Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Case Title
SANTOS-CONCIO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (G.R. No. 175057 - January 29,
2008)
BOISER, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 180299 - January 31, 2008)
BALANGAUAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G. R. No. 174350 - August 13, 2008)
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On challenge via petition for review on certiorari are
the Court of Appeals May 24, 2006 Decision and
October 10, 2006 Resolution1 in CA-G.R. SP No.
93763 dismissing herein petitioners petition for
certiorari and prohibition that sought to (i) annul
respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Department
Order Nos. 902 and 1653 dated February 8, 2006 and
March 8, 2006, respectively, and all orders,
proceedings and issuances emanating therefrom,
and (ii) prohibit the DOJ from further conducting a
preliminary investigation in what has been dubbed
as the "Ultra Stampede" case.
In the days leading to February 4, 2006, people
started to gather in throngs at the Philsports Arena
(formerly Ultra) in Pasig City, the publicized site of
the first anniversary episode of "Wowowee," a
noontime
game
show
aired
by
ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN). With high
hopes of winning the bonanza, hundreds queued for
days and nights near the venue to assure
themselves of securing tickets for the show. Little
did they know that in taking a shot at instant
fortune, a number of them would pay the ultimate
wager and place their lives at stake, all in the name
of bagging the prizes in store.
Came the early morning of February 4, 2006 with
thousands more swarming to the venue. Hours
before the show and minutes after the people were
allowed entry through two entry points at six oclock
in the morning, the obstinate crowd along Capt.
Javier Street jostled even more just to get close to
the lower rate pedestrian gate. The mad rush of the
unruly mob generated much force, triggering the
horde to surge forward with such momentum that
led others to stumble and get trampled upon by the
approaching waves of people right after the gate
opened. This fatal stampede claimed 71 lives, 69 of
whom were women, and left hundreds wounded 4
2
which necessitated emergency medical support and
prompted the cancellation of the shows episode.
The Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), through then Secretary Angelo Reyes,
immediately created an inter-agency fact-finding
team5 to investigate the circumstances surrounding
the stampede. The team submitted its report 6 to the
DOJ on February 7, 2006.
By Department Order No. 90 of February 8, 2006,
respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez (Gonzalez)
constituted a Panel (Evaluating Panel)7 to evaluate
the DILG Report and "determine whether there is
sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a
preliminary investigation on the basis of the
documents submitted."
The Evaluating Panel later submitted to Gonzalez a
February 20, 2006 Report8 concurring with the DILG
Report but concluding that there was no sufficient
basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary
investigation in view of the following considerations:
a) No formal complaint/s had been
filed by any of the victims and/or
their
relatives,
or
any
law
enforcement agency authorized to file
a complaint, pursuant to Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure;
b) While it was mentioned in the FactFinding Report that there were 74
deaths
and
687
injuries,
no
documents were submitted to prove
the same, e.g. death certificates,
autopsy reports, medical certificates,
etc.;
c) The Fact-Finding Report did not
indicate the names of the persons
involved
and
their
specific
participation in the "Ultra Incident";
d) Most of the victims did not
mention, in their sworn statements,
the names of the persons whom they
alleged to be responsible for the
"Ultra Incident".9
3
the Administrative Code of 198723 bestowing
general investigatory powers upon the DOJ.
Petitioners concede that the DOJ has the power to
conduct both criminal investigation and preliminary
investigation but not in their case,24 they invoking
Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG.25 They posit that in
Cojuangco, the reshuffling of personnel was not
considered by this Court which ruled that the entity
which conducted the criminal investigation is
disqualified
from
conducting
a
preliminary
investigation in the same case. They add that the
DOJ cannot circumvent the prohibition by simply
creating a panel to conduct the first, and another to
conduct the second.
In insisting on the arbitrariness of the two
Department Orders which, so they claim, paved the
way for the DOJs dual role, petitioners trace the
basis for the formation of the five-prosecutor
Investigating Panel to the NBI-NCR Report which
was
spawned
by
the
supposed
criminal
investigation26 of the Evaluating Panel the members
of which included two, albeit different, prosecutors.
While petitioners do not assail the constitution of
the Evaluating Panel,27 they claim that it did not just
evaluate the DILG Report but went further and
conducted its own criminal investigation by
interviewing witnesses, conducting an ocular
inspection, and perusing the evidence.
Petitioners position does not lie. Cojuangco was
borne out of a different factual milieu.
In Cojuangco, this Court prohibited the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from
conducting a preliminary investigation of the
complaints for graft and corruption since it had
earlier found a prima facie case basis of its
issuance of sequestration/freeze orders and the
filing of an ill-gotten wealth case involving the same
transactions. The Court therein stated that it is
"difficult to imagine how in the conduct of such
preliminary investigation the PCGG could even
make a turn about and take a position contradictory
to its earlier findings of a prima facie case," and so
held that "the law enforcer who conducted the
criminal investigation,
4
Consider the following pertinent provision of Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 3. Procedure. The preliminary
investigation shall be conducted in
the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the
address of the respondent and shall
be accompanied by the affidavits
of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other
supporting
documents
to
establish probable cause. They
shall be in such number of copies as
there are respondents, plus two (2)
copies for the official file. The
affidavits shall be subscribed and
sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence
or unavailability, before a notary
public, each of whom must certify
that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that
they
voluntarily
executed
and
understood
their
affidavits.33
(Emphasis
and
underscoring
supplied)
As clearly worded, the complaint is not entirely the
affidavit of the complainant, for the affidavit is
treated as a component of the complaint. The
phraseology of the above-quoted rule recognizes
that all necessary allegations need not be contained
in a single document. It is unlike a criminal
"complaint or information" where the averments
must be contained in one document charging only
one offense, non-compliance with which renders it
vulnerable to a motion to quash.34
The Court is not unaware of the practice of
incorporating all allegations in one document
denominated as "complaint-affidavit." It does not
pronounce strict adherence to only one approach,
however, for there are cases where the extent of
ones personal knowledge may not cover the entire
gamut of details material to the alleged offense.
5
party,41 an "accused" rather than a respondent, 42
and a "court" that shall pronounce judgment. 43 If a
"complaint or information" filed in court does not
comply with a set of constitutive averments, it is
vulnerable to a motion to quash. 44 The filing of a
motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit is
proscribed by the rule on preliminary investigation,
however.45 The investigating officer is allowed to
dismiss outright the complaint only if it is not
sufficient in form and substance or "no ground to
continue with the investigation"46 is appreciated.
The investigating fiscal, to be sure,
has discretion to determine the
specificity
and
adequacy
of
averments of the offense charged. He
may dismiss the complaint forthwith
if he finds it to be insufficient in form
or substance or if he otherwise finds
no ground to continue with the
inquiry,
or
proceed
with
the
investigation if the complaint is, in his
view, in due and proper form. It
certainly is not his duty to require a
more particular statement of the
allegations of the complaint merely
upon the respondents motion, and
specially where after an analysis of
the complaint and its supporting
statements he finds it sufficiently
definite to apprise the respondents of
the offenses which they are charged.
Moreover, the procedural device of a
bill of particulars, as the Solicitor
General points out, appears to have
reference to informations or criminal
complaints filed in a competent court
upon
which
the
accused
are
arraigned and required to plead, and
strictly speaking has no application to
complaints initiating a preliminary
investigation which cannot result in
any finding of guilt, but only of
probable cause.47 (Italics and ellipses
6
indicate that the incident is of such nature and
magnitude as to warrant a natural inference that it
would not have happened in the ordinary course of
things and that any reasonable mind would
conclude that there is a causal connection between
the shows preparations and the resultant deaths
and injuries.
Petitioners fears are speculatory.
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or
quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions.54 For ones prompt dispatch may be
anothers undue haste. The orderly administration
of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration,55 with particular regard of the
circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity56 includes the public
officers official actuations in all phases of work. 57
Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent
upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence
other than a
mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. 58
This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift
completion of the Investigating Panels initial task
cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without
discounting the presumably regular performance of
not just one but five state prosecutors.
As for petitioners claim of undue haste indicating
bias, proof thereof is wanting. The pace of the
proceedings is anything but a matter of
acceleration. Without any objection from the
parties, respondents even accorded petitioners a
preliminary investigation even when it was not
required since the case involves an alleged offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is below Four
Years, Two Months and One Day.59
Neither is there proof showing that Gonzalez
exerted undue pressure on his subordinates to tailor
their decision with his public declarations and
adhere to a pre-determined result. The Evaluating
Panel in fact even found no sufficient basis, it bears
emphatic reiteration, to proceed with the conduct of
a preliminary investigation, and one member of the
7
January 31, 2008
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari[2] assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated June 5, 2007 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP.
No. 02368.[3]
The main issue in this case is whether the CA
committed reversible error in affirming the decision
of the RTC which denied petitioners omnibus
motion to quash the informations filed against him.
Based on the findings of the CA, the pertinent facts
of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 2004, three (3) Informations were filed
against petitioner, charging him with acts of
lasciviousness, other acts of child abuse, and rape [4]
of minor AAA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 1, Tagbilaran, Bohol.
On June 11, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion praying
that a hearing be conducted to determine the
existence of probable cause and to hold in
abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against him. On June 16, 2004, private respondent
filed an Opposition thereto.
LYNDON D. BOISER,
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180299
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
8
informations. On November 22, 2006, petitioner
filed anew an Urgent Omnibus Motion to Quash. On
November 30, 2006, the RTC issued an Order
denying the second omnibus motion to quash, and
set the arraignment on December 15, 2006. A day
before the arraignment, petitioner filed a Second
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the order
denying his motion to quash.
On December 15, 2006, petitioner reminded Judge
Amila of his second omnibus motion for
reconsideration. Judge Amila, in open court, denied
for lack of merit the second omnibus motion for
reconsideration. Upon arraignment, petitioner
refused to enter a plea for the 3 cases. Accordingly,
a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner for
each of the 3 criminal cases.
On January 2, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition for
certiorari[5] before the CA claiming that the family
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the orders denying his omnibus motions to quash
the
information.
On June 5, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision [6]
affirming the Orders of the RTC. In denying the
petition, the CA ratiocinated that it cannot reverse
the RTC orders because: (1) an order denying a
motion to quash is interlocutory and not appealable;
and (2) the petitioner failed to positively prove
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
judge in the issuance of the assailed orders. The
fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The assailed orders of the
respondent judge are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[7]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
which the CA denied in a Resolution [8] dated
September
19,
2007.
10
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene submitted
their joint counter-affidavit basically denying the
allegations contained in the affidavits of the
aforenamed employees of respondent HSBC as well
as that made by York. They argued that the
allegations in the Complaint-Affidavits were pure
fabrications. Specifically, petitioner Katherene
denied 1) having spoken on the telephone with Dy
and York; and 2) having admitted to the personnel
of respondent HSBC and York that she took the
P2,500,000.00 of York and invested the same with
Shell Corporation. Petitioner Bernyl similarly denied
1) having met with Dy, Iigo, Cortes and Arcuri; and
2) having admitted to them that York knew about
petitioner Katherenes move of investing the
formers money with Shell Corporation.
Respecting the P12,500.00 and P8,333.33
regular monthly deposits to Yorks account made
using the code CEO8, petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene, in their defense, argued that since it was
a deposit, it was her duty to accept the funds for
deposit. As regards Yorks time deposit with
respondent HSBC, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene
insisted that the funds therein were never entrusted
to Katherene in the latters capacity as PCSR
Employee of the former because monies deposited
at any bank would not and will not be entrusted to
specific bank employee but to the bank as a whole.
Following
the
requisite
preliminary
investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Victor
C. Laborte, Prosecutor II of the OCP, Cebu City, in a
Resolution[8] dated 21 February 2003, found no
probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene liable to stand trial for the criminal
complaint of estafa and/or qualified estafa,
particularly Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the ACP recommended the dismissal
of respondent HSBCs complaint.
The ACP explained his finding, viz:
conformity
to
our
knowledge,
observation and experience.
Mr. York could not have been
that
unwary
and
unknowingly
innocent to claim unfamiliarity with
withdrawal slips and cash movement
tickets which Ms. Balangauan made
him to sign on several occasions. He
is a premier client of HSBC
maintaining an account in millions of
pesos. A withdrawal slip and cash
movement tickets could not have had
such
intricate
wordings
or
terminology so as to render them
non-understandable even to an
ordinary account holder. Mr. York
admittedly is a long-standing client of
the bank. Within the period of longstanding he certainly must have
effected some withdrawals. It goes
without saying therefore that the
occasions
that
Ms.
Balangauan
caused him to sign withdrawal slips
are not his first encounter with such
kinds of documents.
The one ineluctable conclusion
therefore that can be drawn from the
premises is that Mr. York freely and
knowingly knew what was going on
with his money, who has in
possession of them and where it was
invested.
These
take
out
the
elements of deceit, fraud, abuse of
confidence and without the owners
consent in the crimes charged.
The other leg on which
complainants cause of action stands
rest on its claim for sum of money
against respondents allegedly after it
reimbursed Mr. York for his missing
account supposedly taken/withdrawn
11
by Ms. Balangauan. The banks action
against respondents would be a civil
suit against them which apparently it
already did after the bank steps into
the shoes of Mr. York and becomes
the creditor of Ms. Balangauan.[9]
The ACP then concluded that:
By and large, the evidence on
record do (sic) not engender enough
bases to establish a probable cause
against respondents.[10]
On 1 July 2003, respondent HSBC appealed
the
above-quoted
resolution
and
foregoing
comment to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a
Petition for Review.
In a Resolution dated 6 April 2004, the Chief
State Prosecutor, Jovencito R. Zuo, for the
Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In
denying respondent HSBCs recourse, the Chief
State Prosecutor held that:
Sec. 12 (c) of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 2, 2000
provides that the Secretary of Justice
may, motu proprio, dismiss outright
the petition if there is no showing of
any reversible error in the questioned
resolution.
We carefully examined the
petition and its attachments and
found no reversible error that would
justify a reversal of the assailed
resolution which is in accord with the
law and evidence on the matter.
Respondent
HSBCs
Motion
for
Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality by
the DOJ in a lengthier Resolution dated 30 August
2004.
The DOJ justified its ruling in this wise:
A perusal of the motion
reveals no new matter or argument
which
was
not
taken
into
consideration in our review of the
case. Hence, we find no cogent
reason to reconsider our resolution.
Appellant failed to present any iota of
evidence
directly
showing
that
respondent Katherene Balangauan
took the money and invested it
somewhere else. All it tried to
establish
was
that
Katherene
unlawfully took the money and
fraudulently invested it somewhere
else x x x, because after the
withdrawals were made, the money
never
reached
Roger
York
as
appellant adopted hook, line and
sinker the latters declaration, despite
Yorks signatures on the withdrawal
slips covering the total amount of
P2,500,000.00 x x x. While appellant
has
every
reason
to
suspect
Katherene for the loss of the
P2,500,000.00 as per Yorks bank
statements, the cash deposits were
identified by the numerals CEO8
and it was only Katherene who could
transact from the computer in the
work station CEO-8, plus alleged
photographs
showing
Katherene
leaving her office at 5:28 p.m. with a
bulky
plastic
bag
presumably
containing cash since a portion of
the funds was withdrawn, we do not,
however,
dwell
on
possibilities,
suspicion and speculation. We rule
based on hard facts and solid
evidence.
Moreover, an examination of
the petition for review reveals that
appellant failed to append thereto all
annexes to respondents urgent
manifestations x x x together with
supplemental affidavits of Melanie de
Ocampo and Rex B. Balucan x x x,
which are
pertinent documents
required
under
Section
5
of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July
3, 2000.[11]
Respondent HSBC then went to the Court of
Appeals by means of a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On 28 April 2006, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision granting respondent
HSBCs petition, thereby annulling and setting aside
the twin resolutions of the DOJ.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us GRANTING the
petition filed in this case. The assailed
Resolutions dated April 6, 2004 and
August 30, 2004 are ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.
The City Prosecutor of Cebu
City is hereby ORDERED to file the
appropriate Information against the
private respondents.[12]
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherenes motion for
reconsideration proved futile, as it was denied by
the appellate court in a Resolution dated 29 June
2006.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court.
12
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene filed the
present petition on the argument that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the
DOJ when: (1) [i]t reversed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, Manila dated August 30, 2004
and correspondingly, gave due course to the
Petition for Certiorari filed by HSBC on April 28,
2006 despite want of probable cause to warrant the
filing of an information against the herein
petitioners[13]; (2) [i]t appreciated the dubious
evidence adduced by HSBC albeit the absence of
legal standing or personality of the latter[14]; (3)
[i]t denied the motions for reconsideration on June
29, 2006 notwithstanding the glaring evidence
proving the innocence of the petitioners[15]; (4)
[i]t rebuffed the evidence of the herein petitioners
in spite of the fact that, examining such evidence
alone would establish that the money in question
was already withdrawn by Mr. Roger Dwayne
York[16]; and (5) [i]t failed to dismiss outright the
petition by HSBC considering that the required
affidavit of service was not made part or attached in
the said petition pursuant to Section 13, Rule 13 in
relation to Section 3, Rule 46, and Section 2, Rule
56 of the Rules of Court.[17]
Required to comment on the petition,
respondent HSBC remarked that the filing of the
present petition is improper and should be
dismissed. It argued that the correct remedy is an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, on the
other hand, asserted in their Reply[18] that the
petition filed under Rule 65 was rightfully filed
considering that not only questions of law were
raised but questions of fact and error of jurisdiction
as well. They insist that the Court of Appeals
clearly usurped into the jurisdiction and authority
of the Public Prosecutor/Secretary of justice (sic) x x
x.[19]
13
stand, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene had lost the
right to appeal via Rule 45.
Be that as it may, alternatively, if the
decision of the appellate court is attended by grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, then such ruling is fatally defective on
jurisdictional ground and may be questioned even
after the lapse of the period of appeal under Rule
45[26] but still within the period for filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse
of discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse
of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law.[27]
The word
capricious, usually used in tandem with the term
arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the
corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of
caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion is imperative.[28]
In
refusing
to
file
the
appropriate information against the
private respondents because he does
not dwell on possibilities, suspicion
and speculation and that he rules
based on hard facts and solid
evidence, (sic) the public respondent
exceeded his authority and gravely
abused his discretion. It must be
remembered that a finding of
probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged. The term does
not mean actual or positive cause;
(sic) nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on
opinion
and
reasonable
belief.
[Citation omitted.] A trial is there
precisely
for
the
reception
of
evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge.
14
the respondent HSBC in its Petition for Review filed
therewith. And, in support thereof, respondent HSBC
maintains that it is incorrect to argue that it was
not necessary for the Secretary of Justice to have
his resolution recite the facts and the law on which
it was based, because courts and quasi-judicial
bodies should faithfully comply with Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that
decisions rendered by them should state clearly and
distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which
the decision is based.[33]
no
purpose
except
that
of
determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.
15
the DOJ. And by the nature of his office, a public
prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the
averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion.
But this is not to discount the possibility of
the commission of abuses on the part of the
prosecutor.
It is entirely possible that the
investigating prosecutor has erroneously exercised
the discretion lodged in him by law. This, however,
does not render his act amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[42]
And while it is this Courts general policy not
to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, leaving the investigating officers
sufficient discretion to determine probable cause,
[43] we have nonetheless made some exceptions to
the general rule, such as when the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority,[44]
resulting from a grave abuse of discretion.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule
for the determination of probable cause, since the
same must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination,
such a finding should not disregard the facts before
the judge (public prosecutor) or run counter to the
clear dictates of reason.[45]
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the
present petition, the reasons of DOJ for affirming the
dismissal of the criminal complaints for estafa
and/or qualified estafa are determinative of whether
or not it committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
requiring hard facts and solid evidence as the
basis for a finding of probable cause to hold
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial
16
which York approved, and that it was only for one
year; and b) met with petitioner Bernyl, and that the
latter at first denied having knowledge of his wifes
complicity, but later on admitted that he knew of
the investment with Shell Company, and that he
supposedly made the loose-change deposit via
phone banking; that after 23 April 2002, York was
told that respondent HSBC had no new product or
that it was promoting investment with Shell
Company; that York denied having any knowledge
that his money was invested outside of respondent
HSBC; and that petitioner Katherene would not have
been able to facilitate the alleged acts or omissions
without taking advantage of her position or office,
as a consequence of which, HSBC had to reimburse
York the missing P2,500,000.00.
From the above, the alleged circumstances
of the case at bar make up the elements of abuse of
confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and
damage under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code
on estafa and/or qualified estafa. They give rise to
the presumption or reasonable belief that the
offense of estafa has been committed; and, thus,
the filing of an Information against petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene is warranted.
That
respondent HSBC is supposed to have no
personality to file any criminal complaint against
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene does not ipso
facto clear them of prima facie guilt. The same
goes for their basic denial of the acts or omissions
complained of; or their attempt at shifting the doubt
to the person of York; and their claim that witnesses
of respondent HSBC are guilty of fabricating the
whole scenario. These are matters of defense; their
validity needs to be tested in the crucible of a fullblown trial. Lest it be forgotten, the presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of
which can best be passed upon after a full-blown
trial on the merits. Litigation will prove petitioners
Bernyl and Katherenes innocence if their defense
be true.
17
respondent immediately signed the criminal
complaint upon its filing and ordered that the case
be set for preliminary hearing on January 12,
2006. His own branch clerk certified that the
complainant and her witnesses only subscribed
their statement before the presiding judge. Worse,
respondent allowed the criminal case to be filed
even if it is based on hearsay evidence, as the
complainant therein, one Dr. Elida D. Yanga, was not
in the place at the time the alleged offense
happened. From the documents gathered, the
undue haste by which respondent acted is very
evident because the complaint-affidavit, the
criminal complaint, and the subpoena have the
common date of January 4, 2006. More so, the
subpoena was immediately served on complainants
on January 5, 2006.
Grave Abuse of Discretion and Unfaithfulness to
the Law
Respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion when he did not conduct a preliminary
investigation in Crim. Case No. 06-004. Under
paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rules),[2] preliminary
investigation is required to be conducted before the
filing of a complaint or information for offenses
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four
years, two months and one day. The maximum
imposable penalty for Grave Coercion is six years
imprisonment; hence, complainants should have
been accorded the right to preliminary investigation
whereby they could have demonstrated that the
complaint is worthless. Respondent, however,
chose to be ignorant of the basic provisions of the
Rules in order to exact revenge and cause them to
unduly stand trial. Despite the Motion to Quash
Complaint with Prayer for Voluntary Inhibition filed
by complainants to give him a chance to correct his
error by at least referring the case to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan for the conduct
of the requisite preliminary investigation, he
remained adamant by issuing an order referring the
18
This is not correct because his signature was only
for the purpose of administering an oath, as
evidenced by the certification issued by the clerk of
court. The fact is that the criminal case did not
reach the stage of preliminary investigation since
complainants filed a Motion for Inhibition which was
readily granted. Respondent conducted the court
proceedings in accordance with the provisions of
the Rules, particularly Sections 3 (a) and 8 (b) of
Rule 112.[3]
As to the charge of Grave Abuse
Discretion and Unfaithfulness to the Law:
of
19
the Order resolving the Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition in Crim. Case Nos. 04-430 and 04-572,
that the latter branded him as somebody he could
not co-exist with in the quest for a just and
equitable administration of justice. Atty. Santos
alleged that respondent even furnished the
Executive Judge of Bulacan with a copy of the Order
to broadcast that he is a difficult lawyer to deal
with. He emphasized that this administrative
complaint is not about his client in Crim. Case No.
04-572 but is concerned with the injustice
committed by respondent when he willingly and
deliberately violated established rules and legal
doctrines just so complainants would suffer undue
injury by being tried for a fabricated case of Grave
Coercion.
Parrying the supplementary allegations, on
the other hand, respondent countered in his
Rejoinder that it is unfair for complainants to
conclude, much more insinuate, that his wife has
something to do with any impropriety by her mere
presence in the chamber. He reiterated that her
company is necessitated by his health condition and
that, anyway, she also has her own business to
attend to that of managing the family inheritance
of leased premises in the nearby town of Pandi,
Bulacan, and actively engaging herself in an
independent business concern, held not in MTCBocaue, which is the large-scale trading of electric
transformers, metal scraps and heavy equipment
entrusted to her by her uncles and close relatives.
As to the charge of frequent delay of court
sessions, respondent stated that he has been
always present and ready to begin the proceedings
but it is the desire of most lawyers to start at 2:00
p.m., more or less, because most of them, including
the public prosecutor and the PAO lawyer, come
from RTC hearings and even all the way from
Malolos City. To compensate for the lost time,
however, he averred that court sessions adjourn
even up to 6:30 p.m. so that all cases may be
accommodated.
held:
20
imposable
penalty
for the crime found
to
have
been
committed by the
respondent after a
preliminary
investigation. In this
case,
the
crime
charged
in
the
complaint of the NBI
filed in the Department
of
Justice
was
kidnapping/serious
illegal detention, the
imposable penalty for
which
is
reclusion
perpetua to death.
The absence of
preliminary
investigation does not
affect
the
courts
jurisdiction over the
case. Nor do they
impair the validity of
the
information
or
otherwise
render
it
21
Notably, however, by the time the criminal
complaint of Dr. Yanga against herein complainants
was filed on January 3, 2006, respondent was
already without authority to conduct preliminary
investigation since effective October 3, 2005,
judges of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts are no longer authorized to
conduct the same, pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC
(Re: Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by Removing
the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation from
Judges of the First Level Courts).[8] The appropriate
action of respondent, therefore, should have been
to immediately refer the complaint to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan so that a
preliminary investigation could proceed with
reasonable dispatch. His issuance of a subpoena
directing complainants to appear before the court
on January 12, 2006 for a preliminary hearing,
although the hearing did not materialize after his
voluntary inhibition from the case on January 10,
2006, was definitely out of order. At this point, it is
clear that respondent committed gross ignorance of
an existing procedure which is basic and
elementary.
Meanwhile, as to the impropriety purportedly
committed by respondent in his own chamber, the
OCA rightly found that complainants failed to
provide specific details that would validate any
misuse or abuse of government funds and/or
facilities. Nonetheless, it is opportune to remind
respondent as well as other trial court judges, who
are the front-liners in the promotion of the
people's faith in the judiciary, of the directives
embodied in the following administrative circulars:
1.
Administrative
Circular
(A.C.) No. 3-92 (Prohibition against
Use of Halls of Justice for Residential or
Commercial Purposes)[9] All judges
and court personnel are reminded that
the Halls of Justice may be used only
22
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 9 July 2001
and Resolution3 dated 30 January 2002 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58139.
The Facts
Spouses Fernando and Fausta Alarma (respondents)
are the owners of an 11.7 hectare parcel of land
(land) located in Iba, Zambales. The land, identified
as Cadastral Lot No. 2087 of Iba Cadastre, was
posted as a property bond for the provisional liberty
of a certain Joselito Mayo, charged with illegal
possession of firearms in Criminal Case No. 1417-I,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Gregorio
Cayan, et al."
23
action contending that it had no jurisdiction to annul
the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Iba, Zambales, Branch 70, a co-equal court. 10 The
trial court declared further that since the issue of
the case was the validity of OCT No. O-7249, the
case should have been filed with the Court of
Appeals which has exclusive original jurisdiction
over annulment of judgments of a Regional Trial
Court.
24
execution was issued and the property was put up
for sale and awarded to petitioners, the highest
bidders.
These turn of events distinctly show that there was
a failure of due process of law. The execution was
issued, not on a judgment, because there was none,
but simply and solely on the declaration of
forfeiture.
An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional
and interlocutory, there being something more to
be done such as the production of the accused
within 30 days. This process is also called
confiscation of bond. In People v. Dizon,14 we held
that an order of forfeiture is interlocutory and
merely requires appellant "to show cause why
judgment should not be rendered against it for the
amount of the bond." Such order is different from a
judgment on the bond which is issued if the accused
was not produced within the 30-day period. The
judgment on the bond is the one that ultimately
determines the liability of the surety, and when it
becomes final, execution may issue at once. 15
However, in this case, no such judgment was ever
issued and neither has an amount been fixed for
which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law
was not strictly observed and this violated
respondents right to procedural due process.
In addition, we find that the issue of good faith in
buying the property at the auction sale is no longer
material. This Court in a previous case had already
ruled upon the invalidity of the execution and sale
of the land. As a result, the basis for which title to
the land had been issued has no more leg to stand
on. The appellate court, therefore, was correct in
ordering the annulment of the title to the land as a
25
plaintiffs will [sic] under such terms and conditions
as this Court may affix.5
Thereafter, at the instance of Carolina, several
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 226 were filed against
respondent Purita before the MTCC of Cebu City,
Branches 2 and 5. Purita, in turn filed motions to
suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question, on the theory that the checks
subject of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases are void for being
contra bonos mores or for having been issued in
payment of the iniquitous and unconscionable
interest imposed by petitioners. The motions were
denied.7
Respondents thereafter filed before the RTC a
"Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Temporary Restraining Order"8 seeking to restrain
the MTCCs from further proceeding with the B.P. Blg.
22 cases on the ground of prejudicial question.
Petitioners opposed the motion. Nevertheless, the
RTC through its 20 December 2004 Order9 issued a
writ of preliminary injunction, thereby enjoining the
MTCCs from proceeding with the cases against
Purita. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the
order but their motion was denied due course in the
RTCs 3 February 2005 Order.10
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals11 and questioned the propriety of the
RTCs issuance of a preliminary injunction based on
a prejudicial question. The appellate court stated
that respondents had sought to annul the checks for
being void pursuant to Article 1422 of the Civil Code
which provides that "a contract which is the direct
result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and
inexistent." Accordingly, the appellate court
concluded that if the checks subject of the criminal
cases were later on declared null and void, then
said checks could not be made the bases of criminal
prosecutions under B.P. Blg. 22. In other words, the
outcome of the determination of the validity of the
said checks is determinative of guilt or innocence of
Purita in the criminal case.12
26
this case there is a prejudicial question which is sub
judice, and that there is persecution rather than
prosecution.23
The case hinges on the determination of whether
there
exists
a
prejudicial
question
which
necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in
the MTCCs.
We find that there is none and thus we resolve to
grant the petition.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the latter may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.24
Now the prejudicial question posed by respondents
is simply this: whether the daily interest rate of 5%
is void, such that the checks issued by respondents
to cover said interest are likewise void for being
contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg.
22 will no longer prosper.
The prejudicial question
respondents must fail.
theory
advanced
by
27
injunction in the civil casea relief which they had
already asked for in their complaint and which was
also initially not granted to them. Any which way
the situation is viewed, respondents acts
constituted forum shopping since they sought a
possibly favorable opinion from one court after
another had issued an order unfavorable to them.
The Court notes that three cases, namely, Ras v.
Rasul,31 Medel v. CA32 and Danao v. Court of
Appeals33finding no application to the instant
casewere mentioned by the RTC, the Court of
Appeals and by respondents themselves in support
of their position.
Ras v. Rasul cropped up in the order of the RTC
which was quoted with approval by the Court of
Appeals. According to the RTC, the ruling in the said
case allegedly "can be squarely applied in this case
which nullified and set aside the conviction in a
criminal case because of a prejudicial question."34
We do not agree. The Ras case involves a petition
for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of
forgery. While the civil case was pending, an
information for estafa was filed against the
respondent in the civil case. The Court ruled that
there were prejudicial questions considering that
the defense against the charge of forgery in the civil
case is based on the very same facts which would
be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in the estafa case. The instant case is
different from Ras inasmuch as the determination of
whether the 5% daily interest is contra bonos mores
and therefore void, or that the total amount loaned
from petitioners has been sufficiently paid, will not
affect the guilt or innocence of Purita because the
material question in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is
whether Purita had issued a bad check, regardless
of the purpose or condition of its issuance.
Medel v. CA is the case upon which respondents
anchor their claim that the interest due on their
loans is only 1% per month and thus they have
already overpaid their obligation to petitioners. In
GALO MONGE
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170308
March 7, 2008
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
28
This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court whereby petitioner Galo Monge
(petitioner) assails the Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 June 2005 which affirmed his
conviction as well as the discharge of accused
Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness.
The factual antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994,
petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay
tanods Serdan and Molina in possession of and
transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in
Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and
then, the tanods demanded that they be shown the
requisite permit and/or authority from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able
to produce any.3 Petitioner fled the scene in that
instant whereas Potencio was brought to the police
station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the
DENR-Community
Environment
and
Natural
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO).4 The DENR-CENRO
issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of
lumber indicating that the items, totaling 77 board
feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been
seized from Potencio.5 Later on, petitioner was
arrested, but Potencios whereabouts had been
unknown since the time of the seizure6 until he
surfaced on 3 January 1998.7
An information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner
and Potencio with violation of Section 688 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, 9 as amended by
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of 1997. The
inculpatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994],
at about 9:30 oclock in the morning, in
Barangay
Sto.
Domingo,
Iriga
City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating with each other,
without any authority of law, nor armed with
necessary
permit/license
or
other
documents, with intent to gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
transport and have in their possession three
(3) pieces of Mahogany of assorted
[dimension] with a[n] appropriate volume of
seventy-seven (77) board feet or point
eighteen (0.18) cubic meter with a total
market value of P1,925.00, Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
DENR in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner
entered a negative plea.11
Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on
the circumstances of the apprehension but for
failing to appear in court for cross examination, his
testimony was stricken out.12 On 16 January 1998,
Potencio was discharged to be used as a state
witness on motion of the prosecutor. 13 Accordingly,
he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but
claimed that for a promised fee he was merely
requested by petitioner, the owner of the log, to
assist him in hauling the same down from the
mountain. Potencios testimony was materially
corroborated by Molina.14 Petitioner did not contest
the allegations, except that it was not he but
Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that
contrary to what Potencio had stated in court, it was
the latter who hired him to bring the log from the
29
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No.
277, criminalizes two distinct and separate
offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering,
collecting and removing of timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority; and (b) the possession
of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing laws and
regulations.19 DENR Administrative Order No. 59
series of 1993 specifies the documents required for
the transport of timber and other forest products.
Section 3 thereof materially requires that the
transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate
of lumber origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In
the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other
forest products may be proven by the authorization
duly issued by the DENR. In the second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting,
gathering, collecting and removal of forest products
are legal precisely because mere possession of
forest products without the requisite documents
consummates the crime.20
It is thus clear that the fact of possession by
petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany
lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the
requisite legal documents, taken together, has
already given rise to criminal liability under Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act
punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative
testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness
on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension
well establishes petitioners liability. Petitioner
cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over
the pieces of lumber found in his possession nor in
his claim that his help was merely solicited by
30
Carpio, Acting Chairperson, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna,
Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur
(4) Wilson J. So, Chief Executive Officer of PortaPhone, who testified that meetings were held to
demand from Ferdinand the subject sum of money.
As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered
the following: Exhibit "A" - Official Receipt No. 2242,
the receipt in which Ferdinand acknowledged that
he received the amount of P15,000.00 from
Hemisphere; Exhibit "B" - the Minutes of the
Meeting held on 30 October 1996 attended by
Wilson So, Juanito Tan, Luningning Morando and
Ferdinand, wherein Wilson So asked Ferdinand the
reason for the former's refusal to remit the
P15,000.00 to the company, and Ferdinand
answered that there was no need to turn over the
said amount because he had outstanding
reimbursements from the company in the amount of
P8,518.08; Exhibit "C" - the Resignation Letter of
Ferdinand; Exhibit "D" - the Inter-Office Demand
Letter dated 7 November 1996, addressed to
Ferdinand from Juanito M. Tan, Jr. requiring the
former to return the amount of P15,000.00; Exhibit
"E" - the Handwritten Explanation of Ferdinand
dated 8 December 1996, that he remitted the
amount to Luningning Morando; Exhibit "F"- InterOffice Memorandum dated 8 November 1996,
issued by Juanito Tan and addressed to Luningning
Morando to explain her side regarding the allegation
of Ferdinand that she received the P15,000.00;
Exhibit "G"- Inter-Office Memorandum prepared by
Luningning Morando dated 9 November 1996,
denying the allegation that she received the
amount of P15,000.00 from Ferdinand; Exhibit "H"Inter-Office Memorandum dated 11 November 1996,
issued by Juanito Tan for Ferdinand to further
explain his side in light of Luningning Morando's
denial that she received the amount. It also advised
Ferdinand to wait for the verification and
computation of his claim for reimbursements;
Exhibit "I"- Formal Demand Letter dated 25
November 1996, addressed to Ferdinand and issued
by the legal counsel of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc.,
asking the former to return to the company the
subject amount; Exhibit "J"- the Affidavit of
31
Complaint executed by Juanito Tan against
Ferdinand; Exhibit "K"- the Collection List dated 30
October 1996, showing that Ferdinand received
from Hemisphere the amount of P15,000.00, and
the same was not turned over to Catherine; Exhibit
"L"- Reply-Affidavit dated 5 February 1997,
executed by Juanito M. Tan, Jr.; Exhibit "M"- the SurRejoinder Affidavit of Juanito M. Tan, Jr. dated 21
February 1997.
The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution
shows that at around 5:30 p.m. of 25 October 1996,
in the City of Makati, Ferdinand, who is a Marketing
Manager of Porta-Phone, a domestic corporation
engaged in the lease of cellular phones and other
communication equipment, went to the office of
Porta-Phone located on the third floor of Enzo
Building, Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, and took hold of
a pad of official receipts from the desk of Catherine,
Porta-Phone's collection officer. With the pad of
official receipts in his hands, Ferdinand proceeded
to his client, Hemisphere, and delivered articles of
communication equipment. Although he was not an
authorized person to receive cash and issue
receipts for Porta-Phone, Ferdinand received from
Hemisphere the amount of P15,000.00 as
refundable deposit for the aforesaid equipment. On
26 October 1996, Ferdinand went to Porta-Phone
and returned the pad of receipts, but failed to
deliver the cash he received from Hemisphere. On
28 October 1996, the next working day, Catherine
checked the booklet of official receipts and found
that one of the official receipts was missing. The
green duplicate of the missing official receipt,
however, showed that Ferdinand received the
amount of P15,000.00 from Hemisphere. Upon
learning of Ferdinand's receipt of the said amount,
Catherine confronted Ferdinand, who answered that
he deposited the amount to his personal bank
account. Catherine then instructed Ferdinand to
remit the amount the next day.[6] Catherine reported
the incident to the accounting supervisor,
Luningning Morando, who, in turn, reported the
same to the General Manager, Junito Tan. The
32
crime of QUALIFIED THEFT, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS and to pay the
costs.[8]
On 2 August 2001, Ferdinand filed a Motion for New
Trial on two grounds: (1) absence of a preliminary
investigation for the crime of qualified theft; and (2)
newly discovered evidence. Anent the first ground,
it must be noted that in the beginning, Ferdinand
was being indicted for Estafa/Falsification of Private
Document. The prosecutor later found that the
proper charge should be for Qualified Theft.
Ferdinand argued that since his counter-affidavits
were for the charge Estafa/Falsification of Private
Document,
he
claimed
that
preliminary
investigation for Qualified Theft was absent. With
regard to the second ground, Ferdinand argued that
newly discovered evidence, i.e., the testimony of a
certain Marilen Viduya, could change the judgment
on the case. The RTC granted the motion based on
the second ground, and set aside its 30 June 2001
decision.
Marilen Viduya, a former employee of Hemisphere,
testified that she asked Ferdinand to affix his
signature to an acknowledgement receipt for the
amount of P15,000.00, which was the refundable
deposit of Hemisphere for the equipment delivered,
because Ferdinand did not bring with him the
official receipt of Porta-Phone. She also averred that
Luningning went to Hemisphere and conducted an
inventory of the delivered communication items.
Luningning admitted to her that the P15,000.00 was
already remitted to Porta-Phone.
In an Order[9] dated 15 July 2003, the RTC declared
that it did not find the testimony of Marilen Viduya
persuasive. It revived and reinstated its 30 June
2001 decision convicting Ferdinand of the crime
charged.
Dissatisfied, Ferdinand appealed the judgment to
the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 27 April 2006,
promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of
the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The 30
June 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 140, in Makati City, is hereby AFFIRMED.[10]
Ferdinand filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated 4 October 2006.
Hence, the instant petition.
Ferdinand contends that he was denied due process
as his trial was pursued without prior clearance
from the Department of Labor pursuant to
Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 16 which
allegedly states that "clearance must be sought
from the Ministry of Labor and /or the Office of the
President before taking cognizance of complaints
for preliminary investigation and the filing in court
of the corresponding information of cases arising
out of, or related to, a labor dispute." He avers that
this circular is designed to avoid undue harassment
that the employer may use to cow employees from
pursuing money claims against the former.
He also argues that due process was not accorded
since he was indicted for qualified theft, even as he
was initially investigated for estafa/falsification of
private documents. It must be noted that the
original indictment was for estafa/falsification of
private documents but later the prosecutor found it
proper to charge him with qualified theft. According
to him although he was given the chance to file
counter-affidavits
on
the
charge
of
estafa/falsification of private documents, he was not
given the opportunity to answer during the
33
Since the same allegations and evidence were
proffered by the complainant in the qualified theft,
there is no need for Ferdinand to be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits anew, as he
had already answered said allegations when he
submitted counter-affidavits for the original
indictment
of
estafa/falsification
of
private
documents.
The RTC correctly convicted Ferdinand of the crime
of qualified theft.
xxxx
34
himself. He could not have taken the amount had he
not been an officer of the said company. Clearly, the
taking was done with grave abuse of confidence.
Ferdinand likewise assails the testimony of
prosecution witness Juanito, who retracted his
affidavit of desistance in favor of the former and
explained on the witness stand that he had agreed
to execute the same due to personal favors
bestowed on him by Ferdinand. Ferdinand asserts
that Juanito's retraction should not be given
credence. This contention is unconvincing. As aptly
discussed by the Court of Appeals:
[W]hile his desistance may cast doubt on his
subsequent testimony, We are not unmindful that
he was in fact grilled by the defense regarding his
motives in revoking his earlier desistance and he
remained
steadfast
in
his
testimony
that
[Ferdinand] was never authorized by Porta-Phone to
collect payments and that during the meeting of 30
October 1996, [Ferdinand] refused to return the
money. Rather than destroy his credibility, the
defense's grilling regarding the reasons for his filing
his earlier desistance even strengthened the value
of his testimony for he only executed the same
because of some personal favors from [Ferdinand].
And while [Ferdinand] suggests that subsequent
revocation of his desistance in open court may be
due this time to favors extended by Porta-Phone
cannot be sustained when taken together with the
fact that [Juanito] was long been separted from
Porta-Phone when he testified. In fact Porta-Phone's
CEO did not even have kind words for [Juanito]
when the former testified. x x x.[16]
In sum, this Court, yields to the factual findings of
the trial court which were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, there being no compelling reason to veer
away from the same. This is in line with the precept
stating that when the trial court's findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally conclusive and binding upon this
Court.
The RTC imposed on petitioner the indeterminate
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
35
Assailed before this Court is the decision[1]
dated November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00301 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No.
98-105, finding accused-appellant Rene Rosas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
When arraigned on January 5, 1999, accusedappellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued, in the course of which the
prosecution presented the testimonies of Dr.
Crisostomo Necessario, Jr., Municipal Health Officer
of Kabacan, Cotabato; Wilfredo Bataga, mayor of
Kabacan, Cotabato; Antonio Palomar Bataga, Jr.; and
Arceli Estacio, widow of the victim.
For its part, the defense presented accusedappellant himself and his girlfriend, Karen Nayona.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On September 15,
1995 , around eleven oclock in the
morning, Antonio Palomar Bataga, Jr.
was outside the billiard hall along
Aglipay Street near the public
terminal and market of Kabacan,
Poblacion,
Kabacan,
Cotabato.
Around 15 meters away, he saw
appellant Rene Rosas standing beside
the post near a store across the
street. Palomar knew appellant long
before, as they were both into
gambling. Thereafter, the victim,
Nestor Estacio, arrived alone on
board his motorcycle. He stopped in
Meanwhile, around
that same time and fifteen (15)
meters away, in a carinderia located
at the Bus Terminal in Poblacion,
Kabacan, Cotabato, several gunshots
were heard. Wilfredo Bataga, who
was the owner of the said carinderia
and also the commanding officer of
the 39th Infantry Batallion assigned in
Kabacan,
Cotabato,
immediately
proceeded to where the gunshots
came from. He saw appellant about
to run and a dead body being carried
by four persons into a tricycle.
Wilfredo upon seeing that appellant
was armed with a 45-caliber pistol,
ran after the latter but lost him in the
crowd.
36
On October 27, 1995 ,
Wilfredo
was
handed
with
a
cartographic sketch of the suspect
made by the National Bureau of
Investigation.
He
indorsed
the
cartographic sketch to the police of
the Poblacion and reported the
incident.
On August 5, 1998 ,
around 5:30 in the afternoon,
appellant was spotted a meter away
in front of Wilfredos house. Wilfredo
upon seeing appellant took out his
copy of the cartographic sketch and
confronted appellant that it was his
picture. Appellant answered Siguro
ako nga. Appellant was then
immediately arrested.
The
post-mortem
examination
conducted
by
Dr.
Crisostomo
Necessario,
Municipal
Health Officer of Kabacan, Cotabato
revealed that the victim sustained
multiple gunshot wounds in the
lumbar region (lower back area), a
gunshot wound in the epigastric area
(upper mid-portion of the abdomen
near the chest) and the mid-left
portion of the hypogastric area (left
abdomen). Thereafter, Dr. Necessario
issued a Medical Report attributing
SO ORDERED.
37
On February 4, 2002, this Court accepted the
appeal and docketed the same as G.R. No. 148879.
[7]
SO ORDERED.
I
WHEREFORE, the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with
modification that the award for actual
damages is DELETED for reasons
already discussed; in lieu thereof, an
award of temperate damages in the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand
(P25,000.00)
Pesos
is
hereby
GRANTED.
II
38
appellant, their contradicting testimonies should not
be accorded any weight and credence.
Q.
Rosas?
A
Q.
By the way, do
you know the accused in this
case?
A.
Q.
Do you know the other name
of Rene Rosas?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Tell the Court what is the other
name or the alias of Rene Rosas?
A.
Yes, sir.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Yes, sir.
A.
Because he was an employee
of the Municipal Hall, sir.
Q.
You said you were outside the
Billiard Hall at 11:00 oclock in the
morning, now while you were
there on September 15, 1995, was
there any unusual incident that
happened?
Q.
Now, prior to 1995 have you
known Rene Rosas?
A.
Q.
Tell the Court, what was that
unusual incident that happened?
Yes, sir.
Q.
For how long did you know
Rene Rosas prior to 1995?
A.
sir.
A.
Q.
Now, did you see the killing of
Nestor Estacio?
Q.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Q.
Now, you said you saw the
killing of Nestor Estacio, what was the
weapon used in the killing of Mr.
Estacio?
A.
Yes, sir.
A.
Pistol, sir.
Q.
A.
A.
Because
activities.
of
our
gambling
Q.
Now, how about the victim
here, Mr. Estacio, do you know him?
39
Q.
Now, you said that Nestor
Estacio was killed, did you see who
killed Nestor Estacio?
ATTY. BALAGOT:
Q.
Why were you there, was
there any incident of happening
that occurred?
Your
COURT:
A.
sir.
Q.
do upon
body?
A.
When
I
heard
several
gunbursts, I immediately proceeded
to the
scene of the crime and I
saw the suspect including the lying
victim
Nestor Estacio which was
brought along by four (4) persons
in
loading a tricycle in going to
a hospital, sir.
Estacio,
A.
He was carried
upon by four persons inside
the tricycle for immediate
medication, sir.
Q.
Now, you said you
saw the accused Rene Rosas,
what did you do when you saw
him?
Nestor
Yes, sir.
xxx
Q.
A.
xxx
xxx
A.
I chased him, sir. I
was not able to arrest him due
to the thickness of the civilians
running together with him, sir.
Q.
Now, you said you saw
Rene Rosas, what was he doing
when you
saw him?
xxx
A.
When I saw him,
he
was
already
running
together
with
innocent
civilians towards the market,
sir.
Q.
Now, you said you
also saw the dead body of a
person, what is the name of
xxx
xxx
ATTY. BALAGOT:
Q.
You said that on
September
15,
1995,
at
around 11:00 oclock you were
40
at your
right?
A.
carinderia,
is
that
Yes, sir.
Q.
Now,
your
carinderia was located that
time at the old bus terminal
building, is that right?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And you said
while you were there you
heard gunshots?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And you went to
the site from where the
gunshots were heard?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
How far was your
carinderia from the site where
you heard those gunshots?
A.
That was more or
less 15 meters, sir.
Q
Fifteen (15) if you will pass
through the terminal going to that
site?
A
sir.
Q
Now, at that time, Mr.
Witness , is it not right that
you passed through Jacinto
Street particularly at the back
of the old terminal building?
A
I intended to conduct a
hamper; a block in front of Ku
Kuan so that I could arrest the
suspect and I personally found
out and identified the running
person to be Rene Rosas @
Boy Rosas running together
with scampered civilians, sir.
B
But
you
passed
through Jacinto Street, Mr.
Witness, is it right?
A
Yes, sir, and I saw him
personally.
Q
And if you will pass
through Jacinto Street, first the
walking distance would be
around 15 meters, is that
right?
A
I saw him personally
this way but I crossed the
block, sir.
Q
Now, because at that
juncture
while
you
were
walking through that Street,
you met this Rene Rosas, is
that right?
A
I was not able to see
him but when I arrived at the
scene of the crime I saw him
personally and I chased him
but could not arrest him due
to the thickness of the civilians
running together with him.
Q
Now, you claimed that
you saw Rene Rosas the
accused personally, he was
running at the time when you
saw him, is that right?
A
About to run when I
reached the scene of the
crime, sir.
Q
Also there were other
persons who were about to
run at that time, is that right?
A
Yes, sir, when I reached
the scene to chase him he ran
already.
Q
That you choose Rene
Rosas because that time he
was the bodyguard of Mr.
Karutin, is that right?
A
I was able to identify
him when the cartographic
sketch of the suspect coming
from the NBI expert and Dr.
Sevilla was given to me, sir.
41
Q
Mr.
Witness,
on
September 15, 1995, why did
you chase Rene Rosas?
A
Because I saw in his
arm a pistol caliber 45, sir.[15]
Clearly,
Wilfredo
positively
identified
appellant as the person running away from the
crime scene towards the public market after
shooting the victim. Just like Antonio, Wilfredo
could also not have been mistaken as to accusedappellants identity considering that he was just 15
meters away from the crime scene and the crime
was committed in broad daylight.
42
Accused-appellants argument deserves scant
consideration. The recent case of People v.
Sayaboc[23] reiterated the pronouncement in
People v. Aquino[24] that even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by
descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified
by to properly qualify an offense. Section 8 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure[25] does not require the
use of such words to refer to the circumstances
which raise the category of an offense. It is not the
use of the words qualifying or qualified by that
raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific
allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds
the essential element raising the crime to a higher
category. It is sufficient that the qualifying
circumstances be specified in the Information to
apprise the accused of the charges against him to
enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus
precluding surprises during trial.
43
With respect to actual damages, the victims
widow, Arceli Estacio, testified that she spent a total
of P40,000.00 as burial and funeral expenses but
she failed to present receipts to substantiate her
claim. In People v. Abrazaldo,[31] we laid down
the doctrine that where the amount of actual
damages for funeral
expenses cannot be
determined because of the absence of receipts to
prove them, temperate damages may be awarded
in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of actual
damages, temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of Rene
Rosas because although the exact amount was not
proved with certainty, it was reasonable to expect
that they incurred expenses for the coffin and burial
of the victim.
SO ORDERED.
44
administrative case does not necessarily bar the
filing of the criminal prosecution for the same or
similar acts which were the subject of the
administrative
complaint.
(2) The independent nature of a criminal
prosecution dictates that the Sandiganbayan must
determine petitioner's criminal liability without its
hands being tied with what transpired in the
administrative
case.
- The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from
these rules.
Petitioner argues that the criminal case against him
requires a higher quantum of proof for conviction that is proof beyond reasonable doubt - that the
administrative case, which needs only substantial
evidence. He claims that from this circumstance, it
follows that the dismissal of the administrative case
should carry with it the dismissal of the criminal
case.
This argument has however been addressed in
jurisprudence. In Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, the
Administrative case against the accused was
dismissed by the Ombudsman on a finding that the
contract of loan entered into in pursuance of the
police power of the accused as local chief executive,
and that the accused had been re-elected to office.
The Ombudsman however, still found probable
cause to criminally charge the accused in court.
When the accused filed a petition with the Supreme
Court to dismiss the criminal case before the
Sandiganbayan, the Court denied the petition.
To sustain petitioner's arguments will be to require
the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman to merely
adopt the results of administrative investigations
which would not only diminish the powers and