Guidelinesfor Enhancing Building Securityin Singapore Jul 2010

FOREWORD
A safe and stable environment is one of the key pillars behind Singapores success. This will continue to be so.
The Government has invested heavily to maintain safety and security: from the efforts at our border checkpoints, to
hardening of potential targets and to building up the preparedness and resilience of our communities. While we will
continue to put in place the necessary measures and infrastructure to protect Singapore and its people, the wider
communitys involvement and contribution are equally vital.
Every person, business and building owner can take a direct responsibility to ensure their own safety and security. Our
strength lies in us leveraging on the people to embrace a security mindset, both in preventing and mitigating a terrorist
attack, and very importantly to practice it in our daily activities.
The Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore (GEBSS) is a comprehensive compilation of international
best practices in building security that can be applied to Singapore. It provides the building and construction community
with practical information and guidelines on how they can take personal action to enhance the security of their buildings.
Developers, engineers, architects and security managers will find the guidelines relevant.
A salient point made in the publication is the importance of incorporating security considerations from the very beginning
of the building design process. This way, the cost of security is greatly minimised and the architectural vision of the
building can be preserved. Indeed I think you should plan for security as the building is being designed, as it is almost
always more costly to retrofit a building to implement security measures after it has been built.
I encourage the building and construction community to study this publication and use it actively to enhance the security
of buildings in Singapore. Your efforts in doing so would be a direct and invaluable contribution to the safety and security
of Singapore and our people.
WONG KAN SENG

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs
January 2010
Page 1
(Updated as at July 2010)

The Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore (GEBSS)
is a follow-up from the earlier Enhancing Building Security booklet and has been prepared by
Homefront Security Division - Ministry of Home Affairs
in consultation with:
Singapore Police Force;
Internal Security Department;
Singapore Civil Defence Force;
Building and Construction Authority;
Urban Redevelopment Authority;
as well as with inputs from external consultants.
The GEBSS is a live document which will be updated when necessary. For feedback or queries, please write to
MHA_Guidelines_BuildingSecurity@mha.gov.sg.
No part of the GEBSS shall be reproduced in whole or part without prior written consent of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
Table of Contents
Introduction To Building Security

1.1 The Costly Threat of Terrorism
1.2 Overview of the Guidelines
1.2.1 Background
1.2.2 Purpose
1.2.3 Assumption
1.2.4 Possible Threat Scenarios
1.2.5 Factor in Security in Building Design Early
1.3 Who Should Read the Guidelines
1.4 How to Use the Guidelines
1.5 Need for Security & Protective Design/Blast Consultant(s)
1.6 Feedback and Queries
Key Building Design Considerations

2.1 Introduction
2.2 General Architectural Considerations

2.2.1 Creating Stand-Off Distance
2.2.2 Building Orientation
2.2.3 Perimeter Line

2.2.5 Planning of Internal Areas
2.2.6 Materials/ Faade Systems
2.3 General Structural Considerations
2.3.1 Prevention of Progressive Collapse
2.3.2 Structural Redundancy
2.3.3 The Use of Detailing to Provide Structural Continuity and Ductility
2.3.4 Capacity for Resisting Shear Failure
2.3.5 Multi-storey and Underground Car Parks
2.4 Mechanical and Electrical System Considerations
Building and Protection Categories

3.1 How To Use This Chapter
3.2 Determining Building Category
3.3 Determining Building Structure category
3.3.1 Construction Method
3.3.2 Envelope Wall
3.3.3 Structure Category
Protection Recommendation Tables

4.2 Small Building/ Very Low Occupancy Building Category S
4.3 Low Occupancy Building Category L
4.4 Medium Occupancy Building Category M
4.5 High Occupancy Building Category H
4.6 Special Buildings Building Category Y
Perimeter Design
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Stand-Off Distance
5.1.2 Perimeter line
5.1.3 Clear Zone
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5.3 Perimeter Line

5.3.1 Introduction
5.3.2 Vehicle Anti-Ramming Perimeter Line
5.3.2A Introduction

5.3.2C Vehicle Anti-Ramming Standards
5.3.2D Design of Vehicle Anti-Ramming Perimeter Line
5.3.2E Natural and Landscaping Barriers
5.3.2F Fabricated Barriers
5.3.3 Infrastructure Pipes
5.3.3A Introduction
5.3.3B Design of Infrastructure Pipes
5.3.3C Example of Design
5.3.4 Anti-Intrusion Fence
5.3.4A Introduction

5.3.4C Design of Anti-Intrusion Fence
5.3.4D Examples of Designs
5.3.5 Blast Shielding Wall
5.3.5A Introduction

5.3.5C Design of Blast Shielding Walls
5.3.5D Examples of Designs
5.3.6 Ballistic Perimeter Line
5.3.6A Introduction

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5.3.6C Ballistic Standards
5.3.6D Design of Ballistic Perimeter Line
5.3.6E Examples of Designs
5.4 Vehicular and Pedestrian Entrances
5.4.1 Introduction
5.4.2 Vehicle Anti-Ramming Entrance
5.4.2A Introduction

5.4.2D Design of a Vehicle Anti-Ramming Entrance
5.4.3 Administrative Barriers
5.4.3A Introduction
5.4.3B Design of Administrative Barrier
5.4.3C Examples of Designs
5.4.4 Protected Pedestrian Entrance
5.4.4A Introduction

5.4.4C Forced Entry Standards
5.4.4D Design of Protected Pedestrian Entrance
5.4.5 Delivery/Service Vehicle Access Control
5.4.5A Introduction

5.4.5D Design of Delivery/Service Vehicle Access Control
5.4.6 Interlocking Vehicle Entrance (For higher security needs)
5.4.6A Introduction

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5.4.6C Design of Interlocking Vehicle Entrance
5.4.6D Example of Design
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5.5
Security posts
5.5.1 Introduction
5.5.2 Pedestrian security posts
5.5.2A Introduction

5.5.2C Standards
5.5.2D Design of Security Posts
5.5.3 Vehicle Entrance Security Post
5.5.3A Introduction
5.5.3B Design of Vehicle Entrance Security Post
5.6 Landscaping
5.6.1 Introduction
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5.6.3 Design of Landscaping
5.6.4 Example of Design
5.7 Security Lighting
5.7.1 Introduction
5.7.2 Security Lighting - Perimeter Line and Entrances
5.7.2A Introduction

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5.7.2C Illumination Standards
5.7.2D Design of Security Lighting
5.8 Positioning of car parks and critical utilities
5.8.1 Introduction
5.8.2 Positioning of Car Parks
5.8.2A Introduction
5.8.2B Design of Car Parks
5.8.3 Positioning of Critical Utilities
5.8.3A Introduction
5.8.3B Design of critical utilities
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6.5 Windows
6.5.1 Introduction
6.5.2 Blast Protected Windows
6.5.3 Ballistic Protected Windows
6.5.4 Forced Entry Protected Windows
6.5.5 Combined Protection of Windows
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6.6 Doors
6.6.1
6.6.2
6.6.3
6.6.4
6.6.5
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Building Faades
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6.2.2 Standards for Blast Resistance
6.2.3 Standards for Forced-Entry Resistance
6.2.4 Standards for Ballistic Resistance
6.3 Building Walls
6.3.1 Introduction
6.3.2 Pre-Cast Load Bearing Walls
6.3.3 Non-Load Bearing Wall Panels
6.3.4 Light Walls
6.4 Curtain Walls
6.4.1 Introduction
6.4.2 Fully Framed Glass Curtain Walls
6.4.3 Point Supported or Other Curtain Wall Systems
6.4.4 Stone or Metal Finished Light Walls
Introduction
Blast Protected Doors
Ballistic Protected Doors
Forced Entry Protected Doors
Combined Protection For Doors
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Building Structure
7.1 Introduction
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7.3 Design Criteria
7.3.1 The Blast Load
7.3.2 General Guidelines
7.4 Progressive Collapse Prevention
7.4.1 The Systematic Approach
7.4.2 The Localised Approach
7.4.3 Column Protection
7.4.4 Wall Protection
7.4.5 Beam Protection
7.4.6 Slab Protection
8
Security Systems
8.2 Security Control Room

8.2.1 Introduction
%

8.2.3 Design of a Security Control Room
8.3 Intercom and Communication System
8.3.1 Introduction
%

8.3.3 Design of an Intercom and Communication System
8.3.4 Examples of Designs
8.4 Public Address System
8.4.1 Introduction
%

8.4.3 Design of a Public Address System
8.5 Alarm System

8.5.1 Introduction
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8.5.3 Design of an Alarm System
8.5.4 Examples
8.6 Access Control System

8.6.1 Introduction
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8.6.3 Design of An Access Control System
8.6.4 Examples of Design
8.7 CCTV System

8.7.1 Introduction
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8.7.3 Design Considerations
8.7.4 Installation & Operation
8.7.5 Essential Support
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8.7.7 References
8.8 Security Lighting for CCTV systems
8.8.1 Introduction
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8.8.3 Standards
8.8.4 Design of Security Lighting
8.8.5 Example
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Special Attention Areas
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9.2 Parking
9.2.1
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9.2.3
9.2.4
9.3 Pedestrian Entry Areas

9.3.1 Introduction
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9.3.3 Design of Pedestrian Entry Areas
9.4 Loading Docks

9.4.1 Introduction
<

9.4.3 Design of a Loading Dock
Introduction

Design of a Car Park
Example
9.5 Garbage and Waste Disposal Dock

9.5.1 Introduction
9.5.2 Design of Garbage and Waste Disposal Areas
9.6 Mail and Delivery Room

9.6.1 Introduction
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9.6.3 Design of Mail and Delivery Rooms
9.7 VIP Holding Room
9.7.1 Introduction
9.7.2 Design of VIP Holding Rooms
9.8 Protected Rooms

9.8.1 Introduction
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9.8.3 Design of Protected Rooms
9.9 Central Utility Rooms
9.9.1 Introduction
9.9.2 Design of Central Utility Rooms
9.9.3 Example
9.10 Air-conditioning System

9.10.1 Introduction
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9.10.3 Design of an Air-Conditioning System
9.11 Water Supply and Tanks
9.11.1 Introduction
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9.11.3 Design of Water Supply and Tanks
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Appendix A
Sample of Security and Safety Design Requirements for Buildings: For Tendering Purposes
1
Engagement & Scope of Security and Protective Design/Blast Consultant(s)
2
Assessment Process
3
Security and Protective Design Plan Submission Stages
4
Site Planning and Design Considerations for Crime Prevention
5
Site Planning and Design Considerations for Vehicular Threats
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Site Planning and Design Considerations for Parking
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Site Planning and Design Considerations for External Circulation
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Architecture and Interior Design
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Structural Design
10 Mechanical Design
11 Electrical Design
12 Chemical, Biological & Radiological Protective Measures
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Appendix B
General Security Guidelines for Hotels
Introduction
Security Rings
1 Deterrence
2 Pro-active Security
3 Perimeter Security
4 Access Control
5 Security Command & Control Rooms
6 Emergency Plans & Procedures
Concluding Remarks
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Appendix C
General Security Guidelines for Shopping Malls
Introduction
The Security Concept
Security Rings
1 Deterrence
2 Pro-active Security
3 Perimeter Security
4 Access Control
5 Security Command & Control Rooms
6 Emergency Plans & Procedures
Concluding Remarks
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Page 8
1
1.1
INTRODUCTION TO BUILDING SECURITY

THE COSTLY THREAT OF TERRORISM
1.2
OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDELINES
1.2.1 BACKGROUND
Financing terrorism may be cheap but a terrorist attack
anywhere is a very disruptive and potentially destabilising force.
News reports and press statements from governments tell us that
there are many types of costs, direct and indirect, associated
with a terrorist bomb attack. Other than the loss of precious
human lives and injuries suffered, there are also business
losses, cost of rebuilding, insurance payouts, shattered investor

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are just a small sample of the many costs that businesses, and
governments, have to deal with in the wake of a terrorist bomb
attack on or in the vicinity of their establishment.
The September 11 terrorist (9/11) attacks in 2001, which
cost the terrorists US$500,000 to stage, claimed 3,000 lives and
the total losses of life and property cost insurance companies
approximately US$40 billion. This direct cost pales in comparison
to the indirect costs. Shopping centres and restaurants across
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buildings (such as the Sears Tower in Chicago) were evacuated;
planes were grounded; and the stock market ceased trading for
four consecutive days. The effects were not only felt in New York.
The Florida tourist industry was also badly affected where the
total tourism activity had been reduced by one-third, or about
US$20m per day. An APEC Tourism Working Group statement
said that falls in tourism arrivals since 9/11 had varied from a few
percent in some member economies such as Thailand, 10% in
Singapore and up to 21% in Taiwan. Given the average direct
contribution from tourism of over 5% of GDP across the APEC
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economies is substantial.
Closer to home, the Oct 2002 Bali Bombing, which cost
the terrorists approximately US$20,000 to stage, claimed the lives
of around 200 innocent people and devastated Indonesias US$6
billion tourism industry. The Indonesian stock market crashed
and the Bali tourist economy, which contributes about 5% of the
countrys GDP, came to a halt. Overall, the attack resulted in a 2
percent drop in Indonesian GDP for 2002.
More recent attacks in the region have shown that
terrorists continue to actively pursue their terror campaigns and
the targets are now commonly hotels or resorts. The attack on
the Islamabad Marriott Hotel in Sep 2008, co-ordinated attacks
in Mumbai in Nov 2008 which included 2 hotels, The Taj Mahal
Palace & Tower and The Oberoi Trident and the Jul 2009
bombings in Jakartas JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels are
just a few such examples.

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to cripple economic activity and recognise that the shockwaves of
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impact. Certainly, such attacks would undermine businesses and
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The Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security

in Singapore (GEBSS) was drawn up following a series of
comprehensive threat and risk analysis studies that were carried
out on several types of buildings in Singapore. The studies were
undertaken in order to review current construction techniques and
materials typically used, security procedures, culture, practices
and constraints for different types of buildings in Singapore, as
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physical protection guidelines. The types of buildings reviewed
included those that belong to the hospitality and retail industries,
transportation infrastructure and government institutions.
1.2.2
PURPOSE
The GEBSS intends to provide a menu of good

security practices and considerations to help building owners
and professionals implement pragmatic and practical security
procedures, physical protection concepts and security technology.
A series of security recommendations and considerations have
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requirements, which allow building designers to focus on the key
recommendations that are applicable to their type of building. This
is based on factors such as design occupancy levels, structural
types and faade type that affects the buildings inherent risk and
vulnerability.

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the structure and faade of the building before referring to the
list of security measures and choosing those that are most
applicable. In other words, it allows them to minimise the security
risk of their building complex while still preserving the essence of
their architectural design.
The GEBSS also aims to provide domain owners with
clear professional security guidelines and standards, which will
serve as recognised norms that can guide manufacturers of
security equipment, security practitioners and users alike. This
will put everyone on the same page and ensure a minimum level
of acceptable security standards in the industry. For example,
the guidelines will state internationally recognised standards (e.g.
for vehicle barriers: SD-STD-02.01, ASTM F2656-07 or UK BSI
PAS68:2007) that manufacturers should adopt if they wish for
their equipment to be used in Singapore. Building owners and
consultants will also be able to use these standards as a basis to
determine the technical requirements of the security measures to
put in place.
The levels of protection recommended in these
guidelines establish a foundation for the rapid deployment of
additional protective measures as threat levels increase. They
do not assume nor recommend that maximum protection is
required as a standard but suggest design considerations and
ways of preparing the infrastructure for later implementation of
higher levels of protection. If project constraints prohibit the full
implementation of the relevant guidelines, it is up to the project
developer or user of this guide to decide on the extent to which
the various protective elements will be implemented, based on
the location of the potential threats and subsequent analysis.
Page 9
1.2.3
ASSUMPTION
These guidelines are based on the common assumption

that comprehensive protection against every possible threat is
cost prohibitive. The philosophy introduced in these guidelines is
that appropriate protection can be provided for new development
projects either at a reasonable cost or at no additional cost.
Building designs that employ factors to eliminate or limit the
possibility of an attack help reduce the need to employ hardening
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areas. When the possibility of an attack cannot be eliminated
or limited, the guidelines will supply recommendations that
1.2.4
are aimed at mitigating the casualty level. Full implementation

of these guidelines will provide reasonable protection against
terrorist threats.
As most building developments nowadays are designed
to house large concentrations of people, a reasonable level of
protection for the large numbers of people who visit the area
must be provided. In general, the design and operation of these
buildings should not aggravate the likelihood of mass casualties
among the visitors in the event of a terrorist attack.
POSSIBLE THREAT SCENARIOS
The threats as illustrated in Table 1 : Possible TerroristRelated Threats, are derived from the adversarys ideology,
capability and modus operandi, and have been used to determine
the different threat scenarios that are likely to be executed at

locations throughout the development that are assessed to be
vulnerable.
Table 1 : Possible Terrorist-Related Threats 1
Ministry of Home Affairs: June 2007

1
This table illustrates possible scenarios to be considered. Actual threats to any particular buildings may vary on a case-by-case basis.
Page 10
1.2.5
FACTOR IN SECURITY IN BUILDING

DESIGN EARLY
ACHIEVING AESTHETICS
While building prohibitive structures may enhance
security, it can also cause the complex to lose its aesthetic
appeal, making it look like a fortress. However, many solutions
available today meet the objective of raising the level of security,
yet blend in very well into the architectural design. The best
time to assimilate elements of building security will be during the
planning and design stages of the development life cycle. Indeed,
effective building security design can be factored in as early as
the conceptual design stage. This will not be at the expense of
the architectural vision envisaged by the building owners. It is
possible to design-out security risks while still preserving the
essence of the design.
MAINTAINING BUILDING FUNCTIONAILTY
Building functionality can be maintained if security
design is taken into account from the early stages of the building
development life cycle. For example, the failure of a main transfer
beam led to the progressive collapse of a substantial portion of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In fact,
most of the structural damage, and a vast majority of the fatalities
were caused by this progressive collapse, and not by the direct
effect of the bomb blast.
1.3 WHO SHOULD READ THE GUIDELINES

This set of building security guidelines describe concepts
and provide detailed information for security oriented building
design. The targeted audiences include, but are not limited
to, building owners, architects, structural engineers, urban
construction developers, construction project managers, security
consultants, security system designers and others engaged in the
design and construction of buildings.
General information is included to provide senior
managerial staff and decision makers with an understanding
of security concepts and to help emphasise the importance of
physical design in matters of security. At the same time, it also
provides developers, engineers and architects with a new and
innovative resource for determining security oriented design
approaches to protect buildings against terrorist-related incidents.
This is achieved through the introduction of a cohesive strategy
that creates synergy between elements from the structural,
technical and human resources domains.
The security principles and considerations highlighted
in this document are applicable to any type of civilian buildings,
especially those serving large numbers of people on a daily basis
such as commercial buildings and shopping complexes. These
can either be new buildings or existing buildings undergoing
repairs, alterations or additions (whether carried out within or
outside the building).
According to testimony by an expert witness to the US

Congressional committee investigating the attack, progressive
collapse could have been avoided through the installation
1.4 HOW TO USE THE GUIDELINES
of additional strengthening structures.
In fact, additional
strengthening structures would not even have to be installed,
The guidelines first provide an introduction to key
if building designers had taken this propensity to progressively
building design considerations for enhancing building
collapse into account early on.
security, in terms of general architectural considerations
and general structural considerations (in Chapter 2). Next,
MANAGING COSTS
for users who intend to apply building security principles
to a specific building, Chapters 3 and 4 provide details on
It is common knowledge that a well designed building how to determine the building and protection categories
requires relatively less maintenance and this rule can also be and to select the relevant protection elements needed
applied to security design. The primary underlying principle of the (refer to Diagram 1 for an illustration on this process).
guidelines is therefore to balance security needs with economic The remaining chapters of the guidelines provide detailed
viability and sustainability. To achieve this, the guidelines adopt information on the protection elements listed in the
risk management principles, where users focus on what are Protection Recommendation Tables (PRT) (these are
assessed to be higher likelihood and higher consequence threats. categorised into: Chapter 5 Perimeter Design, Chapter 6
It also takes into account the local context, such as local threat Building Facades, Chapter 7 Building Structure, Chapter
scenarios, construction trends, urban planning requirements, 8 Security Systems, Chapter 9 Special Attention Areas).
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Finally, there are 3 appendices in the guidelines. Appendix
A can be used as a sample for tendering purposes for the
Security designs, if factored in early in the design phase security and safety design requirements for buildings.
of a new development, can result in minimal cost implications Appendix B provides general security guidelines for hotels
while at the same time, increase the inherent protection level and Appendix C provides general security guidelines for
provided to the building. This can be met through prudent master shopping malls.
planning, and through following design and construction practices
which typically result in minimal constraints on the design and
architecture. By factoring in elements of protective security
early in the design stage, the developer will be able to avoid
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environment. This will help to minimise the impact of additional
security measures, and thus control costs more effectively.
Hence, implementing these guidelines will have positive effects
on the buildings day to day security operation and its cost.
Page 11
Diagram 1 : Illustration on the process for selecting the

relevant building and protection categories and
Protection Recommendation Table (PRT):
These guidelines address the following issues:
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including the perimeter line, landscaping and the structural scheme
itself;
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communications, which are all crucial to the protection of buildings
and their occupants;
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damage to structural and non-structural components of buildings
and related infrastructure; and
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resulting from conventional IED bomb attacks and other types of
attacks.
1.5 NEED FOR SECURITY & PROTECTIVE

DESIGN / BLAST CONSULTANT(S)
The levels of protection recommended in these guidelines
establish a foundation for the rapid deployment of additional
protective measures as threat levels increase. They do not
assume nor recommend that maximum protection are required
as a standard, and they suggest design considerations and ways
of preparing the infrastructure for later implementation of higher
levels of protection.
Building owners and developers should decide on the

extent of security provisions that they would like to incorporate
into their building design. In this regard, building owners and
developers are encouraged to engage professional security and
protective design/blast consultant(s), even as early as the project
concept stage to assist in conducting threat, vulnerabilities and
risk assessments of their buildings. This ensures that adequate
and commercially viable security measures can be put in place
If project constraints prohibit the full implementation to address these threats.
of the relevant guidelines, it is up to the project developer or
user of this guide to decide on the extent to which the various
protective elements will be implemented, based on the location of
the potential threats and subsequent analysis. Examples of this
1.6 FEEDBACK AND QUERIES
include determining the level of blast load the protective windows
are required to withstand in different sides of the building based
Building owners who are members of the Safety and
on how close each wall is to a road, determining which openings
Security
Watch Group (SSWG) may approach their respective
require forced entry protection based on their accessibility from
Community

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ground level, etc.
GEBSS can also e-mail feedback and queries to MHA at
While the guidelines may establish a minimum level of MHA_Guidelines_BuildingSecurity@MHA.gov.sg.
acceptable security foundation, building owners should also
consider engaging professional security and protective design/blast
consultant(s) where the functionality and the physical constraints
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with knowledge of the wide variety of technical and structural
solutions and with the ability to balance costs with expected
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Page 12
2
2.1
KEY BUILDING DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION
The project concept as well as the design and planning cases, incorporating this notion into the building design
stages of the building development are key milestones to considerations will provide a better secured facility at no additional
incorporate security considerations into the architectural layout, cost.
the structural aspects as well as the mechanical and electrical Stand-off refers to the distance from the building to a potential
systems of the building development. At the project concept threat and not the distance from the building to the perimeter of
stage, key issues to be considered include but are not limited the lot (although in many cases the two align). This requires a
to site selection and location, the building type, dimensions, preliminary assessment of the current and foreseeable threats.
positioning and orientation within the lot, landscaping as well as
@ ^J, J design and planning stage, The blast load is characterised by an overpressure shock wave,
important deliberations include but are not limited to the structural which rapidly expands as a hemispherical pressure wave from
scheme, characteristics of the envelop walls and facades, the source of the explosion. The nature of the shock pressure is
, @ a sudden rise of pressure and rapid exponential decay, followed
congregation areas.
by a longer and smaller negative phase.
Relating to physical security issues during the initial An explosive charge detonating very close to the structure
J*, @ J
[ imposes a very high impulse and very high, intense pressure
effective way to achieve the required security level at minimal over a local area.
cost. Studies have demonstrated that the implementation of
For example, if the lot has a public road that runs along
security elements at the preliminary design stage according to
it,
the
building
positioning should try to maximise the distance
J *,
,:J ^,,
@ @ J
,q
,:@, between the road and the structure or areas where people gather
for protection of the facility, by relating to the security aspects (Figure 1: Stand-off distance).
early on, architects and planners will be able to blend the
required protection elements into the design of the facility thereby
ensuring a minimum aesthetic impact. This could also assist the
architect to avoid any compromise in his vision or design of the
facility in favour of security elements. Such compromises are
typically sources of tension between the architect and the security
planners if security aspects are only considered at a later stage of
the project.
The following sections of this chapter relate to general
design, structural and system issues which should be addressed
regardless of the security level.
2.2
GENERAL ARCHITECTURAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Considering security issues during the initial stages of

a development project has an enormous impact on the ability to
implement cost effective protective solutions. By eliminating or
limiting the possibility of carrying out an effective attack, the need
to harden the building or vulnerable areas can be reduced.
However, given the scarcity of land in Singapore, most

commercial developments within the city centre are built up to
the road reserve. These are either party-wall developments or
are set back about 3m from the common boundaries. Hence, the
application of adopting a larger buffer zone for stand-off distance
2.2.1
CREATING STAND-OFF DISTANCE
might not be practical for most developments and could also run
: J q^ @ ,,J *J*

Due to the physics of explosions and the behaviour of
stand-off distance cannot always be achieved in Singapores
the resulting pressure waves (loads), stand-off distance is the
urban environment, there are other means of increasing stand-off
single most important factor when considering the mitigation of
distance to reduce the protection burden on the building such as
the effects of an explosive attack. The importance of stand-off
distance can be clearly demonstrated by the simple fact that if positioning possible vulnerable locations (e.g. main faade) as
the closest distance that an explosion could occur is increased far as possible from public vehicle or pedestrian access areas.
from 10 to 25 metres, the resulting applied loads will be reduced q*,J* @, q
,
by approximately one order of magnitude (90%). Eliminating the faade of a high rise building will typically allow for a greater
the possibility of an effective vehicle-borne improvised explosive stand-off distance due to the distance from the public area
^0`q*, *,^
and the height of the faades. For buildings located in urban
effort and capital costs that would otherwise be needed to deal areas, the security solution must depend more heavily on other
with the attack consequences. It has been proven that in some
recommendations found in the guidelines.
Page 13
2.2.2
BUILDING ORIENTATION
The orientation of the building and its elevations may

* J J *J q,

By taking advantage of the horizontal and vertical angles
and obscuring the lines of sight from a potential threat, the
* @ :q*
,:
Raising the ground level as high as possible over the public
areas will also increase the stand-off distance. Positioning the
building at an angle in the lot (Figure 2 & Figure 3), or opposite
a natural retaining wall may also reduce its vulnerability. The
nature of the surrounding landscaping and obstacles between the
explosive device and the buildings will also affect the loading on
the buildings.
2.2.4
TRAFFIC FLOW, ACCESS ROADS AND PARKING
With a large vehicle population in a dense urban

^
J,,*J@,
development. The security requirements for limiting entry and
access control must be balanced with the need to meet standard

*, *@@ J
@ ^
accessibility to the building and parking areas. These issues,
and in particular the location for current or future access control
points, must be factored in at an early stage in order to meet the
*:
* ` J *, q J
J
@ J *:
aspect as well as the convenience of the users of the facility.
J
`@@ J *,,
take into account the need for vehicle screening and consider
factors such as the number of screening bays, the type of
screening measures and the average time taken to screen each
vehicle.
Special care should be taken to study the security
**J
@ @,
Jq*,Jq *|,:
*,
design mistakes and to allocate space for such activities. Making
sure the access roads and the entrances to the building and
its drop-off and parking areas complies with the access control
and other security requirements will assure proper functionality
when the site is operational. Proper analysis and design in the
early stages of the project according to the security requirements
will prevent demands for costly and problematic additions and

,
2.2.3
PERIMETER LINE

*,J *,J^,,[
@J:,@
line separating secure and non-secure areas as it is the last
obstacle preventing a vehicle from approaching within dangerous
proximity of the building.
The perimeter line should be designed to assist in
preventing such threats by ensuring that they will not endanger
vulnerable areas. This line can be achieved in many ways
depending on the protection level required, and the layout of the
building. A more detailed discussion on perimeter lines can be
found in Chapter 5.
Page 14
2.2.5
PLANNING OF INTERNAL AREAS
Many facilities are characterised by the presence of large

J @ @,@
^*JJq*,J
areas of mass congregation are considered highly attractive for
terrorists and therefore should be given special consideration
during the design stage. As crowd concentrations behind large
glass faades in public areas are exposed to a great risk, it is
therefore not recommended to use exposed faades as the main
light source opposite public areas. This, however, does not apply
to internal faades which are not exposed to threat scenarios.
2.2.6
The internal positioning of the various functional areas

JJJ,* J Jq,:
protect them. For example, areas that hold high crowd densities
should be positioned away from high risk areas such as envelope
,,, 9,@,
rooms should be positioned at the core of the building or in
specially protected areas. The areas that should be considered
include:
MATERIALS/ FAADE SYSTEMS
Building materials are a critical issue when protecting

a facility. Different materials have different hazard levels and
require different protection methods. The main categories to be
considered are:
2.3
GENERAL STRUCTURAL
CONSIDERATIONS
An explosive charge detonating very close to the building

imposes a very high impulse and very high, intense pressure over
a local area. This tends to shatter the structural materials or to
cause them to shear. At greater distances, the peak pressure is
@,:
,:** J|@ ,:q*
a larger area of the structure will be affected and more structural
members will be exposed to the overpressure. The load on the
building will appear as concentric rings of different load intensities.
^ ,,@
J@ ,, ,
failure from element to element, eventually resulting in the
collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part
of it.
Any type of building collapse must be avoided, but the
most critical category to be avoided is progressive collapse. Past
incidents have demonstrated that progressive collapse results in
^:JJ ,:,,*
,,,
to humans, buildings and other structures in the surrounding area.
In order to mitigate progressive collapse, protective measures
should be directed towards strengthening primary structural
elements.
The primary structural elements are the essential parts
of the building, which provide the resistance against progressive
collapse due to blast loads. Primary structural elements of
buildings include main columns, beams, girders and the main
lateral resistance. The secondary structural elements are the
remainder of the load bearing elements that will provide protection
against local collapse.
The intensity of the blast load on the structure is a function of the
distance between the centre of the blast and the building, the
type of explosive used and the weight of the explosive charge.
Page 15
2.3.2
The ability of the structure, faade or object to resist
blast pressure given all the above parameters is a function of the
material composition of the structure, and the section properties
of the main structural elements, the structural spans and the
connection details. These structural design guidelines should be
considered during the initial structural design phase to minimise
J @ J q*,
, J @
these features will provide a much more robust structure and
increase the probability of achieving a low potential for progressive
collapse.
During the design and planning stage, the public faade
should have a simple structural scheme consisting of a beam/
column system or even pre-fabricated load bearing panels. Arising
from the studies of the Oklahoma City attack, it is recommended
that placing large transfer beams carrying the faade opposite
public areas that are accessible by vehicles be avoided. It is
recommended that internal primary structural elements be placed
behind the public faade, which acts as a form of shielding.
2.3.1
PREVENTION OF PROGRESSIVE COLLAPSE

^ ,,@
J@ ,
local failure from element to element, eventually resulting in the
of it. Progressive collapse occurs, for example, when the loss of
one column results in the collapse of a disproportionate portion of
the building. This was illustrated in the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah building in Oklahoma City on 19 Apr 1995. The majority of
the 168 fatalities were due to the partial collapse of the structure
rather than the result of the direct blast effects.
STRUCTURAL REDUNDANCY
The use of redundant lateral and vertical force resisting

systems is highly encouraged in order to overcome forces
imposed by the blast and transfer loads from locally damaged
structural elements. Redundancy tends to promote a more
robust structure and helps to ensure that alternate load paths
are available in the case of the failure of structural elements.
Additionally, redundancy provides multiple locations for yielding
to occur, which increases the probability that damage may be
constrained.
2.3.3
THE USE OF DETAILING TO PROVIDE

STRUCTURAL CONTINUITY AND DUCTILITY
It is critical that the primary structural elements be

capable of spanning two full spans (i.e., two full bays). This
requires beam-to-beam structural continuity across the missing
,* ,, J |*, q,: q J @:
and secondary elements to exceed their elastic limit without
experiencing structural collapse.
2.3.4
CAPACITY FOR RESISTING SHEAR FAILURE
It is essential that the primary structural elements

*
J*,:*q ,,
event to preclude a shear failure such as in the case of a structural
element failure. When the shear capacity is reached before the
|*,@:J@ q,: * [*, ,*
the element exists, which could potentially lead to a progressive
collapse of the structure.
2.3.5
MULTI-STOREY AND UNDERGROUND CAR PARKS
The forces acting on the structure as a result of an

explosion in an underground car park or other enclosed spaces
are quite different to those from other possible detonation
locations. Since the behaviour and potential effects of such an
|@, J^
,: J**J
multi-storey and underground car park must be designed and
analysed carefully whilst relating to the structural stability provided
by the main structural columns and to any possible breaching of
the slabs. Since the blast in an underground car park is subject to
: J@*,*JJJ @
to an explosion in the open air. The lifting forces are therefore
|@ q^:JJqJ ,
be expected. This was seen in the 1993 attack on the NY World
Trade Centre when a car bomb detonated in the underground car
park.
These guidelines promote a local approach to design.

This incorporates the design of primary structural elements
against local failure for the given threat and stand-off distance. For
example, pre-fabricated load bearing walls with proper connection
details can resist very high concentrated loads. Another design
approach is to design certain areas of the structure to redistribute
the loads in the event that a key element is destroyed. The design
of structure against progressive collapse requires structural
redundancy and increasing ductility. The structure must be able
to absorb large displacement and redistribute the loads over
damaged areas.
Page 16
2.4
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL

SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
Given that the rationale behind these guidelines is

to have all the security requirements for a new development
project incorporated into the general design, security
considerations for mechanical and electrical systems should
also be considered at an early stage. Compatibility and
integration with the general design in the initial stage will help
achieve an effective assimilation of systems to the design.
#*J ,, , @^ q J
system requirements and other factors such as the urban
@,,@,J
:
The solutions should be designed based on current
technology but take into consideration future generations
of the systems. Any software and hardware used should
therefore be modular and upgradeable with adequate physical
space catered for future replacement. It is also recommended
@ |q,: J *
check-points at various locations in the future if needed.
Typically, many systems are either shared by security,
safety and administration or at least must take into account the
requirements and environment of each other. This has to be
considered at an early stage to ensure that the requirements
of all parties are met and that there is adequate integration
between them. This will ultimately save resources and effort.
Detailed discussion on mechanical and electrical systems
are found in Chapters 8 and 9.
Page 17
3
3.1
BUILDING AND PROTECTION CATEGORIES

HOW TO USE THIS CHAPTER
The Protection Recommendation Tables have been

divided into four general categories and these relate to the
MAJOR protective role of each of the elements that appear in
the table, i.e. what are the main phenomena each element is
supposed to prevent. Most of these elements have additional
I. Determine building category.J:@,,:
q: roles which can be found in Chapter 5 to Chapter 9 that describe
q J Jq*,@*@ + each elements proper application and design.
example, a one story museum that hosts a relatively small number
@ @, @ J * ,, q
J^ , *@: The major protective roles referred to in the Protection
and a large 25 storey crowded hospital building hosting many Recommendation Tables (PRT) are:
J * @ @, *,q,,q
J^
JJ *@:+^ J^q
J + :+J @ ^ ,,:
details and selection criteria can be seen below in Section 3.2.
penetrate perimeter lines, doors, windows or walls.
In order to identify the security recommendations for any given
building, this chapter should be used in the following way (as
illustrated in Diagram 2):
II. Determine building structure category. This is determined

by the proposed construction method and the types of faade/
envelope wall. For more details regarding the structure and
faade/envelope wall categories, refer to Section 3.3. It is highly
advisable to consider more than one construction method in order
@ ^|q,:*J
III. Review the relevant Protection Recommendation Table
(PRT) (Chapter 4). For each building category, a protection
recommendation table lists all the structure categories and the
different possible protection elements. By reading the table, it is
possible to determine which elements are recommended for each
structure category.
IV. Look up the details for each protection element (Chapter
4). For each item in the protection recommendation table, a
detailed description on its technical requirements is provided.
Diagram 2 : Illustration on the process for selecting the

relevant building and protection categories and Protection
Recommendation Table (PRT):
^9 ,,@9J J@

an initial local failure from element to element, eventually resulting
in the collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large
part of it.
+ + J , ,,
projectiles that are hurled or shot at a building or its interior (e.g.
bullets, primary and secondary fragmentation, etc).
#@, # J J
@^ *J` , @
Jq*
that may be subject to threats due to their special characteristics
or their sensitive role in the buildings operation during routine
or emergencies (e.g. control room, loading dock, ballrooms, VIP
rooms, etc).
3.2
DETERMINING BUILDING CATEGORY
The required protection level is derived from the buildings

purpose, level of activity, occupancy and number of people found
in and around it.
It is important to note that the main objective of these
guidelines is to protect lives, therefore the occupancy criterion
J J ^q, * J q*,
protection level.
Generally speaking, the larger the number of occupants in
the building, the more protection is required. However there
are circumstances when the authorities, the developers or the
occupants might identify additional factors which may change
the level of protection required for a building. Examples of
buildings that may require extra considerations include medical
clinics, hospitals, and critical infrastructure buildings.
When selecting a building as a potential target, terrorists
will usually consider the impact of a successful attack. Their
considerations will include the potential achievable number of
casualties, the type and nature of the buildings activity and its
occupancy. For this reason, the buildings purpose and activity,
JJJ,@
J *@: *, J
protection guidelines. Note that a symbolic building that may be
targeted regardless of its occupancy will be assigned a special
category (Y).
Page 18
An analysis of terrorist activities shows for example that

certain types of commercial properties have become targets
where the number of occupants served only as secondary factor
to the terrorist. In cases such as these, it may be desirable to

Jq*,@,q*,9 :
Five building categories are listed in the table below.
The categories are very broad and are aimed at reducing the
protection burden2 on small buildings which may not have a high
occupancy or may not be considered strategically important. The
categories roughly follow the building categories used by the
Singapore Civil Defence Force under the Fire Safety Act 1994
although they vary in a number of aspects.
When a stakeholder decides to apply increased
protection to a building category, the design team may wish to
J : JJ J J : JJ J
buildings real occupancy. The result will be a greater level of
protection but with the increased demands that go with it.
IMPORTANT NOTE: If the building is designated as special or

symbolic and assigned as Category Y, it is vital to engage the
services of security and protective design/blast consultant(s)
throughout the design since the protection cannot be determined
fully through these guidelines, and special or unique solutions
may need to be designed. Simply assuming a maximum
protection level for such a building and taking the highest level
of protection from every category in this document could result in
over-design of an unnecessarily fortress-like structure. Security
and protective design/blast consultant(s) working with the design
,,qq, @
@ ,* q
suited for a unique building.
After determining the building category, the next stage
is to determine the buildings structure category according to the
proposed construction method and building envelope. It should
q JJ,Jq*, :
|J:q
|q,: J J q*, ** :
according to budgetary and design considerations.
Table 2: Building Categories
3.3
DETERMINING BUILDING STRUCTURE

CATEGORY
The buildings structure determines the ability of the

structure to survive a large explosion within or outside the
building. It is determined by a combination of the construction
method employed, and the type of building faade. Whenever a
combination of methods or faade types is used, it is important to
always select a category according to the weakest link in order to
determine the correct protection level. For example, if a building
has both cast in-situ columns and pre-cast concrete beams, it
should be categorised as a pre-cast structure.
3.3.1
CONSTRUCTION METHOD
There are many ways in which buildings can be built, but

a survey undertaken in Singapore in early 2006 found four major
categories of construction commonly used here.
Table 3: Construction Methods
In order to determine the correct building category, the

purpose and activity must be carefully considered. In cases
where there is uncertainty as to which category to assign to a
given project, it is recommended to always choose the higher
category rather than the lower one. It is also recommended to
@ *J|q,:@ q, J ,,
for a future change in functionality and occupancy.
In order to reduce the protective burden, risk management is

used. It is highly recommended for the stakeholders to understand
the alternatives as it may be desirable to adopt a higher level of
protection, especially when the incremental costs are minimal.
Page 19
3.3.3
STRUCTURE CATEGORY
Structural engineers are advised to take the protection
, J** JJ*
In this section, the construction method and the envelope
on the overall structure category (see Table 5). If the appropriate
construction method cannot be clearly selected from the above walls are combined in a table to represent a structure category for
table, it is recommended to choose one level down the list (with any given building.
1 being the weakest type of construction and 4 the strongest).
Once the structure category has been established, the
In other words, when in doubt, always choose a category which
design
and
construction team can then review the Protection
will result in a stricter or more comprehensive protection solution.
Recommendation Tables (PRT) for the proposed building category
J@
@
3.3.2
ENVELOPE WALL
the building.
The buildings envelope wall plays a major part in the
^,,@ @q, Jq*,`J
,
The way that the tables are constructed allow the
@ q,, ,,
@ architect and structural engineers to see the trade-offs in the
forced entry and many other crime and terror related threats. The design methods and the costs related to special protection
building envelopes materials and construction also determine the elements like perimeter wall, windows, doors, parking area
extent of fragmentation in the event of a blast.
and more. For example, by selecting a perimeter wall of 20cm
concrete with small windows rather than a light brick wall with
From the security point of view, the more desirable , J@ ,^,q
,:
envelope wall would be constructed of reinforced concrete (with with very little effect on the budget.
or without cladding) and include small, protected windows. This
Table 5: Building Structure Categories
type of wall requires a minimum of security design but is usually
not the type of wall favoured by architects. If any other envelope
wall is considered, the architect should consider the protection
In-situ
requirements for each wall system before deciding on any
Structure
Pre cast
Pre-cast load
column,
proposed system. This is even more important for faades that
column &
Steel
bearing walls
beams &
beam
face open public areas. It is strongly recommended to consider
slabs
J ,* q
, Envelope
Walls
There are protection solutions for almost every type of faade,
1
2
3
4
q*J

,@ *J ,* :q

J:: q,:^,q,J
Curtain
A
1A
2A
3A
4A
Large
windows
above 25%
1B
2B
3B
4B
Medium
windows
10% - 25%
1C
2C
3C
4C
Small
windows less D
than 10%
1D
2D
3D
4D
walls
For protection purposes, envelope walls fall broadly into

one of four categories:
Table 4: Envelope Walls
The aim of the Building Structure Category Table is to give

the design team the overall picture for protection design options.
The design can be based on the envelope walls (according to
the rows) or on the structure characteristics (according to the
columns).
The best design combinations from the protection and
security point of view are as follows:
Fewer Protection Elements Recommended:
3C, 4C, 3D, 4D
Moderate Number of Protection Elements
Recommended: 2B, 3B, 4B, 2C, 2D
More Protection Elements Recommended:
1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 1B, 1C, 1D
If the type of faade proposed for the building does not
appear in the above table, it is recommended to choose one
category above the category closest to it. In other words, when
in doubt, always choose a category which will result in a stricter
or more comprehensive protection solution (with A having the
strictest protection requirements and D the least strict) .
If the desired design option does not appear in this table, the
closest option should be selected keeping in mind that whenever
in doubt, a more conservative grouping should be selected. This
ensures that the building is not under-protected.
Page 20
4
4.1
PROTECTION RECOMMENDATION TABLES

The aim of the Protection Recommendation Tables

(PRT) are to give the architect and the design team the list of
protection elements and recommended materials to be included
in the design of the building. This may be used as a general
guide, and in conjunction with the Threat Vulnerability and
Risk Assessment (TVRA) conducted for the building, which will
J@
@ ,
The PRTs divide the different protective elements into
*@ J @, J @

elements major role in the protection of the building. It is
important to note that the different elements usually have more
than one role. Each structure type (combination of construction
method and faade material/ design) that appears in the Structure
Category table will have different protection requirements.
All the design options relevant to the same building

category are listed in the same table. Within the table, the columns
represent the items relevant to each building structure category
(construction method + envelope walls). The protection elements
are listed in each row of the table only by name. To learn more
q *J@
J@ ,
please refer to the detailed technical information in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 9.
4.2
SMALL BUILDING/ VERY LOW

OCCUPANCY BUILDING CATEGORY S

J q, q, J @ *
for small buildings or buildings with a very low occupancy that
serve as commercial, residential or any other use. By very low
I. Select the Building Category from Table 2: Building (S, L, M, occupancy, it is assumed that the building has one or two storeys
and contains no more then 10 people in it at any one time. It
H, Y) (Section 3.2).
is therefore assumed that the building requires only minimal
II. Select the Building Structure Category from Table 5: Building protection and security since its risk level can be considered
Structure Categories (A1, A2. D3, D4) (Section 3.3.3) having low. Despite the low occupancy, if the design team considers the
J * J q,9 * building to be particularly threatened for whatever reason, it may
Methods) (Section 3.3.1) and envelope walls (Table 4: Envelope choose to relate to a higher category (L or M) with the associated
higher level of protection.
Walls) (Section 3.3.2).
To use the Protection Recommendation Tables (PRT):
To use the table below:
III. Go to the Protection Recommendation Table for the selected

building category and identify the column for the selected building
structure category.
I. In each row of the table, a protection element is listed.
IV. The rows in the table for the selected building structure category
determine the protection elements that are recommended or
required.
II. Find the column that represents the desired buidling structure
category (a combination of construction method and envelope
,,,#
For each building category, a separate Protection

Recommendation Table appears in this chapter:
III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the symbol
+, the protection element for that row should be included in the
design.
IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
recommended protection envelope for the building.
Some of the protection elements will be referenced as
q*,J *:@
* q *J,^,
of protection needed for each building category. In this case,
the user should consult security advisers, the relevant authority
or alternatively, choose the most relevant protection level to the
project.
For more details on each of the protection elements,
refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to Chapter 9.
Page 21
Table 6: Small building / very low occupancy Building Category S
Page 22
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category S), there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
buildings design. In this case, it is highly recommended to design every building to incorporate the items highlighted in the above
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 23
4.3
LOW OCCUPANCY BUILDING

CATEGORY L

Jq,q, J@ q*, II. Find the column that represents the desired buidling structure
with a low occupancy. By low occupancy it is assumed that the category (a combination of construction method and envelope
density of people in the building is less than one person per 30 m2 walls as detailed in Section 3.3).
on average or less than 100 people in a relatively large building
(for example each room in the building holds an average of only III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the
one person at a time). Despite the low occupancy, if the design symbol +, the protection element for that row should be included
team considers the building to be particularly threatened for in the design.
whatever reason, it may choose to relate to a higher category (M
or H) with the associated higher level of protection.

For more details on each of the protection

recommendations, refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 9.
Table 7: Low occupancy Building Category L
Page 24
Page 25
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category L) there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 26
4.4
MEDIUM OCCUPANCY BUILDING

CATEGORY M

Jq,q, J@ q*,
with a medium occupancy. By medium occupancy it is assumed
that the density of people in the building is less than one person
per 10 m2 and more than 1 person per 30 m2 on average, or less
then 1000 people in total. If the design team believes that more
than 250 people will congregate in a single area of the building at
any time, it is recommended to select a higher category of H with
the associated higher level of protection.
III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the
symbol +, the protection element for that row should be included
in the design.
Chapter 9.

walls as detailed in Section 3.3).
Table 8: Medium occupancy Building Category (M)
Page 27
Page 28
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category M) there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 29
4.5
HIGH OCCUPANCY BUILDING

CATEGORY H
III.Look down the column and wherever indicated with the symbol
The table below is meant for buildings with a high +, the protection element for that row should be included in the
occupancy. By high occupancy, it is assumed that there are more design.
than 1000 people in the building and/or more than 1 person to
every 10 m2 ^J ::q* @
lower occupancy locations which would otherwise be assigned recommended protection envelope for the building.
Category M or L but may require a higher level of protection.
Chapter 9.
Table 9: High occupancy Building Category H
Page 30
Page 31
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category H) there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 32
4.6
SPECIAL BUILDINGS BUILDING

CATEGORY Y
The table below is meant for special or symbolic

buildings. The concept of special relates to the need for special
security and this category is relevant for buildings that are at high
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their symbolic nature. For example, Parliament House requires
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terms of the ratio of people per square metre.
It is common practice for special or symbolic buildings

to have a unique architectural design. In order to ensure that
the buildings overall design incorporates the required level of
protection without compromising the aesthetic aspect or the
architects vision, it is important for the design team to include
a protective design/blast consultant. The guidelines in the table
below are intended to provide the basic protection concept for a
high security facility and should allow a budget to be derived.
III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the symbol
+, the protection element for that row should be included in the
design.

Chapter 9.
Table 10: Special or symbolic buildings Building Category (Y)
Page 33
Page 34
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category Y), all protection elements are critical and it is highly recommended to include them in the building design.
Page 35
PERIMETER DESIGN
5.1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the positioning of a building

within the lot and the protection elements between the buildings
envelope walls and the boundary line of the lot. The chapter will
consider two scenarios:
I. Where the buildings envelope wall itself forms the boundary
line.
II. Where there is an open area between the buildings envelope
walls and the boundary line.
This chapter provides conceptual solutions for integrating
perimeter line designs, landscape architecture (vegetation,
landforms, and water) and site planning.
Integrating security requirements into a comprehensive
approach achieves a balance between many objectives including:
o Risk elimination or mitigation
o Achieving planned building functionality
o Aesthetics and architecture
5.1.2
PERIMETER LINE
Unimpeded access to the buildings and open spaces in

a lot constitutes a risk, and may enable the perpetration of most
threats close to the critical elements of a building or to areas
with large crowd concentrations. Perimeter line protection can
assist by preventing a threat or intruder from approaching the
building envelope walls and openings and populated areas of the
building. By adding protection elements on the perimeter line,
the risks and threats from every building category are reduced.
This is especially important to the more vulnerable building types
such as those with envelope wall type A (glass curtain walls) or
structure type 1 (pre-cast columns and beams).
5.1.3
CLEAR ZONE
The purpose of the clear zone is to establish a

demarcation of the secured boundary and permit visual

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by an adversary. Clear zones are the integration of security needs
into the civil and architectural elements of the exterior landscape
and pedestrian and vehicle access to the structures.
Many protection objectives can be achieved during the

early stages of the design process when threat elimination and/
or mitigation are the least costly and most easily implemented.
Developers, architects, and landscape designers play an
important role in identifying and implementing crucial asset
protection measures while considering the orientation of buildings
on the site and the integration of vehicle access, control points,
physical barriers, landscaping, parking, and protection of utilities
to mitigate threats.
KEY COMPONENTS OF PERIMETER DESIGN:

5.1.1
STAND-OFF DISTANCE
The stand-off distance (setback) of a building from

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outcome of any potential attack. Providing adequate distance
can reduce or even eliminate the need to provide additional
protection to the building.
Distance is the most effective and desirable method
to provide site protection because other measures vary in
effectiveness and some times have unintended consequences.
The most effective solution for mitigating explosive effects is to
ensure that an explosion, if happens, occurs as far away from the
building as possible.
There is no ideal stand-off distance since it is determined
by the type of threat, the methods of construction, and the
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off distance cannot always be achieved in Singapores urban
environment, where possible, maximising the distance may be
the most effective solution. Stand-off distance must be coupled
with appropriate building hardening, as discussed in Chapter 6
and Chapter 7, to provide the necessary level of protection.
Page 36
When determining the site landscape and perimeter line,

designers should consider the following factors:
The following protection elements appear in this chapter:
Building footprint within the lot.

Suitable building location relative to the site perimeter.
Distance between the perimeter line and the building.
Access via foot, road, rail, water, and air and the implications of
access on the ability to maintain a secure perimeter.
Current and planned infrastructure and vulnerabilities such as
tunnels or main roads.
Presence of natural physical barriers such as water features,
dense vegetation, and terrain that could provide access control
and/or shielding (e.g. grade level differences), or suitability of the
site for the incorporation of such features.
Topographic characteristics that could affect the performance
of weapons.
Lines of sight from beyond the site boundaries and the ability
of vegetation in proximity to the building or site to screen covert
activity.
5.3
5.2
5.3.1
This chapter contains descriptions and technical

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of the building on the perimeter line and within the propertys
boundary line or building lot. The protection recommendation
tables in Chapter 4 refer to the various elements in this chapter.
Each protection element is described in its own section
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protection elements in this chapter can be implemented even if
they do not appear in the list of recommendations table. In this
case, the design team should refer to the protection role of the
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element, the levels of protection are mentioned and standards
(if applicable) are described. The level of detail provided is not
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provide basic knowledge and assistance in the procurement
procedure and to ensure that the right demands are made of
suppliers and/or protection engineers.
PERIMETER LINE
INTRODUCTION
A perimeter line is a physical line, usually following a

site boundary, which provides an element of security to the site.
There are many possible objectives for a perimeter line, and
depending on the objectives, different physical characteristics or
security systems may be required.
Different objectives for a perimeter line include:

Marking an administrative border line of a private area.

Preventing unintended entry of vehicles or people.
Creating a stand-off line for a variety of threats.
Deterring possible intruders.
Preventing or delaying the intrusion of a person.
Preventing the intrusion of a vehicle.
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An operative defence line for security guards or police.
Shielding element against blast.
Shielding element against ballistic threats.
A line-of-sight blocking element against ballistic threats.
An architectural or landscape feature.
A combination of these objectives may be relevant but it

will be necessary to strike a balance between the security needs,
the cost, the complexity and the architectural impact of meeting
the objectives.
Page 37
A physical perimeter line is a means of establishing

a controlled access area around a building or asset. Physical
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limits of a building and can help to restrict, channel, or impede
access and create a continuous barrier around the site. Physical
barriers are also a deterrent for anyone planning to penetrate the
site and as such, they should either delay or prevent access. The
types of barriers selected can have a direct impact on the number
and type of security posts that may be needed to ensure site
security.
As explained in the following sections, there are a
number of solutions to the creation of a physical barrier including
various types of fences, barriers, walls, bollards, planters,
concrete barriers, grade level differences and trees. The
selection of barrier elements must take into account the level of
desired security based on the threat levels (e.g. in the case of a
vehicle, the various approach speeds). The leading factors that
must be taken into account when deciding on the type of physical
barrier solution are the urban landscape design, architectural
requirement and the threat level to be countered. The various
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architectural considerations.

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would be at risk from a terrorist-related attack, building owners
should adopt a prudent approach. For example, most buildings
will require basic perimeter line measures such as establishing
a vehicle anti-ramming line and infrastructure pipes. Other
measures such as anti-intrusion fences, blast shielding walls and
establishing a ballistic perimeter line would be for buildings that
have been assessed to require higher levels of security.
The objective of this section is to provide a basic understanding
of perimeter defence issues. This will enable architects to
make decisions about the types of fence, wall or line necessary
for any building, based on knowledge and understanding of
the relevant design points and buildings characteristics as
described previously in Chapter 3. The sections will discuss the
various protection levels to be achieved and describe various
architectural possibilities and design considerations for each of
these categories.
Page 38
5.3.2
VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING PERIMETER LINE
5.3.2A INTRODUCTION
The aim of a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line is to
prevent unauthorised vehicles from entering the building/ facility
boundary and coming close to the building/ protected facility.
This line can also be designed as a combined protection element
to also prevent pedestrian intrusion.

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ramming perimeter line is to reduce the number of locations
where a vehicle can penetrate the perimeter line. This can be
affected by ensuring that the perimeter line is not close to any
roads or any other area which allows vehicles to approach.
Note that a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line usually

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bollards, concrete walls, grade level differences, planters and requires foundation works to be done and therefore must be
trees. Active barriers such as retractable bollards, crash beams, considered early on in the project. The establishment of this
barrier foundation can present a challenge since for maximum
and sliding gates will be discussed in Section 5.4.
effectiveness, the barrier needs to be placed as close as possible
The breaching of the perimeter line by a vehicle is one to the kerb. Since the property line of buildings does not usually
of the most serious scenarios and must be prevented in order extend to the kerb, approval should be sought from all relevant
to mitigate threat consequences. The range of possibilities for government authorities including the Singapore Land Authority,
Urban Redevelopment Authority, Land Transport Authority and
perpetrating threats using a vehicle is great and can include:
National Parks Board before the barriers are installed.
I. A vehicle carrying a large explosive device driven by a suicide
The vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line can be combined
bomber.
with the ability to prevent or delay intrusion of a pedestrian intrusion
II. A vehicle ramming into a building or a mass congregation area. and/or blast shielding. This combination can be achieved using
a single structure such as a blast wall high enough to prevent
III.A vehicle carrying assailants used as a carrier to break through anyone from climbing over it, and strong enough to withstand a
close detonation of a car bomb. In some cases the combination
the perimeter line.
can be achieved by creating an individual line for each task. For
example a bollard line on the kerb side, followed by a pedestrian
IV. A vehicle crashing into the perimeter by accident.
anti-intrusion fence, followed by a retaining wall for blast shielding.
Page 39
5.3.2B TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Table 11A: Impact Standard SD-STD-02.01 Issued by the
US Department of State
For the designation of vehicle weight and allowed impact

speed under ASTM F2656-07, please refer to Table 1: Impact
Condition Designations of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled
Standard Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter
Barriers3.
For the designation for vehicle weight and allowed
impact speed under PAS68:2007, please refer to Table 2:
Vehicle Impact Test Criteria of the PAS68:2007 document, titled
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the UK BSI PAS68:2007 in lieu of the SD-STD-02.01, only the
barriers tested using the Vehicle Impact Method (Performance
Class V) are acceptable.
5.3.2C VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING STANDARDS
The acceptable ASTM F2656-07 and UK BSI PAS

68:2007 crash tested barriers corresponding to SD-STD-02.01
are shown below.
The guidelines for vehicle anti-ramming here are based

on the SD-STD-02.01 standard issued by the U.S. Department
of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security which is commonly used
worldwide for anti-ramming barriers and walls and the UK BSI
PAS68:2007 issued by UK British Standards Institute. The SDSTD-02.01 standard considers various threat levels in the form of
vehicles weighing 6,800kg ramming the barrier at various speeds
and is aimed at preventing a vehicle ramming into the barrier
from penetrating more than 1 metre past the barrier line. As of
1 Feb 2009, SD-STD-02.01 was replaced by ASTM F2656-07.
Both ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007 allow for different vehicle
types (e.g. from passenger cars to very heavy trucks) ramming at
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When it is determined that a vehicle anti-ramming
perimeter line is required, the protection level should be
decided by the facility owner/developer in consultation with the
architects, security and protective design/blast consultant(s). The
parameters to be considered should include the speed a vehicle
is able to achieve before impacting the potential barrier and the
type of vehicle that is able to approach the perimeter line (e.g. car,
van, truck, etc.). Unless proven otherwise, the minimum standard
for barriers should adhere to the SD-STD-02.01 K4 standard or
the equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or PAS68:2007 standard.
The designation for vehicle weight and impact speed
under SD-STD-02.01 is as follows:
Please refer to ASTMs website to obtain the ASTM F2656-07

Standard test method for crash testing of perimeter barriers
(http://www.astm.org/Standards/F2656.htm).
Please refer to BSIs website to obtain the PAS 68:2007

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bsigroup.com/en/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030135101).
Page 40
Table 11B: Corresponding Standards for SD-STD-02.01, ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007
* This data was extracted from Table 1: Impact Condition Designations of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled Standard Test
Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter Barriers.
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Notes:
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ramming the barrier at 80km/h from penetrating more than 1 metre past the barrier line (PU50 to C40 under ASTM F2656-07; or 2
500-80 to 1 500-48 under PAS68:2007 would also fall within this criteria).
Page 41
5.3.2D DESIGN OF VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING

PERIMETER LINE
In general, the anti-ramming barrier line should be
continuous and should completely surround the site. Any
locations where an unscreened vehicle could possibly approach
or enter the site should be analysed and eliminated, including
neighbouring plots and open areas around the site. Factors to be
considered in the design of a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line
are:
VEGETATION
Vegetation along a perimeter line can be used to deter

intruders from approaching the building. The vegetation is
required to act as an obstacle preventing the direct approach of
vehicles. Trees with a trunk diameter larger than 50 cm can be
used to stop a vehicle, depending on the protection level required.
However, thick vegetation is not advised as weapons and
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) hidden in dense plantings
in close proximity to a building may not be easily detectable.
I. The approach speed of a potential vehicle approaching the

Fabricated perimeter barriers capable of stopping moving
perimeter line is a design criterion which should be considered vehicles can be integrated with vegetation such as shrubs, trees
at the initial design stage when planning the access roads to or other plants for aesthetics purposes to hide or soften the
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appearance of the security elements.
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lower the required protection level of the barriers.
The feasibility of employing vegetation as a natural and
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II. The edge-to-edge distance between discontinuous barriers between plant growth and the presence of underground utilities.
such as bollards, or trees with a trunk diameter larger than 50cm, As large plants and trees grow, their root systems may affect
should be no more than 120cm. If the barriers are tapered, the subsurface conditions and undermine both utilities and the welledge-to-edge distance should be measured at mid-height. Any being of the plant. Close collaboration between the security and
decorative coverings should be ignored in determining the edge- protective design/blast consultant(s) and landscape designers is
to-edge distance.
critical to create an aesthetic landscape design in which plantings,
light distribution, pedestrian circulation and surveillance work
III.The minimum height of the barrier should be 65 cm from the together. This collaboration should also include a plan for the
ground.
care and maintenance of the landscape.
IV.The mass and foundation of the barrier are major factors in its
ability to stop vehicles. The barrier foundation for a typical antiramming barrier is required to be approximately 60 cm deep and
should always be designed according to prevailing soil conditions.
There are also designs available for anti-ramming barriers to suit
shallow foundations.
V. Often there are obstacles to the creation of deep, strong
foundations for the barrier due to underground utilities or even
a basement or car park under the pavement. In this case, the
barriers should be designed from piles, shallow footing strips
made of steel-concrete composites or shallow buried heavy
planters. Embedding a barrier next to the basement wall or
through the basement roof may introduce design complications.
Another problem is barriers built on top of paving stones or similar
materials such as decorative stones. The foundation of the
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it to ensure proper operation.
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Two main barrier types are typically considered:
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5.3.2E NATURAL AND LANDSCAPING BARRIERS
Natural and landscape barriers can be very effective but
must be integrated into the design at an early stage. Natural and
landscape obstructions such as the terrain, creating grade level
differences, retaining walls, water and vegetation can be used
to stop, deter, or slow a vehicle trying to enter a facility. Three
types of natural and landscape barriers will be considered here:
Vegetation, Water and the Terrain/Grade level.
WATER
The effectiveness of bodies of water or water features
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value in slowing vehicles and as a deterrent is obvious. For this
reason, it is best to use them in situations where the stand-off
distance available is relatively large. For example, cars and light
trucks will be limited to speeds of approximately 40 km/hr by wide
bodies of water 15-20 cm deep. Bodies of water 90 cm deep
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body of water is uneven or contains several deep trenches, the
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the uneven ground under the water further impedes possible
movement speeds.
In addition, water features such as fountains or pools
may be used as barriers if additional structural components are
built in.
Page 42
Page 43
TERRAIN/GRADE LEVEL
Terrain features such as retaining walls, natural steps,
or large rocks may provide effective barriers to vehicles. Grade
level differences can also be built in to the landscape design as
another form of barrier.
5.3.2F
FABRICATED BARRIERS
There are a wide variety of options for fabricated vehicle

barriers. The following are a few examples:
As long as the inner core comprises a proper steel

pole able to withstand the impact according to the standard,
the covering can be decorative and can match any architectural
design (bollards located in the city centre should also comply with
URAs requirements). Bollards used as part of a vehicle antiramming perimeter line should minimally meet the SD-STD-02.01
K4 standard or the equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or PAS68:2007
standard.
PLANTER
BOLLARD
A planter is a concrete landscape feature with vehicle

anti-ramming capability that is installed partially underground and
partially above ground. The planter is required to be specially
designed to withstand the forces of a ramming vehicle according
to the SD-STD-02.01 K4 standard or the equivalent ASTM F265607 or PAS68:2007 standard.
A bollard is the most common type of anti-ramming vehicle

barrier. It is usually made of a steel pole with a large reinforced
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designs incorporate deep piles without concrete foundations. The
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concrete composites footing strips. At the high-end, bollards are
constructed to completely stop most vehicles.
As there are manufacturers who offer barriers that do not
comply with the anti-ramming standard, it is strongly advisable to
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carefully.
Page 44
HARDENED STREETSCAPE ITEMS

Items integrated into the streetscape, such as benches,
sculptural or seating barriers, lamp posts, signposts may be
hardened to function with bollard-like performance. These can
often be used effectively in combination with other barrier types
(natural and fabricated).
5.3.3
INFRASTRUCTURE PIPES
5.3.3A INTRODUCTION
Ducts, channels, drain and sewage infrastructure can all
be used to perpetrate attacks against buildings and installations.
Such pipe works could either be used to penetrate a building/
facility, or could be used as a hidden location for inserting an
explosive device or hazardous materials.
These infrastructure elements are a necessity to the
buildings functioning and therefore cannot be eliminated. It is
therefore critical to ensure that they do not become a hazard.
The openings, access or vents to these infrastructure
elements may often be at the perimeter line or beyond (e.g. rain
drainage pipes in a perimeter fence), on the street (e.g. sewage
manholes that lead into the buildings sewage system), or they
can be incorporated into the building itself (e.g. air intake ducts).
5.3.3B DESIGN OF INFRASTRUCTURE PIPES

Picture: U.S. GSA
Figure 15: Examples of sculptural feature
The following factors should be considered in the design

of pipe/duct infrastructure:
I. The number of large openings to exterior unprotected areas
should be limited to the absolute minimum.
WALLS
Walls that are structurally reinforced can be used
effectively as part of a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter. These
may consist of retaining walls, plaza edges, an extension of a
buildings architecture or as the base of a fence. For such walls,
it is vital that the foundation be continuous, and be specially
designed to withstand the forces of a ramming vehicle according
to the SD-STD-02.01 K4 standard or the equivalent ASTM F265607 or PAS68:2007 standard. Such walls may typically be used in
combination with other barrier types.
II. The forced-entry protection level for pipe/duct infrastructure

should be according to the level of protection provided at the
point that the pipe/duct exits the building. For example, if the rain
drainage channel leads to the yard, it should be protected to the
level of the perimeter line. If the air intake leads into the building
itself, it should be protected to the level of the building envelope.
III.The intrusion detection level for the pipe/duct infrastructure
should be according to the level of protection provided at the point
that the pipe/duct exits the building. For example, if the sewage
pipe leads into the building itself, it should be protected to the
level of the building envelope.
IV. The size of the openings should be limited to the minimum
required for proper functioning.
V. All utility pipes or ducts that penetrate the sites perimeter
should be screened, sealed, or secured to prevent their use as
access points for unauthorised entry into the site. If access is
required for maintenance purposes, all pipes, ducts or channels
should be secured with screening, grating, latticework, or other
similar devices to prevent intruder access. If warranted by the
sensitivity of the building, it may be necessary to install intrusion
detection sensors and consider overt or covert visual surveillance
systems.
Standards
There are no internationally recognised security standards that
are relevant to the protection of sewage or drainage access
pipes.
Picture: U.S. GSA
Figure 16: Example of wall used

as base of fence
Page 45
5.3.4
VI.
Drainage ditches, culverts, vents, ducts, and other
openings that pass through a perimeter and which are greater
than 25 cm in diameter should be protected by securely fastened
welded bar grilles. The addition of grilles or pipes to culverts or
other drainage structures must be coordinated with the engineers
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additional maintenance resulting from the installation can be
taken into account.
VII.
Manhole covers 25 cm or more in diameter must be
secured to prevent unauthorised opening. They may be secured
with locks and hasps, by welding them shut, or by bolting them to
their frame.
5.3.3C EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
ANTI-INTRUSION FENCE
5.3.4A INTRODUCTION
A pedestrian anti-intrusion perimeter line is designed
to prevent unauthorised persons from entering the site and
approaching the building. It is also possible to combine this line
with other protection elements in order to prevent the ramming of
vehicles. This section will relate only to fences.
An intrusion of a person can be stealthy and silent or
forced and noisy. The ranges of possible threats include:

A suicide bomber carrying an explosive device.

An intrusion in order to plant an explosive device.
A start of an assailant attack.
An intrusion for sabotage / theft.

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be breached under any circumstances, the planning and design
of an anti-intrusion perimeter line at the initial stages should focus
on causing the maximum delay for an intruder to give reaction
forces adequate time to respond.
An anti-intrusion fence can be designed and built per
project or can be purchased as an off-the-shelf product. In many
cases, the fence will be combined with a detection system in order
to detect the intruder as well as to delay him. In some cases, the
fence line can be virtual, with an intrusion detection system but no
physical presence. This can only be done when there is a large
buffer zone which allows the response team time to intercept the
detected intruder.
Page 46
5.3.4C DESIGN OF ANTI-INTRUSION FENCE

of an anti-intrusion fence:
I. The fence should be designed to meet the required level of
protection across all its component parts. This includes not
only the fence itself but also the footing (to prevent anyone from
digging under), the corners, and connection to structures.
II. The minimum height required for an anti-intrusion fence is 250
cm.
III.Vegetation, light poles or similar objects near the fence line,
should be designed in such a way as to prevent them from
assisting an intruder to scale the fence.
IV.The line should be planned in such a way as to prevent or
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to arrive.

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is hollow 4 mm 5 X 5 cm. The distance between bars should
be no greater than 10 cm. Due to the weight of the fence and
the desired heavy duty performance, it is particularly important to
plan the pole foundation properly.
The fence can be produced with or without the top part
angled outward but it is important to make sure that no element
of the fence design or location will allow an intruder to use it as
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single intruder or blocking a mob. For certain designs of the base
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a ramming car. As stated previously, combining fence types can
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fence type can be fully upgraded to a smart fence.
V. The design should take into consideration the detection, alarm

and surveillance systems to be installed.
VI.The line-of-sight requirements should be considered at the
initial design stage and fence materials (opaque or transparent)
should be selected accordingly.
Standards
There are no internationally recognised security standards for
the construction of anti-intrusion fences.
Note: URA may have restrictions on fence heights at 1.8m.
5.3.4D EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
HARDENED WELDED CHAIN LINK WIRE FENCE
This is a welded chain link wire fence with a minimum
wire thickness of 4 mm. In most cases, the fence should be
placed on a concrete base to achieve maximum effectiveness.
This type of fence is useful to prevent an accidental intruder or an
intruder, but it is not strong enough to stop a crowd.
A hardened welded chain link fence has a relatively long
life compared to other simpler fences and is recommended in
most cases. It is possible to upgrade this fence to a smart fence
by combining it with detectors.
CONCRETE FILLED HOLLOW BRICK WALL OR RED BRICK

WALL
This type of anti-intrusion fence is a wall constructed of
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may or may not include steel bars inside to increase the strength.
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level and security needs.
This wall is effective for stopping different kinds of
intrusions or a mob and the fence can be upgraded to a smart
fence.
STEEL PROFILE FENCE

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used for fences but which vary in cost and effectiveness. The
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structural stability.
Page 47
PREFABRICATED CONCRETE WALL

Prefabricated concrete walls are formed from elements
built elsewhere and assembled on site. The dimensions of a
single element typically start from 1.5m wide and 2.5m high. The
detail for connecting the elements should be designed according
J@

This type of wall is extremely suitable in situations
where a heavy duty wall is needed for a limited period of time.
It is effective against a wide range of threats including intruders,
attacks and crowds. In some circumstances, depending on the
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even serve as a blast shielding wall. This wall can be upgraded to
a smart fence.
CONCRETE WALL CAST ON-SITE

A reinforced concrete wall built on-site usually varies
from 20 to 80 cm thick but construction of this kind must be done
@

This wall is effective against a wide range of threats
including intruders, attacks, crowds and ramming cars, and both
small and large blasts. It can also be upgraded to a smart fence.
Page 48
FENCE OPTIONS
SMART FENCES
A range of options can be installed on the top of the

*, @ ,q ^`
cases these options can also be used as the detectors for the
smart fence. These options can typically be built into the fence at
the time of its installation or added on later depending on budget
and needs.
Page 49
5.3.5
BLAST SHIELDING WALL
5.3.5A INTRODUCTION
The purpose of a blast shielding wall is to reduce the load
levels on areas of the buildings structural elements and external
faade as a result of an explosion. A blast shielding wall is often
used when it is not possible to establish an acceptable stand-off
distance between a potential blast and the target building, and
when the hardening of the structural elements and the faades is
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the architects and engineers to use building methods, materials
and products (walls and windows) that would otherwise not be
feasible.
Reducing loads on the building walls is achieved by two means:
For example, at a given standoff distance and threat

level, the expected load on the building is an impulse of 1,300
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loads to an impulse of under 100 psi*msec. This would allow for
a wide variety of standard design solutions of building elements
instead of specially-designed elements with high resistance to
blast loads.

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psi levels striking unprotected buildings can be reduced to 50 psi
at ground level. The extent of pressure reduction will depend on
the height of the wall in relation to the height of the building, and
the distance between the wall and the building.
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building.
II. Creating a shadowed area that will reduce the loads on the
building.
It is important to note that generally speaking the spherical
blast wave that is projected from the blast will hit the shielding
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the barrier and the wall of the building. The pressure however,
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Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the shadowing of the shielding wall
on the building.
A typical blast shield wall is a massive reinforced

concrete structure which can be designed to be structurally
destroyed, rotated or slide, as long as it does not create secondary
fragmentation of concrete elements. More innovative shield walls
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needs.
Figure 25: The shadowing effect of

a shielding wall on a building.
Figure 28: Heavy pre-cast shielding walls before

test
Figure 29: The walls after the detonation
An alternative concept to the construction of blast shielding

walls is to use materials that will allow the wall to disintegrate
or scatter rather than withstand the blast in a rigid manner. For
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fragments. Blast shielding walls can also be designed as a
landscape feature such as retaining walls.
Figure 25: The reflection of a blast from a

building due to a shielding wall.
Page 50
IV. The wall may be constructed of any material (sand, earth,

water) as long as the 3 points above are observed.
V. The wall should be designed to absorb expected loads in a
manner that will ensure no fragmentation or spoiling.
VI. The distance of the blast shielding wall from the protected
building wall should not exceed 15 metres.
VII. The expected detonation point should be as close as possible
to the blast shielding wall. If the detonation point is expected to be
some distance from the shielding wall, the loads on the building
should be analysed. In such a case, the shielding effect will be
reduced, but the loads on the building will also be reduced since
the point of detonation will be further away from the building.
VIII. A blast shield can incorporate natural features such as
landscaping as well as take advantage of elements like retaining
walls and ground elevations.
5.3.5C DESIGN OF BLAST SHIELDING WALLS

In general, shielding walls are best used where there
is only a short distance between the structure to be protected
and the closest possible point of detonation. Such conditions are
typical in urban areas in which the land around the building is
limited, and vehicles can get within close proximity to the building.
Note: URA may typically have restrictions on wall heights at

1.8m.
5.3.5D EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
The design of a shielding wall is different from a standard

dynamic design, since it is expected and permitted for the wall to
be completely destroyed, to rotate or to slide as long as it does not
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Standards
There are no internationally recognised security
standards for blast shielding walls or their performance. This
is mainly due to the fact that there are so many parameters
involved in a blast against a wall. The selection of the wall type
depends on:
The distance between the detonation point and the wall
The distance between the wall and the building
The height of the protected areas in the building
The wall can be designed with heavy foundations, in
which case the blast energy on the wall will be absorbed by deep
plastic deformation. Ductility of 30-40 cm is possible as long as
shear failure is prevented.
The following factors should be considered in the design of a
blast wall:
I. The wall should be designed by a structural engineer who is
able to calculate dynamic responses and design accordingly.
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soil investigations.
III. A shielding wall designed to slide will require dynamic analysis
to show that the wall will not become a projectile and impact the
building. Such a wall can be built using pre-cast wall elements.
Page 51
5.3.6C BALLISTIC STANDARDS
Figure 33: A shielding wall designed for sliding
Figure 34: Examples of blast shielding walls made of prefabricated sections

As demonstrated in the picture on the left, shield walls can be decorated and incorporated into an area's
landscape design
5.3.6
BALLISTIC PERIMETER LINE
5.3.6A INTRODUCTION
5.3.6D DESIGN OF BALLISTIC PERIMETER LINE

of a ballistic perimeter line:
I. All components of the fence or partition should be designed

to meet the required level of protection. This includes both the
panel and the connectors.
A ballistic perimeter line prevents a shooting incident

from outside. This line can be combined with other elements to
prevent both intrusion and the ramming of vehicles. This section
relates to locations where exterior ballistic protection is required. II. If there are external areas which overlook the parts of the
Areas that may be considered for ballistic protection include facility which require protection, the protection will have to be
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example).
III.Every effort should be made to prevent a direct line of sight
The two concepts usually employed for preventing from the exterior into the building. This usually does not serve as
ballistic protection but might eliminate or at least limit the threat.
shooting assaults from outside are as follows:
Blocking the line of sight can be achieved either by decorative or
standard fencing, or by landscaping and vegetation.
A physical barrier to stop the penetration of a projectile.
A barrier made of material that blocks the line-of-sight from the
outside. This reduces the probability of the attack, but does not
stop the actual bullet.
Page 52
5.3.6E EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Figure 35: A glass ballistic partition
5.4
5.4.1
Figure 36: A steel ballistic partition
VEHICULAR AND PEDESTRIAN

ENTRANCES
INTRODUCTION
Wherever a perimeter line is planned, points of access

for vehicles and pedestrians are required at various points along
the line. These points are usually regarded as the weak links of
the perimeter as they require a breach in the protective line every
time they are opened. Access points control the time and people
permitted to enter a building or facility. In addition to controlling
passage, access management usually includes the ability to
observe and track movement in and out of controlled areas.
The entry points through a perimeter line will typically
consist of vehicle gates, pedestrian gates, and in some cases, a
guard post. The entry points provide places where the required
level of vehicle or pedestrian screening and access control can
be implemented. The challenge of designing an entry point is
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authorised access by pedestrians or vehicles.
Planning for vehicle and pedestrian access and entry
control points for a new project should begin at the initial stages
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expected rates of vehicular and pedestrian access to the site.
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is one of the main challenges when planning an entrance of any
kind.
For most buildings located in urban settings, the vehicle
entrance often leads directly into an underground or multi-story
car park. It is important to note that the security screening of
passengers at a vehicle entrance usually does not provide the
same level of scrutiny as the security screening at a pedestrian
entrance and therefore does not replace it. The entrance from the
car park to the building will therefore require the same screening
level as the other pedestrian entrances.
Three types of vehicle screening and two types of
pedestrian screening entrances are required which may be at
separate locations or incorporated into one.
The following general measures should be considered in the

design of entry control points:
VEHICLE ENTRANCES
If possible, the entry point should be at a location as far as
possible from the building or facility itself.
Entry roads which run under parts of the building should be
avoided in all cases.
If possible the access road should be designed in a way that
will force drivers to approach at low speed.
The number of access roads and entrances to a building or site
should be optimised.
Designate an entry to the site for service and delivery vehicles,
preferably away from high-risk locations buildings and vulnerable
venues.
Position the entry control point to allow adequate visual
assessment of approaching vehicles.
The approach to the site should be designed according to peak

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road network.
Allow adequate passage for a vehicle that has been denied
access at the security check to exit without having to enter the
site or move vehicles in queue.
Consider current and future inspection technologies (e.g.
above vehicle and under vehicle surveillance systems).
Anti-ramming barriers should be implemented both at the
entrance and exit points.
Any vehicle gate on the perimeter line should provide the same
level of protection against vehicles and intruders as that provided
by the rest of the perimeter line.
Entrances should be designed in such a way as to enable
access control to be implemented either for unattended entry
using an access control system or by guards.
After working hours closure requirements should be taken into
account.
Page 53
PEDESTRIAN ENTRANCES
If possible, the entry point should be at a location as far as

possible from the building or facility itself.
The entrance should be designed in such a way as to

contain an attack and prevent it from progressing towards the
protected facility.
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Any pedestrian gate on the perimeter line should provide the

same level of protection against vehicles and intruders as
that provided by the rest of the perimeter line.
Entrances should be designed in such a way as to enable

access control to be implemented either for unattended entry
using an access control system or by guards.
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for communication (which may be at a distance) between the
people entering and those responsible for approving access.
After working hours closure requirements should be taken

into account.
Future needs and technologies should be facilitated.

5.4.2
In such cases, it would be more effective to install two separate

gates at the entrance for vehicles and pedestrians.
VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING ENTRANCE
5.4.2A INTRODUCTION
A vehicle anti-ramming entrance is used to prevent
unauthorised vehicles from entering the premises. A combination
of elements may be used to also prevent the intrusion of
pedestrians.
A vehicle getting within close proximity of the building or
gaining access to an underground or multi-storey car park is one
of the main threats which needs to be prevented. The range of
possibilities for perpetrating threats using a vehicle is wide and
can include:
I. A vehicle carrying a large explosive device driven by a suicide
bomber.
II. A vehicle ramming into a building or a group of people.
III. A vehicle carrying assailants used as a carrier to break through
the perimeter line.
IV. A vehicle crashing into the perimeter by accident.
At the early stages of project planning, consideration
should be given to optimising the number of entrances and most
importantly, positioning them at the least vulnerable locations.
For maximum protection, the vehicle anti-ramming
entrance needs to be placed as far from the building as possible.
However, as far as possible, it should be established within the
propertys boundary line/building lot as otherwise, approval from
the appropriate authorities (e.g. SLA, URA, LTA) would need to
be sought for any barriers proposed to be installed outside the
boundary line/building lot.
Vehicle anti-ramming perimeter entrances may
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Page 54
Table 12A: Impact Standard SD-STD-02.01 Issued by the US

Department of State
For the designation of vehicle weight and allowed impact

speed under ASTM F2656-07, please refer to Table 1: Impact
Condition Designations of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled
Standard Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter
Barriers 5.
For the designation for vehicle weight and allowed
impact speed under PAS68:2007, please refer to Table 2:
Vehicle Impact Test Criteria of the PAS68:2007 document, titled
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the UK BSI PAS68:2007 in lieu of the SD-STD-02.01, only the
barriers tested using the Vehicle Impact Method (Performance
Class V) are acceptable.
The acceptable ASTM F2656-07 and UK BSI PAS
68:2007 crash tested barriers corresponding to SD-STD-02.01
are shown below.
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Page 55
Table 12B: Corresponding Standards for SD-STD-02.01,

ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007
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Page 56
5.4.2D DESIGN OF A VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING

ENTRANCE
of a vehicle anti-ramming entrance:
I.
The approach speed of a potential vehicle approaching
the perimeter line is a design criterion which should be considered
at the initial design stage when planning the access roads to
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lower the required protection level.
II.
The minimum height of the barrier should be 65 cm.
III.
The foundation requirements of the proposed barriers
should be considered early on since an underground car park
beneath the barrier line could limit the choice.
IV.
Consideration should be given to any requirements for
pedestrian access as well as the vehicle anti-ramming criteria.

SLIDING GATE
A sliding gate can be a barrier for both vehicles and

pedestrians, however they can be very deceptive with regard to
V.
Space for vehicles waiting to enter must be planned the level of protection they provide and must be massive in order
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anchoring on both sides of the gate.
VI.
Certain types of barriers are more suitable to extended
Sliding gates are very slow when opening and closing
opening if the site does not require vehicle screening at all times
and
until
completely closed do not provide any anti-ramming
(e.g. only at elevated or high threat levels or at certain hours).
protection. Leaf (hinged) gates are usually not able to provide
VII.
Barricade Speed / Response Time. The barrier system adequate protection levels.
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time delay after activation to allow vehicles to enter or exit the
parking area.
VIII.
Cycle Time / Pass-through Rates. The device passthrough rate should be consistent with the desired vehicle
processing (3 to 15 seconds is suitable for most inspection and

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IX.
Environment.
Not all barriers are suited to the
environmental conditions at all locations. Barrier components
may require protection from excessive heat, dirt, humidity, sand,
high water table, or require additional maintenance.
X.
Reliability/Maintenance. Reliability is an important factor
in selecting active barriers. Evaluate the systems failure modes to
ensure that the barrier will fail in the predetermined position (open
or closed) based on the security and operational requirements.
Backup generators or manual override capabilities are needed to
ensure continuous operation during power failures or equipment
malfunction.
ARM BARRIER
An arm barrier provides protection from vehicles but not
from pedestrians. There are many arm barriers available, but
not many meet anti-ramming standards and in order to provide
adequate protection, they will usually be equipped with an
internal cable. The barrier needs to be fully closed to provide the
protection level. If there is a roof above the barriers, the height of
the opened gate should be considered.
XI.
Safety Options/Features. Active barrier systems are
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intended purposes. Warning devices (visible colours and patterns,
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used to mark the presence of a barrier and enhance its visibility to
drivers. Vehicle detector safety loops and road plates chequered
for good traction can also enhance safety.
XII.
Proposed screening equipment should be based on the
ability to discover threat devices according to the relevant threat
level (e.g. if the threat to the building is a large bomb hidden in a
car boot, a screening system to search the underside of a vehicle
will not be effective).
Figure 40: An anti-ramming arm barrier
Figure 41: The reinforcing cable (both inside

the arm and below it)
Page 57
RETRACTABLE BOLLARDS
Automatic retractable bollards provide protection from
vehicles but not from pedestrians. They are useful because
of their relatively fast operation cycles and can therefore be
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5.4.4
PROTECTED PEDESTRIAN ENTRANCE
5.4.4A INTRODUCTION
Retractable bollards which meet anti-ramming standards

would typically require a relatively deep foundation, and so need
to be located suitably.
A forced entry gate prevents unauthorised people from

entering the premises. Intruders may seek to gain entry to a
building with either criminal or terrorist intentions. In the case
of terrorist attacks, the entrance itself is often where the attacks
have taken place, particularly when there is some form of security
in place there.
It is recommended to have the bollards installed together

with a light arm barrier for visibility and safety reasons.
When considering the pedestrian entrances at the initial planning

stage of a new development project, the aims should be to:
I. Optimise the number of entrances.
II. Position the entrances at the least vulnerable locations.
For maximum protection, the entrances need to be
placed as far from the building line as possible but in all cases it
is recommended to locate them in an area that will prevent any
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or the area above an entrance could be left unoccupied to avoid
an explosion at the entrance affecting anyone above.
5.4.3
ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS
5.4.3A INTRODUCTION
An administrative barrier prevents an unauthorised
vehicle with no hostile intention from entering the premises
accidentally and is used for the administrative arrangement of
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5.4.3B DESIGN OF ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIER

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required, or a sliding gate if it is to serve as a pedestrian barrier
as well.
Standards
There are no internationally recognised security standards that
are relevant for administrative barriers.
5.4.4C FORCED ENTRY STANDARDS

A standard level of forced entry is determined according
to the following three criteria:
5.4.3C EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS

The accessibility of the area to a potential intruder both

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in
terms
of the length of time that an intruder can stand and work
required, or a sliding gate if it is to serve as a pedestrian barrier
to
gain
entry
without being disturbed, and in terms of physical
as well.
accessibility.
The importance of the site.
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Page 58
Where an interlocking system is required, it should be

The following international standards are recommended for use XI.
implemented at entrances and exits.
in Singapore:
XII.
If screening is to be undertaken as a standard procedure
either at present or in the future, it should take place before the
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XIII.
In case of an interlocking system, the area between
the barriers should be used as the security screening point and
preferably should be outside the perimeter line. Every attempt
should be made to avoid locating this area under populated or
vulnerable parts of the building.
XIV.
If there is no choice but to locate the screening area
under parts of the building, the whole area must be strengthened
in such a way as to contain any possible attack that could take
place there.
5.4.4D DESIGN OF PROTECTED PEDESTRIAN

ENTRANCE
XV.
In all cases it is recommended that the entrance be
located in an area that will prevent any potential incident from
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an entrance could be left unoccupied to avoid an explosion at the
entrance affecting anyone above.

XVI.
Even if procedures at normal threat levels do not require
of a protected pedestrian entrance:
an interlocking entrance, it is recommended to try to allocate
I.
A gate in the perimeter line should be built to the same necessary space in case such a procedure is required in the
future for higher threat levels.
protection standard as the perimeter line.
Preparation for the installation or deployment of
A portal at the entrance should be built to the same XVII.
II.
screening
equipment should be considered, and this should
protection standard as the building envelope.
include the following:
III.
The gate should prevent anyone from breaking through
as well as climbing over or under.
IV.
Waiting areas may need to be assigned both on the
exterior side (pre-security screening) and on the interior side
(post-security screening).
Space for a walk-through metal detector and an x-ray

machine.
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equipment (mentioned above).
Suitable electricity infrastructure.
Suitable post for the guard performing the screening.

V.
The different security requirements for during and after
XVIII.

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Cycle Time / Pass-through Rates. The device passthrough rate should be consistent with the desired entry
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For effective screening, proper lighting is required.
VII.
Reliability/Maintenance. Reliability is an important factor
in selecting gates or turnstiles. The systems failure modes
should ensure that the barrier will fail in a predetermined position
(open or closed) based on security and operational requirements.
Backup generators or manual override capabilities are needed to
ensure continuous operation during power failures or equipment
malfunction.
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issues should be resolved at early stages.
IX.
Safety Options/Features some gate systems are
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purposes. Warning devices should be used to mark the presence
of a gate.
X.
It is recommended to plan for the possible upgrade of
each entrance to an interlocking system. Even though this may
not be required for current threat levels, it may be necessary in
the future.
Page 59
5.4.5
DELIVERY/SERVICE VEHICLE ACCESS CONTROL
5.4.5A INTRODUCTION
Loading docks and service access areas are a necessity
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In many cases, loading docks are positioned either inside the
building itself or in an underground car park and therefore careful
attention should be given to these service areas in order to avoid
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If a delivery or service access control point is planned,

it should always be equipped with a barrier line at least to the
same standard as the vehicle access point (if it exists). It should
be noted that the vehicles at the loading dock are expected to
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point. Reference should be made to section 5.4.2 on Vehicle
Anti-Ramming Barriers for the design considerations and possible
designs used in a delivery/ service access control point.
Page 60

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Table 13A: Impact Standard SD-STD-02.01 Issued by the US
Department of State
For the designation of vehicle weight and allowed impact speed

under ASTM F2656-07, please refer to Table 1: Impact Condition
Designations of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled Standard
Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter Barriers7.
For the designation for vehicle weight and allowed impact
speed under PAS68:2007, please refer to Table 2: Vehicle Impact
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for Vehicle Security Barriers8. When adopting the UK BSI
PAS68:2007 in lieu of the SD-STD-02.01, only the barriers tested
using the Vehicle Impact Method (Performance Class V) are
acceptable.
The acceptable ASTM F2656-07 and UK BSI PAS 68:2007
crash tested barriers corresponding to SD-STD-02.01 are shown
below.
Page 61
Table 13B: Corresponding Standards for SD-STD-02.01,

ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007
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Page 62
5.4.5D DESIGN OF DELIVERY/SERVICE

VEHICLE ACCESS CONTROL
of a delivery/service vehicle access control point:
I. It is recommended to separate delivery entrances from main
vehicle entrances.
5.4.6
INTERLOCKING VEHICLE ENTRANCE (FOR

HIGHER SECURITY NEEDS)
5.4.6A INTRODUCTION
An interlocking system for a vehicle entrance is used to
ensure that an authorised vehicle entering the premises is not
tailed by an unauthorised vehicle which takes advantage of the
open barrier to slip in after the authorised vehicle.
II. Separate loading docks and shipping/ receiving areas by at

An interlocking system is created by installing two lines
least 20 metres in each direction from utility rooms, utility mains,
of barriers in such a way as to guarantee that only one barrier
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can be open at any time. This is usually controlled by electronic
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means rather than procedures.
and heating mains, etc.).
III. Locate loading docks so that vehicles will not be allowed under
the building. If this is not possible, the area should be hardened
for blast and under no circumstances should the location be close
to major structural elements.
IV. Loading dock design should limit damage to adjacent areas
and vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building.
Such a system is typically used where anti-ramming

protection is required, so at least one of the two barrier lines
must be able to withstand ramming. The other line may be an
administrative barrier line as it is protected by the standing
vehicle.
V. If loading zones or drive-through areas are necessary, monitor

them and restrict their height to keep out large vehicles.
VI. Avoid driveways to the loading docks within or under buildings.
VII. Provide signs to clearly mark separate entrances for deliveries.
VIII. It is recommended to use an interlocking vehicle entrance
for the delivery / service entrance, or at least have the ability to
upgrade to one in case of elevated or high threat levels.
IX. The delivery or service access control point should be
protected with the appropriate vehicle anti-ramming barriers,
which should be at least the same level used for the barrier line.
The same protection level is required at both entrances and exits.
X. The security screening area should be located on the exterior
of the barrier.
XI. Consideration should be given to the expected queue of
delivery vehicles at peak hours and a queuing area should be
considered.
XII. The security screening method should be discussed at
an early stage to ensure it can be implemented. The delivery
/ service entrance area will almost always have some form of
security check / registering and a proper guard post should
be established. Preparation for the installation or deployment
of screening equipment should be considered. This could
include screening machinery, underground pits, extra lighting,
underground cameras etc. all of which will require electricity
outlets and space.
XIII. Proposed screening equipment should be based on the
ability to discover threat devices according to the relevant threat
level (e.g. if the relevant threat to the loading bay is a large bomb
hidden in one of the deliveries, a screening system searching the
bottom of the vehicle will not be effective).
5.4.6C DESIGN OF INTERLOCKING VEHICLE

ENTRANCE
of an interlocking vehicle entrance:
I. When one of the barrier lines also forms part of the perimeter
fence, it is recommended that the sliding gate be the light barrier
(i.e. non-anti-ramming). This ensures quicker operation and is
also more commercially viable.
II. It is preferable to establish the second barrier as the antiramming line.
III.The interlocking system is required at both entrances and
exits.
IV. It is recommended to have both barriers operated by the same
system controller.
V. The area between the barriers should be used as the security
screening point and preferably should be outside the perimeter
line. Every attempt should be made to avoid locating this area
under populated or vulnerable parts of the building.
Page 63
VI. If there is no choice but to locate the screening area under

parts of the building, the whole area must be strengthened in
such a way as to contain any possible attack that could take place
there.
VII. Even if procedures at normal threat levels do not require
an interlocking entrance, it is recommended to try to allocate
necessary space in case such a procedure is required in the
future for higher threat levels.
VIII. The distance between the two barrier lines should take into
consideration the maximum vehicle size of potential users of the
entrance (delivery trucks/ private vehicles). The actual distance
should be at least 150% of the size of the largest vehicle expected
to enter.
IX. The entrance should be designed in such a way as to prevent
a vehicle from bypassing the second line once it has been allowed
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X. Preparation for the installation or deployment of screening
equipment should be considered. This could include catering for
electrical outlets and space.
XI. For effective screening, proper lighting is required.
5.4.6D EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
5.5
SECURITY POSTS
5.5.1
INTRODUCTION
Security posts are built when there is a security need to

man a static location on the buildings perimeter line or at critical
positions for long periods of time. The security post is meant to
enhance the ability of the security guard to perform his duties by
being well positioned and well equipped regardless of the weather
or light conditions. It can also be used to improve his survivability
in case of an attack aimed at breaching the buildings perimeter.
Security posts can be designed and built as part of the
development or can in certain situations, be bought as a readymade product when only a small booth is required (usually at
vehicle entrances).
The security posts will usually combine the ability to
perform pro-active security and monitoring both physically and
using security systems.
5.5.2
PEDESTRIAN SECURITY POSTS
5.5.2A INTRODUCTION
As seen in Section 5.4.4 a pedestrian entrance can be one of
the most vulnerable and critical locations within a site because it
performs three main functions:
Administrative admission / information.
Access control.
Security screening.
For these reasons, a pedestrian security post could be
considered as a sensitive location which may be subjected to
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of the building.
Page 64
BALLISTIC RESISTANCE STANDARDS
5.5.2C STANDARDS
BLAST RESISTANCE STANDARDS
Due to the fact that the guard post is usually on the front line,
it is almost impossible to provide it with full protection due to its
proximity to the potential threat. Therefore it is recommended to
use medium level as standard.
5.5.2D DESIGN OF SECURITY POSTS
of a security post:
I. Security post positions on the perimeter which are securing the
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vision and tactical control of the area under their responsibility.
FORCED ENTRY STANDARDS
A standard level of forced entry is determined according
to the following three criteria:
The accessibility of the area to a potential intruder both in
terms of the length of time that an intruder can stand and work
to gain entry without being disturbed, and in terms of physical
accessibility.
The importance of the site.
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The following international standards are recommended for use
in Singapore:
II. Where necessary, the observation of the area under

responsibility should be augmented by proper lighting and
cameras.
III. Blind spots should be prevented and backed up by CCTV
monitoring or mirrors if they cannot be avoided.
IV. No critical controls for the building security systems should
be placed in the perimeter or entrance security post. Exceptions
can be made only if the security post has an adequate protection
level.
V. The systems in the security post should be fail-safe to ensure
the site remains sealed if the post is breached. If the post is not in
an area secured from the potential threat in the exterior side, the
line between the security post and the inner side of the building
should be protected to prevent any potential problem moving into
the building.
VI. The entrance to the security post should be from the inner
area and not from the outside.
VII. If the security post is on the building line, it should be carefully
considered if access is needed both between the security post and
the screening area and between the security post and the inner
building area. This should be avoided or where unavoidable, a
high level of forced-entry protection must be installed.
VIII. A security control room, if it exists, should have the ability
to overrule the access control systems operated by the security
post.
Page 65
5.5.3
VEHICLE ENTRANCE SECURITY POST
5.5.3A INTRODUCTION
A vehicle entrance is one of the most vulnerable and
critical locations within a site. For that reason, designing an
effective security post at this point has a major effect on the future
protection level provided to the site. As the vehicle entrance point
is usually on or close to the building lot line, design mistakes are
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achieved. Vehicle entrance security booths are in common use in
a wide range of developments. They typically perform three main
tasks:
5.6
LANDSCAPING
5.6.1
INTRODUCTION
The clear zone is the area between the buildings and

the perimeter line. Unrestricted visibility is required in order to
ensure that no approach will be unnoticed and package-sized
objects cannot be abandoned without detection. A clear zone
can be achieved by using a combination of civil and architectural
elements with exterior landscaping.
5.6.2
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
5.6.3
DESIGN OF LANDSCAPING
Administrative admission (charging parking fees).

Access control.
Security screening.
In higher security developments (such as building type
Y as referred to in these guidelines), it is recommended to divide
these three tasks into three physically separate positions. Due to
their critical role in providing protection to the assets by keeping
unauthorised vehicles away, a certain protection level is required
for the post itself.
5.5.3B DESIGN OF VEHICLE ENTRANCE
SECURITY POST
of a vehicle entrance security post:
I. Security post positions on the perimeter which are securing the
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vision and tactical control of the area under their responsibility.
II. Where necessary, the observation of the area under
responsibility should be augmented by proper lighting and
cameras.
III. Blind spots should be prevented and backed up by CCTV
monitoring or mirrors if they cannot be avoided.
IV. No critical controls for any building security system should
be placed in the perimeter or entrance security post. Exceptions
can be made only if the security post has an adequate protection
level.
V. The systems in the security post should be fail-safe to ensure
the site remains sealed if the post is breached.
In a typical facility there are two zones of protection for

the Clear Zone; namely Zones 1 and 2.
ZONE
1:
ZONE
2:
Zone 1 (see diagram) is the first 2 metres adjacent to the structure. Within
Zone 1 there should be no planted material or landscape feature that is
taller than 15 centimetres.
Zone 2 starts 2 metres from the structure and extends to 10 metres from the
structure. Within Zone 2 there should be no planted material or landscape
feature that is taller than 50 centimetres or wider than 40 centimetres.
Plants should be selected that do not obscure more than 20% of the ground
in any place. Plants may be taller than 50 centimetres at full maturity as
long as they do not have a horizontal density that obscures more than 10%
of the ground and wall systems in any place. Plants or landscape features
may be clustered to create planters or monuments as long as they do not
obscure visibility of more than 10% of the ground or wall systems in any
place and do not create hiding places for a package
VI. The entrance to the vehicle security post should be from the
inner area and not from the outside.
VII. If the security post is on the building line, it should be carefully
considered if access is needed both between the security post and
the screening area and between the security post and the inner
building area. This should be avoided or where unavoidable, a
high level of forced-entry protection must be installed.
VIII. A security control room, if it exists, should be able to override
the access control systems operated by the vehicle entrance
security post.
IX. The vehicle entrance security post should have enough
allocated space to house all screening equipment for both
currently planned and future options.
Page 66
5.6.4
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
5.7.2
SECURITY LIGHTING - PERIMETER LINE AND

ENTRANCES
5.7.2A INTRODUCTION
Lighting along the perimeter line, together with other
alarm and surveillance systems is a basic tool in the detection
of intruders into an installation. The lighting around the entrance
points of an installation is often critical to the proper operation of
access control. The lighting types and coverage should therefore
be designed carefully based on the intended security screening
methods at the site.
Note that the need for a clear zone can be reduced if

stronger controls are used on the outer security ring or if the
building structures resistance to blast effects is increased.
5.7
SECURITY LIGHTING
5.7.1
INTRODUCTION
Security lighting increases visibility around perimeters,

buildings, and sensitive locations and also acts as a deterrent.
It should therefore be provided at the perimeter to allow security
personnel to maintain visual observation during darkness both by
direct surveillance and through the CCTV system. It is a security
management tool that is applicable in almost all environments
within an urban development, and should be considered when
installing other access control systems, particularly those focusing
on surveillance.
At a minimum, all access points, the perimeter and
restricted areas should be illuminated from sunset to sunrise or
during periods of low visibility. In some circumstances, lighting
may not be required, but these circumstances must be addressed
in the buildings security plan. Lighting however, also needs to be
matched to the operating environment and this should be taken
into consideration during planning. For example, lighting can also
make a critical difference in the effectiveness of the CCTV system
at night.
Page 67
Page 68
5.7.2C ILLUMINATION STANDARDS

The recommended standards are based on the US DOT
standards FTA-TRI-MA-267085-05 and DOT-VNTSC-FTA-05-02.

ENTRANCES
I. All vehicle and pedestrian entrances to the facility should have
appropriate lighting.
II. Lighting at manned entrances must be adequate to identify
people, examine credentials, inspect vehicles entering or
departing the facility premises through designated control points
(vehicle interiors should be clearly lit), and prevent anyone from
entering unobserved into the premises.
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environmental conditions.
IV. Lighting intensity at entrances should be planned to ensure
that drivers arriving at the facility can readily recognise the
premises and see where to drive their vehicle.
V. Lighting should not be placed in such a way as to blind the
driver.
VI. Security posts at entrance points should have a reduced level
of interior lighting to enable the security guards to see better,
increase their night vision adaptability, and avoid inward viewing.
VII. The control for the lighting system should be in a secured
area, preferably in the security control room.
5.7.2D DESIGN OF SECURITY LIGHTING

of security lighting:
5.8
POSITIONING OF CAR PARKS AND

CRITICAL UTILITIES
5.8.1
INTRODUCTION
Addressing security issues during the initial stages of a

development project has an enormous impact on the ability to
implement cost effective protective solutions. By eliminating or
I. Where perimeter lighting is required, the lighting units for a limiting the possibility of carrying out an effective attack, the need
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protected area and above the fence so that the coverage will
The following can make a critical difference to the outcome of a
include an area both inside and outside the fence.
terror event:
PERIMETER LINE
II. Light poles should be positioned in such a way as to prevent

anyone from climbing over the fence or into the building.
Stand-off distance between potential threat areas and either

critical areas or areas where people gather.
III. Perimeter lighting should be continuous on both sides of

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system.
Good positioning of the buildings or vulnerable areas within

the lot.
IV. The cone of illumination from lighting units should be directed

downward and outward from the structure or area being protected.
Cones of illumination should overlap to provide coverage in the
event of bulb burnout.
V. The lighting should be arranged so as to create minimal
shadows and minimal glare in the eyes of security guards.
VI. The control for the system should be in a secured area,
preferably in the security control room.
VII. The lighting should be turned on automatically by a clock or
photoelectric cell.
VIII. The lighting design should consider the future matured state
of the vegetation used in the landscaping.
Whilst the stand-off is hard to achieve because of

land scarcity and other architectural considerations, the
right positioning is able to considerably compensate this
lack of stand-off.
For example, if the buildings lot has a public road that
runs along it, the structure positioning should try to maximise
the distance between the road and the structure or areas where
people gather.
The congregation of a large number of people behind
large glass faades in public areas poses a great risk and exposed
faades opposite public areas should not be used as the main
light source for the interior of the building. Internal faades can
be used for the main source of light and the location of crowded
areas. The internal positioning of the various functional areas
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protect them.
Page 69
This section will focus on two main areas whose

positioning is particularly sensitive:
Car parks
Critical Utilities
5.8.2
POSITIONING OF CAR PARKS
5.8.2A INTRODUCTION
Car parks constitute a relatively simple opportunity to
introduce large quantities of explosives to a buildings vicinity
or to its sensitive and vulnerable areas. Limiting or restricting
parking can help to keep threats away from a building, however
in dense urban environments such as Singapore, parking spaces
in close proximity to the building, and underground parking are
common. Mitigating the risks caused by parking in close proximity
can be achieved by creative design measures, including parking
regimes, perimeter buffer zones, barriers, structural hardening
and other architectural and engineering solutions. Operational
measures may also be necessary to inspect or screen vehicles
entering car parks.
5.8.2B DESIGN OF CAR PARKS
5.8.3
POSITIONING OF CRITICAL UTILITIES
5.8.3A INTRODUCTION
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the shock of an explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical
for safely evacuating people from the building or to the emergency
response to an attack. Their destruction could cause damage
that is disproportionate to other building damage resulting from
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or smoke ventilation systems not functioning can be much higher
than the direct results of the explosion.
5.8.3B DESIGN OF CRITICAL UTILITIES
of critical utilities:
I. Plan the utilities to be underground, concealed, and protected.
II. Provide redundancy to life saving utility systems.
The following factors should be considered in the

positioning of car parking areas:
III.Protect water treatment plants and storage tanks by limiting

and securing access points, such as manholes.
I. Vehicle parking areas should be as far as possible from the

buildings highly populated areas.
IV. Locate the main fuel storage away from areas that can be
easily accessed.
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from utility rooms, utility mains and service entrances, including from the outside of the building thereby limiting the need for
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suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.
VI. Locate garbage containers as far away from the building as
III.Parking under the building is not recommended but if possible.
unavoidable, the building should be hardened for blast and if
vehicle access close to major structural elements is unavoidable,
the major structural elements must be protected against blast.
VII. Conceal incoming utility systems within building and property

lines.
IV. The design of the car park should limit damage to adjacent
areas and vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building.
VIII. Route critical or fragile utilities so that they are not on exterior
walls or on walls shared with mailrooms, loading docks etc.
V. If possible, separate resident and visitor parking and locate

visitor or general public parking near, but not on, the site itself.
To limit opportunities for aggressors to place explosives

underneath buildings, ensure that access to crawl spaces, utility
tunnels, and other means of under building access is controlled.
All utility penetrations of a sites perimeter barrier, including
penetrations in fences, walls, or other perimeter structures,
should be sealed or secured to eliminate openings large enough
for an intruder to pass through the barrier. Typical penetrations
could be for storm sewers, water, electricity, or other site utility
services.
VI. If possible, design the parking lot with one-way circulation.

VII. Prohibit parking within the stand-off zone based on the ability
of the structure and its materials to withstand a potential threat.
VIII. Provide parking lots with adequate lighting and with CCTV
cameras connected to the security system.
IX. Height limitations should be imposed to limit the size of
vehicles allowed to the car park or to highly vulnerable areas.
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be considered carefully
Page 70
BUILDING FAADES
This chapter describes construction methods, solutions

and protection elements relating to the buildings envelope
including faades and openings. The faades at the buildings
envelope walls are the main protection against most criminal and
terror related threats including silent or forced entry, shootings
and explosions.
The objective of this chapter is to provide basic protection

design guidelines enabling architects and engineers to make
decisions regarding doors, windows, envelope walls and building
materials. These decisions should be based on knowledge
and understanding of the relevant design criteria, protection
requirements and the buildings characteristics as described in
Chapter 3.
Standards
Every wall or protection element mentioned in Chapter
6 must minimally meet the relevant building codes and

internationally recognised standards:
Blast resistance
Forced entry
Ballistic resistance
6.2
DEFINITIONS AND STANDARDS
6.2.1
DEFINITIONS
Pre-fabricated wall elements and curtain wall systems

are the dominant construction systems in modern countries.
In Singapore, the trend towards industrial construction of
prefabricated walls, beams and column is prevalent. These
guidelines will focus on these construction systems.
6.1
This chapter contains descriptions and technical

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at the buildings facades and openings.
The Protection
Recommendation Tables (PRT) in Chapter 4 refer to the various
elements in this chapter.
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protection elements in this chapter can be implemented even
if they are not indicated as recommended in the PRT. In this
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are described. The level of detail provided is not intended to
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knowledge and to assist in the procurement procedure to ensure
that the right demands are made of suppliers and/or protection
engineers.
The guidelines cover basic design principals and
materials that are commonly used in Singapore. If a proposed
building system or product design is not mentioned in the
guidelines, it is recommended to refer to the recommended
protection level for the closest relevant system or design whilst
applying best engineering practice. In such a case it is also
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design/blast consultant.
Page 71
6.2.2
STANDARDS FOR BLAST RESISTANCE
Blast Resistance
6.2.3
STANDARDS FOR FORCED-ENTRY RESISTANCE
Forced-entry Resistance
6.2.4
STANDARDS FOR BALLISTIC RESISTANCE
Ballistic Resistance
Page 72
6.3
BUILDING WALLS
6.3.1
INTRODUCTION
Envelope walls have many architectural and functional

roles in the building and in some cases they form the main
structural support. In this section, the protection roles of the
building envelope walls and the need for the addition of special
protection elements will be discussed. The objective of this
chapter is to provide basic protection design guidelines to enable
architects to make decisions about the type of doors, windows,
envelope walls and building materials to use for any given building
or facility. To fully understand the security and protection role of
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read the General Architectural Considerations in Section 2.2.
The main protection and security functions of the envelope walls
are:
Sealing the inner parts of the building against silent or forced
entry.
Protecting the inside of the building against blast loads, bullets
and shrapnel.
Concealing the activity inside the building from external
intelligence gathering or targeting.
Providing structural support to the building.
The external walls should be straight without recesses,
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recommended that columns are positioned behind the external
wall, thereby enabling the external wall faade to shield the
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the external wall. In all cases, the narrow side of the column
should face the external threat. It is not recommended to use
exposed external columns or exposed transfer beams. External
walls recessed behind a line of exposed transfer beams and
columns that might be directly affected from an explosion in the
vicinity are particularly dangerous and may cause heavy blast

In the above diagrams, it can be seen that in Figure

55: External wall with exposed column line, the column line is
exposed and the external wall is recessed whereas in Figure 56:
Column line protected by external wall, the columns and transfer
beams are shielded by the external wall and straight wall columns
are not exposed to direct blast loads.
6.3.2
PRE-CAST LOAD BEARING WALLS
INTRODUCTION
In-situ reinforced concrete walls are the most costeffective method of protection in the building industry. The
highest level of protection is achieved when construction
methods, details and materials are according to those required
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Todays construction methods favour the use of pre-cast load
bearing elements rather than in-situ reinforced concrete walls. It
is therefore critical that the same guidelines for wall strengthening
are followed for pre-cast elements where protection is required
for high blast loads.
DESIGN OF PRE-CAST LOAD BEARING WALLS
Standards
All relevant Singapore building codes and standards must
be followed. If there is a contradiction between these
guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail.
Page 73
In general, the standard pre-cast load bearing walls

which are commonly used in the building industry in Singapore
provide relatively high resistance to blast loads. A typical vehicleborne IED (VBIED) at a distance of approximately 10m from the
building will create an impulse of 500 psi*msec. At this level, the
wall itself will be severely damaged but is expected to continue
to support the vertical loads of the building. The recommended
general design criteria for pre-cast load bearing walls should
include the following:
I. Blast resistance. The pre-cast load bearing wall must be
able to withstand a full range of expected blast loads and should
preferably exceed the expected parameters. Among the many
aspects to consider, the structural engineer must design the
steel reinforcement and concrete characteristic according to the
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act on the wall in an explosive event. A professional protective
design/blast consultant/engineer may be essential if there are
special requirements.
II. Forced entry. If the connection details and the section
properties are planned correctly, a pre-cast load bearing wall can
withstand a high level of forced entry. A professional protective
special requirements. The most sensitive parts of the wall are
the openings for windows, doors and utilities where the required
level of forced entry protection must be ensured.
III. Ballistic Resistance. 10 cm of concrete can very easily
withstand bullets and other projectiles but close attention must be
given to the connection details for doors, windows, and adjacent
walls to ensure that they offer the same level of protection.
EXAMPLE OF DESIGNS
DESIGN OF NON-LOAD BEARING WALL PANELS

Standards
In general, the standard pre-cast walls which are commonly
used in the building industry in Singapore provide relatively
high resistance to blast loads. A typical VBIED at a distance of
approximately 10m from the building will create an impulse of
500 psi*msec. At this level, the wall may be destroyed, but the
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causing secondary fragments of concrete and building materials
due to the blast leakage. The recommended general design
criteria for pre-cast non-load bearing wall panels should include
the following:
I.
Blast resistance. The pre-cast load bearing wall must
be able to withstand a full range of expected blast loads and
should preferably exceed the expected parameters. Among the
many aspects to consider, the structural engineer must design
the steel reinforcement and concrete characteristic according to
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act on the wall in an explosive event. A professional protective
special requirements.
II.
Forced entry. If the connection details and the section
properties are planned correctly, a pre-cast load bearing wall can
withstand a high level of forced entry. A professional protective
special requirements. The most sensitive parts of the wall are
the openings for windows, doors and utilities where the required
level of forced entry protection must be ensured.
III.
Ballistic Resistance. 10 cm of concrete can very easily
withstand bullets and other projectiles but close attention must be
given to the connection details for doors, windows, and adjacent
walls to ensure that they offer the same level of protection.
EXAMPLE OF DESIGNS
6.3.3
NON-LOAD BEARING WALL PANELS
INTRODUCTION
Non-load bearing wall panels should be supported
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can provide resistance to high blast loads. In general, the
standard connection details currently used in the building industry
are adequate to provide resistance to medium blast loads.
The above-mentioned resistance only relates to the
panel and not for the supporting building components. In the
event of an explosion, blast loads on the panels will be transferred
to the supporting elements of the building and therefore adequate
consideration must be given to them as well.
Page 74
6.3.4
LIGHT WALLS
EXAMPLE OF DESIGNS
INTRODUCTION
Light walls or light metal walls are used mainly for
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are sensitive to vertical loads and may not be able to support
more solid structures. They can also be used as internal light
metal walls placed behind external curtain walls which would not
otherwise provide the necessary level of protection (See Section
6.4 for more information). The protection capabilities of light walls
are limited in the following ways:
Blast resistance is limited to low pressure. If the light walls
need to resist higher pressure, special details will need to be
applied.
Forced entry resistance is limited however it is possible to add
special details to increase its resistance.
Resistance to bullets and other projectiles is very limited, but
special materials may be applied to increase protection either as
cladding or as an inner layer.
DESIGN OF LIGHT WALLS
Standards
There is a wide range of options for light walls but in
general, a metal faade of a building has a low resistance to blast
loads, projectiles and forced entry. It is recommended that where
higher levels of protection are required, a custom designed wall
can be used (possibly as a second layer behind the external
faade), which can be designed to provide either blast, ballistic or
forced entry protection:
I. Blast resistance. Custom designed walls can meet the full
range of blast loads thereby compensating for the low level of
protection typically provided by light walls.
II. Forced entry. Custom designed walls can meet the full range of
forced entry requirements.
III. Ballistic resistance. Custom designed walls can meet the full
range of resistance requirements to bullets and other projectiles.
6.4
CURTAIN WALLS
6.4.1
INTRODUCTION
Curtain walls are used very frequently in modern

architectural design. In this section, the protection roles of
curtain walls and the need for the addition of special protection
elements will be discussed. The objective of this chapter is to
provide basic protection design guidelines to enable architects to
make decisions about which doors, windows, envelope walls and
building materials to use for any given facility, based on knowledge
and understanding of the relevant design considerations and
the buildings characteristics as described in Chapter 3. To fully
understand the security and protection role of the envelope walls,

J,
Architectural Considerations in Section 2.2. The main protection
and security roles of the curtain walls, windows and doors are:
Sealing the inner parts of the building against silent or forced
entry.
Protecting the inside of the building against blast loads, bullets
and shrapnel.
Page 75
Concealing the activity inside the building from external

intelligence gathering or targeting.
Preventing fragments of building material from hitting people
inside the building.
In general it is recommended to use fully framed curtain
walls which, when designed in accordance with these guidelines,
will provide basic protection to occupants of the building. The use
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casualty level in the case of a terror attack involving explosives
or forced entry. Point supported curtain walls and other curtain
wall systems are not as desirable as a fully framed curtain wall,
due to the concentration of loads on the elements providing the
support. If however, a point supported curtain wall is to be used,
applying laminated glazing and a catcher system to it will reduce
the casualty level.
6.4.2
Protection is further enhanced if the bite of the curtain

wall frames is increased in order to retain the binding of the
laminated glass together with structural silicone sealant is used to
adhere the laminated glass to the frame. In all cases, the overlap
between the glass and its frame should be as large as possible.
The minimal size of the bite should be 20mm. This attention to
the size of the bite and the sealant attachment will prevent the
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becoming a large projectile.
The laminated inner glass must be glued to the framing
members with a four sided structural silicone adhesive, preferably
a two-part shop glazed application of structural silicone. This will
enable the PVB membrane to act as a blast shield and prevent
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It will also prevent the glazing from detaching from the frames and
allow the system to fully realise the energy absorbing capacity of
the glass.
FULLY FRAMED GLASS CURTAIN WALLS
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of protective glazing is to prevent or reduce
casualties and damage in case of an attack against the building
or its vicinity. In the event of an explosion, attempt at forced entry
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glass debris from the damaged faade can cause many casualties
because of its hazardous nature. The creation and impact of
such debris, termed secondary fragmentation, can be effectively
controlled by means of protective glazing materials.
Applying these recommendations will provide a basic

level of protection.
EXAMPLE OF VALID DESIGNS
Protective glazing should be considered for all

exterior windows/curtain walls including skylights where
blast overpressures, shrapnel and projectiles may produce a
hazardous condition. Applying these protective design features
will dramatically reduce the risk to occupants, the building and
its equipment. Protective designs should take into consideration
blast, as well as ballistic and forced entry resistance in the
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densely populated areas.
DESIGN OF FULLY FRAMED GLASS CURTAIN WALLS
of fully framed glass curtain walls:
The ability to resist loads is a function of the connection
to the supporting frame and the type of glazing. Annealed glass
can resist minimal blast pressure whereas heat-strengthened
glass, fully tempered glass and laminated glass can resist larger
pressure loads. The post-damage behaviour of glass determines
the hazard to the occupants. Unlike annealed glass, fully tempered
glass breaks into pebble sized pieces. Laminated glass has one
of the most desirable post-damage behaviour with its ability to
hold the fragments in place after the glass fractures. The most
effective protective glazing utilises laminated glass, connected
to the mullions with structural silicone sealant. Insulated glazing
panels (thermo-panels) can be very effective if interior laminated
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structural silicone sealant. In this case, it is recommended that
the laminated glazing be made out of heat strengthened glass.
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element, but testing has proven that the external glass adds to
the protection level of the glazing.
Standards
6.4.3
POINT SUPPORTED OR OTHER CURTAIN WALL

SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
Glass facades which are not fully framed are attached
to the building structure with metal hangers that are connected
to the glass by point supports. These systems provide relatively
poor protection. Point supported systems are not capable of
withstanding high blast pressure loads. The supports concentrate
the blast forces at the four corners of the glazing and as a result,
there are large stress concentrations in the glass corner supports.
Instead of absorbing energy (by bending), the components of
point supported systems can turn into large projectiles with high
energy. These types of glass facades do not provide a high level
of protection against forced entry and in order to achieve higher
protection levels, special designs and glass systems must be
used.
Where a higher level of protection is needed, secondary
protection systems can also be added to the glass faade to
enhance the protection levels without touching the original curtain
wall.
Page 76
DESIGN OF POINT SUPPORTED CURTAIN WALL

SYSTEMS
of point supported curtain wall systems:
In general, it is not recommended to use point supported
curtain walls due to their limited resistance to blast loads.
Where a higher level of protection is needed, a secondary
protection system should be added to the glass faade. This may
be in the form of a catcher system.
Standards
EXAMPLE OF DESIGNS
DESIGN OF STONE OR METAL FINISHED LIGHT WALLS

,
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In the event of an explosion, protected faades will
probably transfer part of the attacks force into the buildings
structure. This transferred force must be calculated and
considered when designing the structure. Some products will
transfer more energy than others and their performance under
extreme conditions must be proven by the manufacturer in
test conditions or by calculation. The failure mechanism of the
protection element must be provided to the design team and
studied in order to ensure that it will not cause more damage than
an unprotected faade.
Standards
Stone is a fairly brittle material, therefore when using
stone panels, it is advisable that the backing elements be
designed as a debris catcher system. In general, stone panels
are not recommended for locations where large numbers of
people gather. If they should be located in such areas with mass
congregation, it is recommended to install the panels above head
JJ$% J ,q
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
6.4.4
STONE OR METAL FINISHED LIGHT WALLS
INTRODUCTION
Transparent or decorative walls, constructed of light
, : J,J
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buildings. These wall systems are relatively weak and provide
little protection against most threats including blast or forced entry.
There are two major ways to enhance its protection capabilities:
To specially design it for protection with stronger materials and
connection details.
To add an extra protection layer behind the standard faade.
The protection layer can be designed as a decorative feature like
wooden bars or a steel mesh.
A stone or metal panel faade can be designed to
withstand blast or forced entry by using materials with a steel or
concrete backing, which have been fully tested and approved, and
specially design connections. Any such design must be tested by
*,
,q : @ ^q:,*, *,
to be able to withstand the expected force and impulses. The
architect will usually not be limited in his faade design since
the protection elements, which are typically on the inner parts
of the faade, will not interfere with the exterior aesthetics of the
building.
Page 77
6.5
WINDOWS
6.5.1
INTRODUCTION
Windows are used in every building for light and

occasionally for ventilation. However, they are normally a weak
point in the protection envelope of the building. The building
industry has recognised the problem and there are many
available products that can meet the required protection levels.
The objective of this chapter is to provide basic protection design
guidelines to enable architects to make decisions about which
windows and building materials to use for any given building or
facility. In order to understand the security and protection role of
J
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The main protection and security roles of windows are:
Protecting the inner parts of the building against silent or forced
entry.
Protective windows and glazing should be considered for

all exterior windows where blast overpressures may produce a
J * `*:q* :q
and from exposure to direct blast pressures. In general, basic
protection should be applied:
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To windows in the buildings facades which are not subject to
the threat.
To windows in internal courtyards.

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to recommendations and threats.
Protecting the inside of the building against blast loads, bullets,

other projectiles and shrapnel.
Preventing fragments of building material from hitting people
inside.

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cannot be opened) and could be designed as an integral part of
a curtain wall system or glass faade between slabs or applied
as an integral part of pre-fabricated wall panels. Windows that
can be opened do not provide as high a level of protection and
should be only be used at certain areas to allow for cleaning,
maintenance or emergency access.
6.5.2
BLAST PROTECTED WINDOWS
INTRODUCTION
STANDARDS FOR GLAZING HAZARD PROTECTION
There are many commercially available windows which
meet different protective levels. Only windows which have
q* *,,:@@ ^q:
,,q :
should be used. The test report must be attached to the detailed
installation drawings enabling installation and supervision in line
with the testing method. Without clear and approved construction
drawings, it is impossible to validate the installation of the protected
windows. Although most of the blast protected commercial

| q @
case of emergency. It is recommended to place the windows
which can be opened (whether they be protected or unprotected)
in less populated areas.
The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) blast

protection criteria have been adopted by the Interagency
Security Committee (ISC) and are the most widely recognised
,
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table below).
While tilt or tilt-turn windows are available, such windows

will meet the protective criteria only when the windows are closed
and fully locked. There are four basic protection levels (refer to
Blast Resistance Standards in Section 6.2). For higher protection
levels, only approved tested products can be used.
The purpose of using protective windows and glazing
is to reduce (or prevent) casualties and damage in the event of
an explosion outside the building. Glass debris can cause many
casualties and damage because of the velocity and shape of
J: JJ : q
effectively controlled by means of protective glazing materials.
Typically, as the level of blast protection increases, so does the
level of forced entry resistance and ballistic protection, in addition
to the expected life span of the product. It is recommended to
check all these parameters with the manufacturer.
Page 78
Table15: GSA/ISC Performance Conditions for Window System Response
DESIGN OF BLAST-PROTECTED WINDOWS

The ability to resist loads is a function of:
The connection of the window to the supporting frame.
The connection of the glazing to the frame of the window.
The type of glazing.
Standards
The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) blast
protection criteria have been adopted by the Interagency
Security Committee (ISC) and are the most widely
!
!
Refer to Chapter 6.2 for Details.
The supporting frame can be a reinforced concrete wall
element or equivalent. The window frame can be constructed
from materials including aluminium, HPVC, steel or others. If a
window is to be opened, the ability to transfer loads from the frame
of the window to the supporting frame of the building depends on
the locking mechanism. In most commercial windows, the ability
of the locking mechanism to resist blast loads is very limited.
Annealed glass can resist minimal blast pressure

whereas heat-strengthened glass, fully tempered glass and
laminated glass can resist larger pressure loads. The post damage
behaviour of glass determines the hazard to the occupants.
Unlike annealed glass, fully tempered glass breaks into pebble
sized pieces. Laminated glass, which includes an interlayer of
[J[
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most desirable post-damage behaviour with its ability to hold the
fragments in place after the glass fractures. The most effective
protective glazing utilises laminated glass, which is adhered to
the frame of the window with structural silicone sealant. Insulated
glazing panels (thermo-panels) can be very effective if interior
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with structural silicone sealant. In this case, it is recommended
that the laminated glazing will be made out of heat strengthened
glass. With thermo panels, the outer pane is considered a

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adds to the protection level of the glazing.
Protection is further enhanced if the bite of the curtain wall
frames is increased in order to retain the binding of laminated
glass together with structural silicone sealant is used to adhere
the laminated glass to the frame. This attention to the size of the
bite and the sealant attachment will prevent the entire sheet of
,, : q ,
projectile. The minimal recommended bite is 20mm.
Page 79
The laminated inner glass must be glued to the framing

members with a four sided structural silicone adhesive, preferably
a two-part shop glazed application of structural silicone or
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glass to act as a blast shield and prevent the shattered outer
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the glazing from detaching from the frames and allow the system
to fully realise the energy absorbing capacity of the glass.

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mechanically connected anchorage system further reduces the
likelihood of the glazing system exiting the frame. Mechanical
attachment includes anchoring methods that employ screws
q@JJ J
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or four sides. The mechanical attachment method can be less
aesthetically pleasing when compared to the shop glazed
approach because additional framework is necessary.
Applying these recommendations will provide a basic level
of protection.
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
6.5.3
BALLISTIC PROTECTED WINDOWS
INTRODUCTION
There are many commercially available bullet resistant
windows which meet different protective levels. Only windows
JJJ^q* *,,:@@ ^q:
,
laboratory should be used. The test report must be attached
to the detailed installation drawings enabling installation and
supervision in line with the testing method. Special care should
be taken at the connection of the ballistic protection, the wall and
its supporting frame. Without clear and approved construction
drawings, it is impossible to validate the installation of the
protected windows.
DESIGN OF BALLISTIC PROTECTED WINDOWS
The protective components of the bullet resistant windows
J *, q @@ ^ q:
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most common method of providing ballistic protection in windows
is by combining thick glazing with steel plates which are used to
protect the connecting details to the supporting frame. The test
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with the steel corner protection to ensure that identical products
are installed on site. Some commercial windows use aluminium
or ceramic materials instead of steel plate which is acceptable
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followed.
Standards
The European EN standard should be used.
Refer to Chapter 6.2.4 for details.

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some can be opened either for maintenance or in an emergency.
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because the connection detail to the supports will only involve one
frame. Windows which can be opened usually require two frames
one for the glazing and one for the connection to the supporting
element. While tilt, tilt/turn or sliding windows are available, such
windows will only meet the protective criteria when the windows
are closed and fully locked.
Page 80
Bullet resistant windows can be used as an integral part

of a curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in general it
is recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated concrete
panel or in-situ reinforced concrete wall. The connection detail
between a ballistic protected window and a reinforced concrete
opening is relatively simple, with minimal gaps/holes. The
connection detail to a structural steel frame is also straight forward
q*J , *,,
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in general not recommended.
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
GUIDE SPECIFICATION
GLASS-CLAD POLYCARBONATE
Each unit of glass should be designed for applications where
ballistics performance is primary and optical characteristics are
secondary.
The protected side of window is a mar resistant polycarbonate
with the Threat Side a glass surface.
Each unit should have a nominal overall thickness of 1.25.
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
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Glass Clad Polycarbonate.
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KEY FEATURES OF BULLET-RESISTANT SYSTEMS:
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INSTALLATION
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Follow recommended glazing installations as set forth in:
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Glass Association of North America Glazing Manual.
Compliance with standards for bullet-resistant windows, doors

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Glass Association of North America Sealant Manual.
Wide range of designs.

High level of system security.
Page 81
Page 82
6.5.4
FORCED ENTRY PROTECTED WINDOWS
Forced entry windows can be used as an integral part

of a curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in general
Forced entry resistant windows serve as an integral part it is recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated
of secured buildings, especially on the ground levels. Protection concrete panel or in-situ reinforced concrete. The connection
,^, ,^,: JJ
^ * : detail between forced entry protected windows and a reinforced
resistance level. For comparison, the normal antihousebreaking concrete opening is relatively simple, with minimal gaps/holes.
steel bars commonly found on windows will not withstand more The connection detail to a structural steel frame is also straight
forward but the connection detail to a standard aluminium curtain
than two minutes of forced entry.
,,
*,,
Modern forced entry resistant windows can be designed
with no visible bars or protection elements by using glass
STEEL GRILL
(laminated or polycarbonate), frames and locking mechanisms
JJ @
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It is common to protect windows against forced entry
many commercially available forced entry protected windows by adding steel grills. Although it may not be aesthetically
which meet the various protective levels. Forced entry resistant pleasing, they are usually a cost effective solution that provides
q* ,: @q:
protection when the window is open. The grill must be designed
report from an approved laboratory. The test report must include in accordance with the forced entry standards, including its
detailed installation drawings which will allow the windows to be connection details. There are many commercially available
installed and checked against the tested product. Special care forced entry grills but care must be taken to ensure that they meet
J
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should be taken at the connections between the wall and its
supporting frame and the windows frame and the walls frame.
It is recommended to install the forced entry resistant grill
Without approved construction drawings that include clear details internally to the glass window so that the grill can also act as a
of the protected connections, it will not be possible to validate the catcher system for additional blast protection.
installation of the protected windows as an equivalent product to
the tested sample.
INTRODUCTION
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
DESIGN OF FORCED ENTRY PROTECTED WINDOWS
The protective components of the forced entry windows
J *,q@@ ^q:
,q :J
common method of providing forced entry resistance in windows
is by combining the glazing itself, the connection details between
the glazing and the sub-frame, and the locking mechanism to the
frame of the wall (in the case of opening windows). The test
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mechanism (in the case of opening windows) and the wall
connection of the frame.

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and electric). For every protection level, there is different set of
tools and time limits by which the technicians have to open a
window of a predetermined size. The difference in the standards
is that the US DOS standard is based on a manual set of tools
(mainly against the attack of a massive unorganized mob)
whereas the EN standards are based on the use of electric tools
assuming a smaller and more organized group attempting forced
and silent entry. The project team must make the decision on the
standard that is more suitable for the building in question.
Standards
The US Department of State 12-FAH-5 standard or the
European standard ENV 1630: 1999 should be used.
Refer Chapter 6.2.3 for details.

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be opened are usually designed for maintenance or emergency
| ` , *
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protected windows where the relevant connection details are
limited to one frame only. Where a window opens, it usually
includes two frames one frame for the glazing and one frame
for the connection to the supporting element. While tilt, tilt/turn
or sliding windows are available, such windows will only meet the
protective criteria when the windows are closed and fully locked.
Page 83
DESIGN CRITERIA
See the relevant sections in each of the protected window types:
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Figure 85: Bullet & blast resistant glazing system
Figure 84: Example of a 15 minute forced entry grille design
6.5.5
COMBINED PROTECTION OF WINDOWS
INTRODUCTION
Windows can be designed to meet a combined level
@ + |@, J *
be designed to resist blast loads as well as forced entry and
ballistics. Many designers and manufacturers tend to forget that
in most cases, it is desirable for bullet resistant windows to also
be able to withstand blasts. The addition of blast protection to
6.6
DOORS
bullet resistant windows is usually not complicated and the small
, **,,:@ ^
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against many more threats than just ballistic ones. Another
6.6.1
INTRODUCTION
example of a combined system is a forced entry grill which when
External doors are used mainly for pedestrians, cars and
installed behind basic blast protected windows can provide both
forced entry protection and can be used as a catcher system cargo to enter the building. They can be transparent (made of
glass or other material), single or double and in any shape or
against high blast loads.
size. Doors are an important factor in the overall protection of
Most protected windows can be designed with all three the building, especially against forced entry threats. Doors are
protection capabilities. It is advisable at the design stage to check less important for the envelope protection against blast or ballistic
the differences in costs and appearance of using multi-protection threats, since they cover only a very small percentage of the
faade. They do, however, have a major role in the protection of
JJJ*@ ,^,@

the most vulnerable locations of the building. The main protection
and security roles of doors are:

Protecting the inner parts of the building against silent or

forced entry.
Protecting the inside of the building against blast loads,
bullets and shrapnel.
Preventing splinters or shrapnel from the building materials
from hitting people inside.
Controlling access to the building.
Page 84
Standards
Contradictions between the security guidelines and safety
standards can usually be resolved, For example, an external
door with a panic device which is used for evacuation can
serve also as a forced entry protected door by means of a
magnetic lock system.
The objective of this section is to provide basic protection
design guidelines to enable architects to make decisions about
which doors and building materials to use for any given facility,
based on knowledge and understanding of the relevant design
points and the buildings characteristics as described in Chapter
2. This section relates to all building doors both internal and
external, but the emphasis is on external doors.
6.6.2
EXAMPLES OF VALID DESIGNS
Figure 88: Blast-resistant door after a 22 kg

explosion at 7.6 m
Figure 89: Blast-resistant door after a 100 kg

explosion at 10 m
BLAST PROTECTED DOORS
INTRODUCTION
There are many commercially available blast doors
which meet the various standards for blast loads. Doors can be
* ,: @ q:
@
an approved laboratory. The test report must include detailed
installation drawings allowing for the doors to be installed
and checked against the tested product. Without approved
construction drawings, which include clear details of the protected
connections, it will not be possible to validate the installation of the
protected doors as an equivalent product to the tested sample.
Blast protected doors should be considered for all
exterior doors where blast overpressures may produce conditions
hazardous to people behind them. As blast protected doors are
,^,: ,:
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they are installed when they are facing crowded areas. If this
is not possible, then a catcher system or partitions should be
installed behind the doors.
Doors may be hinged, sliding, double-leaf or any other
@`**,,:@ q,
@ ^
of each of these door types which have been tested and approved.
Doors can be set in concrete walls, installed as part of a curtain
wall design (typically glass doors), installed as part of a special
steel wall, or used in many other ways to complete the overall
protection of the faade.
6.6.3
BALLISTIC PROTECTED DOORS
INTRODUCTION
Ballistic protected doors are typically used at the

entrances to special locations in the building or at specially
protected buildings. Typical locations for ballistic protected doors
include the external guards booth, security control room, treasury
room and interlocking room at the entrance to a secured area or
building. There are many commercially available ballistic doors
Blast protected doors should be considered for all which meet the various protective levels. Ballistic doors can be
sensitive locations such as the central control room, safe areas * ,: @ q:
@
and VIP rooms as they will dramatically reduce the risk to an approved laboratory. The test report must include detailed
occupants and equipment in the facility.
installation drawings allowing for the doors to be installed and
checked against the tested product. Special care should be
DESIGN OF BLAST PROTECTED DOORS
taken with the ballistic protection at the connections between
the wall and its supporting frame. Without approved construction
It is acceptable for the doors to be completely destroyed as drawings, which include clear details of the protected connections,
" #" it will not be possible to validate the installation of the protected
leakage.
doors as an equivalent product to the tested sample. This should
The protected door must be supplied by the manufacturer also include the handles, peep hole and others, which should be
with the complete instructions for implementation within the @@ ^q:
,q :
designed wall. Blast protected door typically open outwards
Standards
and are supported by the frame against positive pressure. The
designer is advised to ensure that the wall and door connection
systems are able to withstand the same or greater blast loads as
the door.
Standards
Blast doors similar to the CD shelter doors meet the basic
level of protection and hence, may be used for basic levels
of protection.
Ballistic doors can be used as an integral part of a

curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in general it is
recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated concrete
panel. The connection detail between ballistic protected doors
and a reinforced concrete opening is relatively simple, with
minimal gaps/holes. The connection detail to structural steel
frame is also straight forward.
Page 85
In many cases ballistic protected doors should also be

blast protected. It is important to check that the ballistic door will
:J*q JJq,,
and its supporting frame. Without approved construction drawings,

which include clear details of the protected connections, it will not
be possible to validate the installation of the protected doors as
an equivalent product to the tested sample.
DESIGN OF BALLISTIC PROTECTED DOORS

The protected door must be supplied by the manufacturer
with the complete instructions for installing it in the designated
wall.
DESIGN OF FORCED ENTRY PROTECTED DOORS
The protective components of the forced entry doors

J *, q @@ ^ q:
,q : J
The protective components of the ballistic door should most common material used to provide forced entry resistance
q @@ ^ q:
,q : J in doors is steel which is extensively used in the plates, ribs and
commonly used protective material in ballistic doors is steel frame. The strength of the connection between the door panel
@, J @ * ,*
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and the frame to ensure that the identical products are installed in J@ *,*
J, @
the site. Ballistic protected doors with glazing should be treated and the locking mechanism.
like ballistic protected windows.
Standards
Ballistic doors can be used as an integral part of a
curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in general it is
recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated concrete
panel. The connection detail between ballistic protected doors
and a reinforced concrete opening is relatively simple, with
minimal gaps/holes. The connection detail to structural steel
+ :
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frames is also straight forward but the connection detail to a
,** * ,,
*, , q:@ ,JJ@
,*,
and electric). For every protection level there is different set of
recommended.
tools and time limits by which the technicians have to open a
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
window of a predetermined size. The difference in the standards
referred to in Section 6.2 is that the US DOS standard is based
on a manual set of tools (mainly against the attack of a massive
unorganized mob) whereas the EN standards are based on the
use of electric tools assuming a smaller and more organized
group attempting forced and silent entry. The project team must
make the decision on the standard that is more suitable for the
building in question.
Forced entry protected doors can be used as an integral
part of a curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in
general it is recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated
concrete panel. The connection detail between forced entry
protected doors and a reinforced concrete opening is relatively
simple, with minimal gaps. The connection detail to a structural
steel frame is also straight forward but the connection detail to
,** * ,,
*, ,
recommended.
6.6.4
FORCED ENTRY PROTECTED DOORS
INTRODUCTION
Forced entry resistance is a basic attribute of every
door. The many doors which are commercially available differ
in their levels of protection. In order to select the correct door, it
is necessary to decide the level of protection required at every
door location in the building. In general, a higher protection level
will be required at the outer envelope doors or special locations,
with the level of protection decreasing as you move towards the
middle of the building.
There are many commercially available forced entry
protected doors which meet the various protective levels. Forced
entry resistant doors can be used only if accompanied by a test

@ @@ ^ ,q : J
report must include detailed installation drawings which will allow
the doors to be installed and checked against the tested product.
Special care should be taken at the connections between the wall
Page 86
DESIGN CRITERIA
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
See the relevant sections in each of the protected door types:
8 transversal steel bars
4 sides locking system
Rigid polystyrene
foam blocs
2/16 (3 mm)
thick plate
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Figure 92: 15 minutes forced entry resistant door
6.6.5
COMBINED PROTECTION FOR DOORS
INTRODUCTION
Doors can be designed to meet combined levels of protection,
for example entry doors in a secured building will typically be
required to withstand forced entry, blasts and ballistics. The level
@ q
q: J *: @ ,
chosen by the project team according to the recommendations in
these guidelines. In most cases, it is desirable for ballsitic doors
to also be able to withstand blasts such as those created by hand
grenades and small explosive devices.
Page 87
7
7.1
BUILDING STRUCTURE
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide general and

local guidelines for the protection of buildings against progressive
collapse. General guidelines relate to the entire construction
scheme of the building, while local guidelines assume the
involvement of a professional protective design/blast consultant
who will develop protection solutions for precise areas of the
q*,q @
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7.2

An explosive charge situated very close to a building
imposes a very high impulse and very high, intense pressure
over a local area. This tends to shatter or shear the structural
materials.
7.3
DESIGN CRITERIA
The fundamental design criteria must ensure that major

damage sustained to the building or any part of it will not result
in progressive collapse. However, a controlled level of casualties
and asset damage may be permissible.
7.3.1
THE BLAST LOAD

The intensity of the blast load on the building is a function
of:
The distance from the centre of the explosion to the building.
The type and quantity of explosive material used.
The structure of the explosive device and its casing/housing.
The ability of the structure, faade or object to resist the
blast pressure, is a function of:
The structural materials.
The section properties of the main structural elements.
The structural spans and the connection details.
The blast load is characterised by an overpressure
shock wave which rapidly expands as a hemispherical pressure
wave from the source of the explosion. The nature of the shock
pressure is a sudden rise of pressure and rapid exponential
decay, followed by a longer and smaller negative phase.
At greater distances the peak pressure rapidly and

,: * |@ , : q* J
area of the building is larger and more structural members will
be exposed to the overpressure. The load on the building will
appear as a concentric ring of differing load intensity.
Page 88
7.4.1
THE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
One approach is to consider the structure as a whole

and design certain areas to redistribute the loads in the event that
a key element is destroyed. This type of approach requires
structural redundancy and increased ductility. The structure
should be able to absorb large displacements, redistributing
the loads over damaged areas.
The systematic approach is relatively simple to
apply for in-situ reinforced concrete beams and columns
structure. Prefabricated columns and beams require special
design that will enable them to have ductile connections
and continuity. Flat slabs construction systems are also
relatively sensitive to progressive collapse and need to be
designed in a special way to enable them some measure
redundancy.
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a distance of 100 feet.
7.3.2
This systematic approach can be combined with a

localised approach (see the next section) which will help protect
the structure against progressive collapse by increasing the
@ @
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on the threat and risk analysis. This concept is covered in the
UFC guidelines9 where the levels of protection correspond to
those in these guidelines according to the following table:
GENERAL GUIDELINES
I. Redundancy The use of redundant lateral and vertical force

resisting systems are highly encouraged. Redundancy tends to
promote an overall more robust structure and helps to ensure
that alternate load paths are available in the case of the failure
of structural element(s). Additionally, redundancy generally
provides multiple locations for yielding to occur, which increases
the probability that damage may be constrained.
NOTE: ^,

J *, * *
design by a protective design/blast consultant.
II. The use of detailing to provide structural continuity and

The following are some examples of design
ductility It is critical that the primary structural elements be
capable of spanning two full spans (i.e., two full bays). This considerations for the systematic approach:
requires beam-to-beam structural continuity across the removed
,* ,, |*, q,: q J @: I. Tie Force requirements (TF)
secondary elements to well beyond their elastic limit without
The design must provide horizontal tie force capabilities for
experiencing structural collapse.
Category S buildings or both horizontal and vertical for Category
III. Capacity for resisting shear failure It is essential that L buildings. If vertical tie cannot be provided, the alternative path
J@:**,,*
J method must be applied to bridge the removed elements.
ductility under an abnormal load event to preclude a shear failure
such as in the case of a structural element failure. When the shear II. Alternative Path requirement (AP)
@:Jq J|*,@:J@ q,:
a sudden, non-ductile failure of the element exists which could The alternative path method must be used when a vertical
element cannot provide the required strength. This is not relevant
potentially lead to a progressive collapse of the structure.
for very low or low levels of protection, but for medium and high
levels of protection, alternative paths will need to be planned for
@
,
7.4
PROGRESSIVE COLLAPSE PREVENTION
III.Additional ductility requirement

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,
local failure from element to element, eventually resulting in the Category M and H buildings.
of it. Progressive collapse occurs, for example, when the loss
of one column results in the collapse of a portion of the building.
There are two general approaches to design against progressive
collapse. The systematic approach considers the building as
a whole while the localised approach focuses on strengthening
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UFC 4-023-03, 25 Jan 2005 and Progressive Collapse Analysis

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Modernization Projects June 2003
Page 89
EXAMPLES OF DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE

SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
7.4.2
THE LOCALISED APPROACH
The localised approach to design against progressive

collapse focuses on strengthening and protecting key elements
of the structure by analysing their expected behaviour for a given
threat and stand-off distance. For example, pre-fabricated load
bearing walls with proper connection details can resist very high
concentrated loads. Another example is a special design for the
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This section discusses columns, beams and loadbearing walls in the external faade of the building, primarily on
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in underground parking will be discussed separately.
7.4.3
COLUMN PROTECTION
This section considers a detonation of an explosive

charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater. In general, the
structure should be designed in such a way as to ensure that the
loss of one column will not cause a progressive collapse. The
localised approach is to design the column against local failure.
Actual car bombs events and recent tests demonstrate
that columns constructed from reinforced concrete or structural
steel has a relatively high resistance in the case of close
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to the resistance of the column.
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR COLUMN PROTECTION
Shielding Columns should be located internally behind the
external wall, enabling the external wall faade to shield the
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the external wall, with the narrow side of the column facing
the external threat. It is not recommended to design exposed
external columns.
Sleeve A sleeve is an external casing cover that will appears
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some of the blast energy and to reduce concrete crushing due
to the detonation. This failure mechanism of the column with
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are ductile and able to absorb large plastic displacement. The
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steel casing concrete with steel columns, which have a very high
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be promising.
Page 90
Detailing J *: ,*, J *

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spans must take into consideration the loss of lateral support for
the column. Shear reinforcement in the column is important for
close detonation of explosives.
Page 91
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR COLUMN PROTECTION

CLOSE DETONATION
charge at a distance of between 1 and 3 metres. A closer
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structure should be designed in such a way as to ensure that the
loss of one column will not result in progressive collapse. Special
care should be given to corner columns. If a localised approach
is adopted, the column should be designed against local failure.
Details on shielding and sleeve protection can be found in Figure
105: Reinforced concrete column with steel sleeve.
In the event of a close detonation, the column may be
locally damaged prior to or together with the dynamic response
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distance, the charge and the type of the sleeve. A well designed
sleeve can prevent this phenomenon. Otherwise, the area
which is at risk should be redesigned including the possibility of
increasing the surface area of the column section.
GUIDELINES FOR DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Loads on the columns could be calculated using the
Conwep software package or other approved software. Dynamic
analysis using a Single Degree of Freedom (SDOF) or Multiple
Degree of Freedom (MDOF) model should be undertaken for
the column and using a permissible ductility of 2 for reinforced
concrete and steel columns. The equivalent reaction should be
calculated and the maximum shear capacity of the column must
prove to be greater than or equal to the applied shear forces.
7.4.4
WALL PROTECTION
charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater from a load-bearing
wall constructed of reinforced concrete, however, a load bearing
pre-fabricated wall could also be considered. A distance of 1-3
metres is considered a close detonation.
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR WALL PROTECTION
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energy applied to the wall. It is recommended to shield the load
bearing walls.
Detailing Shear reinforcement, double mesh arrangement,
vertical and horizontal continuity in the supports and details are
all equivalent to the reinforcement details of the standard home
shelters in Singapore. The wall should be supported against the
slabs and a mechanical support is recommended to allow the
direct shear forces to be applied to the supporting slab edges. A
bite of 10cm or more is recommended. If mechanical support
is not possible, the wall should be connected by means of shear
studs that will transfer the applied horizontal forces to the slabs.
Page 92

Loads on the walls could be calculated using the Conwep
software package or similar. Dynamic analysis using a SDOF or
MDOF model should be undertaken for the wall panel, using a
permissible ductility of 4 for reinforced concrete. The equivalent
reaction should be calculated and the maximum shear capacity
of the wall must prove to be greater than or equal to the applied
shear forces.
7.4.5
BEAM PROTECTION
charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater. A closer distance will
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CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR BEAM PROTECTION
Geometry - It is recommended that beams are positioned
internally behind the external wall, thereby enabling the external
wall faade to shield it. If this is not possible, the beam should
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design transfer beams or columns and leaving them exposed as
was demonstrated during the Oklahoma City event. However,
exposed transfer beams may be designed but it is advisable for
calculations to be undertaken by physical protection experts who
can take into account the effects of blast loads.
Figure 118: An illustration of the Oklahoma City event showing

the crater and the exposed columns and beams
Detailing The continuity of the beam is critical, primarily along

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spans must take into consideration the possibility that the vertical
support for the beam may be lost. Shear reinforcement of the
beam is important for its protection against close detonation of
explosives.
Loads on the beam could be calculated using the
Conwep software package or other approved software. Dynamic
analysis using a SDOF or MDOF model should be undertaken
using a permissible ductility of 2 for reinforced concrete and steel
beams.
Page 93
7.4.6
SLAB PROTECTION
charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater. The main slab to be
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slab may be exposed to high lifting forces.
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR SLAB PROTECTION
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shield the slab. If this is not possible, the external wall faade
should be designed from standard wall panels such as a nonload bearing prefabricated wall panels with small openings. Light
frangible faade such as non-protected curtain wall, will not shield
the slab and lifting of the slab is possible.
Detailing Double mesh arrangement, continuity in all the
supports should be equivalent to the reinforcement details of Civil
Defence (CD) home shelters.
Page 94
SECURITY SYSTEMS
The objective of this chapter is to provide basic security Security systems are usually used for the following purposes:
design guidelines that will enable architects and electric system
engineers to make the right decisions when choosing the Detect illicit activities or intrusions.
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Warn designated security personnel of hostile activity and/or
when deciding on its positioning throughout the building.
breaches of security to the building.
Technical and electronic systems such as CCTV and
alarm systems are part of every modern building plan and are Monitoring of activity in sensitive or vulnerable locations.
considered basic. These security systems which are installed
Recording activities for future investigations.
throughout the building usually consist of:
End points, which are the systems data gathering sensors

(e.g. detectors, cameras, etc.).
Base points, which receive and process all the input gathered
by their systems end point (e.g. CCTV matrix, alarm system).
Cabling, infrastructure and wireless channels.
The systems are usually meant to assist in the

implementation of the building maintenance plan, the
administration plan or the security plan. Some systems are
dedicated to serve one of these plans while others play two or
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electronic security systems into the overall electrical design of the
building has many advantages. It will help to assure that the end
points are positioned in a manner that enables them to perform in
the best way. It will also help to assure that the systems cabling
will be installed in such a way that will make it as unnoticeable as
possible and that the spaces and features in which the systems
are meant to be located are adequate, and will not hamper their
performance.
Deterrence.
Replacing or supporting human security resources for cost

effectiveness.
Assuring the proper function of physical security elements.
When planning the security systems layout for a building,

it is recommended to take into account possible future upgrades
and enhancements of the systems capabilities. Such planning
should enable the system at least 50% growth and should include
extra deployment and installation of alternatives for the system
and added infrastructure that will enable the installation of more
end points. This pre-planning will allow the buildings security to
conduct low-cost future upgrades when necessary.
8.1
This chapter contains information on security systems

and security related systems, located in the various parts of a
building development. The Protection Recommendation Tables
(PRT) in Chapter 4, mention a list of protection elements that can
be found in this chapter. Each protection element is described in
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If desired, protection elements in this chapter can be implemented

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security products made by different manufacturers. Only a PRT. For each element, the levels of protection are mentioned
relatively small number of these systems are tested and approved and standards are described. The level of detail provided is
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to provide basic knowledge and to assist in the procurement
These technical systems are usually not considered to be life
procedure to ensure that the right demands are made of suppliers
saving systems but are operated as support systems that and/or protection engineers.
give an extra value to the security deployment of a building. It
is therefore advised that the project team consider whether their The following protection elements appear in this chapter:
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usually more expensive). In some cases non-approved systems
might be adequate for performing a minor supportive role.
Early planning of the systems will also allow important
coordination between the building domain, the human domain
and the technology domain. This will assure minimal changes
and additions once the building is occupied and hence avoid
additional and unnecessary security costs.
Security systems, unlike physical protection elements,

have a relatively moderate life span (usually not more the 10
years). It is therefore advisable to design the relevant parts in
the buildings infrastructure to enable changing and updating of
these systems at minimal extra expenses and / or damage to the
buildings.
Page 95
8.2
SECURITY CONTROL ROOM
8.2.1
The security control room design must allow it to function

as an effective tool for managing the security operations of the
building in both routine and emergency situations. In order
to perform its tasks, the security control room must have the
following capabilities:
INTRODUCTION
The security command control room is the nerve centre
of security operations for a building and should receive and
provide vital information to and from the security personnel on Collecting all the data required in order to formalise a clear and
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routine and emergency situations.
The data received and presented should relate to, among other
things, any regular and irregular activities, crowd concentrations
An effective control room that focuses on relevant and security related incidents. The data should be collected
threats can make the difference between a proper response during both routine and emergency situations.
and chaos, once an incident has been initiated.
A buildings security operation should be aimed at both
crime and terror prevention. The level of effectiveness in which
crime and terror prevention operations are carried out is greatly
dependant on the capabilities of the control room and its operating
staff.
A typical control room should contain all of the main
operating stations of the security systems installed throughout
the building. The control room should also contain sub-stations
of several of the buildings management systems such as the airconditioning and lift control systems. Some of these substations
should have overriding authority over the main station, whereas
others can have regular operating capabilities or should be limited
to view only.
The following systems should be included in a security
control room:

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cutting down the number of monitors that need to be watched
and prioritising inputs received from the security cameras and the
alarm system in a way that will make sure that only real incidents
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include:
Communicating information to both staff and visitors in
emergency situations.
Assisting in and monitoring the evacuation of the
buildings occupants when necessary.
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responders while they are performing their respective
responsibilities.
Operate in full function during post attack periods.
8.2.2
8.2.3
DESIGN OF A SECURITY CONTROL ROOM
GENERAL
I.
It is recommended to design the control room as a
dedicated unit (i.e. that it will not serve a dual purpose as both a
security control room and an access control guard post).
II.
The security control room should have a direct connection
to or integrated with the buildings management systems that are
considered to be critical or security related (e.g. air conditioning
systems). This is meant to enable the security control room staff
to override or control these systems when the situation requires
it10.
III.
Protection and backup of all critical systems is required
in order to allow the security systems to continue operating
during emergency situations in which the security control room is
damaged and during events of power failure.
Page 96
IV.
The security control room plays a critical role in a buildings
security deployment. It is therefore recommended to design its
protection in a robust manner. The purpose of these measures
is to make the security control room able to withstand an attack
either against the building it occupies or a direct attack against
the security control room and continue to function both during
and after the emergency. The entrance to the security control
room should be equipped with an access control system and
forced entry. These measures are meant to ensure that no
un-authorised persons will gain access to the security control
room.
V.
The lighting in the control room should be designed in a
way that will ensure that it does not cause glare on the various
monitors. For this purpose, it is recommended that the control
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VI.
The security control room should be equipped with a
working surface that is positioned in way that will allow the security
control room operator to have a good view of the monitors.
VII.
The security control room should be equipped with
emergency power and lighting to enable it to continue to function
during power failures.
VIII.
The security control room should be equipped with
a climate control system. This is meant to help create a more
comfortable working environment that will assist the security
control room operators to stay alert, especially during night-time
and long shifts.
IX.
The security control room should be supplied by at least
two separate power lines. One dedicated to security systems
while the other for administrative purposes.
CCTV MONITORS & RECORDERS

I.
The number of constantly viewed monitors should be
limited to a minimum and should not exceed 8 images per person.
The images for each person could either be presented on a single
large monitor or on several smaller ones.
II.
The minimal image size is 10.
III.
The monitors should be located in a way that allows the
person in the control room to perform his regular duties (phone,
log book, access control) and monitor the cameras without
interference.
IV.
All data received by the systems (CCTV, alarm, access
control) should be recorded for post incident investigation. The
required recording rate (FPS), the recordings resolution, and
the period that the recordings are stored for, should follow the
guidelines in Section 8.7. It is important to note that issues
pertaining to data storage have implications both on operational
matters (e.g. face recognition) and on administrative matters (e.g.
amount of space required for holding the equipment).
ALARM
I.
Indication of alarms, transferred to the security control
room, should appear in the most accurate way possible. Alarm
indications are required to relay the exact location of the breach
or event to the security control room operator. Each indication
should also be accompanied by a visual picture of the location
where the breach or event is taking place.
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
X.
When planning the security control room, there is a need
to designate an area for administrative proposes. This area
should be planned and positioned in a way that will ensure that
any activities conducted within do not interfere with the security
control rooms regular operation and in emergencies.
XI.
The control room should be equipped with a dedicated
phone line that has a direct external line.
10
It is not recommended to have both the security systems and the

buildings management systems installed in the same room.
Figure 123: Example of a bad design
Figure 124: Example of a good design
EQUIPMENT ROOM
I.
It is recommended to place other electrical equipment
used by the security control systems that are located in the
security control room, in an adjoining but separate room.
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allow cabling to be installed.
III.
A concentration of electrical equipment in a closed room
can cause the temperature in the room to rise considerably. The
rise in temperature may even damage the electrical systems
causing them to fail. It is therefore recommended to install climate
control systems in the equipment room.
Figure 125: Equipment room
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control room and its adjoining equipment room (where applicable)
must be of a kind that, if operated, will not cause damage to the
electrical equipment.
V.
It is recommended that both the security control room
and (where applicable) the adjoining equipment room, should not
have water pipes running through them.
Page 97
8.3
8.3.1
INTERCOM AND COMMUNICATION

SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
An intercom is a private telecommunication system that

allows people from two or more locations to communicate with
each other. Although usually considered administrative systems,
intercom systems and other similar communication systems
play an important role in a buildings security deployment. This
is especially true with regards to access control. The intercom
system enables the personnel operating the access controlled
doors or gates to communicate with the people wishing to enter
the building, without exiting the relatively secure inner area in
which they are positioned (whether it is located inside the building
or in an external security post).
There are many types of systems that can be used as an intercom
system, these include:

Standard point to point intercom system (party line systems).

Matrix systems.
Videophone systems.
Wireless systems.
Telephone based systems and others.
8.3.2
VI.
When designing a non-matrix intercom system for
access control, it is important to make sure that the systems
cabling enables communications between the unit installed at the
access point and the units installed both at the access control
point and the security control room.
VII.
Most intercom systems need to undergo maintenance on
a regular basis. It is therefore recommended to install them at a
location that will allow for the maintenance work to be conducted
in a convenient manner.
VIII.
Exterior intercom units should be protected against
environmental conditions such as temperature, humidity and rain.
IX.
Exterior intercom units should be designed with antivandalism measures.
X.
Intercom units that are installed at vehicle entrances
should be designed in a way that will not require drivers to exit
their car in order to operate them. For example a call initiator
can be connected to a detector that operates it as soon as a car
approaches the designated area.
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window openings could potentially stop radio communication
with emergency responders who are inside the building. With
the installation of cell enhancers, communication by radio among
emergency responders becomes possible between the interior
and exterior of the building and within the building between the
different storeys including basement levels.
Standards
The system should comply with the relevant construction
and electricity related standards.
8.3.4
8.3.3
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
DESIGN OF AN INTERCOM AND

COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
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levels should be set after taking into consideration the noise
levels of the operating environment (e.g. an intercom located on
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installed in a room).
II.
The applied levels of both volume and background

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distance that the users will be from the unit while operating it
(e.g. an intercom used by drivers in their cars requires a different
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entrance).
III.
It is recommended to combine intercom units employed
for use in access control, with CCTV coverage, and proper
lighting. This will enable the security personnel to screen incoming
persons in a more effective manner.
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system for security purposes, it is important to check whether
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adequate for use in the buildings environment.
V.
Electric infrastructure might create interference with
the intercom systems audio signals. This occurs if the two
systems are positioned too close to each other. It is therefore
recommended to maintain proper separation between intercom
lines and other electric lines.
Page 98
8.4.3
DESIGN OF A PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM
I.
A building should always have one PA system that can
be controlled from the security control room.
II.
Access to the PA system should be provided to the
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for evacuation.
Figure 128: Combined video/ intercom/ access control unit
Figure 129 :Point to point videophone unit
Desk
Videophone
Unit
Desk Unit
III.
The system should include pre-recorded messages in all
relevant languages covering the required response to the various
attack scenarios.
IV.
The speaker coverage should be complete and cover
each and every room.
V.
The system should be easy to operate under emergency
situations.
Switchboard
Access
Controller
Electric lock
Standards
The system should comply with the construction and
electricity related standards.
Door
videophone
Unit
Master Unit
Figure 130: Typical point to point intercom system layout
8.4
PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM
8.4.1
INTRODUCTION
The public address (PA) system plays an essential role

when it comes to emergency procedures. During emergency
situations the system can be used to convey life-saving
instructions to the general public. The PA system must be
designed as an integrated part of the buildings intercom system
and other security systems. A typical PA system will include the
following:

Indoor / outdoor speakers

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Microphone
Area division panel (to be able to address parts of the building
individually)
8.4.2
8.5
ALARM SYSTEM
8.5.1
INTRODUCTION
Alarm systems installed in buildings and/or complexes

are aimed at detecting both unlawful intrusion and lawful entry

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a combination of elements (sensors, keyboards, control units
and others) that create a smart system. This smart system
is programmed to be able to monitor various parameters, which
may include, but are not limited to, the following: opening of doors
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shifts in temperature; change in lighting etc. The type and number
of parameters monitored by the system can vary and should be
designed according to the requirements of the buildings security
plan.
An alarm system will usually consist of:
Detectors of various types
Keyboards
Control Units
Display units
Diallers
Cabling
Sirens
Backup batteries
Optional remote controls/ wireless items / signal lights
There are many types of anti-intrusion detectors that are
used to protect different types of areas throughout different types
of complexes and buildings. The following are some examples of
the various detector types:
PERIMETER LINE DETECTORS
Protecting a perimeter line and fencing is usually done
using smart fences which are fences with detection systems
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alert when someone or something attempts to cross the fence
line.
Page 99
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DETECTORS
8.5.2
8.5.3
DESIGN OF AN ALARM SYSTEM
I.
The type of detector that is to be used should only be
determined after all location (e.g. indoors, outdoors etc.) and
environmental (e.g. humidity, temperature etc.) issues have been
taken into consideration.
II.
An alarm system should include several types of
detectors.
III.
Cabling for alarm detectors should always be installed in
a protected manner.
IV.
It is recommended to avoid installing detectors with a
relatively high false alarm rate. A high false alarm rate (more
then one false alarm per week for the whole system) will reduce
the effectiveness of the system and add to the probability that a
true alarm will be ignored.
V.
The display unit should provide clear information as to
which zone and detector were set off. A smart system should
clearly display the zone and detector on a computerised map of
the protected site. A standard system may display the information
on the keypad unit.
Page 100
VI.
Alarm systems should have two sets of detectors

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are supposed to be permanently closed (e.g. emergency exits),
and (b) day/ night detectors, that are installed on doors that are
regularly opened during day/ activity hours but closed during after

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manner. The two sets of detectors should be designed to sound/
give out different types of alarms at different situations (e.g. a
buzzer during the day and siren at night).
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inputs received from the detectors (e.g. sounding different alarms
for different amount of weight applied to weight sensors).
VIII.
An alarm system should include a dialler so that it would
be able to alert response forces in case of a breach. A siren or
other alarm element should be considered.
IX.
Magnetic or mechanical switches that are installed on
window frames are an effective tool to make sure that windows
are closed after hours. However, it must be noted that they are
not able to detect situations in which the windows glass is broken.

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equipment.
XI.
All external openings that can be reached by people
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ground level openings and those openings that can be reached
by climbing.
XII.
It is recommended that an independent expert in the
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alarm system.
Standards
8.5.4
EXAMPLES
Page 101
Figure 132: Example of an alarm system layout
8.6
8.6.1
ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION
Access control is the ability to determine who may and The measures must still facilitate access to the building by
the disabled.
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a fundamental principle of access management, and an important
aspect of any effective security system. When applying access
When designing an access management plan, developers
control, the following issues need to be taken into account:
should analyse which areas and assets need to be protected by
access control measures. After deciding which areas and assets
The number of entrances to the building/installation should should be protected, the proper measures need to be selected
and deployed. Entry-point screening is typically employed at the
be minimised.
Identifying and deciding areas to which access should be entrance to secure/ non-public areas. This type of screening can
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limited.
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physical screening (e.g. people, bags, vehicle, etc.), x-ray
screening, weapons detection measures, explosives detection
protection and safety systems.
measures, and chemical/ biological agent detection measures.
Page 102
The security related access control system must be

designed together with the other security systems. This section
will relate to access control systems while other access control
issues can be found in Section 5.4.
Access control is a combination of physical elements
and security procedures. The physical access control measures
usually include the following and more:
8.6.4
EXAMPLES OF DESIGN
Camera
Door closer

Card readers.
Control panels for opening doors.
Electromagnetic locks.
Electric locks.
Emergency escape buttons (glass break).
Open door detectors (magnetic switches).
Access control management software.
Access control management stations.
A door closer.
8.6.2
Intercom
switch
Access Controller

Figure 133: An example of a typical access controlled door layout
8.6.3
DESIGN OF AN ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM
I.
All external doors that are used on a regular basis but
should be closed to the general public would require access
control.
II.
All access controlled doors should be equipped with a
closer.
III.
If in doubt, infrastructure should be prepared to
allow access control measures to be deployed, as adding the
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IV.
The main entrance doors should be equipped with an
automatic locking mechanism allowing external guards to lock the
doors if an emergency situation occurs outside.
V.
A door that is supposed to be protected against forced
entry must be equipped with an electromagnetic lock rather than
an electric lock.
Standards
8.7
CCTV SYSTEM
8.7.1
INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of a CCTV system is to support

and enable the overall management of a buildings security. Video
surveillance facilities are an aid to security monitoring, especially
of vulnerable or sensitive areas. CCTV systems may also act as
an investigative tool as a post-incident source of evidence, or
may deter potential criminals/terrorists if they perceive that their
actions are being monitored. However, the CCTV system does
not perform an active protective role and should not be designed
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must work in conjunction with other security measures (e.g.
access controls, alarm systems, etc.).
THESE GUIDELINES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE
FOR A UNIFORM AND CONSISTENT APPROACH TO
THE RECOMMENDED SPECIFICATION, INSTALLATION,
OPERATION AND PERFORMANCE OF CCTV SYSTEMS
ACROSS BUILDINGS IN SINGAPORE.
Given the dynamic CCTV market, these guidelines will
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system but relate to general concepts and design considerations
that should be taken into account when developing a buildings
CCTV system.
AS THERE ARE MANY CCTV OPTIONS AVAILABLE ON
THE MARKET, IT IS RECOMMENDED TO EMPLOY A
PROFESSIONAL CONSULTANCY WHEN DESIGNING CCTV
SYSTEMS.
Page 103
8.7.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
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non-authorised users. In addition to these, it may be good to
install PTZ cameras (especially in areas where there may be
mass congregations or main thoroughfares) to allow the security
surveillance operators to pan, tilt or zoom as and when required.
MONITORS
I.
All monitors should be capable of displaying colour
images and have appropriate adjustment controls (e.g. contrast,
brightness, sharpness, etc.).
II.
The displayed picture on monitors should be sharply

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free of noise, interference or pulsing effects.
III.
Monitor sizes should be appropriate for the intended
viewing distance within the room housing the viewing facilities.
The system should allow multi-view display on CCTV monitors.
RECORDING EQUIPMENT
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capacity to enable the continuous 24-hour recording of each
camera and archival of at least 28 days, with an additional 10%
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be kept to replace those seized by security agencies for post
incident investigations.
II.
The system should have duplex multiplexing capability or
greater. This is meant to allow simultaneous image recording and
playback. The system should be designed in a way that enables
playback of footage without causing interruption to the recording
process.
III.
The system integrator or vendor should propose codecs
to achieve optimal compression ratios while ensuring no or little
loss of image/ video quality (e.g. MPEG4 and M-JPEG2000).
The video container format proposed for the DVR recorded
images and viewer software should be open-source container
formats and/or common multi-media container formats (e.g. *.avi
(Microsoft), *.mov (Apple QuickTime), *.mp4 (MPEG)).
8.7.3
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
CAMERAS
I.
The CCTV system should consist of multiple cameras
distributed throughout the building to give comprehensive
coverage of all common areas11 JJ ,^,
II.
Cameras in common areas should be situated where
they cannot be easily evaded, damaged or obscured and should
be clearly visible to members of the public. Where headroom is
restricted and cameras may obstruct public passage, cameras
should be mounted in recesses so as to avoid the possibility of
injury to members of the public.
III.
Cameras located in vulnerable locations should be
protected against vandalism by means of vandal resistant
materials and design (e.g. vandal-resistant enclosures with non^J[,^@
IV.
All cameras should provide colour images to maximise
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offenders.
V.
Cameras should be suitable for internal or external use
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and view in all weather conditions.
IV.
An authentication mechanism should be included to
ensure the integrity of all recordings by allowing for detection
of any alteration or tampering (e.g. watermarking). This should
include the recording of the camera ID and date and time
(synchronised from a single source), which must not be adjustable
by the operator.
QUALITY OF RECORDED IMAGES
I.
Images captured by the CCTV cameras should be
recorded using digital video recorders (recommendation subject
to change with future advancements in technology).
II.
The footage collected by each camera should be
recorded at a minimum of 6 frames per second (for indoor) or
12 frames per second (for outdoor). In addition, the capability to
record from selected or designated cameras in real time mode at
25 frames per second would be useful.
III.
The recording equipment should be able to record colour
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quality meeting a resolution of at least 4CIF or equivalent.
11
These include general access locations such as main entrance

lobbies, corridors, taxi stands, car parks, pavements, streets within the
developments boundary line.
Page 104
IV.
The recorded image should at all times be accurate,
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normal lighting. For reduced lighting or emergency lighting
conditions, the recorded image should minimally be an accurate

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Table16: Summary of Recommendations for Key Areas
PLAYBACK FACILITIES
I.
The CCTV system should provide for the playback,
removal or transfer of any image from any camera recorded up to
28 days prior (in a controlled environment).
EXPANSION CAPABILITY
I.
The installed CCTV system should be designed to
allow for future expansion or additional capacity with minimum
disruption to the working system.
COVERAGE AT KEY AREAS
I.
Common Areas Comprehensive coverage throughout
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behaviour. This includes general access areas such as main
entrance lobbies, street areas, pavements, car parks and vehicle
boarding and alighting points such as taxi stands, bus-stops and
vessel docking points within the developments boundaries. For
hotel premises, coverage should include to the lobby, front desk,
concierge, entrance/exit points and corridors. General views
should meet a minimum image height at Detection (10%R) level
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II.
Entrances & Exits - All external public access doors,
emergency exits and vehicle entrances/exits (e.g. at the gantry
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a clear, unobstructed image of all persons entering/exiting
through them (frontal view). The cameras must be mounted at a
suitable height (e.g. where they cannot be evaded, damaged or
obscured) looking towards, rather than down at the doorway or
driver, and meet a minimum image height of Enhanced Detection
(20%R) level. For buildings with sizeable open areas included
in its boundary, the minimum image height would be Recognition
(50%R) level.
III.
Lifts For lifts which act as alternate entry and exit points
to the building, frontal view of the lift doors for people entering the
building and general views of the associated lift lobby areas are
to be monitored at Enhanced Detection (20%R) level.
IV.
Checkpoints For locations that involve security checks
or registration before people are granted permission to proceed
further into the building like checkpoints and ticket issuance
counters, the CCTV system should capture the frontal view of
people at Recognition (50%R) level.
8.7.4
INSTALLATION & OPERATION
INSTALLATION OF THE CCTV SYSTEM

I.
The positions of the cameras should be carefully
planned and located to provide the required coverage with the
minimum number of cameras. Account should be taken of the
effect that periods of maximum human density may have on the
achievement of the operational requirement.
II.
Notices strategically located around the building should
V.
Sensitive areas These include rooms or open areas be provided to inform members of the public that the CCTV
that house important and critical equipment, documents, system is being continuously monitored and recorded.
property and people e.g. warehouses, locker facilities, etc. In
particular, cameras should also cover facilities involving monetary
transactions, such as at banks, money changers and ATM
machines locations. Cameras at these areas should be installed
with a minimum image height of Enhanced Detection (20%R).
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upon activation of the alarm, trigger the display of the image of
the relevant camera(s) automatically on a dedicated monitor.
Page 105
CCTV OPERATING STAFF

The shift patterns adopted for the CCTV operating staff
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image quality (both monitor view and the recorded image) should of the staff.
be taken and reviewed by the buildings Security Manager, to
The CCTV operating staff should undergo the appropriate
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training as stipulated by the buildings Security Manager for
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security personnel. They should rudimentarily be taught what to
IV.
If the same proprietor owns adjacent buildings, it would look out for and be able to react when a potential incident occurs,
be useful for each buildings CCTV system to include the capability to monitor the event accurately and not lose information that
could be pertinent to any future investigation.
of accessing images from the adjacent locations as well.
V.
To facilitate incident management by Emergency
Agencies during a crisis situation, it would be good to provide
capabilities for the Emergency Agencies mobile command post
to retrieve live images for remote viewing. This could include up
to 3 video output channels and one control port extended to, and
terminated at the room housing the buildings viewing facilities.
VI.
The storage facilities for the CCTV systems should
be capable of keeping the recordings in a secure environment
protected from excessive moisture and dust, with preventive
measures against unauthorised removal or viewing of the
recordings. The location of the recording and storage facilities
should be decided on a local risk assessment which takes into
account security and crime-related risks, and should be sited in the
inner parameter of the building and away from vehicular access.
If the location of these facilities is located in the inner parameter
of the building but still deemed to be high-risk (e.g. open to public
access), then it is recommended that the room be built with
adequate reinforcement/protection to withstand the explosion
of a 10kg TNT or equivalent charge (with fragmentations) at a
distance of 5 meters away.
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Procedures (SOPs) in place for reference and to conduct regular
refreshers to ensure that the CCTV operating staff are familiar
with the SOPs.
8.7.5
ESSENTIAL SUPPORT
POWER SOURCE
I.
Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) with at least 30
minutes of backup capacity should be provided for the CCTV
system.
II.
The CCTV system should feature an alert system for
loss of power or image due to technical failure.
LIGHTING FOR CCTV
I.
The building should be provided with adequate lighting
24/7 to ensure that quality coloured images for facilitating
monitoring, investigation and prosecution are captured.
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In the event of lighting failures, the CCTV system should
the requirements of the CCTV system (e.g. in terms of the be capable of producing images that will enable evacuation of
maximum number of concurrent feeds).
the building to be effectively managed under emergency lighting
conditions.
USE OF THE CCTV SYSTEM
MAINTENANCE AND AUDIT OF CCTV SYSTEM
I.
Within the CCTV viewing facility, the operator should be
able to select any camera picture for display on any monitor at any I.
The CCTV system should be supported by a maintenance
time or alternatively to set up a scanning sequence as desired. regime that ensures the operational requirements are consistently
The dwell time of the scanning sequence should be adjustable.
met and availability of all parts of the system are maximised.
System availability should be set at 95% over a 12 month time
II.
The camera selection control system should allow rapid frame.
selection of any camera using minimum manual effort and be
consistent across the CCTV network.
II.
The quality of the visual and recorded images should
be monitored and compared to a set of auditing standards,
III.
The CCTV system should include a default settings implemented by the buildings Security Manager. Any deterioration
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auto reset to their original position after a pre-determined time
duration.
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24 hours, or sooner if the fault results in serious loss of CCTV
IV.
Any one user selecting a live image (feed) should not coverage.
preclude other users selecting the same live image (feed), or any
other live images (feed) on the same system.
IV.
The buildings Security Manager should also be
responsible for auditing the correct implementation of the CCTV
V.
For viewing of recorded images, the recording equipment system to meet the operational requirements and identify any
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, improvements (if necessary).
forward, rewind, record, stepping frame, visual search forward
& reverse, speed search and stop.
VI.
The camera ID and the date and time should be displayed
on monitors in a single imposition and for the recorded image
be located where it is least likely to obscure or interfere with the
image of the main subject.
VII.
The numbering of cameras and the associated recording
sequence should be carefully planned in order to facilitate both
the rapid and seamless tracking of targets movement and the
speedy retrieval of recorded images.
Page 106
8.7.6
DEFINING AND MEASURING FIELDS OF VIEW

FOR CCTV SYSTEM
CATEGORIES OF VIEW
I.
Fields of view required for CCTV systems are described
by four categories of view as follows:
a)
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the available screen height. Following an alert an observer can,
after a search, ascertain with a high degree of certainty whether
or not a person is visible in the pictures displayed to him.
b)
Enhanced Detection (ED)- Following an alert
an observer can, after a search, ascertain with a high degree
of certainty whether or not a person is visible in the pictures
displayed to him. It must be noted that Enhanced Detection
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measure.
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least 50% of the screen height, viewers can say with a high
degree of certainty whether or not the individual shown is the
same as someone they have seen before.
d)
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at least 120% of the screen height, picture quality and detail is
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beyond reasonable doubt.
THIS GUIDELINE OF RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR

CCTV SYSTEMS FOR BUILDINGS HAS BEEN JOINTLY
PRODUCED BY HOMEFRONT SECURITY DIVISION AND
SINGAPORE POLICE FORCE OF THE MINISTRY OF HOME
AFFAIRS, SINGAPORE.
II.
The categories are measured by relating the views to
the image height of a standard test target 1.6 m high. When the
8.7.7
REFERENCES
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London Underground Limited - Station Surveillance
said to be 100%R., where R is the abbreviation of Rotakin. I.
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CCTV Standard (Reference No: 2-03066-004, version A3, dated
July 2005);
as follows:
a)
Detection - Not less than 10% R.
b)
Enhanced Detection (ED)-Not less than 20%

R.
c)
Recognition - Not less than 50% R.
d)
+ - Not less than 120% R.
II.
Video Surveillance System (VSS) Standard For Bus
Interchanges (Version 3.0, dated July 2006);
III.
Video Surveillance System (VSS) Standard For Mass
Rapid Transit (MRT) Stations (Version 3.0, dated July 2006);
IV.
Building a Building Security Code (BSC) Framework in
Singapore (Version 7.0, dated 18 Aug 2006);
CCTV Cameras Standards for Police Establishments

III.
For Detection (10%R) and Enhanced Detection (20%R), V.
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,: (Version : 3.0, dated 22 Dec 2006);
above the threshold of human sensitivity and that the picture is
VI.
Draft for Public Australian Comment Standard AS
not unduly cluttered with non-targets.
4806.1 Closed Circuit Television, Management & Operation Code
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is assumed that the angle of view and lighting is suitable and no
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out of focus is evident.
V.
It should however be noted that these measurement
guidelines were originally set up using a fully analogue PAL system
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into the digital domain. For digital systems, consideration should
be given to the number of pixels on target when attempting
to categorise the level of detail required in the image. It is also
important to examine the recorded picture quality to ensure that
the picture quality is not reduced due to the image compression
technology.
Page 107
8.8
SECURITY LIGHTING FOR CCTV
SYSTEMS
This section discusses the lighting requirements
for security systems including CCTV. For general lighting
considerations, please see Section 5.7.
8.8.1
INTRODUCTION

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seen. From a security point of view, lighting that is strategically
placed can increase the effectiveness of CCTV systems and
guard work while reducing the chance of criminal acts occurring
in the illuminated area. The basic level of lighting should allow the
security deployment (CCTV and guards) to identify a human face
from a distance of about 10 metres.
8.8.4
If the area is intended to be used during the hours of
darkness, the lighting system should provide adequate visibility
for the intended night time operation. Pedestrian walkways, back
lanes and access routes open to public areas should have a basic
level of lighting. Inset spaces, signs, entrances and exits should
be adequately lit so that CCTV coverage would provide a clear
picture.
Security lighting is employed in order to increase the
visibility around perimeter lines, buildings, and sensitive locations.
It is a security management tool that is applicable in almost all
environments within an urban development. Proper lighting
can greatly improve the combined operation of other security
systems, particularly CCTV and other surveillance measures,
and therefore it must be designed to compliment these systems.
8.8.2
DESIGN OF SECURITY LIGHTING
I.
Lights located in vulnerable locations should be protected
against vandalism by means of vandal resistant materials and
design.
II.
Lighting design should take into account the various
current and future obstructions that may cause light to be blocked
(e.g. various types of vegetation, such as trees).
III.
Design proposals should take into account the possibility
of night time outdoor activities and should specify the type,
location and intensity of the various lighting elements that will be
installed.
IV.
Lighting should be equally spread out, reducing contrast
between shadows and lightened areas. It is recommended to
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with higher wattage. This will help reduce the creation of deep
shadows and will help avoid excessive glare.
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heights that enable easy maintenance and replacement.
VI.
The lighting plan should locate areas that may be
shadowed and light them up.
VII.
Lighting at manned entrances must be adequate to
identify persons, examine credentials, inspect vehicles entering
or departing the facility premises through designated control
points (vehicle interiors should be clearly lighted), and prevent
anyone from entering unobserved into the premises.
VIII.
The lighting illuminating the buildings entrance should
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extreme environmental conditions (e.g. heavy downpour).
IX.
Security posts at entrance points should have a reduced
level of interior lighting to enable the security guards to see his
surroundings while minimising the adversarys ability to look
inside the posts.
X.
The controls of the lighting systems should be positioned
in a secured area, preferably in the security control room.
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support the CCTV coverage.
XII.
Cones of illumination should overlap to provide coverage
in the event of bulb burnout.
XIII.
Lighting should be arranged so as to create minimal
shadows and minimal glare.
XIV.
Lighting should be turned on automatically by clock or
photoelectric cell.
8.8.3
STANDARDS
The recommended standards are based on the US DOT

standards FTA-TRI-MA-267085-05 and DOT-VNTSC-FTA-05-02.
Page 108
8.8.5
EXAMPLE
Page 109
SPECIAL ATTENTION AREAS
Most buildings have rooms or operational areas that

require special attention in terms of security. These operational
areas are usually required for the basic functions of the building
such as access control, loading and unloading, parking, building
maintenance, mail delivery etc. Addressing the security and
protection requirements for these areas is essential for maintaining
the security level in the building. Ideally, the protection should
be designed in such a way that there is minimum interference
with the original operational design of the building. Nevertheless
in most cases, answering security needs will require a certain
degree of change to the buildings everyday activities. Most of
the security changes to these areas will be aimed at the following
goals:

Prevention of the entry of unauthorised people or packages.

Protection of the building structure and inhabitants from an
event occurring at those locations.
Protection of the areas to prevent a localised attack that may
affect the whole building.
The objective of this chapter is to provide basic

protection design guidelines for these areas thereby enabling the
architect to make decisions regarding their positioning, design
and construction.
Whereas chapters 5-8 relate to the different protection
elements according to the building category, the subjects
addressed in this chapter should be considered by the
architect or relevant consultant in any case where one of the
listed functional areas is included in the planned building.
9.1
Any developer or architect designing a new project which

includes one or more of the areas referenced in this chapter
should follow the associated security guidelines. In most cases,
this will be required regardless of the building type or building
structure category (discussed earlier in Chapter 3).
The following sections include security requirements
and explanations for a number of different functional areas.
The requirements for these areas include a variety of security
elements described previously in Chapters 5 to 8. When relevant,
this chapter will include a reference to the required item in those
chapters.
9.2
PARKING
9.2.1
INTRODUCTION
In dense modern urban areas, the most common solution

is to position the car park underground or on one or more of the
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the vulnerability of the building in relation to potential car bombs
because:
A relatively large explosive charge can potentially be driven

into the building.
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is enclosed.
protection elements in this chapter can be implemented even if
they do not appear in the list of recommendations table. In this The typical structure of a car park allows an explosive charge
to be placed extremely close to primary structural elements.
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Following the recommendations in this chapter will help
are described for approval or/and approved drawings. The mitigate the threat of a car bomb explosion whilst maximising the
level of detail provided is not intended to provide a full technical ability to control incoming vehicles.
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in the procurement procedure to ensure that the right demands
are made of suppliers and/or protection engineers.
The guidelines cover basic design principles and
materials that are commonly used in Singapore. If a proposed
building system or product design is not mentioned in the
guidelines, it is recommended to refer to the recommended
protection level for the closest relevant system or design whilst
applying best engineering practice. In such a case, it is also
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protective design/blast
consultant.
Page 110
9.2.2
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE LOCATION
I.
Critical infrastructure areas such as the emergency water
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electricity supply must be protected from catastrophic events in
the car park as consequences of a general or targeted attack
against them. It is recommended to position these areas in
known or resident designated parking areas if it is not possible to
position them away from all the parking areas.
II.
For loading dock considerations see Section 9.4.
ENTRANCES AND EXITS OF CAR PARKS

I.
The entrances to car parks should be designed with
access control check points, which can either be automated or
GENERAL
controlled by trained security personnel (see Section 5.5.3 for
guidelines). The entrances are the most likely locations for attacks
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control and screening needs should be taken into account when primary structural elements (a minimum of 10 metres). The
designing the entrances to the building from the parking area. J *,, q@
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This usually means providing adequate space for screening from crowded critical areas.
equipment and security personnel and planning for the provision
of utilities such as electricity and adequate lighting. This is true II.
The entrances and exits must be equipped with an antieven when current access control procedures do not require ramming vehicle barrier to an adequate level (see Section 5.4
a security check at the access point since an upgrade may be for details).
necessary at higher threat levels.
9.2.3
DESIGN OF A CAR PARK
II.
When planning and positioning areas in the site during
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between the car park and the location of any potential dense
crowds (such as conference rooms) or sensitive areas. This
is relevant not only for underground car parks belonging to the
building, but also to any neighbouring underground car parks that
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9.2.4
EXAMPLE
9.3
PEDESTRIAN ENTRY AREAS
Standards
All standards and guidelines against progressive collapse
(see Chapter 7.4) are recommended for car parks. In the
building core and in populated areas, it is imperative that
these standards be followed.
PARKING LOCATIONS
I.
Parking alongside primary structural elements should be
prohibited. If that cannot be achieved, parking along the primary
structural elements should be limited to screened vehicles
of trustworthy people such as residents or management. In
all cases, a physical barrier is required to maintain a distance
between the vulnerable element and the nearest parking location.
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critical areas such as the Fire Control Centre (FCC), water
tanks or other key areas should be prohibited. If that cannot be
achieved, parking near these areas should be limited to screened
vehicles of trustworthy people such as residents or management.
In all cases, a physical barrier is required to maintain a distance
between the vulnerable element and the nearest parking location.
9.3.1
INTRODUCTION
Pedestrian entry and/or exit areas and lobbies are
one of the most vulnerable areas in a building as these would
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be the places where an attacker will try to enter the building.
above or beneath a populated area should be limited to screened
For architectural and aesthetic reasons, the entrance lobby is
vehicles of trustworthy building tenants.
typically a wide and open area with a glass facade. The principal
recommendations in this section are relevant for every opening
that separates the inner part of the building (the secured area)
from public or unsecured areas.
Page 111
9.3.2
9.3.3
DESIGN OF PEDESTRIAN ENTRY AREAS
9.3.4 EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
The following guidelines are for the architectural design. For

structural guidelines please refer to Chapter 7.
Standards
There are no special standards or regulations for the
entrance and exit areas, however there are standards which
apply to the equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to Chapter
8.
MAIN ENTRANCE LOBBY

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load capacity of 7.5 kpa at locations where checking equipment
and security operations may take place in the future. Such
equipment includes X-Ray machines, Walk Through Metal
Detectors (WTMD), Hand Held Explosive Detectors (HHED)
Sniffers and security checking tables and turnstile gates. It
is highly recommended to plan for space, as well as electricity
and low voltage infrastructure in the relevant locations for future
equipment. The checking area must be designed to enable a
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than one every 5 seconds when it is operational.
It is advisable to physically shield or separate the main
entrance checking area from the main inner lobby. This will allow
the future isolation of the checking area and will help contain a
terror attack at the checking point. Such an attack could occur

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or security people. It is advisable to plan for a security standing
point, room, or booth positioned in such a way as to give security
personnel an unobstructed view of the entire entrance area.
ELEVATORS OR STAIRCASES
When designing elevators or staircases at entrance
areas, it is necessary to plan an option for deploying access
control systems and forced-entry resistant gates/doors which
could be locked during periods of high alert. The entrance area
which usually connects to the elevator or staircase should be
equipped with electricity and low voltage infrastructure and space
to cater for the possible deployment of screening equipment in
the future.
EMERGENCY EXIT DOORS
Every emergency exit door must be equipped with a
detector connected to an alarm system which will raise an alert
in case of unauthorised opening. It should also have a locking
mechanism suitable for an emergency door according to the
regulations and standards.
The entrance area which usually connects to the
emergency exit via a corridor should be equipped with electricity
and low voltage infrastructure to allow for the deployment of
screening equipment at a later stage should the door be converted
to a normal entrance.
Page 112
LOADING DOCK LOCATED UNDERNEATH THE BUILDING

No primary structural elements should be located in the
9.4.1
INTRODUCTION
loading dock. If this is unavoidable, then the structural engineer
Most modern buildings have designated areas for must design the primary structural elements for maximum
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and all other deliveries to the building. Commercial buildings in the same manner, and no critical building element or important
such as shopping malls or hotels require the loading dock to be a building functions should be located there.
relatively large area. Loading docks can be internal or external.
9.4
LOADING DOCKS
Access control issues for loading docks are discussed in

Section 5.4.5. In this section, the security and protection issues
for loading docks are considered. These guidelines will have to
be coordinated with the operational procedures which, especially
in commercial buildings, must take into account the unloading
time, queuing time and subsequent line of waiting vehicles which
could build up. There are two typical locations for a loading dock:
In the basement of the building, under its main structure
At the side of the building (above or below ground), away

from its main structure
For more security design details regarding the entrance,

parking, access control and other subjects, please refer to
Chapter 5 or Chapter 7.
9.4.2
LOADING DOCK LOCATED AT THE SIDE OF THE

BUILDING
The loading dock should be located as far away from the buildings
wall and primary structural elements as possible, but in all cases
a distance of no less than 10 meters should be ensured between
primary structural elements and the vehicle parking positions. If
this is not possible, the structural engineer must design primary
structural elements for maximum redundancy. No large opening
should be located at or overlooking the loading bay. If this is not
possible, glass and other building materials must be protected to
the highest blast resistant level (see Chapter 6 for details).
9.4.4
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
9.4.3
DESIGN OF A LOADING DOCK

The entrance to the loading dock must be designed with
a vehicle anti-ramming barrier and access control or security
personnel. The gate and access control point must be placed
as far away from the building as possible and where possible, it
should not be under the building and/or below or next to a primary
structural element.
Upper Floor
building line
During high alerts, for other security reasons or even at

peak delivery times during normal alert levels, queuing vehicles
must be taken into consideration. The security checking time at
the entrance point may take a number of minutes and delivery
vehicles may even be asked to turn around and exit. Space
must be allocated for cars to turn around (without them passing
the check point) and for vehicles to safely queue. The loading/
unloading area must be located as far as possible from any
crowded areas or areas where large numbers of people gather
(such as conference rooms) or critical functional areas of the
building such as the security control room, safe haven or key
building utilities.
Shielding elements should protect the elevator and
staircase from the main loading and unloading area. These
elements need to be designed to withstand the high loads that
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dock. The shielding elements will block any direct line of sight
between vehicles parked in the loading dock and the elevator
lobby. The same shielding elements should also block the line of
sight to any main corridors or important areas in the building. It
is advisable to allocate an area in the loading dock for checking
deliveries and goods. This should include future X-ray or other
checking equipment.
Figure 138: A typical loading dock layout
Standards
There are no special standards or regulations for loading
dock areas, however there are standards which apply to the
equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to Chapter 8.
Page 113
9.5
9.5.1
GARBAGE AND WASTE DISPOSAL DOCK

INTRODUCTION
Garbage and waste disposal areas, rooms and docks

can be designed in many ways. From a security point of view,
it is an area that is close to or inside the building, and which
has openings to both the secure areas of the building and to
the unprotected areas outside of its perimeter. The purpose
of this section is to give the architect and engineer guidelines
for designing protected waste disposal docks or areas without
compromising their functionality.
There are two types of garbage and waste disposal areas:

A disposal area that can be accessed by the contracted

service provider without passing any security checks or
barriers.
A disposal area that can only be accessed after passing
through a security check or barrier.
9.5.2
DESIGN OF GARBAGE AND WASTE DISPOSAL

AREAS
Every vehicle wishing to cross the perimeter line must

pass through an anti-ramming car gate with access control
and security supervision. All openings from the building into
the garbage collecting area or openings which lead to garbage
containers must be closed and covered by CCTV and detectors
at all times. If the openings are chutes leading from the interior of
the building, they must include a door which can be closed after
work hours, anti-intruder detectors and CCTV coverage.
9.6.3
DESIGN OF MAIL AND DELIVERY ROOMS
The room should be located near the entrance to the

building in order to prevent delivery people from unnecessarily
entering the building. It should be located to the side of the
building and never in or attached to a main structural element
such as a building core or staircase. It is recommended to build
the room from reinforced concrete and design it as a structurally
insulated box with walls that can withstand an inner static
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the insulated mail room and additional permissible load of 10 kpa
for inspection equipment. The door must open inwards and be
designed to withstand the aforementioned blast load (for more
details see Section 6.6.3).
The room should have no connection to the buildings
main ventilation system or openings. All openings or ventilation
for the mail room should be separate and ventilated to the
outside. The room should be provided with an electricity and low
voltage infrastructure to support X-ray equipment, HHED and
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coverage and an intercom and door which should be closed
during inspection.
Standards
There are no special standards or regulations for mail and
delivery rooms, however there are standards which apply
to the equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to Chapter 8.
9.6.4
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Standards
There are no special standards or regulations for garbage
and waste disposal areas, however there are standards
which apply to the equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 8.
9.6
MAIL AND DELIVERY ROOM
9.6.1
INTRODUCTION
In such rooms, mail, parcels and delivery items arrive

and are stored until collected by the recipient. They also typically
receive large boxes. From the security point of view, if such
rooms are not properly designed and positioned, entry of letters
and parcels can represent a threat to the people in the building
and even to the stability of the building itself (if large parcels are
delivered). The purpose of this section is to provide the design
team with guidelines for locating and designing the mail room and
the equipment in it.
9.6.2
Page 114
9.7
VIP HOLDING ROOM
9.7.1
INTRODUCTION
VIP holding rooms are common in modern buildings

and especially in government buildings and luxury hotels. A VIP
holding room can be any room that can accommodate the head
of an organisation, a meeting room for important or threatened
people, or the presidential suite in a hotel that may accommodate
celebrities or politicians. Such rooms should be designed in a way
that physical protection and security procedures will be relatively
easy to implement in the future and with minimal incremental
cost.
It is also recommended to allocate an area for VIP cars.

The area should be closed or protected against all types of
intruders including pedestrians and should be covered by CCTV
and detectors. There must also be escape routes close by.
9.7.3
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
Standards
There are no special security standards or regulations for
VIP holding rooms, however there are standards which
apply to the equipment and procedures as detailed in
Chapter 5 to Chapter 8.
9.7.2
DESIGN OF VIP HOLDING ROOMS
The VIP holding room may be designed with a dual

purpose or use for an alternative function, provided that this
does not impact its availability for major functions. These rooms
should be located near function areas where VIPs are expected
to congregate. They should be located as close as possible to
an emergency escape route that will be under the total control of
the security forces during an event or emergency, which lead to
an onsite car park and/or adjacent roads. The main entrance to
the room should not lead to the emergency escape route. It is
preferable to have a second exit from the VIP room that leads to
the escape route.
9.8
PROTECTED ROOMS

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all be available for the total inspection of the security team. There
9.8.1
INTRODUCTION
should be a key or card access system that can open all doors
within the building to facilitate bomb sweeps. The main entry way
Most modern buildings will have rooms with special
is recommended to be via a double-door interlocking entry hall
with forced entry resistant capabilities on the inner door. There protection and security needs. This can be as a result of the function
should also be CCTV and intercom equipment to cover both of the room or the importance of the equipment, information
it holds. This includes computer rooms, communication rooms,
doors (see Chapter 8 for details).
or the treasury room. In many cases, a room can be designed
Note that all the walls and openings of the VIP holding room to be multi-purpose. This is particularly relevant for buildings
should provide 15 minutes forced entry resistance (see where rooms may change their function over the course of time.
The purpose of this section is to give the design team the basic
Section 6.6.5 for design details).
characteristics for protection of such rooms in the building.
The VIP holding room should be without windows. If this
is not possible, all exterior windows or glass faades in the room
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room is located (see Chapter 6 for design details) as follows:
9.8.2
9.8.3
DESIGN OF PROTECTED ROOMS
All openings in the walls of the protected room must be

forced entry and blast resistant to a minimal level but will typically
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needs or design team decisions (see Chapter 6 for details). All
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All windows or glass faades that can be seen from forced entry resistant bars (tested according to the standards in
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be ballistic resistant to the level of the threat or at least level 1 be equipped with an infrastructure for security systems.
(see Chapter 6 for design details). All windows and doors are
Access to the protected room should be via an easily
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protected and secured route to allow the relatively isolated
break detectors connected to an alarm system.
movement of equipment and goods and better protection
It is recommended to consider allocating an area to @q,J^ J,,,
the security attachment. This would typically include of the protected room should provide 15 minutes forced entry
resistance (see Chapter 6 for design details).
bodyguards in an adjacent room with the security equipment
infrastructure connecting the two rooms and a line of sight
to the VIP rooms interlocking entrance.
Page 115
The main entry way is recommended to be via a doubledoor interlocking entry hall with forced entry resistant capabilities
on the inner door. There should also be CCTV and intercom
equipment to cover both doors (see Chapter 8 for details). All
exterior windows or glass faades in the room should be blast
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(see Chapter 6 for design details) as follows:
Every window or other opening, including ventilation or

air-conditioning ducts must be closed off with forced entry resistant
bars to a minimum 5 minutes resistant (see Chapter 6 for testing
standards). It is highly advisable to have all the above openings
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alert against intruders or an attempted break-in. Areas containing
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must be locked at all times and access should only be permitted
for authorised personnel.
Standards
All recommendations in this section must comply with the
safety and building regulations standards and other legal
requirements.
9.9.3
EXAMPLE
9.10
AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM
9.10.1
INTRODUCTION

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with magnetic switches and/or glass break detectors connected
to an alarm system.
If safes are to be placed in the protected room either now
or in the future, this should be considered during the design stage
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m2 as the minimum design criteria.
Standards
All accepted building and safety standards must be applied
in the design and all relevant guidelines in this document
should be followed. If there are major contradictions
between the two, the national standards should always
prevail and the security and protective design/blast
consultant(s) should be informed.
9.9
CENTRAL UTILITY ROOMS
9.9.1
INTRODUCTION
A buildings central utility rooms serve most of its areas

and are connected to almost every location within it. The main
functions of the utility rooms which are of interest from the
security point of view are water, electricity, communications and
air-conditioning.
It should be noted that counter infrastructure attacks and
other types of terror attacks can be perpetrated through a
buildings utility ducts, pipes and other supply channels.
The purpose of this section is to provide guidelines to the
design team who can design better protected and secured utility
rooms and prevent costly changes in the future. It is advisable to
implement these protection recommendations with access control
and forced entry doors, since maintenance people are often from
external companies.
9.9.2
A central air-conditioning system is responsible for

supplying the entire building with fresh and treated air. It
usually draws air in from the outside (via vents in the roof or
other locations), mixes it with the inner treated air and pumps
it back into the ventilation system through the cooling system.
This simplistic description describes the operation of a typical
air conditioning system for the purpose of these protection and
security guidelines only and does not necessarily represent an
accurate description of every air-conditioning system.
Air conditioning systems may be used by an adversary to
introduce chemical or biological agents into the buildings
environment.
DESIGN OF CENTRAL UTILITY ROOMS
Utility rooms must be located in areas which are well

away from potential threats. They should therefore not be
close to public car parks or public areas. If this is not possible,
then the rooms must be built with adequate protection, such as
a shielding wall to protect them from blast related threats on
all exposed facades (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 for design
details). Entrances to the utility rooms should be locked at all
times, controlled by an access control system and monitored from
the control room by CCTV and intruder detectors (see Chapter 9
for more design details).
These guidelines will refer to central air-conditioning

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to pose a threat to the buildings occupants. They do not relate
to relatively small individual systems which are typical to private
houses or individual rooms. The purpose of this section is to give
the system designer and architect an idea of a more secure and
protected air-conditioning system.
9.10.2
Page 116
9.10.3
DESIGN OF AN AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM
The vents which provide the intake of fresh air must

be positioned as high as possible to ensure that they cannot be
reached from a public location. The air intake pipes and their
location must be protected against any intruder or object thrown
from a minimum of 10 metres (the protected area should be far
more than 10 metres). It is highly recommended to place the
collection of intakes on the private protected building roof as far
as possible from any threat.
9.11.3
DESIGN OF WATER SUPPLY AND TANKS
Mandatory requirements for security of water storage

tanks for potable water supply in buildings are stipulated in the
Public Utilities Act, Public Utilities (Water Supply) Regulations
and the Singapore Standard CP 48 Code of Practice for Water
Services.
The requirements state that all drinking water tanks and

their ancillary equipment must be secured against unauthorised
access. They must be housed in a secured and locked dedicated
Any feed or exhaust for the air-conditioning system tank/pump room or located within a secured and locked enclosure.
including air pipes, air intakes and vents should be closed J J J ^ @@ J J,,
with forced entry resistant bars or mesh to a minimum level of be within the secured and locked dedicated tank/pump room,
5 minutes resistant (see Chapter 6 for testing standards). In , * J ^ @@ J,, @ *
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outside the secured and locked room, enclosure or area.
with detectors and connected to an alarm system to alert against
intruders or an attempted break in. It is also recommended to
Additional security measures to be considered would
provide the infrastructure for future installation of detectors of toxic be for all entrances to the water tanks rooms or openings and
or other biological/chemical agents in the air-conditioning system pipes main valves to be closed with forced entry resistant doors/
(these can be combined with smoke detectors). These should mesh and windows to a minimum level of 5 minutes resistant
be located at the main intake of fresh air and on the exhaust vent (see Chapter 6 for testing standards). It is highly advisable to
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add detectors to all the above openings and to send an alert to
security in the event of intruders or an attempted break-in. This
It is highly advisable to install valves/shutters to close is all designed to make it very hard for anyone to sabotage the
not only the main fresh air intake, but the intake and exhaust vent system or insert dangerous materials into it.
from every room. These valves/shutters will be activated when
a biological/chemical agent or smoke is sensed by the detectors.
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They can be operated automatically or manually by the security or the facility it must be locked in a room with the same protection
operational control room. It is also highly advisable to allocate an level as above (5 min forced entry resistant) and must include
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, an access control system on the door and detectors against
system into the main air-conditioning system. This will provide a unauthorised entry.
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It is highly recommended to provide the infrastructure for
detectors to be added to the water system in the future to detect
toxic or other biological/chemical agents (this can be combined
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detectors at the main intake pipe (to check the incoming water)
and the supply exiting from the tank (to check the water supplied
9.11 WATER SUPPLY AND TANKS
to the buildings residents).
9.11.1 INTRODUCTION
Water in most buildings in Singapore is supplied through
large pipes that feed into reservoir tanks located within the building.
The threat to the drinking water supply is mainly from inserting a
biological or chemical agent into the water that will affect everyone
that drinks it. The insertion could either be into the pipes or more
simply, into one of the reservoir tanks. In most buildings there are
separate tanks for drinking water and for utilities. The description
below is for the purpose of security and protection of the drinking
water only, and does not necessarily relate to the water supply in
each building. The purpose of this section is to give the system
engineer and design team recommendations for more secured
water line design and implementation.
Standards
Mandatory requirements for the security of water storage
tanks for potable water supply in buildings are stipulated
in the Public Utilities Act, Public Utilities (Water Supply)
Regulations and the Singapore Standard CP48-Code of
Practice for Water Services.
9.11.2
Page 117
APPENDIX A
SAMPLE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS: FOR
TENDERING PURPOSES
PART 1: PROCESS
1
ENGAGEMENT & SCOPE OF SECURITY AND

PROTECTIVE DESIGN/BLAST CONSULTANT(S)
a.
The Developer shall engage a security and protective
design/blast consultant(s) (hereafter called the Consultant) to
incorporate comprehensive provisions for building security from
the onset of the buildings conception. The Consultant shall
submit and show relevant experience, track records, curriculum
vitae, and in cases involving sensitive projects, have the
necessary security clearance. Although the Consultant does not
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shall clearly demonstrate the ability to communicate effectively
with the developer for the duration of the contract.
b.
The Consultant shall prepare a preliminary security and
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comprise an assessment and analysis of asset values, threats
and hazards, vulnerabilities and risks of the building, and blast
analysis should be conducted for the relevant areas. The plan
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to, but not limited to, the design of the following:I.
II.
III.
Site planning and landscape design;

Architecture and interior design; and
Structural, mechanical and electrical designs.
c.
The Consultant shall work closely with the architects
and engineers to develop the requirements of the security
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implementation in the project as well as subsequent operation
and management of the building.
d.
The Consultant shall work closely with the relevant
government agencies to ensure that the security and protective
design plans are adequate to address the threats and hazards,
vulnerabilities and risks to the building.
2
ASSESSMENT PROCESS
The consultant shall carry out an assessment and

analysis of the asset values, threats and hazards, vulnerabilities
and risks of the building, which shall include, but not be limited to,
the following:
a.
Asset Value Assessment
Assets shall include but not be limited to people, information and
property. The asset value is the degree of debilitating impact that
would be caused by the incapacity or destruction of the asset.
The Consultant shall identify the assets of the building, including
critical assets that can be affected by threats and hazards. The
Consultant shall rate each assets value and justify the basis for
the ratings.
Ministry of Home Affairs: June 2007

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The Consultant shall consider the following threats that have
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Page 118
c.
Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an
aggressor, or, in a non-terrorist threat environment, make an
asset susceptible to hazard damage. The Consultant shall
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identify the vulnerabilities of building functions, systems, etc. The
Consultant shall rate the vulnerabilities and justify the basis for
the ratings.
d.
Risk Assessment and Management
The Consultant shall evaluate the risks using a threat-vulnerability
matrix. The Consultant shall rate each of the risks and justify the
basis for the ratings. The Consultant shall identify the top risks
where measures are necessary to mitigate the vulnerabilities and
reduce the risks.
SECURITY AND PROTECTIVE DESIGN PLAN

SUBMISSION STAGES
The Consultant shall submit the security plan in 3 stages

during its development for review and acceptance. The format
and content for each stages submission shall be proposed and
submitted to the building owner for review and acceptance.
a.
Preliminary security and protective design plan to be
submitted by the Consultant as part of the tender.
b.
Detailed security and protective design plan to be
developed by the Consultant in consultation with the relevant
government agencies.
c.
Final security and protective design plan to be
developed by the Consultant and agreed upon by the Developer.
PART 2: PLANNING AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

4
SITE PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

FOR CRIME PREVENTION
The design of the building, including site layout and

landscaping, shall support the buildings functions. It shall provide
a safe and secure environment for occupants and visitors. The
Developer shall incorporate within the building master plan,
principles that facilitate the prevention of crime and public order
incidents.
III.
TERRITORIAL REINFORCEMENT. The master plan
should incorporate the provision of clear boundaries between
public and private areas. This could be achieved by using physical
elements such as fences, pavement treatment, art, signs, good
maintenance, landscaping, etc, to express a sense of ownership
by legitimate users and create territorial reinforcement. The space
or area being reinforced should have clear legibility, transparency
and directness to discourage potential offenders because of the
users familiarity with their environment.
5

FOR VEHICULAR THREATS
The Developer shall incorporate within the building

master plan, principles that facilitate the protection of the building
from vehicular threats. This includes preventing progressive
collapse of the building due to damage caused to critical
structural elements by an explosion that occurs in proximity to
the building and reducing the potential blast waves caused by an
explosive threat in the form of a vehicular bomb. The method or
process of protecting the building from vehicular threats depends
on its structural design and proposed site layout. To achieve
this objective, consideration shall be given to stand-off distance,
buffer zone and vehicle screening.
I.
STAND-OFF DISTANCE. The appropriate distance
from unscreened vehicles to the building should be considered
to protect it against vehicular threats. A buffer zone around the
building to unscreened vehicles could be created using design
features such as street furniture, urban landscape design and
bollards that can function as vehicle anti-ramming barriers.
II.
PERIMETER PROTECTION ZONE. This can be
achieved with the installation of perimeter barriers or layers of
barrier systems (e.g. planter boxes, natural landscape designs)
that meet the US DOS K4 standard or equivalent ASTM F265607 or UK BSI PAS68:2007 standard12. Consideration should be
given to limiting the speed of approaching vehicles with good
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offsetting vehicle entrances as necessary from the direction of a
vehicles approach (to force a reduction in speed).
III.
PERIMETER VEHICLE SCREENING. The provision
of space for vehicle screening shall be considered and located
at an appropriate distance away from the building. The vehicle
screening bays shall include design features that can stop
vehicles, prevent them from leaving the screening area, prevent
tailgating and reject vehicles that fail the screening.
The Developer can achieve this by incorporating the

basic principles and concepts of Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED). They are:I.
NATURAL SURVEILLANCE. In terms of the operation
of the building, this could be achieved by placing more people
(observers) or legitimate eyes on the street at the area being
surveyed to increase the perceived risk to potential offenders.
In terms of the design, it can be achieved by generating or
channelling activities to the area, and by having more windows,
good lighting and removing obstructions to improve line of sight,
etc.
II.
NATURAL ACCESS CONTROL. Consideration should
be given to providing adequate locks, doors, window barriers,
fences and shrubs, etc, for private/ restricted areas. In public
or semi-public areas, properly located entrances, exits, fencing,
landscaping and lighting, etc, shall be considered to subtly direct
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criminal opportunities.
12
US Department of State (DoS) SD-STD-02.01 Vehicle Crash Testing of

Perimeter Barriers and Gates, Revision A, dated March 2003, or ASTM
2656-07 Standard Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter
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Page 119

FOR PARKING

master plan, the provision of safe and secure parking facilities
(if applicable). In order to achieve this objective, consideration
shall be given to providing public parking, parking for authorised
vehicles and natural surveillance of all parking areas in the
development.
I.
VIP PARKING AND ALIGHTING POINT (IF RELEVANT).
The site layout should take into consideration the provision of
separate and dedicated car park space for VIPs. This will include
providing ingress/ egress into the VIP car park space that should
not be shared with other car park users. The alighting point for
VIPs should be covered or located at a basement. There should
be a secured passageway immediately at/or close to the drop
off point for VIPs. There should not be any direct line of sight
into the passageway. There should not be any glass windows or
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an explosion to injure the VIPs during the evacuation process.
II.
BASEMENT OR MULTI STOREY CAR PARKS FOR
PUBLIC. If the car parking areas are located within the building
(i.e. at the basement or multi-storey), the relevant threats and
protective measures will need to be considered.
III.
NATURAL SURVEILLANCE. All parking facilities should
be provided with consideration to maximise visibility across, as
well as into and out of the parking facility. The natural surveillance
would also be improved by limiting vehicular ingress/ egress to a
minimum number of locations.
7

FOR EXTERNAL CIRCULATION

master plan, the provision for safe and secure external circulation
within the building boundary by considering effective site lighting,
signage, and landscaping.
II.
VEHICLE CIRCULATION. In order to ease congestion,
consideration should be given during the master planning of the
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multiple ingress and egress roads to the various car park areas,
drop-off points and service areas. This should be developed in
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to the LTA for approval (if applicable). The TIA Report shall also
take into consideration the time taken to screen vehicles entering
the building.
III.
PEDESTRIAN CIRCULATION. Consideration during
the master planning of the building should provide footpaths
that are suitable for dealing with large crowds arriving from busstops and MRT stations (if applicable). This should also include
segregating pedestrians from the vehicles leaving the location.
IV.
PERIMETER ACCESS CONTROL.
Consideration
should be given to pedestrians circulation routes during the
master planning of the building to concentrate activities towards
designated access controlled points (or portals) and away from
secured areas.
V.
BUS STOPS AND TAXI STANDS. Consideration should
be given to the location of bus stops, taxi stands and coach bays.
These should be located at an appropriate setback distance from
the building.
8
a.
ARCHITECTURE AND INTERIOR DESIGN

Architecture
I.
BUILDING SHAPE. The shape of the building can have
a contributing effect to the overall damage to the structure caused
by a bomb blast. Re-entrant corners and overhangs shall be
avoided as they are likely to trap the shock wave and amplify the
effects of the blast. If curved surfaces are used, convex shapes
shall be preferred over concave shapes. In general, simple
geometrics should be preferred.
II.
OFFICE AND ROOM LOCATIONS
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press room, holding room) should be located or treated so
I.
EFFECTIVE SITE LIGHTING LEVELS. Consideration that the occupant(s) are secure and cannot be seen from the
should be given to providing effective levels of lighting at vehicular @*q, J^ @ q, J
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and pedestrian entrances and for vehicular and pedestrian face courtyards, internal sites or controlled areas. If this is not
circulation areas. Consideration should be given to providing possible, suitable obscuring glazing or window treatment should
perimeter lighting that is continuous and on both sides of the be provided, including blast and ballistic resistant glass, blast
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curtains or other interior protection systems.
to support CCTV coverage.
III.
MIXED OCCUPANCIES. Function rooms for VIPs use
b.
Site Signage

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housed with other users. If they are co-located together, the
I.
EFFECTIVE SIGNAGE. Confusion over site circulation, public areas should be separated from the sensitive areas.
parking and entrance locations can contribute to a loss of site
security. The master planning should incorporate a signage IV.
PUBLIC TOILETS AND SERVICE AREAS. Areas that
strategy that considers off site and entrance signage, on-site escape surveillance or allow individuals or items to be hidden
directional, parking and cautionary signs for vehicle and persons. should be avoided. Public toilets, service spaces or access to
Consideration should be given to provide electronic signboards vertical circulation systems (e.g. stairways/ lifts/ elevators) should
that allow various messages to convey important information about be avoided in any non-secure areas, including the queuing area
arrival direction, measures in place, etc. It is also recommended before screening at public entrances.
that signs should generally not be provided to identify sensitive
areas.
V.
LOBBIES. This space is designed to separate the
secure and non-secure areas at the point of entry. It does not
c.
Landscaping
include access to vertical circulation systems. Access should be
controlled between the separate secure and non-secure areas
I.
EFFECTIVE AND AESTHETIC. Consideration should with space provided for screening equipment to conduct checks,
be given to landscaping design elements that are attractive including turnstiles, walk through metal detectors, or other
and welcoming as they can be used to enhance security. For ^ * * J

example, plants can deter unwanted entry, ponds and fountains @ ^ J *, q |q, @ q, ,,
can block vehicle access, and site grading (gradient) can also limit J
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access. It is recommended that the master plan avoids creating area should be located within the secure area. Mechanical
landscaping that permits concealment of criminals or obstructs ductwork, piping and main electrical conduit runs should not
the view of security personnel and CCTV.
extend into the non-secure area.
a.
Site Lighting
Page 120
VI.
HIGH RISK LOBBIES (E.G. SPACE FOR QUEUING).
These points of access will need to be designed or operated in
accordance with the appropriate level of risk. High risk areas
should be enclosed in blast and fragment resistant construction.
The installation of features, such as trash receptacles or
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high risk non-secured areas should be avoided. The structure
for high risk lobbies should be distinctly separated from the rest
of the building, but it can be located within the building setback
space. The area should be designed to mitigate the effects of
a blast on primary vertical or lateral bracing members. The air
pressure in high risk lobbies should be maintained at positive,
relative to the exterior, so that contaminated air can be expunged
manually by opening the external doors.
VII.
LOADING AND UNLOADING BAY AREAS. The
installation of critical utilities and services such as main switch
board, water tank, standby fuel or generator adjacent to the
loading/ unloading bays should be avoided. These areas should
be an appropriate distance from critical utilities and services. The
recommendation for lobbies would apply at these areas as this
space is designed with secure and non-secure areas. It should
be separated from the access to the parking spaces (if any).
The area should be designed to limit damage to adjacent areas
and vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building. There
should be space for screening equipment to conduct checks on
all incoming deliveries.
VIII.
RETAIL AND F&B SPACES. These areas should be
arranged, designed and operated such that products and staff
are subject to the appropriate screening process. Retail and
F&B spaces should preferably be accommodated within the
lobby, instead of within the main building. These areas should be
designed to mitigate the effects of a blast on primary vertical or
lateral bracing members.
IX.
STAIRWELLS.
Stairwells required for emergency
egress should be located as remotely as possible from areas
where blast events might occur. Where possible, stairs should
not discharge into lobbies, parking or loading areas.
X.
MAILROOM. The mailroom should be located away
from main entrances, areas containing critical services, utilities,
distribution systems and important assets. In addition, the
mailroom should be located at the perimeter of the building with
an outside wall or window designed for pressure relief. It should
have adequate space for explosive disposal containers. An area
near the loading dock may be a preferred mailroom location.
The mailroom should be built to withstand a blast due to a mail
or parcel IED. The air handling unit for the mailroom should be
stand-alone.
b.
Interior Construction
I.
UNSECURED AND SECURED AREAS. Unsecured
building areas should be located exterior to the main building
structure where possible. Unsecured and secured areas should
be separated horizontally and vertically using buffer zones and/or
J ,,
II.
CRITICAL BUILDING COMPONENTS. The location of
the following critical building components should be located at an
appropriate distance from any main entrance, vehicle circulation,
parking or maintenance area depending on the structural
treatment of the area.
i.

ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
Emergency generator including fuel systems,

:
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Normal fuel storage;
Main switchgear;
Telephone distribution and main switchgear;
Fire pumps;
Building control centres;
UPS systems controlling critical functions;
Main refrigeration systems if critical to building
operation;
Elevator machinery and controls;
Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities;
Critical distribution feeders for emergency
power.
III.
EQUIPMENT SPACE. Public and employee entrances
should include space for possible future installation of access
control and screening equipment.
IV.
ROOF ACCESS. Locking systems should be designed
to limit roof access to authorised personnel.
V.
MATERIAL USED. The use of non-structural elements
such as false ceilings and metal blinds should be limited. If need
be, lightweight non-structural elements can be used to reduce
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or system above for strength can also be used.
VI.
EGRESS ROUTES. Egress routes should not be
clustered together in a single shaft or location but be separated
and spread out. The use of glass along primary egress routes
and stairwells should be kept to a minimum.
9
STRUCTURAL DESIGN
The building shall be designed against both progressive

and disproportionate collapse. The secondary goal shall be to
design the structural components against localised failure, and
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occupants of the building. This will enhance life safety and
facilitate rescue and evacuation. It is suggested that the design
to mitigate effects of blasts be done in conjunction with a detailed
threat assessment of the building and its critical components.
The following items below are recommendations of how a building
can be designed to resist both progressive and disproportionate
collapse.
a.
Robustness
The building shall be designed to comply with the robustness

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CP65, BS8110 and BS5950.
b.
Resistance to Progressive Collapse/ Alternate Load
Paths/ Removal of Columns

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effects of progressive collapse and disproportionate collapse.

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alternate load paths and inherent redundancy in the structural
system.

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of Buildings to Resist Progressive Collapse by the Department
of Defence, USA or other equivalent documents be used as a
guideline to design the building against disproportionate and
progressive collapse. At a minimum, the removal of a primary
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not cause the progressive collapse of the entire building.

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Critical vertical load bearing building components should also

be explicitly designed to resist the design-level explosive forces

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threats. It is recommended that this be viewed in conjunction with
a detailed threat assessment study of the building in order to
determine the possible design blast loads.
d.
Structural Systems
It is recommended that in the selection of structural systems,

due consideration is given to the ductility and robustness of the
system. A suggested list of desirable structural characteristics for
the mitigation of air blast effects and progressive collapse is listed
below:I.
MASS. Structural systems with inherently high mass
such as concrete are in general more resistant to blast effects.
Page 121
II.
SHEAR CAPACITY. Primary members and/or their III.
Floor System
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achieved before failure. Brittle shear failure shall be avoided to
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III.
CAPACITY FOR REVERSING LOADS. Primary
members and their connections shall be designed for possible
load reversals caused by blast effects.

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above does not cause subsequent progressive collapse.
IV.
REDUNDANCY. Where possible, redundant load paths
shall be incorporated in the vertical load carrying systems to
ensure alternate load paths are available in the event of the
failure of structural elements.

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areas (e.g. lobbies, loading docks and mailrooms) should be
considered. Heavily occupied areas should not be located
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cannot withstand localised breeching caused by package bombs
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V.
TIES. An integrated system of ties in perpendicular
directions along the principal lines of structural framing shall
serve to redistribute loads during catastrophic events.
IV.
Interior Columns
VI.
DUCTILITY. Members and their connections shall
be designed to maintain their strength while undergoing large
deformations. Ductile plastic design concepts such as strong
column weak beam together with appropriate detailing should be
adopted.

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under Exterior Frame (mentioned above) should apply to interior
columns as well.
VII.
MATERIALS. Due consideration should be given to
materials selection from the view point of ductility and brittleness.

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designed to contain the explosive effects within the unsecured
areas. Ideally, unsecured areas should be located adjacent to the
building exterior so that the explosive pressure may be vented
outward as well.
e.
Structural Elements
It is suggested that critical structural components be designed to

the following criteria:I.
Exterior Frame
V.
Interior Walls

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unit) walls shall be reinforced vertically and horizontally, and
adequately supported laterally. Anchorage at the top and bottom
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of the wall.
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limit damage to supporting columns.
more stories without buckling.
Evacuation Routes (e.g. Lift Shafts, Staircase cores)

9 ,*J,,q
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ties or spiral reinforcement to enhance shear capacity, ductility
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and improve the performance of lap splices in the event of loss of
staircase cores of the building shall be constructed of reinforced
concrete cover.
concrete or adequately hardened such that they are still available

#, ,*@,J,,q@, q ^ for evacuation purposes in the event of an emergency.
level as practical. Splices at exterior columns shall employ
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Building Envelope
such that the connection does not fail before the member develops f.
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I.
Walls
II.
Roof System

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pressure
loads. Any failure of the walls should be in the ductile
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a ductile fashion which gives adequate time for the occupants |* Jq, J J,,
to respond. This can be achieved by providing adequate ties, should be at least as strong as the windows, doors or frames they
redundancy and ductility in both the vertical load bearing elements support.
@,:

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Due consideration should be given to the provision of ties such
as the inclusion of shear connectors between the steel beam and
deck and the provision of a steel mesh within the concrete deck.
Beam end connections shall be capable of developing the ultimate
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column connections shall be able to resist load reversals.
II.
Windows

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the supporting wall should be capable of resisting the breaking
pressure of the window glass. The window glass should fail
before the frame, anchorage or supporting wall system.

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conventional loads should be used. The type of glass used

`JJ,: J *@@[ should be laminated annealed glass. For insulated panels, only
post-tensioned systems shall be designed for load reversals
the interior pane needs to be laminated. Tempered glass should
arising from blast effects.
be avoided for external windows as it is 4 times stronger than

+ ,q@, : * annealed glass.
consideration should be given to mitigate punching shear failure
at the columns. Continuous bottom reinforcement shall be
provided across the columns to retain the slab in the event of
punching shear failure.
Page 122

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10
MECHANICAL DESIGN
-inch. The minimum silicone sealing around the inside glass
a.
Emergency Functions
perimeter should be a -inch, with a minimum tensile strength of
20 psi (138 kPa).
I.
GENERAL. All emergency functions should be located
away from high-risk areas in protected locations with restricted

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access. Do not place them near structurally vulnerable areas
net curtains and catcher systems should be considered and used
(such as transfer girders). Harden and/or provide physical buffer
where applicable.
zones for the enclosures around the emergency equipment,
controls and wiring. Provide redundant and separated emergency

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systems as well.
be retained by the frame, be caught by catcher systems, or exit
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b.
Ventilation System
III.
Doors
I.
AIR-INTAKES. Air-intakes should be located as high as
practical to limit access to the general public. For buildings of

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more than 4 stories, air-intakes should be located on the fourth
against the door frame/jam. The door frame anchorage should
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have a lateral capacity greater than door leaf itself.
the roof or as high as practical. Locating air-intakes high on a wall
is preferred over a roof location. Sloping vent guards should be

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installed to prevent injection of foreign objects into the air-intake
a master key should have access to all doors, windows or
system.
receptacles (including service and utilities areas).
II.
SURVEILLANCE. For public access areas, there

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should be securing and monitoring of all air diffusers and return
along designated egress routes.
air grilles. Air-intake locations, fan rooms and other mechanical
rooms should also be under security surveillance and tied to the
IV.
Louvres
alarm system.

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III.
EGRESS ROUTES. Positive pressurisation of egress
the supporting structure has a lateral capacity greater than that of
routes, stairwells and vestibules is recommended.
the element.
c.
Utility Protection

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I.
UTILITIES AND FEEDERS. Utility and feeder systems
of the louvers.
should be located at least 30 metres away from loading bays,
lobbies, parking areas and other high risk areas.

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anchored into the structure behind the louvres.
II.
INCOMING UTILITIES. Within the building and property
lines, incoming utility systems should be concealed (underground).
V.
Cladding
These systems should not be located at vehicle screening points
or at high risk areas (e.g. lobbies, loading bay, parking areas).

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panel thickness that is acceptable for conventional loads.
d.
Water Supply

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I.
WATER TANKS. The water tanks should be located in
be designed to resist the ultimate lateral resistance of the panel.
a secured area and inaccessible to the general public or staff.
Mandatory requirements for security of water storage tanks for

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potable water supply in buildings are stipulated in the Public
transmission path into the main structure as practical to minimise
Utilities Act, Public Utilities (Water Supply) Regulations and the
shear and torsional response.
Singapore Standard CP 48 Code of Practice for Water Services.
In addition, CCTVs should be installed to monitor activities in

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this area.
vertical load-carrying members should be avoided. Instead, the
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11
ELECTRICAL DESIGN
VI.
Venting

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explosive forces and gases from the interior spaces to outside
of the structure. An example is the use of blow-out panels and
window systems that provide protection from external blast
pressure but fail or vent internal blast pressure.
a.
Emergency Power Supply and Fuel Storage
I.
EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM.
Redundant
emergency power systems remotely located from each other
should be provided. The emergency power distribution feeders
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redundant routing paths to enhance reliability. Emergency
distribution panels should be located in rooms separate from the
normal power system and hardened where possible.
Page 123
II.
FUEL STORAGE. Fuel storage tanks should be
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enclosures. Their access should be restricted and protected.
Fuel piping within the building should be located in hardened
enclosures, and redundant piping systems should be provided to
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stations should be located away from public areas and monitored
by CCTV.
VI.
ELECTROMAGNETIC DOORS. 1200 lbs Electromagnetic locks should be used for all exterior doors. The magnetic
switches should be able to be de-activated during emergency to
facilitate evacuation. In order to detect possible intrusion when
the switches are de-activated, CCTV cameras should be installed
to monitor the movement at the egress points. As an added
security feature, these doors should only open from inside the
building.
III.
TRANSFORMERS. Transformers should be located
inside the building and away from public access. Multiple
transformers should be located remotely from each other to
enhance their reliability should one transformer be damaged by
an explosion.
VII.
DURESS ALARM OR ASSISTANCE STATIONS. Call
buttons should be provided at key public areas and areas that are

JJ
b.
Lighting
VIII.
MONITORING SYSTEMS. Physical/ electronic security
and monitoring system as well as backup power should be
provided.
I.
LIGHTING. There should be adequate environmental
12
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL & RADIOLOGICAL
lighting to enhance building security and complement CCTV
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
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exit signs should be provided with integral battery packs. Non- I.
ACCESS RESTRICTION & SURVEILLANCE. Restrict
slip phosphorescent treads should also be used.
access to critical ventilation equipment such as AHUs and to
mechanical control rooms. Diffusers and return air-grilles in
public areas, as well as air-intakes and mechanical control rooms
should be secured and under surveillance.
c.
Communications and Security Systems
I.
BACKUP COMMUNICATIONS. The building could
have a backup communication system or telephone service to
maintain communications in case of an incident. The preferred
alternative is to have a base radio communication system with
antennas installed in the stairwell, and portable sets distributed on
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systems as well as back up power provision.
II.
RADIO TELEMETRY.
Distributed antennas could
be located throughout the facility if required for emergency
communications through wireless transmission of data.
II.
HVAC SYSTEMS. Zone HVAC systems and isolate
HVAC zones in unsecured areas. Each zone should have its
own AHU and duct system. Isolation of the return air system (i.e.
no shared returns) is also recommended. Incorporate fast acting,
low-leakage shut off dampers in the HVAC systems.
III.
SAFE ZONES. Create safe zones using enhanced
, [J * : @

* : @@ @ *@@,

aid, water, personnel-protective equipment). Provide positive
pressurisation of primary egress routes, safe havens and critical
areas.
IV.
PUBLIC AREAS. Filter both the return air and outdoor
air supply for public areas.
III.
SPARE CONDUITS. Empty conduits and power outlets
should be considered for possible future installation of security
control equipment, Smart Card Technologies or other security
solutions.
V.
HIGH RISK AREAS. Lobbies, loading docks and
mail rooms, etc, are considered high risk areas. They should
be located outside the main building footprint and be provided
with separate HVAC systems with isolated returns capable of
100% exhaust. In addition, these areas should be maintained
IV.
OPERATIONAL COMMAND CENTRE (OCC), FIRE at a negative pressure relative to the rest of the building but at
COMMAND CENTRE (FCC) AND SECURITY COMMAND a positive or neutral pressure relative to the outdoors. Their
construction should be air-tight with vestibules and air-locks if
CENTRE (SCC). The SCC and OCC may be co-located. The
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chain of command should be carefully pre-planned to ensure the to be activated upon suspected internal CBR release should also
*,
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Secure the information links between the SCC, OCC and FCC.
VI.
FILTRATION SYSTEMS. J
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The FCC shall be accessible from the building exterior.
be carefully designed and employed to maximise effective
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V.
CCTV SYSTEMS. A colour CCTV surveillance system JJJ
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with recording capability should be provided to view and record ^
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activity at the perimeter of the building, particularly at primary potential to integrate detection systems at a later stage.
entrances/exits, and VIPs enclosure. A mix of monochrome
VII.
POSITIVE PRESSURISATION. The HVAC design
cameras should be considered for areas that lack adequate should create a slight overpressure of 5 to 12 Pa within the
illumination for colour cameras. The system should be capable building environment relative to the outdoors. The design should
of archiving high resolution CCTV footage for 30 days. Intelligent q qJ
, : J@
CCTV (i-CCTV) should be installed for space designed for secure against external release of CBR agents.
and non-secure areas e.g. lobbies, unloading bays. For details,
AIR-TIGHTNESS. In order to maintain the desired
please refer to the guidelines for CCTV Systems at Section 8.7 VIII.
pressure
relationships between HVAC zones and limit the
of the Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore.

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structure and its boundaries (e.g. doors, windows, walls, etc)
should be designed to be as airtight as practical.
Page 124
APPENDIX B
GENERAL SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR
HOTELS
INTRODUCTION
themselves expect to feel secure while visiting the hotel. It can

therefore be said that there is a commercial value in creating a
secure environment in the hotel.
, @ : ** @,:

role in a countrys economy. They serve both the local and , J^ J J

international business communities and bolster the economy with challenge in designing security and protective countermeasures:
foreign currency. Terror attacks that target hotels can therefore
potentially cause great harm to a countrys economy.
They are open to the general public.
They host large numbers of local and foreign guests.
Modern terrorism, as demonstrated in recent events, has * @q:,*

targeted hotels and has made them a preferred target. Terrorist
weight.
organisations understand the vulnerabilities of the hotel industry. They host major functions such as conferences, parties and
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weddings that attract even more guests, who visit the hotel
attractions could have on tourism, the economy and on public
for a relatively short period of time.
morale. It is these factors that have brought terror organisations Hotels routinely receive large numbers and amounts of
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deliveries and supplies (both in volume and quantity).
mass terror attacks against hotels and tourist resorts.
Hotels employ a large number of permanent and temporary
staff.
Standards

Luxury
hotels often host or entertain both international and
There is a Singapore Standard for Hotel Security
, ,0`@ ,,
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SS545:2009 by SPRING Singapore. This provides a
framework for hotels to assist them in setting up a
security management system.
The general directions presented in this appendix are divided
according to the following security rings:
The prominent past terror attacks against tourist centres include:
1.
Deterrence
Coordinated attacks at different locations in Mumbai which 2.
Pro-active Security
included 2 hotels, The Taj Mahal Palace & Tower and The 3.
Perimeter Security
Oberoi Trident (November 2008, 173 dead and hundreds 4.
Access Control
more wounded);
5.
Security Command and Control Room
The attack on the Islamabad Marriott Hotel (September 2008, 6.
Emergency Procedures
54 killed, more than 200 injured) where a suicide bomber
SECURITY RINGS
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hotel;
1.
DETERRENCE
Simultaneous attacks against three hotels in Amman
(November 2005, 57 dead and hundreds more wounded);
Deterrence theory explores the conditions under which one party
Attack against the Egyptian resort of Sharm al-Sheikh (July
can deter another opposing party from taking an action that is
2005, at least 88 dead and hundreds more wounded);
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The attack against the Hilton Taba and two beach resorts
either or both of the following aspects:
(October 2004, 32 dead and over a hundred wounded).
The attack on Park Hotel in Netanya (March 2002, 30 killed
I.
The threat to use force in response to an undesired
more than 140 injured) where a terrorist took advantage of
action this is aimed at making the opponent decide that the
a religious event in the hotel to perpetrate a mass murder
projected losses caused by the violent response will be greater
attack.
than the projected gains from the actions he wishes to perform.
Among the tourist attractions attacked in the region were:

Twin bombings at Jakartas JW Marriott Hotel and RitzCarlton Hotel (July 2009, 9 dead, 53 injured);
Bomb attacks in Balis Jimbaran (near Four Seasons Hotel)
and Kuta areas (Oct 2005, 23 dead, 129 injured);
The attack outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta (August 2003,
12 dead and over a hundred wounded);
The attacks against tourists in Bali (October 2002, 202 dead,
many more wounded, and October 2005, 26 dead and more
than a hundred wounded).
When planning security measures for a hotel, it is imperative to

remember that the security plan should create a balance between
the need to create a secure environment and the requirements
of the hotel to maintain an open, inviting and warm environment.
Providing the correct level of security measures throughout a
hotel can contribute to the hotels business as it is the hosts duty
to provide a secure environment to its guests and the guests
II.
The assurance of failure this is aimed at convincing the
adversary that his planned actions are doomed to fail, thus giving
him no gain.
Deterrence is both an aim and a by-product of a security plan,
and can be achieved with little or no extra cost.
When relating to deterrence in the protective security arena, the
measures employed are usually aimed at making the adversary
think that he is doomed to fail.
The assurance of failure is created both by deploying robust
and clearly recognisable security measures and by cultivating a
reputation of tight, effective security deployment.
Page 125
A robust and clearly recognisable security deployment is achieved

by:
I.
Applying a pro-active security concept security guards
that actively and visibly hunt the threat create an intimidating
security presence and give the adversary the feeling that his
operative might also be singled out and apprehended by the
security deployment.
II.
Deploying visible technical security measures such as
CCTV coverage of an area which could be interpreted by the
adversary as a pro-active security measure even if the footage
of the CCTV camera is not reviewed regularly (a fact that the
adversary is not likely to be aware of).
III.
Implementing visible physical protection elements such
as perimeter bollards and fences, screening areas and access
control at entrances will deter most attackers from choosing that
building as a target.
A reputation for tight, effective security deployment can be created
both by advertising past successes in foiling real and simulated
attacks and by using propaganda (e.g. newspaper articles that
@*:*@, :@
,
Deterrence helps prevent attacks in their planning stage and thus
should be an essential component of every security plan.
In the case of hotels, deterrence can be achieved by:
I.
Building physical protection elements at the perimeter
line and entrances including access control and gates (even if
they are only deployed during times of high alert).
II.
Deployment of robust technical security measures
such as CCTV and alarm systems throughout the hotel and its
perimeter.
III.
The deployment of uniformed security personnel who will
perform checks at the hotels entrances.
The solution to the apparent inferiority of the defending force

can be found in its inherent advantages. The security force can
usually afford better training for its personnel. The security team
must be able to take advantage of the fact that it is operating on
J * J q, J q

detailed knowledge of their terrain which can provide them with
tactical superiority during the adversarys intelligence gathering,
as well as during an attack.
Pro-active security is a tool for enhancing the security units
advantages while minimising those of the potential attacker.
Pro-active security is comprised of:
I.
A pro-active mindset The security guards must be
educated to have a hunter mentality. This means that they
need to constantly seek out the potential attacker, screening their
surroundings for suspects and irregularities. This will enable the
security deployment to potentially detect the terrorists prior to an
impending attack. Even if the terrorists are not detected before
they attack, the pro-active mindset will enable the guards to shift
from routine to emergency mode faster.
II.
A pro-active deployment The security deployment
must be outward-reaching and its various sensors must be
directed to detecting possible approaching threats. The practical
application of this type of deployment is the positioning of
perimeter guards and the direction of CCTV coverage at possible
terrorist deployment areas.
III.
A pro-active command The security management
must lead the pro-active efforts. Security managers must be
trained as commanders, leading their security unit by example.
Security commanders must be available to their team at all times
(equipped with a mobile radio), carry arms (if the unit is armed),
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IV.
Pro-active specialised training The security guards
and commanders must be trained in the various skills that will
enable them to detect terrorists and pre-attack reconnaissance.
Two important measures in achieving and maintaining a proactive security operation are pro-active minded audits and red
teaming exercises. These should be focused on testing and
` J
, [ @ |@ J J assuring pro-active security measures. They help to evaluate the
that the defender is usually in an inferior position vis--vis the level of preparedness and pro-activeness of the tested security
attacking terrorists. This is primarily as a result of the routine deployment. They also help to focus the security unit on the need
nature of security work combined with the relatively low number for applying pro-active security, by showing that the security
of attacks taking place which together tend to make security regulator puts an emphasis on these measures.
deployment defensive and reactive.
3.
PERIMETER SECURITY
The attacker has the advantage of initiative on his side. He is able
to choose the time, place and modus operandi of the attack. He When planning perimeter security for hotels, special emphasis
can abort the attack or postpone the attack if he believes that he must be given to the various entrances and exits to the building
is in a disadvantageous situation.
and especially to the main entrance.
2.
PRO-ACTIVE SECURITY
On the other hand, security guards will usually be passive to their

surroundings and only once an incident has occurred or been
reported will they move into an active mode. Analysis of terrorist
attacks in recent years shows that the passive nature of some
security operations have contributed to their failure in preventing
and defeating attacks.
A hotels main entrance is usually a busy area, crowded with

guests going into and out of the hotel, and it hosts relatively large
concentrations of luggage waiting to be taken into the hotel or
to be loaded onto out-going vehicles. A hotels main entrances
is usually characterised by a relatively vulnerable structure, with
large openings and usually includes a large glass faade that
enables visitors and people walking by to look into the hotels
lobby and reception areas. Such entrances are also usually
accessible by vehicles which make them both attractive and
vulnerable to VBIED attacks.
Page 126
When planning the security deployment for hotels in Singapore

it is important to note that during normal periods the threat level
in Singapore is relatively low and thus the deployment of certain
noticeable security measures that would be utilised in hotels
in higher risk countries is not warranted. One must remember,
however, that given the deterrent role of the security and
protection elements, the hotel industry in Singapore needs to be
prepared for a rise in threat levels, which may occur at any time.
This external security presence should have the means and

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include:
Preparations for such a rise in threat levels may take time and
thus the industry must prepare itself in advance for making the
necessary increase in its security deployments strength.
I.
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intelligence (recce)
III.
Deterring potential attacks
IV.
Providing advanced warning and reporting possible

approaching threats
V.
Providing the initial armed response to attacks

originating both inside and outside the hotel.
These preparations should include:

I.
The installation of retractable barriers (US DOS K4
standard or equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or UK BSI PAS68:2007
standard13) that would remain open but could be closed in times
of heightened threat.
II.
Acquiring the necessary security equipment (e.g. X-ray
machines and explosive material detectors).
III.
Preparing the necessary infrastructure for the
deployment of the security equipment (designing the area to
carry the equipments load, laying electricity cables, allocating the
necessary space at the relevant locations).
b) Technological Security Measures

The technological security measures deployed on the hotels
perimeter needs to complement and support the human security
measures. The technological measures must ensure that:
I.
Vehicles and people wishing to enter the hotel are only

able to do so through the protected screening posts.
II.
Critical areas not covered by human security presence

can be viewed from afar using CCTV or other measures
ncluding detectors to alert the guards of an intrusion.
IV.
Training the security staff with the necessary skills (e.g.
correct use of technological screening equipment, pedestrian and
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a) Security Guards
During periods of heightened threat or in any situations where it
may be deemed necessary, a manned outer security perimeter
for the hotel may need to be created. In certain situations based
on threat assessments, the Singapore Police Force may deploy
resources, if they deem it to be necessary, for this purpose or may
require hotels to put in place the necessary security guards.
The perimeter security should consist of at least two armed
guards who should be stationed at the entrance and the exit to
the hotel driveway on a 24 hour basis. These guards should be
responsible for stopping an attack before the assailants reach the
hotel premises.
Any breach of the perimeter security will raise an alarm

that will in turn allow the security deployment to react
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It is important to note that the security measures employed

on a hotels perimeter need not be obvious or make the hotel
to resemble a fortress. Vehicle barriers can be designed as
decorative planters or attractive railings, CCTV cameras can be
placed out of sight, hotel security personnel can be dressed in
hotel uniforms, thus blending into the environment.
4.
ACCESS CONTROL
A policy of relatively free access is vital for a hotels regular

operation and especially to the operation of restaurants, bars and
other function facilities.
At normal threat levels, hotels employ visual screening of guests/
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entrances. This measure is usually aimed at preventing both
terrorist and criminal elements from entering the hotel.
During an elevated threat, however, it will be necessary to apply
a more thorough examination to the people and vehicles wishing
to enter the hotel premises. Furthermore, during a high state of
alert, the number of open entrances to the hotel would have to be
limited or reduced.
In order for a hotels security unit to be able to move smoothly
and quickly between normal, elevated and high threat level
deployments, a prepared security infrastructure must be in place
in the hotel.
13

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Page 127
This infrastructure should include the space, structural load

bearing capability and the electrical means needed to operate
technical access control screening measures. It should also
include adequate security procedures and the proper training of
the hotels security guards and management.
c. Screening of Deliveries for Guests

Reccomendations for normal threat levels:
Hotels must train their security staff and other personnel with
the skills needed to detect suspected IEDs.
Packages delivered to hotel guests should be visually

screened by the hotels staff.
Suspicious packages should be deferred to the hotels

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the package should be referred to the police for treatment.
a. Guest and staff screening

Hotel staff members have a relatively high level of interaction with
the hotel guests. They clean their rooms, carry their luggage and
serve them in the different bars and restaurants.
It is recommended that the hotels staff, both security and non*:^*@
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members should be encouraged to be aware of terror related Reccomendations for elevated threat levels:
threats and to alert the hotels security unit of any suspicion they
might have regarding a guest or a visitor.
Suspicious packages should be screened using the X-Ray
and explosive detectors in a protected area away from the
The hotel should also develop a system of background screening
hotels guests or main building structure.
of staff and hotel staff should be encouraged to look out for and
report suspicious behaviour of colleagues as well as guests.
Reccomendations for high threat levels:
The details of suspicious guests or staff may be sent to the
Singapore Police Force for checks and follow-up actions (if
necessary).
b. Screening of guests entering the hotel
d. Screening of Deliveries to the Hotel
Recommendations for normal threat levels:
Hotels routinely receive large quantities of deliveries both in

volume and number. These deliveries might be used in order to

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All incoming packages should be screened using X-Ray and

explosive detectors in a protected area away from the hotels
guests or main building structure.
Hotels should employ visual screening of guests/patrons by

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recommended for guards to make the visual screening more
Designated time frames should be determined for each
effective in detecting the relevant threats.
delivery company.
Recommendations for elevated threat levels:
The hotels security must compile a list of approved delivery
trucks and drivers.
It is recommended that hotels limit the number of open
access ways to their premises, and that all open entrances
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will be monitored by security staff.
personnel before allowing delivery trucks to enter the hotels
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loading bay area.
I.
Visually screen pedestrians for indications of suspicious

behaviour.
Delivery drivers and the deliveries themselves must be

visually scanned by the hotels security,
II.
Conduct a more thorough examination of suspects

(using metal detectors, opening hand bags and discreetly
screening their luggage with an x-ray machine) in a more
protected area or behind a protected movable shield.
In order to enhance deterrence against terrorist attempts to

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suspicious deliveries together with a small number of random
deliveries be checked using explosives trace detectors
(sniffers).
III.
Conduct random checks in order to enhance deterrence.

Reccomendations for elevated threat levels:
Recommendations for high threat levels:

It is recommended that hotels limit the number of open

access ways to their premises, and that all open entrances
be monitored by security staff.
Everyone wishing to enter the hotel should be checked with

metal detectors, in order to create deterrence and to ensure
the potential terrorist will be examined.
All luggage and handbags should be checked with an x-ray

machine, suspected luggage should also be checked with
explosive detectors.
Delivery companies will be instructed to notify the hotels

security in advance with the particulars of delivery drivers
and delivery vehicles registration numbers.
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company and the ordering store, prior to entering the loading
bay area and being accepted by the hotel.
Reccomendations for high threat levels:

All deliveries will be checked by explosives trace detection

devices.
An area must be allocated for suspicious luggage and people

and have protection elements and forced entry resistant
doors and windows.
Page 128
e. Vehicle Access
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during routine and different types of emergencies.
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responders while they are performing their respective
responsibilities.
Is robust, secure and resilient under routine and
Vehicle access routes in the vicinity of the hotel usually exist for
three main reasons:
I.
To enable access to the hotels parking areas.
II.
To enable the parking of selected vehicles in front of the

hotel.
III.
To allow vehicles to access the entrance for the purpose

of picking up or dropping off guests and their luggage.
The basic requirements of a command and control room:
III.

Technical measures such as car barriers should be installed

so that they can quickly be deployed during elevated and
high threat levels.
During normal threat levels, the hotel need not screen

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for the hotel to do so).
I.
Location To be placed in the most secure and protected

part of the building with extra physical protection
elements if needed. (See the guidelines for more
details).
II.
Operational Effectiveness This is achieved mostly by

creating prioritisation of the alarm and CCTV systems
outputs.
III.
Accurate alarm indications This enables the Command

& Control Room operator to immediately understand
where the breach or event is and to receive an
immediate visual picture of it via CCTV.
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Procedures) to be taken during each of the various
emergency situations that could arise. This enables the
security staff to initiate an effective security response
to a variety of emergency situations quickly.
V.
Automated procedures such as automated alarms that

notify the different security forces involved in responding
to the incident. This should take some pressure off the
security control room staff.
VI.
Direct connection or integration with the hotels

management systems that are considered critical or
security related. This should enable the security control
room staff to override or control these systems when the
situation requires.
VII.
Protection and backup of all critical systems. This gives

the security systems resilience during emergency
situations in which the security control room may be
damaged. Provisions that allow for an off-site Command
and Control centre are recommended.
Recommendations for elevated threat levels:

Barriers, which should have been installed but kept in the

open position, should now be deployed in order to allow the
hotels security staff to screen incoming vehicles and prevent
suspected VBIEDs from entering the hotel driveway.
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of vehicles wishing to enter.
Suspicious vehicles need to be searched (inside the

passenger compartment, in the baggage compartment,
next to the engine and underneath the vehicle) as do their
occupants (using metal detectors). This should allow the
detection of weapons and IEDs before permitting them to
enter the hotels driveway.
Recommendations for high threat levels:

All vehicles need to be searched (inside the passenger

compartment, in the baggage compartment, next to the
engine and underneath the vehicle) as do their occupants
(using metal detectors).
Vehicles should not be permitted to park in parking spaces
located at the front of the hotels, and should also be kept
away from other vulnerable areas.
The design of the command and control room should

correspond with these tasks.
5.
SECURITY COMMAND & CONTROL ROOM
The security command control room of a building is the nerve

centre of the security operations and should receive and provide
vital information to and from the security personnel on the shift,
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A hotels security operations should be aimed at both crime and
terror prevention. The effectiveness and the manner in which
these operations are carried out are dependant on the capabilities
of the control room and its operating staff.
The security control room design must allow it to function as an
effective tool for managing the security of the building. This can
only be achieved if the security control room:
CCTV MONITORING
The tendency in hotel security planning is to design CCTV
systems for crime prevention and insurance reasons. Security
managers should not overlook the importance of deploying antiterror CCTV coverage throughout the hotel and its perimeter (for
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guidelines).
Another issue to remember when planning the CCTV monitoring
scheme is that the security personnel operating the security
control room have a limited ability to cover monitors.
In order to avoid overloading the security control room operators
with information, and thus making the CCTV monitoring ineffective,
it is recommended that each operator cover a maximum of 8
monitors that supply an image of at least 10.
Page 129
The monitors to be observed in the security command room

need to be carefully selected in accordance with threat and risk
assessment. Additional monitors can be installed, but should only
be operated in emergencies when the security control room staff
is bolstered by reinforcements.
SAFE HAVENS AND ESCAPE ROUTES

Safe havens
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incidents and exercises should also be taken into account. If an
attack occurs or an alarm is set off, CCTV footage of the area can
be used to reconstruct events, recognize suspects, solve crimes
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responses. In order to accomplish all of this, CCTV footage has to
be stored for a period of time (30 days is recommended. Please
refer to section 8.7.3 of the guidelines for details).
6.
EMERGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES
Emergency procedures should cover modern terrorist attack

scenarios such as:
I.
Armed assaults.
II.
Staggered attack comprising a combination of scenarios

(e.g. a VBIED explosion followed by an armed assault).
In many threat and emergency scenarios, the safest place

to be is in a safe haven within the building rather than trying
to escape. Typically, the safe haven room will be reinforced
against forced entry and even equipped with bio-chemical
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attacks for long periods of time until help comes. In many
buildings it will be the shelter room.
Identifying and incorporating safe havens into the buildings
emergency planning is one of the main responsibilities of a
buildings security manager. The security manager needs to
give clear and simple instructions to the buildings occupants
regarding the use of these safe havens. These instructions
must include clear criteria that determine in which situations
the occupants must go to the safe havens. Safe havens are
especially critical in situation whereby evacuation routes may
be inaccessible following a terror attack.
Emergency escape
Routes should be designed taking into consideration the

threats and risks estimated for the hotel according to possible
terror scenarios. Special care should be taken to ensure that
they do not pass through areas that are considered hazardous
in an emergency situation. The escape routes should be
planned in accordance with and in coordination with both the
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following:
The guiding principle for determining whether to activate an

escape plan is simple. Evacuation is ordered when the danger
to the occupants is greater within the building/installation than
it is outside it.
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whilst they are dealing with the wounded.
IV.
Attacks utilising unconventional weapons (dispersion of

a chemical agent via the buildings ventilating systems).
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II.
The responsibilities and duties of all employee groups

(hotel security team, maintenance, front lobby staff, etc.)
during and after the emergency situation a special
focus should be put on assigning a team to help guests
who cannot evacuate themselves.
III.
A clear chain of command at all stages of the attack.
IV.
Which local forces will provide immediate reinforcements?
V.
Who evacuates the guests and visitors?
VI.
Who will be responsible for reporting and to whom? Both

within and outside the hotels management structure.
VII.
The position of emergency equipment and its functions.
VIII.
Safe havens and escape routes.
It must be possible to initiate emergency and evacuation

procedures immediately without having to await permission
from an administrative manager/executive. Seeking
administrative permission to evacuate the building/installation
in life threatening situations is not advisable due to the
time constraint.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above appendix of general security guidelines for hotels

provides generic recommendations for security solutions for
hotels that if implemented will enhance security levels. The
appendix includes many general recommendations according to
the different security rings presented. The overarching concept
of the appendix, which will greatly facilitate the implementation of
the recommendations, is that by correctly preparing and training
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they will become a force multiplier in anti-terrorism preparedness.
Page 130
APPENDIX C
GENERAL SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR
SHOPPING MALLS
INTRODUCTION
In Singapore, both the booming tourist industry and the hot climate
combine to make our major shopping malls important centres for
economic activity. The large and prosperous shopping malls,
hosting thousands of shoppers daily, can be seen as symbols
of Singapores economic success. The impact of a major terror
attack against one of these malls would be severe and would
probably cause serious damage to the countrys economy.
An analysis of terror attacks in the modern era show that terrorist
organisations have frequently targeted shopping malls in their
terror campaigns. In the terror campaign against Israel, which
began in September 2000, the Palestinian terror groups had
attacked shopping malls in Israels cities, one example being
the attack which took place at the Sharon Shopping Mall in sea
side city of Netanya in December 2005. In this attack, a suicide
bomber from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad detonated himself at
the entrance to the mall after his entrance was blocked by security
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The IRA had also targeted shopping malls and commercial
centres in the past with the VBIED attack against the shopping
centre in Manchester on the 15th June 1996 being the most
prominent example. In this attack, over 200 people were injured
despite the warning given by the IRA close to detonation.
Shopping malls have certain characteristics that create a

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measures:
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foreign.
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can be used as places for concealing IEDs.
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and supplies.
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in their food halls and in areas that hold clothing).
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attract customers).
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temporary staff including a security force made up
usually of both uniformed guards and plainclothes store
detectives.
Another terror organisation that had attacked shopping malls was

the Kurdish PKK. In an attack at a mall in Istanbul in March 1999,
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people in the attack. The Abu Saif organisation had attacked malls
in the Philippines and the ETA had planted bombs in department
stores in Spain.
Terrorist organisations understand the vulnerabilities of the
commercial and tourist centres and have attacked many tourist
related targets. The attack against the Egyptian tourist resort of
Sharm al-Sheikh (July 2005, at least 88 dead and hundreds more
wounded) and the attack against the Hilton Taba and two beach
resorts (October 2004, 32 dead and over a hundred wounded)
are just two examples.
Large and crowded shopping malls are attractive targets to
the rising threat of global terrorism, which is characterised by
professionalism, detailed planning, identifying and utilising
vulnerabilities and a lack of inhibition in attacking civilian targets
seeking to cause mass casualties.
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halls.
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procedures and can not be drilled to gain familiarity.
In normal threat environments, the general security concept

employed in shopping malls is derived from the main
objective of their security policy crime prevention. In
order to achieve this objective, shopping malls allocate
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technology and procedural domains. These resources
can be effectively utilised to provide security solutions to
threats of terrorism that malls may face.
In order for the security resources of a shopping mall to be

utilised effectively, there must be an anti-terrorism security plan
THE SECURITY CONCEPT
for the mall. This plan must be integrated into the malls security
policy through management policy, training and audit. The malls
When designing a security concept for the protection of malls, security force(s) must be trained in all the skills and procedures
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between creating a secure environment and the requirements of plan.
the shopping mall to be open to the public with an inviting and
Since shopping malls on a regular basis employ a
commercially attractive environment. Providing the correct level
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of security for customers is the domain owners responsibility and
through adaptive training, achieve fairly high levels of
can contribute to the malls quality and therefore to its business.
security for relatively little additional investment in security.
Creating a secure environment in and around shopping
malls has a commercial value.
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adapt to different threat levels. The model presented below offers
a system for transferring protection assets from crime prevention
to anti-terrorism according to threat levels. The transfer will be
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levels rise, so more of the shopping malls security assets are
allocated to anti-terrorism functions and positioning.
Page 131
It is important to note that shifting a guard or plainclothes store

detective from crime prevention mode to anti-terrorism mode
does not necessarily mean that the crime prevention level will be
lowered. In some cases the new role may make the guard more
alert and dynamic and therefore improve the effectiveness of the
crime prevention. A store detective with experience at identifying
the suspicious behaviour of shoplifters will be able to adapt very
well to identifying other possible suspects provided he is equipped
with the necessary tools and training.
SECURITY RINGS
1.
DETERRENCE
Deterrence theory explores the conditions under which one player

can deter another opposing player from taking an action that is
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involves one of two aspects or a combination of both:
I.
The threat to use force in response to an undesired
action this is aimed at making the opponent evaluate the
projected losses caused by the violent response to be greater
than the projected gains from the actions he wishes to perform.
II.
The assurance of failure this is aimed at convincing the
adversary that his planned actions are doomed to fail, thus giving
him no gain.
Deterrence is both an aim and a by-product of a security plan,
and can be achieved with little to no extra cost.
Well maintained deterrence saves resources over time.

When relating to deterrence in the protective security arena, the
measures employed are usually aimed at leading the adversary
to the decision that his attack plan is likely to fail completely or not
achieve the results that were sought.
The assurance of failure is created both by deploying robust
and clearly recognisable security measures and by cultivating a
reputation of tight, effective security deployment.
Another important component of deterrence is the
adversarys lack of understanding of the entire scope and
level of the security deployment.
A robust and clearly recognisable security deployment is achieved
by:
I.
Applying a pro-active security concept security guards
that actively and visibly hunt the threat create an intimidating
security presence and give the adversary the feeling that his
operative might also be singled out and apprehended by the
security deployment.
II.
Deploying visible technical security measures, for
example CCTV coverage of an area could be interpreted by the
adversary as a pro-active security measure even if the footage
of the CCTV camera is not reviewed regularly (a fact that the
adversary is not likely to be aware of).
A reputation of tight, effective security deployment can be created
both by advertising past successes in foiling real and simulated
attacks, and by using propaganda e.g. newspaper articles that
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shopping mall, etc.
Deterrence helps prevent attacks in their planning stage and thus
should be an essential component of every security plan.
The general directions presented in this appendix are divided

according to the following security rings:
In the case of shopping malls, deterrence can be achieved by the

deployment of dynamic uniformed security guards and technical
security measures, such as CCTV and alarm systems, throughout
the mall and its perimeter.
1. Deterrence
2. Pro-active security
3. Perimeter Security
4. Access Control
5. Security command and control room
6. Emergency Procedures
Page 132
2.
PRO-ACTIVE SECURITY
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the defender is usually in an inferior position in relation to the
attacking terrorists. This is primarily as a result of the routine
nature of security work combined with the relatively low number
of attacks taking place, that tend to make security deployment
defensive and reactive.
The attacker has the advantage of initiative on his side. He is able
to choose the time, place and modus operandi of the attack. He
can abort the attack or postpone the attack if he believes that he
is at a disadvantage.
On the other hand, a security guard will usually be passive to his
surroundings and only once an incident has occurred or been
reported will he move into an active mode. Analysis of terrorist
attacks in recent years show that the passive nature of some
security operations have contributed to their failure in preventing
and defeating attacks.
The solution to the apparent inferiority of the defending force can
be found in its inherent advantages. The security force can usually
afford better training for its personnel. The security team must be
able to take advantage of the fact it is operating on home ground;
this enables them to have an intimate and detailed knowledge
of their terrain which can provide them with tactical superiority
during the adversarys intelligence gathering as well as during an
attack.
Pro-active security is a tool for enhancing the security units
advantages while minimising those of the potential attacker. It is
made up of:
I.
A PRO-ACTIVE MINDSET - the security guards must
be educated to have a hunter mentality, that is to say that they
need to constantly seek out the potential attacker, screening
their surroundings for suspects and irregularities. This will enable
the security deployment to potentially detect the terrorists prior
to an impending attack. Even if the terrorists are not detected
before they attack, the pro-active mindset will enable the guards
a smoother shift from routine to emergency mode.
II.
A PRO-ACTIVE DEPLOYMENT the security
deployment must be outward facing; its various sensors must be
directed to detecting possible approaching threats. The practical
application of this type of deployment is the positioning of
perimeter guards and the direction of CCTV coverage at possible
terrorist deployment areas.
III.
A PRO-ACTIVE COMMAND the security management
must lead the pro-active efforts. Security managers must be
trained as commanders, leading their security unit by example.
Security commanders must be available to their team at all times
(equipped with a mobile radio), carry arms, if the unit is an armed
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IV.
PRO-ACTIVE SPECIALISED TRAINING the security
guards and commanders must receive training in the various
skills that will enable them to detect terrorists and pre-attack
reconnaissance. Two important measures in achieving and
maintaining a pro-active security operation are pro-active minded
audits and red teaming exercises. These should be focused
on testing and assuring pro-active security measures. They help
to evaluate the level of preparedness and pro-activeness of the
tested security deployment. They also help to focus the security
unit on the need for applying pro-active security, by showing that
the security regulator puts an emphasis on these measures.
3.
PERIMETER SECURITY
The majority of terrorist attacks against shopping malls have

been conducted by placing an IED inside the mall or by trying

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of a dynamic, pro-active perimeter security deployment cannot
be underestimated. One of the principles of security is the ability
to detect a suspected attacker as far away from the building as
possible or at a point where the attacker would cause the least
amount of damage. One of the means to do this is by employing
external security rings.
Another major threat relating to the building perimeter is the easy
approach of a potential VBIED to the external walls and entrance
and ramming through them to enter the main building. This threat
may have catastrophic implications on the mall if carried out.
The main principle in mitigating consequences in such an event
is by determining the vulnerable locations for such threats and
preventing the attack from being carried out in a catastrophic
manner (assuming complete prevention is not always possible).
This would be done usually by installing a physical barrier to
prevent the vehicle from approaching a critical proximity and
installing blast mitigation elements on glass facades.
Perimeter security is a critical external ring and when not
effectively realised it may cause a serious vulnerability
in a buildings security deployment. This is the kind of
vulnerability to which terrorism is attracted.
When planning perimeter security for shopping malls, special
emphasis must be given to the malls various entrances and exits
and especially to the main entrance.
A malls main entrance is usually the busiest and most crowded
entrance often positioned facing the main road, packed with
shoppers entering and exiting the mall. A shopping malls
main entrance is usually characterised by relatively vulnerable
construction; large openings, a large glass faade that enables
both shoppers and passers-by to view the merchandise on
display inside the mall. These main entrances are also usually
accessible by vehicles to allow private car and taxi drop-off and
pick-up of shoppers, a feature that makes them very attractive
and vulnerable to VBIED attacks.
Preparations for such a rise in threat levels may take time and
thus the industry must prepare itself in advance for making the
necessary increase in its security deployments strength.
These preparations should include:
I.
The installation of retractable barriers (US DOS K4
standard or equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or UK BSI PAS68:2007
standard14) that would remain open but could be closed in times
of heightened threat.
II.
Acquiring the necessary security equipment (e.g. X-ray
machines and explosive material detectors).
III.
Preparing the necessary infrastructure for the
deployment of the security equipment (designing the area to
carry the equipments load, laying electricity cables, allocating the
necessary space at the relevant locations).
IV.
Training the security staff with the necessary skills (e.g.
correct use of technological screening equipment, pedestrian and
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Page 133
General recommendations for normal threat levels:
a. Walk-in Shoppers Screening
Due to the very large numbers of people in Singapores

major shopping malls and their attractiveness as targets for
terrorism, there should be an armed and pro-active security
presence even during times of normal threat (2-3 armed
guards) on the perimeter of these malls.
This external security presence should have the means and

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include:

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A preliminary visual screening of people entering the mall

is most effective if carried out at the various entrances.
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be countered or neutralised before they enter the building.
Some of the screening can be done by exterior patrols and
some by guards posted at or near the entrances. Special
attention should be given to people such as individuals
carrying large bags, wearing heavy clothing like suits or coats
or who stand out as unusual or odd.
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Suspects will be physically screened using metal detectors
reconnaissance
and their handbags should be searched visually or screened
III.
Deterring potential attacks
using a hand-held metal detector.
IV.
Providing advanced warning and reporting
possible approaching threats
Relevant screening equipment should be available.
V.
Responding to alerts given from the command
post
At elevated threat levels:
VI.
Providing the initial security response to the
attack
Security guards need to be posted at each entrance to
visually screen all people entering the mall. Any suspects
General recommendations for elevated threat levels:
and a pre-determined percentage of random individuals will
be physically screened using hand-held metal detectors and
A minimum number (to be determined) of randomly picked
their bags will be visually searched.
shoppers need to be checked per hour by the perimeter
*:
J @ @ @,

*@J*,, Closing some of the less busy entrances should be considered
to enable a concentration of effort for access control at the
open entrances if resources are limited.
In addition to the armed exterior presence at the entrances,
frequent patrols (two per hour) should be operated around
At high threat levels:
the perimeter.
A perimeter of crowd control barriers should be erected to

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away from the entrance in order to provide stand off and depth
for reaction. These crowd control barriers should be manned
by an armed guard and an additional security guard.
The diagram below is an illustrated example of this type of

crowd control barriers.
General recommendations for high threat levels:

The perimeter security should provide protection for crowd

concentrations that might form at shopping malls exteriors
near the screening at the entrances.
, *: J *, q

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4.
ACCESS CONTROL
Access control deals with authorisation and rules by which

vehicles, personnel and goods may enter a building. The reason
access control is such an important security feature is that in most
cases, an attack that takes place inside will cause much more
damage and casualties than an attack which occurs outside. For
this reason it is recommended that a shopping malls security
unit deploys a certain level of access control measures at normal
threat levels which will increase with a rise in the threat level.
The different methods for implementing access control for walk-in
shoppers, vehicles and deliveries, are derived from the potential
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tuned to enable discovery of that threat. A person walking into
the mall can only carry a relatively small amount of explosives.
The most likely threat quantity is an IED carried by an individual
assimilated in the crowd i.e. 5-20 Kg. On the other hand, a VBIED
can contain much larger quantities of explosives of up to several
hundred kilograms.
Page 134
Security guards need to be posted at every entrance of the

shopping malls except those entrances which are behind the
crowd control barriers.
An elevated guard post should be constructed and manned
by an armed guard. The position will enable tactical control
over the areas around and beyond the crowd control barriers.
General recommendations for elevated threat levels:

Delivery companies should be instructed to notify the shopping

malls security departments in advance with the particulars of
the drivers and the vehicles registration numbers.
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company and the ordering store, prior to entry.
All people wishing to enter the shopping malls will be

physically screened and their bags will be searched.
General recommendations for high threat levels:

b. Screening of Deliveries
Delivery companies will be instructed to deliver supplies at
|J *JJ,,, J@*q, *

the peak hours.
Major shopping malls receive vast quantities of merchandise and

supplies each day. The delivery of merchandise and supplies can
be used as a platform for bringing VBIEDs or large IEDs into a All deliveries will be checked by explosives trace detection
devices.
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screened according to the threat level.
c. Vehicle Access
At normal threat levels three basic anti-theft and fraud measures
commonly used are adequate for dealing with the VBIED and IED
threats. These three measures are:
I.
Screening of the documentation of incoming
delivery vehicles in order to make sure that the delivery
was ordered by a tenant of the shopping mall.
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unloaded from the trucks at the loading docks matches
the details of the delivery as is written on the delivery
papers. The match should be according to number of
parcels and their size.
III.
Drivers that are not regulars or drivers that
seem suspicious should be questioned by the security

Major shopping malls in Singapore often provide car parking

space for their clients in the form of underground or multi-storey
car parks within the shopping mall building. The threat of a
VBIED entering a malls car park poses a serious threat. These
threats are presented in the main body of the guidelines. This
appendix assumes that such a threat exists and relates to it with
@
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aim of these recommended security screening measures is to
:
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car park. The greater the vulnerability to a mall from a particular
car park, the greater the importance of the screening measures.
All vehicles should be visually screened at the entrance to

the car park driveway for suspicious people or suspected
VBIEDs.
Suspected vehicles and people will be directed to a

designated15@ Jq:*:

General recommendations for elevated and high threat

levels:
All vehicles wishing to enter the shopping malls car park

will be searched internally and externally, according to the

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Suspicious and random vehicles will be checked with

explosives detection devices.
5.
SECURITY COMMAND & CONTROL ROOMS
The security command control room of a shopping mall is the

nerve centre of security operations for the mall and should receive
and provide vital information to and from the security personnel
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routine and emergency situations.
Important note:
The additional training that shopping mall security personnel

should receive as recommended in the guidelines will further
enhance the security response for this threat level.
In order to enhance deterrence against terrorist attempts

against shopping malls, it is also recommended that
suspicious deliveries together with a small number
of random deliveries be checked using explosives trace
detectors (sniffers).
A shopping malls security operation should be aimed at both

crime and terror prevention. The effectiveness and the manner in
which these operations are carried out are greatly derived from
and dependent on the capabilities of the control room and its
operating staff.
15
The screening area should be determined taking into account its

location in regards to structural vulnerabilities, high crowd concentration
area, etc.
Page 135
The security control room design must allow it to function as an

effective tool for managing the security of the mall and emergency
situations. This can only be achieved if the security control room:
VIII.
Protection and backup of all critical systems this
is meant to allow for the security systems resilience during
emergency situations in which the security control room will be
damaged.
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routine and emergency situations in order to assist the IX.
Access control for the control room itself, preventing undecision makers to make the right decisions based on authorised entry.
facts.
The formulation of the command and control room should
correspond with these tasks.
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positioned in it to keep a high level of alertness without

^ 16 .
CCTV Monitoring
Normally there is a tendency in shopping mall security planning

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to design CCTV systems for crime prevention and insurance
during routine and different types of breaches and
reasons. Security managers should not overlook the importance
17
emergencies .
of deploying anti-terror CCTV coverage throughout the mall and
@ J@
@, :
Jq,: @
,:q J section 8.7 of the guidelines).
and visitors in emergency situations and monitor the
evacuation of the people if necessary.
It is important to note when planning the CCTV monitoring
scheme that the security personnel operating the security control
#*@@
room have a limit to the number of images they can monitor at
responders while they are performing their respective any one time.
responsibilities.
In order to avoid overloading the security control room operators

` q* * , * * with information and thus making the CCTV monitoring less
effective, it is recommended that each operator cover 4 to 8
images, no less than 10 wide each.
The basic requirements of a security command and control
room are:
The monitors to be observed in the security command room
need to be carefully selected in accordance with threat and
I.
Operational Effectiveness This is achieved mostly by risk assessment, time of day, and different activities at hand.
creating prioritisation of the alarm and CCTV systems outputs Additional monitors can be installed, but should only be operated
,^*, *q,
* q in emergencies when the security control room staff is bolstered
by reinforcements. Monitors that are meant to assist in access
II.
Accurate alarm indications This is meant to enable the control in controlled areas should be dedicated.
C&CR operator to immediately understand where the breach or
event is and to receive an immediate visual picture of it via CCTV. When designing the CCTV deployment and coverage plan, we
, J^ *J* q

```
,,:
q J , and exercises. If an attack occurs or an alarm is set off, CCTV
to be taken during each of the various routine and emergency footage of the area can be used to reconstruct events, recognise
situations that could arise. This enables the security staff to suspects, solve crimes and learn lessons from both successful
initiate an effective security response to a variety of emergency *:@ ` @,J,, J
situations in a relatively short time.
CCTV footage has to be stored for a period of time (28 days is
recommended. Please refer to section 8.7.3 of the guidelines for
IV.
A log book which supports the investigation of incidents details).
and gives a clear picture of what happened and the actions taken.
It should be noted that CCTV coverage also plays a key role in
V.
Recording all data received by the systems (CCTV, creating deterrence.
alarm, access control) for post-incident investigation.
6.
EMERGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES
VI.
Automated procedures such as automated alarms that Terror attacks are lethal, immediate, develop at a rapid rate
notify the different security forces involved in responding to the and usually occur with no prior warning, leading to possible
incident this is meant to take some pressure off the security catastrophic results. In these cases, there is no time for planning
control room staff.
the response, reporting and requesting orders. Time is critical,
VII.
Direct connection or integration with the shopping malls
management systems that are considered critical or security
related this is meant to enable the security control room staff
to override or control these systems when the situation requires.
The most critical system that must be controlled by the control
room is the public address system.
many lives are at stake and the security response must be

immediate, automatic and pre-planned. This is achieved through
the emergency and evacuation plan.
In the case of a crowded mall, the consequences of an attack can
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of the crowd. Furthermore, the chaos can be created even if the
situation is only a scare and not an actual attack. The purpose
of the emergency plan is to save lives, minimise damage, ensure
continuity in the functioning of critical systems and accelerate
recovery.
16
Prioritizing inputs received from security cameras and connecting them

to an alarming system will enable only a few monitors to be viewed on a
constant basis.
17
In many cases security and safety systems are connected and interact
and therefore it is necessary that the command post have the capabilities
to operate both.
Shopping malls that are interconnected with links to other malls

or MRT stations may share an inter-dependent risk and should
collaborate with these linked facilities on the relevant security
measures and contingency response plans.
Page 136
Emergency procedures should cover modern terrorist attack SAFE HAVENS AND ESCAPE ROUTES
scenarios such as:
Safe havens @[
J,

^: *@ * q
installation which provide certain levels of physical protection for
the residents from threats during possible and actual emergency

*,
situations. In many threat and emergency scenarios, the safest
place to be is in a safe haven within the building rather than trying

# @ q to escape. These should be considered in a mall as well, although
(e.g. a VBIED explosion followed by an armed assault). *, q
*, ,* J J q
emergency plan because the concept is against the nature of a

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@ crowd.
whilst they are dealing with the wounded.
Identifying and incorporating safe havens into the buildings

*,* ^ ,@ @ emergency planning is one of the main responsibilities of a
a chemical agent via the buildings ventilating systems). shopping malls security manager. The security manager needs to
give clear and simple instructions to the malls shoppers regarding
?" * the use of these safe havens. These instructions must include
the following:
clear criteria that determines in which situations the shoppers
must go to the safe havens. Safe havens are especially critical

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in a situation whereby evacuation routes may be inaccessible
following a terror attack.

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Emergency escape routes should be designed taking into

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consideration the threats and risks estimated for the shopping
(management,
shopping
mall
security
team, mall according to possible terror scenarios. Special care should
maintenance, sales people etc.) during and after the
be taken to ensure that they do not pass through areas that are
emergency situation a special focus should be put on
considered hazardous in an emergency situation. The escape
assigning a team to assist shoppers in need.
routes should be planned in accordance with and in coordination
Jq JJ : *, J,,J
q

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The guiding principle for determining whether to activate an

JJ, , ,,@ ^ escape plan is simple and directed by simple instructions sounded
clearly in all areas of the mall in all major languages spoken in the

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mall. Evacuation is ordered when the danger to the occupants is
greater within the mall/complex than it is outside it.
18
19

q^ * and required @ *@

relevant scenarios.
Emergency and evacuation procedures must be allowed to be
initiated immediately without having to await permission from

J ,,q@ q, @ J q J an administrative manager/executive. Seeking administrative
within and outside the malls management structure?
permission to evacuate the mall in life threatening situations is
not advisable due to the time constraint.

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Concluding Remarks

# J^ ,^,:@
The above appendix of general security guidelines for shopping
malls provides generic recommendations for security solutions for
shopping malls that if implemented will enhance security levels.
The appendix includes many general recommendations according
to the different security rings presented. The overarching concept
of the appendix, which will greatly facilitate the implementation of
the recommendations, is that by correctly preparing and training
J J @@ ,,
*: [
measures, they will become a force multiplier in anti-terrorism
preparedness.
18
19
According to the existing signs throughout the mall

According to the threat location and the exit locations
Page 137

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FOREWORD

WONG KAN SENG

(Updated as at July 2010)

Introduction To Building Security

Key Building Design Considerations

2.2 General Architectural Considerations

Building and Protection Categories

Protection Recommendation Tables

5.2 How To Use This Chapter

5.3 Perimeter Line

8.2 Security Control Room

8.5 Alarm System

8.6 Access Control System

8.7 CCTV System

Special Attention Areas

9.1 How To Use This Chapter

9.3 Pedestrian Entry Areas

9.4 Loading Docks

9.5 Garbage and Waste Disposal Dock

9.6 Mail and Delivery Room

9.8 Protected Rooms

9.10 Air-conditioning System

INTRODUCTION TO BUILDING SECURITY

OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDELINES

The Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security

The GEBSS intends to provide a menu of good

These guidelines are based on the common assumption

are aimed at mitigating the casualty level. Full implementation

POSSIBLE THREAT SCENARIOS

the different threat scenarios that are likely to be executed at

Table 1 : Possible Terrorist-Related Threats 1

Ministry of Home Affairs: June 2007

FACTOR IN SECURITY IN BUILDING

1.3 WHO SHOULD READ THE GUIDELINES

According to testimony by an expert witness to the US

Diagram 1 : Illustration on the process for selecting the

These guidelines address the following issues:

J   ,  :@ , *q ^, @ @  

1.5 NEED FOR SECURITY & PROTECTIVE

Building owners and developers should decide on the

KEY BUILDING DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Considering security issues during the initial stages of

However, given the scarcity of land in Singapore, most

recommendations found in the guidelines.

The orientation of the building and its elevations may

TRAFFIC FLOW, ACCESS ROADS AND PARKING

With a large vehicle population in a dense urban

PLANNING OF INTERNAL AREAS

Many facilities are characterised by the presence of large

The internal positioning of the various functional areas

MATERIALS/ FAADE SYSTEMS

Building materials are a critical issue when protecting

An explosive charge detonating very close to the building

PREVENTION OF PROGRESSIVE COLLAPSE

The use of redundant lateral and vertical force resisting

THE USE OF DETAILING TO PROVIDE

It is critical that the primary structural elements be

CAPACITY FOR RESISTING SHEAR FAILURE

It is essential that the primary structural elements

MULTI-STOREY AND UNDERGROUND CAR PARKS

The forces acting on the structure as a result of an

These guidelines promote a local approach to design.

MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL

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