INFERENCE

3.5.2 The position with regard to conduct is similar. The view which I am attacking
holds that by having special rules of inference we can say that there can be inferences
from a set of indicative premisses to an imperative conclusion. If we ask 'What are these
special rules of inference?' it is clear that they are nothing but the old rules of conduct in
a new guise. What under the old dispensation appears as an imperative major premiss
reappears under the new as a rule of inference. The criterion which I suggest for
deciding on the merits of these two ways of putting the matter is the same as before. Let
us take an example. Suppose that I say 'Don't say that, because it is false'. Are we to
represent this argument as follows:
S is false.
Do not say S,

or shall we add the imperative major premiss 'Never say what is false'? If the latter, the
inference is valid by the ordinary rules of logic; but if the former, we have to have a
special rule of inference, which will just be this imperative major premiss in another
capacity. Does it matter which of these alternatives we choose? Surely it does if we are
concerned to distinguish between on the one hand general principles about our
conduct, which have content, and tell us to do, or to refrain from, certain positive acts in
our external behaviour, and on the other logical rules, which are rules, not for behaving
correctly, but for talking and thinking correctly, and are, if Popper is to be believed, not
about our actions, but about the meanings of the words used.
This argument would tell equally against a theory which reduced rules of conduct to
definitions of value-words; for in that case also arguments about how one should
behave would turn into merely verbal disputes. Suppose that a Communist and I are
arguing about whether I ought to do a certain act A; and suppose that on his principles
I ought not to do it, whereas on mine I ought. An advocate of the sort of theory that I
am attacking might treat this dispute as follows: each of the disputants has his own
way of verifying the sentence 'I ought in these circumstances to do A'; and these ways
differ. Therefore, in order to avoid such disputes, it would be better for us to substitute
two unambiguous terms for the one ambiguous one; for example, the Communist
should use the term 'ought1' for the concept governed by his rules of verification, and I
should use 'ought2' for my concept. But the point is that there is a dispute, and not
merely a verbal misunderstanding, between the Communist and me; we are differing
about what I ought to do (not say) and, if he convinces me, my conduct will be
substantially different from what it would be if I remained unconvinced.