Surveillance Update November 13

Millennial Debate
November 12, 2015 Policy Update
Executive Power & New Phone Records Case...............................................3

Executive Power DA NU.............................................................................. 4
A2: Phone Records Ruling Nus DAs/Executive Power.................................5
Nuclear Terrorism.......................................................................................... 6
Nuclear Terrorism Impact Card...................................................................7
India-Pakistan Escalation........................................................................... 9
A2: ISIS Wont Use Nukes.........................................................................11
A2: No Dirty Bomb Attacks Yet.................................................................12
Dirty Bomb Economy Impacts..................................................................13
Cloud Computing Advantage & Answers.....................................................16
Cloud Computing Advantage Link............................................................17
A2: Cloud Computing Advantage.............................................................18
Genetic Surveillance Neg............................................................................ 20
Genetic Surveillance Solvency Answers...................................................21
Genetic Surveillance Af..............................................................................30
Genetic Surveillance Solvency --- A2: State/Local....................................31
General Privacy/Surveillance.......................................................................32
General Privacy Solvency Answers..........................................................33
Corporate Privacy Protection Counterplan..................................................34
CP Corporations Can Protect Customer Data/Not Share it With the
Government............................................................................................. 35
Section 702 Af............................................................................................ 42
A2: PDD-28 Solves................................................................................... 43
Section 702 Neg.......................................................................................... 45
Status Quo Solves US Person Harms........................................................46
A2: Foreign Relations............................................................................... 48
A2: Surveillance of Non-US Persons Violates International Law...............49
Presidential Leadership/Foreign Policy Link..............................................52
Presidential Powers Links Congressional Limits.....................................55
Terrorism/Foreign Policy Link to Protecting Privacy of Non-US Persons....56
Politics Link to Foreign Privacy Rights......................................................58
Proposals for Protecting Privacy of Non-US Persons (Could be Plans or
Counterplans).......................................................................................... 60
Expanded FISA Oversight Fails.................................................................63
Interagency Coordination CP....................................................................64
ETC.............................................................................................................. 66
Should v. Shall................................................................................... 67
Governments Collecting Private Metadata...............................................68
Public Advocate Solvency........................................................................69
No Efective Surveillance Oversight.........................................................71
Surveillance Solvency Answers................................................................73
Race-Based Surveillance.............................................................................75
Race-Based Surveillance Widespread......................................................76
Racist Profiling......................................................................................... 80
A2: Holder Guidelines Solve.....................................................................81
A2: Courts Solve...................................................................................... 82
Surveillance Isnt Suspicion-Based...........................................................83
International Law Advantage...................................................................85
Racial Profiling Violates International Law................................................86
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Free Speech Advantage........................................................................... 91

Racial Profiling Neg..................................................................................... 92
Cant Solve State/Local -- NYPD...............................................................93
Racist Immigration Enforcement..............................................................94
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Executive Power & New Phone

Records Case
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Executive Power DA NU
NU new ruling on telephone records
Charlie Savage, 11-9-15, New York Times, Judge Deals a Blow to NSA Data
Collection Program, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/us/politics/judgedeals-a-blow-to-nsa-phone-surveillance-program.html DOA: 11-12-15
AfederaljudgeonMondaypartlyblockedthe
NationalSecurityAgency
sprogramthat
systematicallycollectsAmericansdomesticphonerecordsinbulkjustweeksbeforetheagencywas
scheduledtoshutitdownandreplaceit.Thejudgesaidtheprogramwasmostlikely
unconstitutional.Inaseparatecasechallengingtheprogram,afederalappealscourtinNewYorkonOct.
30haddeclinedtoweighinontheconstitutionalissues,sayingitwouldbeimprudenttointerferewithan
orderlytransitiontoareplacementsystemafterNov.29ButonMonday,ina43pageruling,Judge
RichardJ.LeonofUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbiawrotethattheconstitutional
issuesweretooimportanttoleaveunansweredinthehistoryoftheprogram,whichtracesbacktoafterthe
Sept.11terroristattacksandcametolightin2013inleaksbyEdwardJ.Snowden,theformerintelligence
contractor.Withthegovernmentsauthoritytooperatethebulktelephonymetadataprogramquickly
comingtoanend,thiscaseisperhapsthelastchapterinthejudiciarysevaluationofthisparticular
programscompatibilitywiththeConstitution,hewrote.Itwillnot,however,bethelastchapterinthe
ongoingstruggletobalanceprivacyrightsandnationalsecurityinterestsunderourConstitutioninanage
ofevolvingtechnologicalwizardry.Undertheprogram,theN.S.A.hasbeencollectingAmericansphone
recordsinbulkfromtelephonecompanies.Itusesthedatatoanalyzesociallinksbetweenpeopletohunt
forhiddenassociatesofterrorismsuspects.JudgeLeonspecificallyorderedtheN.S.A.tostopcollecting
phonerecordsforonecustomerofVerizon:alawyerinCaliforniaandhislawfirm.Buthedidso,he
wrote,knowingthattheJusticeDepartmenthadsaidthatblockingthecollectionofjustonepersons
recordsmightrequireshuttingdowntheentireprogrambecauseitwouldbetechnicallydifficulttoscreen
himout.TheJusticeDepartmentsaiditwasreviewingthedecisionbuthadnocommentaboutwhetherit
wouldappealtheinjunction.ReutersreportedonMondaythattheN.S.A.hadsentamemotoCongress
sayingthattestingofthereplacementsystemhadbegun.Theprogrambeganbasedonaunilateralclaim
ofexecutivepowerbyPresidentGeorgeW.Bush.In2006,theJusticeDepartmentpersuadedtheForeign
IntelligenceSurveillanceCourttobeginissuingordersfortheprogramunderaninterpretationofa
provisionoftheU.S.A.PatriotActthatpermitscollectionofbusinessrecordsrelevanttoanational
securityinvestigation.
NU Executive power over immigration has been limited

Dan DeLuce, 11-12-15, Foreign Policy, To Close Guantanamo, Obama Will
Have to Test the Limits of Presidential Power,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/to-close-guantanamo-obama-will-haveto-test-the-limits-of-presidential-power/ DOA: 11-12-15
TheWhiteHouseisexpectedtounveilitslongdelayedplantoclosetheGuantnamoprisonon
Friday,apackagethatwillincludeoptionsfortransferringtheremainingdetaineestohighsecurity
prisonsinColorado,Kansas,orSouthCarolinaandanassessmentsoftherelatedcostsandlogistics.
WithCongressfirmlyopposedtoclosingtheprison,aunilateralmovebyObamaofferstheonlyrealistic
wayforhimtoshutterthecontroversialfacilitybeforehistermexpires.Butitwouldsetupthebiggest
testyetofhisviewof presidential authority, which took a hit onMondaywhena
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federalappealscourtblockedexecutiveordersdesignedtoshieldmillionsofundocumented
immigrantsfromdeportation.
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A2: Phone Records Ruling Nus DAs/Executive

Power
The ruling has no significant impact because
1 -- the program was already set to expire
2 it only impacts a few plaintiffs
3 A different court ruled the opposite
DevlinBarret,November9,2015,WallStreetJournal,FederalJudgeRulesAgainstNSAPhone
SurveillanceProgram,http://www.wsj.com/articles/federaljudgerulesagainstnsaphonesurveillance
program1447091701DOA:111215
WASHINGTONAfederaljudgehasruledagainsttheNationalSecurityAgencyscollectionof
Americansphonerecordsavictoryforcivillibertiesadvocatesbuttheimpactislimitedbecause
theprogramisdueformajorchangesbymonthsend.U.S.DistrictCourtJudgeRichardLeonon
MondaysidedwithconservativelegalactivistLarryKlayman,whohadrequestedacourtorderbarringthe
NSAfromcollectingthephonerecordsofsomeofhisclients.TheclientshadsuedtheNSAoverthedata
collectionfollowingrevelationsfromformerNSAcontractorEdwardSnowden.Thiscourtsimplycannot,
andwillnot,allowthegovernmenttotrumptheConstitutionmerelybecauseitsuitstheexigenciesofthe
moment,JudgeLeonwroteinhis43pagedecision.Mr.Klaymancalledthedecisionatremendous
victoryfortheAmericanpeople,andsaidheplanstocontinuefightingthecaseatatrialseeking
monetarydamagesfromthegovernment.LateMonday,theJusticeDepartmentfiledanemergencyrequest
tostaythejudgesdecision,sayingthatthetechnologybehindthesurveillanceissocomplexthatto
immediatelyhaltcollectionononeindividualwouldrequirethemtostopallthecollection.TheNSA
currentlycollectsmillionsofAmericansphonerecordsinordertosearchthemforpossibletiestoterrorists.
Therecordsincludethetime,durationandnumbercalled,butnotthecontentoftheconversations.In
June,Congresspassedalaw
thatwillendthiscollectionoftherecords.InsteadtheNSAwillbe
allowedtosearchthephonecompaniesdatabasesforsuchcallrecords,butonlyifitgetsawarrant.That
changewilltakeeffectonNov.29,andgovernmentlawyershadurgedJudgeLeontoallowtheNSAto
conductatransitiontothenewsystemonitsownschedule.JudgeLeonrejectedthatrequest.Henotedthat
withthecomingchanges,thecasemaymarkthelastchapterinthecurrentfightoverthegovernments
collectionofphonerecords.Buthesaidtheconstitutionalissuespresentedarecrucialones,andthatthe
casewouldntendthedebateoverthegovernmentsuseoftechnologytoconductsurveillance.Although
thiscourtappreciatesthezealousnesswithwhichthegovernmentseekstoprotectthecitizensofournation,
thatsamegovernmentbearsjustasgreataresponsibilitytoprotecttheindividuallibertiesofthosevery
citizens,hewrote.JudgeLeonalsorefusedtostayhisordertoallowtimeforfurtherappeals.However,
therulingaffectsonlysomeoftheplaintiffsinthisparticularcase,sincetheydemonstratedincourt
thattheirrecordswerebeingcollected.Lastmonth,afederalappealscourtinNewYorkruledinthe
oppositedirectiononthesameissue,sayingthephonerecordscollectioncouldcontinue
untilthe
programchangesattheendofNovember.
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Nuclear Terrorism
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Nuclear Terrorism Impact Card

We would retaliate to a terror attack tensions are high
global nuclear war
Virtue & Kegl 15 both journalists in London citing a US economist and
former William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy in the Center for Strategic
and International Studies at Georgetown (Dr. Paul Roberts) and a renowned
American trend forecaster and publisher of an internationally distributed
quarterly Trends Journal (Gerald Celente)
[Rob Virtue & Agnes Kegl, Migrant crisis and Euro tensions threaten to trigger
catastrophic conflict claim experts,
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/607158/World-War-3-Experts-raisefears-migrant-crisis-could-lead-to-catastrophic-scenario]
The scenario - especially the one currently being played out in Serbia and Hungary - is
hauntingly similar to that which triggered the First World War.
The
problem has manifesting itself in central Europe where Hungary is besieged by growing numbers of
refugees passing through from Serbia and Croatia, forcing its government to build fences to stem the
influx. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbn warned European life and its established laws were under
threat from huge numbers of people heading through the continent from war-torn states in the Middle East.
In a defence against criticism of the aggressive stance against refugees taken by the country , he said
yesterday: "Our borders are in danger. Our way of life where we respect the law is in danger. "The whole of
Hungary and Europe is in danger. "The migrants are blitzing us." Hungary and Serbia have constantly been
at each others' throats over the issue, with Budapest urging its non-EU neighbours to do more to help
tackle the growing neighbours migrants. It is now sending troops armed with rubber bullets and tear gas to
Bence, a Hungarian political

journalist for the mandiner.hu website said the situation with growing tensions between nations was
reminiscent of the international scenario from just over 100 years ago. He said: "This is how
the eve of the First World War could have looked like: complete
hesitancy, the termination of the usual channels of diplomacy, the
lack of solidarity, pressure to take a step and the countries issuing
threats to each other are all reminding us of that. It definitely doesn't look like a
the border with Serbia to protect the country's frontier. Pinter
cooperating Europe. "Mr Orban is right in stating that it would only worth to talk about quotas if we can
control the registration of the migrants coming to Europe. And so far no country has any idea how to do
that. "That's what the Hungarian Government has done, though it risks projecting an image of inhumanity."
He said reports of a Croatian train filled with 1,000 migrants illegally entering Hungary last week, could
easily be the sort of act that escalates the currently fraught situation. Politicians in Budapest described the
train's unannounced arrival as a "major, major incident". Mr Pinter said: "What did the Croatian
government think when they sent a train with 40 fully armed police officers on it, crossing the border at a
red signal? In the worse cases an afair like this can lead to an outbreak of a war." The escalating situation
Celente,
who is a trend forecaster in the United States, said the current crisis
draws huge parallels with a previous global conflict - in this case the
Second World War. He blames America's attacks on Libya, Iraq and most recently Syria, for
on the continent has also drawn interest across the Atlantic Ocean. Like Mr Pinter, Gerald
bringing "refugees of war" to Europe. Mr Celente said this is going hand in hand with trade wars, with
China devaluing its currency to gain a global advantage, similar to what happened prior to the Second
World War. Considering the current situation in Syria, where America is bombing president Bashar alAssad's regime while Vladimir Putin's Russia is defending him by attacking ISIS, his warnings are all too
clear. He said: "We're on the march to war. History is repeating itself. "It's a
repeat of the 1930s. The crash of 1929, the Great Depression, currency wars, trade wars, world war.
"We've got the panic of '08, the Great Recession, currency wars, trade wars and now we're seeing the
refugees of war sweeping on the shores of Europe." He said
another big terror attack on
society will see an emotional outpouring across the Western world
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that will then transform into a catastrophic thirst for revenge. Mr

Celente said: "They are leading us to the next great war. All it is going to
take is a terror attack and people will be tying yellow ribbons
around everything that doesn't move, waving American flags and
we're off to what Einstein called the whole war scenario ." US
economist Dr Paul Craig Roberts, who served in the Reagan administration, is another who
predicts doom on the horizon. He spoke at an Occupy Peace event organised by Mr Celente at the weekend
remarked on the impact of a nuclear war under

the currently tense climate, if countries such as Russia and China
are involved. He said the effects would be devastating, as there would
be a "first-strike, pre-emptive force". He added: "Armageddon could be
at hand. "This is chilling. People should be scared to death." Running
about rising tensions. Dr Roberts
alongside the rising tension between global superpowers is the threat emanating from Islamic State. Just
weeks ago Italian prime minister Sergio Mattarella said the seeds of a major conflict were being planted
across the region, with religious-based terrorism at the root of it. Speaking at a meeting of world leaders in
Rimini, he said: "Terrorism, energised by a fanatical belief in God, aims to start a

third world war in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa. Our duty is to stop it.
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India-Pakistan Escalation
Next India-Pakistan crisis escalates, no deterrence
Dr. Qaisar Rashid, November 11, 2015, Daily Times,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/11-Nov-2015/nuclear-threat-in-southasia 11-12-15 Nuclear Threat in South Asia
Thecombinationofsizeofnuclearweaponswiththerangeofmissileshasprecipitatedthenuclear
threatinSouthAsiabetweenitstwonuclearstates,PakistanandIndia.Toelaborate,nuclearweapons
attachedtoshortrangemissilesposeonefacetofthechallengewhereasnuclearweaponsmountedonlong
rangemissilesofferanotherfacetofchallenge;bothchallengesarequiteremovedfromtheambitof
nuclearisationfordeterrencepurposes.OnOctober20,bymakingadeclarationthatithaddeveloped
lowyieldTacticalNuclearWeapons(TNWs)whetherornotattachedtoshortrangemissilesPakistan
mighthavestruggledtoemboldenitssecuritybut,atthesametime,Pakistaninvitedafive
dimensionalrisk.First,bydeclaringtheuseofTNWsagainstIndiasColdStartDoctrine,Pakistan
indicatedloweringthenuclearthresholdagainstIndia.Second,Pakistaninadvertentlyallurednon
stateactors,bothlocalandforeign,tofigureoutthepossibilitiesforprocuring,somehow,TNWs.
Third,Pakistanraisedthefearsoftheconcernedtothinkofapossibilityfornuclearterrorismasan
upgradedversionofthe9/11attackscoupledwiththefactthatPakistanisdeprivedofnonnuclear
proliferationcredentials.Fourth,Pakistaninvitedtheattentionofthecountriesengagedindealingwith
Iran(tomakeIrancapitsnuclearambitionsformilitarypurposes)todealnowwithPakistantoo.Fifth,
PakistanhasincreasedthechancesofitsvulnerabilitytothepreemptiveapplicationofUNSecurity
CouncilResolution1540passedinApril2004:Callingonallstatestorefrainfromsupporting,byany
means,nonstateactorswhoattempttoacquire,use,ortransfernuclearweaponsortheirdeliverysystems.
Pakistanseemstobeoblivioustothreefactsthatrelaytheremaybehighconsequencesforalow
probabilityact.First,throughtheKargilwarof1999,Pakistanhasprovedthatasubconventionalwar(ora
lowintensityconflict)belowthenuclearthresholdcanbepossibleacrosstheLineofControl(LoC)before
athirdpartysuchastheUSconvenesdiplomaticinterventiontodampendownthecrisis.Thedangernow
isthatthisprecedentmaybereplicatedormodifiedbyIndianexttimetointroduceaconflictacrossthe
LoCoreventheinternationalborder.Second,PakistanhastaughtIndiathefutilityofalargescalestand
off(onthepatternofthe1990and20012002crises).Thedangernowisthattheseprecedentscanhelp
Indiamodifyitsstrategynexttimetoachieveitsconflictobjectives.Third,thesubconventionalwarof
Kargilin1999acrosstheLoCandtheasymmetricconflict(orawarofattrition)intheformofthe
Mumbaiattacksin2008(plustheGurdaspurattackin2015)acrosstheinternationalborderwithIndia
haverenderedthetraditionalconceptofnucleardeterrenceobsoleteinSouthAsia.Nevertheless,the
confidenceofPakistan(initsengagementwithIndia)predicatingonasubconventionalwaracrossthe
LoCoralargescaleprolongedmilitarystandoffalongtheinternationalborder(besidestheLoCand
workingboundary)inthehopeofcrisisreductioninducedbythethirdpartysdiplomaticintervention
soonerorlaterwillbefraughtwithrisks.Itisalsoprobablethatthecrisis,inwhateverform,maynot
recedenexttimetothelevelofnormalcyand,instead,assumesanunpredictable,perilousturn
makingitdifficultforanycrisisactivatortoresolveitinanonviolentway.BothPakistanandIndia
seemtoberevelinginfivemajorillusions.First,bothcanbehaveastheUSandtheformerSoviet
Union,thetwonuclearcumsuperpowers,actedduringtheColdWarerabylettingnuclear
deterrencecircumventaconventionalwarbetweenthem.Thispointiswithoutrealisingthefactthat
thetwosuperpowerslockedhornswitheachotheronanideologicalstruggleandnotonterritorial
disputes,whichissomethingthathasintroducedbitternessintoPakIndiarelations.Secondly,both
PakistanandIndiacansustaintheconsequencesofthekindofColdWargoingonbetweenthem.Inits
wake,theColdWarbetweentheUSandtheformerSovietUnionwitnessedoneofthemthelatter
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crumbleintopiecesunderitsownweight.Thirdly,bothPakistanandIndiabelievethatnuclear
deterrenceworkedinthepasttoavoidawarunderthefearofmutuallyassureddestruction(byusing
strategiclargeyieldnuclearweapons)andcanonceagainplaythesamerole.Thispointiswithout
consideringthefactthatbothhaveenteredtheeraofTNWsthatarebothportableandhandy.
Fourth,bothPakistanandIndiacancontinuebankingonthethirdpartysdiplomaticintervention
toreducethenearwarcrisisbetweenthem,astheUShasdoneeverytimeinthepast,andthesamecan
happenagaindispassionately.Thispointiswithoutrealisingthefactthat,since1999,theUShasmoved
nearertoIndiaandfartherfromPakistan.ThemajorhindrancetotheestrangementbetweenPakistanand
theUSistheongoingwaronterrorsecondedbytheengagementofUSforcesinAfghanistan.TheUS
prefersnottoannoyPakistanatthistime.Fifth,bothPakistanandIndiathinkthattheirtheoreticalnuclear
principles,strategiesanddoctrinesareequallyworkablepractically.Thisisdespitethefactthatneitherof
themtestedtheseparadigmsontheground,astherehastakenplacenonuclearwarbetweenthem.
Computerbasedsimulationsarenotanalternativeforaphysicalbattleground.
SouthAsiahastranscendedthelimitsofpossessingnuclearweaponsfordeterrencepurposes,thereby
makingtheconceptofnuclearisationfordeterrencepurposesdeadandrenderingtheconceptofminimal
credibleorcredibleminimaldeterrenceoutdated.Theaddedpressureisexertedbytheabsenceofany
treatyagreeingonnofirstnuclearstrikeagainsttheother.Furthermore,withtheloweringofthenuclear
threshold,thechancesofabruptoraccidentalescalationofanuclearwarhaveincreasedmanifoldbetween
PakistanandIndia.Unfortunately,inPakistan,thereisavailablenointernalhandletoturnoffthenuclear
menace.
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A2: ISIS Wont Use Nukes

ISIS seeking mass killing, will use nukes if they can get
them
I have dedicated most of my professional life to reducing and eliminating the
nuclear threats to our country and our planet. They are horrifying enough
without any exaggeration. The Islamic State has repeatedly demonstrated its
barbarity, including its willingness to use chemical weapons against civilian
targets. There should be no question that if given the means and opportunity,
they would do the same with nuclear or radiological weapons. That is nothing
to scof at. And the threat is only growing worse.
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A2: No Dirty Bomb Attacks Yet

This doesnt mean there wont be dirty bomb attacks in
the future
Joe Cirincione & Jef Wilson, November 10, 2015, War on the Rocks, Why I
fear the dirty bomb and you should too,
http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/why-i-fear-the-dirty-bomb-and-you-shouldtoo/ DOA: 11-11-15
Thatisanunacceptablecosttopay.MauronisaysthatYes,therearehundredsofcasesoflostorstolen
radioactivematerialeveryyear,thoughoverwhelminglynothighlyenricheduraniumorplutonium.And
yettherehasneverbeenadetonateddirtybombinhistory.Ever.Simplybecausesomethingterriblehas
nothappeneddoesnotmeanthatitcannotorwillnothappen.Thisisthefallacyofusingpast
performancetopredictfuturebehavior;everystockbrokerwarnsyouaboutdoingthis.Aspace
shuttlehadneverblownup,beforeonedid.Atsunamihadneverstruckanuclearpowerplant,until
onedid.Aterroristgrouphadneverflownplanesintoofficetowers,untilonedid.
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Dirty Bomb Economy Impacts

A dirty bomb in New York would destroy the global
economy
Itactuallycouldbeworse.Imaginewhatwouldhappentothe world economyifadirtybombwentoff
onWallStreet.A2006studypublishedbytheNavalPostgraduateSchooldoes.Init,formerDeputyChief
oftheFireDepartmentofNewYorkJohnSudnikwritesthat:Anylargescaleattackcouldreasonablybe
expectedtoinvolvetheFinancialDistrictinlowerManhattan.Withhundredsoffinancialfirms
encompassingallaspectsoftheindustry,itisarguablythemostvaluablenodeoftheAmericaneconomy
worthprotecting.Onanygivenbusinessday,afewhundredthousandemployeesinhabitarelativelysmall
cavernous,highrisebuildingareaoflessthanonesquaremile.Thisareahaspreviouslybeentherecipient
oftworelativelycatastrophicattacks;anditremainsanextremelysusceptibletargetforyetanother,more
cataclysmic,strike.Hegoesontoestimate:Theaftereffectsof9/11haveproventhatanattackonthis
sectorwillreverberatethroughtheentireU.S.economy.[An]attackinwhich40cityblocksinLower
ManhattanarecontaminatedbeyondEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)guidelineswould
undoubtedlycripplethelocalandregionaleconomies.Ifsuchaneventweretotakeplaceintheareasof
LowerorMidtownManhattan,utterdevastationwouldbeofferedontheentireNYCmetropolitanarea.
Hence,itisentirelyappropriatetoconsideraradiologicalattackatanyoneoftheselocationsaweaponof
massdestructionevent[andwhileitis]difficulttoquantifytheexactamountofeconomicdamage
likelytobeincurredlossesresultingfromanRDDattackintheareaoftheNewYorkStockExchange
couldactuallyreach$1trillion.
A dirty bomb would shut-down DC

Forthosewhoneedarefresher,accordingtotheUnitedStatesNuclearRegulatoryCommission,adirty
bombisonetypeofaradiologicaldispersaldevice(RDD)thatcombinesconventionalexplosives,suchas
dynamite,withradioactivematerial.Adirtybombwouldnotproduceanuclearexplosionlikethoseat
HiroshimaorNagasaki.Few,ifany,peoplewoulddieinadirtybombattack.Onlythoseclosetothe
conventionalexplosionwouldbeimmediatelyharmed.Buttheradioactivemateriallacedwithinthebomb
wouldbespreaddozensofblocksorevenmilesfromtheexplosion,dependingonthesizeofthebomband
theradiologicalmaterialused.
IndeedastheNuclearRegulatoryCommissionsays,adirtybombisnotaWeaponofMassDestruction
butaWeaponofMassDisruption,wherecontaminationandanxietyaretheterroristsmajorobjectives.
Thisisatrueterroristweaponthatwouldspreadthroughoutacityapotentfearthatexposurewouldcause
cancer,birthdefectsorheavymetalpoisoningovertheyears.Thinkofitasifsomebodysprayedasbestos
inyourapartmentbuilding.Noonewoulddieandyoucouldgoinandout,butnobodywouldforfearof
exposingthemselvestocancercausingagents.
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Mauronicallsthisfearirrational,andsaysthatmyclaimofradioactivecontaminationcausingan
affectedcitycentertoshutdownisridiculous.Heelaborates,sayingthat
WhatCirincionemeans(butdoesntsay)isthatpublicofficials,panickingbecauseoftheperceptionof
radioactivedispersalintheircity,willordertheevacuationofpeoplefromthecontaminatedareatoinclude
ahealthybufferareafurtherout,notbecauseoftheactualpublichealthriskofafewmillicuriesof
radiationexposureeveryday,butbecausetheydontwanttobefiredasaresultofnotbeingreactive
enough.
DowntownWashingtonisasmallpieceofrealestate.Infact,allthreebranchesofthefederalgovernment
areonlyabouttwomilesapartfromoneanother.DoesMauronireallythinkthatifsomeoneweretosetoff
adirtybombsomewhereonPennsylvaniaAvenue,thefederalgovernmentwouldcontinuetofunction?
IfIfoundoutthatadirtybombhadexplodedontheNationalMall,andthatmyofficewasahalfmile
awayandthewindwasblowingawayfromme,wouldIstayatwork?Noway.Andneither,Iwouldbet,
wouldMauronievenknowingagreatdealaboutthelimitationsofsuchadevice.Certainlynooneelse
inthecitywouldstayinplace,calmlycontinuingtowork.Thecitywouldbeinamasspanic.Irrational?
Maybe.Butveryrealterrorwouldgripthecity.
Thiswouldnotimpactjusttheuninformedpublic,anditwouldnotbeoverinjustoneday.Ifevena
smalldirtybombattackdosedtheU.S.Capitol,SupremeCourt,orHouseorSenateofficebuildingswith
cesium(whichbondswithcementbytheway),wouldanyofthethousandsoflegislativeorjudicialstaffers
whokeepthegovernmentrunningreallycomebacktowork?IrememberwhentheRayburnHouseOffice
BuildingwaswrappedinplasticandworkersinHAZMATmoonsuitsworkedfordaysafterananthrax
scarein2001.
A dirty bomb would shut-down LA ports, destroying the

economy
Thisisnotjustmyspeculation.A2007studybytheCenterforRiskandEconomicAnalysisofTerrorism
Events(CREATE)attheUniversityofSouthernCaliforniaanalyzedtheimpactofadirtybombattackon
thePortofLosAngelesandLongBeach.Whilehumancasualtieswouldlikelybelow,thestudy
concluded:
OneofthemajorconcernsaboutthedirtybombthreattotheportsofLosAngelesandLongBeachisthe
potentialforanextendedshutdownoftheregionsoperations.Whileitisveryhardtopredicthowlongthe
portswouldbeinoperableitisunderstoodthatlargeareasoftheportswouldbesubjectedtoshort,
medium,orevenlongtermclosuresbecauseof:concernsofdockworkersaboutreturningtowork,
concernsofshippersaboutdeliveringgoodstotheharbors,[and]extensiveproceduresrelatedto
decontaminationactivities.
ThecontinuedshutdownofthePortofLosAngeleswouldbeeconomicallydevastating.Thereportgoes
on:
Severalshutdownscenarioswereanalyzed,rangingfromshort(15days)tomedium(120days)tolong
(oneyear).The15dayshutdownhasasmallimpact(about$300million)becausemostshipswould
simplywaitouttheportclosuresandbusinesseswouldbesuppliedthroughotherports.The120dayand
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oneyearshutdowns,incontrast,havesignificantimpacts($63and$252billion,respectively)becausethey
accountfortheeconomicimpactsofadelayofdeliveringgoodsaswellasallrippleeffectsthroughoutthe
nationseconomythatsuchlongtermdelaysinvolve.Thisincludescostsrangingfromthelossoflocal
dockworkerjobstothereducedincomeandpossibleforcedclosureofnationwidebusinessesnotreceiving
necessarypartsorretailproducts.
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Cloud Computing Advantage &

Answers
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Cloud Computing Advantage Link

US surveillance undermines the cloud computing industry
Daniel Severson, Summer 2015, Harvard International Law Journal,
http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/562Severson.pdf American
Surveillance of Non-US Persons: Why New Privacy Protections Ofer Only
Cosmetic Change, DOA: 11-13-15 Severson -- J.D. 2016; Harvard Kennedy School,
M.P.P. 2016. Daniel Severson served as a Harvard Presidential Public Service Fellow at the U.S.
Department of Defense, and a Council of American Ambassadors Fellow at the U.S. Department
of State
A. Economic Costs
By some estimates, U.S. companies stand to lose billions of dollars from
consumers choosing non-U.S. technology service providers that they perceive
as less vulnerable to U.S. surveillance. In July 2013, a month after the
Snowden disclosures, a Cloud Security Alliance survey found that 66% of nonU.S. members reported that they had either canceled a project with or were
less likely to use U.S.-based cloud service providers. n132 Analysts estimated
that the U.S. cloud computing industry could lose between $ 35 billion and $
180 billion. n133 A January 2014 survey suggests these predictions may
already be playing out: 25% of 300 British and Canadian businesses surveyed
indicated that they were moving their data outside of the United States. n134
One Washington, D.C.-based privacy lawyer warns that American companies
are "taking a beating in the market place" as a result of perceived
discrepancies in privacy protections. n135 In anticipating that countries will
develop stricter domestic privacy regulations and data-localization laws, the
Information Technology and Innovation Fund predicts that growth in the U.S.
technology-services industry could slow by as much as four percent.
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A2: Cloud Computing Advantage

Their impact assumes an industry collapse and
surveillance only slows the industry down by 4%
of State
One Washington, D.C.-based privacy lawyer warns that American companies

are "taking a beating in the market place" as a result of perceived
discrepancies in privacy protections. n135 In anticipating that countries will
develop stricter domestic privacy regulations and data-localization laws, the
Information Technology and Innovation Fund predicts that growth in the U.S.
technology-services industry could slow by as much as four percent.
Its exaggerated, impacts never occurred

of State, p. 488-9
First, the economic costs may be exaggerated. Whether high-tech business

leaders, lawyers, journalists, or consultants, each party has an interest in
exaggerating the damage from electronic surveillance in order to bolster
sales, readers, or the attention of lawmakers. Exaggeration is possible. In the
context of cybercrime, computer security companies claimed that the
economic cost from intellectual property theft was high--as much as $ 1
trillion. n142 These estimates may have been exaggerated, however,
because the assessments relied on self-reported figures and because the
computer security companies had an incentive to portray a more dangerous
threat environment to drive business.
Second, some of the most dramatic economic concerns have failed to
materialize. Take data localization, for instance. Roughly speaking, data
localization laws require companies to store citizens' data within a country's
borders. n144 Such initiatives are not new. China, Iran, and Russia have
imposed policies that require all citizen data to remain in-country. n145
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Snowden's unauthorized disclosures prompted democratic governments like

Brazil to pursue these expansive policies, as well. n146 However, Brazil
ultimately dropped a data localization requirement from its Internet reform
bill. n147 Building data centers has turned out to be expensive and
complicated. Analysts have also argued that such data localization may
actually reduce privacy because data held ofshore and outside of U.S. firms
would be less secure and would result in lower legal hurdles for NSA
collection. n148 Besides data localization, some observers also worried that
suspicion about the integrity of U.S. technology firms in the wake of the
Snowden revelations would cost these companies, n149 but stock prices for
companies like Facebook and Cisco have not sufered.
We absorb economic costs all the time

of State
p. 488-9
Fourth, the U.S. government may view the economic costs as tolerable. One
recent study attempted to quantify the annual costs of cyber crime and cyber
espionage by analogizing them to the costs of doing business in other
industries. The report noted that car crashes, maritime piracy, and pilferage
of sales inventory each cost society roughly one percent of national income
per year. n151 Despite these costs, we continue to drive cars, use giant
merchant ships, and sell goods because these activities provide aggregate
benefits in efficiency and convenience. The U.S. government may have made
a similar calculation: although surveillance may cost U.S. firms, such costs
are acceptable in light of the benefits to national security, whether that
means information to combat international terrorism or strategic intelligence
to inform foreign policy. The costs may even be more tolerable than other
accepted costs. For instance, automobile accidents cost the United States
between $ 99 billion to $ 168 billion per year, or between 0.7% and 1.2% of
GDP, a cost we are willing to accept because of the benefits such
transportation provides. n152 By contrast, estimates indicate NSA
surveillance costs U.S. cloud computing firms (a major sector of the U.S.
economy) less--between $ 17.5 billion and $ 90 billion over two years (20142016). n153 While these cost figures are not entirely comparable, they
suggest that the government may have reason to consider the costs to
society as acceptable.
Its a sunk cost
Millennial Debate
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of State, p. 490
Fifth, it is possible that the damage is done, and that further government
action will not help U.S. firms in a meaningful way. In this sense, Snowden's
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive documents may have created a one-time
sunk cost. If this is true, then the economic cost is unavoidable but should not
afect future decision-making.
Millennial Debate
Genetic Surveillance Neg
22
Millennial Debate
23
Genetic Surveillance Solvency Answers

Cant solve most genetic surveillance is state and local,
outside of federal influence
Jason Kreag, Associate Professor, University of Arizona, October 2015, Boston
University Law Review, Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic
Surveillance, http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2015/10/KREAG.pdf DOA:
11-12-15, p. 1492
The past five years have seen a dramatic and, until now, wholly unexamined
splintering of genetic surveillance by law enforcement. Investigators have
shifted from using the FBI's centralized, national DNA database network to a
growing number of unregulated local databases. n1 These databases operate
outside of federal laws and rules that govern law enforcement's use of the
FBI's national DNA database network. As a result of this regulatory void,
police departments have pushed the boundaries of genetic surveillance,
using it in ways not previously permitted. n2 The aggressive use of local
databases has helped police to increase clearance rates and decrease crime
rates. n3 But the story is not all positive. The expansion of this surveillance
tool at the local level has unleashed significant negative forces that threaten
privacy and dignity interests, exacerbate racial inequities in the criminal
justice system, and undermine the legitimacy of law enforcement.
Even state laws cant control it, and its free from federal
law
11-12-15, p. 1493
This Article makes three claims. First, cutting-edge genetic surveillance
issues are playing out on the local level, free from federal regulation and
often in the absence of state or local laws. n4 Second, this Article responds to
Professor Rachel Harmon's challenge to scholars to help law enforcement
establish "harm-efficient policing" practices by identifying and measuring
external harms generated by policing that are not captured by law
enforcement's narrow focus on solving crime.
Local databases free from CODIS

11-12-15, p. 1494
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The expansion of locally-controlled DNA databases follows two decades of

federal oversight of law enforcement's use of genetic surveillance. Since
1994, when Congress authorized the creation of a national network of DNA
databases commonly referred to as CODIS, n7 the FBI has overseen what has
become one of the largest genetic surveillance tools in the world. n8 CODIS
includes DNA profiles from over 14.3 million known individuals and from over
625,000 crime scene samples. n9 It has been built with millions of dollars of
federal funding, n10 and law enforcement officials and politicians routinely
advocate for its expansion. n11 CODIS has survived every legal challenge it
has faced. n12 And it has delivered many law enforcement victories. n13
Nonetheless, many local agencies have turned away from CODIS to establish
their own local databases. n14
Local databases worse than CODIS

11-12-15, p. 1494
The external harms of local databases arise from the gulf between how law
enforcement is permitted to use CODIS and the wild west of genetic
surveillance practices currently permitted with local databases. n23 For
example, like CODIS, local databases include genetic profiles from convicted
individuals and arrestees. However, local databases also often include
genetic profiles of suspects (including juvenile suspects), witnesses, crime
victims, family members of victims, and citizens who responded to police
DNA dragnets, which sometimes follow violent, unsolved crimes.
Furthermore, local agencies are free to search these databases however they
see fit, unconstrained by the limitations governing CODIS adopted by
Congress n24 and the additional regulations the FBI promulgated for CODIS.
n25 As a result, local databases amplify some of the same external harms
generated by CODIS while simultaneously generating new ones.
Local databases targeted at people of color

11-12-15, p. 1497
These harms include exacerbating racial inequities, threatening privacy and
dignity interests, and undermining the legitimacy of law enforcement. While
local databases have the potential to mitigate some of the racial inequities in
the criminal justice system by replacing police reliance on intuition and
hunches with more reliable investigative leads based on DNA evidence, n26
local databases increase distributional inequities because local police have
Millennial Debate
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total discretion about who to target for inclusion in these databases. This has
resulted in police seeking out the "usual suspects" - poor people of color - to
secure DNA samples for these databases.
Local databases trigger all the harms

11-12-15, p. 1497
These databases threaten privacy and dignity interests in several ways. With
respect to privacy, they increase surveillance on innocent, law-abiding
citizens, expand the use of familial DNA searching, and have the potential to
limit self-expression and self-determination for targeted individuals. n28
Furthermore, they impose dignity costs in the short and long term. Immediate
indignity and stigma accompany being stopped by police in public to provide
a DNA sample. n29 And there is the long-term dignity cost when these stops
communicate that someone needs to be watched - not because he or she
was arrested or convicted, but based on law enforcement's belief that he or
she will be a future criminal. Collectively, these costs carry the potential to
undermine the legitimacy of law enforcement.
Local databases operate outside of federal control

11-12-15, p. 1498-9
As local agencies circumvent the federal regulations that govern CODIS by
creating their own databases, legislatures and courts have remained aloof,
allowing these databases to evolve with little oversight. However, the
external costs generated by local databases demonstrate the need for
regulation. The current reliance on self-regulation is not sufficient. Law
enforcement's success is commonly measured by a narrow focus on crime
rates and clearance rates. As a result, police chiefs lack incentives to identify
and measure external costs of surveillance practices. n31 Current external
regulations of genetic surveillance are also insufficient. The vast majority of
local databases operate outside of federal and state statutory regulations.
n32 Furthermore, these databases operate largely beyond the reach of the
Fourth Amendment because of their extensive reliance on obtaining DNA
samples by consent or from abandoned DNA. n33 This freedom from
regulation was welcomed by early adopters of local databases. It was a
driving force behind their creation. n34 However, even proponents of local
databases recognize the value in embracing some external regulation.
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Local agencies dont even use CODIS

11-12-15, p. 1501-2
Early adopters of local DNA databases have pointed to two reasons why
CODIS does not adequately meet their needs. First, they argue that the
CODIS authorizing statute and the FBI's regulations for its use are too
restrictive, preventing law enforcement from performing certain searches and
from including DNA profiles from certain individuals in CODIS. n44 Second,
they argue that because much of CODIS's growth is the result of adding DNA
profiles from known violent ofenders who are often serving lengthy prison
sentences, CODIS remains an inefective crime-solving tool.
The FBI has adopted an extensive regulatory scheme for CODIS, n45 and it
regularly audits participating public crime laboratories to ensure compliance.
n46 These regulations are designed to ensure the database is reliable and
secured. n47 For example, the FBI will only allow the inclusion and search of
DNA profiles if the profiles were processed by public DNA laboratories that are
a part of the CODIS network. n48 Second, federal regulations prohibit
inclusion in CODIS of many types of partial DNA profiles, n49 and limit law
enforcement's ability to compare a partial profile to the other profiles in
CODIS. n50 Third, the process of confirming a match in CODIS can take up to
one month, n51 and this is in addition to the six to twelve months often
needed for the actual DNA processing at CODIS-participating laboratories.
n52 Fourth, federal regulations require the removal of profiles from CODIS if a
convicted ofender's conviction is overturned, or, in the case of an arrestee, if
the charges are dismissed. n53 Finally, as a result of its emphasis on building
a database of convicted ofenders and arrestees, the FBI's regulations
prohibit the inclusion of DNA profiles from individuals, including suspects,
who provide law enforcement with consensual DNA samples. n54
Local DNA databases dont have to comply with federal

regulations
11-12-15, p. 1503
Local DNA databases are not required to comply with any of these federal
regulations. For example, they are free to include consensual DNA samples
from people deemed merely suspicious, victims, victims' family members,
and witnesses. These consensual samples have driven the growth of local
databases. n55 Local DNA databases are also built with DNA processing from
private laboratories. n56 Furthermore, local law enforcement is free to set its
own protocols for including and searching partial DNA profiles in their
Millennial Debate
27
databases and for expunging DNA records. n57 Adopters argue that local
databases are more efficient, providing hit confirmations within days of
submitting DNA samples to the laboratory as opposed to taking six months to
a year, which is common when dealing with CODIS. n58
Local DNA databases lead to disproportionate surveillance

of people of color
11-12-15, p. 1526-7
Despite these possible mitigating factors, there are several potential negative
implications for people of color that may result from the expansion of local
databases. Scholars have focused on how CODIS disproportionately monitors
poor people and people of color. n197 They have also observed how police
surveillance techniques, in general, often impose costs on people who
possess the least social and political power. n198 For example, in analyzing
the protections the Fourth Amendment provides, Professor Stuntz concluded:
The problem is not just that the police may tend to be more careful when
searching middle-class homeowners than residents of poor city
neighborhoods. The larger problem is that the police may be more likely to
search the latter because the law protects the former so well. And because
such a large portion of defendants come from poor city neighborhoods,
legislatures, prosecutors, and judges may find it easier to imprison ever more
of them. n199
A similar dynamic will likely result from law enforcement's use of local
databases.
The racial disparities that result from the use of local databases are driven
both by the same factors that drive the racial disparities in CODIS, n200 and
by other factors unique to local databases. The factors that contribute to the
disparities in CODIS are well documented. n201 For example, in opposing
eforts to include DNA profiles from arrestees in CODIS, Professors Erin
Murphy and Brandon Garrett argued that because of the "racial disparities in
arrest rates" such a practice "will mean including disproportionate amounts of
genetic information from African-Americans and Hispanics as compared to
other groups." n202
The factors unique to local databases have not received the same attention.
For example, the inclusion of DNA profiles from suspects, not just those
arrested or convicted of crimes, gives local law enforcement officials
tremendous discretion in building their local databases. As this discretion
grows, the likelihood that negative stereotypes will play a prominent role in
these databases increases. n203 The concern that discretion can lead to
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28
racial imbalances in local databases is not just a theoretical concern. John

Blackledge, the architect of Palm Bay's database, advises law enforcement
agencies seeking to develop local databases to start by collecting samples
from any and all individuals who police suspect are involved in criminal
activity. n204 This does not necessarily imply that local DNA databases will
be populated in a racially disproportionate manner. However, if the starting
point for building them is individual officers targeting people they suspect are
involved in criminal activity, it is likely that these officers will
disproportionately turn to the "usual suspects," which overwhelmingly include
poor people and people of color. n205
SmallPond's business model relies on a similar assumption about the ability
of police to successfully target segments of the local population from whom
to collect DNA samples. To make the case to potential new clients that a local
database can provide quick results even if an agency starts with zero profiles,
SmallPond hired a former police officer as its salesperson. n206 His argument
to new clients is that local police "basically know who's committing the
crimes. It is a small percentage of the population that commits the majority
of the burglaries." n207 With that knowledge, the argument goes, local police
can secure consensual or abandoned DNA samples from those individuals,
which in turn will start to generate database hits quickly. Left unstated is how
the police "know" who is committing the crimes, and it is in that unstated
assumption where prejudices and stereotypes lurk.
Local DNA databases threaten privacy

11-12-15, p. 1529-30
Given how law enforcement uses local databases, the expansion of this
surveillance tool also represents a new threat to privacy diferent in degree
and scope from the burden on privacy CODIS generates. It is diferent in
scope because these databases will expand the portion of the population
under surveillance. n208 It is diferent in degree because those individuals
who have already faced the burdens of other police surveillance techniques
- stop-and-frisk or other informal police-citizen encounters - will now be asked
to provide consensual DNA samples, allowing law enforcement to reach even
deeper into their lives. n209 This Section identifies and analyzes the privacy
intrusions local databases raise.
One result of the expansion of local databases is that there will be increased
surveillance of innocent people - individuals who have not committed a
crime and who will most likely not commit crimes in the future. This is so
because many local databases include profiles not just from arrestees and
convicted individuals, but from victims, witnesses, and any person law
enforcement targets who consents to providing a sample. n210 Undoubtedly,
some of these individuals will ultimately be linked to a past or future crime.
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29
Yet, the majority of these individuals will never be the subject of a DNA hit.
Furthermore, if law enforcement's use of local databases follows the patterns
of other surveillance techniques, people of color will disproportionately feel
this increased surveillance of innocent people. n211
Scholars have criticized over-inclusive surveillance techniques that scoop up
large numbers of innocent people in order to identify the few actual
ofenders. n212 Some scholars have proposed theoretical schemes to limit
police activities that are over-inclusive in order to curb the harms borne by
innocent people. n213 However, these schemes are in tension with the very
premise of local databases. These databases are designed with the
assumption that they will ultimately include a large number of DNA profiles
from people who will never be linked to a crime. Law enforcement officials
accept this outcome in exchange for the better odds that a larger database
will yield more hits to actual perpetrators. n214
Some will argue that there is no, or at best only a very small, privacy
deprivation that results from adding DNA profiles of innocent, law-abiding
people to local databases, concluding that because these people will not
commit crimes in the future their privacy interests are not diminished. For a
variety of reasons, I disagree. First, DNA matches in local DNA databases will
not only identify potential perpetrators of criminal activity, they also have the
potential to highlight innocent, but highly personal and/or embarrassing
information. n215 For example, the use of familial searches, a common
practice for local databases, has the potential to identify previously unknown
biological relationships. n216 Similarly, when police arrive at the scene of a
burglary and ask the victim and her family to provide DNA samples for
elimination purposes, the victim might be forced to tell the police that she
was having an afair, and with whom she was having an afair, so as to
eliminate the possibility that her afair partner is accused of the burglary.
In addition, there is the risk that awareness of one's DNA profile being
included in a local database will alter behavior and limit self-expression. To be
certain, altering behavior is one of the stated goals of DNA databases and all
police surveillance activities. n218 Proponents and courts emphasize the
ability of DNA databases to deter crime. n219 However, like other
surveillance techniques, genetic surveillance carries the potential to alter
innocent behavior, curb unpopular behavior, and limit political and
associational freedom. In the summer of 2012, the NYPD's use of its local
database during the Occupy Wall Street protests demonstrated how genetic
surveillance can chill political activity. n220 The NYPD collected DNA from a
chain that it believed protestors used, and it quickly compared the DNA to
profiles from other unsolved crimes in the NYPD database. n221 When the
profile from the chain matched to an unsolved murder, the news linking an
Occupy Protester to a prior murder quickly gripped the national media. n222
However, almost as quickly as the sensational story broke, the NYPD
admitted that the purported match was the result of a lab error. n223 The
aggressive use of DNA analysis at the scene of one of the protests and the
fact that the purported link to a murder was leaked so quickly prompted
criticism of the NYPD's practices. Professor David Kaye explained:
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30
What's interesting is taking [the DNA] from a chain that so many people could
have touched and then running that through the database of crime-scene
samples ... . I guess that's creative. They're either very committed to finding
clues, no matter how weak, or they're out to get a group of people. n224
In addition to chilling political expression, the expansion of genetic
surveillance carries the potential for more insidious invasions of privacy.
Professor Kimberly Bailey has characterized how ongoing and comprehensive
police surveillance "has a chilling efect on poor people of color's selfdetermination, self-expression, and freedom of association." n225 In more
concrete terms, the expansion of genetic surveillance will afect routine daily
decisions, such as whether to spend time outside with friends and which
route to take to school or work so as to minimize the opportunity for an
unwelcome encounter with the police.
Local databases also present new privacy threats because they promise to
expand the use of familial DNA searches. n227 Such searches, which are
performed after law enforcement fail to find an exact match to a known
individual, ofer law enforcement the fallback of trying to identify a family
member of the actual perpetrator. n228 Armed with the identification of a
family member, law enforcement can pursue the family member to identify
the actual source of the crime-scene DNA. Currently, CODIS restricts law
enforcement's use of familial searches. n229 Many states have also adopted
laws prohibiting such searches. n230 However, in the states where
lawmakers have remained silent on this issue, local databases have the
capability of performing familial searches. n231 Indeed, the ability to perform
familial searching is one of the reasons why the Arizona Department of Public
Safety developed its non-CODIS database.
The expansion of local DNA databases also brings into sharper focus the fears
many privacy advocates raised about CODIS. In short, they feared that once
the FBI's DNA database was created, it would be too tempting for law
enforcement to be able to limit its use, causing the tool to evolve and reach
deeper into our lives. n233 CODIS's growth demonstrates the merit of these
fears. CODIS expanded from an initial focus on collecting profiles from
ofenders convicted of certain violent crimes, to including all felony ofenders,
to now including all arrestees. n234 Similarly, after first prohibiting familial
searches, CODIS now permits them in certain circumstances. n235 These
advocates also fear what might come next, when technology allows us to
glean even more information from an individual's DNA sample. n236 They are
particularly fearful of the possibility that law enforcement might use genetic
samples to attempt to identify a genetic predisposition to crime. n237
Finally, the expansion of local databases will contribute further to the erosion
of privacy protections, to the extent that people come to expect increased
surveillance. Fourth Amendment privacy protection is linked to society's
reasonable expectations of privacy. n238 As many have noted, this standard
is fluid, but it has historically moved in the direction of society accepting
lesser privacy protections. Law enforcement's expansion of genetic
Millennial Debate
31
surveillance has contributed to this trend, and the trend will continue as it
becomes routine for even small agencies to build local databases.
Local DNA databases threaten dignity

11-12-15, p. 1533-4
The expansion of local databases raises important issues about individuals'
dignity interests and what role, if any, policing practices should play in
respecting these interests. The view of many officials who promote local
databases is that the databases promote dignity interests - chiefly through
helping to ensure personal safety and protecting our property by efficiently
identifying criminals. n239 This is true, but it is only a partial truth. What has
not been explored and fully considered are the dignity interests of those
targeted for inclusion in the database. n240 To the extent that these
databases are disproportionately composed of people from socioeconomically
marginalized groups, it is not surprising that officials have not considered
these dignity interests. n241 This Section aims to remedy that shortcoming.
The specific threat to dignity interests that local databases raise exists on two
levels - one immediate and the other less direct, though perhaps more
damaging and lasting. First, there is the immediate indignity in the police
publicly stopping a person and asking him or her to consent to providing a
buccal swab. In that moment, despite law enforcement's attempt to ensure
that it only collects DNA samples through consent, police exert significant
power over the targeted citizen. n242 Furthermore, the stop itself can signal
to others that the targeted citizen is someone the police view as a potential
threat, and this signal can carry a lasting stigma in society. n243 While the
stigma of law enforcement publicly identifying a person as a criminal suspect
exists in many police-citizen encounters - e.g., any arrest - the efect of this
stigma is arguably worse in the context of local DNA databases, because law
enforcement officials often seek consensual samples from individuals who
have not been arrested, convicted, or even implicated in any specific crime.
Rather, police target individuals based on a diferent, less articulable, and
lower, level of suspicion.
The second dignity interest local databases undermine is both more serious
and more difficult to measure. It has to do with the implicit (or sometimes
explicit) message a police officer sends when she requests a consensual
sample for inclusion in a local database. The message is not, "we are all in
this together. We are gathering everyone's DNA." Rather, the message is, "I
identified you as a potential future criminal. We need your DNA on file,
forever, to be able to catch you when you most assuredly act on your criminal
instincts." Even if our ability to predict future criminal behavior improves
dramatically, this message carries the potential for perverse and lasting
efects on citizens targeted by police. n244
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32
Importantly, this message can also negatively impact the habits of police.
Professor David Sklansky has observed this in the context of officers who
repeatedly invade citizens' privacy interests, a prospect that seems quite
applicable to the populating of local databases. n245 Professor Sklansky
theorizes: Privacy violations are harmful not solely because of their efects on
the victims, but also, and maybe mostly, because of the habits and ways of
thinking they engrain in the violators... . [Such violations] can train
individuals and organizations in habits of dehumanization and
depersonalization. n246
Scholars have criticized other aspects of the criminal justice system that
cause similar harms in identifying the potential wrongdoer as someone with
reduced dignity interests. n247 For example, in the parole context, Professor
Cecelia Klingele warns that our system reinforces divisive assumptions that
those implicated in the criminal justice system are inherently diferent and,
perhaps, less human than people who have not been arrested or convicted.
The expanded use of local DNA databases carries the potential to do the
same thing.
Existing regulation of local DNA databases is not sufficient

11-12-15, p. 1543-4
Having argued for the need for external regulation of local databases, it is
necessary to explore who is capable of regulating this tool and whether
existing external regulations are sufficient. This Section demonstrates that
Congress and courts have been integral in regulating CODIS, however these
regulations do not reach local databases. Thus, new regulations are needed.
There is a significant debate among scholars and in the courts about which
regulatory body - legislatures or courts - is more capable of regulating police
surveillance techniques, particularly when the techniques involve evolving
technology. Some advocate for courts to be the main source of regulation.
Others emphasize the virtues of legislative regulation. n292 And still others
recommend a hybrid approach. n293 Notably, CODIS is regulated through an
"interbranch dialogue," n294 relying on self-imposed limits adopted by the
FBI, n295 federal statutes, n296 and the Supreme Court. n297 In contrast to
the comparatively extensive regulation of CODIS, local databases have
generated very few regulations. n298 And constitutional provisions, including
the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, do not reach law
enforcement's use of local databases in most instances.
Millennial Debate
Genetic Surveillance Aff
33
Millennial Debate
34
Genetic Surveillance Solvency --- A2:

State/Local
States and locals depend on federal funds
11-12-15, p. 1505-6
Because local, non-CODIS databases are in some ways duplicative of CODIS,
it is reasonable to presume that even if these databases had strong support
from law enforcement officials, their expansion would be limited by costconscious local government officials not eager to fund them. This has not
been the case, in part, because some local databases have been supported
by federal, not local funds. n68 It is ironic that after allocating such a
significant amount of money to develop CODIS, n69 the federal government
is funding non-CODIS databases that are at least potential rivals to the CODIS
network. n70 More importantly, federal funding has allowed local agencies to
bypass the local budget process and the limitations it imposes on other law
enforcement surveillance techniques.
The primary sources of federal funding for local DNA databases are the
federal forfeiture laws that return money to local law enforcement officials in
exchange for their participation in federal task forces. n72 These laws allow
the Department of Justice to share the proceeds of seized property with local
agencies that "participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the
property." n73 Local law enforcement agencies have come to depend on this
revenue stream, n74 and it has been crucial to the evolution of local DNA
databases. For example, resources from federal forfeiture laws fully fund the
local database in Bensalem Township, and local officials view this as a reliable
source of funds for the foreseeable future. n75 Without this revenue stream,
it is unlikely that local databases would have developed as quickly as they
have.
Millennial Debate
General Privacy/Surveillance
35
Millennial Debate
36
General Privacy Solvency Answers

Government restrictions on its own surveillance doesnt
stop the government from buying the information
11-12-15, p. 1520-1
Current Fourth Amendment doctrine - in particular the principles of the thirdparty doctrine n163 - allows law enforcement to benefit from the vast amount
of information the public voluntarily shares with private companies. n164 This
has led some scholars to conclude that law enforcement will respond by
altering their surveillance practices. Professor Paul Ohm predicts that "as the
surveillance society expands, the police will learn to rely more on the
products of private surveillance, and will shift their time, energy, and money
away from traditional self-help policing, becoming passive consumers rather
than active producers of surveillance." n165 Professor Ohm's instincts are
correct about certain types of surveillance activities. It seems likely that
police will be inclined to use information amassed by private sources,
decreasing the need for law enforcement to conduct duplicative surveillance.
Millennial Debate
Corporate Privacy Protection

Counterplan
37
Millennial Debate
38
CP Corporations Can Protect Customer

Data/Not Share it With the Government
Corporations can refuse to share customer data with the
government
Kayla Robinson, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 2015, July 2015,
Corporate Rights and Individual Interests: The Corporate Right to Privacy as a
Bulwark Against Warrantless Government Surveillance,
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/36-6/ROBINSON.36.6.pdf, p. 22858
This leak has also prompted consideration of two Fourth Amendment
doctrines that limit constitutional privacy protections: the "third-party" and
"non-contents" doctrines. n12 Under the third-party doctrine, information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties - even if only intended for a limited
purpose, and without an individual's actual knowledge - is presumptively
exempt from Fourth Amendment protections. n13 Under the related noncontents rule, courts distinguish between the content of communications,
which is usually constitutionally protected, and the information used in or
created by the transmission of that content - such as a phone number or the
routing information used to deliver an email - which is presumptively not.
n14 When interpreted expansively, these doctrines efectively eviscerate an
individual's right to privacy in an ISP's records and allow the government
unfettered warrantless access. n15 While it appears settled that
individuals cannot assert a constitutional right to privacy in "noncontents" metadata, or in information that has been "voluntarily"
shared with a corporation, n16 it remains to be seen whether a
corporation could assert its own constitutional privacy rights to
shield these records from warrantless government surveillance. Such
a doctrinal development could close the gap in privacy protections left by
Fourth Amendment exceptions that arose before the advent of the Internet.
The Roberts Court has demonstrated its inclination to recognize
expanded rights for corporations. In Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, n17 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment bars the
Federal Government from curtailing core political speech based on the
speaker's corporate form. n18 The idea of the corporation as a bearer of
constitutional rights did not originate in Citizens United, but it appears to
have been given new life by the Court's decision. n19 Furthermore, although
the Supreme Court held in Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc.
n20 that corporations do not have "personal" privacy rights for purposes of
the Freedom of Information Act, the Court pointedly reserved judgment on
the corporation's constitutional right to privacy.
Further, the most recent word on corporate rights from the Supreme
Court, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., n22 signaled the Court's
willingness to recognize more "personal" rights for corporations.
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, held that the term "person" in the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) extended to the
Millennial Debate
39
plaintifs: closely held, for-profit corporations. n23 Therefore, according to the

Court's analysis, corporations enjoy the heightened free exercise protections
ofered by RFRA. n24
Hobby Lobby, AT&T, and Citizens United - together with a number of
other cases - indicate that corporations may be able to shield their
customers' information from warrantless government surveillance by
protecting their own privacy interests in this information. n25 While
the constitutional right to privacy evolved chiefly in the context of an
individual's privacy rights, n26 corporations can hold other individual rights
that are constitutional in nature. n27 Further, although Internet users may not
be able to protect their information due to Fourth Amendment exceptions,
there is a residual privacy interest in this information. n28 A corporation
has a manifest interest in protecting the private information of its
customers due to the corporation's own interest in protecting trade
secrets n29 and maintaining good customer relations, and hence,
profits. n30 This Note argues that the corporate right to privacy fills
an existing gap in privacy rights: although under current doctrine
users do not have a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the
records they generate, the corporations keeping these records do.
Accordingly, corporations can and should assert this limited,
instrumental right to privacy to forestall widespread, suspicionless
government surveillance of online transactions.
Corporations have privacy rights

A corporate right to privacy is an apparent afront to common sense, as the
interests protected by privacy - such as dignity, autonomy, and emotional
security - are generally conceived of as individual interests. n89 However, as
discussed in Part I, corporations are unique legal entities permitted to
exercise personal rights. n90 Furthermore, privacy can be as important for
organizations as it is for individuals. n91 The ability to shield certain actions
and information from the public makes it possible for organizations to carry
out the functions for which they are formed. n92 In the context of business
organizations, the correlation between privacy and profits led to the
formation of trade secrets laws, n93 which govern the protection of
confidential information that confers a competitive advantage to the
business. n94 There is demonstrable acceptance that businesses should be
aforded zones of privacy, and although trade secret law does not define the
scope of a corporation's constitutional rights, n95 it lends credence to the
idea that corporations, like individuals, should be shielded by privacy rights in
certain spheres. This can inform the constitutional limits of government
intrusion into a corporation's afairs.
Millennial Debate
40
Corporations protected by the Fourth Amendment

The Supreme Court has held for over a century that corporations have
cognizable Fourth Amendment rights: in Hale v. Henkel, n127 the Court found
a grand jury subpoena duces tecum was too broad to be reasonable, n128
and that the request for records therefore impinged upon a corporation's
Fourth Amendment rights. n129 The Court reasoned that corporations are
merely associations of individuals who do not waive their constitutional rights
by organizing into the corporate form. n130 Although Hale involved a criminal
investigation, n131 the Court has most frequently considered the Fourth
Amendment's application to businesses in the context of the government's
right to conduct regulatory or administrative searches of commercial
property. n132 While generally upholding regulatory statutes that allow for
administrative searches of commercial property, n133 the Court has
consistently held that commercial property is protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and that Fourth Amendment rights extend to corporations.
Courts have held that corporations have privacy interests

One does not have to speculate about the Fourth Amendment's intangible
application to corporations; since Katz, the Court has held that corporations
have constitutionally cognizable privacy interests under the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard. n156 In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
n157 the Supreme Court upheld a statute allowing the Environmental
Protection Agency to take aerial photographs of Dow Chemical's industrial
plant complex. n158 However, the Court recognized that the corporation, not
its individual owners, had a legally cognizable expectation of privacy under
the Katz formulation. n159 Dow's Fourth Amendment claim was rejected not
based on its corporate form, but rather on the basis of the "open fields"
doctrine. n160 The Court found that Dow had an expectation of privacy in
some of its property that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable.
n161 However, the Court declined to extend the definition of the protected
curtilage, n162 a concept tied to an individual's dwelling, into the context of
commercial property. n163 Thus, using the Katz reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test, the Court found Dow had a cognizable privacy interest, n164 but
due to the open fields exception it declined to categorize aerial surveillance
of Dow's outdoor property as a Fourth Amendment "search."
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41
Ruling that corporations can assert privacy interests in

records solves privacy violations
Whatever the limits of their right to privacy, n210 corporations should at
least be able to assert a constitutional right to privacy in records that contain
sensitive information about their customers. Recognition of this right would
be a boon for individual privacy rights in light of current surveillance
practices of the U.S. government as well as the degree of control some
corporations currently have over the privacy of individuals. Moreover, it would
be consistent with the interests of the corporations themselves.
A. Government Surveillance Under FISA Section 702
Beginning in June of 2013, a leak of classified material brought to light
several clandestine government surveillance programs, including a security
initiative through which government agencies collect domestic telephone
metadata. n211 Other recently revealed surveillance programs, most
notably the so-called PRISM program, n212 are conducted pursuant to
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Through
these programs, U.S. intelligence agencies collect data from both the servers
of ISPs and the telecommunications "backbone" - the infrastructure used to
send telephone and Internet communications. n214 When an analyst wants
to gain access to the records of a new target under a Section 702 program,
the request must be reviewed by a supervisor who affirms the analyst's
reasonable belief that the proposed target is in fact a foreign national who is
outside of the country at the time the data is being collected. n215 Under
these programs, a government analyst may not intentionally target: (1) a
person known to be inside the United States; n216 (2) a person reasonably
believed to be outside the United States if the purpose is actually to target
someone in the United States; n217 or (3) an American citizen located
outside of the United States. n218 Surveillance can last for only one year,
n219 and the program is subject to the oversight of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC). n220 FISC does not, however, have to approve
individual targets. n221 The preservation of records collected pursuant to
Section 702 is governed by complex minimization procedures that must be
periodically approved by FISC. n222
Even if it has been conducted in accordance with FISA, critics have argued
that Section 702 programs are constitutionally suspect because they permit
the government to conduct surveillance and accumulate data without first
obtaining individualized or particularized court orders. n223 The President's
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, an
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42
independent panel created in August 2013, conducted a review of Section

702 surveillance programs and concluded that they put Americans'
communications at risk of inadvertent interception because: (1) a U.S.
person's communications can be collected if they are in contact with a legally
targeted non-U.S. person; (2) it can be difficult to tell if a user is a U.S. person
based on her communications; and (3) the exception that the
communications of known U.S. persons may be retained if they contain
information of "foreign intelligence value" is vague and "can easily lead to the
preservation of private information about even known [U.S.] persons." n224
In addition to legal questions about the implementation of certain
surveillance programs, there are serious policy concerns intrinsic to
government collection of user-generated ISP data. Collecting the content of
an individual's Internet communications - a practice sanctioned by Section
702 - is a marked imposition on privacy, as we generally assume that the
content of our emails and other messages is only being read by the persons
with whom we are communicating. n225 But customer data held by ISPs also
includes "non-content" information that the user may not realize she is
generating, and this data may reveal information even more sensitive than
the content itself. n226 Location information, and other kinds of
"communicative metadata," n227 can reveal enormously sensitive aspects of
an individual's behavior, including the people she talks to, the items she
purchases, and the places she visits. n228 Aggregation of information can
allow for an even more complex picture of an individual, as discrete data
points form a mosaic [*2312] of her life. n229 As Former NSA General
Counsel Stewart Baker has said, metadata can convey "everything" about a
person's life. n230
In spite of the individual privacy interests at stake, and questions as to the
legality of some Section 702 programs, there are obstacles to mounting a
legal challenge. Foreign targets of these programs likely cannot successfully
assert Fourth Amendment rights, n231 and U.S. persons whose information
may be gathered "incidentally" n232 under the program may not have
standing n233 to challenge the constitutionality of the program. n234
Moreover, even if an individual could establish standing, she may not have a
constitutional right to privacy in much of the information collected by the
government due to the third-party doctrine - as the user has voluntarily
transmitted the information to the ISP n235 - and the non-contents doctrines
- as the government is interested in collecting metadata. n236 Corporations,
by contrast, may be able to resist warrantless government review of records
containing sensitive information by asserting their own rights, rights
predicated on their own interests.
B. Corporations Have Constitutional Privacy Rights in Commercially Sensitive
Data
The only consistent basis for denying a corporation constitutional rights has
been the visitorial power of the government: n237 primarily the right to
regulate industry for public welfare. n238 Outside of the context of
regulation, constitutional rights generally extend to a corporation as they
Millennial Debate
43
would to a natural person n239 except where a corporation is found to be so

diferent from a natural person in terms of its interests and abilities that
ascribing the right would be absurd. n240 While a corporation may not be
able to successfully assert "personal" privacy interests due to obvious
diferences from natural persons, n241 the corporate form arguably
heightens the interest in preventing economic loss if the purpose of
incorporation was to create a business organization.
Thus, even if corporations do not have a cognizable interest in the
information itself, n243 ISPs have an interest in excluding the government
from accessing user information because such access can impact their
bottom lines. n244 ISPs ask their users to surrender much personal
information, and are entrusted with facilitating the personal communications
of their users. n245 Therefore, it is crucial for these companies that they are
trusted to keep this information confidential - otherwise they cannot continue
eliciting disclosure. n246 American technology companies that are known to
have been the targets of government surveillance are at risk of losing
business, n247 particularly from overseas customers who may be the direct
targets of government surveillance. n248 There is also a risk that government
surveillance could cause a corporation to breach its privacy agreements with
customers n249 or its contracts with business partners, and that this could
result in liability for the company. n250 Even if a corporation's constitutional
right to privacy is more limited than that of an individual, n251 corporations
have constitutional rights to privacy in the their commercial property, n252
and in the information contained in records about their customers. n253
Corporations should be able to protect sensitive customer information from
warrantless government surveillance not only because it afects corporate
interests, n254 but also because, in certain cases, corporations are in the
best position to champion the public's interest in controlling disclosure of
their information, both for doctrinal and practical reasons. n255 When
corporations are denied constitutional rights, it is usually on the basis of
public interest. n256 The interests of ISPs that seek to shield sensitive user
information from government surveillance, corporations' interests are
substantially aligned with the interests of their customers, n257 and the
extension of privacy rights to such corporations serves rather than impedes a
public interest - preventing potential governmental overreach.
Protecting corporate privacy rights solves Section 702

harms
C. Corporate Privacy Rights and Section 702
Millennial Debate
44
Regardless of the contours of the corporate personality, to the extent that a

corporation has its own existence, that existence is predicated on the ability
to protect property, business interests, and obligations to stakeholders, n259
interests the Supreme Court has long recognized as constitutionally
cognizable. n260
Section 702 programs constitute an intrusion into both the privacy of the
corporations they afect and the individuals they target. While the
government's interest in national security is undeniable, n261 when balanced
against the constitutional right to privacy, security probably does not, for
constitutional purposes, rationalize the far-reaching data mining that Section
702 collection entails. n262 Although Section 702 collection targets foreign
nationals, n263 it also actively collects information from U.S. individuals and
ISPs in a way that is more than "incidental." n264 The Court has said that the
government cannot conduct warrantless surveillance of domestic targets in
the name of national security without prior judicial review. n265 Section 702
programs do not require judicial preclearance, and thus fall below an
established baseline for Fourth Amendment protections. n266
Just as the right to privacy can protect interests considered fundamental for
individuals, such as personal autonomy and dignity, n267 a right to privacy
for corporations can protect the core interests of a business corporation.
Section 702 surveillance programs impair the property and contract interests
of its incidental corporate targets. n268 For the reasons discussed in previous
Sections, a corporation has a constitutionally cognizable privacy interest in at
least some circumstances. n269 Extending a constitutional right to privacy is
appropriate because this kind of surveillance can hamper a corporation's
ability to carry out the functions for which it was formed. n270 A corporation's
right to privacy in the sensitive records of its customers should be balanced
against the government's interest, and should be curtailed only as a result of
a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment. n271 Section 702
programs likely fail this balancing test: there is potential and demonstrable
injury as a result of warrantless government surveillance programs, n272 and
the government interest advanced by these programs is an ill-defined and
intangible interest in national security. n273 Nor do these programs fall into a
recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment: a special needs search
ought not be justified by the government's need for "foreign intelligence
information" because this term is both broad and vague.
Finally, corporations might also be able to assert a privacy interest based on
an independent right to nondisclosure of private information as declared in
Whalen and Nixon. n275 However, in the context of the Section 702
programs, this argument has several potentially fatal flaws. First, the right
itself is tenuous: the Supreme Court has identified it, but has never protected
an interest based on this right, n276 and circuit courts diverge as to the
breadth of the right. n277 A second stumbling block is the fact that Section
702 surveillance would probably not be considered "disclosure" of the kind
that would be cognizable, since in both Whalen and Nixon, the Court found
that the respective invasions of privacy were outweighed by the
government's interest because the information was not subject to public
Millennial Debate
45
disclosure. n278 The third potential issue in squaring this doctrine with
warrantless government surveillance of customer data is that a corporation
probably does not have enough of an independent "personal" interest in the
confidential information of its customers to assert the right to nondisclosure.
n279 In this context, a corporation's right of privacy rests more securely on
Fourth Amendment principles than it does on a tenuous right to nondisclosure
of personal information.
Conclusion
The interests protected by the right to privacy are multifaceted, and not
limited to protecting the emotional security of individual human beings;
privacy also shields interests related to property, autonomy, and
confidentiality, all of which are of profound importance to corporations. Aside
from the corporation's stand-alone interest in protecting pecuniary interests,
a corporate right to privacy in the personal records of customers vindicates a
public interest in ensuring that government surveillance is bounded by the
Constitution. Corporations are better situated to assert a right to privacy in
the context of Section 702 programs, in part because corporations, not the
targeted users, are the custodians of user data, and in part because of the
evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Thus, recognizing a corporate right
to privacy in sensitive customer records serves the purposes of protecting the
corporation's stand-alone interests, acting as a check on government
surveillance, and protecting the more personal and emotional aspects of the
right to privacy of the customers.
Millennial Debate
Section 702 Aff
46
Millennial Debate
47
A2: PDD-28 Solves

PDD-28 formalizes the status quo, doesnt protect privacy
of State
Responding to these pressures, President Obama and Congress directed

several reviews of U.S. surveillance practices n2 and initiated policy reforms
of intelligence activities, including transparency initiatives. n3 While much of
the public debate has centered on the constitutionality of surveillance
programs and whether protections for U.S. persons are adequate to
safeguard privacy and civil liberties, the sharp international reaction to U.S.
surveillance practices abroad also spurred the government to consider
whether to aford foreigners more privacy protections. On January 17, 2014,
President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 28 ("PPD-28"). PPD-28
discusses the protections to be aforded to non-U.S. persons in the context of
U.S. signals intelligence programs. The directive states that the U.S.
government's "signals intelligence activities must take into account that all
persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their
nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have
legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information."
This Note argues that, despite its aspirational language, PPD-28 largely
formalizes current practices and incentives within the U.S. Intelligence
Community ("IC"), and makes real policy changes only at the margins. Given
the extent of international pressure for increased privacy protections, PPD28's cosmetic changes remain a puzzle.
PDD-28 doesnt protect the privacy of non-US persons

of State
Millennial Debate
48
Overall, prior to PPD-28 the U.S. government made no public commitment to

protect the privacy of non-U.S. persons. For electronic surveillance under
FISA, none of the NSA's minimization procedures for the section 702 program
applied to non-U.S. persons: "Foreign communications of or concerning a nonUnited States person may be retained, used, and disseminated in any form in
accordance with other applicable law, regulation, and policy." n93 Similarly,
none of the restrictions on collection, retention, and dissemination under
Executive Order 12333 apply to non-U.S. persons.
New requirements protect US persons

of State
The 2015 Anniversary Report also reinforces the current paradigm by

granting stronger protections to U.S. persons. For information collected
pursuant to section 702 of FISA, the NSA will now need to supply a written
statement of facts showing that a query is likely to return foreign intelligence
information. n130 The government must also delete U.S. person information
that has been determined to lack foreign intelligence value, and the
government cannot introduce such information into a criminal proceeding
against the person without the approval of the Attorney General. n131 Taken
together, these heightened requirements for U.S. person information-requirements that do not extend to non-U.S. person information--serve to
reinforce the status quo distinction based on territory and nationality.
Millennial Debate
Section 702 Neg
49
Millennial Debate
50
Status Quo Solves US Person Harms

In the status quo, the government correctly identifies if
the target is a US person 99.5% of the time
of State, p. 471-2
Traditional FISA authorized the government to target specific individuals for

surveillance if it could show probable cause to believe that the individual was
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and that the target would use
the facilities to be placed under surveillance. In enacting FISA, Congress
concluded that giving non-U.S. persons within the United States no privacy
protections would advance the national security of the United States in
countering threats of international terrorism and espionage. For example, the
legislative history indicates that Congress received testimony demonstrating
that some aliens who come to the United States temporarily "work[] for
foreign intelligence networks." n27 Congress also noted the possibility that
aliens in the United States on student visas were conducting clandestine
intelligence gathering, but that the government could not show that those
persons violated U.S. law knowingly, the standard required for U.S. persons.
n28 Recognizing the need to conduct foreign intelligence, however, Congress
was careful to provide privacy protections for U.S. persons. n29 Executive
Order 12333 adopts the same distinction and emphasizes that "all means,
consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full
consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to develop
intelligence information for the President and the National Security Council."
n30
To determine whether a person enjoys U.S. person status, the IC uses
presumptions based on physical location and foreignness, and requires
analysts to consider information that could rebut those presumptions. Agency
policy documents create rebuttable presumptions of U.S. person status. n31
A person located in the United States is presumed a U.S. person
unless "the nature of the communications or other indicia in the contents or
circumstances of such communications give rise to a reasonable belief" to the
contrary. n32 Similarly, a person located outside the United States is
presumptively a non-U.S. person. n33 An unincorporated association with
headquarters outside the United States is likewise presumptively not a U.S.
person, unless information indicates a substantial number of its members are
U.S. persons themselves. n34 In determining U.S. person status, these
Millennial Debate
51
presumptions apply regardless of whether the government conducts

collection pursuant to FISA or Executive Order 12333. n35
Intelligence analysts must determine U.S. person status based upon the
"totality of the circumstances available." n36 If the initial lead information
does not state the target's location or U.S. person status, then the
analyst must infer U.S. person status. An analyst must take into
account all available information and cannot ignore information that
would rebut the presumption of U.S. person status. n37
In practice, determining U.S. person status may prove difficult and factspecific. For instance, when the government seeks to target a particular email
account, the fact that a U.S. company (for example, Google) services the
account does not determine U.S. person status because many foreigners use
U.S. Internet Service Providers ("ISP"). Instead, the government may look to
other factors to determine "foreignness," such as the Internet Protocol ("IP")
address or the physical means by which the data travels. When the
government seeks to target unincorporated associations, it remains unclear
in publicly available sources what counts as a "substantial number" of
members sufficient to bring a club, student group, lobbying organization, or
charitable group within the definition. n38 While the answers to these and
other questions remain unclear from publicly available information, a
classified directive exists that provides more detailed guidance concerning
the determination of U.S. person status. n39 In the context of surveillance
conducted pursuant to section 702, the IC has developed "a common
understanding" for what constitutes a sufficient basis to determine that a
person is not a U.S. person.
According to reports, the National Security Agency ("NSA") appears
to determine U.S. person status accurately. The Department of Justice
("DOJ") reviewed one year of data derived from section 702 programs to
assess how often NSA's foreignness determinations proved inaccurate. In
other words, the DOJ assessed how often the NSA requested information from
a communications service provider and subsequently realized that the target
was a U.S. person or was located in the United States. DOJ determined that
only 0.4% of NSA's targeting decisions turned out to be wrong. n41
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52
A2: Foreign Relations

Responses muted, relations OK
of State, p. 490-1
Snowden's unauthorized disclosures of NSA surveillance on U.S. allies

definitely strained U.S. foreign relations in the short term, but the
consequences appear to be receding. Brazil and Germany--two of the most
outspoken critics of U.S. surveillance post-Snowden--provide good examples.
Brazilian President Dilma Roussef canceled a visit to the White House in
response to revelations that the NSA spied on her and the Brazilian oil
company, Petrobas. n154 Her decision marked the first time a world leader
turned down a state dinner with the President of the United States. n155
However, in an interview in July 2014, Roussef eased tensions by indicating
that the Obama administration was not directly responsible for the increased
spying measures established after September 11, 2001. n156 In signs of
warming relations, in January 2015, Vice President Joe Biden attended
President Roussef's second inauguration, and in March 2015, the White
House re-invited Roussef for a state visit. n157 As for Germany, for months
after the Snowden revelations, Chancellor Angela Merkel refused to visit the
United States. But in a February 2015 visit to the White House, not only did
Merkel not criticize U.S. surveillance, but she also praised the U.S.
intelligence community for its coordination with German agencies in
mitigating security threats.
Evidence suggests other countries have muted their political and legal
responses. One year after Snowden's unauthorized disclosures, a report
analyzed responses from legal and Information Technology ("IT") experts in
29 countries. The report concluded that the overwhelming majority of
countries assessed ... have not responded in any tangible, measurable way to
the Snowden disclosures that began in June 2013. While there has been a
notable volume of "activity" in the form of diplomatic representations,
parliamentary inquiries, media coverage, campaign strategies, draft
legislation and industry initiatives, there has--at the global level--been an
insignificant number of tangible reforms adopted to address the concerns
raised by the Snowden disclosures. n159
The report came just one year after the initial revelations, and states could
take more action over time. Still, the report suggests that the revelations may
not spur other countries to take meaningful action, particularly since
Millennial Debate
53
attention fades over time. By June 2014, global media coverage had already
declined to less than two percent of the reporting from the initial maelstrom.
n160 Therefore, the U.S. government might reasonably conclude that
diplomatic tensions will ease over time.
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A2: Surveillance of Non-US Persons Violates

International Law
Surveillance of non-US persons doesnt violate
international law
of State, p. 492-7
C. International Legal Obligations

A case can be made that U.S. signals intelligence collection against
foreigners abroad violates international law, but this argument is tenuous.
The argument could be framed as follows. The United States ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") in 1992. Drawing
on the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, n161 Article 17 of
the ICCPR enshrines the right to privacy under international law. It states:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks. n162
With regard to this and other rights, by its terms the treaty prohibits
discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of national origin. n163
The Human Rights Committee ("HRC") has further emphasized that the
Covenant's "guarantee applies to aliens and citizens alike." n164 Moreover,
with respect to the rights to privacy, family, home or correspondence, "there
shall be no discrimination between aliens and citizens in the application of
these rights." n165
Continuing the argument, the ICCPR's jurisdictional clause indicates these
obligations apply to U.S. activities both inside and outside the United States.
Article 2 defines the scope of the ICCPR as binding a State Party "to respect
and to ensure" the rights recognized in the treaty "to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction." n166 At the very least, then,
international law requires the United States to provide equal privacy
protections to citizens and non-citizens alike when conducting surveillance
within U.S. territory. n167 The United States has agreed to guarantee the
right to privacy to all individuals within its territory. n168 The HRC interprets
the ICCPR such that these obligations apply to U.S. activities outside U.S.
territory, as well. As explained below, the United States contests this view,
Millennial Debate
55
but the Committee emphasizes that a State Party must "respect and ensure
the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or efective
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the
State." n169 Essentially, the HRC reads the phrase "subject to [a State
Party's] jurisdiction" expansively to include persons "within the power or
efective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory."
n170 The Committee emphasizes that such obligations would obtain, for
instance, for persons under the control of a State Party's peacekeeping force,
but the Committee notes that the obligations apply "regardless of the
circumstances in which such power or efective control was obtained." n171
Given this interpretation, some human rights advocates argue that the NSA's
surveillance of foreigners abroad amounts to "efective control" of their
correspondence, and therefore that such surveillance "interferes" with the
right to privacy. n172 Because the section 702 program involves the
compelled assistance of communications service providers, these advocates
argue the surveillance necessarily occurs within U.S. territory or within its
jurisdiction. And because large volumes of foreign-to-foreign Internet traffic
travel over U.S.-based infrastructure, the treaty may also apply to many
surveillance activities conducted pursuant to Executive Order 12333.
The argument is tenuous for several reasons. First, the Human Rights
Committee's interpretations are not binding, and the U.S. government has
never committed to them. The HRC is charged with receiving reports
submitted by nations under the ICCPR's self-reporting provisions and issuing
"such general comments as it may consider appropriate." n174 The
Committee has assumed broader powers of interpretation, but its original
mandate is narrower and nonbinding. n175 Contrary to the HRC, the U.S.
government contends that the ICCPR's obligations do not run to activity
outside a State Party's jurisdiction. According to the U.S. government, the text
of the treaty imposes a "dual requirement": obligations only apply when a
person is both within U.S. territory and under its jurisdiction. n176 The
treaty's negotiating history confirms this interpretation. Anxious about the
ICCPR applying to foreign persons under U.S. occupation after World War II,
the United States suggested adding the phrase "within its territory." n177 The
language was adopted, and subsequent eforts to remove the phrase failed.
n178 But even if one reads "and" as "or" and the ICCPR were to apply to U.S.
electronic surveillance activities outside the United States, the U.S.
government may nevertheless satisfy its obligations. For instance, section
702 programs--which limit collection to specific national security purposes-are not necessarily "arbitrary or unlawful," especially in the absence of an
international norm as to when surveillance of another state's citizens
amounts to "arbitrary or unlawful" action. n179 In sum, under the ICCPR the
United States is bound--as a matter of international law, but not domestic
law--to protect the right to privacy of citizens and aliens alike. But, according
to longstanding U.S. interpretations of international law, that obligation does
not apply extraterritorially. n180
As a practical matter, it is also worth noting that currently no one can obtain
a legal remedy for U.S. violations of the ICCPR. Under the U.S. Constitution,
treaties are the "supreme Law of the Land," n181 but the Supreme Court has
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held that only self-executing treaties provide rules of decision for U.S. courts.
n182 When the Senate provided its advice and consent to the ICCPR, it
attached a declaration that Articles 1-27 of the treaty are not self-executing.
n183 Consequently, although the treaty binds the United States as a matter
of international law, state and federal courts are not bound to enforce its
terms. On the international plane, the United States has not signed the
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which extends the Human Rights Committee's
powers to cover complaints by private individuals. n184 Therefore,
individuals also cannot appeal alleged violations to the HRC.
Second, even if the ICCPR did apply to U.S. extraterritorial activities,
surveillance does not naturally amount to "efective control" of a person.
Such an interpretation seems strained. Interference with correspondence
hardly amounts to efective control of a person in the same manner as
physical detention. It is far from obvious that intercepting an individual's
communications would render her subject to the jurisdiction of the state
conducting surveillance.
Third, international human rights law was not thought to cover foreign
surveillance until very recently. Snowden's unauthorized disclosures are not
the first to reveal the U.S. government's spying on Western allies. As recently
as 2001, a major controversy emerged over ECHELON, a signals intelligence
collection program conducted by the United States and certain allies.
Although the means and scope always remained unclear, under the program
Anglo-American countries intercepted communications around the world,
including in Europe. European leaders protested, and the European
Parliament created a special committee to investigate the program. The
resulting report noted that ECHELON could conduct "quasi-total surveillance"
by intercepting "any telephone, fax, Internet or e-mail message sent by any
individual." n185 However, the report concluded that ECHELON did not
violate existing EU law, n186 and failed to address whether the program
violated the ICCPR. n187 The EU report noted that European states conducted
massive surveillance programs, n188 but it did not address whether those
programs violated the ICCPR, either. That the Committee investigated
ECHELON thoroughly but did not study the program's compliance with the
ICCPR nor EU country surveillance programs' compliance with the treaty,
suggests the EU may have believed either that such espionage did not in fact
violate international law or that any such violations were so pervasive as to
be legally irrelevant. Moreover, given that states have practiced massive
surveillance routinely under the ICCPR, the proper interpretation is that the
ICCPR does not apply to such electronic surveillance. In any event, the idea
that international human rights law applies to electronic surveillance appears
to be of only recent vintage.
Fourth, no international law prohibits peacetime espionage. Under the Lotus
principle, absent an explicit prohibition, sovereign states retain general
freedom of action. n189 Because international law has never prohibited
intelligence gathering, n190 states may engage in it freely, subject to
traditional consequences outside international law, such as diplomatic
expulsions, punishment of captured spies, and public denunciations.
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State practice underscores the legitimacy of espionage. Brazil, one of the

harshest critics of U.S. spying in the wake of Snowden's revelations, had to
acknowledge spying on U.S. and other foreign diplomats within its borders.
n192 But other states have not confined their spying to government officials.
In its report on ECHELON, the European Parliament noted that "interception of
private communications by foreign intelligence services is by no means
confined to the US or British foreign intelligence services." n193 Instead, the
report showed that among 14 European countries, 12 spied on
"communications in foreign countries," including 8 on "civilian
communications." n194 Moreover, although European governments publicly
denounced the U.S. surveillance programs Snowden revealed, the European
Parliament has again acknowledged concerns about similarly broad
surveillance programs among its member states, including France, Germany,
Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. n195 This state
practice reinforces the conclusion that international law does not generally
prohibit signals intelligence activities. If "everyone does it," then customary
international law cannot prohibit it. Moreover, the tu quoque principle may
prevent victims of espionage from claiming international law violations. As a
Department of Defense report on the legality of information operations
concluded, "the lack of strong international legal sanctions for peacetime
espionage may also constitute an implicit application of the international law
doctrine called 'tu quoque' (roughly, a nation has no standing to complain
about a practice in which it itself engages)."
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Presidential Leadership/Foreign Policy Link

Surveillance of non-US persons necessary for effectively
conducting foreign policy
of State, p. 495
Assessing the economic and diplomatic costs versus the benefits of U.S.
surveillance necessarily involves a high degree of indeterminacy. It would be
difficult to measure the impact of extending various privacy protections to
non-U.S. persons. Even if the impact could be measured, some of the key
supporting facts and conclusions would certainly (and perhaps justifiably)
remain classified. The risks associated with granting more protections to nonU.S. persons are not obviously large or small. They involve uncertainty. In this
sense, the lack of protections may be viewed as a safeguard against
international terrorism, espionage, and other threats to national security.
Does it make sense to terminate that policy? In the face of uncertain but
potentially devastating risks, incentives push in the other direction. Moreover,
it is important to remember that the IC collects information not only to detect
and thwart international terrorism and espionage, but also to facilitate the
conduct of foreign afairs. Extending privacy protections may slow or restrict
such activities to the point where valuable information is lost. If valuable
information is lost, then the question becomes whether it is worth incurring
the cost of economic harm and diplomatic irritation. Only if the diplomatic
and economic harms are significant and sustained should the United States
consider placing substantial constraints on signals intelligence gathering. In
the event, the economic costs may be exaggerated, and such costs may also
decline over time as the controversy fades from view. The diplomatic costs
also appear temporary; many countries, including U.S. allies and partners,
spy on each other's citizens, and diplomatic relations are improving.
Collecting bulk signals intelligence important to effective

foreign policy and preventing terrorism
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of State, p. 498-9
Theoretically, one extreme option is to abandon bulk signals intelligence

collection altogether, but this option is imprudent. Available information
suggests that bulk signals intelligence collection serves important national
security and foreign policy goals and should not be abandoned. Bulk
collection entails the collection of large amounts of data, most of which is
irrelevant but, when aggregated, provides opportunities for refined analysis
and identification of patterns. According to the government, bulk collection
and analysis can help identify unknown threats as well as address specific
knowledge gaps that other collection methods cannot provide. Caitlyn
Hayden, spokesperson for the NSC, asserts that "new or emerging threats"
are "often hidden within the large and complex system of modern global
communications, and the United States must consequently collect signals
intelligence in bulk in certain circumstances in order to identify these
threats." n198 Senator Diane Feinstein has emphasized that NSA's
surveillance capabilities are crucial to countering terrorism. N
Other sources confirm the value of bulk signals intelligence activities in
certain contexts. In PPD-28, President Obama directed the Director of
National Intelligence to investigate the technical feasibility of creating
software-based alternatives that would allow the IC to avoid bulk collection.
n200 The resulting report, released in January 2015 by the National Research
Council, concluded that no such alternatives could provide a complete
substitute for bulk collection to detect some national security threats. n201
The report emphasized that "in contrast to domestic law enforcement ... the
world of intelligence analysis has many fewer tools available for investigation.
In hostile foreign environments, personal interviews and observations and
records review are much more limited. Accordingly, the role of bulk data as a
way to understand the significance of past events is important ... ." n202 In
fact, "for investigations that have little or no prior targeting history, bulk
collection may be the only source of useful information." n203
It is important to emphasize that bulk collection does not simply help detect
and thwart terrorist attacks; it also plays an important role in informing the
U.S. government's other national security and foreign policy goals and
strategies. Although PCLOB concluded that the U.S. government's domestic
bulk telephone metadata program conducted under section 215 "has shown
only limited value" and recommended that it be terminated, n204 bulk
signals intelligence collection abroad can prove extremely useful for foreign
intelligence purposes. The National Research Council's unclassified report
cited certain contexts in which bulk collection may prove especially useful for
strategic intelligence. For instance, monitoring a range of communications
can reveal statistical patterns on agricultural production, electric power
supply, health care conditions, or migration patterns that a foreign
government may report inaccurately or not at all. n205 Further, sampling
everyday communications, including social media, can help the government
understand local reactions to political trends that might result in a change in
government, violent or otherwise. n206 While none of these purposes
necessarily involves a direct threat to life, policymakers have a legitimate
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interest in gathering this foreign intelligence to advance American interests.

Abandoning bulk signals intelligence collection of non-U.S. persons would
therefore frustrate valid national security and foreign policy goals.
Government needs flexibility in responding to national

security threats
Kate Poorbaugh, 2015, University of Illinois Law Review, Security Protocol: A
Procedural Analysis of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts,
http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilrcontent/articles/2015/3/Poorbaugh.pdf DOA: 11-13-15 p. 1364-5
Before delving into all of the ways that FISA could be improved, it is
important to consider the inherent struggle between civil liberties and
national security concerns. "National security" involves protecting the nation
from a perceived violent threat against the stability of the government, the
safety of its citizens, or the government's success in armed conflicts. n157
The government is tasked with the fundamental responsibility of preventing
these attacks. "The national security threats facing the United States and our
allies are numerous and significant, and they will remain so well into the
future." n158 Rapid changes in technology, increased globalization of trade,
and advancements in communications technology have resulted in more fluid
attacks on national security, against which we expect our government to
provide protection.
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Presidential Powers Links Congressional

Limits
Congressional limits on Presidential foreign surveillance
power threaten Presidential leadership/power
of State, p. 508
Third, bringing more programs under the FISA framework raises a potential
constitutional objection. A full treatment of the constitutional question
remains outside the scope of this Note. However, it is worth noting that the
President and Congress share war powers and some foreign afairs
responsibilities. On the one hand, enacting legislation that sets standards for
executive action appears to be well within Congress's Article I powers. On the
other hand, the President has expertise in conducting foreign afairs and
needs discretion to exercise his Article II powers efectively. n221 When the
President directs foreign surveillance, he does so pursuant to his powers as
Commander in Chief and head of the Executive Branch. Conducting foreign
surveillance to understand the capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign
actors and threats to the United States falls squarely within those powers. For
Congress to inject statutory constraints on those powers or impose judicial
oversight would alter the distribution of foreign afairs powers between the
President and the Congress, thereby raising a potential constitutional
problem.
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Terrorism/Foreign Policy Link to Protecting

Privacy of Non-US Persons
Establishing privacy protections for non-US persons
undermines foreign policy and risks terrorism
of State, p. 501-4
2. Abolishing the U.S. Person Distinction and Extending Identical Privacy

Protections
While the U.S. government could, in theory, abolish the distinction between
U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons, that policy would prove unwise. Extending
identical protections to non-U.S. persons threatens to compromise national
security and the efective conduct of foreign afairs, would lower the
protections U.S. persons currently enjoy, and may encounter political
opposition.
Would eliminating the distinction compromise national security? On one view,
foreigners do not necessarily cause more harm to the United States than U.S.
persons. Domestic terrorists and criminal gangs can, depending on the
circumstances, pose a greater threat to Americans than foreign spies and
terrorists. Moreover, according to the government the unauthorized
disclosure of classified documents by U.S. persons has also caused great
damage to U.S. national security. n207 Under this view, one might argue that
if the government directed more resources against domestic threats, it could
prevent more harm to Americans.
This argument misses several key points, however. First, the IC operates
under the assumption that a person's non-U.S. person status predicts a
higher likelihood and severity of potential harm to Americans. While this
assumption may be difficult to verify and such an assessment lies outside the
scope of this Note, the logic is as follows. Non-U.S. persons have not
developed ties of allegiance to the United States. They may take advantage
of safe havens where they can plan and execute terrorist attacks. Because
they operate outside the United States and its law enforcement system, the
government generally has fewer opportunities to gather information on them.
They may have greater resources, training, equipment, and perhaps even
backing from a hostile state. Foreign militaries, spies, terrorists, and other
hostile forces are therefore thought more willing and capable to inflict
grievous harm than domestic terrorists. The attacks on September 11, 2001,
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resulted in higher casualties than all previous terrorist incidents in the United
States combined. n208 The logic also assumes that among the people who
are opposed to the United States, more of them live abroad than within the
country. It follows that the threat is greater overseas.
Second, the government does not collect foreign intelligence information
merely to thwart international terrorist or other hostile attacks. The
government also collects information to generate knowledge and seize
opportunities for foreign afairs purposes, such as preparing for trade
negotiations and assessing economic trends in foreign countries.
Third, by enacting FISA the Congress determined that foreign intelligence
collection in the domestic context presents a special danger to U.S.
democratic institutions. The risk of politically motivated targeting and other
abuses rises when the government directs its powerful tools of foreign
surveillance inward. n209 A government's surveillance against its own people
is particularly dangerous because the government can deprive liberty or
allocate benefits and burdens based on what it knows about a person's
private life. Surveillance also risks chilling freedom of expression and
association, as persons change their behavior in order to avoid these risks.
Because most foreigners are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, government
surveillance of foreigners generally poses fewer risks. To be sure, signals
intelligence collection on foreigners could chill freedom of expression abroad,
as foreigners change their communication behaviors in an attempt to avoid
U.S. surveillance. Given international commerce, such a chilling efect abroad
could negatively impact U.S. economic interests, as foreigners restrict the
scope of their creative activities. But these chilling efects are speculative and
any efect would be smaller than in the domestic context. Therefore, even
though some may argue that the government could possibly save more
American lives by directing its surveillance powers inward, the cost to
democratic institutions would prove too high. Overall, the U.S. person
distinction serves an important purpose.
Eliminating the distinction would also threaten to lower the protections U.S.
persons already enjoy. Under the current legal framework, providing identical
protections to U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons would efectively prevent
bulk signals intelligence collection outside of the United States altogether.
Sections 703 and 704 of the FAA restrict the targeting of U.S. persons outside
the United States, a category of foreign intelligence previously outside the
scope of FISA. Under both sections, the FISC must find probable cause that
the target is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, and
probable cause that the target is a foreign power, an agent of a foreign
power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power. If non-U.S. persons were
aforded the same protections as U.S. persons--in other words if the scheme
"leveled up" protections for non-U.S. persons--then all collection on foreigners
outside the United States would need to follow section 703 and 704
prescriptions. Because these provisions require an individualized showing of
probable cause, the government would need to make individual applications
for FISC warrants, thereby preventing bulk collection. Faced with this
prospect, the government would either need to cancel bulk signals
Millennial Debate
intelligence collection programs or alter the legal standard, which would
efectively water down the predicate for U.S. persons.
64
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Politics Link to Foreign Privacy Rights

Political opposition to establishing privacy rights for
foreigners, and the link outweighs the turn
of State, p. 509
The above analysis outlines the costs involved in abandoning the distinction,
but other considerations are noteworthy, too. At present, political
considerations probably push against abolishing the distinction. An American
president considering extending privacy protections to foreigners may need
to convince a skeptical public that increased protections for non-U.S. persons
would not expose the United States to greater threat. The American public
may also wonder why the U.S. government should extend protections to
foreigners if no other country has so far been willing to do the same. n210
Few if any countries protect non-citizens in signals intelligence collection
abroad. Indeed, as Justice Powell has noted, "it would be contrary to the
public interest for Government to deny itself the prudent and lawful
employment of those very techniques which are employed against the
Government and its lawabiding [sic] citizens." n211 It is worth noting that the
constituencies most likely to favor eliminating the distinction--illegal aliens
and lawfully admitted aliens on student or other temporary visas in the
United States, as well as foreigners outside the United States--have limited
political power within the United States. Perhaps for this reason, Congress has
never publicly debated altering the standards for non-U.S. persons. n212
Foreigners do have some leverage, however. For instance, if citizens in Italy
or Germany grew sufficiently upset about U.S. signals intelligence activities,
those countries could withdraw support for U.S. naval and other military
installations. Those bases are crucial to U.S. force projection around the
world. Because the U.S. government depends on cooperative relationships
with other countries to achieve its national security and interests, strong
objections from key partners could prompt more serious consideration of this
issue. Absent a change in circumstances, however, the political climate in
the United States will likely not prompt active consideration of any changes to
the protections for non-U.S. persons.
US already has the most protections for international

privacy
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of State, p. 503-4
An understanding of the U.S. government's legal scheme in comparative

perspective is also noteworthy, though not decisive to the appropriate policy
choice. Available evidence suggests that with section 702 the United States
already ofers more transparency and more protections to foreigners than
most other countries. n213 While it may come as little surprise that China
"maintains almost unlimited and unfettered access to private sector data"
n214 collected both domestically and abroad, France and the United Kingdom
both conduct broad surveillance under laws that do not require prior judicial
approval and that allow collection not only for counterterrorism but also to
advance economic interests, a justification lacking under FISA. n215 With
section 702, Congress extended judicial oversight to a category of
surveillance that it had previously left outside judicial supervision. This
requirement goes beyond what many other intelligence agencies require
when they collect against persons who are not their nationals. According to
one study of thirteen countries, eight governments--Australia, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom--do not require a
court order for foreign intelligence surveillance. n216 Under the U.S. scheme,
judicial oversight does not apply to surveillance conducted pursuant to
Executive Order 12333 (an admittedly large exception), but many other
countries do not require a court order under any scenario. Of course, lack of
reciprocity should not preclude appropriate action. That the United States
provides more protections to foreigners than other countries does not mean
the U.S. policy is adequate or correct. Given the American commitment to
personal liberty and the fact that American surveillance capabilities far
surpass those of other countries, the United States may have a heightened
obligation to provide more transparency, if not more privacy protections.
Moreover, a country may decide to do the right thing unilaterally, for
instance, by refraining from torturing or using chemical weapons.
Nevertheless, the public may question a policy that, on its face, risks
compromising national security. And unilaterally restricting signals
intelligence activities denies the possibility of bargaining with other countries
over such collection in the future. n217 Overall, extending identical
protections to non-U.S. persons threatens to compromise national security
and the efective conduct of foreign policy, would lower the protections U.S.
persons currently enjoy, and may encounter political opposition. Such a policy
is, on balance, inadvisable.
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Proposals for Protecting Privacy of Non-US

Persons (Could be Plans or Counterplans)
3. Maintaining the U.S. Person Distinction and Extending Some Key
Protections to Non-U.S. Persons
U.S. law and policy currently provide four main protections to U.S. persons:
(1) restrictions on what kinds of information may be collected; (2) restrictions
on what information may be retained and for how long; (3) restrictions on
what information may be disseminated; (4) oversight mechanisms; and (5)
legal remedies under the Privacy Act. What would happen if the United States
extended some of those protections to Europeans, for instance? The analysis
below suggests that providing such protections would involve significant
administrative costs and potential harm to national security.
Collection. Section 702 and Executive Order 12333 do not impose substantial
limits on the types of information the government can collect. Both
authorities enumerate certain categories of foreign intelligence information
(such as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and
espionage), but they also include broader categories (such as the conduct of
foreign afairs). These categories, as well as the National Intelligence
Priorities Framework, already apply to collection against non-U.S. persons,
however. Executive Order 12333 provides that the government must use the
"least intrusive" means when collecting on U.S. persons. Applying this rule to
collecting against non-U.S. persons would benefit foreigners, but at probably
a large cost to efficient collection. Intelligence collection inevitably entails
breaking foreign laws. To require the IC to use publicly available sources
before turning to investigative techniques that require a warrant would
impede efficiency.
It is also worth noting that creating a rule that restricts collection to certain
categories of targets or sources would prove difficult to implement. Signals
intelligence activities range from activities whose legitimacy no one
questions--such as collection on hostile forces to support tactical battlefield
operations--to activities that may seem unnecessary and unwarranted--say,
collection on French high school students. Perhaps the IC could extend the
protections to certain classes of persons assessed to pose a low threat, and
no terrorist attack would succeed. Then again, perhaps not. Even a country
friendly to the United States, like France, contains nationals who would do
[*505] the United States harm. In an ideal world, the government would not
collect on segments of the population or modes of communication that never
yield information of value. But if a rule prohibited collecting on particular
targets, there is no guarantee that a risk would not materialize there. And if a
rule prohibited collection on certain types of communications, one could
imagine nefarious actors starting to use such communication channels.
Intelligence agencies need flexibility in order to anticipate and adapt to new
threats and communications platforms. This is not to say that the government
should not tailor its signals intelligence collection to the extent feasible.
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Doing so saves resources and focuses collection eforts. However, a rule that
narrows collection absolutely seems untenable in practice.
Retention. The main restriction on retention is that information with no
foreign intelligence value must be purged no later than five years from
collection. A commitment to purge irrelevant information would theoretically
benefit foreigners who do not want the government to retain highly personal
or embarrassing information about them. And if the data is irrelevant, then
the government loses nothing if it purges the data. However, limiting
retention would be unlikely to satisfy foreigners who worry more about the
collection of information in the first instance. Such a policy then would
provide little value. Even if limits on retention were seen as valuable, it would
prove difficult to implement. When reviewing intelligence, analysts often find
it difficult to assess whether a given piece of information has foreign
intelligence value. In order to justify purging a piece of information, an NSA
analyst must determine not only that the piece of information has no present
foreign intelligence value to her, but also that such intelligence would not
ofer valuable information to any present or future foreign intelligence need.
n218 Valuable information might be lost. Five years might not aford a
sufficient period of time for the data to be exploited, as the IC might wish to
use the data for assessing patterns over longer time periods. Moreover, a rule
that requires purging information of no value could impose a high
administrative cost, not to mention privacy cost, as analysts would be
required to examine information that would have gone untouched. The
increased costs could be time-bound; if the government imposed retention
standards, it could spur the IC to invest in technologies to filter and purge
information automatically. However, the viability of such solutions remains
unknown. Therefore, absent a viable technological solution, additional
retention requirements would likely impose significant administrative cost
and could result in loss of valuable information. For some or all of these
reasons, the five-year destruction requirement announced in the Signals
Intelligence Reform 2015 Anniversary Report includes significant exceptions.
Dissemination. The chief privacy protections with regard to dissemination are
twofold. First, identifying information can only be disseminated if it is
necessary to understand the value of the foreign intelligence. Second,
generic phrases must be substituted so as not to identify U.S. persons. As
applied to non-U.S. persons, the purported benefits of these measures would
be to ensure that personal information is redacted and viewed only by those
officials with a need to know. While these prescriptions seem reasonable, in
practice they would entail significant costs. Policymakers often need to know
names, places, and other identifiers in order to assess foreign intelligence
information. If an agency must use a vague identifier, such as "SOMALI
PERSON 1," before it shares that information with another agency, it could
turn intelligence sharing into a guessing game. The dissemination protections
therefore also entail nontrivial cost.
Oversight. Another option would be to pass legislation that places all signals
collection programs (not only the one authorized in section 702) under the
FISA framework. In general, FISA does not cover surveillance conducted
outside of the United States. n219 In theory, a congressional debate and vote
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to bring more programs under FISA would ensure the public weighs the costs
and benefits of the programs. Having the FISC sign of on programs--even if
through broad certifications, such as the section 702 certifications that do not
specify facilities or targets--would also lend a judicial imprimatur of legitimacy
to the programs. In addition, reporting statistics on U.S. intelligence gathering
abroad could bolster confidence that the U.S. government does not engage in
indiscriminate mass surveillance.
Foreign surveillance doesnt threaten democracy

of State, p. 507
The costs of judicial supervision and statistical reporting for signals

intelligence collection programs may prove prohibitive, however. First, the
rationale for including the PRISM program under FISA likely does not apply to
other programs. Section 702 is a unique program that requires the compelled
assistance of U.S. telecommunications and Internet service providers to
target foreigners. n220 When the government cooperates with domestic
businesses to conduct surveillance, the risk of abuse and threat to
democratic institutions increases. Such adverse consequences are not
present when the government targets foreign powers, companies, or persons.
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Expanded FISA Oversight Fails

Expanding FISA oversight doesnt solve
of State, p. 508
Fourth, it remains unclear whether FISA would provide any meaningful

additional oversight in the context of foreign intelligence collection against
foreigners abroad. Each intelligence agency already has an inspector general
that reports directly to Congress. While certain violations have occurred with
respect to the communications of foreigners, one source estimates that only
a handful occurred over the last decade. n222 Moreover, most of those
violations were self-reported, and each one resulted in termination of the
employee. n223 But whether or not the current oversight system is sufficient,
it is unclear that extending additional judicial oversight would allay the
concerns of foreigners. According to one legal expert on the technology
industry, foreign firms now cite the PATRIOT Act as a reason to switch away
from American products, even though that legislation has little to do with
current signals intelligence collection conducted overseas. n224
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Interagency Coordination CP
Interagency coordination solves the diplomatic irritation
and economic costs
of State, p. 511-12
A policy that requires greater interagency coordination seems most feasible

and could better advance the overall national interest. If diplomatic irritation
and economic cost to American companies represent two of the main harms
generated by bulk or perceived indiscriminate signals intelligence collection,
then it seems appropriate to require intelligence agencies to consult or at
least inform the Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce before
implementing new signals intelligence activities. Both Departments provide
important perspectives to inform the overall national interest. The
Department of State provides policy expertise on foreign afairs and could
inform the IC of the diplomatic consequences of signals intelligence activities.
The Department of Commerce's mission is to assist American businesses to
promote job creation and economic growth. Both departments also provide
unique and relevant expertise with regard to the Internet. The State
Department's Office of International Communications and Information Policy
owns the "Internet Freedom" agenda. The Commerce Department's National
Institute of Standards and Technology has established encryption standards,
and its National Telecommunications and Information Administration
facilitates the functioning of the Internet's Domain Name System. Requiring
high-level coordination with these agencies would ensure that, before it
engages in signals intelligence collection, the IC would be sufficiently
informed of the views of other components that may hold diferent
assessments of the national interest.
To be sure, this proposal has potential downsides. To be practical, such
coordination would need to be delegable to the Deputy Secretary in each
Department, and possibly an Undersecretary. As with any intelligence
activity, the likelihood of operations being compromised increases as the
number of people involved increases. This coordination could prove
redundant, too. The National Intelligence Priorities Framework--the document
that guides resource allocation in collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence
information--already includes an interagency process at the NSC. n240
Without knowing details about the NSC coordination process, it remains
unclear how much value this policy would provide. If current NSC coordination
focuses mainly on setting intelligence collection priorities, then a process that
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afords heads of departments and agencies the opportunity to challenge the

IC to ensure that the benefits of such programs justify the costs could prove
useful. While this solution may ensure interagency coordination and send a
message to allies and foreign partners that the U.S. government takes their
concerns seriously, at the end of the day it represents a modest change to
current policy. The Coordinator for International Diplomacy created under
PPD-28 moves in this direction, but the directive does not specify reporting
lines and policymaking procedures that would ensure this official has
sufficient authority to change practices where necessary.
Another possible mechanism for encouraging interagency coordination would
be to require a signals intelligence program privacy impact statement. The
statement could be modeled after environmental impact statements, which
provide a discussion of significant environmental impacts and reasonable
alternatives. Instead of making the statement open for public comment,
however, a privacy impact statement would solicit input from within the IC
and from select departments, including State and Commerce. Section 3 of
PPD-28 provides that the heads of agencies that participate in the policy
processes for establishing signals intelligence priorities and requirements will
review annually those priorities and requirements. n241 But this provision
does not require the agencies to weigh the costs and benefits of the
programs themselves. By reducing to writing the costs and benefits, such a
statement could force the IC to actively consider the economic and
diplomatic costs of intelligence activities. The statement could have
significant downsides, however. If a privacy impact statement were required
for individual programs, it could stifle innovation. Because signals intelligence
activities necessarily involve invasions of privacy, an analyst might hesitate
to propose a new collection technique if the value of the information derived,
though possibly highly valuable, is still speculative. In order to avoid stifling
innovation, then, a privacy impact statement might best consider programs
in the aggregate.
More limits undermine national security

of State, p. 514
In addition, more oversight will not necessarily prove beneficial for an

organization with large but finite resources. Former NSA General Counsel
Stewart Baker has emphasized that the FISC, inspectors general, and other
current oversight mechanisms have a large impact on NSA's performance. He
warns that, "arguably, existing oversight mechanisms have already led NSA
to protect privacy better than it protects national security. Adding more
oversight, as Congress seems inclined to do, will shift NSA's priorities further
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in the same direction. At some point, I fear, that will lead to a serious national
security failure." n248 While PPD-28 largely reflects current practice, it could
create room for further expansions in the future. Policymakers will want to
weigh these options carefully. In an age of rapid technological change,
balancing privacy and national security admits of no easy solutions.
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ETC
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Should v. Shall
Should is advisory, shall is a requirement
of State
Interestingly, the interim status report to PPD-28, which the DNI released on
October 17, 2014, changes the operative language from "shall" to "should."
n121 "Shall" generally imposes a requirement, while "should" is merely
advisory. Under the status report, each intelligence agency "should consider"
disseminating and retaining non-U.S. person information using U.S. person
standards.
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Governments Collecting Private Metadata

Governments around the world making requests for
private user data
Tension between the conflicting demands of security and liberty is not a novel
concept, and it has sparked many debates throughout our nation's history. n1
Today, however, the use of powerful new technologies has heightened this
concern. n2 During the first six months of 2013, Google received 25,879 legal
requests for users' data "from governments around the world," a number that
has tripled since 2009. n3 Of these requests, 10,918 came from the U.S.
government alone. n4 Other Internet companies, such as Facebook and
Microsoft, have reported similar numbers. n5 These statistics reveal the
"government's steadily growing appetite for more data from more users" and
thus less privacy for individuals. n6
This issue came to the forefront of U.S. policy makers' concerns in June 2013
when Edward Snowden leaked confidential information shedding light on the
true depths of U.S. surveillance and eavesdropping programs. n7 The leaks
caused panic among some U.S. citizens, who feared that their privacy had
been compromised. n8 These concerns have spurred "the first serious reexamination of government spying" since the 1970s.
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Public Advocate Solvency

A. Public Advocate
I recommend that a public advocate be added to FISC proceedings to
represent the public's privacy and civil liberty interests, a proposal that is
supported by President Obama as well. n261 The adversarial process is a core
tenant of our U.S. legal system. n262 Typically both parties to a dispute have
the right to represent their interests in court. When many people sufer the
same injury they create a class action lawsuit and have a member of the
class represent their interests. n263 When millions sufer the same injury of
having their privacy compromised through government surveillance
programs, they too should be able to have their interests represented in
court. This is much more difficult, however, than simply picking a member of
the "class," because the "class" is the entire public, and many of those
injured are unaware of their injuries. Thus, a special role must be created to
represent the public's civil liberty interests in front of the FISC.
Further, I recommend the public advocate should be housed in a newly
created independent agency of the executive branch. While there are
concerns of intrabranch litigation, the ""mere assertion' that a legal action "is
an intra-branch dispute, without more,' does not operate to defeat federal
jurisdiction." n264 The case should be justiciable because there are "real
parties in interest" here - the public whose privacy and civil liberties are
harmed from the surveillance and the government who seeks to conduct
more surveillance to protect national security. n265 This option is preferential
to the other proposals. It would be unwise to outsource this position to a
private law firm or advocacy group due to the sensitive nature of FISC
proceedings and longevity concerns. Further, the public advocate should not
be housed in the judicial branch because this violates the principle of
separation of powers by "casting the judicial branch into the role of advocate,
as opposed to neutral arbiter." n266
Lastly, I recommend that the public advocate be an elected position. While
this recommendation runs contrary to the current leading bills on this issue,
n267 I believe there is real merit in this proposal. First, the public should be
the one to choose who represents them as the public advocate in the FISC. If
the public advocate was elected, he or she would be more accountable to the
public, and less likely to be influenced by the other branches of government,
or an officer with appointment powers. Some may argue that the public will
not be able to distinguish between the candidates, and that a more
competent public advocate would be selected if it was an appointed position.
The public, however, is the one who is having their privacy and civil liberties
jeopardized, so they should be the ones to decide who will represent their
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interests, much like an injured party in a typical lawsuit has the ability to
choose which lawyer will represent his or her interests.
The introduction of a public advocate is especially needed in the FISC
because, as Clapper v. Amnesty International USA made clear, it is very
difficult for plaintifs to meet the standing requirements in order represent
their interests in front of the FISC. n268 Another reason that a public
advocate should be an essential component of FISC proceedings is that the
fundamental function of the court has developed over time and now the FISC
"regularly assesses "broad constitutional questions' and establishes
"important judicial precedents, with almost no public scrutiny.'" n269 Because
of the impact these decisions have on the everyday lives of U.S. citizens, it is
essential that FISC proceedings become more adversarial to improve judicial
decision making.
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No Effective Surveillance Oversight

Too many actors, scattered surveillance makes oversight
impossible
Torrest et al, 2015, Carlos Torres, Azadeh Shahshahani, and Tye Tavaras,
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change, (Carlos Torres is
a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Michigan
Law School. His work history includes work at the Georgia Capital Defender's
Office, the University of Michigan Health System, Human Rights Watch as a
Program in Refugee and Asylum Law Fellow, and public service in civil rights
enforcement. Azadeh Shahshahani is President of the National Lawyers Guild
and previously served as National Security/Immigrants' Rights Project
Director with the ACLU of Georgia. She is a 2004 graduate of the University of
Michigan Law School and also has a Master's in Modern Middle Eastern and
North African Studies from Michigan. Tye Tavaras has a background in
International Studies, Arabic, and Public International Law. She is a graduate
of Emory University, The American University in Cairo, and Emory University
School of Law), University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law & Social Change,
Indiscriminate Power: Racial Profiling and Surveillance Since 9/11,
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1183&context=jlasc DOA: 11-13-15,
Oversight of government surveillance, already largely abdicated by the
courts, is weakened further by the myriad of agencies that
participate in the gathering of intelligence. The National Security
Agency, the National Security Branch of the FBI, the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis with the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence are among the seventeen diferent agencies
and offices that make up the United States Intelligence Community. n61
Although they meet to coordinate activities and information, each agency
operates independently, and brings its own expertise and motives to the
table. A number of these agencies are devoted to non-domestic work, which
further complicates matters. n62 Even sub-federal authorities, like the New
York City Police Department ("NYPD"), now play a domestic intelligence role.
n63
Beyond this, the bodies responsible for oversight of these agencies
have fractured jurisdictions that fail to exercise effective power over
most aspects of public surveillance and cannot provide a coherent
picture of the scope of American domestic intelligence programs. No
particular body is charged with oversight of intelligence as a whole.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISA Court") only has an ex
ante role in the determination of the sufficiency of an application for
intelligence-gathering on a particular individual, group, or situation,
and has no competency for follow-up with the investigation that
results from its decision. n64 On the other end of the continuum of
investigation, civil suits are also difficult to bring: most people who
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have been surveilled have no idea that surveillance is happening; it

is difficult to prove an injury to obtain standing; and the state
secrets doctrine hamstrings any lawsuit before it can substantively
begin. n65 Even in Congress, where there is supposed to be active
oversight in place, committees are weak; limited terms and purviews
prevent the development of expertise in the field; investigations
generally only occur where there has been a public issue raised
already; oversight committees generally lack budgeting authority,
which effectively declaws any enforcement strategy; and the
committees are miniscule compared to, yet just as fractured as, the
agencies they purport to oversee. n66 Although pressure against these
activities, a push for stronger regulations, and reduced informational
accessibility is starting to build from within the government, n67 the
monitoring bodies themselves are not always immune from the very
surveillance they are supposed to be regulating. This was recently
evidenced by the highly publicized findings of the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") Office of the Inspector General's report,
completed on July 18, 2014, which found that CIA employees
improperly accessed or caused access to Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence files and email.
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Surveillance Solvency Answers

Cant enforce the plan, government will act illegally
article=1183&context=jlasc DOA: 11-13-15
Intelligence and surveillance practices that the United States Intelligence
Community engages in are kept secret based on a dubious legal footing. This
secrecy is compounded by the organization of intelligence services
in the United States, which, as explained above, is fractured among
seventeen diferent agencies and offices, with no central coordination or
responsible body. n69 Add to this the exceptions to public oversight; a
rubberstamp warrant court with no follow-through authority;
similarly confused and somewhat perpetually amateur toothless
Congressional oversight; and a public unaware of and legally unable
to redress the violations of its rights; and the result is an
intelligence apparatus so fragmented and disorganized that it is
nearly impossible to monitor or control. Without a tight rein, it is
historically apparent that government intelligence agencies give in
to some of their basest political and strategic desires, and engage in
dubiously legal, and outright illegal , activity.
Government agencies map every day activities and

engage in profiling
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However disorganized it may be, the American surveillance regime is very
efective at certain components of its job, regardless of their legality. The FBI
and other agencies regularly map everyday activities, targeting ethnic
communities and engaging in blatant, if sometimes seemingly innocent,
racial profiling. Such programs invade the privacy of millions of Americans
under no justifiable pretense. An examination of what the government looks
for, and how it approaches the information it is seeking, can explain - though
not excuse - the type of information they are currently gathering.
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Race-Based Surveillance
83
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Race-Based Surveillance Widespread

FBI engages in widespread racial and ethnic-based
surveillance
These investigations do not stop at the individual level. As a predicate to
finding the targets for individual investigations, the FBI also preliminarily
and without a convincingly articulable standard engages in geomapping of ethnic communities when doing so will ""reasonably aid
in the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities' and assist in
"intelligence analysis.'" n11 By tracking the movements of persons
within ethnic areas and the locations of "ethnically-oriented
businesses and other facilities," n12 the FBI, as instructed by its 2008
internal Domestic Investigation and Operations Guide ("DIOG"), catalogues
"specific and relevant ethnic behavior" n13 in particular locations.
This data collection extends to ""behavioral and cultural information
about ethnic or racial communities' that may be exploited by
criminals or terrorists "who hide within those communities.'" n14
This program is known as "Domain Management." n15 It relies on
broad-brush, stereotypical associations between perceived criminality and
affiliation with ethnic, national, religious, or political groups to justify
surveilling and curtailing the civil liberties of people solely on the basis of
belonging to these groups.
Restrictions on racial profiling do not apply in the national

security context
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article=1183&context=jlasc DOA: 11-13-15, p. 825
This racial, ethnic, religious, and political profiling is an afront not to only the
collective consciousness, but the FBI's own internal directives. The U.S.
Department of Justice's Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies n17 prohibits race from being
used "to any degree" in law enforcement action or decision-making
without a specific indication of its appropriateness (i.e., a specific description
of a particular perpetrator, witness, or other actor). n18 However, in the
case of national security and border integrity investigations, this
restriction is very neatly loop-holed out of existence. n19 These
exceptions, barely facially neutral, lead to the targeting of Latino
populations (given that our most active border is to the south) and
Middle Eastern populations (given the colloquial association between
terrorism and persons of Middle Eastern origin). Most unfortunately, the
historical lack of religious profiling restrictions has led to the further
victimization of ethnic and immigrant populations, given the extensive
intersection of immigration status and minority religious status (i.e., Islam).
n20 Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants, for example, already have
three strikes against them in the surveillance regime - and as such,
their information and personal liberty are likely far from secure.
FBI Race and ethnic-based surveillance chills speech,

liberty, and encourages one to change the contents of
ones identity
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Often the most mundane of activities are reported under these
constitutionally dubious circumstances. n21 Examples of activities reported
by ordinary citizens include Middle Eastern males purchasing large pallets of
water, a professor taking photos of buildings for his art class, a Middle
Eastern physician neighbor being "unfriendly," or protestors engaged in a
scheduled action sending an email regarding their concerns about the
potential for police use of abusive force. n22 When the government
efectively deputizes its citizens (using untrained persons in pursuit of law
enforcement priorities) to become reporting parties, n23 and the law
enforcement community engages in blatant profiling without reasonable
suspicion, it is inevitable that a large number of innocent persons, groups,
and activities will become the subject of unwarranted suspicion and
surveillance. Such surveillance not only chills one's speech and perceived
liberty, but may actually change the content of one's identity. n24
Indiscriminate, mass surveillance activities may in fact be causing the
United States to miss clues about terrorist activity that might be discovered
with more limited, focused monitoring. n25
FBI engaging in race-based profiling in Georgia

The FBI engages in similarly broad mapping of ethnic communities in
Georgia. The ACLU of Georgia obtained FBI documents that revealed the
mapping of various ethnic populations in Atlanta and the surrounding region,
as well as the mundanity of the activities in which they are engaged that
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apparently warrant suspicion. n74 The FBI was monitoring the "Black
Separatist Threat" by noting rallies opposing the police killings of African
Americans in Atlanta; noting dated eight-year-old information that a
prominent Nation of Islam official had operated in Atlanta, and that "in
December 2001, ... there [was] a strong alliance between the Crips and NBPP
[the New Black Panther Party] in Atlanta"; and outlining the population
percentages of African Americans through time and their projected growth in
the future. n75 Another document appears to track the activities and
nationalities of students and others in technological businesses, noting the
types of immigrants in Atlanta, recent census data, and various technical and
scientific conferences in the area, concluding with a list of U.S. military
installations in the Atlanta area. n76 Other documents reveal assessments of
the numbers of foreign-born persons in Atlanta; n77 "moderate confidence"
information about the existence of Hizballah in Atlanta, which presumably
relies partly on demographic and census information for support; n78 and an
extensive look at the presence of persons of a variety of Latino nationalities,
justified by the presence of some persons of those nationalities in the gang
Mara Salvatrucha ("MS-13") - also noting the use of deportation as an
alternative means of threat elimination when information is insufficient to
[*294] warrant criminal prosecution. n79 These local assessments, coupled
with similar assessments across the country, n80 exhibit the blatant use of
ethnic and demographic information as a primary component of domestic
security threat assessments by the FBI.
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Racist Profiling
Systemic discrimination against racial minorities that
operates to protect whites
Discrimination and discriminatory legal wrangling is no stranger to the
American scene. From the expulsion of Native American tribes in
violation of treaty obligations, to the three-fifths clause of our
Constitution, to internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II,
the U.S. government has taken sweeping actions to "secure" this
country for its nominally (and inconsistently) "white" n87 citizenry to
the detriment of people of color and immigrants. Modern expressions
of these tactics have manifested in discriminatory enforcement
against, and searches of, populations of people of color and
immigrants (in spite of the fact that actual drug possession rates do
not significantly differ between races n88 and rates of usage for
some drugs are twice as high for Caucasians as they are for nonCaucasian populations n89), disproportionate arrest n90 and
imprisonment of people of color and immigrants, n91 and now the
targeting of ethnic and religious minority populations for
surveillance and control.
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A2: Holder Guidelines Solve

Revised Holder guidelines still allow ethnic profiling
article=1183&context=jlasc DOA: 11-13-15, p. 298-9
Former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. has released his revisions to the
guidelines. n115 The proposed guidelines expand prohibited profiling to
include "religion, national origin, gender and sexual orientation." n116 These
prohibited categories would be functionally equivalent to the prohibition on
racial profiling. The guidelines raise the standard that agents are required to
meet before considering these factors: "unless there is specific, credible
information that makes race relevant to a case," it must be ignored. n117
According to Hina Shamsi, an attorney with the ACLU, "Putting an end to
[religious profiling] not only comports with the Constitution, it would put real
teeth to the F.B.I.'s claims that it wants better relationships with religious
minorities." n118
The revised guidelines do however, allow the FBI to map ethnic populations
and use that information "to recruit informants and open investigations."
n119 Furthermore, the guidelines do "not apply to interdiction activities in the
vicinity of the border," n120 and thus provide tacit approval to the FBI, the
Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"), and Customs and Border
Protection ("CBP") to engage in profiling within the "vicinity" of the border.
The "vicinity" of the border is understood to reach 100 miles from any
external land or sea boundary, as well as airports and seaports that are
located on inland waterways. n121 The guidelines further do not cover state
and local enforcement. While the guidelines cover some joint federal and
local law enforcement activities, n122 a nationwide ban on unconstitutional
practices is sorely needed.
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A2: Courts Solve

Court cases have permitted race-based surveillance
Despite these judicial constraints, other cases have allowed government
surveillance to continue or expand. In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, led by Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards, held that
federal agencies, including the FBI, could withhold certain investigatory
information - including how suspects are surveilled - even though the
methods used by the FBI may have been improper, as long as the information
was created in the pursuit of a law enforcement purpose. n159 As a result,
the court did not distinguish the FBI's documents on its program against
"black nationalist groups," which listed the goals of "preventing militant black
nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting
them," from other documents with law enforcement purpose. n160
In 1986, in Lopez-Pacheco v. United States, the plaintif claimed that he was
injured as a result of FBI surveillance activity. n161 The court dismissed the
case, holding that the FBI's activities were of the nature and quality that
Congress had shielded from tort liability in the "discretionary function"
exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act. n162
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Surveillance Isnt Suspicion-Based

Surveillance not based on criminal suspicion but race and
ethnicity
What is clear from the manner of these assessments is that investigations by
the FBI are no longer performed based on criminal predicates, but rather
ethnic and demographic characteristics of communities of color that have
some stereotypical and unfounded social association with particular types of
crime. This predictive assessment very closely resembles another scientific
practice that presents a host of uncomfortable metaphorical conclusions:
"disease surveillance" by epidemiologists. n81 Epidemiologists study
diseases within a population with the aim of curtailing their spread and
eliminating their presence within that population. Broad-based public
surveillance eforts, like epidemiological studies, collect large quantities of
simple information on as many individuals within a community as possible to
determine behavioral patterns that may lead to the discovery of the "disease
path," or the transmission of the pathogen to be eliminated - or in the case of
public surveillance: potential terrorist threats. n82 Although dangers to
personal privacy could be ameliorated by anonymizing the information
gathered, the very presence of such "personal vectors" within the information
available to an agency exposes individuals to severe threats to personal
liberty should those gathering the information ever cease to self-monitor.
Intelligence agencies are demonstrably vulnerable to this flaw, if past
practice is any indicator. The FBI engages in these types of assessments
under the name "domain management." n83 The goal of domain
management is to acquire an understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities
within a territory. Tellingly, such threats were sometimes initially assessed
through analysis based partly on the hope that "sales records of Middle
Eastern food would lead to Iranian terrorists." n84
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The U.S. domestic security apparatus, as part of the war-on-terror paradigm,

seems to be stuck in a wartime footing that demands dramatic, extensive
surveillance as part of the guarantee of American security. n85 As is
apparent from the FBI and NYPD investigations revealing the [*295]
targeting of ethnic, national, and religious communities, there have been
significant recent trends in investigation correlating criminality with certain
ethnic characteristics. Profiling has occurred not merely because a racial,
ethnic, national, or religious characteristic has been used to identify a target
for surveillance, but rather because those characteristics have been used as
substitutes for individualized investigation into, or particularized information
about, the potential for criminality within a particular group or of individual
persons. Thus, race is being used as a signal of criminality, not a descriptor of
an individual.
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International Law Advantage
93
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Racial Profiling Violates International Law

Racial profiling violates international law and destroys US
International legal credibility
The war on terror has served as pretext for increasing surveillance on
American citizens, based on racial, ethnic, religious, or other status grounds.
Racial, ethnic, religious, and political profiling is not only counter to U.S. law
and internal Department of Justice directives, but it also contravenes
principles of international law.
The United Nations provides extensive recommendations and guidelines on
privacy and racial discrimination. n175 The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("UDHR") is one such document that establishes a basis for
understanding the right to privacy. n176 UDHR Article 12 states: "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence... ." n177 The rights in the UDHR are to be protected and
provided for all persons regardless of race, religion, political association, or
other similar status. n178 Although Article 17.1 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") reads similar to UDHR Article 12, n179
ICCPR Article 4 provides some clarification regarding derogation of rights,
stating that, in times of emergency, states "may take measures derogating
from their obligations" insofar as such measures are consistent with other
obligations and "do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race,
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin." n180 The difficulty in the
United States is that government officials continually subvert international
obligations due to perceived "national security" prerogatives on
constitutionally dubious, if nominally legal, grounds. n181 The new FBI
guidelines will still allow these subversions as they do not apply to all
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government agencies, including but not limited to the TSA and the CBP. n182
Even in times of war, however, status discrimination is always outside of a
government's permitted tool set.
Aside from violating the rights to privacy, current monitoring practices are
founded on the profiling of potential suspects based on racial, ethnic,
religious, and other status grounds. The International Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination ("CERD") sets clear guidelines and
recommendations regarding state actions and policies that may rely on racial
distinctions. n183 The CERD defines "racial discrimination" as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or efect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural or any other field of public life. n184
As parties to this treaty, states agree to the definitions therein, and also
agree to review governmental policies, and to amend or rescind those that
perpetuate racial discrimination. n185 Despite this requirement, the United
States has expanded surveillance and intelligence powers and
authorizations clearly targeting people based on racial, ethnic, religious, or
other status grounds.
VIII. PRIVACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the right to privacy is not as absolute as freedom from status
discrimination, limitations on privacy are only justified in accord with the
provisions and objectives of the ICCPR. In Toonen v. Australia, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, the body that monitors the
implementation of the ICCPR, explained that it "interprets the requirement of
reasonableness [in ICCPR article 17] to imply that any interference with
privacy must be [*306] proportional to the end sought and be necessary in
the circumstances of any given case." n186 In the case of surveillance, one
would need to determine whether perpetual monitoring is necessary and
proportionate to the end sought. The end in this case is threat assessment
and, should a threat be discovered, attempts at prevention. In the case of
perpetual monitoring, the scope is shockingly broad. n187 These means are
simply not necessary or proportional to achieve the desired outcome.
Outside of treaties, the international community has crafted a significant
number of guidelines regarding privacy and surveillance. More specifically,
the United Nations has taken a leading role in defining the right to privacy in
the digital age, particularly given the special vulnerabilities of electronic
communications and digital identities. n188 The discussion surrounding the
right to privacy in the digital age began with a resolution in which the United
Nations General Assembly expressed concern about the impact that
surveillance has on human rights and affirmed that rights must be
protected in online formats just as in real life. n189 The General Assembly
also called upon states to:
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review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the surveillance

of communications, their interception and the collection of personal data,
including mass surveillance, interception and collection, with a view to
upholding the right to privacy by ensuring the full and efective
implementation of all their obligations under international human rights
law ... . n190
Additionally, the resolution called upon the High Commissioner for Human
Rights to prepare a report examining the right to privacy in the digital age.
n191 The report, issued in June 2014, specifically cites concerns that the U.S.
National Security Agency and United Kingdom General Communications
Headquarters have, together, created technologies that grant access to a
vast amount of global Internet traffic. n192 Furthermore, the report indicates
that a significant number of human rights other than the right to privacy have
been impacted by digital surveillance practices including, but not limited to,
freedom of opinion and expression, family life, and the right to health by the
implementation of practices as diverse as torture and drone warfare. n193
Member states and other stakeholders have expressed concerns with
unfettered access to Internet traffic and requested that guidelines be set to
ensure security and privacy within reason for all peoples. n194
IX. THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERSECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
NATIONAL POLICY, AND SOCIAL CONVENTION
p. 307-8
Although the United States prides itself on being a (self-appointed)
beacon of human rights protection for the international community,
its adherence to international human rights standards leaves much
to be desired. The United States voted in favor of the UDHR and has ratified
the ICCPR and the CERD, but has placed reservations and understandings on
these instruments to ensure that it has room to maneuver around rights
protection as necessary, a strategy that is allowable under international law.
n195 The United States uses public safety and national security to
undermine the effect of provisions pertaining to discrimination,
clarifying that the United States guarantees protection for all peoples
under the law, yet, in times of emergency, the United States reserves
the right to implement distinctions "that may have a
disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status." n196
Additionally, a U.S. reservation to the CERD denies that the convention can
authorize action by the United States that is incompatible with the U.S.
Constitution, and ensures that the United States has the power to determine
its degree of adherence to conventions by means of domestic precedent
based solely on domestic law. n197
The war on terror has caused a shift in the way the U.S. government
and American society view war and wartime tactics. This shift to a
mindset of constant war has made that which was once exceptional into the
status quo, in addition to adjusting the social conceptions that traditionally
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drew distinct boundaries between war and peace and ratcheting up the level
of subversion of rights that is commonly acceptable to the public during
times of "war." The former General Counsel of the U.S. Department of
Defense, Jeh Johnson, stated in a speech at Oxford University in 2012 that
""war' must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of
afairs." n198 The war on terror, with its unknowable opponent, unattainable
objectives, and consequently indeterminate duration, shatters that traditional
conception and, with it, the associated norms of governmental behavior and
public expectations.
The U.S. government has used the war on terror, to justify a number
of rights restrictions for U.S. citizens and individuals it has detained
on an indefinite basis. This "war" of indefinite duration has served as
a justification for torture and the expansion of surveillance powers.
Although the derogation of certain rights is allowed during times of certain
predefined security crises, its continuation through a perpetual security
crisis risks permanent rights infringements, and even the ultimate
destruction of rights. The increase in rights abuses and racial
targeting on American soil is but a single consequence of perpetual,
normalized war.
X. CONCLUSION
The U.S. government has used a heavy hand to sort our nation by color, and
continues to do so. The cultural and political motives of control and
maintenance of the status quo exhibited during COINTELPRO are also part of
the modern surveillance culture, albeit now more often along religious lines
and diferently drawn ethnic lines. Although current surveillance and
intelligence eforts are intense, there have been recommendations, as early
as 1970, that they be intensified further. n199 Suggestions ranged from
opening physical mail to permitting surveillance of any foreign national "of
interest" in the United States, and from increasing group-characteristic
studies to ramping up CIA surveillance of American students and others living
abroad:
(1) "coverage by NSA of the communications of U.S. citizens using
international facilities;"
(2) "intensification" of "electronic surveillances and penetrations" directed at
individuals and groups "who pose a major threat to the internal security" and
at "foreign nationals" in the United States "of interest to the intelligence
community;"
(3) removal of restrictions on "legal" mail coverage and relaxation of
"restrictions on covert coverage" [mail opening] on "selected targets of
priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest;"
(4) modification of "present restrictions" on "surreptitious entry" to allow
"procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material" and "to permit
selective use" against "high priority internal security targets;"
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98
(5) relaxation of "present restrictions" on the "development of campus

sources" to permit "expanded coverage of violence-prone and student-related
groups;["]
(6) "increased" coverage by CIA "of American students (and others) traveling
or living abroad;"
(7) appointment of a "permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies" to evaluate "domestic
intelligence" and to "carry out the other objectives specified in the report."
n200
With more than forty years of evolution of technical capacities, executive
power, and group identity politics, it is possible that even more than this
would be desired and carried out by the government today.
What becomes apparent during even a brief recap of governmental profiling
and biased surveillance activities, coupled with a basic understanding of
American history, is that attitudes about race and other identities move freely
back and forth between law enforcement and the public. It is no
coincidence that anti-Arab and anti-Muslim country sentiments
following 9/11 paralleled government action against people of Arab
and Muslim-country descent in immigration and surveillance
activities, nor that these types of discrimination have faced a lack of
popular outcry when limited to immigrant populations and persons
of color. n201 It would be naive to think the internment of JapaneseAmericans during World War II did not have roots in public sentiment about
the Japanese, fed in turn at least in part by biased portrayals on mass media.
It is also true that many major advances in the protection of civil rights
have been fought every step along the way by status quo political
forces, and fed by discriminatory social attitudes, in a conflict that
ranges through social and political battlefields. n202 What has been
required to force advancement of civil rights is efective governmental
oversight and public information. Certain situations have been easier to
monitor - racially segregated schools are fairly obvious. Workplace rights,
equal access to public and private businesses, and the new push for equality
for queer individuals have been harder to monitor, but are still largely
apparent in the public sphere. But the newer types of discrimination and
invasions of civil liberties seen here, worked in the relative secrecy of
immigration courtrooms, NSA bunkers, and secret, redactable FBI files, are
tougher to ferret out. Coupled with a lack of official oversight, it only stands
to reason that this discrimination will pervade an intelligence apparatus made
up of the very same population that holds, in part, these views. n203
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99
Free Speech Advantage

Profiling chills free speech
Profiling based on certain forms of expression can chill free speech rights
when it efectively becomes a proxy for racial or religious profiling:
The harms associated with First Amendment profiling mirror those arising
from explicit racial or religious profiling. Where a form of expression is
strongly linked to one's ethnicity, national origin, or religion, government
selection of individuals for special scrutiny on account of their expression will
"feel" the same as targeting members of that racial or religious group directly.
n142
Professor Frank Cooper argues that identity - and thus, to a degree, one's
personality - is composed of both an internal and an external component.
n143 Since what you do is the only representative aspect of who you are, and
your identity is to some extent constrained by what it is that you can do,
social limitations on your ability to act or speak in certain ways constrain the
parameters within which you can construct your identity. n144 Put diferently,
if you feel as though you cannot act, speak, or associate for fear of
surveillance or prosecution, you will avoid those means of self-expression and
- due to the social pressure constructing that constraint - your personality will
actually be altered. Fear of surveillance creates changes in behavioral
patterns that force conformity with status quo personal and political
identities. n145
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Racial Profiling Neg
100
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Cant Solve State/Local -- NYPD

NYPD engages in local race & ethnic surveillance
The NYPD has been one of the more active domestic intelligence gathering
services for which we have extensive information. In his complaint against
the NYPD, Hamid Raza quotes the NYPD Radicalization Report's admonition to
monitor "enclaves of ethnic populations that are largely Muslim [that] often
serve as "ideological sanctuaries' for the seeds of radical thought." n70
Warning of the dangers posed by middle-class families, college students,
unemployed persons, first, second, and third generation immigrants,
alongside persons suspected of criminal conduct, the Radicalization Report
notes that the NYPD watches "radicalization incubators" - mosques, "cafes,
cab driver hangouts, flophouses, ... student associations, nongovernmental
organizations, hookah bars, butcher shops, and book stores." n71 Most
egregiously, it identifies as "radicalization indicators" the wearing of
traditional Islamic clothing, beard growth, alcohol abstention, and "becoming
involved in social activism and community issues," - all of which are First
Amendment-protected activities, and none of which inherently indicate
criminality or terroristic activity. n72 Put another way, even if a person
engaging in these activities was plotting a terrorist action, these activities
themselves would not substantiate a conclusion, one way or another. The
complaint also reveals that the NYPD engaged in mapping "ancestries of
interest," including twenty-eight diferent nationalities and regions in addition
to "American Black Muslims." n73
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Racist Immigration Enforcement

Racist discrimination in immigration enforcement
Discrimination is also part of law enforcement outside of the security realm,
particularly in the field of immigration. People from certain nations have been
targeted for intensified identification measures, "voluntary" interviewing,
discriminatory deportation, and baseless detention. n92 During the ambit of
the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System, immigrants from Muslim
and Arab countries experienced an increase in deportation that was nearly
ten times the average increase for immigrants from other countries. n93
Laws that permit law enforcement officers to detain suspected
undocumented residents on a "reasonable suspicion" allow for extended
detention of members of the public not accused of criminal activity. n94
"Show-me-your-papers" laws that require documentation of immigration
status impose significant burdens on many immigrants and interfere with
national uniformity of immigration systems. n95 Some states have even
enacted laws that allow police officers to arrest an individual on "the probable
belief that a person has committed a public ofense that makes him or her
removable from the United States." n96 Removability determinations require
due process, and are difficult for many experienced decision makers to
handle, let alone untrained police officers without the necessary legal
knowledge. Such statutory provisions serve as little more than a pretext to
profile and harass immigrants and people of color.
IV. FBI GUIDELINES
Attorney General Edward Levi first devised an internal protocol n97 (known
as the "Levi Guidelines") for FBI domestic security investigations in 1976 in
response to public criticism. n98 Allison Jones articulates the reasons for the
criticism:
Millennial Debate
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Surveillance Update November 13

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Millennial Debate

November 12, 2015 Policy Update

Executive Power & New Phone Records Case...............................................3

Free Speech Advantage........................................................................... 91

Executive Power & New Phone

NU Executive power over immigration has been limited

testyetofhisviewof presidential authority, which took a hit onMondaywhena

A2: Phone Records Ruling Nus DAs/Executive

Nuclear Terrorism Impact Card

Bence, a Hungarian political

another big terror attack on

society will see an emotional outpouring across the Western world

that will then transform into a catastrophic thirst for revenge. Mr

remarked on the impact of a nuclear war under

Rimini, he said: "Terrorism, energised by a fanatical belief in God, aims to start a

A2: ISIS Wont Use Nukes

A2: No Dirty Bomb Attacks Yet

Dirty Bomb Economy Impacts

A dirty bomb would shut-down DC

A dirty bomb would shut-down LA ports, destroying the

Cloud Computing Advantage &

Cloud Computing Advantage Link

A2: Cloud Computing Advantage

One Washington, D.C.-based privacy lawyer warns that American companies

Its exaggerated, impacts never occurred

First, the economic costs may be exaggerated. Whether high-tech business

Snowden's unauthorized disclosures prompted democratic governments like

We absorb economic costs all the time

Its a sunk cost

Daniel Severson, Summer 2015, Harvard International Law Journal,

Genetic Surveillance Neg

Genetic Surveillance Solvency Answers

Local databases free from CODIS

The expansion of locally-controlled DNA databases follows two decades of

Local databases worse than CODIS

Local databases targeted at people of color

Local databases trigger all the harms

Local databases operate outside of federal control

Local agencies dont even use CODIS

Local DNA databases dont have to comply with federal

Local DNA databases lead to disproportionate surveillance

racial imbalances in local databases is not just a theoretical concern. John

Local DNA databases threaten privacy

Local DNA databases threaten dignity

Existing regulation of local DNA databases is not sufficient

Genetic Surveillance Aff

Genetic Surveillance Solvency --- A2:

General Privacy Solvency Answers

Corporate Privacy Protection

CP Corporations Can Protect Customer

plaintifs: closely held, for-profit corporations. n23 Therefore, according to the

Corporations have privacy rights

Corporations protected by the Fourth Amendment

Courts have held that corporations have privacy interests

Ruling that corporations can assert privacy interests in

independent panel created in August 2013, conducted a review of Section

would to a natural person n239 except where a corporation is found to be so

Protecting corporate privacy rights solves Section 702

Regardless of the contours of the corporate personality, to the extent that a

Section 702 Aff

A2: PDD-28 Solves

Responding to these pressures, President Obama and Congress directed

PDD-28 doesnt protect the privacy of non-US persons

Overall, prior to PPD-28 the U.S. government made no public commitment to