the average
annual income of a municipality for the purposes of its conversion into an
independent component city
Held: Yes. Ratio: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a
component city because its average annual income for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required
annual income of P20,000,000 for its conversion into a city. After deducting
the IRA, ti appears that the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Petitioners asseverate
that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid
from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease,
depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. Petitioners
asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part
of the income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to
be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average
annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly
certified by the Department of Finance. A Local Government Unit is a political
subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of
substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an
imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense
that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The
practical side to development through a decentralized local government
system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its
broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit
must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in
turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty,
responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is
accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to
discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of
such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government
unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the
right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the
form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its
equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the
national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. For purposes of
budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income

of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the
national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is
as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be
all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions
of funds of the local government unit. The IRAs are items of income because
they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government
unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.
11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably
rely upon as the source of much needed funds. To reiterate, IRAs are a
regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the
same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and
meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to
when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations". Issue:
WON considering that Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817,
RA 2770 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives
Held: Ye s. Ratio: Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should,
by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that RA 7720 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same
import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it
cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives
first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves
cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18,
1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No.
8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB
No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative
process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No
violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible
under the circumstances attending the instant controversy. Furthermore,
petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved
on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate
Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No.
8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17,
1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a
month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local

Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate

held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817,
already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that
a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for
as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: Nor does the Constitution prohibit the
filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill.Every law, including RA No 7720 has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality. It is a well entrenched
jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of
constitutionality,. Consequently, for RA No 7720 to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Consititution, not
merely a doubtful and equivocal one, in other words, the grounds for nullity
must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this court to
declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis
that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking
into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding
ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No 7720,
the court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore inevitable.
LEAGUE OF CITIES v COMELEC (2011)
FACTS: During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of
municipalities into component cities were filed before the House of
Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on
bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress,
R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for
conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locallygenerated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the
cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular
municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No.
9009.

ISSUE: Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities

constitutional?
RATIO: November 18, 2008 Ruling No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the
exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC
and not into any other laws. The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units. The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of
the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law,
are material in determining the just share of local government units
(LGUs) in national taxes. (League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR
No. 176951, November 18, 2008)
March 31, 2009 Ruling
Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.

No.

The

SC

denied

the

first

Motion

for

April 28, 2009 Ruling No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a
second motion for reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November
18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or
Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that
based on Congress deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the
then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum
income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes;
and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood
bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only
affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The
Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities
by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants
before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher
income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be
indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be
given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they
have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth
under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951,
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of

Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the

Philippines v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18,
2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the
SCs Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for
reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and
reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the
Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities.
Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc
Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc
Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the
second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main
decision where there is no prior decision, the Court said. In the latest
resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the
Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly
provides that no cityshall be createdexcept in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code. It stressed that while all
the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the
Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption
from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec.
450 of the LGC. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact
that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of
the Constitution.Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power,
rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the
Constitution, the Court held. The Court further held that limiting the
exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the
same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the
exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional
for violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No. 176951, League of
Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Comelec, August 24, 2010)

February 15, 2011 Ruling Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15,
2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the
Cityhood case in 2008.
April 12, 2011Ruling Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional.
We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the
Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local
Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009.
Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and
fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its
imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress, the SC said. The
Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government
units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA
9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the
creation of cities. The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being
deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of
conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the
Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001,
when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative
intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending
during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities
Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage
of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint
Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for
approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the
conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House
and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted upon.
When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved.
The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses
ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express
articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents,
without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009,
and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express
exemptions
being
embodied
in
the
exemption
clauses.(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews

%20flash/2011/04/04141101.php) The Court held that the imposition of the

income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was
arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local
government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it
cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every
amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing
effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy,
decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national
growth. (GR No. 176951, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR
No. 177499, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC: GR No. 178056,
League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC, April 12, 2011)
DRILON VS LIM (1994)
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187
of the Local Government Code3. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him
of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila
Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to
law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and
sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional
because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation
of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the
procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in
the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition
originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy
of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held: Yes. Ratio:BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all
civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of
lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In
the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the

utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of

unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this
Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a
law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully
studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined By
them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of
the Constitution.
Issue:WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review
only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to
revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or
sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did
not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure
was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of
control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by
his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that
the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does
he have the discretion to modify or replace them. Significantly, a rule similar
to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That section allowed the
Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his
opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of
judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would
smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never

questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not
given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is
ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the
right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon
set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the
inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the
legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of
public hearing, no publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing,
no posting, no translation into Tagalog) Judge Palattao however found that
all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove
such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five
days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting
of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial
court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices
of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The
minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits
B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and
the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the
approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the
Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions
are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not
affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of
a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not
been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and
disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local
development plans and public investment programs of the local government
unit and not to tax ordinances.
Footnote 3 Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval
of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with
the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further,
That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or

revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision
within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided,
however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the
Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
SOLICITOR GENERAL V METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (1991)
Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio
M. Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of
motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could
be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was
permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of
stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed
that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not
directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be
imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that Traffic
Enforces continued with the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of
license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court
that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of
illegally parked vehicles.
Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing
itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/
abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in
Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution requiring the Metropolitan
Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the
contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended
the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power
conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of
resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null
and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative
power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically
PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of
license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged

impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal

challenge to its validity.
Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare
Clause embodied in the LGC
Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative
power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such
delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the
statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only
as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents
must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of
such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular
requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles
governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance,
to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6)
must be general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under
consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to
existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either
the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following
provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to
impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such
sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose
fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and
under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself.
Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at
least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5
thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's
license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions
comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
`The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing
law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by

virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature.

They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case
before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,
cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
statute. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other
ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of
implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional
requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts,
to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of
freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the
means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. The measures in
question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse,
impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In
so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal
the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605
applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general
authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land
Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country
with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The
Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of
motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective
reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition
and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the
same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that
may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices
described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there
is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition
against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged
enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for
Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not
to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply
delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan
Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues
prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the

conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila.
GANZON v CA (1991)
Facts: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of
administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city
officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of
authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent (Sec of Local
Government) issued a preventive suspension order for a period of sixty days.
In the other case, respondent ordered petitioner's second preventive
suspension for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC. The second
preventive suspension was not enforced. Amidst the two successive
suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the
respondent in the RTC. Presently, he instituted an action for prohibition, in
the respondent CA. Meanwhile, the respondent issued another order,
preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time
in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor
as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced before the CA, a
petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the cases.
Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego,
can suspend and or remove local officials.
Held: Yes. Ratio: It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution
no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to
exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials.
According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen
self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase "as
may be provided by law," to strip the President of the power of control over
local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the
debates of the Constitutional Commission. The issue consists of three
questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be
provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate,
suspend, discipline, and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution
repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the
significance of the change in the constitutional language? It is the considered

opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional

language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right - or
the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to
provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that
the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to
underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break
Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not,
however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of
all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini- states out of local
government units, as in the federal governments of the USA. Autonomy, in
the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of
the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest - is to wean local government
units from over dependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that
under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but
subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a
local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation
law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also
noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy
finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government
code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress
may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code
has done, delegate its exercise to the President. The deletion of "as may be
provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the
framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of
its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local
legislation. The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as
existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local
Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the
Constitution contains no prohibition. The petitioners are under the
impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied
her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority The Court does not believe that the petitioners can
rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the

President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by

themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo
would exclude the power of removal from The president, commissioner blas
ople would not.The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new
Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 337. As we
said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may
stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local
autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the
approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. As the
Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than
to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of
local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not
meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in
a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local
governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however
limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to
enhance self-government. As we observed in one case, decentralization
means devolution of national administration - but not power - to the local
levels. Thus: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order tobroaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and
"ensure their fullest development as self- reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only
to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared
to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart
its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central

authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power

amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
contituency.
Issue:WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon Ganzon are proper
Held:No. Ratio: The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor
Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed
looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative
charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension,
in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of
course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Ganzon is guilty
of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600
days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office.
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for
the above reasons, and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a
vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have
held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of
the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or
to keep him off "the records and other evidence." It is a means, and no
more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring
local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty
days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter
period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be
lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code
provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a
longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and nothing less than
tyranny. We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the
Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion
that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and
needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
Ganzon Supplement: Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a
mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials
remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may
provide; The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; The change in
constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant

but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt
thelatter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with
the fundamental premise of autonomy; Since local governments remain
accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the
manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
"Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation"
does not signify "control" (which the President does not have); The
petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered,
but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally;
provided: that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault,
neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing
the time of suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)] that if during, or after the
expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or
other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are fled against him by
the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to
his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2),
Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
GANZON v CA (1991) supra.
Held:The 1987 Constitution did not divest the President [in this case acting
through Sec of LocGov] of the power of supervision over LGUs. The change
in the constitutional language merely underscores local governments'
autonomy from congress and to break Congress "control" over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake
of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. Autonomy does not
contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the
federal governments of the US. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is
subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision
clause" itself suggest is to wean local LGUs from over-dependence on the
central government. Under the Constitution, "local autonomy" is not
instantly self- executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of
a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and
a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at
the local level. Also, despite the autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive. Finally, the
Charter allows Congress to include in the LGC provisions for removal of local

officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as
the existing LGC has done, delegate its exercise to the President. The
petitioners are under the mistaken impression that the Constitution has left
the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the
power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. Legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority. "Control" = the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
test of the latter. "Supervision" = overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. As we held,
however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is
a lesser power than "altering"
MCIAA V. MARCOS (1996)
Facts: Petitioner was created by virtue of RA6958, mandated to "principally
undertake the economical, efficient and effective control, management and
supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and
the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Under Section 1: The authority shall be
exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its
political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. However, the Officer of
the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on parcels of
land belonging to petitioner. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption.
It also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing
governmental functions, citing section 133 of the LGC which puts limitations
on the taxing powers of LGUs. The city refused insisting that petitioner is a
GOCC performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption was withdrawn
by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC. Petitioner filed a declaratory relief
before the RTC. The trial court dismissed the petitioner ruling that the LGC
withdrew the tax exemption granted the GOCCs.
Issue: WON the City of Cebu has the power to impose taxes on petitioner.
Held: Yes. Ratio: As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no
limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency
who are to pay it. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are
the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation

and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris
against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of
exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language
in the law too plain to be mistaken. There can be no question that under
Section 14 RA 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty
taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is
the rule and exemption is the exception, the exemption may thus be
withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The LGC, enacted
pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the constitution provides for the exercise
by LGUs of their power to tax, the scope thereof or its limitations, and the
exemption from taxation. Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common
limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs: (o) Taxes, fees or charges of any
kind on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities and
LGUs. Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real property tax.
Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of GOCCs,
except as provided therein. On the other hand, the LGC authorizes LGUs to
grant tax exemption privileges. Reading together Section 133, 232 and 234
of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in Secs 133 the
taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of inter alia, "taxes, fees,
and charges of any kind of the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalties, and LGUs"; however, pursuant to Sec 232, provinces,
cities, municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real
property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of
the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial
used thereof has been granted to a taxable person." As to tax exemptions or
incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the
LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity
of the LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to
local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non
stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless
otherwise provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234,
which enumerates the properties exempt from real property tax. But the last
paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption in
so far as the real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only
to those enumerated there-in; all others not included in the enumeration lost
the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as the real

property is owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its political

subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the
exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been
granted to taxable person for consideration or otherwise. Since the last
paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the
LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical
persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in the said section, and the
petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily
follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its
charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can
only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions
provided in Section 234, but not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since,
as shown above, the said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. In
short, the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133. It
must show that the parcels of land in question, which are real property, are
any one of those enumerated in Section 234, either by virtue of ownership,
character, or use of the property. Most likely, it could only be the first, but
not under any explicit provision of the said section, for one exists. In light of
the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of the Government", it
could only be within be first item of the first paragraph of the section by
expanding the scope of the terms Republic of the Philippines" to
embrace ."instrumentalities" and "agencies." This view does not persuade
us. In the first place, the petitioner's claim that it is an instrumentality of the
Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly mentions the word
"instrumentalities"; and in the secondplace it fails to consider the fact that
the legislature used the phrase "National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the phrase "Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivision "in Section 234(a). The terms
"Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not
interchangeable. The former is boarder and synonymous with "Government
of the Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987
defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions of
the government are exercised through at the Philippines, including, saves as
the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to
the autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivision or other forms of local government." These autonomous regions,
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are the political

subdivision. On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire
machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different
forms of local Governments." The National Government then is composed of
the three great departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial.
An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein;" while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations".
If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal
of the exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last
sentence of the said section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the
National Government mentioned in Section 133(o), then it should have
restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did not Moreover, that Congress did
not wish to expand the scope of the exemption in Section 234(a) to include
real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of the
government including government-owned and controlled corporations is
further borne out by the fact that the source of this exemption is Section
40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. Note
that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and any governmentowned or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter" was excluded. The
justification for this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious:
to limit further tax exemption privileges, specially in light of the general
provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes in
the last paragraph of property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234.
These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure
autonomy to local governments 33 and the objective of the LGC that they
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self- reliant communities and make them effective
partners in the attainment of national goals. 34 The power to tax is the most
effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad
activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential
to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace,
progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall that

the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted
to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other units of
government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and
distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situatedenterprises, and there
was a need for this entities to share in the requirements of the development,
fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and other charges due from them.
The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the parcels of land
in question belong to the Republic of the Philippines whose beneficial use has
been granted to the petitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxable
person". It may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands" refer to
"lands" in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes
the parcels of land the respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real
property taxes. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands" among other
things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use
thereof, with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines.
This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof
because the petitioner's authorized capital stock consists of "the value of
such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports." Hence, the
petitioner is now the owner of the land in question and the exception in Sec
234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a
"taxable person" under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment
of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is
conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject
to all taxes, except real property tax. Finally, even if the petitioner was
originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of
the forgoing disquisitions, it had already become even if it be conceded to be
an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the Government, a taxable person for
such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234
of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier
adverted to, applies to the petitioner. Accordingly, the position taken by the
petitioner is untenable. Reliance on Basco vs. Pagcor is unavailing since it
was decided before the effectivity of the LGC. Besides, nothing can prevent
Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the
government performing governmental functions may be subject to tax.
Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national
policy, no one can doubt its wisdom.
SAN JUAN v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1991)

Facts: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for Rizal Province was
left vacated. Petitioner, Gov. Reynaldo San Juan informed Dir. Reynaldo
Abella of the DBM that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO and
requested Dir Abella to endorse the appointment of Santos. In a memo,
however, Dir Abella appointed Cecilia Almajose as PBO of Rizal on the basis
of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers. According to Abella,
Almajose was most qualified as she was a CPA. DBM Undersecretary Nazario
Cabuquit signed the appointment papers of Almajose. In a letter, Petitioner
reiterated his request for Santos appointment. DBM Regional Dir Agripino
Galvez denied the request as Santos was not qualified. When petitioner
learned of Almajoses appointment, he protested on the grounds that
Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the
PBO; that Almajose lacks the required three years work experience as
provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under EO 112, it is the
Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to
recommend nominees for the position of PBO. The DBM issued a memo
ruling that petitioners protest is not meritorious as the DBM validly
exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the
petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements. The CSC affirmed.
Issue: WON petitioner has the right and privilege to recommend the
nominees to the position of PBO.
Held: Yes. Ratio: The tug of war between the Secretary of DBM and the
Governor of Rizal over a position involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We
have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable
of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and
the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor
of autonomy. The exercise by LGUs of meaningful power has been a national
goal since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional
provisions and legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials,
national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or
water down what little grants of autonomy have so far been given to
municipal corporations. President McKinley's Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission ordered the new Government "to devote their
attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments
in which natives of the Islands, both in the cities and rural communities,
shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local officers to the

fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of
supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and
observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the
maintenance of law, order and loyalty." In this initial organic act for the
Philippines, the Commission which combined both executive and legislative
powers was directed to give top priority to making local autonomy effective.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However,
the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments
to "general supervision as may be provided by law." The President controls
the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments.
He has only supervision and that is both general and circumscribed by
statute. Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation
implementing local autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264
(Local Autonomy Act) was enacted. The provisions of the 1973 Constitution
moved the country further towards greater autonomy. An entire article on
Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a local
government code defining more responsive and accountable local
government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial
boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local
government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create
sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local
governments. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked
in the present Constitution (Art II Sec 25, Art X Sec 2-3). When the Civil
Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial
Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously
hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local
governments to develop self- reliance and resoluteness in the handling of
their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set
back. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and
after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are
prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those
budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing
DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are
relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that there should
be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of
proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for this reason that
the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power

between the two levels of government. It may not be amiss to give by way
of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and
Judges. Under Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicial
positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. DBMs grave abuse of
discretion is aggravated by the fact that Dir Galvez required the Governor to
submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his
earlier recommendation. The appointment of Almajose was formalized before
the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee
had been rejected. The complete disregard of the LGUs prerogative and the
smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are
manifest. In his work, Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of LGUs
as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that
they enjoy. He stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the
strength of free nations. A people may establish a system of free
government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have
the spirit of liberty." Our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the
spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITIONVS.COMMISSION ON AUDIT (1991)
Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986,
the Cordillera Peoples LiberationArmy (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong
Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall notundertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such
as politicalnegotiations.A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by
the two parties. Such agreement states that theyare to:Par. 2. Work together
in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that
couldperform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake
consultations and studiesleading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.Par.
3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the
R.P. Panel indrafting the Executive Order.Pursuant to the above joint
agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
governmentand of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was
then signed into law by President CorazonAquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR],which
covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and theCity of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O.
220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order,the President, in

the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress

from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras
Issue: Constitutionality of EO 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the
Cordillera Administrative Region - assailed on the primary ground that the
President pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by Congress and the
approval of such act through a plebiscite.
Held: EO 220 envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of
services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the
areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the
grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation
of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the
creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras which undoubtedly, will
take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the
first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures
to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime the organic
act had not yet been passed. Petitioners incidentally argue that the creation
of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy
for the provinces composing it. It must be clarified that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand,
the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political
autonomy, not just administrative, to these regions. As said earlier, the CAR
is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political
subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC V ERICTA (1983)

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total

area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial. For
several years, the section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city
authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the
Quezon City Council passed the a resolution directing the City Engineer to
stop selling memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to
donate the required 6% space for pauper burial. Respondent reacted by
filing with the CFI a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in
question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the
Revised Administrative Code. The Court declared the Section 9 null and void.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public
use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue
that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise
of local police power. On the other hand, respondent contends that the
taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property.
Issue:WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the
police power
Held:No Ratio:An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does not reveal
any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the
provision granting police power to the City. The power to regulate does not
include the power to prohibit (. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
There are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes
with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3)
taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as
necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the
power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use
of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the
use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property
outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to

promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover
from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. The police
power being the most active power of the government and the due process
clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict
between this power of government and the due process clause of the
Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing
authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of
the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property
with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace
and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It
seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay,
even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery
for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The
expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of the Revised Charter of Quezon City which
empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center
of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place
subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for
the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law
or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land
or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners
of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and

other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots.
The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from
said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries
of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer
when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact, the
petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of
the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory
basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and
liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking.
Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino,
Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and
commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery
cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the
private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.