OPERATIONS IN IRAQ - AN ANALYSIS FROM A LAND PERSPECTIVE ‘on the actual day of batle naked truths may be picked up for the asking: by the {ollowing morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms” Sir lan Hamilton, officiel Srtish observer to the Russo-Japanese Wa" PREFACE |. This publication is the Brilsh Army's analysis of combat operations in frag. itis produced in response to a task sot byte Executive Committee of the Army Board ‘and direction given by the Army Doctrine Committee * It reviews the events of the ‘campaign and draws the major observations from the Coalition's experiences up to + May 2003." It concentrates on land and land-air issues. tis nelther a history of the campaign, nor is it a catalogue of lessons identifed. It is intonded to ‘complement such works, written by other directorates. It considers both US and British experiences, and draws from British, American and other sources, It was writen by the staff ofthe Director General of Development and Doctrine. li. A wide range of commanders and staff offers have been interviewed and Information drawn from transcripts. of such interviows. All available Brish ‘commanders’ diaries have been scrutnised, as well as After Action Reports, Ministry (of Defence publications, and several similar US documents, both from the US Amy for Marine Carps (USMC). Many of the relevant operation orders have been read, ‘andi some cases radio logs scrutinised. The author has attonded several brefings by commanders and headquarters involved inthe campaign and has cross-checked ‘a number of brifing poins. In doing so the author observed some inconsistencies ‘and noted facts and trends not captured elsewhere. fi, Interviows and reports written by offcers wino participated in the Operation have been a rich seam of information and opinion. Many perceptive comments. have ‘come from Britsh staf oficers who served in appointments on the periphery of the UK Land Contingent, and who were well placed fo take an objective view of the verll effect of British actions, The conten of this Analysis may not appear familar to somo of thoso who took part in the Operation; this is a consequence of the depth and breadth of the analysis. In several areas the act of contrasting local perspectives has allowed the formation of an overview. This publication isnot fully Feferenced; however all remarks or quotations which have not been formally attributed arise from primary sources. They are givan no reference here in order to feqgourage candour in the writing of operational reports inthe future Clary, an analysis such as tis wil benefit from hindsight. Where it is suggested that an alternative course of action may have been more appropriate, that altemative ‘may not have been apparent atthe time. However, the abservation is appropriate it lessons are to be leat. No crticism is made of or impliod to any individual, unit or headquarters. Throughout, the overriding objective has been to make obsBrvations Which wit ultimately benef the Services as a whole, and the individuals who sarve ‘A Sta Oficars Serapbook, 1903, Quoted in Burma 1942: The Japanese invasion; |. Grant sd K Tanayeama, The Zares press, Chichester 1989, page S"ADCAHOD} dad 10 Jun 35 and (03) date 4 Sep 03. + tn few excoptons, Kcansdar mata rooeved up fo 1 Noverbor 2003, RESTRICTED }inthem. This objective has bean reinforced by an awareness that this Analysis will form the ariish Army's principal reference to foreseeable future. \ The British Army aspires to be, and considers itself to be, among the best armed forces in the world. Care must be taken when drawing lessons from a conflict in which a thir-rate army was defeated. Instead, operational performance should be ‘measured against the British Army's own standards and experience as well as best practice elsewhere. That philosophy has been applied to this analysis. However, ‘while being professionally crical, the key message is thatthe warfighting phase of Operation TELIC was ‘a significant miltary success vi The first Chapter of this Analysis provides an overview of the campaign Subsequent Chapters present more detalied analfsla, Research followed he present Defence Capability Framework (of Command, Inform, Prepare, Projact, ‘Operate and Sustain) in relation to strategic and operational issues. The term ‘Operate’ refers to the tactical planning and exocution of operations. Within that ntext the Army's Functions in Combat (Command, information and Inteligence, repower, Manceuvre, Protection and Combat Service Support) are used. The Contents were then reorganized for ease of raading. Stratagic, operational and tactical issues are described within each Chapier, where appropriate vi Primary sources have been used wherever possible. The same sources have been Used in other MOD reports such as the First Refletions* or Lassans forthe Future* reports. This analysis refers principally to land operations, and itis unsurprising that they are not identical with thoso of other reports. Where discropancies have boon noted, they have been resolved through further reference to primary sources. vil tis intended to produce a companion volume, which will cover the conduct of peace support operations until the transfer of authority tothe interim Iraqi Government on 30 June 2004, in due course. ‘talonery es, December 003 (heresier NAO Raper’), 9.2 ptagragh & MOD Dteter General Coors Conmmuniatons, Operations aq = Fist Reictons’ July 2008 terete Fast Reflections, DIVCDSi401/2(10/31} dled 17 Oct 09, prepared bythe MeD Dieckerate of Operations hereaer OG Rept RESTRICTED rsh military operations in iraq forthe 1 CONTENTS Preface Contents a Chapter 2: chapter 3: Chapter 4: Chapter Chapter 6 napter 1: The Campaign Preparation and Planning Operations Command of Operatiois Personnel and Logistics ‘Summary, Observations and Conclusens Annexes A. Major Events B. Chronology of Combat Operations ©. List of Prin 3 Britsh Land Systems RESTRICTEDWars it was garrisoned by British Army and RAF forces under a League of Nations mandate, Britain conducted a process of imperial policing’ which included the use of bomber sircrafl and armoured cars. Britain withdrew from Iraq in 1956. 103, From 1856 to 1990. The monarchy was deposed in 1958; the Ba'ath party led & ‘coup in February 1963 and seized power definitively in another coup on 17 July 4968. Saddam Hussein, by than aged about 30, became the Head of Internal Security and de facto Interior Minister. He nationalised Iraqi ol facies in 1968 and oversaw a vast increase in national wealth: oll revenues increased from $476 milion in 1968 to $26 bilion in 1980. This was accompanied by an effective programme ff agricultural reform and economic diversification. Saddam was involved with suppression of the Kurds from 1969, and the development of biological and chemical weapons from 1974. Chemical weapons were used against the Kurdish population from May 1987, resultiig in about 5,009 deaths and 250,000 refugees. In 1974 trag aspired to possess a nuclear weapons capabilly by 1985, and accordingly bought a nuclear reactor from France (after agreement in principlp at a meeting with the Prime Minister Jacques Chirac) in 1975. That same month Saddam stated publicly that “The agreement with France is the first concrete step toward the production of the Arab atomic bomb" Iraq was involved in supporting Palestinian terorism from around the time of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and in ‘suppressing its domestic Shite population from about 1971. Saddam became head of state on 17 July 1979._ Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1980; the resulting Iran-Iraq Wer was brought to an end by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 4598 of 18 July 1988. Neither country had made any territorial gains, and both sides, hhad lost several hundred thousands casualties. 104, The First Gulf Wer. Iraqi finances were in ruins, In 1889 and 1990 it attempted to pressurize the Gulf slates and the Arab Cooperation Council 1o agree to a moratcrium on war loans, and the provision of further loans. On 18 July 1980 it presented an ultimatum to Kuwait, relating to financial aid and threatening attack. ‘Saddam probably misinterpreted a meeting with Apri Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, on 25 July regarding US intentions and on 2 August invaded Kuwait, Alter a prolonged build-up of forces, a US-led coalition commenced air operations against Iraq on 16 Janvary 1991. Alter 6 weeks! bombing the land offensive opened at 0400, hrs local time on Sunday 24 February, The British land contingent comprised the tst (UK) Armoured Division, with the 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades under command. Roughly 100 hours later, after about 48 hours of fighting, the Iraqi Army had been heavily dafealed and evicted from Kuwait. Over 15 dhvisions had been badly ‘damaged and 370 tanks had bean destroyed. $0,000 prisoners of war were taken ‘and tolal casualties possibly exceeded 150,000. The US name for this campaign ‘was Operation DESERT STORM; the UK contribution was Operation GRANBY. 105. From 1991 to 2002. After the Iragi defeat thee were revolls in Basrah, Noja, Karbala and the Kurdish region. Western nations decided not to intervene, but by 3 April 1991 the UN had adopted UNSCR 687. This was the fist of a series of resolutions related to NBC weapons, missile technology, cooperation in the destruction of weapons stock piles, and the restoration of Kuwaiti property. Cougttin, op ct 9.133, [Cougein, op ct 9.134, 4-2 RESTRICTED ‘Sanctions were put in piace ana u vrs UIOUYIN Wat euwen meus oe yo 2 yer, allowing @ more favourable regime to replace him. The Iraqis Suppressed the revols, resulting in up to 2 milion Kurdish refugees fleeing into the mountains. LUNSCR 688 of May 1991 established # no-fy zone North of the 36th Paralle! and provided for humanitarian reliet* In the same month Saddam instiuied a systematic, seven-year long campaign of obstruction and concealment with regerd to the UN Special Commission for Disarmament (UNSCOM), which must be regarded as highly successful. As a result of sanctions the Iracl population became desltule, short of food and medicines, but the Saddam regime did not accept UN offers to trade ol for food for 4 years.® UNSCOM withdrew in 1988. Itwas replaced by the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in 1999, second no-fly zone had been established south ofthe 32nd Parallel to afford some protection to the Marsh Arabs. Thus Western air forces had been operating Continuously over Northern and Southern'iraq continuously since 1991. Military ‘operations against the Kurds had resulted inthe establishment of a Kurdish enclave, and the standing deployment of three Iraqi Army corps on its borders. 108. The Political Build-up tothe Campaign. Continuing Iraqi obstruction of UNMOVIC's activities, including a refusal to allow it access, prompted the ‘adoption of UNSCR 1441 ‘of 8 November 2002. This required Iraq to. comply with the provisions of previous Resolutions, and to make a wiiten declaration of its holdings ‘of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their ‘components. The senior UN observer, Dr Hans Bix, reported on 19 December 2002 that the Iraqi declaration fell short of requirement, and might constituis a material breach of extant UNSCRs. Britain had announced a precautionary deployment of ar anc naval forces on 24 September 2002, and a land force on 18 December, Whilst UNMOVIC continued to attempt to very Iraq's WMD ‘capabily, tho US, UK and Spain tabled a further draft resolution on 27 February 2003. Public opinian in Europe was broadly in favour of miltary operations against “Tho US Operation PROVIDE COMFORT; the asin Operation WARDEN. The programme sari n 1996 under UNSCR 86, 1-3 RESTRICTEDIraq if second resolution was adopted.’ Domestic opinion in the US was more supportive. On 14 March 2003 France deciared is intent 10 veto the drat Resolution. UNMOVIC inspectors left Iraq on 18 March and President Bush declared the commencement of miliary operations at 0315 hrs GMT on 20 March £2003. An oulline of malor events connected withthe campaign is at Annex A. ‘OVERVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN RGEC locations: AD: Adnan Division “AN: Al Nida Division BA: Baghdad Divisions. HA: Hammurabi Division ME: Medina Division INE: Nebuchadnezza Division Figure 1.3: RGFC Locations 107. Iraqi land foroes were daployed in 3 main groups. Il and IV Corps of the Iraqi Army were disposed along the traditional route to Baghdad, that Is from Basrah north ‘along the Tigris almost as far as Al Kut. The bulk ofthe Republican Guard Forces: command (RGFC) was disposed in a ring around Baghdad, which (with its ‘associated air defences in the ‘Super MEZ' ’} was colloquially known as the ‘Red Zone’. Thirdly, | ll and V Corpe ofthe fraqi my (totaling 11 divisions) were based ‘along the 'Green Line’ which formed the border withthe Kurdish Autonomous Zone in the north. ‘The Coalition attack on Baghdad was therefore designed to defeat * poston ta mitary apeatins suppor by a Second resolution, anid om 55% Tukey and 50% in Germany, down to 19% in ran. Source: EOS Galus pol of Gorman. Belgum, be Naverande, Franc Tuts tay, Span and Botan, pusiahed in The Economist. 15-21 Feury 2002. Convrsay# shoul a0 Senate nat nf tho counties rpresoiad, public opinion epsed achon without UN suppor Missle Engagement Zona 1-4 RESTRICTED ‘elements of Ill and IV Comps, while blocking or neutralizing tne Duk ot nese Tormations; to penetrate the Red Zone and seize the city; whilst preventing reinforcement from the north of Baghdad raal Army Corps: Not | Corps: 2, 8, 38 Inf Divs; 5 Mech Div. Corps: 3 Armd Div; 15 & 34 Inf Divs. \V Corps: 1 Mech Div; 4, 7 & 16 Inf Divs South: Il Corps: 6 Armd Div; ‘11 Inf Div; 5 Mech Dw 1V Corps: 10 Armd Div; 14.8 18 Inf Divs. Figure 1.4: Iraqi Army Locations 108. The US name for the Operation was Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: the British contribution was Operation TELIC’ There were 2 operational-level geographic objectives: Baghdad and the Rumalia Cilfleids. The Coalition Force Land Componont Commander's (CFLCC’s) plan was based on a two-pronged attack on Baghdad trom Kuwait 108. V (US) Corps, iniialy comprising 2rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), 101st Air ‘Assault Division and 11th Aviation Regiment, would attack on the lef, advancing ‘rapidly through the desert to the West of the River Euphrates, cross it around Karbala and approach Baghdad from the South West. 3rd Infantry Division would {orm the main effor of V Corps, and hence ofthe Coaition Land Component. Bish operation ames are supposed to have ne connection wih herr ofthe aperaton beng panned oc undertaken. However TELIG was assured o stand for Tel Everyone Leave Is Cancel 4-5 RESTRICTEDRESTRICTED Figuro 1.5: Battlefield Geometry * ‘110. The 1st US Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF), @ composite air-ground task force ‘of roughly corps size, would seize the Rumaila Oilfelds, cross the Euphrates at Al ‘Nasariyan, drive rapidly Nort to cross the River Tigris between An Numaniyah and ‘Az Zubadiyah, then approach Baghdad from the South and South East. The 1st Marine Division would form the main effort of 1 MEF. The MEF also included Task Force (TF) Tarawa, a brigade-sized force based on 2nd Marine Infantry Regiment; the fst (UK) Armoured Division; and the 3rd Marine Air Wing (3 MAW), TF Tarawa \was tasked with rear area secur, initially al Al Nasariyah and then futher North 1st (UK) Armoured Division's mission was, broadly, to seize the Faw Peninsula and relieve elements of 1 Marine Division and then o block between the Iranian border ‘and the Haw’ Al Hammar.” Fixing and neutralizing the bulk ofthe Ira) Ill and IV ‘Comps, tothe east of 1st Marine division as it drove north, would be the primary task of 3 MAW. CFLCC's Intent Statement and the 1 MEF Mission are shown at Figures 1.7 and 1.8. Uke most of na maps, Figures 1.5 and 56 re then from contemporary operational sash, The Hawr al Marerars a arge marshy aoa Wing norhwostof Basrah. See Figure 3 1-6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Imoraetng EF operations ‘er Umm Gat ua the Rmalyan On Fat ad Bosra Arport i roth of he Euphrates ac aot othe Sha A Basra ‘fom reinforelng 21 Moch DV. “Tara Obeci0 Tir Gorps near A ‘Amarah rom ofrcng Stat Figure 1.6: 1 MEF Targeting Objectives GFLEC's Intent ‘When directed, CFLCC attacks to defeat Iraqi forces and control the zone of action; secure and exploit designated sites: and, removes the current Iraq regime. On order, CFLCC conducts posthostiltes stabiliy and support operations; rensitns to CJTF-4." Figure 4.7: CFLCC’s Intent 1 MEF Mission: (On orders, | MEF attacks in zone to defeat enemy forces and secures Key oll infrastructure and LOCs in order to support V Corps’ rapid movernent north and regime removal. On orders, prepares for future operations and redeployment as directed. : Figuro 1.8: 1 MEF Mission 1-7 RESTRICTED111. 112. ‘The main tasks of ‘st (UK) Armoured Division were to seize the Faw Peninsula, relieve Sth and 7th Marine Regimental Combat Teams" (RCTs) around Az Zubayr ‘nd in the Rumalia Oilfield, and then block to the noith and north east. Basrah was ‘not an inital objective, and the seizure of Az Zubayr was not a stated task. It was, however, considered that entry into both places would probably take place at some stage. Although a number of other contingencies were considered, British forces ‘completed those missions and then conducted peace support operations when ‘organised military resistance collapsed, ¢ Figure 1.9: 1st (UK) Armoured Division Area of Operations ‘The Coalition Air Component had held a considerable degree of control ofthe air since before the beginning of the campaign, as a consequence of continuous ait operations since 1981. A 14-day perioc of air operations had initially been planned lo take place prior to the slart of land operations. However, that was discounted due to the possibility thatthe Iraqi regime would use the time to destroy the Rumalia olfelds, or deploy NBC weapons. Tho duration of that intial phase was progressively reduced unt both air and land operations were scheduied to begin at the same time: A-Day (the beginning of air operations) and G-Day (the stat of land operations) coincided on 21 March, However, a stratagie aerial attack on the Iraqi ‘egime was then launched at relatively short notice on the night of 19-20 March, ‘Targets in Baghdad were struck by ascombination of Tactical Land Attack Missiles land stealth aircraft. There was then a short pause. H-Hour was scheduled for 0300 hrs on 21 March, bul the pre-H-Hour freplan and preliminary operations such as the ‘seizure of the Faw Peninsula by 8 Commanda Brigade were due to start at 1900hrs. ° Briga-sized combined arms free based on 2 Mane Infant Region 1-8 RESTRICTED fon 20 March. These timings were subsequently altered, as shown in paragraph 119 below. 413. Coalition maritime operations included supporting the seizure of the Faw Peninsula”, supporting air operations, opening porls and waterways in southern Iraq, and enabling the delivery of humanitarian supplies by sea, 114, Significant special force operations were conducted in northern and western Iraq. In the north, the principal objective was to prevent reinforcement of Iral forces around Baghdad. In the wast, the main task was to prevent Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel, 115. The outcome was heavily one-sided. The strategic objectives were gained within 19 days for relatively few Coaition casualties." Iraqi casualty figures are unknown, 2.203 prisoners of war were taken, and many of the remaining Iraqi armed forces Ceserted or disappeared. Although al first sight quite similar, Operation TELIC showed important differences from Operation GRANBY. In TELIC the land force was generally larger (three British brigades rather than two)": and fighting was more protracted (lasting from 21 March unil atleast 6 Apri in 2003, as opposed to 4 days in 1981), but in general less intense. Irregular and civilan racis were a far greater factor in TELIC than GRANBY. Notwithstanding that fighting was generally less intense, there wore several significant engagements at up to battlegroup level ‘during Operation TELIC. 116. Iraqi weaknesses and failures were significant. The iraqi Army was describod by a senior British officer as one of our battle-winners. The lragi Ai Force did not fight lragi deep-sirke capabllty was limited, and continuously degraded: only a few ‘cruise and ballistic missles were launched, Limited use was mace of conventional fercas; above battalion level they largely evaporated. Ground forces made very 200" use of the major natural obstacles available, Those conventional forces were poorly equipped and poorty trained. For example, several dozen RPGs were fired at elements of the 3rd Brigade of the US 3rd Infantry Division in Baghdad, from ranges between 100 and 500m, but fewer than 10% hit their targets. At Objective MONTGOMERY near Baghdad International Airport on 4 Apri, a troop of the 3rd ‘Squadron, 7th US Cavalry was engaged by a dug-n battalion of Iraq T-62s; siteen| 125mm rounds wore fred, but none hi." Subsequent analysis showed that the nearest missed is target by 25m. In one Iraqi division the tanks had undergone no collective training in a year, in another they had fired 4 rounds per tank in the pravious year, Substantial pockets of irregular Fedayeen were found only in Basrah ‘ang Al Nasiryah; elsewhere they largely adopted hit-and-run tactics. The Iracis cid ot make use of chemical or biological weapons, and in many places dd not enjoy “Tings gan hers are GMT (Zu). Local ime was 4 hours in advence. Hence 1000h Z would bo 00h cal ° "The US Naval Special Warfare Group sazed rica element of inastucure onthe Peninsula pie to ‘he main ateaul by 3 Commando Bigade, wich lade the atalonsz! 15m Marine Expeonary Unit (3 MEU, "2 Beit doad from all causes. 27 wera kilo ard 55 were wounded in acton upto 19 Apri 2003. US. ‘pare sal that 2 US Amy, 0 US Morne and 16 Bris slsore oa bate {lad lore narbars ate somtimes canoe, basse 4,000 oso Roy Marines of 3 Commando Brigade wore dployed in acon fo the 28.000 Army personel deployed for Operaton TELG. “RUS Cavaky Regiments abigado-szad force. Hence a US Cavaly Squadion isa baislosized force nd a Troop a compary sed rouing, 1-9 RESTRICTED17, 118, 119 120. 121 the suppor of the local population. However, it should be stressed that Iraqi forces ere oflen dedicated and fought well, For example, 1 RRF Ballegroup was ‘tacked in up to company strength supported by tanks on a number of eccastons ‘hilt denying the bridges over the Shalt Al Basrah Bish and US equipment was generally moder, highly effective and rliable."” The high qualty of Brtish miliary personnel was noted by many observers, not least by citer Coalition forces and the Wester media, Both aspects wil be considered in Ghapter 2 THE EVENTS. ‘The US Central Command (CENTCOM) had commanded operations in Afghanistan jn 2001 and early 2002. During 2002's altenflon switched towards operations in Iraq. In the Summer of 2002 British officers were attached to CENTCON, including ‘Aimy liaison and contingency planning officers within the Lane Componéht staf (On the evening of 20 March 40 and 42 Commandos, Royal Marines commenced ‘operations in the Faw Peninsula in conjunction with the US Naval Special Warfare Group. Land operations had been called forward during 20 March in response to the air attack on the previous night, and also in response to limited Iraqi ballistic missile launches into Kuwait. The 3rd US infantry Division advanced across the Kuwailraq border at 1736 hrs on 20 March, and Sth and 7th Marine RCTs crossed the border rom 1730hrs. Elements of 1st Armoured Division left their assembly area following 1st Marine Division. (On 21 March 16 Air Assault Brigade relieved § RCT in the Rumalia Cifields. 7th ‘Armoured Brigade conducted a limited attack to protect the right flank of 7 RCT, with ‘an H-Hour of 0300 hrs. The Brigade then relieved 7 RCT around Az Zubayr and Basrah and astablished its blocking postions. 3rd Commando Brigade consolidated its blocking positions across the mouth of the Faw Peninsula, the attached 15 MEU seized the town of Umm Qasr and began to secure it and the por. ‘On 22 March the leading elements of 3rd US Infantry Division {is armoured cavalry ‘squadron, 3rdth Cavainy") reached Al Samawah, roughly 250km from the Kuwait) border and halfway to Baghdad. 2d US Infantry Division reached Najaf by the 24 ‘March and started to probe towards Karbala, and feint towards Al Hilah. ‘Consolidating in that area, the Division was relieved by 10st Alroome Division Irom 28 March, and went on to defeat the Adnan Division of the RGFC. in the Karbala ‘area. Bypassing Karbala and crossing the River Euphrates, it reached Baghdad Intemational Apart on 4 Apri. After probes and raids, Baghdad fell on 9 Apri. Meanwhile 10st Air Assault Division had cleared Karbala on 5 April and A Hilah on 6 Anti, both actions being brigade-level operations. Elements of the 82nd US ‘Abome Division had elso been fed in to take avar responsibilty for areas initially ‘occupied by 3 10 along the River Euphrates, as the latter moved towards Baghdad. In 1909, Major General P 4 Russaiones, the Assistant Chie fhe Dotonce Sat fr Lan Operational Regutemants,cbsoned eres equement wn abou a8 goad 8 eve Nad beer = See Fooincle above, 1-10 RESTRICTED 122. 123. 124. 126. 126. ‘Lat Marine Division crossed the River Euphrates at Al Nasariyah on 24 March. it advanced rapidly on 2 axes: 1 RCT direct to Al Kut and § RCT via Ad Diwaniyah ‘ist Manne Division then consolidated, before crossing the River Tigris at An Numaniyah on 5 April end defesting the Baghdad Division of the RGFC at Al Kut, By 7 Aprlt had defeated the Al Nida RGFC Division, seized Salman Pak and closed lupo the south easter suburbs of Baghdad. The 1st Marine Division then took part in the seizure of Baghdad, and from 12 April began to move North towards Mosul, Tikit and Kirkuk, TF Tarawa had relieved 1st Marine, Division al Al Nasariyah on 24 March, but can into significant resistance whilst conducting security operations. This, together with extremely heavy rain and the requirement to regroup before the allack on Baghdad In practice led to all in tand component operations until about 30 March.” From 31 March, TF Tarawa rellevéd elements of 1st Marine Division in Ad Divaniyah and ‘An Numaniyah, before advancing east on 7 and 8 Apri, to secure Al Amarah on 10 Apri Within 1st (UK) Armoured Division, 3 Commando Brigade had secured Umm Qasr znd the Faw Peninsula. Umm Qasr was opened to shipping on 28 March, when 300 tonnes of humanitarian reli supplies were delivered by RFA Sir Galahad. 15 MEU hhad been relieved in place by 42 Commando on 24 March and joined TF Tarawa, C ‘Squadron SCOTS DG was detached to 3 Commando Brigade on 28 and 27 March for operations in Ubd al Qasib. 3 Commando Brigade took part in the seizure of Basrah, attacking the City from the South East and saizing the presidental palace by 0030hrs on 7 Apri 7th Armoured Brigade maintained its blocking position in the Basrah area, ‘employing increasingly aggressive tactics. Az Zubayt was occupied on 28-29 March after atmoured raids by 1 BW and 2 RTR Battlegroups, which had started on 25 March. Az Zubayr was handed over to 1 OWR, who had been brought to theatre to act as the Prisoner of War handling organization and was acing as a light-role bation. 1 RRF Battlegroup maintained locking postions onthe principal bridges over the Shat! al Basrah, joined at imes by 1 BW and SCOTS DG Battlegroup, for 15 days from 22 March to 6 Apri, The three Battlagroups undertook fighting patrals and raids into Basrah, eliminating enemy strongpoints and subsequently ‘establishing bases east of the River. Eariyin the moming of 6 April SCOTS DG and 1 BW Battlegroups were conducting coordinated raids. It became apparent that Basrah was about fo fall. Orders were given for the seizure ofthe city, large areas (of which were secure by nightiall 16 Air Assault Brigade had secured the Rumailiaolfelds after the departure of 1st ‘Marine Division, and thereafter conducted a guard force action on is northern flank. (On 30 March the Brigade began engaging forward of ts northern boundary, and had ‘a major batt that afternoon and evening. Pathfinder patois were inserted north of, the River Euphrates on 3 April to support 1 MEF. Expanding north after 6 Apri, the ‘Brigade occupied Ad Dayr an 7 April. The next cay it occupied Medinah and Qurnah and:-secured the bridges over the River Tigris. eth Air Assault brigade linked up with TF Tarawa in Al Amargh on 11 Apri. 3 PARA had been detached from & April Discussed in Chaar 3. 111 RESTRICTED‘and cleared the Old Town of Basrah under command of 7th Armoured Brigade on the 7th. 2 RTR Battlegroup was attached to 16 Air Assaull Brigade over the period 13-14 April, Figure 1.10: Basrah, Showing 7th Armoured Brigade's Nicknames 1212 RESTRICTED. 127 128, ‘though organized resistance in Basrah collapsed on 6 April and in Baghdad on the tn, there was considerable disorder in both cities. Looting had taken place in Basrah as early as the aftemoon of the Sth. Order was slowly imposed, with assistance [rom the majority of the population. Insurgency and disorder gradually ‘decreased, and no attacks were reported against Coalition forces in Baghdad for the previous 24 hours on 17 Apri, which was a landmark. Miltary operations had ‘svitched rapidly end reasonably effecivaly from combat fo civi-miltary cooperation; power and running water were largely-restored to Basrah by 28 April 16 Air Assault Brigade began to return to the UK on § May: 3 Commando Brigade on 13 May. 7th ‘Armoured Brigade was rolieved by 19th Mechanized Brigade in early July and retumed to Germany. ‘The chronology of combat operations is shown at Annex B. 4-13 RESTRICTED201 203, 204, CHAPTER TWO - PREPARATION AND PLANNING For several reasons, the planning and preperation for this operation was more rushed than should have been the case. Notwithstanding the extensive and woll- practised organizations and processes by which the UK conducts national military ‘operations, the time available to plan Operation TELIC was not well spent at the strategic and operational levels. This had many implications for the operational and tactical conduct of the operation, including Phase 4 operations. As this chapter wil show, many of the shortcomings of the Operation could have been avoided i the avalable ime had been used more-effectivly ‘The forces which deployed had for the most pat boon tained and held at high reatiness, anc deployed intg theatre rapa. They arived just in tm to undertake operations. However, there were signifeant shoricomings. Readiness states were broken in many cases; crea slores and equipment cid not ave in time (for txample, 30mm training ammunition arivedto0 lat To Wan; there were signileant shoriages of small arms ammunition in some unis as they Began operations: NEC Mors for tanks didnot ative; and there were significant difeulies with Urgent Operational Requirements (UORS). Al his represented signifeant risk: forunatey forthe mos pa this wes not realized. However, Briish land forces dd perform wel fad this seems largely to be due tothe way the Army and Royal Marines select educate, ran and exercise their individuals, units and formations. ‘STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AND THE COMITTAL OF LAND FORCES (On 18 December 2002 the Secretary of State for Defence announced that the UK. would contribute a dvisional-sized land force to any operation in iraq, and that the force would be based on 1 (UK) Armoured Division. AL tho same time the GOC, Major General Brims, was nominated as the UK's Land Contingent Commander. ‘This was the frst polical commitment of UK land forces to the operation. This was in contrast to committal of air and maritime forces, which was publicly announced on 24 September 2002 From March 2002, or May at the latest, there was a signifcant possibly ofa large- scale British operation, for only the second time in the 11 years since Operation GRANBY." In planning forthe Iraq operation, the Army consistently declared that 6 months were necessary to generate a large-scale land force (that is, at divisional level, but inthe end was forced to make do with only 3 months in which fo prepare, train, and deploy a force for operations. The estimate identified bul up of logistic ‘stocks and equipment upgrades (through a UOR programme), and training as crlical actives, These were all requir to make up for areas which, to use current ‘terminology, had been ‘akon at risk’. Many shortcomings identified inthis Analysis are direcly atibuted to lack of preparation time, coupled with reductions in stocks. tw achieve cash savings.* ‘The che? gossbty wes the Option B (pan for Kosove. ® “Thofeat estate af how ong woud ok og a an fora or ag wae publahed by OMC on 18 ‘oa 208, 2 The MoD had bean encouraged by the National Aut Ofice and the Committ on Pubic Accounts to remove eycess sous. NAO Repon, p11 paragraph 285, 2-4 RESTRICTEDFigure 2.1: GOC 1st (UK) Armoured Division with the US Secretary of State for Defense 205. Poltcalsenstivty over comma ottand forces is understandable. Ai and maritime forces ae tes vse, andthe pub e more used fo ther deployment oversee, Deployment of amoured forces sends an unmislakeablo pale ressage, anh the noone! and intrationalcimate,earerpoeal coma woe net ban. This may bo the medal orto hut The UK should exploe ways 10 einer Generale orca n much ss tne, oto make bt use the Une avalble bers Poliia ciel” Maanng force at igh oadness takes contertle eon Bnd is expensive. It may be that changes are necesary so thal frees can be employed soon afer aval n theatre, wth (or example) it requirement for ie beaten,” Hover. hat macy alld sone deco makes more loway to crovarcate, whist hoking forces at excessive high ote fr 1 Bards nd fling o provi the raring required to getter o high readiness, out Soliors woul ol be wal served. Conversely ithe nents spy to heve roe Sees ahh readiness Sls, the cost and enous mpstons wl be Senin 208. Furthermore, what has now become an orthodox assumption that rapid deployment, followed immediately by rapid empiayment,is necessarily the right ed ‘employment is necessarily the right course should bo utinised, The deployment for Operation GRANBY was more measured. It DOC Repon. . 32-1 saragranh 57 * NAG Report p. 4 pategraph 2. 2-2 RESTRICTED allowed more time for political negotiation, once the intent to use armed force if ecessary had been confirmed. It allowed collective training in theatre, and the deployment, fiting and training with equipment UORs. On reflection, it appears that the requifement to deploy then employ rapidly for Operation TELIC was the outcome sf ofthe relatively late decision to employ British troops in rolation to the hot season in the Middle East, Another factor was the relatively late decision to commit the tst ‘Armoured Division to attack from Kuwait rather than Turkoy, as discussed in Paragraph 210 below. 207. Inthe case of Operation TELIG, there was an option flake up an eversoas exorcise in Kuwait for 1st Armoured Dvision's Offensive Support Group, in January and February 2003. This would have permitted much low profie equipment and personnel preparation; but the proposal was rejected because the additonal cost of £5.4M could not be found fram HQ Land Command's taining budget. The UK may A. be abe to find other ways in future, intucing early deployment of land foces as par ofthe diplomatic process, rather than as a esut ofthe failure of that process. 208. It is therefore hard to support suggestions that the MOD needs to be more responsive in force planning.” The converse is tue: the Armed Forces should be allowed to make sensible use of the time available, rather than hurry to calch up ‘once that time has already been lost. However, itis also possible that our current planning methods are 100 spectfic, and hence too sensitive to detailed changes of force package. This is discussed in Chapter 4 209. Lack of political committal also caused serious difficulties for UK planners in US > esdavrers. Athough UK mila sa coud ee shortcomings n axpocs of he campaign plan, they were unable to influence US decision-makers until UK ‘committed major combat units - by which time the campaign had essentially been planned, PJHQ staff were poltely excluded from key CENTCOM planning for much ‘of September and October 2002. Furthermore, it was diffcutt to plan significant roles for UK forces when the US was unsure whether those British forces were going to arrive in time 210. Until 26 December 2002, British land forces were planning to attack Iraq from the north, using a line of communication through Turkey. All planning was precicated Upon this. In retrospect, the UK should have considered the possibilty of Turkish Tefusal to allow this option. This would have permitted eariior corisideration of a southem attack from Kuwail, rather than looking at it for the frst time in January 2003. Early olosure of this stralogic option caused considerable short-notice Planning, and resulted in selection of a force package based on what we could {deploy into theatre in time, rather than what was needed lo accomplish the mission. eri em Potnd (Exarcaes ULAN BARBARA ard LIVE DART) to Konmt Exercise EASTERN SANDS) Foote 4 above * One nl oft was than the 1 MEF pan 1t (UK) Armoured Dison was to flow 1st Marine Onsen ‘and conduct a ral in pice, With gear confides tat UX foros wow be ers, lanners could Mave ‘von Tt Amourod Don tha lescing rl in ho ary attack nto sour aq The orginal lan had Thy Mechanise Brigade deploying alongside Th Armoured igace, bul this woud have iwolad a socond it of shipping or which there was neuticent te gen he aedionl sistance Kiwat 6 ac Assavt Brigade was atacod because off stategi mobil ther han tact! need 2-3 RESTRICTED211, Tiroughout the planning process thee was much debate as te whether UK should commit a division or brigade sized land fore to the operon The Aro ee sonal thal 9 dvson was the aprepato zo a ongae a, capa o independent acon, would requis integration into © majr US formation a Suecanaly recico our wenee on th condit of te campaign’ Heweves, «discussion continued trough much of the planning process, penal on th A grounds of cost. Operation FRESCO {the Femen's spite) soo hae ipo nly one bigadeof st Armoured Dison aus be poeced tome conn! ‘There was understandable tensanbetveen pening or Operators FRESCO ond TELIG" Eat otinates of cot were #500-300M for medum scale ond S000 180 fr age scale. ‘Despite ference, wld appr tat ie atonal Get hada deroprionaity pstve fect onthe Inarenschived retrospect, i is clear the rght dation was made: commit of ts aa Division, albeit late in the day, bought the UK irffuence seas tone Dison, let to the ay, ougt be UX tuence he Bangin proces hat ‘THE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDE! THE LAND CoM R (LCC) AND THE SENIOR BRITISH 212 In ratonpect, the the design of the UK national chain of command sh ‘shortcomings. A high-ranking National Conti denicyed win atonal Contingent Commander was deployed a large sta, wiht ful rcogniang tate iy fo uonce evens, wed alvays be lned. At the same time ives dete that the Bish dvs ermander would acta the UK Land Cortingent Commander, butho wae tion to influence the US Land Component Commander; bot ‘emence i ponent Commander; both in the chain of command Figure 2.2: General Officers in the Land Component Note the relative absenco of British officers PIDOG 2140 dated 6 February 2004 (DOC Report of Op FRESCO). p. S121 paragragh 2b, 2-4 RESTRICTED the UK MOD misunderstood the relative importance of CENTCOM and the concept gf component command. Although British representation at CENTCOM was ‘esertal for national reasons, decisions on employment of UK forces were made at ‘Component level. Yat the UK's representation at the Land Camponent HQ wes just 7 officers, compared to 200 at the National Contingent Command (NCC). One Consequence was the inabilly to persuade US planners to overcome US structural Shortcomings in later Phase 4 planning, The penalty has proven expensive. 213. ‘The success of the UK's ad hoc liaison arrangements with the US CFLCC was largely due to the personal relationship between the Senior Briish Land Advisor (GSLA) and the US land component commander. SBLA was an ad-hoc LO from the UK Ghief of Joint Operations to the CFLCC. He identified a need for UK input into planning atthe operational level, and particutaly the need to plan for Phase 4 (post Fostiies). In the absence of sufficient staff resources, the British Army had to tlispatch an ad-hoc planning team to the CFLCC in November 2002 to plan the Northem Option. The Army is re-considering” a previously stalled intive to form 6 standing land component cadre that can establish permanent relationships with Us land component Hs, PJHQ, and the other UK comaonent Hs. 214 Rae re ae eon einen Talay ie bak ace US a A\// FRESCO. Provision of such a level of command would, however, have given the 216. Divisional Hs are intended to plan for combat operations up to 48 hours ahead. However, in the absence of guidance from a UK national land contingent HQ, HQ 4st (UK) Armoured Division conducted planning that considered many aspects of the campaign as a whole; but not all the most important aspects. For example, there ‘was no clear contingency plan or plans to seize Basrah, nor any clear Divisional plan (7 fer Phase 4 Both contingencies might reasonably have been anticipated, However, this matter is more complex, and is discussed in Chapter 4 PHASE 4 PLANNING 217. The Coalition plan effectively contained no detail once Baghdad and Basra hac been taken and the Iraqi regime removed - Phase 4 of the Coaltion plan. Although {an Office for Reconstruction ond Humanitarian Affairs had been established, the {ranston to the point al which this body becare effective was not considered early inthe planning. These shortcomings were identified by SBLA, who was in turn given ating rank of major general and appointed as the CFLCC Deputy Commanding General for Post Hostllies. However, in practice he was unable to develop ‘August 2008 3 The rerpiement to pan forthe campaign ag a wale was recognized asthe eri uncon fora proposed UK Lans Component (ori this caee Content) Cedre. 2-5 RESTRICTEDCoalition planning sufficiently 1o have material effect, ar force the implementation of that plenning into effective execution, There was therefore a nolable loss of momentum after the fall of Baghdad and Basrah, In the case of the British ‘contingent, the Divisional order for Phase 4 was released on Apri 21, 15 days after Basrah fell In that sense, the ciiical ‘explotation’ phase of the campaign was, neglected. 218. This gap does not appear to have had undue long-term consequences in thé British sector. That mey reflect either unt and formatior-ievel experience of peace support ‘operations, or simply thatthe civil population was largely oppased to the Balathist regime, and was glad to be liberated. The gap may have been a significant issue elsewhere, allowing some Iraqis to regroup and rearganize for insurgent operations This shoricoming is the more noteworthy becayse it was predictable, and indeed was anticipated in advance of hostilities. re FORCE GENERATION 219. Planning. The process of planning at the operational lavel was described above, ormation-evel planning for a deployment took place from February 2002, invelving PJHO, HO LAND and HQ ‘Ist Armoured Division. This planning was described as {generic contingency planning, but was ‘greatly hampered by frequent changes to planned ORBATS"* “In retrospect, there appears to be a need for truly generic planning tools which are not eubject to detailed ORBAT changes, the resuls of Which can be refined once decisions to commit have been taken. “Such methods ‘might for example contain broad planning figures for the deployment of given force, with upper and lower limits to enable best and worst cases to be assessed, ‘The problem with detailed advance planning is that provisional figures are, at best, taken as accurate, and in many cases they are taken to be the upper limits 220. Major Field Training Exercises. Many valuable observations were’ made during Exercise SAIF SARREEA Il in the Oman in the Autumn of 2001, not least thal many Of the lessons identified on Operation GRANBY had not been actioned. In adkltion, thal exercise was sufficiently recent that the GOC and many staff officers of HQ st ‘Armoured Division were sill in post for Operation TELIC."" Similan, important lessons and experience were gained by Exercise LOG VIPER in 2002. For ‘example, 202 Field Hospital RAMC (V) practised relieving a regular hospital in Place, which occurred twice during Operation TELIC, The performance of units and formations on Operation TELIC indicates that it iS not strictly necessary for al ‘loments ofa force to exercise together in a given year to be at high standards of collective performance. However, it is necessary for a rolling programme of major field taining exercises (FTXs) to be held. That enables a large proportion of the force to be broadly ready, so that other troops can be effectively integrated into i The key issue is that a large proportion of a force, ofall ranks and all arms and services, should have personal expgrience of large-scale’ exercises or operations. ‘ssues such as working with formation reconnaissance and third-ine CSS, Practising deployments over long distances, operating outside permanent infrastructure, practising ai-land operations, and regrouping between battlegroups ‘and formations can only be done in large FTXs. On Operation TELIC logistic units HQ (UK) Armd Div 9080/17 G3 Pans deed 8 Jun G3 (nereator't Div POR), p 6 peragraph 12 "OW POR 2.8 pevagraph 12 2.6 RESTRICTED 221. Fores magnitude of the task of supporting the formations they are ‘Thal surprise refects Insufficient oxperience of large-scale wore sured by he ‘onde to supper. crocs. " Capping. Upper tnis to force stongth have been applied ee renee toss Operation GRAN. Ts 9 be expedodroteat seo (Gres nao mdi ne ae Opa TEL Opn Sa ‘the nosd"to plan for subsequent rouloment wore pasar reeves The Divo was fecal capped at abou 18,000 a rks, but ti cons uded 3 Commando Srgeds and 102 Logat Brigade. isk was ken Per SREat 6 montane etary target. preverted the ncuson of MLS er spe, Roper AO an Aroured bevety Croup and a Prsoner of Wa Sena Cronnstn. rey bo al the ele! offre cpg can be mated pare a Sgoner planing (20, asindcaled above. also means thal he Amy ork Wey Sownly ot sie, wich conadered in Chale & A igorus song fhe rors deployed in iamaton Hs mht have gnerted he HO of STOWE outer companies of MPa for Phase layment. Deployment other rg ok place by se or equipment an Fee rae ant by ei or personnel Took 10 weeks ss than hal te tine fr Oernten GRANBY. The was rgoly a consequence othe avait shiping Crise tough the MOD a good ob of ane up shipping rom ade Tsase emir avalasy cf shiping for char wi nat necessary be the ca Intuure operators, Acompanson of he deployments or Operation GRANBY and Operation TELIC is as follows ‘Ser[_ Statistie Op GRANBY] Op TELIC | Difference @) ©) Cl @ G} 7, [Personnel 4,000 32,000, 5% Z_Wehicies 4,700, 75,000 Era 3. [Ammunition Tonnes) | 47.400, 75,000 8% [Shipping Containers | 7.181 6604 “Sie 5 [Deployment Time | 22 weeks | TO weeks | -54% ‘Table 2:4 - Comparison of Deployments for Operations GRANBY and TELIC The obvious major dflerence ste reduction of amunitn moved by over 32 000 (onnae However til covert appoario have been a major aco. hore wos not ‘moa spp io mee ihe fren ono th, ané twas orginal planned to end Sho ay rigas in each of two. However, once the doasion nad boon ken {esr or Trey © Kova thre wat ow mauler me foro Ms, an euttsent sipping fo tae oir Tih Armoured Begade and sth Mechanised 1 18 March 2002: DOG Report, p. 32-1 =_The MoD egorad Operon FRESCO ante main lon nit nae 200, 006 eat 3:1 tcaneah 98 There were ngractza eect Upper ints on deployed Fresco, Fow PORE. © paoaton 2 SAMO was subsaquenty asd, he form of DUR. a Bh no. Honor ot peak 224 tenner of sve wore taraporte eet Oya pt oY "NAO Repo. puragrph 24 "NAO Repo 8 Tate * The ditance col ave bean tanspare in sng ei. or Bic eres. aet RESTRICTEDBrigade in one lit. Thus shipping was considered to be a significant constraint on planning 225. War Manning. A pairing mechanism existed between units and formations of tst and Srd Divisions. This proved to be unworkable, not least because ofthe effects of Operation FRESCO. To offset tis, Germany-based urls were manned from within tat Armoured Division. Thus, for example, 1 RRF would normally expec 1 provide three armoured infantry (Al) company groups to balllegroups wihih Th ‘Armoured Brigade. ether then draw those companies up to war strength with individual reinforcements ftom 3rd Division, 1 RRF manned two Al companies a full “strength”, “Similarly SCOTS DG and 2 RTR manned tivee squadrons at fll strength from the four avaiable in barracks. Thus SCOTS DG. 2 RTR, 1 RRF and 1 BW provided a toil of only six squadrons and four companies ofthe eight and eight required for a ‘square’ brigade. The’éawas therefore a shgtal of two squacrons and four companies, which was met from elsewhere in Tet Armoured Division ® Those adaltional subunits had not formed part of the Brigade for its traning year, nor had 2 RTR Battogroup.* | 724, Square Brigades. There was no lata! operation which required 7th Amoured | Brigade to ght as a square brigade (of two armoured and two Al battlegroups, each | (of two armoured and two Al subunits). However, it was deemed appropriate to provide as much armour as possible, All the armour in the British Land Contingent ‘was dispatched in 7th Armoured Brigade, which was as large as it could reasonably be, The ability to detach armour to 3 Commando Brigade and 16 AirAssault Brigade | 4nd still retain @ viable brigade structure, as happened twice, was most important ‘The evidence of Operation TELIC does not support any general conclusion as to the most desirable structure of @ deployed heavy brigade. The only safe observation is that, if only one heavy brigade is to be deployed, it should be as powerful and capable as possible, 225. Mobilization of Reserves. Operation TELIC was the first major” compulsory mobilization of reserves since the Suez Crisis in 1956, and the frst under the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA 96). Mobilization proceeded smoothly overall * However, there were several local failures, which meant that for many reservists ‘their personal experiences of mobilization were unsatisfactory. Factors included the faliure of an IT system at the Army Personnel Centre at Glasgow which seriously For example, some 0098 were required to delay with Compa etons forth frst 24 hous, but ware not allows take tates or mache onthe aera. In a°her case weeps eeployng wih personal and Suppor weagbrs wore requted to remove nae ecieter and pen kawes frm Der hand baggage. 3 Cao [Bde 2/0100" dood May 03 thereat" Cao Bd POR), paragraph 21 2° HO 7enArnd Bde 9588/69 dated 6 fn OS (heeater 7 Ara Be POR), pO sell 17, Th erorcerments came from 20h mered Begade a Callcive Pertormenca (CP) Love 3. ® In racic, about 6 mnths (180 days). See paragraph 2 This pots enone i footnote nthe DOC Repent. p. 3-24 Foot 8 2-9 RESTRICTEDdespite shortages of training ammunition and other resources. On reflection, HOs should have given more allention to generic MAPEXs and CPXs, and less to extensive contingency planning. MAPEXs and CPXs were given far greater | prominence in the preparation for Operation GRANBY than TELIC. The abilty to | plan quickly in response to a developing situation appears to be considerably moro | ‘effective than attempting to write copious contingency plans in advance. ‘The goal should have been collective mental agilty rather than being fixed by plans made jn advance. Moltke's dictum that no plan survives fist contact with the main body of the enemy sill holds, I ‘THE QUALITY OF PERSONNEL 228, The high quality of personnel was displayed in many areas. Division wrote that the quality of our troops, ad particulary the junior lqadership, ‘was one of the keys to success.” US commanders spoke of the excellant Wualty of | | GOC 1st Armoured | | attached Briish staf officers. Media attention was almost invariably highly positive, | land @ public opinion poll taken in Britain soon after the Operation indicated that British Armed Forces are thought to be amongst the best in the world * Units re- roled without apparent diffcully: 1 DWR was affliated to 4 diferent formations at various times, and 3 RHA, 12 Regt RA and the Joint NBC Regiment were given Peace support tasks after the fall of Basra. When 2 soldiers were injured in Kuwait in a road trafic accident on 20 February, their main concer was to be allowed to remain in theatre.” Junior ofcors and soldiers seen on television conducting peace ‘support operations invariably appeared professional, confident and, in particular, | humane. There were doubtless a fw counter-examples, however. on balance the | Performance of officers, soldiers and marines was clearly in accordance with the highest traditions of the Services. 230. tis important to understand the principal contributors to that quailty: it does not just happen. Training, experiance, and career patterns are major factors, Specifically, a. Allsoidiers have, since the early 1980s, undergone common intial training at fone af five Army Training Regiments prior to specialo-arm training. This is ‘seen as a greal improvement over the former cepot system and forms the bedrock for further collective training, b. Corer courses linked to promotion are now standard. For example, attendance at tactics and small-arms courses became mandatory for infantry NCOs in the 1980s, ©. Allendance at a junior staf course for all Regular young-entty captains has bbeen mandatory since the 1960s. Some late-entr officers also attend, 4. The top 20-25% of officers has allended the Army, or latterly the Joint Services, Command and Staff Gdllege at or about the age of 32-34 "1 DW POR, paragraph 5 Unpubied Pons qualitative racking pl, eating summary. September 2003, * IGA Assaut Be Commanders iat nly Yor 20 February 2003, 2-10 RESTRICTED Figure 2.3: Civil-Military Relations Operational experience is widespread. The Army has been deployed Ccontituously to Northern Ireland since 1969, although major terrorist incidents largely stopped in 1894. Experience of Operation GRANBY, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, afd to a limited extent the Falklands Confit is common. Some young officers and soldiers inevitably had no prior operational experience but they were probably in @ minority. It is net uncommon for & senior NCO or captain to have & or 6 campaign medals.” {The Royal Amouted Cos, Royal rly the Foot Guard and ho Ifanty have paces of ng-orn sacs inthe same unt or aoiars, and oles ar regimental uy” Ths ‘Regimental Syton’ fe neihorpeticslry wel deactbod ner unersood, bls widely end deeply Ralét b0 a slniicant focor nthe operational efocivenese ofthe unis whe employ hI i Without dot a contact othe cohesion tey ply 231. is notable that almost no reports of stress on commanders have been reported for Operation TELIC, Thisis in corirast to Operation GRANBY'6 It may reflect difering Creumslances, better raining, of broader operational experience Very ow sos and mates sil sor wl have akon tn Operation CORPORATE in 1982 ~ Onreocon fs Bish omy and Royal arres roby haves mach colocie expen uso of To Tenn ape on Operon GRAN onthe Bans, consabe csi its ‘earch wos ahd on sve on carats coi, Th resorsh ws subsequent died and Publabed n Brose & pave, Presses Fang Commander (SCSt Oczna! No 29,187) 2-11 RESTRICTEDHEoIIvieD RESTRICTED 232, During the 1980s the Army issued explicit guidance on ‘Values and Standards relating o issues such as persone, interpersonal and professional conduct." At the time it was considered that prescribing such standards was unnecessary. There is no real evidence to show that this publication promoted and sustained high standards, or merely encapsulated those standards which the Army routinely displays. "However, itis clear that these values and standards ara appropriate, and in the great majority of cases appropriate behaviour was observed In particular, isplays of ‘machismo’ were almost completely absent.” EQUIPMENT 233, HO Ist Armoured Division noted that when frdperly resourced, the UK's equipment is among the best in the world.” Challenger 2, Warrior and AS 90, together with cueing systems such as Phoenix, were considered to be crucial to taclical success. Principal British equipments deployed for the ‘operation are listed at Annex B. It should be noted that MLRS was not deployed, and that the Brilish WAH-64D Apache attack helicopter had not yet Figure 2.5: Challenger 2 MBT entered service. Apaches were in service with the US Amy, and AHSIW Cobra helicopters were in [Ser Tem Cost eM) Remarks serves withthe US Marines, | ba ® 7% @ 234, Considerable numbers of equipment UORS were | [Ci [evatenger dust migatonmedutes| 82 |Compoied by 19 March procured end shipped to theatre. The total cost of all | | 27s oo environmental enhancement [10.8 [Completed 29 Apri UORS was £510 million. Examples are shown at Figure 2.4: 1 package, i Table 22. This represanis the practical expression British Soldier and Friend |, (—>—IGpajenger 2 eehavcod armour BS |Gompleted by 19 March of risk in the equipment programme, that industry K protection. could provide critical equipment against planned lead times, In most cases the |’ t-a—Wana ne deconlamwalon Ea [10% dalvered by 1@ equipment arved in tme. However itis an expensive way to procure equipment Aeak March ‘Much oft atved by air, placing a considerable load onthe at bridge and delaying 5 the build-up of forces. It imposed a training and fing bil, which eroded the ited | |S. [Medial intensive therapy modules. so yieNe | time avaiable in theatre for taining ond preparation. This was most significant for | | 6. |Minimv ight machine gun 23 fay 76 Nor the armoured forces which, being equipment-heavy, took longest to arrive and thus = feomplets 4 Apr had the least time for necessery training and preparation. In some cases the UORs. 7. |Deser clothing and boots, ZS [40% in theatre by 13 April were not available in time: the upgrade for the AS 90 fleet was only completed on | |—3—lEnranced combal body a7Tour 30 29 March. Not least due to reluctance to place contracts in time, the risk placed in 5:5 [Entencecl corm 2 UORS seems to be excessive. ‘Table 2.2: Selected Urgent Operational Requirements ty planes 8 Amy Dackne Publication Vokee 6 ‘Slt tho Avery Covenant amy Case 642. Feta 2900 Brigadier A F Birtwistle OBE commanded 43)(NW) Brigade atthe me of the Foot and Mouth epidemic in 200 Ho ook charge of mitanyanealance operas Comba. Aer the epee, in arerening ot the solders uncer is command he bao tat kh sls ae aie copa ei compacuense in general yo ery mat ot geo shay mache = HOw POR p. 2 poregagh 25 NAO opr 10 poneranh 28 NAO Repo: paragon 2 Rice aE 2-12 2-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED301 302 CHAPTER THREE - OPERATIONS Coalition land forces operated weil in most regards, and significantly overmatched the oppostion in many areas. Fears ofa Slaingrad or Groznyy were not realized. Massive rumanitarian disasters did not materialize, However, there wore shortcomings and unique circumstances, whicn should be acknowledged. Furthermore, there is @ perception that coalition successes were in large part a consequence of the latest high-technolagy gystems and processes. In many areas Coalltion supercity was due to far more simple and old-fashioned factors - such a8 beter equipment, better training, and better leadership, ‘THE NATURE OF LAND COMBAT ‘Armies know that combal is complex, chaotic, dangerous, adversarial and human, land thei doctrines tend to reflect that. In the case of Operation TELIC there appears to have been some surprise that, technological sophistication notwithstanding, in combat most information about the enemy comes from the troops in combat. There is only so much that advanced CIS can do to resolve the fog of war. However, i also appoers thal the contemporary operating environment is yet more compiex and chaotic (hence confusing) than perhaps previously thought. 208. Figure 3.1: Some Aspects of Modern Conflict The Three-Block War. General Krulak, a former Commandant of the USMC, articulated the concopt of a "Three-Block War’ in which armed forces might be ‘equifed to fight in one cty block, conduct peace support operations in another, and Provide humanitarian assistance in a third." This is @ recognition that land forces today do not just fight they do many things, of which fighting is one. “The British Army history is full of Such experiences, The term Three-Block War! is a "Commandant of he US] Marne Cors Whee Later No 3-58 dated 26 dune 1808. a4 RESTRICTED.hori or peatons arose spect of cnet. Thw pecs ls, th | Iecalon and tring are ot cca In protic, expeanea Wom Bagh, Basa | ana other paces suggests that tho Conceot of Tiree Bock Warr aduahy oh Udorsttoment. Operations can Row fom warfghtna te peace suppor aed humanitaran acon and back without any obvious dercston, The rt ne | British experience since Operation GRANBY tends to point in the same direction. | However thos operons have not inolved protected contre proses ha | not been obvious, In Iraq, British Armed Forces coped with this environment | Partslry wel wich suggets thal hor oveal farng and expences ssc | thom in goo stead, That complex envronmrt must be capured and ade expe, | ‘onsrothat the expenence gained nat xt. Thal pimaiy Ines acon at | higiovel doctine wo expan beta he character o mada operators | 304. The Threat to Rear Areas. The comflex opérsting environment, with ts attendant ‘isk of regular, irregular oF insurgent forces acting throughout the thea, implies Increased risk to what have traditionally been classified as rear areas. One could | say that there is no longer a rear area, except thatthe term ‘rear area’ ie useful to denote the area of rear operations and therefore the primary area from which the force is sustained. Two incidenis ilustrate this risk. One was the deaths of two soldiers of 33 Engineer Regiment (EOD), probably kled by Be'ath party imegulars. The other was the ambush of the 607th US Maintenance Company moving through Nasariyah in convoy on 23 March. i aS ce: | E. Nasiriyah route vs. Hwy 1 route (Contact Pt. to Release Pt.) Joperations at Ai Nasiriyah prior to the committal of 1st Armoured Division, TF Tarawa was intended to provide rear brea security for 1 MEF all the way from the Kuwait border to Baghdad, as 1st Marine Ghision advanced northward. To facitate this it was originally intended to bypass Al Nosiriyah, sealing it off to prevent intorfrence wth 1 MEF LOCs northwards (see Figure 4.1), and using Highway 1 the as primary route, However, @s British forces became available during February 2003 1 MEF changed its Using the bridges through Al Nasiriyah would shorten the LOC by 6Okm, Therefore 1 MEF committed most of TF Tarawa to securing routes through the city from 23 March 2003, Unfortunately it was during 23 March thatthe 507th Maintenance Company was fattacked whilst moving through An Nasinyah (described below). The city was not ‘definitively cleared until 31 March; TF Tarawa moved north fo relieve {st Marine Division at Ad Diwaniyah on 1 Apri “The Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company ‘At about 0700hrs (local time) on 23 March 2003, while moving through the outskits of the city of Al Nasiriyah, an element of the US 507th Maintenance company was altacked by Iraqi military forces and irregulars. The company had become isolated as ‘communications, already stretched tothe limit, could not bo extended to include them. (They were empioyed in recovering heavy wheeled vehicles from soft sand end breakdowns along a cross-country route through the Iragi desert). Over @ period of 60- 70 hours, wit ite rest and limited communications, human error further contributed to the situation through a single navigation eror. “The company had driven north through Al Nasiryah, rather than tuming west in the southern outskirts. As it eft the city it came under sporadic small arms fre. Realising its mistake, the company turned round and began to retrace its steps. It made a further map reading error and a second U-turn, On the rotum route vehicles were shot al and damaged. Some had lo be abandoned: others were cut off together with their crew. One sary, led by the OC, managed to reach elements of the 6th Marine Tank Battalion south ofthe city. Togetter they set off to rescue the remainder. ‘They did rescue 10 soldiers of another group, but all 17 members ofa third party (including the now-famous Private Jessica Lynch) were killed, wounded or captured. In all, of the 33 offers and soldiers who entered the city that morning, 11 were kiled, 9 \were wounded and 7 were captured (including some of those wounded) ‘Several of tha,group's weapons malfunctioned: the US Army report stated that these ‘malfunctions"'may have resulted from inadequate individual maintenance in @ desert pe ee ervironment. Ths nuded te campers only inch Browning HMG" Figure 3.2: Routes Through Al Nasiriyah ———_ * Unretrreed US Amy acount erga om te Cento Army estos eae 3-2 3-3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED308, Media Casualties. About 900 ‘media staf - journalists, TV and radio reporters, ‘cameramen and sound technicians - deployed into Iraq ffom all nations during the combat phase. Of those, 16 cied. This was the highest ‘morality rate of any category of participant. Historically, infantry subaltorns. and infantry soldiers have been the most at risk in war. It now appears that those who report the conflict tare more at risk than those who participate ‘This had significant effect. According to one senior officer, fourteen US Army Infantry battalions were redeployed to rear socuity duties in ts immediate aftermath This was probably an overstalement, oF an over-reaction. It came as US forces ‘were approaching the Red Zone, and some adjustment of forces was without doubt required. The Coalition had not intended to seize Baghdad off he line of march, ant ‘both 3rd infantry Division and 1st Marine Division had reached tho edge of the Rea Zone with a single brigade leading. However, that readiustment, nervousness over rear security, and atrocious weather had the cumulative effect of hakingrmajor movement forward from about 24 to 30 March, which could be construed as. an __ operational pause’ 305. Forces for Security and Peace Support Operations. Some tisk was accepted in JOINT LANDIAIR ISSUES ‘war security, The RHQ and one squadron of QDG, together with 12 Regt RA, were ‘employed in rear security operations; whil&t"d DVR conducted peace support ‘operations in Az Zubayr. 3 RHA and the Joint NBC Regiment alco cofgucted peace support operations, affer6 Apri. The experience of Operation TELIC suggests that @ wide range cf troops have lo be capable of conducting security and peace support lasks, at short notice and with litle (if ary) in-theatre taining. One of the international legal requirements for an armed force is the requirement to guard and ‘administer PW, and by implication to command the forces requirad to do 50. It further extonds to the requirement to guard wounded PW in British field hospitals. It is not clear why this requirement was not intially resourced. I is a lesson from Operation GRANBY which appears to have been forgotten.* 308, The coalition enjoyed a very high ‘degree of control ofthe air from before the start ‘of the operation. Destruction of critical enemy systems had started long before 21 March: 28 ALSamoud missila launchers wore reported destroyed by 6 March, In comparison with the Gulf Wer of 1990-1, the proportion of air sorties flown in support of land forces increased from 55% to 78%. There were two main reasons. Fist, there was no need to obtain, and relatively litle’ need to sustain, control of the al. Figure 3.3: Embedded Journalist secondly, there were relatively fewer attacks on 306. Sensitive Site Exploitation. Expeditionary operations will oien requir. certain | senetve sites to be investigated in dela, Examples inclade document caches, | strategic targets, The RAF flew 6% of all mass graves, WMD depots, and accident or crime sites. Specialists from many Coalition at sorties and delivered 3% of ailaunched weapons. cisciplines willbe required to work together. Special procedures wil be required, for | to capture forensic evidence or avoid contact with hazardous materials. | 310. A greater proportion The task cannot simply be left tothe SIB. Policy and procedures for Sensitive Sit | Of precision-guided Explotation should be developed and coded. Coalition forces: have gained | aerially-delivered substantial experience of this task during Operation TELIC, which should be weapons was used, recorded and incorporated into staff raining. fising to 68% during eS Operation TELIC. - = 307. Non-State Conflict. The UK appears to have repeated the lessons lost of Kosovo, Precision-guided = where it leemt what was needed of a land force, the civil administration, and the munitions. (PGMs) Te interactions beiween them in a regime change. Ifthe assets, ther readinoss and had effectively their synchronisation in a coherent plan are not considered, the Land Component become cheaper, has to pick up the pieces. Most ofthe resources for ths regime replacement phase? and Joint Direct ‘are required in the land component. Joint doctrine, or policy, is required to clay the ‘Attack Munitions responsibiles of each ofthe military components, other goverment departments, (JDAMs), which and non-governmental organizations. Exposing those responsibilities in doctrine or ‘employ "satelite Policy would avoid these lessons being forgotten again. Ironically, the phase that Guidance, had been was initially termed the ‘aftermath’ seems to be the most decisive and costly, inoduced. JDAMS financialy and in ves. + represent a eauneSh Alt BOBS significant increase Sees! "This cussed rer at paragraph 335 blow ——_ + gceme, OREN RANEY ory Daan rad ow Pitre cf Wer Hania | +” Rape ace By spat, on G Dey Br i om dt maromre +The iii, almostpecarateryenabingphaso bg ‘iti rege removaor‘estcton andes out of 12 or about 244 of te land component 3-4 3-5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTEDan 312, 313, “consequence of an ATO process which is 72 hours long). in capabilty, because they allow precise delivery without operator or third-party ‘guidance. Pre-planned sorties can now be mora effective, Additionally, if precise | target coordinates can be obtained, JDAMs can be used in response to reactive or | short notice targets without the nead for a laser target designator Overview. However, tactical and procedural shortcomings were observed. The decision to conduct a strategic attack on the night of 19-20 March took many ‘commanders and statf by surprise. Coupled with the gradual reduction of the preliminary air operation until A-Day and G-Day coincided, the Air Tasking process was severely disrupted for the first four days of operations (a necessary Battle Damage Assessment was not well done, throughout the campaign. Thore wore shortcomings with staff procedures, resulting in a perception that 1st (UK) Armoured Division was | rot wellserved wth air support. However, if sbould be remembered that V (US) CCoros was on the Lard Component main eff, whist within 1 MEF tfig main effort | lay with 1st Marine Division. 1st Armoured Division understandably did not enjoy a | high priority for ar support | Control of the Air. Western armed forces have enjoyed a high level of control of the air in all operations since Operation GRANBY and now tend to take such control for granted. That assumption should be explored. Fist, freedom of action has not been absolute, with difficulties for allied aircraft operating at low levels (Iypically 5,000 feet and sometimes higher), due to an inabilty to suppress completely shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles and light antiaircraft artilery. During ‘Operation TELIC, freedom of operation over the 'Red Zone’ around Baghdad was ‘considerably constrained. Secondly, there is as yet lille evidence that enemy use of cruise missiles and UAVs can be suporessed with reliably. Thirdly, it seems reasonable to assume that Western armed forces will gain, atthe least, freedom of manoeuvre for their own land forces for the foreseeable future. However, the ‘questions of how iong that may take, and whet resources would be needed, needs to be explored. There should also be an examination of the requirement to conduct land operations before that stage is reached. For example, in such circumstances it might be thal enemy ground forces suffer no significant atttion before attack by land forces; or that AH constitute the only viable source of CAS and Al. Conversely itmay be that AH are too vulnerable to enemy airpower- including the use of UAVS tolocate FARPs, and cruise missiles to attack thom. Operation TELIC suggests that a better-organized but similarly modesty-equipped enemy could contest control of the air al some levels quite effectively; it does not need a major peer competitor with ‘conventional ar force to do so, Land-Air Synergy. Neither Joint, Land nor Air doctrine contain any useful description of how land and air forces should interact, to mutual benelit, at the ‘operational and lactical levels. Such doctrine as exists tends to dwell on procedural detail, The avsence of an overarching understanding and set of Principles has probably led to confision, mutual misunderstanding and reduced effectiveness. Soldiers and aitmen share some expectation of synergy, but what that synergy is and how its obtained is not obvious. Some benefis of control ofthe air are reasonably well understood, such as maintaining the freedom of manoeuvre of land forces. However, other aspects of cooperation are less obvious. For 3-6 RESTRICTED zz 31a, ‘example, observations about operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan suggest that {ground force action provokes enemy land force responses in ways which typically Frerease signatures - radio, radar, thermal or visual. That improves the abiity of the ‘ar componant to find and to strike those enemy land forces. In the case of ‘Operation TELIC, the seizure of the Faw Peninsula and the establishment of blocking positions around Basra prompted Iraqi attempts to counterattack (paricularly towards 3 Commando Brigade). This presented good targets to Coalition ait forces, and assisted MAW in its mission. Additionally, both the iraqi movement south and the air attacks reduced the enemy’ abilty to threaten the flank Of 1st Marine Division as It advaneed north. As a second example, the RGFC Medina Division maved south west in response to the advance of 3rd Infantry Division. It sought to use a szndstorm as cover from air attack Unfortunately for the Iraqis the sandstorm was insufficient protection against modem airpovrer. Thus there was considerable synergy at several levels. Common, agreed Joint and single-Service doctrine is required to describe these high-level interactions. Figure 3.5: 3 MAW's role in protecting the flank of 1 MEF. Situation at about 4-5 April 2003, Air Tasking Procedures. There was considerable cissatisfaction with current air tasking procedures. The ATO is intended to allow the most effcient use of airpower by coordinating all necessary assets to a single plan made at the highest tactical leval (the Air Component Commander, operating on the operational-tactical 3-7 RESTRICTED318. 316 RESTRICTED interface). However, some elements of the US Army have expressed dissatisfaction | with the inflexibility of the ATO process as applied, with some justification. Prior to G-Day, strker had been plannod gaint the 1aih Armoured Brigade of the Republican Guard Modina Division i the Karbla-ilah are, As 3rd US Infantry Division approached tha area, i was assessed thal sikes agaist tha Divisional ‘Aatilry would be more speropato, ane it requested changes tothe ATO wih 24 to 48 hours’ notice. Ths. seemingly reascnable request simply reflectec the Linpreditabity of land combat. However, caused considerabo problems within the USAF ed air tasking process. HO 1 MEF retained convol ofthe aitrat of 3 “MAW. Although ther tasking was rellected on the ATO, the ACG could ot in practice coordinate all (nealre ar asses to the groatet fect. On baiance, appears that the ATO process isin principle workabl, bu hat greater Next is | Tenuired i the way that ar planing Is actuay-goncucted within That fexibity | Should enable movement ftom the coortnated application of ell assis at some ‘stages (for example in gaining control of the air or in pre-G-Day strikes, to the | sxatest decentralization and fexbily where appropriate) once land forces are engaged, Ii might be that at some stages the Lané Component (ors subordinate | elements) shouldbe given contro of some aspects ofthe arpace: for exam, a far asthe Fie Support Coordination Line (FSCL) below $000 foe, or sia MAWs. It was widely believed amongst British land forces that the possession of @ largely autonomous MAW gave 1 MEF better air support than V (US) Corps. This impression seems to have resulted from a briefing given by 3 MAW staff before G- Day. However, the overall picture seems diferent. First, quantity of support to one land formation or another isnot the main parameter ofthe effectiveness of airpower. ‘Secondly, the USAF does seem to have been less flexible in their response to V Corps (a8 desenbed above); but that was a consequence of process, not structure, ‘Thirdly, 1st Armoured Division was a low prionty for air support, and may have Perceived the results ofthe relative prionty afforded to tst Marine ‘Division to be a Consequence of structure rather than priority. Lasly, there is eviderice that the British land force aic support procedures were not as slick as USMC procedures, ‘hich may have reinforced the same perception, Ithas bean suggested that British {and forces should have had dedicated air support (for example, fist callon the RAF Harrier force), by analogy with 3 MAW. Overall, the evidence from Operation | TELIC does not seem to suppor those suggestions UAVs. Coalition use of UAVs was widely regarded as a success. Relatively few systems were used - perhaps a few dozen sorties per day across the Coalition. It was found that US systems, primarily procured for reconnaissance and surveillance, Could be used effectively for artillery target acquisition. Conversely, Phoenix (which was primarily procured for larget acquisition) was found to have considerable value in reconnaissance and survoilance. The experience of Operation TELIC is one- sided, buta pointer o the future. The UK needs to explore the consequences of the luse of much larger numbers of UAVs, probably controlled at several levels, However, the Army should also explore the possibilty of extensive enemy use of UAVs, and consider active and passive defensive measures. There is some evidence that the UAVs available wore held at too high a level of command. This is fone aspect of the control of ISTAR assets, which is considered in Chapter 4. 3-8 RESTRICTED 317. 318, RESIRIGIED ‘The FSCL and Air interdiction. The FSCL has traditionally been set by corps or Ind component commanders, and has normally followed 2 major terrain festure However, during Operation TELIC the Air Component used a system of ‘Kill Box Interdction, in which the theatre was divides into large squares or ill Boxes’. Air Interdition of ground targets was controlled by opening ar closing those boxes. Ki tox interdiction works well where all aicraft have GPS navigation, and are not navigating primarily by terrain features. Boxes short of the FSCL were controlled by {and slaf, and targets within them subject to positive contol by ground controle. Boxes beyond the FSCL were controlled by the Air Component and positive control ‘was not required. Three effects were observed: First. the FSCL was,moved forward tov soon, as a way of suggesting progress during land operations. This created areas beyond the range of fand:based systems but within tre FSCL, which was accordingly not given the prionty by the Air Component which it probably required b. Secondly, kil boxes astide the FSCL were not open as offen as those immediately beyond it in part or whole, to much the same effect. Thirdly, considerable quantities of ordnance were dropped by aircraft returning from planned sorties, or atthe end of on-call missions, into open kil boxes. Whilst this undoubtedly resulted in 2 higher overall kil rate and was in essence a form of Armed Reconnaissance, itis not necessarily particularly tffcent. Targets were attacked because they could be, rather than because they were the best available. Kill box interdiction as practised can be seen as a workable measure in an environment of plentiful resource. “The nature, purpose and location of the FSCL requires further study, as does the use of kil box interdiction. It may be thal, as GPS becomes increasingly common ‘amongst land forces, the FSCL could follow tho boundaries of kil boxes, rather than ‘eographical features as at present. Alternatively, it may be that the FSCL concept is becoming redundant. Battle Damage Assossment, Bale Damage Assessment (BDA) was considered to be inadequate, There were three main reasons and one major consequence, ‘The reasons were, fst, the reduction of the inital air operation unti Aand G Days coincided, so that no BDA had been done before G-Day, and the results of intial stratagic strikes were not understood for the first 2 to 3 days of the campaign. The ‘second reason was the strategic attack on the Iraq regime on 19:20 March. The primary measure of effecveness of this stike (the removal of the regime) did not ‘require conventional BDA, but the physical damage it caused, and the fact that the ‘strike was not integrated into the rest of the air campaign plan, meant that damage had been done prior fo A-Day which was not assessed. Thirdly, insuficient ISTAR ‘assets were available to conduct BDA. The net effect ofthe lack of BOA was that it ‘was vary diffcult to assess campaign effectveness and henca the progress of the ‘campaign plan. The US employed a sophisticated Net Assessment methodology to ty to monitor the progress of the campaign, but it appears to have been of very litle value, The measurement of psychological rather than physical effects remains vary dificult, In adiition, there is a tendency to measure what can be measured, ‘and make fallacious decisions as a result. Two general observations may be made. 3-9 RESTRICTED21 322, 323. ‘Air Assault Operations, The term ‘air assault is commonly taken to mean | helibome delivery of forces on to or near an objective held by an enemy ground force." The 101st Air Assault Division, reportedly the most expensive division inthe World, cue to its dedicated SH force, was unable to create any opportunity to ‘conduct large scale air assaults because the environment was considered too risky. ‘One must question whether the environment will ever be less risky, within mejor fand combat operations. Similar considerations applied to the proposed British seizure of Galat Sigar Airfield by alrbome assault, That operation was eventually rejected because of the AD threat, altiough it was not actually cancelled until st Marine Division had overrun the aitfield. Conversely, 3. Commando Brigade conducted an, ‘adventurous and highly successful air assault onto the Faw Peninsula on the night ‘of 20-21 March. Two enemy infantry companies on the objective were identified only | when the Marines landed. The operation was canglucted relatively close tothe soa, supported by naval gunfire, and within range of ertilery suppor from Bubiyan tsland in Kuwait. In addition, a number of airmobile moves were carried out f'roughout | the campaign. | ‘Overview. The evidence indicates that deep cross-FLOT aviation raids, and air assault operations, are feasible in the right cumstances. However, as Apache enters British service, iis important those circumstances be subject to considerably wider analysis, There appear ta be five major conditions for success, for both ait assault and aviation deep attack: 8, Sutprise should actualy be achioved, . —_Intaligence should be up to date and accurate, 2. Operations should be a combined-arms and joint; with effective defence suppression, whether by arillery or aircraft. The force should be rapidly reinforced, relieved or withdrawn before the surprise wears of, {it follows that the required pre-condiions for deep, long-range sir manoeuvre wil be criically diferent from those of relatvely shallow penotrations. As Operation MARKET GARDEN indicated In 1944, tactical or operational surprise is insufficient ifthe landing force cannot be relieved in time j | | © The aviation force should be commanded effectively in realtime. | | | | | ‘COALITION INTEROPERABILITY British and US forces cooperated wall, dnd to @ degree of subordination not previously foreseen.” This continues a,trend of coalition interoperability sean since 11990: during Operation GRANBY, Easl Timor and Afghanistan; as wall as NATO deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo. Success is in part a result of considerable investment in institutions such as NATO and the American, British, Canadian, ‘Australian and New Zealand Armies (ABCA) programme. Having now seen a fattern cf ‘coalitions of the wiling’, the Army might reconsider its pattern of Intemational exchange and laison officers, with a view to strengthening ties with those nations with which future cooperation is mos! likely, perhaps atthe costo ties with other racttonal aie, 324, Cooperation withthe US was largely ‘successful, but further work is required ‘The Army should monitor US doctrinal and Improve - technical development to interoperability in future. Personal felationships between British and American officers were important in ‘developing the bonds of trust essential in ‘war. Opportunitas to allow relationships to prosper before operations should be Goveloped: this should not be let to chanos, This requires closer institutional links, ‘more training opportunites and @ change to the way the Army selects isison ‘and exchange officers. Furthermore, the ‘Army might consider establishing close ‘and direct links with the US Marino Corps, just a currently has withthe US Army, i 226. Technical and __procedural Shortcomings are stil present National communications systems ere forthe most bart sit not interoperable. They require Imanpowerrntensve falson detachments St the interfaces. which increase the vera size of the HOs._In addition, the Figure 3.8: fre ofthe air tealtion Nations Tease of classed information across he So eee eee Coalition was not as open as might be wished. It is understood that the US is curently reviewing its eleese policy with respect to the UK INFORMATION OPERATIONS 325. The experience ef Information Operations during Operation TELIC was mixed. At the operational level, the Iraqi Government spokesman who consistently denied reports of Coalition progress on television appears to have had a significant negative effect on iraqi forces: they were shocked and surprised when those reports wore found to be true. There was considerable enthusiasm for tactical Information Operations in some HOs, However, there was limited strategic guidanca, apart from profiibition on most media activities. Both trained manpower and cultural advice ‘were limited. Thete is @ clear need to understand the enemy and the people with ‘whom we deal, The Coalitian had very lie relevant human inteligence, and much * san operation nich irae ecole, round, CS and CSS fore manoeuw an ght nan rm ‘of what there was had came somewhat indirectly from UNMOVIC. AS a resut, the the ak and on and er the ground JWE Ot sm ou "it 1 MEU subordinated 3 Conmando Sigade, and 1st Anoured Dion subordnsted t+ MEF 3-12 3-13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED327. 322, Coalition seriously underestimated the effect ofthe Fedayeen Saddam in preventing desertion in response to Information Operations, ‘There is also considerable evidence that Information Operations were not paticuiarly effective. The US Army observed that despite a decade-long joint and ‘Army effort, information operations doctrine, organizations, and practice have not realized the potential of the Information Age. A radio stalion was established to broadcast to Basrah but apparently few people listened to it. A newspepen was printod, But by 20 April only 5,000 copies were being distributed to a cily of over a million people. The destruction of enemy C2 nades dk have some effect. The key eificulty with Information Operations is measuring the effectiveness of psychological rather than physical effects, or the psychological consequences of physical effects, Unt! such measurement is practical, any effort, spent in coordinating tactical information Operations cannot, by definition, be justified rigorously. There is litle | direct evidence to support applying further resources inthe expectation teat they will work. It is not clear why tactical Information Operations have been adopted with such enthusiasm, as there is litle evidence of thelr effectiveness, Some aspects, such as PSYOPS in peace support operations, appear to have some benelit However, there is clearly a need to clarify doctrine and responsibilies inthis area, not least to ensure coherence with strategic and operational activities, FIREPOWER AND MANOEUVRE Protracted and heavy fighting took place on several occasions throughout the campaign. However, notwithstanding the conduct of those under fre, the results were almost invariably one sided. In several instances where heavy fighting was recorded, no casualties were sulfered by British or US forces. Heavy ermoured forces clearly showed their value, and so the investment placed in first class; ‘armoured vehicles (such 5 Challenger 2, M1 Abrams, Warrior and M2 Bradley) is clearly usted. In general, Coaltion armed forces anjoyed a clear advantage in the protection afforded by their AFVs, body armour and helmets, and learnt to exploit ‘hat protection pragmatically. They developed the confidence to operate boldly, Urban Operations. There are probably 9 interlinked reasons why operations in Baghdad and Basrah were not lke those of Stalingrad or Grozny. If all 9 continue lo apply, a recurrence may be expected. If not, the Army has to exercise ‘considerable caution. Specifically 2. The aggressive use of armour in urban operations was only possible to the ‘extent seen because ofthe protection enjoyed by our AFVs, One Challenger recelved 14 hits from RPGs, and none penetrated the armour However, the antitank systems used by the Iraq's ware of very olé patterns such as the Russian RPG-7, b. Coalition air forces could opérate over built up areas with considerable freedom, which provided two benotits surveilanca, largely precisaly using PGMs, The first was effective aerial from UAVs. The second was the ability to attack 3-14 RESTRICTED Figure 3.9: Infantry in Urban Operations © DAM and other PGMs were employed in urban operations for the first ime. ‘This meant that, once pinpointed, Iraqi slrongpoints could be altacked acaurataly with considerable effect and ltte risk of collateral damage. @. —_raql forces were insufficiently numerous to form continuous fronts. They ‘could anly occupy very small areas of ary bult up area, leaving gaps and weakness. e. Because Iraqi forces did not enjoy the support of most of the local population, they were forced to deplay in enclaves which could be accurately located. Consequently they had litle freedom of movement [HUMINT was available both from the local population and fram other sources. This allowed Iraqi positions to be accurately located, then attacked Using either PGMs or ground assaul. 3. Most buildings were only one or two storeys high, minimizing the threat to armour from upper stories and rooftops. Conversely there are accounts of Brtish AFVs engaging Iraqi positions on rooftops.” h. Although many British units had not conducted training for urban operations recently, the levels of skil thoy displayed were very much higher than the Iraqis. i. Coalition forces adapted rapidly to the circumstances in which they found themselves, For example, when they found that their armour was largely invulnerable to the threat, they adapted their tactics accordingly. This is party 2 reflection of their quality as individuals, and partly due to the way they are trained to think on thir feet For example, 1 BWBHOGC4/2 dated 25 Apel 2003, Enclosed at Annex F io Commander's Ory 3-18 RESTRICTEDRESTRICTED The Amy wil need to be cautious about drawing general conclusions from urban ‘operations in Basrah and Baghdad. Unless all 8 or most of these factors apply in @ future operation, the result could be very differant. There is considerable reason te continue to teach tactics for urban operations in the anticipation that it wil not be so ‘easy, whilst stressing tho need to be pragmatic and to exploit local circumstances, Figure 3.10: Armour in Urban Operations 330. Armour in Urban Operations. Current doctrine stresees that Operations in Built Up Araas (OBUA) shouli be waged as a combined-arms operation, Thus it should have been no surprise to find that armour has an important role to play in urban ‘combat.” The use of armour in OBUA training is currently limited, not least because the infrastructure ofthe primary OBUA training faclty at Copehill Down on Salisbury Piain will oly support limited movement of AFVs. However, noting that armour should train for OBUA extensively is not the same as giving it an unconstrained offensive role: in many circumstances unescorted armour wil be highly vulnerable to enemy infanty. 391. Field Artillery. Incremental improvements to atilary fre contol since Operation GRANBY have led toa significant improvement in effectiveness, The effectiveness Of firstround engagements by AS 90 was paticularly noted, Artillery was uséd extensively: the 105mm light guns of 7 RMA fired up to 432 rolunds per fe mission, ‘though 60 or 90 rounds was more common (5 rounds per gun from 2 or 3 batteries). On 24 March, the busiest day, 7 RHA fired 30 missions. US Army field ‘and rocket artilery (MLRS and ATACMs) was also used very extensively, with typically more rounds fired per fre unit than during Operation GRANBY. it should 1 ,2uteg 19645 twa recommended hat Chichl ametrone fark shoud be Uses ngoup of as 3-16 RESTRICTED rmuniton than was 1 otod that wns Bish forces shipped fa ore ailey ammunition 1 oe et aay ariley atone stage fan out of eremunton (argly because of he Pa ee eraaien tha tobe moved). Cadon soul be exercised in emPoyng NX a8 Siperionces of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and TELIC to plan future arilery | ammunition scales, reer Rem] Ta > = (@y [ects an 92 ATACMS (average [!\4 ATACMS (average of Lees tcRS icles and 02 (MLR miseles and 83 ATACMs Jac per system) per sytem) ed a A BAER a TE TOR TST [BOTW an STS fe f |49,982 rounds (average of 69 114,457 rounds (average of 263 jnds pr gun) founds bor gn) Table 3.1: US Army Artillery Comparison, 1990-1 and 2003 Figure 3.11: AS 90 Firing at Night 3-17 RESTRICTED aaa heieeeiien332. Formation Reconnaissance. Formation reconnaissance squadrons were attached ta both 3 Commando Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade. "3 Commando Brigade ‘oted that ls operation could not have taken place in the way It did without such ‘support. 16 Air Assault Brigade recommenced that more formation raconnaiessrcn be attached where possible. Formation reconnaissance was primanly tasked wins ‘sereen or guerd force tasks. A screen force is not primary intended to hgh: Wn fighting took place, the quantity and quality of combat reporting was reduced. ‘Tine {s not surprising, nor intended as criism, but should be considered when face organizing guard forces. In many cases tanks and other elements wil be requrea: 383, Armour with Light Forces. Armoured forces were alsa alached to each of he we lion bigades, C Squadton SCOTS OG was atachoe Corn ee mando Bade on 25.27 March fo operators around Abdul Qaab. 2 ATR Bother eee Bidpn was deployed to css the Sat al Nab, neoce ee | diaries do not mention the logistic implications of regrouping across formation | boundaries. The dangers of Pennypacketing notwithstanding, it appears that there | are several potential advantages in the use of armour with light forces. A singie | {roop might have disproportionate etec in expeditonary operations, Within wae | SPRortunities for light forces to train with armour should be ‘created. Itis reasonable | | Hoop of Ma bridging vahcies to 3. Commando Brigade, ‘This was the frst opereicnsl 4 omy, \ee/god mam xe mei supa was te sachmot of | Provecrion | 385. Rear Area Security. The risk to rear area troops was describéd above. There is 4 until ver Ye be enough combat toons to Motes! ee era ates instalation, nor o esto evry convoy, Indeed tat woul fas Ney eae power Aare economic response woud be fo tan naan HG ce fer setetence to ahr stander hte eck on he US cor eee Company descbed above thre were many isances of weason eto in eft instance ares fk of tang, Tarivoranniee ee Tsou, variulary ammunition. bit also poly enead nere {Ads Ita rue INCOs and sates tained ts ead econ ane "maya toque re-nay f he Snpt fnelstier sec a 396, Al Defence. The ait treat was assessed as negligible and tharelore Amy Rapier Une were not deployed. However. on one ocoason'an ny sey mse missed tho Main CP of HOt MEF by loss than doom he nan alterate CP. An RAF Regimont Rapier Squadron was huntody net ees Fesponse.” On tis occasion the RAF Regiment manoeuvring hog oe absence of the Amy's abit to oso, The Ami noodle tobe ming nie 3-18 RESTRICTED RNR ae TL ceiailed in deploying a force without Army GBAD in fulura operations. A negligible threat is not the same as no threat, particulary in terme of threat to high-value targets. NBC. There was scme evidence of over-rellance on the Joint NBC Regiment: one 7 “ unit reported being ‘under the umbrella! of the Regiment. That unit's roles are pprimaniy those of NBC reconnaissance, monitoring, reporting and decontamination. That does not of itself provide protection to nearby units. The early days of the deployment for Operation TELIC saw many cases of over-reaction to everyday ‘occurrences, triggering masking drils. "camples include the crew of a Landrover in |raq who interpreted moisture landing on the windscreen as chemical droplets. It resulted from the driver ofthe car in font using his windscreen washers, and some of the water passing over his éar. Such over-reaction was seen many times during Operation GRANBY. It is probably inevitable TACTICAL DOCTRINE ‘There is considerable evidence that in most regards the Army's tactical doctrine served very well, In fact there has been no substantive enicism oft. However, his 's to be expected in engaging @ poorly equipped, trained and led army: and was predicted.” As expected, a large number of useful observations were made at the level of procedures, and itis important that those observations be acted upon, However, at the levels of philosophy, principles and practices, no significant ‘observations were made at the time.” 338. 339 Shock and Surprise. Draft British Army Doctrine strasses the importance of achieving shock and surprise in combat. A good example isthe armoured cai into ‘Az Zubayr conducted by 2 RTR battlegroup during the morning of 26 March, The ‘bjactive was an enemy command and contral centre (Objective BRAIN), which was tobe attacked just before H-Hr with eight 1,000Ib JDAMs."" An armoured squadron ‘would then assault the objective, supported by armoured infantry. The ‘Commander's Diary contains the following report: ‘The enemy was completely paralysed by the surprise attack, especially the JDAMs. What had previously been a concentrated area of enemy strength was neutralized by the shock and surprise of the bomting, followed up by tanks into the heart of the enemy's perceived stronghold. That there was no resistance during the conduct of the raid demonstrated the psychological ‘effect as well as the physical blow this achioved against the enemy. The fenemy did subsequently reorganize but only achieved limited resistance further in depth." 340. Simultaneity. A good example of simultancity was the attack of 7th Armoured Brigade into Basrah, Orginally conceived as 3 sequential parallel thrusts from the a 5, Fete Prosecte cat Chapor 7 Amy Boctne Pubication Land Oparaions, published in the Bish ‘ny Rom Number 133, Winter 2003. The obsarvationsn te rs 2 sections ofthis Cheter were made, onrellecton, months afer he conte, * fomy Doctone Punizaton Land Operations, in a £ Oniy 8 JOAN detonated * 2RTR AG 2100/1810 dates 30 Apr 2003, 3-19 RESTRICTEDWest, this was changed so that all three altacks would take place simultaneously The attack did not take place quite as planned. However, during 7 Brigade’s attack 3 Commando Brigade attacked from the East and rapidly seized the Presidential Palace. Thus in practice four attacks took place broadly simultaneously ina single ‘concentric offensive | } iE tessons ; 341. Learning lessons from past conflicts is a key element of preparation for future“) ‘operations, and the fale fo lear lessons from recent confi is marked. Many | iessons trom the Falonds Confer were not exploited before Operation GRANBY, ‘and many of those from GRANBY were not exploited before SAIF SARREEA Ii, | Pans to inate a lessons capture and expotaon process for TELIC included the | reflection of intent, it hides the fact that in mobilisation for Operation TELIC many AT feservsts got considerably ess than 14 days notice. 44, These observations suggest two requirements, The fstis the need for a robust and insittionalized Army lessons process. That process has to be based on the chain fof command, and attract the attention and resources which that implies. Thoroughness and persistence are required. This shoulé include a process of reviewing the lessons, monitoring the Implementation, and acting to resolve any Confit with policy or practice. The second isthe need for an analysis whichis (as far 2s pessible) objective, rigorous and takes an overview of the operation as & whole. That is the purpose of this document. It has to be objective and independent, and review the evidence as It finds it. During the writing of this ‘Analysia, there have been some attempts to inodly its findings to fit current policy. That is not in the Army/s interest in either the short or long term. I may also preparation of an Army Master Questions List, and the dispatch of officersdo capture | lessons in theatre during or shortly afler operations. However, those plans were thwarted by a decision not to deploy the necessary staff into theatre, even though they had been identified and were available, This contrasts withthe great emphasis (on lessons capture placed by both the US Army and USMC. reconsider allowing accredited historians to accompany the land force, in order to provide a further valuable perspective. 18. The floneg means a corona Jy-a that cman be ancl a conde be Noes bn! on =" andi in the writing of operational diaries. This includes the oritcism of tour and sot He whe sper 342. The Army’s analyses of previous wars and campaigns show commen shortcomings, Unit and formation reports, perhaps with commendable loyalty, show a tendency to avoid ertcism of superiors. This has a cost. Weaknesses are glossed over, and ‘overall reports tend to stress the positive rather than provice a balanced view. This 's especially true where reports are aggregated to higher levels. Important facts are b. That operational diaries should not be passed up the chain of command, but SSEEPLET melon eRe nrg Desciaearsemeeras he as | Sua Wate Rat bene doa he En fn vo MOY eed wt i Se Sa sree tS eather ok | | | | | | | recorcs of the Falkiands Conflict omit several key details, which are recorded in published books. In addition the production of such reports is usually slow. It was ‘Rot always so: during the Second World War the British Army regularty published extracts of combat lessons identified within a few weeks ofthe start of a campaign.” That unit operational diaries should generally contain sufficient detail that the activities of subunits an each day of operations should be generally discemable, ‘The issue of Yessons' cannot be considered closed until its observed that lessons i Many of these shortcomings were seen during Operation TELIC. Published unit ‘of recent conflicts are identified and have been properly exploited. reports rarely criticize their superior HO" an outbreak of Diarthooa and Vomiting (O&V) which ran to aver 1,000 cases by 15 May was largely overtooked: and deta {down to subunit level was largely missing. For example, 1 RRF Battlegroup was attacked several times in up lo battalion strength supported by tanks; this Is not fecorded in ts commanders diary. The MOD ‘First Reflections’ document slated that mobilzation of Reserves ‘prooseded smoothiy’®, which isnot entirely supported by available evidence. It was disazpointing to see a Corporate Communications brief produced as laie as Decemiver 2003 which said that the the UOR programme was a major success." It also sad that reservists should in future be given 21 days alice and that this was ‘up from 14 [days]. Whilst that statement is true as ee * "During Operation HUSKY, he Aled invasion of Sicily, tha War Ofc published and dstbuted tactical lessons afr 5 woos ofan Buvesk campagh. Without in, vekabie neeone wed ot have Desh avaible ime to intuence operations forte Normandy lanange mune #984, However, averse escsm can be founc in cammanders dates ® ‘Frat Retlecions Tmo UOR programma discussed in Chapter 2. 3-20 3-24 RESTRICTED RESTRICTEDye | 401 402 408, 404, (CHAPTER FOUR - COMMAND OF OPERATIONS. DDospite the undoubted dedication and professionalism of commanders and staffs, tactical command attracted criticism from several sources, from the Land ‘Component to unit levels. Problems appear to have arisen from three overiapring ‘areas. First, from the mechanism by which the campaign plan was translated into tactical missions and orders, As will be seen, this had a major impact throughout the chain of command. Second, the continuing and largely unconstrained growth of Hs, which caused problems related to the length and timeliness of orders. Third, Hs’ seem to have focused on contingency planning to the detriment of the ‘coordination of their subordinates. This last area is Clearly linked to the other two. For example, given no clear planning guidance from the campaign level, HOS understandably undertook corisiderable contingency planning, much of which tuned ‘out to be nugatory. Problems lie exclusively in the area of headquarters structures and processes, not individuals. Few consequences of poor command were observed, which was probably a result of both the high quality of commanders and the poor quailty of the adversary. A more capable enemy would probably have punished these ‘shortcomings severely. This section concentrates intially on HQ structures and process. ‘TRANSLATING CAMPAIGN PLANS INTO MISSIONS AND ORDERS. During the 1890s NATO nations developed methodologies for campaign planning Those methodolocies identiy tactical actions along defined lines of operations which, if successfully completed, would lead to the campaign end-state and hence the strategic objectives of the campaign. However, in retrospect it appears that the: issue of how to translate the campaign plan into orders. and missions for land formations has not been fully resolved, For Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the CFLCC addressed ths issue by issuing 1 MEF With 2 relatively short mission for the campaign as a whole, but then imposing 11 key tasks’ on CG 1 MEF. HQ 1 MEF translated this into a ‘base order’ which included over 21 pages of missions for 1st Armoured Division. Subsequently HQ 4s Armoured Division produced a ‘base plen’ in which the given mission, concept of ‘operations and missions for subordinates ran to almost 13 pages. Itis very dificult to read the order rapidly to gain any real sense of what was intended. In retrospect, ‘this would be simifar to inviting (say) 11th Armoured Division fo write a single order which would have it land in Normandy, fight the breakout battles, advaneo through Belgium, cross the Rhine and link up with the Red Army somewhere In Germany in 1944-5. ‘Several commentators remarked on the value of the US practice known as the rock dri, which is effectively a map or model rehearsal of a pian with key staf ‘and subordinates. On reflection it appears that such measures were necessary ‘during Operation TELIC to enable participants to make sense of aver-complex ‘orders, There is also a danger that such complex orders promote mental inflexibilly. 4-4 RESTRICTED5 INTENT, TOGETHER WITH THE MISSION AND KEY TASKS ASSIGNED crocs et FLCC Intent: When directed, CFLCC attacks to defeat Iraqi forces and control the zone of action; ‘secure and expioit designated sites; and, removes the current Iraqi regime. On order, CFLCC conducts post-hoslites stably and support oporations; transitions to CJTF-4.° 1 MEF Mission: (0/0, I MEF attacks in zone to defeat enemy forces and secures key oll infrastructure ‘and LOGs IOT support V Corps’ rapid movement north at regime removal. O10, prepares for future operations and redeployment as directed. ‘ CFLCC's Key Tasks to CG 1 MEF + Secure Al Faw Peninsula |OT enable CFMCC to olear the SLOC fo Umm Qasr + On order, as the supporting effort, attack in zone to defeat enemy forces (Stst MRD) to allow CFLCC follow-on force and sustainment flow for ‘decisive operations north of the Euphrates + Secure key oil infrastructure within zone 1OT prevent its destruction and mitigate environmental disaster, + Seize Umm Qasr to enable humanitarian essistance operations * Secure JALIBAH airfield IOT support the establishment of Logistics Support Area (LSA) VIPER. + Secure MSR Tampa in zone to allow CFLCC follow-on force and sustainment flow for decisive operations north of the Euphrates. + Conduct Forward Passage of Lines (FPOL) through V Corps IOT continue ‘decisive operations north in zone. + Defeat the Baghdad RGFC Division vicinity Al Kut |OT prevent interdiction of the CFLCC Main Effor and threaten the regime from the southeast + Deleat the Al Nida RGFC Division to suppor decisive operations vie Baghdad + BPT seize Basrah Intemational Apart to support CMO in the ITO + BPT continue the supporting attack in zone to isolate Baghdad by attacking from the east and southeast to destroy remaining non-complant forces. Po 4-2 RESTRICTED i : MENT i 157 ARMOURED DIVISION'S BASE PLAN: WISSION STAT See FOR 3 COMMANDO BRIGADE Missions and Tasks. (1) 3 do Bee. (a) Phi Setting Theatre Conditions. Preparatory activity (0) Phil Shaping Operations. i. Conduct, FPOL with 35 KU Bde in order to posn forces for Ph IAS and IA ii BPT seize key ol infrastructure on the AL. FAW peninsula in ‘order to prevent or mitigate its destruction and resulting environmental disaster. li._BPT clear and screen AL FAW Peninsula in order to enable CFMCC to clear SLOG to UMM QASR. iv. BPT ‘ociltate rearward passage of UNIKOM force to facilitate 1 MEF offensive operations. v.BPT seize the port of UMM QASR in order to enable humanitarian assistance operations. vi. BPT to execute TRAP within 6hrs of notfication (Task allocated to 15 MEU by 1 MEF). Ph ill Stage At Seizure of AL FAW and UMM GASR Port. © Attack eninsula in order i. Seize key oll nfrastructure on the AL FAW penins {o prevent or mitigate its destruction and resulting environmental disaster. |i. Clear and screen AL FAI Peninsula in order to enable CFMCC to clear SLOC to UMM QASR. |i, BPT facilitate rearward passage of UNIKOM force to facilitate 1 MEF offensive operations. 4-3 RESTRICTED aRESTRICTED RESTRICTED eset nso wr Sr sgt ei ben rte tama treme top lagy {lore Dirt wie Snecma Ree peer oe ear a ace pten ccna er eerie per op Seer eee ee pce cne Bane eer amr ieee ae oc eeseen ets ncaa epee erry eter cet ‘cases it was employed as part of a division. © understandable, such as officers from a Phoenix STA Battery and the Joint NBC —————— ee alee eee a i 10 7th Armd Bde, Op TELIC ‘7th Armoured Brigade claimed to have built an entirely duplicate CP, which might be (o) © @ ‘thought to explain the increase in numbers. Some level of redundancy is clearly 2 era sas 3 eee gd Cree eae eae 7 assatons | a FSS) —— peor PSO eer orogens Sa ea La er en ea Taare RET RAT erecta amen jattached engr sqn or regt) his COS. This seems to be the first time this has happened in recent British military Lease 412, Staff Functions. An expansion of staff functions has been 3 major contributor tothe pacar Serer cee rereeet eetaeaa ts tte seer ps & 1 SSgt eee plus 2 a) ‘attached from has been created. There is no evidence of multi-skilling oF job integration, which Regt (3) would allow a number of staff functions to be carried out by a lesser number of staff. ‘Table 4.1: Comparison of Brigade HQ Size, 1990-1 and Operation TELIC (1) Armd Bde. independent excciionary es (tI 5 Abn 19 ln and 26 Aimcb} hed up to a ‘oxen mor, moat onal for 2d ne sets, (2) Armd des had 1, whic was insfiiont or 20h aps, Independent bdes had vp to 3. (2 hating te asm of BRACIS Wo guoman NEC hazed pdt, waming and For example 2. G1/G4 staff and watchkeepers are present to coordinate the activities of perscnnel, medical and logistic units. Inthe case of 7th Armoured Brigade, 2 ES watchkoopers and 2 mecical LOs were added, ora total of 4 addtional posts, If would have been possible to have created the same effect with {ewer people if appropriate pre-ernployment training had been provided. b, Information Operations Is essentially the coordination of functions such as deception, media operations, EW and physical destruction in accordance With the commanders plan. Coordination of functions is a G3 task. In madam conflict, operations will end to move between combat and non- ‘combat functions; the G3 staff should plan and coordinate that process. © Ha 20 Armee 20961008 dated 13 May TA. TORC Sail 00225 * Incing about 40-48 offcors + Acontenuonce of oats Lm. Fork Bile Jk The Myce! Manone Ens on Soars Enginoaring. 20th Anniversary Esstion, Aidison-Wesley, 1986, “ nce For aca, GeHaRUCONSULTHCRSSETA ood tre 2093 | 4-7 RESTRICTED. 4-6 RESTRICTEDRESTRICTED “There ie clear need for Information Operations skis information Hs, but that does not necessarily mean thal extra posts should be created. It might instead mean revision to the pre-employment training of G3 steft [information Operations are consisered further in Chapter 3.] . c—Similarly itis dificult to see a requirement for a deep operations staf. There is an obvious requirement to coordinate fre; be It in deep, close or rear ‘operations; and this fas naturally tothe atilery stafl. However, tis not easy to see why the branch which coordinates atilery fre in deep, close and rear ‘operations should also be exclusivly responsible for divisional deep ‘operations. The integration of effects is in the first instante 2 G3 responsibilty d. At formation level, the GS branch is responsible for civi-mitary functions, ‘one of which is Civi-Miltary Cooperation (CIMICY. CiMIC requires small, expert groups and wil tend fo be offcerintensive. There is without doubl a ‘equitement for CIMIC groups in @ modern land force in most circumstances. However, ey should be seen as CIMIC units rather than steff. This would sionificanty reduce the apparent need for CINIC staf in Hs. “The net effect of this expansion of functions is @ requirement for ime and effort to coordinate their efforts, This appears to have contributed to stow HO tempo, producing orders whien were too large and {00 late. One COS remarked on the: femergence of ‘an HO within an HQ" in his command post, over whic he had limited contro. 413, Functional LOs. The Briish Army has not dillerentiated clearly between functional LOs and other elements ofthe staff. Functional LOs are present to provide technical vice, and to pass reports, returns and requests; typically at fixed times. One person can normally ful those functions. Conversely, if an HO. is to function Continuously the main 'G' staff branches have to be manned on a 24-hour basis. ‘Thus, in the case of 7th Armoured Brigade above, there is a clear nesd for 2 SO3 Gast not lear that there should be 2 BALOs, since air tasking is largely driven by the 72-hour ATO process. It's probably true that the air cel at a brigade HO. rngeds 24-hour manning, and has to coordinate ar, aviation, AD and balllespace ‘management issues, However, a detailed task analysis would probably indicate that that requirement could be met by 2 of 3 people, nol the 6 which were at fst sight required. This reinforces the need to consider mut-skiling and job integration, suggested at Paragraph 411, 1444, Staff Ranks. The normal working rank in a divisional HQ in the British Army has normally been major and captain, and al brigade, captain. There has been a gradual trend since the late 1980 to place lieutenant colonels in staff posiions at divisional ‘and even brigade Hs, and several majors into brigade HOs. This effect was ‘exacerbated during Operation TELIC® and has several detnmenta! effects. The most serious is tne tendency to over-pian, since these higherranking staf tend to ‘ADP Command» 56 Table. incon n Borin unt 1982 he G5 Branch was exclusively concomes with Attar Goverment. Note thal Yee NATO orm fr oul rill af sC9, doth Pit Amourea and 16 Ar Aeoault igade HOP cota! eta last ove superueraty SOT: NO Tat UKs Amaured Dvn abouts a RESTRICTED, be planners rather than being involved in current operations. It reduces the role of '802s and 8035; the later reportedly at times almost to insignificance. The real effect in Operation TELIC was protracted staff work, much of wich proved to be unnecessary. In retrospect, the quantity of planning appears excessive. Lieutenant Colonels do not perform the same functions as captains and majors, but do tend to require them as subordinates, ticreasing overall numbers 418. Excessive Planning. There ware several inslances of HOs planning too much. “The result was typically orders which arved too late. Such planning tended to focus fon the production of what wore effectively contingency plans that wore never ‘executed. For example, HO 1st Armoured Division prodused a total of 4 Operation Orders, three of them before 21 March. OF those, the second and third covered contingencies which were notin the 1 MEF plan and which were never executed. A large amount of nugatory effort was produced in planning fora contingency to seize ‘and operate from an airfield at Qalat Sigar, well outside the Divisional area. One brigade HO produced atleast five contingency plans in @ 48-hour period prior to 21 March. They used four unesiablished plans officers working in shifts around the clock. ‘None of those contingencies was executed, In pat this was due to the way thatthe campaign plan had been translated into missions and orders.” Alteratvely Rt may have resulted from recent teaching at JSCSC, which has tended 10 ‘concentrate on the operational (joint or campaign) level and not pointed out the differences at the tactical (formation) level. A major consequence of excessive planning isthe workioad it imposes on subordinate HOs and being smaller, they are ‘even less able to cope, 416. Effects. Several staf offcers referred to the disruptive effect of attanding Course of ‘Action brits as part ofthis process. One brigade HO pointes out on 4 March that Divisional orders contained insufcient detail for the operation they were about to undertake, The Divisional HO had already provided a major contingency plan on 28 February, would produce another one on 11 March and updato thal on 15 Merch, None of those plans were implemented. Planning is only beneficial fis well rected. As discussed above, the process for directing that planning throughout the land component should be improved. 417. Contingency Planning, In current doctine, divisional and brigade HOs should plan for the next operation, considered as perhaps 6-30 hours ahead for a brigade and 12448 hours ahead fora division in combat.” Itis sensible, where possibie, to plan for not just the intended next operation (the sequel) but also some aliematives (branches). Some eventualties couid take place at any time: contingent orders should be considered to cover them. As discussed in Chapter 2, in the case of Operation TELIC the sequel (Phase 4 operations) and the most probable "Tin Amoured Brigade Commander's Diy, ey for Sunday 20 Merch 8 3.Cdo Bae POR paragraph 3. * One suspocs that. pven the practice of working around br abies, at than within command vile, the secure Sat eters has gone oo ue, 2" Patron anc Bent are deplyatie secre spac tems. Ptarmigan i the major lang Jemation deployable CS. 16 Ar Assault Brigade Commanders Diary Tuesday 18 Ferry 2003 4-16 RESTRICTED 438, 439, | . RESTRICTED value of satelite-based communications to low levels of command, but stil found that video teleconferencing (VTC) had to be limited because of excessive use of bandwidth. In general it seems that trafic invariably expands to fil the available bandwidth, not least because of the adoption of high-bandwidth systems such as \VTC. Technical breakthroughs fave been promised for decades, but do not appear to occur despite the introduction of much more technology and the complexity it brings. If anything the evidence is that headquarters have become larger and less responsive. High bandwidth systems may have contributed to that. Information and bandwidth management will be citical aspects of digitization. IT was deployed with Briish Army on combat operations for the frst time during Operation GRANBY, and huge progress has been made since then, Modem Hs. could probably not function without i, but the progress of digitization is uneven. Relatively litle IT exists at unit or baitlegroup levels, and some aspects such as arillery anc air defence have attracted moro digitzation than, say, logistics or battlefield engineering. Most IT systems are functionally 'sovepiped. For example artillery CIS can operate up and down the chain of command but cannot interoperate With other battles functions. ‘One US battlefield IT system, deployed across the Coaltion, had a marked impact. The Blue Force Tracker (SFT) automatically reported the location of all units equipped with transmitters to all HOs having a BFT monitor. For the British land Contingent this typically meant transmitters at unit level and monitors at formation level. A screen shot of BFT is shown at Figure 42. Experience of BFT was mixed. High-level HOs (at corps level and above) were generally more in favour of it than Units and low-level HOS. It did not provide sufficient deta o be a significant factor in avoiding fravicide. displayed Coalition unit locations very accurately, but Iraqi Unit locations were only as good as the most recent italigence. Often this was very ‘9004; at times reports were badly out of dale. One British HQ reported that the most important use of BFT was to display the location of US forces theatre-wide, providing @ broad situation report. I'seems likely thal as more elements are issued with such systems their perceived effectiveness will increase HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHMENTS ‘The size, and growth in the size, of formation HOs was discussed above. Following COparation TELIC a number of proposals for increases to HO establishments were ‘made, The following proposals for enhancements have been noted: Divstonai FO Brigade HOE TY Bis ol Pr a SOT ane 53 a OFS Sou rforon Gre BR OF Tent Meal Ops Beach ‘SOz Meseal nt Frese Ofer (21 TSO or SOG ES Amn Gost (unde arm) Ae San bate cai Tsar Od and Pe S08 Mca SOS Ary Ope 1) ‘SOT Ar SOENEC. TAsanior NOY Sores Cams RET ROE SOT SE ional 900 BS Toa 70 ae Tear poe Teak abo Oren pa Table 4.2: Suggested Enhancements to HO Establishmerits| 4-17 RESTRICTED cet eiRESTRICTED 434, British forces were largely unable to exploit national inteligence atthe tactical level during Operation TELIC. The organizational and technical means to Jo so - the Operational Intsligence Support Group - had already been identified, ut required resourcing. Itwas suggested that Inteligence Corps staff were determined lo prove the requirement Conversely, it could be said that the professional inteligence community was prevented from puting eff into resolving a known shortcoming. The preceding two paragraphs indicate that, given the nature of land operations, ‘more intellectual and material effort should be put into improving the process of developing ineligence from troops in contact. 435. Human tnteligence (HUMINT) continues to be problematic, particularly in a Secluded stale or population where there is ite human access, However, operations in Basrah and Az Zubayr demonstrate that, in the right itcumstances, HUMINT can generate highly eflectve, actionable information in suppert of current ‘operations. Conversely. the Army vill offen start from & postion of knowledge inferiorly because HUMINT regarding the motivation, atitudes, discipine and morale of the enemy wil italy be poor: whereas it wil be easy for the enemy to acquire such knowledge about UK coalition land forees. 436, Technical sourcas of information, such as imagery, also have limitations. Imagery sid not reveal two Iraqi infantry company positions on the main objective of 3 Commande Brigade's attack on the Faw Peninsula" Multiple, overlapping sensors ‘continue to be required; no one system dominated the collection process. It seems fo have come as a surprise to some that most tactical intelligence came from the forward troops once in contact. This should be expected: the surprise seems to stems from excessive faith in echnical collection means. The main deduction i to ‘stress the need for rapid and cantinaous combat reporting once in combat. AS @ ‘uide, forward subunits. should give short situation reports every § minutes in ‘Combat, and all superior HOs onco every fiteen minutes f any of thelr subordinates are in contact. Such passage of information upwards, downwards, sideways and within 8 command post enables the rapid decision-making required in contemporary ‘operations. It appears to have been done poorly within formation HO.” cis nD 437. On Operation TELIC, Clansman radio struggled, but coped. Patron was inconsistent, Brent was overloaded, and most calls on Ptarmigan were weak and broken.® The level of batisield digitization was patchy and inconsistent whist the ‘need for voice communications remained strongly apparent, Such battlefield digitization as existed had two major weaknesses: a lack of connectivily and the ‘eed for uninterrupted power supplies. BOWMAN is eagerly awaited. However, no ‘case of ciical loss of communications was noted, Systems seam to have worked, but current expectations appear to challenge the laws of physics. Expectations are ‘often based on experience of siatic HOs using terrestrial landline or even fibre optic cables, which are not available in mobile operations. US experience stressed the 7h Arcured Brigade Commande’ Day entry for Suncay 30 tc, 3 Ca Se POR paragraph 38, One suspects gen he patos of waking around br abe, thor han wihin command ves, {he Sout saferoom has gon ou! use Patron snd Bent re deployable secute speech cytes. Planigan & the major land formation ecioyable Ci, 1 Ar Aseaut Brgace Cormanders Diy, Tuesday 18 Fetrary 2008, 4-16 RESTRICTED CEU EINER RESTRICTED value of satelite-based communications to low levels of command, but stil found that video teleconferencing (VTC) had to be limited because of excessive use of bandwdth. In general it seems that trafic variably expands to fll the ava¥able bandwidth, not leest because of the adoption of high-bandwidth systems such as VTC. Technical breaktiroughs have been promised for decades, but do not appear to occur despite the induction of much more technology and the complex I brings. I anything the evidence is that headquarters have become larger and less responsive. High bandyndth systems may have contributed to that. Information and bbandwacth management willbe criical aspects of cigltization| 1438. IT was deployed with Brtish Army on combal operations for the fest time during Operation GRANBY. and huge progress has been made since then. Modern HOS: could probably not function without I, but the progress of digitzation is uneven. Relatively itio IT exists at unit or batlagroup levels, and some aspects such as anilery and air defence have attracted more digitization than, say, logistics oF bald engineering. Most IT systems are functionally 'stovepiped’, For example, artllary CIS can operate up and down the chain of command but cannot interoperat ‘wth other battlefield functions, 439, One US battlfild IT system, denloyed across the Coaition, had @ marked impact ‘The Bluo Force Tracker (BFT) automatically reported the locaton of all units equipped with transmitters to all HOs having a BFT monitor. For the British land contingent this typically meant transmitlers at unit level and monitors at formation level. A screen shot of BFT is shown at Figure 4.2. Experience of BFT was mixed. High-lovel HOs (at corps lovel and above) were gonerally more in favour of it than units and low-level HOs. I di not provide sufficient detail o be a significant factor in avoiding fraricide. It displayed Coalition unt locations very accurately, but Iraqi unit locations were only as good as the most recent intligence. Often this was very ‘900d; at times reports were badly out of date. One British HQ reported that the most important use of BFT was to display the location of US forces theatre-wide, providing a broad situation report. It seems likely that as more eloments are issued ‘with such systems their perceived effectiveness wil increase. HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHMENTS 440. The size, and growin inthe size, of formation HOs was discussed above, Following Operation TELIC a number of praposals for increases to HO establishments were made. The following proposals for enhancements have been noted: Disonal WO: Brigade HO Bs ol TH @ SOT ond 503 hea OFS OTT IoRTon OPE BSA OF ear edcal Ops Branch SO Mecca Tat Press Oar 2) SOR or SO3ES Am ‘Saal (ander me) ‘Ame San bale cane | “SOT Ag S07 and 7d S03 Mads | - SOT AAy Ops 6) SOTA ~SOS BC [Passer WO) “SOT Gs Corate WRG AOC t =S0T Ose [FF ssstona 900 5 Toa TOT Tar posts Tear aan PE “Table 4.2: Suggested Enhancements to HQ Establishments ant RESTRICTEDRESTRICTED (1) Forarmoued wigades. 11 posts have bean note for 3 Commande Brigade. (2) Permanety ested, (3) Vie the Sst curently present (4) Itong considoed tat RMOs are gona ineuiienly experienced Yo bth command Imodicalastts and ace COS 402. RESTRICTED ‘The tendency to increase the rank held in a particular appointment should be particularly avoided. There is @ need to trust the quality and training of our junior officers and NCOs, to enable them to gain the experience from the operations whilst iil young, Any other trend is inthe long run self-defeating, DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS In part due to the increased size of divisions, the number of supporting arms subunits has grown, and with that the HO has also grown. For example, in the Second World War there wore effectively four engineer, four logistic and three ‘maintenance companies in atypical Bish aivision, Within the divisional area today there would be nine logistic support, eight maintenance and up to 20 engineer subunits. As @ result there are several units of those arm and services.” and the head of arm and service at divisional HO isa colonel in 1944-5 he would have been lieutenant colonel. For comparison: ‘Appt(i) | Br Div2002%| Br DW 10445 | Third US Army 19446 ©) © @ @ [cos [ear EtGor aj Gen Figure 4.2: Blue Force Tracker Screen Shot Token at about 1812 on 20 March 2003. The biue dome-shaped icons reqresent ara n igh. 44 British Army HQs are 4 times larger than they were in 1945 Although some increase has clearly been necessary it is hard to explain increases of thal magnitude. Analysis of archives suggests that incremental increases have ‘occurred in largely unconstrained fashion! almost continuously in the intervening Deriod.® As noted above, detalled analysis of task aid functions does not ‘adequately explain that growth, Whatever the merits of specie proposals, itis lear that misguided augmentation of HOs has in the long run been detrimental to tei function, and should be strongly resisted, Establishment Table 11103 ofctive 20 Nov 43; toate vith 1049 efotve & Dac 43,162 fective 10 Dec 43112612 eect 24 Fab 43,280" eco 7 Dec 43 ad NZ 15 dats 20 Feb 48, H(A eters HBYA) Bs dete 1 Dec 98 and 2 apr BS 4-18 RESTRICTED. COs. [Cor rat (None: Collevel G1 and G4 [Come Any [Brig Bra, Gal [Come Engr [Col ciCor [Cor [Cama Maint | Cor Lr cor [cor [Comd Log S [Col Et Cor (Gal ‘Table 4.3: Comparison of Ranks Noe {1} Shows nesrest equi! or Brtsh Secons Works War dvsons Current divisional HO organization is in some aspects nearer to that of a Second World War army than that of a division. This Is not unigue to the British Army, in 2004 in @ US division the Gt-4 Branches are led by lieutenant colonels, whereas they were lod by majors in 1945, In the Second World War @ head of arm or service (for example, the Commanders RE or REME) was in practice the CO ofa battalion Sized unit of about 3-4 companies. Because the nominal organization of divisions has bocome considerably bigger, there are now several such units (typically discriminated between ‘close’ and ‘general support}, with a colonefs staff 10 coordinate them. That would be entirely justified if such @ division at fll scale were ever deployed. However, only 2 Army brigades wore deployed for both Operations GRANBY and TELIC, and the existing staff structure was adapted to fi On election: © During the Second Word Wir a division was pial 1-16,000 men strong, without he ‘vison! she! of Compe ana amy Woops. & sna dio oa 20-2500 man sONG, S Flagete regiment, & mentenance batons > The atachment of «third begase (3 Commando Brigade) inthe case of Operation TELICcanrot be taken just retaing hove rank eves, sce the beara! rank stveure of 3 Command Brigade is appecitty ‘ter han ta of so my Brigada Bow cannot be used seutaneousyRESTRICTED Ifthe Army expects that it wil not generally send more than 2 brigades on a large-scale operation, thore might be scope for rationalizing the command chain and reducing rank representation, b, —Iteannot be said that a unit commander cannot also function as the arm or ‘service advisor to a divisional commander. That practice was the norm during the Second World War, because the mission of the unit was identifies ‘a thal of supporting the division, as 8 divisional HO ang Signal Regiment stil oes today. Similarly, the apparent complexity of modern war should not be used to justify increased rank representation. As previously discussed, that apparent complexity is atleast in part a consequence of the real complexity of Hs. Any such an argument is sel-(ulling 444. The responsiblity of G1 and G4 stalls appears to have shifted, and the results have been detrimental. Until the early 1880s the OCOS of a farmation was called the Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, Together with his siaff he actively controled all personnal and logistic assets in the formation” They now largely see themselves as being responsibie for planning and coordination from the formation HQ. This leaves 2 gap in the control of the formation logistic units, and a ‘consequent wish fo appoint further officers to that function, For example, Table 4.2 reflects @ wish for an SO1 to run the Divisional Support Group, and HQ 2 CS. Regiment RLC became in effect the HO of the Brigade Support Group for 7th ‘Armoured Brigade. During the Second World War those jobs were done by the divisional Commander, RASC and the OC af the relevant RASC Company. This ‘suggests that there may be grounds for concern, and we shauld bear these in ming \when considering he staffing of future Army structures 448. During Operation TELIC, HO Arillery 1st Armoured Division had relatively few resources. 3 RHA was inialy under OPCOM of the Offensive Support Group (CSG), but in practice supported 7th Armoured Brigade for much of the operation. The only other unit in the OSG was 12 Regt Ri (HVM), which was subsequently 2 roled for rear security operations, Nevertheless the Deep Operations Cell in Divisional HO was augmented by 4 lieutenant colonels. Whilst tis dangerous to craw too many conclusions from a single operation, the appointment of a brigadier 18s CRA with a large and potentially increasing staff should not necessarily be taken 188 @ model forthe future. CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE 446. The terms 'Effects-Based Operations’ (EBO) and ‘Networked-Enablad Capabiliy’ (NEC) were not found in extant doctrine in March and April 2003, They were al most staloments of policy, concepts or aspirations, Thus the use of the term ‘eflecis- based’ in connection with Operation TELIC is misleading. To ascribe useful meaning to those terms inthis context is premature. It does not reflect the way in which the For exami, Maj Gen (ts) Keth Space, formery DAA ard GMG of 16h Parachute Brigade, porsna Curent Sitsh Amy doetine such ae ADP Command or AFM Fermton Tacos does not hate 8 requierent for an Oflensve Suppor Group. 4-20 RESTRICTED. 47. RESTRICTED commanders and stalf have been trained, and so any use of such terms should be taken with caution. It i8 algo unfortunate to see Such terms paraded with the flimsiest of justiigation For example, smart munitions are of themselves. nat rretwork-enabled, To see statistics concarning the increased use of PGMs as evidence for the efficacy af NEG during Operation TELIC is inaparopriate. Public reports of Operation TELIC have at times indulged in the over-enthusiastic use of ‘such terms without proper justification, The risk is that such usage is subsequently Used to suppor policy or doctrine, without a proper basis in observed fact. EBO and NEC are emerging concepls, which require doctrinal codification ater futher study. (OBSERVATIONS Brigades and Battlegroups operated for 15 days after the fall of Basreh without an ‘operation order for Phase 4. They worked well, which is to their credit. t suggests thal the Army's low-level doctrine, and their experience, allowed them to work purposefully, However, it indicates that much of current HO processes, and the frders thus produced, are unnecessary. Subordinates can work adequately without ‘much of them, Mutile, lengthy, unnecessary contingency plans are nat required short, timely ones ere. Without short and tmely orders, locally sensible and purposeful orders tend to be uncoordinated, and lille overall progress is made. in this caso, lengthy but late orders created a pause belween success in combal and ‘any real progress in peace support operations. AS noted at the beginning of this Chapter, the significant pcoblems that were noted all resulted from shortcomings in siaffsindctures and processes, notin command. There are several implications for the training of commanders and stat, 4-21 RESTRICTEDRESTRICTED (CHAPTER FIVE - PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS ‘Never again must we send i-equipped soldiers in to battle" PERSONNEL ISSUES 501. 6,315 Reservists from the TA and the Regular Army Reserve were called out for (Operation TELIC 1. By October 2008 the total had reached 10,455. The proportion of the Army Reserve that was successfully mobilzed was abou! 25% of those callec, ‘and 70% for the TA. Including those deemed unsuitable for mobilization, about 272% of the strength of the TA had been deployed by October 2003. The proportion was Considerably higher in certain key roles, This should be considered against the fact that Operation TELIC was the frst large-scale operation for a decade, and that TA personnel were also engaged for other theatres such as Bosnia and Afghanistan, The TA has been used, for the sort of contingency which the RFA 96 envisaged, but clearly mobilization on such a scale isnot sustainable for protracted periods. 502. The operational welfare packege was generally good and wel-reosived, although there were inevitably local shortcomings and inequalities.” In some cases, however, there seem to have been unrealistic expectations at junior levels. War is inherently chaatio, and the Armed Forces deployed to an area with very litle infrastructure: ‘operational welfare is nol the primary consideration ofa deployment. This seems to ‘be an issue for education and low-level leadership. 503. IT-based personnel tracking, in the shape of the AP3 system, was deployed for the first time on a major operation. Its use was generally successful, The scope and Gistrbution of personnel tracking should be extended and integrated to issues such 28 air movements, casually handling and casually reporting, 504. Procedures for casually and compassionate notification, both within and outside the theatre, were generally successful, although occasional problems were ‘encountered. At times there were technical cificulies, such as the identification of human remains from an air crash, but greater problems stemmed from medic interest and consequent high-level pressure 10 release personal dotalls. Considerable moral courage was displayed by those who, quite correctly. resisted such pressures in the interests ofthe servicamen and their nex! of kin? Continuing investment in IT in this area would assist but will not completely solve the handling of such cases, {Riv Armoured Bigade POR, paregraph 1.2(1), and also paragraph 26. £ JFLoge S001 gates 12 May 03 Rereater UFLoQC Repo, pF Ser 13, * URLogc Rapon p.F-1 89°62 and 3 5-1RESTRICTED Figure 5.1: Repatriation of the Dead from Theatre 508. Illustrative Strengths. For future reference, the strength of @ typical heavy battlegroup during Operation TELIC wes 1133 all ranks, of which: 2. Battlegroup HO: 74; b. Armoured Squadrons: 108 and 110 Al Companies: 145 and 143, . _Artiley tactical patos and AD elements: 67. ©. Armoured Engineer Squadron: 166. {Support Company: 157 9. Reconnaissence Group HO: 25. 1h. At Echelon and RAP: 73, i. 2 Echelon and Ha LAD: 68. i BEcholon: 8 This broadly equates to: 58.5% Combat; 19.6% Combat Support (of which Engineer 18.7%) 13.3% Combat Service Support; 8.73% Command and Command Support hn asec eruping bated onthe HO of carased Al company 5-2 | 508. Overview. Many aspects of the sustainment of UK land forces during © RESTRICTED 606. The Tesiment of Wounded EPW._ Responses re eaten of wundes EDW unr be Geneva Conerton cuss we novia Fas aes esosts alow Ee to ene aon al tine eel Brian shea pia os Si'in unas Socondy te caro prnigararpton tra cauty Xt Rle3 Of Bacay ony otro tre oy at De oeoeates ote Ue Sewanee j Epw en voc trey eed WR 9 hosp te rae pe pete aad cae Ss ster vegeta es aE Inna suppor BPW nos tther caren 507. Theft. Theft was a problem in some places and some units, One batiegroup Feported that half of iis sleeping bags had bean stolen from AFVs in transit 1o theatre, Such theft has a corrosive effect on morale. Howover, large-scale theft can become institutionaized, as unit and subunit commanders turn a blind eye or even encourage the organized raiding of other units to make good local shortages. There is some anecdoial evidence that ths took place. It is one unpleasant consequence of a supply chain that did not function properly, and a falling that requires moral principle to overcome. If necessary, MPs should be deployed to prevent theft. Theft appears to have been a significant problem in most major operations which the Bish Army has conducted, including Operation GRANBY. Losistics TELIC were very well done. Combat units did not run out of ammunition, fuel or fations; and no British battle casualty died atter reaching surgery. However, there Were too many other less important examples to be able to count the sustainment of | the Operation a complete success. No NBG filers for Challenger MBTS were received, leaving tanks with only six hours of NBC protection, Twenty AS 90 barrels ‘went missing, leaving no spares avaliable, Insufficient NBC wamning and monitoring ‘equipment was available. Small arms ammunition was in such short supply that 1 DWR had only 10% of its requirement unt the day after G-day,, and some Royal Engineers started the operation with only 10 rounds per man. Desert boots, desert Lunforms and body armour were alln shor supply’, oF not available where needed.” Only about 10% of logistic demands were met cn time." Morphine and malaria Prophylaxis were either in short supply or distributed to the wrong places.” One battlegroup reported that ‘not one AF G1098 item or expense item demand was met for the entrely of the warfighting phase’ Published reports tend to place insufficient strese on failures, and tend to overstrass successes. As one example, the JFLogC's report does not appear to comment on the inability to meet logistic demands mentioned above, other than some passing references to ‘provisioning! ‘ SFLogC Report. pD-5 Sar 15 «intel, wounded EPW were evacuated thee » SPLseC Repo pF-17 Sr a0 + Tov Amouros Brigade POR, page 0-24 Sera 6, 4 TDW PORE Fea Ser 16 © Dser Boots are 8 necessy, not luxane thet absence resuted incase french fat amongst sldlers roqureste wea least Sooke the dover Th Armoured Brgase POR, page F-25 sonal 122 NAO Report. nage 20 ure 7. * 1 Div POR page E28 Ser 18d and page F12 Ser 60. "ih Armoures Brigade POR, page Fe ee 100. “ JFLogC Report progrophe 1.27 and'3.Fhe 5-3509. Strategic and Operational Risk Come 102 Log Be, writing in the fret person in JFLoge Repo. 1-1 arag RESTRICTED Itis not unreasonable to conclude that, there le stil feeling that the Army still does ‘ot look after its soldiers properiy." There seem to be three overlapping areas of vwoakness: the strategic and operational management of risk, lack of asset visibly, and logistic erganization and process. Hawever, its important to note that broad Statements such as 'just-in-me logistics did nat work have lle meaning, despite many criticisms to that effect. The issue in question is that of managing strategic {and operational risk in logistic provision, In considering logistics in support oF (Operation TELIC, one has to discriminate between underfunding, which in some “}E sreas goes back over several years} high-level decision-making (as dscussed in Chapter 2}; and issues which the Army can itself rectly at litte cost Figure 5.2: Deployed Logistics, Readiness preparation time was broken in Several ereas. One symptom was thal orders were placed with factories too late for feqvipment to reach the front line in time. The MOD placed UORs relates to sustainability worth £140M in total." However, in many instances operational stock levels were not suffcient”, whicn suggests that the UK is taking unwaranted ‘operational risk and placing sn over-rellance on industry (since planning limelines were not mel). This is one aspect of the poor use of the strategic warning time discussed in Chapter 2. If this does represont polcal elt, the consequence is straightforward: higher stack levels have to be held against contingency. That is D} expensive, and is the reason why risk was taken in the first place. 22% of those 4 of the Army's Challenger 2 tarks which were not deployed to the Gul, and 29% of 128. NAO Report p10 parraph 26 NAO Repod,p.# parogran 28. 5-4 RESTRICTED | sto st 512, | sia, RESTRICTED its AS90, were cannibalized for spares. Inthe case of AS9O and Challenger ARRV, ‘specialist containers had to be bough! to move the cannibalized items, Locistic stocks Asset Visibility. There was 2 lack or loss of asset vsiilly before, during and after ‘major combat operations." This was partly because ofa lack of logistic tracking IT systems, which Is 2 symplom of underinvestmant in comparison with much ‘commercial practice. Howaver, procedural factors also played a part. 3 Commando Brigade deployed logistic LOs throughout the deployment chain and achieved a measure of asset vsibilly.* Conversely the JFLogC’s tracking teams were deployed too late", and once global visibility was lost it was not regained. There were also errors in the reporting of the progress of freight in transit.” Thus IT shortcomings should not be blamed entirely for the lack of asset visibly. There are important procedural issues which the Amy should address as @ matter of priority ‘Ammunition Expenditure, As an ilusration purely for the purpases of historical record, one commanders war diary suggests the folowing ammunition exaenditure for an armoured battogroup for Aprii 2003, most of which would have been ‘expended on or before 6 April 114 120mm HESH rounds; 115,000 rounds of 7.62mm belted, 22,500 rounds of §.58mm ball; 83,800 rounds of 5.58mm belied=, 24 smoke grenades, 304 HE grenades, and 130 94mm HEAT rounds. The battlegroup's holeings were 30 Challenger 2, 38 30mm RARDEN (on CVR(T) and Warrior), 67 7.62mm chain guns, 103 GPMG, 69 SABO A2 LSW, 625 SABO A2 ries and 18 Minimi, These figures are illustrative, and should not be used as a basis for future planning, ‘ORGANIZATION AND STAFFWORK Organizational and procedural shortcomings were apparent within the deployed foros. No CSS Waring Ordor was produced by HO 7st Armoured Division, which ‘made epproprite concurrent acton by brgades and CSS unis impossile™ At limes there was much nugatory discussion ofthe command stales of CSS elements, and logistic afiistons were not flexible. was romarked that workable soluions 10 logistic problems were dismissed as being not ‘doctinaly pure.” The overall impression is one of overly complex G4, CSS and logistic support structures and processes which have been over-opliized to @ particular model, and which have Become inflexible. This eppeers to have been a major conrbutory cause tothe logistic shortcomings noted above Overal, logistic support to the Army appears to have dectined in quality since (Operation GRANBY, during which it was remarked that "The Army/s tied and tested 1 Dy POR paragraph 25, "8 Co Bde POR paragrs 18 nd 22. SPLORC Roper, pr ET | % JELORC POR p17 coral 59 ane p. £19 sori 7. 2 Fo: tw Mini LMG that had ust reaches sarce asa UOR ® Tamoured Brigade POR. pF sora 23. * Timoured Begade POR p. FS seal 9 8 5-5 RESTRICTEDRESTRICTED ssystom worked well It is notable that logistic organization and procedures were significantly reorganized after the end af the Cola War in 1869. Prior ta Operation GRANBY the Aimy’s processes were largely the results of the Bartholomew Committee which considered the lassons of the campaign in France in 1940. The Committee remarked that ‘Much greater flexbilty was now required, particularly in respect of third line anspor, which was in fact never used in the way for which it hhad baen designed! All second and third line ‘Supply anc Transport units were re- designed to be interchangeable; greater organisational, administrative and doctrinal flexibiliy was introduced; and junior officers and NCOs were given more responsibility. I should be noted that the rato of officers to task vehicles in divisional LC unis today is roughly double what is was in the RASC in 1944-5." There seems to be a need to significantly revise, simply and clanty G4, CSS and logistic support structure and processes al second and third line, and within divisional and brigade HOs. Taken with the comments about command structures in Chapter 4, there appears to be a need to simplify command relationships within a UK land force. NATO formal command measures such as OPCON or TACON appear to be Inappropriate in situations such as this, 514, The desired order of arival of the force could have been Improved. There was understandable pressure to get combat elements into theatre early. However, this ‘meant that HOS intially aived without the suppor they needed to plan, and that the personnel and logistic elements needed to receive and administer them were notin place #* COMMAND 518. Responsibility forthe whole logistic chain was nol clear-cut, The Defence Logistic ‘Organization held responsibilities in the UK, and a Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC} was formed around 102 Logistic Brigade in theatre. However. in practice there ware gaps, and occasionally overlaps. The choice of an Army logistic brigade 2a the core of the JFLogG had some adverse consequences, When major land ‘operations began, the JFLOgC’'s main effort had to be the provision of third line logistic suppor to’ 1st Armoured Division, leaving shortfalls elsewhere, ‘The results ware described as ‘schizophrenic.’ Some staff augmentoes wore poofy trained for their roles , and in some cases the most appropriate subject matter expert lay (UK) Ama Dv 2022029 G3 Plane cated 25 Mar 93 (POR fr Opertion GRAN). * Qhotas vorbstim in The War Ofte, The Socora World War 1030-88. Amy Supply end Transpo, 1954, pp een. > Compargon of Establishment Tablas 1261/2 datae 2 Feb 14 Amy Surly and Transco (s00 above) ‘Arse le pp 2°30; andthe curent Stal Offers Handoeoe. Today mares ous ex many soos por truck ac ine ware in 1945: but tho tucks are bigger, tus thre are ony roughly 8 Quant es many S06 be ton of capacity. However, sven erilry ammurion fe the vr fr git we should compare [5y the abit fo move (29) 100 sets. The nels ave go havin; over he mur of sds pa 00 is ao0ut the same, bathe numdar of officers "TOD shal os Gout. For a carer but lepine ‘compar, in 1945 thre were 3 offears for tha 300 isk venias a divsion. There are curren about 135 cre for 496 tk vehicles, One succars was tha he certs requted og pereanne inte hese onthe APS system wera in tea at JFLogC Repon.p. Eo Ser 3 and E-7 Ser 60 RN an RAF staf augmanies at Ne S03 level ac tpl recived n ferme staf vaining, since coors of tose Saris curenty tard Tei its! sta raring on eppoinmen! to boutnant commande” or Suacton lar AS the Amy spe soning caplane on the Army sunior Divan the Sta Clege, ts vs Bacome 8 prabien fore Army a6 we 5-6 RESTRICTED. = a =e RESTRICTED elsewhere Examples include aviation equipment support and clinical medical expertise. However, itis not clear that any other solution would have been more cffective, without considerably more resources being required. Nonetheless, where possible a large-scale operation should have dedicated thrd-lina land logistics.” EQUIPMENT SUPPORT 516. Equipment support to Bris land forces during Operation TELIC was generally effective, resulting in high levels of equipment availabilty. For example, in the move into the Forward Assembly Area prior to G-Day, one battlegroup proudly reported that it did not have a single vehicle breakdown. Equipment availabilty is resul of three factors: the inherent reliability of the equipment; the availablity of spares, and the engineering effort applice. Challenger 2's availabilty was recorced as over 80%, However, the avalabilly of the chronically unreliable Challenger 1 in Operation GRANBY was recorded as over 95%", despite distances travelled and the intnsily of fighting in 1891 being generally higher than in 2003, This lovel of avallabilty can be ascribed to the major engineering effort, and that most of the engines and main assemblies for all the Challengers 1 in the Army were sent to the Gul to support Operation GRANBY.® Equipment Support in the Field Figure 5, % JELoge Ropar, p 9-7 paragraph 3.742 “Chalenger 1 Wes ‘eed fom sence aor only 10 years because of chore unvelabiy. The comonstate righ love fae tbe Chatenge 2 pofeypes was @ major factor mis romarement to feplsce Cnalengo ncuding many cannbaized tom tanks a toni uns 6-7 RESTRICTEDRESTRICTED 517. The skill levels displayed by REME craftsmen were a significant factor in equipment availabilty. During Operatioh TELIC, hampered by a lack of spares due to shortcomings in the supoly chain, equipment often had to be "epaied by repair’ rather than ‘repair by replacement (of components and minor assemblies). AS an ‘example, the workshops of 3 RHA did nol ave a single demand for AS 90 spares. ‘met during the Operation. In that case the level of avalablity achieved (95%) was largely due to the high skill Ievels held by REME personnel. It would be cheaper 10 train craftsmen simaly to repair by replacement, but that relles on a functioning supply chain, The shortcomings of such a policy were seen clearly during Operation TELIC. MEDICAL AND HEALTH 518, Surgical suppor fo baltleild casualties repeated the trend, fst noted during the Falklands Confict, that every Briish casually who reached @ surgeon survived. This is highly commendable and reassuring, but does not paint the whole picture, DB, heat injury and medical supplies issues also mer attention. Figure 5.4: Casualty Evacuation 519, Cases of DAV broke out in 7th Armoured Brigade, and probably elsewhere, on or JFK shout 2 Aor, ard number grow rap By 18 Ape thee war an average of 10- 20 cases per battlegroup per Cay, and a total of about 70-80 cases across the major = NAO Repon, 9. 25 paragraph Tab Ontotn Opstten CORPORATE and TELIC hae wee bats Swot dous amongst EPW. Ths door ne apont be Sue ay ck car ornate ote provion the Geneve Conver, bat ‘Spy renose tar wanes BPW rornaly ke nge te each Bah surgeon, bacave thoy ar fen Nt antes wl ora tine ser wound. amour’ Brigade Commanders lary, minute from Medical LO dated 18 April 2003. 5-8 RESTRICTED Lunits of the Brigade. Peak rates for battlegroups had been roughly twice that (Of the 15 or so key staff officers in HO 7th Armoured Brigade, 2 of 3 were affected at any one time. The staff of 34 Field Hospital became infected during the outbreak, |, a5 was the staff of 202 Field Hospital which relieved it in piace at Shaibah Airfield on (X48 May. Demands for Environmental Health (EH) equipment were not met one battlegroup commander noted that 'no EH equinment arrived despite timely demands and far too numerous requests The evidence from Operation TELIC reinforces the olé lesson that stopping an outbreak of D&V depends not just on (GG _ aston by AMS personnel (such as EH teams and infection Conte! nurses), but also YF action by G4 and quarterinaster staff and, ertically, feld hygiene” Evidence from ‘Operation TELIC and other recent deployments (such as to Alghanistan, where 34 Field Hospital suffered from another outbreak) suggests that Brien armed forces fre beginning to lose the standards of field hygiene displayed previously in the major wars of the Twentieth Century 520. Heat injuries became increasingly problematic later in the year, but had become significant by eerly May. Time for acclimatization, ftnass, and battlefield discipline” all appear to be factors in preventing heat injury. Detecting the early symptoms, removing the casualty rapidly from the threat and early treatment were equally important. Four hours! respite from the sun in an ait-conditioned environment, with otter measures such as plenty of water, appears to be sufficient if the early ssymploms are recagn2zed “Squadron deployed into theatre too late." However, there was also little visibility of creator, emt tema aa 522. Some medical personnel such as consultant surgeons are in short supply, and suffer from skil fade if not actually practising their craft. Much the same applies to pilots. ‘The RAF surged pls into theatre, withdrew some for continuity traning as soon as practical, and rotated them back into theatre as required, The same might be Considered for some clinicat specialists. However, many RAMC surgeons are members ofthe TA, so exact parallels may not be appropriate % 1.DW POR p. £25, Sow 187,190 © 202 Feta Hossa! bought the ostbreak uncer cant tin section in 10 days, * For erage, wecring aun ht, keeping sever roleg down crnkng water regal, and nat ting about inthe sun whore avedabie. Theres suggestion at wating RAP re berets ata tan sm Pats Seed Iecaly increased rato of iy. 38. JFLORC POR, p E-18 sail 50,RESTRICTED. CHAPTER SIX - SUMMARY, OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS. ‘SUMMARY DE enter anes creer ac tevapeceaee free toes fos conn ahi ara bes used be voles mete planar esay tle sortnget The abso auoied Peso’ parse nteray oes pot canter tas ies sapecoaiicten Coasters meioael eee (/, ast eee pas Snes Ty een , aeeant sn be hens wenn ofan See poietes we A ST ela nea ten vere eeeiscie ek manures et - processes, including tactical intelligence. Although the effectiveness of logistics was Former by ens avec on cereal rahiy ano ek af ret techn 1 colnesses fr egcte pecobues le coitus bolace Stour li rereorms ar et Sou, proene wth HO sactes ee aay eee eae OBSERVATIONS 602. During the early sumer of 2003, Martin van Creveld remarked that the defeat of Iraq by the USed Coalition was "like an elephant stamping on @ frog’. No, he corrected himself; it ws “ike an elephant stamping on a frag that had already been stamped on by the same elephant.’ To extend the metaphor, the outcome was ‘never really in doubt: the question was simply how much mess would be made in the process, 603. It has been fashionable to ascribe success in modern conflcis to high-technology ‘constructs such as the Revolution in Niitary Affairs or Network-Centric Warfare. ‘Technology and novel constructs did have some effect. Howevar, overall, success ‘came to the Coalition in 2003 largely for old-fashioned reasons, The Coailton went rapidly to where the enemy was, surprised him, and then outfoughit him. There were parallols with Mariborough's campaign to Blenfeim; Napolaon's Lim Campaign; the fall of France in 1940, or the Sinai Campaign in the Six-Day Wer. 604. British and US forces deployed swily and efficiently, and achioved the stated ‘operational objectives equally switly and effectively. Notwithstanding the efforts and, ait times sheer courage of the forces deployed, the defeat ofan Iraqi regime that had been crippled militarily in 1991 and had no chance to reconstruc its forces in over & decade was not really in doubt. The main risks are those of drawing false lessons, ff drawing general lessons for the future irom the particular circumstances of the Gutf, and that of complacency. ‘805. On 2 September 1898 a British and Egyplian Army of 26,000 defeated one twice ts size outside Omdurman in the Sudan after an expeditionary deployment which took several months. The Mahdist army su¥ered 11,000 dead and about 16.000 ‘wounded; the British and Egyptians 48 killed and 382 wounded. The result was vary largely the resul of better organization, tactics and weapons. The comparisons Presentation to RMES Symposia, The Oxford Beil, § May 2003, 6-1RESTRICTED suffered is "Black Week’ in South Afca. Itwas defeated twice, at Stormberg on 10, December and at Colenso on 15 December 1899. The Army then suffered a furtner reverse at Spion Kop on 24 January 1900, In another quite ifferent parallel, that same Army found itself fighting the German Army in France just 14 years later. | ‘with Operation TELIC are sirong.? Yet roughly one year tater, the British Army | 606. Notwithstanding the extensive and wel-practised organizations and processes by \which the UK conducts national miltary operations, the time avaiable to plan (Operation TELIC was not well spent at the strategic and operational levels. This had ‘many implications forthe operational and tactical conduct ofthe operation, incuding Phase 4 operations, and logistics. Many of the shortcomings of the Operation could have been avoided ifthe available tme had been used more effectively. ‘CONCLUSIONS 607. The areas where the Briish Army did least well were those it practises least: in particular, formationJevel command and control logistic eupport of large deployed {otce; and intligence. The primary deduction is the need to continue to invest in large-scale collective training. Command structures and logistic processes are the principal concems arising from Operation TELIC. 608, Caution should be exercised in the degree to which valid lessons can be drawn from Operation TELIC. By and large, reasonable conclusions can be drawn with safety where prior experience allows the Army to'highlight shortcomings in performance, “The use of the strategic warning timo avallable, the organization and behaviour of {formation headquarters, and shortcomings in sustaining forces are all exemples of i ‘such shortcomings. These should be addressed honestly, before encountering & more capable adversary who will expose those shortcomings. The Army should not ‘raw too many lessons from the performance of forces against such an enemy and ‘should ensure that atthe very least there is a robust, rigorous and effective process to capture and act upon the lessons of any significant operation, However, the Army can take pride in the fat that in general ts equipment is world class and that, in particular, the quality of its personnel is outstanding. At times SAV. stn Suton “Ec eines eo due sai caso peo to Stern which nave bor ene er reiea We can sober | 602, The Ziet Lancers uncetook @ disastrous charge at Omaurman and were heavy cut wy A major Ungetjing reason was that the 21, & farmer lan Army regnert, had nove beer In bate anc hat the Unforunat rare of Thou Sbat Not KI. Thare wae therefore considerable social and moral pressure tn the tel te poviorn @ charge, wisthar the tacos svaton vequved or net In eon, nO ‘connaissance ted bean condsced a tarfore Moligence was poor the Repinent rani sage body of Mandsts on 2 shallow reverse slope. There sre song paralls wn te atack of 71h US Avion Regimen: on 2224 March 2008 > 8-2 a RESTRICTED. ANNEX A, MAJOR EVENTS. Ser] Date Event @| & ( il pense aoe ‘to conduct inspections in Iraq in pursuit of 2, | 24 Sep 02 [Britain announces precautionary deployment of naval and air forces. 3. | BNov 02 [UNSCR 1441 adopted 4. [18 Dec 02 [Britain announces the deployment of a land force. 5. | 18 Decoz re pvt as respon soon 4] a a 6. | 19 Jan 03 [HQ of 1st (UK) Arma Div begins to arrive in Kuwait. 7._| 28 Jan 03 |16 Air Assit Bde begins to deplay to Kuwait 8, | 28 Jan 03 | The first elements of 7 Armd Bde arrive in Kuwait, 9. | 15 Feb 03 |3 Cdo Bde declared to be fully operational in theatre. 10. | 27 Feb 03 [US, UK and Spain table a further Graft UNSCR. “1, | 3 Mar 03 [16 Air Assit Bde declared fully operational in theatre. 12, | 14 Mar 03 [France declares its intent to veto the craft Resolution, laa REIS ree Teave Iraq, The last battlagroup of 7 Armd Bde: 44) 2a Marc, naz rome ‘begin. See Annex B for the sequence of combat 15. | 6 Apr 03 [Basrah falls. 16. | 9Apr 03 [Baghdad fais, ‘17. | 28 Apr_ [Power and running water largely restored to Basrah. 78. | 5 May 03 [76 Air Assit Bde begins to return to UK. 18, | 13 May 05 [3 Cdo Bde begins to return to the UK. 20.| Jui03_|7 Armd Bde relieved by 19 Mech Bde and retums to Germany.RESTRICTED ANNEX B. CHRONOLOGY OF COMBAT OPERATIONS Date | 310(m) | Other Elements 1 Mar DWV TFTarawa | 3cdoBde | TAnmdBde | 16AirAssit of V (US) Corps Bde @ » @ @ @ a @ * 120 Nar [Breaches tomer Breaches rani [commences eetonces detences; soizes loperatons in ladvances on Ruma Otte. raw Peninwula west of River \votoves us Euphrates. Naval Spocit lwarare Group) Pt War [Advances towards [Advances |Beains Roleves PROT Rotovas § RCT INasarian. lnorind 1 Mar fetearance oF tne farouns Az Zubsaye|n the Rumalia fo. [Faw Peninsula [ano Basan |Oihelde "22 Mar [Lead wernenis reach Savamah. fas Mar B07In Mant Coy [Secures Br tacked in ns conta Nasariyah. 11th INasariyah for 1 lawn Rest IMar bv. conducts deep attack on night of [23-4 Mar: many. larcrat damaged [2a Mar |eed elemeris —JAun Bile of 10Tst [DW castes River [Excouniors — FE wEU, ach Najaf. [Ar Asst Dv Euphrates: 1 RCT passes|sigiicant released to TF Probes wards foonducts deep through TF Tarawain resistance [Tarawa karbaia and fein Jatack. highly, |Nasaryah; Sand 7 RCT around lowarcs Hah. Jouccesetl lbyeass Nasaryah to |Nasariyah West Dl advances noth towards Al Kut at RESTRICTED.RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Date | 310m) | Other Elements 4 Mar Div Tr Tarawa | 3cdoBde | 7 Armd ede | 16AirAssit ef V (US) Compe. Bde @ © © @ 6) o © oy (2s Mar is atackad | Commencas Jarea of Und at frais into Az lass zubayr [26 Mar [anacie Ranan JAtacks Tato Uba IRGFC ON. a1 Qasis 40 [Goo ta) lar mar Fist aide io Bosra [25 Mar [Gram nar Yaz Zubayr lopened to. occupies = shipping [>o ar 50 Mar Tat Ar Ase Dw begins to rove 3 1D (a sround | Naif ae f Aor [SRCT seowes crossings 01st Ar Assit Div lof tha Tigris st creates Numaniyah. pr] Seizes wessinos demonstration |securngT lar ver south of Hila, IMeF Ad Euphrates east of between + Mar Ikerbala, iv and + (UK) lara Di. IRotioves 1 nar low at [Oiwaniyen B2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED T Date | 310(M) | Other Elements 4 Mar Div TrTarawa | acdoBde | 7Armdsde | 16AirAssit of V (US) Corps, co @ o o © © o @ wy [SApr Atacks east inser lacross River lpatiinder pte Euphrates. Seizes north of River londgeneads ana lEuptrates jaqvancos towards [Baghdad intematinat Aiport [7Ror|Reacnes Baghded ntertional port, [5p [Probes and raids 0Tst Air Asal Div [1 ROT Detoals Baghdad nto Baghdad. fotears Karbala, |RGFC Dv around Kut, 1 Bar civ then attacks Al Nida RGEC Div (SApr Tat Assi Dv latacks to |Basrah fais. | avances not loiears Hila [Basrah (42 Co |Socunty Iv in operations in and Jconiuncton with |around Basra, ‘Are Bd rape [Seas Samnan Pax [occupies Ad Isolates Bagh from loayr |soutn and east and ladvancos into city 83nF o) JOccapies htecinahy 16 Alc Assit Jaman: secures bridges aver River Ti [cake op ‘arava lamaran 7 Armd Bde 3.Cdo Bde TF Tarawa JAdvancos east towards lamaran lentes Arvarah RESTRICTED 1 Kir @ 4 Mar Div [Beans fo move north To [aso 10 Mosul, Tike Other Etomente of V(US) Come [Clearance of Filah compete 310m) secur loperations in [Baghdad area, [Spr aah fos Date lear Haar HT Rar zap RESTRICTED ANNEX PRINCIPAL BRITISH LAND SYSTEMS Se] Sen co ale @ «, |Ghatenger | Enered sic mi G08 Fete Gobet Chaloner] is Frtosed dung Op Gaby [Wario nord sere nmi 1085 and used Op GREY a [as eo [Eero soc ater Op GRANGY. 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[bouman Rais |e Raa nsonee Suey Op TELIG wah Brio rcs ors one Cighaly eased Fon Gumvany UR ad US i Op 11, |FucteNBC | GRANBYIDESERT SWORD, Retained by both counties, and aad deployed to Iraq in 2008, Ered servis hi 805 Aiaiod GG Ba Op 12 [Sago rime are | Eten hosed SA saA0 voon esd oy maja Ok teens nOP TELC ca RESTRICTED