PP v. Echegaray

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO
ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Free Legal Assistance Group Anti-Death Penalty Task Force for
accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE;
REGARDED WITH DISFAVOR IN CASE AT BAR. This is one occasion where
an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in
her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the
accused-appellant. This court explained in the case of People vs. Gerry Ballabare,
G.R. No. 108871, promulgated on November 19, 1996, that: "As pointed out in
People vs. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by the
accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress
the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There
must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance,
create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge." In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as
defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive
identification and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the
affidavit of desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier
discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal prosecution against the
accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
2. ID.; ID.; THE RULE IS THAT THE CLIENT IS BOUND BY THE
MISTAKE OF THE COUNSEL; EXCEPTION. The settled rule is that the client is
bound by the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. One of the recognized exceptions
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Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014
to this rule is gross incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and
prevented, in effect, from having his day in court to defend himself.
3. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; POSSESSES POWER TO SECURE THE
SOCIETY AGAINST THREATENED AND ACTUAL EVIL. One of the
indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and
actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws
that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the
executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the
criminals in accordance with these laws.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTY; DEATH SENTENCE; IMPOSABLE
WHERE THE LAW ITSELF PROVIDES THEREFOR. In Harden, we ruled: "The
penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler,
136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." (81
Phil. 741, 747 [1948]). Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our
courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death
sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal
acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that: ". . . there are quite a number
of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or
unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books,
and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition on certain cases, it is the
duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions." (88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951]) and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of
People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 246, 253 [1995].
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR THE RESTORATION THEREOF.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the
power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for
it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The
constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1)
that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress
specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with
the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize
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the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the
death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be
singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that Congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the
said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a
positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty.
Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It
is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming
upsurge of such crimes," for the same was never intended by said law to be the
yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of
justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death
penalty for said crimes."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEINOUS CRIME, DEFINED. In the second
whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or
description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that: ". . . the crimes punishable by
death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and
which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." Justice Santiago
Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995)
traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans words,
"haineus," meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek
prefix "haton," denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. We find the foregoing
definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a
heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the
victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate
consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing
authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate
penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but
the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; R.A. No. 7659, IDENTIFIES CRIMES WARRANTING
MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY AS WELL AS THOSE PUNISHABLE BY
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RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH. Insofar as the element of heinousness is

concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory
penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily
penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation
of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence
involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659,
with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion.
This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised
Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime
for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No.
7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In
the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659,
while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be
punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN IMPOSABLE. Construing R.A. No. 7659 in pari
materia with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating
circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision
of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty, and (2)
other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably
characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the
imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the
trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime as
heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may attend the
commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is
capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and
every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. No. 7659
provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting
the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESTORATION THEREOF; RATIONALE. The death
penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts
with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject
poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest
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citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both
their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to
the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently
prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate
heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People vs. Cristobal,
G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996 "Rape is the forcible violation of
the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape
deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is
always an intrinsically evil act . . . an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not
only the victim but the society itself."
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM :
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On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was
already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of
death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that
precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We
find no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty.
Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the
Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. The motion
raises the following grounds for the reversal of the death sentence:
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the
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pardon by the offended party and her mother before the filing of the complaint
acted as a bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of
the offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the
accused-appellant from preparing an adequate defense.
[3]
The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant
was the father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the sentence of
death against him on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and
manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of
counsel.
[7]
R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional
per se:
a.
For crimes where no death results from the offense, the
death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III,
Sec. 19 ( I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
b.
The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main
issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and
findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3)
purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
I
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings
nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on
appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution in
Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 1(1)
"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the
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first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or
disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court."
cdasia
It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion,
the defense attempted to prove that:
a)
the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of

the alleged victim's maternal grandmother;
b)
the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c)
the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated
the alleged victim's private part; and
d)
the accused was in Paraaque during the time of the alleged rape.
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review,
the accused-appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:
a)
the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting

her grandchild to file the rape case;
b)
the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could
not have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and
c)
the defense of alibi.
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the
accused-appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal of our judgment
of conviction, we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, the following matters:
a)
the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a

bar to the criminal prosecution for rape against the
accused-appellant;
b)
the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the

offense in the Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant
from adequately defending himself;
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c)
the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying

circumstance that placed the accused-appellant within the coverage
of the Death Penalty Law;
d)
the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the
trial court during the trial of the rape case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration,

the only legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to the Affidavit of Desistance
which touches on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the
prosecution of the accused-appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any time, even during appeal. 2(2)
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by the victim herself in
open court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly
pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the
latter might do the same sexual assaults to other women." 3(3) Thus, this is one
occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as
the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape
charges against the accused-appellant.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare, 4(4) that:
"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is
also cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration
that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when
coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the
testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge." 5(5)
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly
consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and
convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance,
which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no
bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the
trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his
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counsel. 6(6) One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a
way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having his
day in court to defend himself. 7(7)
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant
to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had amply exercised the
required ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of him
relative to his client's defense. As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty.
Vitug, from the time he was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the
hearings thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the Accused-Appellant's
Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration of our June 25, 1996 Decision with
extensive discussion in support of his line of defense. There is no indication of gross
incompetency that could have resulted from a failure to present any argument or any
witness to defend his client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the preparation of his
case against the prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to exculpate his
client, the accused-appellant, is the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The
alleged errors committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the new counsel
could not have overturned the judgment of conviction against the accused-appellant.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as
punishment for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient practice.
We do know that our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin and that
initially, the criminal law was used to compensate for a wrong done to a private party
or his family, not to punish in the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization
throughout the later generations against past barbarity and the institutionalization of
state power under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an individual
person with inherent human rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen
with the duty to serve the common weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society
against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government
enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its
own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the
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causes of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal
laws have been perceived as relatively stable and functional since the enforcement of
the Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional
opposition to the death penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was
originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under
specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our
legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish
Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional
question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases of
Harden v. Director of Prison, 8(8) People v. Limaco, 9(9) People v. Camano, 10(10)
People v. Puda 11(11) and People v. Marcos, 12(12) In Harden, we ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In
Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.'" 13(13)
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the
fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where
the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we
had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that:
". . . there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as
long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions." 14(14)
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion. 15(15)
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide,
murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon
or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson
resulting in death. The list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded
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10
to the emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added
espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law,
which carried the death penalty for leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more
capital offenses were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the
Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes
involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and
led to the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was
convened following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to
power by the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a
rejuvenated people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped themselves into
working committees among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B.
Laurel, Jr.as Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed
bill of rights to the rest of the commission. What is now Article III, Section 19 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded
as follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed shall
be commuted to reclusion perpetua."
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a
consensus among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the death penalty
should be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they proceeded to
deliberate on how the abolition was to be done whether the abolition should be
done by the Constitution or by the legislature and the majority voted for a
constitutional abolition of the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
". . . [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death
penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should be
done by the Constitution in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature
or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the
convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never
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carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly
criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives
might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too
presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has
been there from time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it. Human
life is more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve human life.
So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons which were presented in
support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty". 16(16)
The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive
the debate that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that
"never in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime" and that "criminality
was at its zenith during the last decade". 1(17)7 Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to
an unwillingness to absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and
leave society helpless in the face of a future upsurge of crimes or other similar
emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we
abolish the death penalty in the Constitution, we should afford some amount of
flexibility to future legislation," 18(18) and his concern was amplified by the
interpellatory remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate
Justice Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A.
Rodrigo, and Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Teodoro C. Padilla put it
succinctly in the following exchange with Commissioner Bacani:
"BISHOP BACANI. . . . At present, they explicitly make it clear that the
church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital punishment.
MR. PADILLA. . . . So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the
right even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital
punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic
point of view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA.
In fact . . . we have to accept that the state has the
delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under certain
circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do
what is needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake is
whether or not under the present circumstances that will be for the common
good.
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MR. PADILLA.
But the delegated power of the state cannot be
denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a
particular stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that delegation is
forever under all circumstances
MR. PADILLA.
So this matter should be left to the legislature to
determine, under certain specified conditions or circumstances, whether the
retention of the death penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I
do not believe this Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few
days or even a month, determine a positive provision in the Constitution that
would prohibit even the legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most
heinous crimes, the most grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and
aggravating circumstances." 19(19)
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered provision.

The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the national assembly provides for the death penalty," came from Commissioners
Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however,
expressed reservations even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:
". . . [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in
the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature. Arguments pro
and con have been given. . . . But my stand is, we should leave this to the
discretion of the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will,
in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after repealing this
piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law and that the
legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a
constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the matter of the death penalty to
the legislature, let us leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature, but
let us not have this half-baked provision. We have many provisions in the
Revised Penal Code imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke or repeal
these pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the same time say
that it is up to the legislature to impose this again.
. . . The temper and condition of the times change . . . and so we, I think
we should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes depending on the
changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the legislature
composed of representatives elected by the people.
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I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that
we are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this to the
legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust it to
the legislature 100 percent." 20(20)
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23)

commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12) voting against it,
followed by more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua."
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death

penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special criminal laws and the
state of the scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be
capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra, 21(21) we stated that "in view of the abolition of
the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty
that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua" 22(22) thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period.
The constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty for
murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium, which we
then, in People v. Masangkay, 23(23) People v. Atencio 24(24) and People v. Intino 25(25)
divided into three new periods, to wit, the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum
as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and
reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the three-grade scheme under the
Revised Penal Code. In People v. Munoz, 26(26) however, we reconsidered these
aforecited cases and after extended discussion, we concluded that the doctrine
announced therein did not reflect the intention of the framers. The crux of the issue
was whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty,
for if it did, then, the aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the old
one where the death penalty constituted the maximum period. But if no total abolition
can be read from said constitutional provision and the death penalty is only suspended,
it cannot as yet be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on
the total inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled in Munoz:
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"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution

abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the
remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be
divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended
by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to
reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These
should be maintained intact.
cdt
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is
really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough". 27(27)
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the
1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in
re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact
legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step
process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing
the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and
against capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on the policy issue of
death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body
suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection,
the Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of
death penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would
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vote on this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would
mean a vote in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a
vote against the reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the
Revised Penal Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first
decide the question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed, and
thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the compromise
bill in accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of
the death penalty, the Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes on
which death penalty would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the
nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty on at least one
crime, and that certain refinements on how the penalty would be imposed would
be left to the discretion of the seven-man committee.
xxx
xxx
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA

In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a
senator would vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote 'no' on the
imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic
policy issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the scale
of penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted
down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to
the Rules, but if approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is
going to be appointed and whatever course it will take will depend upon the
mandate given to it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a
penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the Revised
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Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death
penalty, the Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the crime for
which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to the
constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a compelling reason to impose the
death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply
because the crime is heinous." 28(28)
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention,
the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the
scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee
was subsequently created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The
mandate of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the
committee would be the determination of the crimes to be considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special
Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech. He began with an
explanation as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by
amending the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws and includes
provisions that do not define or punish crimes but serve purposes allied to the
reimposition of the death penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:
". . . [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death
penalty on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the work of
drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the subject for future
deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to consider that the death penalty
was imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the
death penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons reimpose that
penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code
that was affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as
provided in the Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been
repealed all provisions on the death penalty would be considered as having
been repealed by the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling
reasons, reimpose such penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only
one article but many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were actually
affected by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional
provision that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal Code
itself in making this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the
proposed draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific
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provisions of the Revised Penal Code are actually either reenacted or amended
or both. Because by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions were totally
repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions could be retained.
And some of them had to be amended because the Committee thought that
amendments were proper." 29(29)
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it

would have been better if the Senate were to enact a special law which merely defined
and imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:
". . . [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind
that the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when
the Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the
Revised Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that where
the death penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal
Code. So we thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes that may be
considered as heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole
trouble is, when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the special
bill the case of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime for which the
death penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in the
case of kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do the
same merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just followed the
simpler method of keeping the definition of the crime as the same and merely
adding some aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in
these offenses originally punished in the Revised Penal Code." 30(30)
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion
until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept
prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each and every
crime for which the supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the statement
in the preamble of the death penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the
alarming upsurge of [heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics
showing that in the case of each and every crime in the death penalty bill, there was a
significantly higher incidence of each crime after the suspension of the death penalty
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on February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority of the
Filipino people, than before such ratification. 31(31) Inasmuch as the re-impositionists
could not satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for the latter to accept
the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying the
reimposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there were, in fact, no
compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina argued that the
compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the State has done everything
in its command so that it can be justified to use an inhuman punishment called death
penalty". 32(32) The problem, Senator Lina emphasized, was that even the
re-impositionists admit that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice
system that may and must be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse to the enactment
of a death penalty bill was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in
the absence of compelling reasons. As an initial reaction to Senator Lina's
contentions, Senator Tolentino explained that the statement in the preamble is a
general one and refers to all the crimes covered by the bill and not to specific crimes.
He added that one crime may not have the same degree of increase in incidence as the
other crimes and that the public demand to impose the death penalty is enough
compelling reason. 33(33)
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle lines
were clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the definition of "heinous
crimes" as provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of
compelling reasons for each and every capital crime. His interpellation of Senator
Tolentino clearly showed his objections to the bill:
"Senator Taada. . . . But what would make crimes heinous, Mr.
President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are described
in the bill or are crimes heinous because they are punished by death, as bribery
and malversation are proposed to be punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but
that is not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense is the
most important element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we
should consider the relation of the offense to society in order to have a complete
idea of the heinous nature of these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by
themselves connected with the effect upon society and the government have
made them fall under the classification of heinous crimes. The compelling
reason for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of malversation and
bribery becomes so grave and so serious as indicated in the substitute bill itself,
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then there is a compelling reason for the death penalty.

Senator Taada.
With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr.
President, does the Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which
would call for the reimposition of the death penalty, should be separately,
distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will be very clear to one and
all that not only are these crimes heinous but also one can see the compelling
reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered
by the Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating the
compelling reason for each and every offense that is included in the substitute
measure. That is why in the preamble, general statements were made to show
these compelling reasons. And that, we believe, included in the bill, when
converted into law, would be sufficient notice as to what were considered
compelling reasons by the Congress, in providing the death penalty for these
different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would
suppose that with the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme Court
would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble would be
applicable to each and every offense described or punishable in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons
for each and every offense.
Senator Taada.
Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional
limitations upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation, especially
the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one which says that no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the
compelling reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a
law, will clearly define the acts and the omissions punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive
law, this is sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will more or
less be a matter of procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the
Constitution with respect to due process itself which is a separate matter from
the substantive law as to the definition and penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada.
Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears
that the reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and these
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are:
1.
penalty;
Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death
2.
There are compelling reasons; and
3.
These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does

the distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state clearly the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as
well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I
believe that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we state
why a certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised
in the Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but
what the Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient compelling reason or as to the
heinous nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The accused can certainly
raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of due
process. It will go into the very power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the
death penalty. So that would be entirely separate from the matter of due
process." 34(34)
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill
violated our international commitment in support of the worldwide abolition of capital
punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera
clarified, however, that in the United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the
different committees which vote on them for consideration in the plenary session. He
stressed that unless approved in the plenary session, a declaration would have no
binding effect on signatory countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be
deemed irrevocably bound by said covenant and protocol considering that these
agreements have reached only the committee level. 35(35)
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill
No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative
votes, and one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on
August 16, 1993.
The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16,
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1993 was a vindication of, the House of Representatives. The House had, in the Eight
Congress, earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of
the death penalty for certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the
Senate when the Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from
the House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during the Ninth Congress in the form
of House Bill No. 62 which was introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House
of Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House
Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955, 1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632
authored by various Members of the Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably
essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-impose the death
penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this
constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I
quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide
for it. . . .'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an amendment by then
Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the
death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it
merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it
at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision,
Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at
some future time, the people might want to restore death penalty through
initiative and referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it
is entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we
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should not preclude today.

xxx
xxx
xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the
reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness
in which crimes are now committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly
a patent disregard of the law and a mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of
heinous crimes the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses,
and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We ought to listen to them
because their lives, their hopes, their dreams, their future have fallen asunder by
the cruel and vicious criminality of a few who put their selfish interest above
that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent
manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent
viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and
order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness
and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence,
shock the moral self of a people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two
lovely daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long years as the
epitome of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young
business executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self of our
people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultman, a comely 16 year-old
high school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model someday, at
the hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the
sensibilities of Christians and non-Christians alike.
cdasia
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom

Castanos, the lovely and promising couple from the University of the
Philippines, is eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds and still makes our
stomach turn in utter disgust.
xxx
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23
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken

by this body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the
overwhelming clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the
Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling
or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
deserve, there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, of vigilante
justice and lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands and
exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House
Bill No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to
listen to our constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty and
pursuit of their happiness under a regime of justice and democracy, and without
threat that their loves ones will be kidnapped, raped or butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on
for justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will deter
future animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their selfish interest over
and above that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon all heinous
crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that
we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty." 36(36)
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the

House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of
oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the
form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes
without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the
perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness
involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate,
their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or
the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No.
62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among
the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not
only for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also for
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other heinous crimes such as treason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery;

rape as defined by the Revised Penal Code with or without additionally defined
circumstances; plunder, as defined in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under
Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the
owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in . . . RA 6235; and
arson resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to
the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of its
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards of decency and morality in a just and
civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to
a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad 1
Phil. 437). By the 'allegiance' is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience
which individuals owe to the government under which they live or to their
sovereign in return for the protection which they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against his
or her own will in some unidentified . . . house by a group of scoundrels who are
strangers is enough terrify and send shivers of fear through the spine of any
person, even scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is
being punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the
commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he commits and sees
it merely as a form of self-amusement. When a homicide is committed by reason
of the robbery, the culprits are perceived as willing to take human life in
exchange for money or other personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the
parents over the personal shock and suffering of their child but the stigma of the
traumatic and degrading incident which has shattered the victim's life and
permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention the ordeal of having to
undergo the shameful experience of police interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the
universal hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who are passengers
and complement of the vessel, and because of the fact that, in the high seas, no
one may be expected to be able to come to the rescue of the helpless victims.
For the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the crime of air piracy is punished due to the
evil motive of the hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon the
sovereignty of an entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant
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circumstance of subjecting the passengers to terrorism." 37(37)
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11,
1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House
of Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it was up for
consideration on third reading. 38(38) The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes
against, and 2 abstentions
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993
and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee
convened to incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to
Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the
Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes," took effect. 39(39)
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the present
time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein
accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of
death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated
to us on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the
death sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's affirmation of
his death sentence and raises for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A.
7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is unconstitutional per se
for having been enacted in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the
death penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against punishment of such nature.
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellant's
view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without complying with the twin
requirements of compelling reasons and heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659
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as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide the context for
the following analysis.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress
the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for
it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty
entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that
Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or
designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death
can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that
characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description
set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill
be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the
definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that
". . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a
just, civilized and ordered society."
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, 40(40) traced
the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus",
meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton",
denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of
what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to
the circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission
of crime, its proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society,
to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in
imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a
mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
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During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and
Taada grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived as a mere
enumeration of capital crimes without a specification of the elements that make them
heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that there were two types of crimes in the
death penalty bill: first, there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death;
and second, there were crimes penalized by mandatory capital punishment upon the
attendance of certain specified qualifying circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua
to death:
(1)
Treason (Sec. 2);
(2)
Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
(3)
Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4)
Murder (Sec. 6);
(5)
Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(6)
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the

following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more
than three days; (b) it was committed simulating public authority;
(c) serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats
to kill him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when
the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec.
8);
(7)
Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
(8)
Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or

edifice; (b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship
or airplane for public use; (d) a building or factory in the service of
public utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or
government museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive
materials located in an inhabited place; or regardless of what is
burned, if the arson is perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec.
10);
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(9)
Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape

is committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by
two or more persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and
committed with homicide (Sec. 11);
(10)
Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(11)
Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(12)
Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of

prohibited drugs (Id.);
(13)
Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs

(Id.);
(14)
Manufacture of prohibited drugs (Id.);
(15)
Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts

(Id.);
(16)
Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (Id.)
(17)
Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18)
Manufacture of regulated drugs (Id.);
(19)
Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and

distribution of regulated drugs (Id.);
(20)
Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs

(Sec. 15);
(21)
Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec.

16);
(22)
Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous

drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23)
Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate

vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24)
Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
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motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).

All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of
them being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. In other words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous
elements in each of foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily
penalized with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty
of death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the
prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty
because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance
of certain circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in the
person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of
significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society,
which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or
inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society.
cda
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is
imposed in the following crimes:
(1)
Qualified bribery
"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains
from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not
prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he
shall suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in
the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to
dehumanizing acts
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of
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death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)

(3)
Destructive arson resulting in death
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized

under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed." (Sec. 10)
(4)
qualified
Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
xxx
xxx
xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed,

the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.
when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.
2.
when the victim is under the custody of the police or
military authorities.
3.
when the rape is committed in full view of the husband,
parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.
4.
years old
when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7)
5.
when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6.
when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency.
7.
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31
has suffered permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )

(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of victim
thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed."
(Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs
where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case
where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is
allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person
using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death
of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed." (Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs
where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
contrary, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in
every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor
who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person
using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of
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Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)

(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or
officers including members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1),
5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1),
16, and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed,
if those found guilty or any of the same offenses are government officials,
employees or officers including members of police agencies and the armed
forces." (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the
mandatory death penalty if convicted are government officials, employees or
officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found
guilty of 'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as
evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein
provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the
offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum [of death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of

heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their
very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated
like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of
his or her growth as a human being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live
a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her
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individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body,
and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and
social preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is
raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made
or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance
and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political
and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat
to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it
governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions
of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not
be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is
concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory
penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily
penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation
of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence
involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with
the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is
not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code
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need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial
court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are
punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No.
7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein
to be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No.
7659 in pari materia with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1)
aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative
the provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum
penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which
indubitably characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that
justify the imposition of the death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua
to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided discretion
granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of
the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may attend
the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man
is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and
every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides the
test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of
the ever existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting
out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing an
innocent man or one criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with
both procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application of
the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement
that the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
we note that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent
demand of the abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous
crime and statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are
inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes
are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human
standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so
destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our
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socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be

frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face
of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by
the ears and thrashing it to its demission.
cda
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued
and implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case such reforms prove
unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by the
constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to
resort to that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by
unbridled criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling
reason required by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant
change in the socio-cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on
February 2, 1987 such as an unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such
are, however, interpretations only of the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the
conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". The imposition of
the requirement that there be a rise in the incidence of criminality because of the
suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for
what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death penalty first proves itself to
be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher
incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty was suspended, that
would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years
before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first place did not
require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that
there be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.
Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be
valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first
be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty.
Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It
is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming
upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the
yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of
justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death
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penalty for said crimes."

We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for attacking the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is
violative of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
in Furman v. Georgia. 41(41) To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by
the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the
nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the
black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the
unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. In
fact, the long road of the American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark
case of Furman was trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting
against racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these
defendants were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task is not
restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties.
Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants
committing these crimes should die . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no

permissible 'caste' aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of
judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be
selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and
despised. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation.

They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
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compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the
ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and
unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty
statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the
trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters,
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention
of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges
and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted
their death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks that were required by
the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new death
penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, 42(42) Jurek v. Texas, 43(43) and Profitt
v. Florida. 44(44)
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman
or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike
murder, does not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention,
accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v.
Georgia. 45(45)
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
". . . It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not
inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is
it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. It is also
established that imposing capital punishment, at least for murder, in accordance
with the procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence from
the infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital
punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
In Gregg [v. Georgia] . . . the Court's judgment was that the death
penalty for deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition of severe
punishment nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the
Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty when
imposed for other crimes. . . .
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That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the

statutes providing the punishment for that crime, has been dramatically
different. In reviving death penalty laws to satisfy Furman's mandate, none of
the States that had not previously authorized death for rape chose to include rape
among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital
offense, only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in
their revised statutes Georgia, North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter
two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and those
laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North
Carolina, respondent to those decisions, again revised their capital punishment
laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape; none of the
seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or replaced their
death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to
Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence for rape
prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included rape
among the crimes for which death was an authorized punishment.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also

authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a
child, and the rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has since been invalidated
because the death sentence was mandatory. . . . The upshot is that Georgia is the
sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present time that authorizes a
sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other
jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a child
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not
wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily
on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an
adult woman.
. . . [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly
confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate
penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the
personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the latter's
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privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be

established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self.' It is also a
violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat of force or
intimidation, to over come the will and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape
is very often accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also inflict
mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the community's
sense of security, there is public injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not
compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.
Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not
include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer
kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is
not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that
the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' . . . is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that
the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for
the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape
in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape,
while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity,
physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge
of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling
of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".
We have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the
forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the
death penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the
death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have
committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or
criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses
from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined
and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial
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injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose
actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the
innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People v.
Cristobal: 46(46)
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person.
It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom,
and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes
grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil
act . . . an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but
the society itself."
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at
the heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death
question to which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over
death". But dealing with the fundamental question of death provides a context for
struggling with even more basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is,
in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what the rights are
of the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.
"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is
substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it.
Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized
hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the society all that appears harsh
and suppressive. If we are to preserve the humane society we will have to retain
sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order that
tranquillity and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that
capital punishment is a . . . necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of
social tranquillity and ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to
indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the
necessity of social survival." 47(47)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration

and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED 48(48) for
LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and
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Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
Time has transformed man into a highly intellectual and civilized, as well as, I
wish to believe, a humane and compassionate, being. The ancient edict of "an eye for
an eye, a tooth for a tooth" has since been abandoned by a society that recognizes the
good in every man and gives a transgressor an opportunity to reform. Somehow,
however, certain vestiges of savage retribution still remain; indeed, the taking of a
human life continues, at least in some penal systems, to be an acceptable punishment.
In this country, the issue of whether or not the State should impose the death
penalty has recently been resolved with the ratification, on 02 February 1987, of the
Constitution by 76.29% of the electorate. Section 19, Article III, thereof, states:
"Sec. 19.
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua."
Ours is a rule of law. The Supreme Court is not a political entity; it can merely
apply and interpret the law. It cannot, and it will not, spare itself from this
constitutionally-mandated duty. Death penalty cases are not excepted. In the discharge
of its grave responsibility, nevertheless, the Court must act with greatest caution and
strictest circumspection for there can be no stake that can be higher, and no penalty
that can be graver, than the extinction by the State of human life.
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty now lies with the
sound discretion of the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject
to the conditions that the fundamental law has set forth, viz:
(1)
That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of

the death penalty; and
(2)
That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.
It appears to me that the Constitution did not contemplate a simple "reimposition" of

the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code
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or just because of it.

The term "compelling reasons" should be enough to indicate that there must be
a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of
the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the
statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it
distinctively inexorable to mandate the death penalty. That milieu must have turned
from bad to worse.
Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the "heinous
nature" of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death
penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law. To venture, in the case of
murder, the crime could become "heinous" within the Constitutional concept when, to
exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death, or
in the crime of rape when the offended party is callously humiliated or even brutally
killed by the accused.
I submit that, given the circumstances and the law before us, the Constitutional
fiat (now being raised for the first time in the instant Motion for Reconsideration) in
the imposition of the death penalty has not been satisfied.
I, therefore, vote for imposing instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua (the
next lower penalty than death).
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1(49) dated August 22, 1996
filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2(50) the accused raises for the first time a very
crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the law reimposing the
death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original) Motion for
Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3(51) this transcendental issue was not
brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the
trial court's sentence of death. 4(52)
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 19.
(1 ) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
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hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua." (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not
been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They
proscribe the imposition 5(53) of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty
already imposed" to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect
(it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed
capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not
merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it
from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua
of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes
that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty
ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be carried out. This is the
clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas exclaimed, 6(54)
"(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom
delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7(55) "It is thus clear
that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the
death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the
statute books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the framers of the
Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of
Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to
a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the
Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor
of the people. 8(56) In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death
penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at
some future time to enable or empower courts to re-impose it on condition that it
(Congress) 9(57) finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language
of the Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10(58) ): the authority of Congress
to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
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(1)
by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution

became effective; and
(2)
to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize

as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining

the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous"
before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For
clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law, prescribes the death penalty on
certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11(59)
to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the
Revised Penal Code; 12(60) (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13(61) and (3) by
amending certain special laws. 14(62)
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in
the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe.
Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general terms)
discuss or justify the reasons for the more severe sanction, either collectively for all
the offenses or individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the
death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took
effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the
commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed
by mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the
limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: In reviving the
death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very
limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe
the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the
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meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely
selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It
did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate
the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its
constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the
preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
"WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous
for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society."
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient

definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously
declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases
therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which
the presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious
and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the
description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity."
Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming
gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15(63) In
this case, it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the
Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe
death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or
absence of aggravating circumstances. 16(64) There's nothing really new that Congress
did which it could not have otherwise done had such provision not been included in
our fundamental law.
cdt
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were
already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With
the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17(65) no new crimes were
introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already
so punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18(66) and by special laws. In short, Sec. 19,
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Article III of the Constitution did not have any impact upon the legislative action. It
was effectively ignored by Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen.
Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19(67)
"So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President,
and from existing special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had
already death as the maximum penalty."
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were
already penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress, I submit, has
not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional
Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same
crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But
the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our
criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent
conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the
charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes"
was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what
possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on
"organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20(68) Note that the honorable
commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but
brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I
believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness",
the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing and
already penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:
1)
the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which

have an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or
viciousness unheard of until then; or
2)
even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential

ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter
perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3)
the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is

carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence,
evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its
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heinousness. 21(69)
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to
qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in a
homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the
Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival
of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659
22(70) made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best
feeble and inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the
Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed
aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of
heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the
words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we should
not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific
reasons" requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659,
Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel
Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23(71)
"MR. LAGMAN:
So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker?. . .
MR. GARCIA (P.).
The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker.
That is one.
MR. LAGMAN.
So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to
justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of
the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The
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Gentleman claims that is one of the compelling reasons. But before we

dissect this particular "compelling reason," may we know what are the
other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.)
Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman
kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if
justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances
after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in
an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be
punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the
offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN.
The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks
of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it
refers to reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of
the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept
of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained
in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the
people ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions,
because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time,
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justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those
who have committed heinous crimes.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of

"worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit that these
grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In
fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the
Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on
those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the
date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was
enacted.
Witness the following debate
Lagman:
24(72)
also between Representatives Garcia and
"MR. LAGMAN.
Very good, Mr. Speaker. Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman
from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.
MR. LAGMAN.
So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform
us the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
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Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988.

Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of
the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that
correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN.
Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of
robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.
MR. LAGMAN.
No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question .
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN.
This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty.
Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Obviously the Gentleman would agree with me, Mr. Speaker that the
volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of
40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
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This is what the statistics say. I understand we are reading now from the
same document.
MR. LAGMAN.
Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of
22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19
percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.)
As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I
would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document
that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN.
But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
The document speaks for itself ."
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures
on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987
as compared to 1991: 25(73)
"Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 this was the year when the death penalty was abolished
the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to
2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to
2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862
in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the
drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and
there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991."
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death

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penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against
heinous crimes." 26(74) However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or
otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship
between the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission
or non-commission thereof.
This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27(75) in the same manner that
another proposition that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate
arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense
and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses can be argued
indefinitely. 28(76) This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken
word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act
within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing
power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is
included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should like any other guarantee in favor
of the accused be zealously protected, 29(77) and any exception thereto meticulously
screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the
right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30(78) Here the issue is not just crimes
but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at
Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." 31(79) This primary right of the people to enjoy life life
at its fullest, life in dignity and honor is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but
is in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the
Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights, 32(80) expressly prohibits any form of torture 33(81) which is arguably a
lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection
to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34(82) and
establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35(83)
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property, for
people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the
strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the
final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.
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Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech,
assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most important of these rights is
the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and
expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that
the death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The
"Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group
36(84) highlights this sad fact:
"(1) Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37(85) have
been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty
convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7)
convicts per month, double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed
the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts
reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly
average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty-one percent
(21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven
percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above
P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000
to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent
(7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000
comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one
percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while
approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five
percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not
know how much they earn in a month.
(3) Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them,
earn below the government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten
(10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty six
(26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong
to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30,000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts
earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15)
convicts do not know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22)
convicts earn nothing at all.
(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%)
are agricultural workers or workers in animal husbandry; of these, thirty (30),
or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the
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transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers
or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27)
are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper)
with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales
and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell
or fish, cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers,
beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers,
radio technicians) and four (4) clerks, janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk).
About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons
belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals,
administrative employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine
percent (9%) are unemployed.
(5) None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication.
About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand
Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand
Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo,
Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national
and speaks and understand Niponggo.
(6) Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college,
about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying levels of elementary education
with twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent
(35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with
more than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts finished
vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all."
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations

sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the
powerless in society those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital
crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are
required. The best example to show the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very
case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings ill the trial court and even before this Court until the Free Legal
Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written
in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are
themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The effect of having a death
penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in
the minds of the latter, a sense unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless
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of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.
cdtai
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in

particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading,
and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving
capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the
unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged
are concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a strange and
incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating,
whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of
the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that
there will always be a certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason
of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are
consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal
environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and
are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in
vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty
neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law
may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much
stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist
in the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged
are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and
assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in
spite of themselves, they can be powered to rise above themselves and their situation.
The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately
wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any
significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the
pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with
this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor
and disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so
obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for
the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
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(1)
The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute
books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.
(2)
The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitutional right

against the death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.
(3)
Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused because such a statute
denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny
equal justice to the underprivileged.
liblex
(4)
Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be

ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
(5)
Congressional power to prescribe death is severely limited by two

concurrent requirements:
(6)
(a)
First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances

which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart
from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain
why and how these circumstances define or characterize the
crime as "heinous".
(b)
Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and
specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the
Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears
repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must both
be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate "for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The compelling
reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.
In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and

compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and not
just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is a fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well

as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 38(86)
While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it
advisedly limits such prerogative only to "cases of extreme gravity." 39(87) To quote
Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40(88) 40a(89)
"punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the
extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
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words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very
rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church
indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly
recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man created
precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows
capital punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the
Church grudgingly permits it only for reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes
of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in enacting RA 7659,
amply discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling
reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH, as provided for under RA
7659," and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.
Footnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
249 SCRA 303, 307-308.

See Amigo v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 382, 390 [1996]; De Leon v. Court of
Appeals, 245 SCRA 166, 172 [1995].
RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 19.
G.R. No. 108871 promulgated on November 19, 1996.
People v. Pimentel, 118 SCRA 695 [1982]; citing People v. Manigbas, 109 Phil. 469
[1960].
Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 245 SCRA 384, 389 [1995]; Arambulo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA
589, 601 [1993]; Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980].
Suarez v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 274, 279-280 [1993].
81 Phil. 741 [1948].
88 Phil. 36 [1951].
115 SCRA 688 [1982].
133 SCRA 1 [1984].
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12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
147 SCRA 204 [1987].

81 Phil. 741, 747 [1948].
88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951].
249 SCRA 246, 253 [1995].
Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. I, p. 676.
Id., p. 678.
Id., p. 680.
Id., p. 744.
155 SCRA 327 [1987].
Id., p. 335.
155 SCRA 113 [1987].
156 SCRA 242 [1987].
165 SCRA 637 [1988].
170 SCRA 107 [1989].
Id., p. 121.
Journal, Senate, February 15, 1993, Vol. 2, p. 1246.
Record, Senate, March 17, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 77.
Id., May 18, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 596.
Record, Senate, March 18, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 106-112.
Journal, February 10 & 11, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1223.
Journal, Senate, March 22, 1993, Vol. II, pp. 1574-1575.
Record, Senate, May 11, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 500-501.
Journal, Senate, February 2, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1161.
Record, House of Representatives, Vol. III, November 9, 1992, pp. 417-418.
Record, House of Representatives, Vol. V, February 23, 1993, p. 98.
People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 [1994]; People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 [1994].
251 SCRA 293 [1995].
408 US 238, 33 L Ed 2d 346, 92 S Ct. 2726.
428 US 153 49 L Ed 2d 859, 96 S Ct 2909.
428 US 262, 49 L Ed 2d 929, 96 S Ct 2950.
428 US 242, 49 L Ed 2d 913, 96 S Ct 2960.
433 US 584, 53 L Ed 2d 982, 97 S Ct 286.
G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996.
Donald Atwell Zoll, "A Wistful Goodbye to Capital Punishment," National Review,
December 3, 1971, pp. 1351-1354.
Three members of the Court voted to declare RA. 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
reimposes the death penalty. Two of them wrote Separate Opinions, which are
attached as annexes hereto, without indicating the names of the authors consistent
with the Court's policy that, in death cases, ponentes of opinions whether majority
or minority are not to be indicated.
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SEPARATE OPINION:
1.
It is called "Supplemental" because there was a (main) Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the previous counsel of the accused, which this Court already denied.
2.
The Anti Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group Pablito V.
Sanidad, Jose Manuel I. Diokno, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren Moncupa, Eduardo R.
Abaya and Ma. Victoria I. Diokno filed its Notice of Appearance dated August 22,
1996 only on August 23, 1996, after the Per Curiam Decision of this Court was
promulgated on June 25, 1996.
3.
Atty. Julian R. Vitug, Jr.
4.
The bulk of jurisprudence precludes raising an issue for the first time only on appeal.
See, for instance, Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA
303, October 13, 1995; Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245
SCRA 715, July 11, 1995; Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 738, July 21, 1995. However, the Court resolved to tackle the
question of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 in this case, anticipating that
the same question would be raised anyway in many other subsequent instances. The
Court resolved to determine and dispose of the issue once and for all, at the first
opportunity. To let the issue pass unresolved just because it was raised after the
promulgation of the decision affirming conviction may result in grave injustice.
5.
In People vs. Muoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989, the Court, prior to the
enactment and effectivity of RA 7659, ruled by a vote of 9-6 (J. Cruz, ponente, C.J.
Fernan, JJ. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and
Medialdea, concurring) that the death penalty was not abolished but only prohibited
from being imposed. But see also the persuasive Dissenting Opinion of Mme. Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera (joined by JJ. Narvasa, Paras, Sarmiento, Cortes and
Regalado) who contended that the Constitution totally abolished the death penalty and
removed it from the statute books. People vs. Muoz reversed the earlier "abolition"
doctrine uniformly held in People vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRA 327, October 30, 1987,
(per C.J. Yap); People vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113, October 27, 1987, (per J.
Melencio-Herrera) and People vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242, December 10, 1987 (per
C.J. Narvasa). It is time that these cases are revisited by this Court.
6.
This quote is taken from I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 676 (July 17,
1986) as follows:
"Fr. Bernas:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on
whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the
abolition should be done by the Constitution in which case it cannot be restored by
the legislature or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman
for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never
carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals,
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved.
Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous for any man.
The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial
should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution
intended precisely to serve human life. So basically, this is the summary of the
reasons which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty. (emphasis supplied)
Dissenting Opinion in People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 129.
Thus in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, September 4, 1986, we held that a statute
which allows an exception to a constitutional right (against warrantless arrests)
should be strictly construed.
In his scholarly Memorandum, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. as amicus curiae in People
vs. Pedro V. Malabago (G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996), vigorously argues that
RA 7659 has validly restored the death penalty which may now be imposed provided
that the prosecution proves, and the court is convinced, that (a) the accused is guilty
of a crime designated by RA 7659 as capital, (b) whose commission is accompanied
by aggravating circumstances as defined by Arts. 14 and 15 of the Revised Penal
Code, (c) the accompanying aggravating circumstance must be one which can be
characterized by the court as making the crime "heinous", and (d) that the execution
of the offender is demanded by "compelling reasons" related to the offense. In other
words, according to him, it is the courts not Congress that have the
responsibility of determining the heinousness of a crime and the compelling reason
for its imposition upon a particular offender, depending on the facts of each case. I
cannot however subscribe to this view. The Constitution clearly identifies Congress
as the sovereign entity which is given the onus of fulfilling these two constitutional
limitations.
People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 121.
Which became effective on December 31, 1993, per People vs. Burgos, 234 SCRA
555, 569, July 29, 1994; People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, December 6, 1995;
People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, December 11, 1995.
Art. 114 Treason; Art. 123 Qualified Piracy; Art. 246 Parricide; Art. 248
Murder; Art. 255 Infanticide; Art. 267 Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention; Art. 294 Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Art.
320 Destructive Arson; Art. 335 Rape.
Art. 211-A on Qualified Bribery.
Section 2, RA 7080 Plunder; Secs. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II of RA 6425
Prohibited Drugs; Secs. 14, 14-A and 15 of Article III of said RA 6425
Carnapping.
A preamble is not an essential part of a statute. (Agpalo, Statutory Construction,
Second Edition 1990; Martin, Statutory Construction, Sixth Edition, 1984). The
function of the preamble is to supply reasons and explanation and not to confer power
or determine rights. Hence it cannot be given the effect of enlarging the scope or
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16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
effect of a statute. (C. Dallas Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Fourth
Edition, Volume IA, sec. 20.03).
Under Sec. 11, RA 7659, it appears that death is the mandatory penalty for rape,
regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
"(w)hen by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed," or when
it is "committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated" in said section.
While plunder and qualified bribery are "new" capital offenses, RA 7659 nonetheless
fails to justify why they are considered heinous. In addition, the specific compelling
reasons for the prescribed penalty of death are not laid out by the statute.
In the case of rape, RA 7659 provided certain attendant circumstances which the
prosecution must prove before courts can impose the extreme penalty. Just the same
however, the law did not explain why said circumstances would make the crimes
heinous. Neither did it set forth the compelling reasons therefor.
Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to March 11, 1993, Volume
III, No. 48, January 25, 1993, p. 122.
I Record of the Constitutional Commission, July 18, 1986, pp. 742-743:
"MR. SUAREZ.
The Gentleman advisedly used the words 'heinous crimes',
whatever is the pronunciation. Will the Gentleman give examples of 'heinous crimes'?
For example, would the head of an organized syndicate in dope distribution or dope
smuggling fall within the qualification of a heinous offender such as to preclude the
application of the principle of abolition of death penalty?
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, Madam President. That is one of the possible crimes that
would qualify for a heinous crime. Another would be organized murder. In other
words, yesterday there were many arguments for and against, and they all had merit.
But in the contemporary society, we recognize the sacredness of human life and I
think it was Honorable Laurel who said this yesterday it is only God who gives
and takes life. However, the voice of the people is also the voice of God, and we
cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in
the future that circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today. We
know that this is very difficult question. The fact that the arguments yesterday were
quite impassioned and meritorious merely tell us that this is far from a well-settled
issue. At least in my personal opinion, we would like the death penalty to be
abolished. However, in the future we should allow the National Assembly, in its
wisdom and as representatives of the people, to still impose the death penalty for the
common good, in specific cases.
MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you.
I would like to pursue some more the Gentleman's definition of 'heinous crimes.'
Would the brutal murder of a rape victim be considered as falling within that
classification?
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, yes, particularly, if it is a person in authority.
He would, therefore, add as an aggravating circumstance to the crime the abuse of his
position in authority.
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21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you."
Some examples of this may be taken by Congress from Richmond vs. Lewis, 506 US
40, like "gratuitous violence" or "needless mutilation" of the victim.
Paragraph 3 & 4 of the preamble reads:
"WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only
in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property but has also affected the
nation's efforts towards sustainable economic development and prosperity while at the
same time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the latter's ability
to maintain peace and order in the country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and the rule of law,
and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes,
finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes;"
Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993, Volume
IV, February 10, 1993, p. 674, emphasis supplied.
Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993, Vol. III,
November 10, 1992, p. 448; emphasis supplied.
III, No. 50, January 27, 1993, pp. 176-177.
See "Sponsorship Remarks" of Rep. Manuel Sanchez, Record of the House of
Representatives, November 9, 1992, pp. 40-42.
Witness, for instance, this interesting exchange between Commissioners Joaquin
Bernas and Napoleon Rama (I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 678):
FR. BERNAS.
When some experts appeared before us and we asked them if
there was evidence to show that the death penalty had deterred the commission of
deadly crimes, none of them was able to say that there was evidence, conclusive
evidence, for that.
MR. RAMA.
I am curious. Who are these experts then social scientist or
penologists or what?
FR. BERNAS.
Penologists.
MR. RAMA.
Of course, we are aware that there is also another school of
thought here, another set of experts, who would swear that the death penalty
discourages crimes or criminality. Of course, Commissioner Bernas knows that never
in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime. I say that criminality was at
its zenith during the last decade.
FR. BERNAS.
Correct, in spite of the existence of the death penalty.
MR. RAMA.
Yes, but not necessarily in spite of the existence of the death
penalty. At any rate, does the sponsor think that in removing the death penalty, it
would not affect, one way or another, the crime rate of the country?
FR. BERNAS.
The position taken by the majority of those who voted in favor of
this provision is that means other than the death penalty should be used for the
prevention of crime."
Cf. Report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prosecution and Control,
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29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
United Nations Social Affairs Division. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Branch, Vienna, 1988, p. 110.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his book The Bill of Rights, (Second
Edition, 1972, p. 4) states: "A regime of constitutionalism is thus unthinkable without
an assurance of the primacy of a bill of rights. Precisely a constitution exists to assure
that in the discharge of the governmental functions, the dignity that is the birthright of
every human being is duly safeguarded. . . ." In the context of the role of a bill of
rights the vast powers of government are clearly to be exercise within the limits set by
the constitution, particularly the bill of rights. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators vs. City Mayor of Manila, (L-24693, July 31, 1967), it was held that the
exercise of police power, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. The guarantee in Sec. 1 of Article III of the
Constitution embraces life, liberty and property. In the words of Justice Roberto
Concepcion in People vs. Hernandez, (99 Phil. 515,551-2 [1956]), " . . . individual
freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be
denied upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety.
Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political
system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph
of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and
(21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom. . . ." These
guarantees are preserved in the 1987 Constitution, according to Fr. Bernas.
See, for instance, People vs. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554, 571, October 25, 1995, and
People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687, 702-703, November 10, 1995.
At. III, Sec. 1.
Art. III, Sec. 11.
Art. II, Sec. 12(2).
Art. II, Sec. 12.
Art. II, Secs. 15, 16 & 17.
For details, see Annex A of the Memorandum for the Accused-Appellant dated
September 26, 1996 filed by the Free Legal Assistance Group in People vs.
Malabago, G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996.
The FLAG-submitted Profile states that 186 have been sentenced to death by trial
courts since the effectivity of RA 7659. The Philippine Star issue of December 9,
1996, page 17, however reports that, quoting Sen. Ernesto Herrera, the total number
of death row inmates has gone up to 267, as of November, 1996, of whom more than
one half (139) are rape convicts. Some major dailies (Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Philippine Star, Manila Standard) in their February 3, 1997 issue up the death row
figure to 300, as of the end of January 1997, with 450 as the probable number at the
end of 1997.
The preamble of the Constitution is theistic. It declares the "sovereign Filipino
people's" imploration of the "aid of Almighty God".
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39.
40.
Catechism of the Catholic Church, p. 512, Word and Life Publications:

"2266.
Preserving the common good of society requires rendering the aggressor
unable to inflict harm. For this reason the traditional teaching of the Church has
acknowledged as well-founded the right and duty of legitimate public authority to
punish malefactors by means of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime,
not excluding, in cases of extreme gravity, the death penalty. For analogous reasons
those holding authority have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the
community in their charge.
Evangelium Vitae, items no. 55 and 56, states:
"55. This should not cause surprise: to kill a human being, in whom the image of
God is present, is a particularly serious sin. Only God is the master of life! Yet from
the beginning, faced with the many and often tragic cases which occur in the life of
individuals and society, Christian reflection has sought a fuller and deeper
understanding of what God's commandment prohibits and prescribes. There are, in
fact, situations in which values proposed by God's Law seem to involve a genuine
paradox. This happens for example in the case of legitimate defense, in which the
right to protect one's own life and the duty not to harm someone else's life are difficult
to reconcile in practice. Certainly, the intrinsic value of life and the duty to love
oneself no less than others are the basis of a true right to self-defense. The demanding
commandment of love of neighbor, set forth in the Old Testament and confirmed by
Jesus, itself presupposes love of oneself as the basis of comparison: "You shall love
your neighbor as yourself' (Mk 12:31). Consequently, no one can renounce the right
to self-defense out of lack of love for life or for self. This can only be done in virtue
of a heroic love which deepens and transfigures the love of self into a radical
self-offering, according to the spirit of the Gospel Beatitudes (cf. Mt. 5:38-40). The
sublime example of this self-offering is the Lord Jesus himself.
Moreover, 'legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for
someone responsible for another's life, the common good of the family or of the
State.' Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of
causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is
attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it about, even though he may not
be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason.
56. This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty. On this
matter there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil society, to demand
that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished completely. The
problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice even more in line
with human dignity and thus, in the end, with God's plan for man and society. The
primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is "to redress the disorder
caused by the offence." Public authority must redress the violation of personal and
social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a
condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way
authority also fulfills the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people's
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safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change
his or her behavior and be rehabilitated.
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the
punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the
words, when it would not be possible other wise to defend society. Today however, as
a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases
are very rare, if not practically non-existent.
In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic
Church remains valid: "If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives
against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public
authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the
concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of
the human person."
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Endnotes
1 (Popup - Popup)
1.
249 SCRA 303, 307-308.
2 (Popup - Popup)
2.
See Amigo v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 382, 390 [1996]; De Leon v. Court of
Appeals, 245 SCRA 166, 172 [1995].
3 (Popup - Popup)
3.
RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 19.
4 (Popup - Popup)
4.
G.R. No. 108871 promulgated on November 19, 1996.
5 (Popup - Popup)
5.
People v. Pimentel, 118 SCRA 695 [1982]; citing People v. Manigbas, 109 Phil. 469
[1960].
6 (Popup - Popup)
6.
Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 245 SCRA 384, 389 [1995]; Arambulo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA
589, 601 [1993]; Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980].
7 (Popup - Popup)
7.
Suarez v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 274, 279-280 [1993].
8 (Popup - Popup)
8.
81 Phil. 741 [1948].
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9 (Popup - Popup)
9.
88 Phil. 36 [1951].
10 (Popup - Popup)
10.
115 SCRA 688 [1982].
11 (Popup - Popup)
11.
133 SCRA 1 [1984].
12 (Popup - Popup)
12.
147 SCRA 204 [1987].
13 (Popup - Popup)
13.
81 Phil. 741, 747 [1948].
14 (Popup - Popup)
14.
88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951].
15 (Popup - Popup)
15.
249 SCRA 246, 253 [1995].
16 (Popup - Popup)
16.
17 (Popup - Popup)
17.
Id., p. 678.
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18 (Popup - Popup)
18.
Id., p. 680.
19 (Popup - Popup)
19.
20 (Popup - Popup)
20.
Id., p. 744.
21 (Popup - Popup)
21.
155 SCRA 327 [1987].
22 (Popup - Popup)
22.
Id., p. 335.
23 (Popup - Popup)
23.
155 SCRA 113 [1987].
24 (Popup - Popup)
24.
156 SCRA 242 [1987].
25 (Popup - Popup)
25.
165 SCRA 637 [1988].
26 (Popup - Popup)
26.
170 SCRA 107 [1989].
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27 (Popup - Popup)
27.
Id., p. 121.
28 (Popup - Popup)
28.
Journal, Senate, February 15, 1993, Vol. 2, p. 1246.
29 (Popup - Popup)
29.
Record, Senate, March 17, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 77.
30 (Popup - Popup)
30.
Id., May 18, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 596.
31 (Popup - Popup)
31.
Record, Senate, March 18, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 106-112.
32 (Popup - Popup)
32.
Journal, February 10 & 11, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1223.
33 (Popup - Popup)
33.
Journal, Senate, March 22, 1993, Vol. II, pp. 1574-1575.
34 (Popup - Popup)
34.
Record, Senate, May 11, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 500-501.
35 (Popup - Popup)
35.
Journal, Senate, February 2, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1161.
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36 (Popup - Popup)
36.
37 (Popup - Popup)
37.
38 (Popup - Popup)
38.
Record, House of Representatives, Vol. V, February 23, 1993, p. 98.
39 (Popup - Popup)
39.
People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 [1994]; People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 [1994].
40 (Popup - Popup)
40.
251 SCRA 293 [1995].
41 (Popup - Popup)
41.
408 US 238, 33 L Ed 2d 346, 92 S Ct. 2726.
42 (Popup - Popup)
42.
428 US 153 49 L Ed 2d 859, 96 S Ct 2909.
43 (Popup - Popup)
43.
428 US 262, 49 L Ed 2d 929, 96 S Ct 2950.
44 (Popup - Popup)
44.
428 US 242, 49 L Ed 2d 913, 96 S Ct 2960.
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45 (Popup - Popup)
45.
433 US 584, 53 L Ed 2d 982, 97 S Ct 286.
46 (Popup - Popup)
46.
G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996.
47 (Popup - Popup)
47.
Donald Atwell Zoll, "A Wistful Goodbye to Capital Punishment," National Review,
December 3, 1971, pp. 1351-1354.
48 (Popup - Popup)
48.
Three members of the Court voted to declare RA. 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
reimposes the death penalty. Two of them wrote Separate Opinions, which are
attached as annexes hereto, without indicating the names of the authors consistent
with the Court's policy that, in death cases, ponentes of opinions whether majority
or minority are not to be indicated.
49 (Popup - Popup)
1.
It is called "Supplemental" because there was a (main) Motion for Reconsideration

filed by the previous counsel of the accused, which this Court already denied.
50 (Popup - Popup)
2.
The Anti Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group Pablito V.
Sanidad, Jose Manuel I. Diokno, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren Moncupa, Eduardo R.
Abaya and Ma. Victoria I. Diokno filed its Notice of Appearance dated August 22,
1996 only on August 23, 1996, after the Per Curiam Decision of this Court was
promulgated on June 25, 1996.
51 (Popup - Popup)
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3.
Atty. Julian R. Vitug, Jr.
52 (Popup - Popup)
4.
The bulk of jurisprudence precludes raising an issue for the first time only on appeal.
See, for instance, Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA
303, October 13, 1995; Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245
SCRA 715, July 11, 1995; Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 738, July 21, 1995. However, the Court resolved to tackle the
question of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 in this case, anticipating that
the same question would be raised anyway in many other subsequent instances. The
Court resolved to determine and dispose of the issue once and for all, at the first
opportunity. To let the issue pass unresolved just because it was raised after the
promulgation of the decision affirming conviction may result in grave injustice.
53 (Popup - Popup)
5.
In People vs. Muoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989, the Court, prior to the
enactment and effectivity of RA 7659, ruled by a vote of 9-6 (J. Cruz, ponente, C.J.
Fernan, JJ. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and
Medialdea, concurring) that the death penalty was not abolished but only prohibited
from being imposed. But see also the persuasive Dissenting Opinion of Mme. Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera (joined by JJ. Narvasa, Paras, Sarmiento, Cortes and
Regalado) who contended that the Constitution totally abolished the death penalty and
removed it from the statute books. People vs. Muoz reversed the earlier "abolition"
doctrine uniformly held in People vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRA 327, October 30, 1987,
(per C.J. Yap); People vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113, October 27, 1987, (per J.
Melencio-Herrera) and People vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242, December 10, 1987 (per
C.J. Narvasa). It is time that these cases are revisited by this Court.
54 (Popup - Popup)
6.
This quote is taken from I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 676 (July 17,
1986) as follows:
"Fr. Bernas:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on
whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the
abolition should be done by the Constitution in which case it cannot be restored by
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the legislature or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman
for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never
carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals,
hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved.
Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous for any man.
The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial
should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution
intended precisely to serve human life. So basically, this is the summary of the
reasons which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty. (emphasis supplied)
55 (Popup - Popup)
7.
Dissenting Opinion in People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 129.
56 (Popup - Popup)
8.
Thus in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, September 4, 1986, we held that a statute
which allows an exception to a constitutional right (against warrantless arrests)
should be strictly construed.
57 (Popup - Popup)
9.
In his scholarly Memorandum, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. as amicus curiae in People
vs. Pedro V. Malabago (G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996), vigorously argues that
RA 7659 has validly restored the death penalty which may now be imposed provided
that the prosecution proves, and the court is convinced, that (a) the accused is guilty
of a crime designated by RA 7659 as capital, (b) whose commission is accompanied
by aggravating circumstances as defined by Arts. 14 and 15 of the Revised Penal
Code, (c) the accompanying aggravating circumstance must be one which can be
characterized by the court as making the crime "heinous", and (d) that the execution
of the offender is demanded by "compelling reasons" related to the offense. In other
words, according to him, it is the courts not Congress that have the
responsibility of determining the heinousness of a crime and the compelling reason
for its imposition upon a particular offender, depending on the facts of each case. I
cannot however subscribe to this view. The Constitution clearly identifies Congress
as the sovereign entity which is given the onus of fulfilling these two constitutional
limitations.
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58 (Popup - Popup)
10.
People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 121.
59 (Popup - Popup)
11.
Which became effective on December 31, 1993, per People vs. Burgos, 234 SCRA
555, 569, July 29, 1994; People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, December 6, 1995;
People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, December 11, 1995.
60 (Popup - Popup)
12.
Art. 114 Treason; Art. 123 Qualified Piracy; Art. 246 Parricide; Art. 248
Murder; Art. 255 Infanticide; Art. 267 Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention; Art. 294 Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Art.
320 Destructive Arson; Art. 335 Rape.
61 (Popup - Popup)
13.
Art. 211-A on Qualified Bribery.
62 (Popup - Popup)
14.
Section 2, RA 7080 Plunder; Secs. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II of RA 6425

Prohibited Drugs; Secs. 14, 14-A and 15 of Article III of said RA 6425
Carnapping.
63 (Popup - Popup)
15.
A preamble is not an essential part of a statute. (Agpalo, Statutory Construction,

Second Edition 1990; Martin, Statutory Construction, Sixth Edition, 1984). The
function of the preamble is to supply reasons and explanation and not to confer power
or determine rights. Hence it cannot be given the effect of enlarging the scope or
effect of a statute. (C. Dallas Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Fourth
Edition, Volume IA, sec. 20.03).
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16.
Under Sec. 11, RA 7659, it appears that death is the mandatory penalty for rape,
regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
"(w)hen by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed," or when
it is "committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated" in said section.
65 (Popup - Popup)
17.
While plunder and qualified bribery are "new" capital offenses, RA 7659 nonetheless
fails to justify why they are considered heinous. In addition, the specific compelling
reasons for the prescribed penalty of death are not laid out by the statute.
66 (Popup - Popup)
18.
In the case of rape, RA 7659 provided certain attendant circumstances which the
prosecution must prove before courts can impose the extreme penalty. Just the same
however, the law did not explain why said circumstances would make the crimes
heinous. Neither did it set forth the compelling reasons therefor.
67 (Popup - Popup)
19.
III, No. 48, January 25, 1993, p. 122.
68 (Popup - Popup)
20.
I Record of the Constitutional Commission, July 18, 1986, pp. 742-743:

"MR. SUAREZ.
The Gentleman advisedly used the words 'heinous crimes',
whatever is the pronunciation. Will the Gentleman give examples of 'heinous crimes'?
For example, would the head of an organized syndicate in dope distribution or dope
smuggling fall within the qualification of a heinous offender such as to preclude the
application of the principle of abolition of death penalty?
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, Madam President. That is one of the possible crimes that
would qualify for a heinous crime. Another would be organized murder. In other
words, yesterday there were many arguments for and against, and they all had merit.
But in the contemporary society, we recognize the sacredness of human life and I
think it was Honorable Laurel who said this yesterday it is only God who gives
and takes life. However, the voice of the people is also the voice of God, and we
cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in
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the future that circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today. We
know that this is very difficult question. The fact that the arguments yesterday were
quite impassioned and meritorious merely tell us that this is far from a well-settled
issue. At least in my personal opinion, we would like the death penalty to be
abolished. However, in the future we should allow the National Assembly, in its
wisdom and as representatives of the people, to still impose the death penalty for the
common good, in specific cases.
MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you.
I would like to pursue some more the Gentleman's definition of 'heinous crimes.'
Would the brutal murder of a rape victim be considered as falling within that
classification?
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, yes, particularly, if it is a person in authority.
He would, therefore, add as an aggravating circumstance to the crime the abuse of his
position in authority.
MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you."
69 (Popup - Popup)
21.
Some examples of this may be taken by Congress from Richmond vs. Lewis, 506 US
40, like "gratuitous violence" or "needless mutilation" of the victim.
70 (Popup - Popup)
22.
Paragraph 3 & 4 of the preamble reads:

"WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only
in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property but has also affected the
nation's efforts towards sustainable economic development and prosperity while at the
same time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the latter's ability
to maintain peace and order in the country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and the rule of law,
and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes,
finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes;"
71 (Popup - Popup)
23.
Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993, Volume

IV, February 10, 1993, p. 674, emphasis supplied.
72 (Popup - Popup)
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24.
Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993, Vol. III,
November 10, 1992, p. 448; emphasis supplied.
73 (Popup - Popup)
25.
III, No. 50, January 27, 1993, pp. 176-177.
74 (Popup - Popup)
26.
See "Sponsorship Remarks" of Rep. Manuel Sanchez, Record of the House of

Representatives, November 9, 1992, pp. 40-42.
75 (Popup - Popup)
27.
Witness, for instance, this interesting exchange between Commissioners Joaquin

Bernas and Napoleon Rama (I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 678):
FR. BERNAS.
When some experts appeared before us and we asked them if
there was evidence to show that the death penalty had deterred the commission of
deadly crimes, none of them was able to say that there was evidence, conclusive
evidence, for that.
MR. RAMA.
I am curious. Who are these experts then social scientist or
penologists or what?
FR. BERNAS.
Penologists.
MR. RAMA.
Of course, we are aware that there is also another school of
thought here, another set of experts, who would swear that the death penalty
discourages crimes or criminality. Of course, Commissioner Bernas knows that never
in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime. I say that criminality was at
its zenith during the last decade.
FR. BERNAS.
Correct, in spite of the existence of the death penalty.
MR. RAMA.
Yes, but not necessarily in spite of the existence of the death
penalty. At any rate, does the sponsor think that in removing the death penalty, it
would not affect, one way or another, the crime rate of the country?
FR. BERNAS.
The position taken by the majority of those who voted in favor of
this provision is that means other than the death penalty should be used for the
prevention of crime."
76 (Popup - Popup)
28.
Cf. Report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prosecution and Control,
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United Nations Social Affairs Division. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Branch, Vienna, 1988, p. 110.
77 (Popup - Popup)
29.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his book The Bill of Rights, (Second
Edition, 1972, p. 4) states: "A regime of constitutionalism is thus unthinkable without
an assurance of the primacy of a bill of rights. Precisely a constitution exists to assure
that in the discharge of the governmental functions, the dignity that is the birthright of
every human being is duly safeguarded. . . ." In the context of the role of a bill of
rights the vast powers of government are clearly to be exercise within the limits set by
the constitution, particularly the bill of rights. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators vs. City Mayor of Manila, (L-24693, July 31, 1967), it was held that the
exercise of police power, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. The guarantee in Sec. 1 of Article III of the
Constitution embraces life, liberty and property. In the words of Justice Roberto
Concepcion in People vs. Hernandez, (99 Phil. 515,551-2 [1956]), " . . . individual
freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be
denied upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety.
Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political
system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph
of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and
(21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom. . . ." These
guarantees are preserved in the 1987 Constitution, according to Fr. Bernas.
78 (Popup - Popup)
30.
See, for instance, People vs. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554, 571, October 25, 1995, and
People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687, 702-703, November 10, 1995.
79 (Popup - Popup)
31.
At. III, Sec. 1.
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32.
Art. III, Sec. 11.
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81 (Popup - Popup)
33.
Art. II, Sec. 12(2).
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34.
Art. II, Sec. 12.
83 (Popup - Popup)
35.
Art. II, Secs. 15, 16 & 17.
84 (Popup - Popup)
36.
For details, see Annex A of the Memorandum for the Accused-Appellant dated
September 26, 1996 filed by the Free Legal Assistance Group in People vs.
Malabago, G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996.
85 (Popup - Popup)
37.
The FLAG-submitted Profile states that 186 have been sentenced to death by trial
courts since the effectivity of RA 7659. The Philippine Star issue of December 9,
1996, page 17, however reports that, quoting Sen. Ernesto Herrera, the total number
of death row inmates has gone up to 267, as of November, 1996, of whom more than
one half (139) are rape convicts. Some major dailies (Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Philippine Star, Manila Standard) in their February 3, 1997 issue up the death row
figure to 300, as of the end of January 1997, with 450 as the probable number at the
end of 1997.
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38.
The preamble of the Constitution is theistic. It declares the "sovereign Filipino

people's" imploration of the "aid of Almighty God".
87 (Popup - Popup)
39.
Catechism of the Catholic Church, p. 512, Word and Life Publications:

"2266.
Preserving the common good of society requires rendering the aggressor
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unable to inflict harm. For this reason the traditional teaching of the Church has
acknowledged as well-founded the right and duty of legitimate public authority to
punish malefactors by means of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime,
not excluding, in cases of extreme gravity, the death penalty. For analogous reasons
those holding authority have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the
community in their charge.
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40.
Evangelium Vitae, items no. 55 and 56, states:

"55. This should not cause surprise: to kill a human being, in whom the image of
God is present, is a particularly serious sin. Only God is the master of life! Yet from
the beginning, faced with the many and often tragic cases which occur in the life of
individuals and society, Christian reflection has sought a fuller and deeper
understanding of what God's commandment prohibits and prescribes. There are, in
fact, situations in which values proposed by God's Law seem to involve a genuine
paradox. This happens for example in the case of legitimate defence, in which the
right to protect one's own life and the duty not to harm someone else's life are difficult
to reconcile in practice. Certainly, the intrinsic value of life and the duty to love
oneself no less than others are the basis of a true right to self-defense. The demanding
commandment of love of neighbor, set forth in the Old Testament and confirmed by
Jesus, itself presupposes love of oneself as the basis of comparison: "You shall love
your neighbor as yourself' (Mk 12:31). Consequently, no one can renounce the right
to self-defense out of lack of love for life or for self. This can only be done in virtue
of a heroic love which deepens and transfigures the love of self into a radical
self-offering, according to the spirit of the Gospel Beatitudes (cf. Mt. 5:38-40). The
sublime example of this self-offering is the Lord Jesus himself.
89 (Popup - Popup)
continuation of footnote 40
Moreover, 'legitimate defence can be not only a right but a grave duty for
someone responsible for another's life, the common good of the family or of the
State.' Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of
causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is
attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it about, even though he may not
be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason.
56. This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty. On this
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matter there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil society, to demand
that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished completely. The
problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice even more in line
with human dignity and thus, in the end, with God's plan for man and society. The
primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is "to redress the disorder
caused by the offence." Public authority must redress the violation of personal and
social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a
condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way
authority also fulfills the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people's
safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change
his or her behavior and be rehabilitated.
Its is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the
punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the
words, when it would not be possible other wise to defend society. Today however, as
a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases
are very rare, if not practically non-existent.
In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic
Church remains valid: "If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an
aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself
to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good
and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person."
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PP v. Echegaray

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997.]

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH. Insofar as the element of heinousness is

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable

R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of

the accused is not the real father of the complainant;

the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting

the defense of alibi.

the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a

the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying

Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration,

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

But the delegated power of the state cannot be

What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered provision.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23)

The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

then there is a compelling reason for the death penalty.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2014

Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death

There are compelling reasons; and