COMELEC VS.

JUDGE TOMAS NOYNAY

FACTS: In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against certain
individuals for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The cases were filed with a
Regional Trial Court in Samar presided over by Judge Tomas Noynay. Judge Noynay
however dismissed the said cases as he ruled that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said
cases because said criminal offenses were punishable with less than six years
imprisonment. He said that said cases should be filed with the MTC.
Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELECs legal department, filed a motion for
reconsideration. He cited a case entitled: Alberto Naldeza vs Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M
No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996 (245 SCRA 286). According to Atty. Balbuena, in the said
case he cited, the Supreme Court has already settled the issue and Atty. Balbuena even
copied in toto the said ruling by the Supreme Court in his motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is correct in dismissing the case.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing the case as the
same was contrary to Section 32 of B.P. 129 as well as Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases are within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts except certain cases (which were not the cases filed
by COMELEC in this case).
Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a rule, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine EXCEPT otherwise provided by special law. The Omnibus Election Code is a
special law which provides that election offenses, regardless of penalties, are under the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judges duty to be studious of the
principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the
law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.
On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in citing cases.
The Supreme Court said that the passage cited by Balbuena in his Motion was not the
actual decision of the Supreme Court in the said case cited but rather the memorandum of
the court administrator which was quoted in the said case. Further, his citation of Naldeza
vs Lavilles, Jr. was wrong. Not only did he spell Naldeza wrong (as the correct spelling
was NALDOZA), he also cited the wrong SCRA. It should have been 254 SCRA 286 and
not 245 SCRA 286.

Balbuena is reminded of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

which requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a
decision or authority.

MONTECILLO AND DEL MAR VS. FRANCISCO GICA et

al
FACTS: Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar
represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del
Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay
Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court
reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a
veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices
knowingly rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been rendered through
negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the
court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered
del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the
President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the
CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of
the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of a
compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually,
the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as
well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the
ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the
judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not
be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating that
had he not been convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless he
would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar
also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among the corrupt, the grafters and
those allegedly committing injustice.

Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who
handled the case dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts.
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on
the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity
of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs Gaudencio Cloribel

(1970)
In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto,
Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads
FACTS: In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24 SCRA 491;
G.R. No. L-27072) which was not favorable to MacArthur International Minerals Co. The
latters lawyer, Atty. Vicente Santiago then filed a motion for reconsideration. Eventually, a
third motion for reconsideration was submitted by him where the following paragraph was
stated:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen
messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their
judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering
that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion
to hold himself in contempt of court seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral
principle involved and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an
accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government
officials are just amoral?

Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked the 1968 decision of the
Supreme Court as false, erroneous, and illegal.
In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two Justices: Justice Fred Castro,
because allegedly, he is the brother of the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion because immediately after the 1968 decision, his son was
appointed to a significant position in the government. (Here Atty. Santiago implied that the
justices were not fair and that their decision was influenced).
In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the above paragraph and was
only included due to inadvertence. But that any rate, he averred that the language he used
was necessary to defend his client.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first
duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their
clients success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. Thus, Santiagos defense is not tenable.
A lawyer must avoid language that tend to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief in
the judicial system. A lawyers duties to the Court have become common place. Really,
there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such
duty: To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance.
Atty. Santiago was fined for his infractions.

DE GRACIA VS. WARDEN OF MAKATI

FACTS: It is settled law-that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for release from
confinement of a person who has served his sentence. It is on such a doctrine that reliance
is placed by petitioner Manuel de Gracia in this application for the issuance of such a writ. It
is undisputed that while the information against petitioner charged him with the commission
of frustrated homicide to which he pleaded not guilty, it was later amended to one of serious
physical injuries. It is to such lesser offense that on September 10, 1971, he entered a plea
of guilty. On the very same day, respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado imposed upon him

the penalty of four months and one day of arrests mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. That period of confinement he had duly served by November 10, 1975,
considering that he had been under detention since July 18, 1975. 2 This notwithstanding,
the petition alleged that he was not set free, the reason being that on November 19, 1975,
the last day of the prison term imposed upon him, "respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marciano P. Sta. Ana filed with the respondent Judge, in the very same case where your
petitioner was convicted and for which he served sentence, Criminal Case No. 15289, a
'Motion to Order the Warden to Hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia alleging as a ground
that the 'father of the victim, Gilberts Valenzuela, informed the movant that the victim in the
above-entitled case died and for this reason the undersigned will file an amended
information. Then came this paragraph in the petition: "That on the following day, November
20, 1975, the respondent Judge, despite the clear and incontrovertible fact that he had no
jurisdiction to act on said motion because the case had long been terminated and his
decision therein had already been executed, and, further, even assuming that the
respondent Judge could still act in the case, he could not and should not act on the Fiscal's
motion because the same was not set for hearing and no copy thereof was furnished to
your petitioner whose very liberty was being sought to be deprived, still he persisted in
acting upon the Fiscal's motion and granted the same 'in the interest of justice,' not at all
minding that your petitioner, while maybe a convict in the eyes of the respondent Judge, is
still entitled to due process of law and to some justice.
On the morning December 17, 1975, respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P.
Sta. Ana, Jr. and the two aforesaid wardens appeared. Neither petitioner nor his counsel,
Salvador N. Beltran, was present. There was this manifestation though: '[Petitioner thru
counsel, respectfully manifests that he has already been released from confinement, for
which reason the present petition has been rendered moot and academic. It would appear,
therefore, that with the release of petitioner, the matter had indeed become moot and
academic. That disposes of this petition, except for one final note. There was a lapse in
judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not even take the trouble of
appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse
explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice
before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his
future actuations as a member of the bar.

ISSUE: Whether the amending of the information by Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr is the proper
remedy to address the order of release of the petitioner.
HELD: After being able to study the applicable rule and jurisprudence, the undersigned
concluded that the proper remedy is not amendment of the information because judgment had
already been rendered on the first information, but the filing of a new information for homicide
upon the authority of this Honorable Court's ruling in People v. Manolong, and It is similar
cases. 8

Brigida Buenaseda et al vs Juan Flavier et al

FACTS: In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption
against Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and several other government officials of the Department of
Health (DOH). The Ombudsman (then Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of
Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier,
being the officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the
suspension order. NCMH submitted its Comment on the Petition where they attached a
Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers of Buenaseda et al.
Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension order,
which is a lawful order from a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such advice
from the lawyers constitute a violation against the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenasedas lawyers as he
maintained that all the Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them.
The Sol-Gen based his argument on Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee
at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials.
Whether or not a Motion for Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action.

HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies
that what the Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the
resolution of the case or investigation thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty
(not punitive suspension). What the Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman may
recommend are punitive suspensions.
Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not
proper. It cannot be filed in this special civil action which is confined to questions of
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts
of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of
members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action. However, the
lawyers of Buenaseda were reminded not be carried away in espousing their clients cause.
The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in
the profession.

PRIMITIVO SANTOS ET AL VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE

ARTURO E. CRUZ
FACTS: In a sworn-letter complaint dated November 16, 1972, addressed to the then
Secretary of Justice, the complainant, Primitivo Santos charged Municipal Judge Arturo E.
Cruz of the Municipal Court of Bulacan with partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge for
having intervened with and/or prevented the complainant in filing cases in the Municipal
Court of Bulacan. The complaint of Primitivo Santos, therefore, was the only one that stood
for hearing.
On the letter it was adduced by the testimony of Roberto G. Garcia, a police corporal of
Bulacan, Bulacan, who brought the police blotter subpoenaed. And that as a standard
operating procedure, he gave the statement to his Chief and no other entry shows that the
complainant returned to the Police Headquarters. Judge Cruz is here wrongfully blamed for
the failure of its filing, as the portion where a complainant's jurat should be, was not signed
by Judge Cruz, but complainant Primitivo Santos could not state that his wife ever appeared
before Judge Cruz to execute the oath nor was any evidence presented that the same was
ever forwarded to Judge Cruz.

On the sixth paragraph of the letter-complaint, the only testimony of Primitivo Santos on
which his suspicion that Judge Cruz was interfering with a criminal case filed by Teresita
Cruz was he saw Judge Cruz enter the room where an investigation was being conducted \
The letter-complaint asks that Judge Cruz voluntarily inhibit himself from trying and allow
another judge to hear it, and Judge Cruz suspended the proceedings.
A careful review of the records of this case shows that the investigating Judge correctly
found that the complainant was not able to prove the charges of partiality and conduct
unbecoming a judge.
However, the transcript of the stenographic notes shows that during the formal investigation
conducted on February 9, 1973 6 the respondent judge, while cross-examining the witness,
Alberto T. Cano, lost his temper and said: "You can go to hell I don't care or where do you
want to go Mr. Cano". This language of the Judge is unbecoming of a municipal judge and
deserves administrative penalty.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Cruz committed a conduct of unbecoming a municipal judge.
HELD: The respondent Judge is hereby EXONERATED of the charge of partiality but is
found guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge by uttering intemperate language during the
trial of the case. The respondent judge is hereby imposed a penalty of a fine equivalent to
one (1) month salary and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely