Brazil's Cold War in The Southern Cone 1970-1975 - Tanya Harmer

This article was downloaded by: [200.87.157.
144]
On: 29 September 2013, At: 16:51
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Cold War History

Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcwh20
Brazil's Cold War in the Southern Cone,

19701975
Tanya Harmer
International History, London School of Economics and Political

Science, London, UK
Published online: 10 May 2012.
To cite this article: Tanya Harmer (2012) Brazil's Cold War in the Southern Cone, 19701975, Cold
War History, 12:4, 659-681
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2011.641953
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or
arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions
Cold War History

Vol. 12, No. 4, November 2012, 659681
Brazils Cold War in the Southern Cone,

1970 1975
Tanya Harmer
Downloaded by [200.87.157.144] at 16:51 29 September 2013
International History, London School of Economics and Political

Science, London, UK
Brazil is traditionally regarded as having been distant from its Latin American
neighbours. However, new documents show that it was actually very involved in
the Cold War struggles that engulfed the Southern Cone during the early 1970s.
In Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay, Brazils military regime intervened to prevent or
overturn left-wing gains. It also did its best to encourage the United States to play
a greater role in fighting the regions Cold War. Finally, it served as the model
that military leaders in the Southern Cone looked to as they plotted to seize
power. Examining these direct and indirect forms of influence, with particular
reference to the relationship between Brazil and Chile, this article argues that
Brazils experience after 1964 was a game changer when it came to the way in
which the inter-American Cold War unfolded.
Two days after the Chilean coup in 1973, Chilean representatives arrived at Brazils
Ministry of Foreign Relations to seek formal recognition of Santiagos new military
government. In an emotional telegram back to Santiago, the Chilean embassys
charge daffaires, Rolando Stein, later recounted the tension he had felt as he then
waited nervously all day to find out how the Brazilian government would respond.
Finally, at 8:30 that evening, after most of the Ministrys employees had gone home,
he was called back to a deserted building. To his relief, the answer he received was
affirmative. Brazils military dictatorship was poised to recognise Chiles junta and
Brazils president, General Emlio Garrastazu Medici, had personally telephoned
from Sao Paulo to issue instructions that he wanted Brazil to be the first country to
do so. Stein wrote home to Santiago that this demonstrated profound friendship.
Tanya Harmer is a lecturer in International History at the London School of Economics and
Political Science. Email: t.harmer@lse.ac.uk
ISSN 1468-2745 print/ISSN 1743-7962 online
q 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2011.641953
http://www.tandfonline.com
660
T. Harmer
He also suggested that Brazil would become a powerful ally in the weeks and
months ahead.1
Stein was right. By the end of October 1973, the Brazilian dictatorship had
provided Chiles new military regime with medical supplies, sugar and over $100 million
in credits. Brazilian officers had assisted their Chilean counterparts in interrogating and
torturing some of the 7000 prisoners held by coup leaders in Chiles National Stadium.2
And Brazilian diplomats were also offering Chilean representatives advice on handling
international relations.3 As Brazils foreign minister knowingly explained to Chiles new
ambassador in Brasilia at the end of 1973, his country had been through a similar
experience to Chiles in the aftermath of the Brazilian military coup of 1964, and its leaders
therefore sympathised with the Chilean junta.4 The CIA meanwhile observed that Brazil
was privately . . . gloating. As US intelligence analysts wrote, the Chilean coup had
materially advanced Brasilias growing importance in South America.5
This growing importance stemmed from an activist role in the Southern Cone
during the early 1970s. In Bolivia, Brazil had supported a military coup in August
1971, and in Uruguay it had helped prevent a left-wing coalition winning the countrys
December 1971 elections by moving troops to the border and covertly interfering with
electoral campaigns. In Chile, the Medici government had also simultaneously been
working secretly to undermine Allendes government and facilitate a coup for three
years. With encouragement and gratitude from Washington, Brazilian military officers
had been exchanging information with their Chilean counterparts and sending
undercover intelligence officials to Santiago since early 1971. Furthermore, Brasilia
had been heavily involved in containing Chilean influence within the inter-American
system whilst engaging in its own so-called diplomatic offensive throughout Latin
America.6
1
Oficio, Stein, EmbaChile Brasilia to Senor Ministro, 13 September 1973 and Oficio, Stein to Senor
Ministro, 27 September 1973, Oficios Confidenciales, Embajada de Chile en Brasil, 1973, Archivo General
Historico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago, Chile [Hereafter: Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/
AMRE].
2
Anthony W. Pereira, Political (In)Justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and
Argentina (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 92, 94; Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Derrotada
(Sao Paulo: Comapanhia das Letras, 2003), 357 58; J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory States: Operation
Condor and Covert War in Latin America (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 57; and John Dinges,
The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: The
New Press, 2004), 264. For details regarding Brazilian credits and support for Pinochet, see below.
3
Electronic Telegram, Scali to SecState, 10 October 1973, Electronic Telegrams, Department of State,
Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA, online at: Access to Archival Databases (AAD) http://.aad.archives.
gov/add/ [Hereafter: DOS/CFP].
4
Record of Conversation, Gibson Barbosa and Hernan Cubillos, 7 December 1973, in Oficio, Hernan
Cubillos, Embachile Brasila to Senor Ministro, 7 December 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.
5
Intelligence Memorandum, Latin America: The Aftermath of the Chilean Coup, 15 September 1973,
Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland [Hereafter:
CREST].
6
For full details of Brazils intervention in Latin America and the US-Brazilian relationship,
see Tanya Harmer, Allendes Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North
Cold War History
661
This activist regional role is intriguing: not only does it show that Brazil was
underestimated both by the Allende government and its Cuban allies as a significant
threat, but it also clashes with the commonly held view that, until relatively recently,
Brazil was separate, disinterested, and disengaged from Spanish speaking Latin America.
As Leslie Bethell has argued, before the middle of the twentieth century, Brazil was
commonly excluded from references to Latin America on account of its different
language, history, Atlantic orientation, and friendly disposition toward the United
States. Meanwhile, Brazilians overwhelmingly regarded Spanish America as something
other or foreign.7 Even in the latter half of the twentieth century, when Brazil was
officially immersed in Latin American concepts, Bethell has written that it is
fanciful . . . to talk of a latinoamericanizac ao of Brazilian foreign policy. In the four
decades after the Second World War, he continues, Brazil cannot be regarded as having
had a deep engagement with the rest of the region.8 Even when it came to the Brazilian
foreign ministrys intelligence service the Centro de Inforac oes do Exterior or CIEX, in
existence between 1966 and 1979 agents were mostly charged with monitoring
Brazilian exiles rather than interfering with other states affairs. As Pio Penna Filho has
argued, this focus is the main difference between the CIA or the KGB and CIEX or other
Brazilian intelligence services, which were predominantly concerned with protecting the
Brazilian military regime and Brazils national sovereignty.9
So how do we explain recent revelations about Brazils direct intervention in Bolivia,
Uruguay, and Chile during the early 1970s? As far as we know, the early 1970s appears
to have been a relatively brief period of Brazilian interventionism. In part, this is
explained by the particularly hard-line presidency of General Medici, who prior to
assuming power in 1969 had served as military attache to Washington, head of the
Brazilian dictatorships ideologically driven intelligence agency, the National
Information Service (Servic o Nacional de Informac oes or SNI), and commander of
the countrys Third Army. But it was also a result of the specific regional context his
regime faced. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, revolutionary promise and counterrevolutionary violence shaped politics and society in the Southern Cone. A socialist
was democratically elected president of Chile, urban guerrilla groups operated in
Uruguay and Argentina, and nationalists sought to mobilize poor disenfranchised
Footnote 6 continued
Carolina Press, 2011). For other references to Brazils role in Chile, see also Peter Kornbluh, ed., Brazil
Conspired with US to Overthrow Allende, August 2009, http://www.gwu.edu/ , nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB282/index.htm; Carlos Osorio, ed., Nixon: Brazil Helped Rig the Uruguayan Elections 1971,
June 2002, http://www.gwu.edu/ , nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/; Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 9293;
and Gaspari, A Ditadura Derrotada, 357 58. This article contributes to the emerging story of Brazils Cold
War and adds to it by using new Chilean archival documents and recently declassified US sources.
7
Leslie Bethell, Brazil and Latin America, Journal of Latin American Studies 42 (2010): 463, 468,
473 74.
8
ibid.. 474, 481.
9
Pio Penna Filho, O Itamaraty nos anos de chumbo O Centro de Inforac oes do Exterior (CIEX) e a
rap ressao no Cone Sul (1966 1979), Revista Brasileira de Poltica Internacional 52, no. 2 (2009): 5556.
662
T. Harmer
sectors in Peru and Bolivia. Then, between 1971 and 1976, Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile,
and Argentina joined Brazil and Paraguay as right-wing dictatorships founded on the
National Security Doctrine, transforming the region quite literally into a killing
zone.10 Far from being disengaged, Brazil was a pivotal force in this transnational
counter-revolutionary wave, both as an example and as a direct supporter. Days after
the Chilean coup, CIA analysts wrote that there was no precedent . . . for the belief
prevalent among military elites today, that they have a transcendent mission to govern
indefinitely while carrying out far-reaching changes. This concept became a strong
force following the military coup in Brazil in 1964.11
Indeed, Brazil set the tone for the Cold War ideological struggle in the Southern
Cone and its military dictatorship became what Anthony Pereira has called a
prototype for a new kind of authoritarianism in Latin America.12 Meanwhile, the
intensification of the ideological struggle in the Southern Cone in the early 1970s drew
Brazil into regional affairs in a way in which it had never been involved before. During
this period, events in Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay had an impact on Brazils military
elite, often pushing or pulling it into other countries affairs. This may have been an
anomalous period in the context of Brazils traditionally more aloof and noninterventionist role in Latin America and, partly as a result of a change in government
in Brasilia in 1974, it did not lead to a sustained deep engagement with the region or
continued interventionism. But those wishing to understand the Cold War in the
Americas and the dramatic upheavals in the Southern Cone cannot ignore its
importance.
In particular, Brazils involvement in Chile illustrates its counter-revolutionary
significance. CIA analysts quite rightly argued that Latin Americans were watching
Chile as a weather vane to determine the direction that the region was likely to go in
during the early 1970s.13 As it turned out, commentators on all sides of the political
spectrum were comparing Salvador Allende to Brazils last constitutional president,
Joao Goulart. After the coup, others alluded to the parallels between what had
happened in Chile in 1973 and Brazil in 1964.14 However, very little has been written
about the similarities and differences between Brazils military dictatorship and the
regime that emerged in Chile after 11 September 1973, let alone the direct and
increasingly troubled relationship that evolved between them. To be sure, there are a
number of excellent studies of Operation Condor in the mid-to-late 1970s that explore
10
On the idea of a killing zone albeit from a predominantly US perspective, see Stephen G. Rabe, The
Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (Oxford/New York: Oxford University
Press, 2010).
11
Intelligence Memorandum, Latin America: The Aftermath of the Chilean Coup, 15 September 1973.
12
Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 16.
13
Intelligence Memorandum, Latin America: The Aftermath of the Chilean Coup, 15 September 1973,
CREST.
14
Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. 1985),
331 32 and Gary MacEoin, Chile, The Struggle For Dignity (London: Conventure, 1975), 194 99. See also
Marlise Simons, The Brazilian Connection, Washington Post, 6 January 1974.
Cold War History
663
how dictatorships in the Southern Cone shared intelligence and cooperated with each
other against their opponents. Yet there is relatively little information on the period
before this or why Brazils support for the initiative was less than that of Chiles,
Uruguays, Paraguays, or Argentinas.15
This has a lot to do with the lamentably closed nature of Brazils archives. Although
ordinary and confidential correspondence between Brasilia and its embassies abroad
is now accessible, secret and top secret documents from the period of the military
dictatorship remain classified.16 Military archives pertaining to Latin Americas other
dictatorial regimes in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina among other countries, also
remain mostly closed. And these limitations mean that, on the whole, historians tend
to know far less about right-wing groups and the relationships between them across
Latin America than they do about relationships on the left. Lack of access to these
kinds of sources has also encouraged historians to rely on far more open and accessible
sources in the United States. All of this has tended to support prevailing ideas about
the United States hegemony in Latin America and its power to make, shape and
control right-wing allies that have precluded serious examination of other interAmerican relationships and protagonists.
The limitations of an exclusively US-centred narrative for understanding the Cold
War in Latin America were nevertheless one of the striking things to emerge from
newly declassified Chilean and US documents relating to Brazils regional role in the
early 1970s. It is true that the Medici government in Brasilia shared many of the same
goals and fears as the Nixon administration, and discussed these directly with senior
members of the US government. But contrary to popular and particularly left-wing
views of military leaders in Brasilia as US puppets, they were not carrying out
Washingtons orders. As Matias Spektor has argued, Brazil systematically turned
down US proposals to act as a regional sheriff in South America even when Brazilian
generals were fighting their own regional Cold War.17
Brasilia nevertheless very often tried to influence US policy towards Latin America
and did its very best to persuade Washington to get more involved in hemispheric
affairs. Indeed, what is so interesting about the story of Brazils relationship to
Chilean events and the inter-American Cold War in the early to mid-1970s is that it
shows how multidimensional, de-centralized and interactive this hemispheric variant
of a global ideological struggle to determine the future shape of the world was. It was
15
For reference to Brazil distancing itself from Operation Condor, see Penna Filho, O Itamaraty nos
anos de Chumbo, 48. On Operation Condor, see Dinges, Condor Years and McSherry, Predatory States.
16
At the time of writing, there is reason to optimistic that the Brazilian Senates approval of new
Freedom of Information Law on 25 October 2011 will change this. President Dilma Rousseff s emphasis on
establishing Truth Commissions to examine and deal with Brazils authoritarian past is also encouraging.
However, all indications suggest that secret and top secret material held by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry
and the Army and Navy Archives will still remain classified for minimum of 50 years.
17
Matias Spektor, Brazilian Assessments of the End of the Cold War, in The End of the Cold War and the
Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict, eds. Sergey Radchenko and Artemy Kalinovsky
(Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2011), 234.
T. Harmer
664
certainly not a struggle that was dominated exclusively by Washington. The

relationships that were forged between different actors in the region were dynamic
and changing as opposed to static predetermined patterns of engagement as some of
those who see the Cold War as a simplistic battle between two sides or Uncle Sam
as having pulled all the strings in Latin America during the Cold War would have
us believe.
To put it another way, Brazilian and Chilean leaders played their own
autonomous parts in the way that history unfolded in Latin America. They were in
control of the relationships they forged, how those relationships were conducted,
and what impressions they formed of each other along the way. For its part, Brazils
military regime clearly felt that it had a stake in Chilean events from 1970 onwards
and actively tried to shape them. After the coup, relations between Brazil and Chile
were nevertheless difficult and complex. As the Chilean dictatorship was launching
ideological crusades against its opponents at home and abroad, the incoming
regime of Ernesto Geisel (19741979) in Brazil turned away from fighting the Cold
War. Having essentially removed any possibility of revolution in neighbouring states
and ensured that there was no place left for Brazilian exiles to seek refuge in the
Southern Cone, Brazil turned towards a new policy of responsible pragmatism,
embracing openings in Europe and Africa and diverting its attention once more
away from its own region. This, in turn, had specific consequences for the
relationship between Brazil and Chile and the evolving dynamics of the interAmerican Cold War.
Tragedy strikes
It is still very difficult to pinpoint precisely what the Brazilian military regime thought of
Allendes democratic victory on 4 September 1970. Faced with what was commonly
regarded as the most important revolutionary triumph in the Americas since the Cuban
revolution, it is nevertheless clear that the Brazilian dictatorship was shocked and
fearful. In the months that followed, Chilean diplomats in Brasilia observed a
heightened interest in Chilean affairs, Cuban influence, and the prospects of
revolutionary upheaval in the Southern Cone. To coincide with Brazils 148th
anniversary of independence, two full pages of articles heralding Brazil, its history, size,
and economic growth appeared in Chiles conservative newspaper, El Mercurio, only
days after Salvador Allendes election. Brazil tomorrow is today, one large picture
proclaimed, implicitly suggesting Chile should follow its neighbour. Meanwhile, the
Chilean navy took out another big advertisement with crossed Brazilian and Chilean
flags to pay homage to Brazil.18 In the months that followed, the Brazilian armys
headquarters then reportedly became a hive of activity. According to a trusted
informant who contacted the Chilean embassy in Brasilia, Brazilian army officers had
18
See El Mercurio, 7 September 1970.
Cold War History
665
built a scaled model of Chiles frontiers with Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru and were
poring over maps to determine areas that might be appropriate to stage a guerrilla
campaign against Allendes government. The idea was not that the Brazilian armed
forces would be involved in such a campaign but rather that the military would help
prepare a civilian insurgency made up of Chilean civilians and volunteers from other
countries in the region. In March 1971, the Chilean embassy also reported that the
Brazilian army was conducting military exercises premised on stopping insurgents in
Brazil escaping to Chile.19 Santiago also received news that Brazilian intelligence agents
had been sent to Chile in early 1971 disguised as tourists. When Chile agreed to receive
70 prisoners in a hostage deal in February that year, the Chilean government had good
reason to believe that at least two of the group of 70 were intelligence operatives as well.20
Brazil had (and has) traditionally been an ally of Chiles. With Argentina as a
common enemy between them, the two countries and their military establishments
have naturally gravitated towards each other since the nineteenth century.21 Yet this
had not meant a great deal in terms of concrete bilateral diplomatic cooperation in the
period leading up to Allendes election. To the contrary, Chile had been relatively low
on Brasilias list of priorities. As Brazilian media depicted, Chile had always been a
friendly nation where nothing really very important happened until tragedy struck in
the form of Allendes democratic election.22 Henceforth, alarmist coverage of Chile in
the Brazilian media tripled. One press report cited a Brazilian officer as warning that
Russian flotillas were on their way to the Chilean port of Valparaiso while O Estado de
Sao Paulo argued that Allendes absolute priorities lay in socialist loyalty and
submission to Fidel Castros continental revolutionary leadership.23 Brazilian military
leaders also began referring to Chile as yet another country on the other side of the
Iron Curtain, only more dangerous because it was so close and embedded in a larger
regional struggle for power.24 As one Brazilian air force general proclaimed, the
international communist offensive sponsored by Cuba was on the march and would
overtake conservative forces in Latin America by whatever means it could violence
and coup detats, or legal electoral processes. In his words, the ideological struggle
was more present, more palpable and more aggressive.25 Based on these kinds of fears,
the Brazilians even briefly considered breaking off diplomatic relations with Santiago
19
Oficios, Raul Rettig, EmbaChile Brasilia to Senor Ministro, 23 and 30 March 1971, Oficios Conf./
Brasil/1971/AMRE.
20
Oficio, Rettig to Senor Ministro, 23 March 1971, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1971/AMRE. The prisoners
were released in exchange for the Swiss Ambassador.
21
Joquin Fermandois, Mundo y fin de mundo: Chile en la poltica mundial, 1900 2004 (Santiago:
Ediciones Universidad Catolica de Chile, 2005), 365.
22
Oficio, Rettig to Senor Ministro, 14 May 1971, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1971/AMRE.
23
O Estado de Sao Paulo, 10 November 1970 as quoted in Oficio, EmbaChile Rio to Senor Ministro, 23
November 1970. See also Oficio, EmbaChile Rio, 13 November 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE.
24
Oficio, Embachile Rio to Senor Ministro, 26 October 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE.
25
Speech, General Canaverro Pereira on the occasion of Argentine General Alcides Lopes Aufrancs visit
to Brazil, October 1970, as quoted in Oficio, Embachile Rio to Senor Ministro, 26 October 1970, Oficios
Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE.
666
T. Harmer
before they decided this might offer Allende a convenient enemy against which to rally
support.26
Although Brasilia pulled back from confrontation in this case, rumours began
circulating in Santiago that an improvement in US-Brazilian relations was squarely
aimed at Chile. When Allende unilaterally re-established relations with Cuba shortly
after he was inaugurated, thereby going against collective OAS sanctions against
Castro in place since 1964, the Brazilians worked diplomatically with the United
States to ensure this move would not prove contagious.27 Following the visit of
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs in March, Brazilian newspapers
then reported that he and Brazils foreign minister US had discussed Cuban
infiltration in Chilean internal affairs and the future transformation of that country
into a base of support for the export of terrorism and subversion.28 Only a year before,
Brasilias relations with Washington had appeared to be suffering from serious
tensions on account of US congressional investigations into allegations of torture.29
Now, Chilean diplomats began to suggest that the US-Brazilian relationship was
improving on account of a mutual desire to oppose Allende. As they argued,
Washington planned to use Brazil to do its dirty work in Latin America.30 Allendes
foreign minister also privately referred to Brazil as the United States most loyal
collaborator in conversation with Polish leaders and worried about Brazilian plans to
isolate Chile.31
26
This possibility and the decision not to break relations were later conveyed to US Secretary of the
Treasury John Connally during conversations with President Medici on 8 June 1972 in Brasilia. See
Telegram, AmEmbassy Wellington to SecState, 23 June 1972, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 1958
1976, Lot 720373, box 135, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland [Hereafter
RG59/NARA].
27
See Telegram, Brazilian Embassy, Washington to Secretaria de Estado das Relac oes Exteriores, 14
August 1971, Rolo 423, Telegramas recebidos da Embaixada em Washingon, Ministerio das Relac oes
Exteriores, Arquivo Historico, Brasilia and Record of Conversation, William Rountree, AmEmbassy
Brasilia, and Gibson Barbosa, 22 December 1970, Telegram, Rountree, to SecState, 23 December 1970, box
2199/RG59/NARA.
28
Paises Latinoamericanos no han contestado consulta de EE.UU para bloqear a Chile; Departamento
de Estado inicio contactos en noveimbre. Norteamerica y Brasil observan Gobierno de Allende, El Diario
and La Prensa, 13 March 1971, enclosures, Telex, Pedro Vuskovic Bravo and Daniel Vergara Bustos to
Orlando Letelier, 13 March 1971, Telex E.: 1-367, Embajada de Chile en los Estados Unidos, 1971, AMRE
[Hereafter EEUU/1971/AMRE].
29
Oficio, EmbaChile Rio to Senor Ministro, 29 April 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE.
30
On Brazils diplomatic offensive see Oficios, Rettig to Senor Ministro, 2 June 1971 and MRE to Senor
Embajador de Chile en Brasil-Brasilia, 11 June 1971, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1971/AMRE. On Brazils
diplomatic outreach to Peru, see Oficio, Raul Rettig to Senor Ministro, 27 March 1971, enclosure, Oficio,
MRE to EmbaChile Washington, 15 April 1971, Oficios Conf./EEUU/1971/AMRE. On responses to
Chilean Foreign Ministry consultations on Brazil, see Oficio, Ramon Huidobro, EmbaChile Buenos Aires
to Senor Ministro, 16 July 1971 and Oficio, Rettig to Senor Ministro, 26 March 1971, enclosure, Oficio,
MRE to EmbaChile Washington, 15 April 1971, Oficios Conf./EEUU/1971/AMRE.
31
Almeyda as quoted in Urgent Note, Summary of Visit of the Chilean Delegation, 2 June 1971, wiazka
3, 40/75, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, Warsaw, Poland. I am grateful to Anita
Prazmowska for sharing this document with me and translating it.
Cold War History
667
In reality, the dynamics of the US-Brazilian relationship and its interaction with
Latin American affairs were far more fluid than the picture of a junior partner being
taken advantage of suggests. However, the idea of working with Brazil to achieve
certain goals in Latin America was a popular one in Washington. Following Allendes
election in September 1970, the White House had explicitly pushed for improving
relations with Brasilia as a counterweight to Chilean events. And as a result, Brazils
relative importance as a key player in inter-American affairs underwent a significant
reappraisal in US policymaking circles during the last two months of 1970.32 This was
spelled out in full in a Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) prepared by the
US embassy in Brasilia in January 1971:
The fundamentally most important US interest in Brazil is the protection of US
national security through the cooperation of Brazil as a hemispheric ally . . . The
danger posed by recent events in Chile and Bolivia [where a left-leaning nationalist
military leader had just taken power] establishes a hemispheric security threat which
did not exist at anywhere near the same level as this time last year. The maintenance,
therefore, of Brazil as a potential ally in hemispheric security affairs could be of
critical interest to the US . . . 33
Nixon was especially insistent on improving and strengthening the US-Brazilian

alliance and issued instructions that he wanted President Medici to visit Washington
within six months.34 As he privately told Kissinger and his Chief of Staff,
Bob Haldeman, he wanted the Brazilians to know that he was just about the best
friend Brazil had ever had in Washington.35
The feeling in Brasilia nevertheless continued to be that the United States had to be
encouraged to work more closely with Brazil in the light of threatening new
hemispheric developments. Brasilia was particularly worried about the left-leaning
nationalist military government of Juan Jose Torres in Bolivia and the possibility that a
left-wing coalition in Uruguay, Frente Amplio, could triumph in the countrys
forthcoming election as Allende had done in Chile. As far as the Brazilians saw things
or at least the impression that they gave to senior US officials in 1971 and 1972
Brazil needed a powerful partner to ensure that imminent revolutionary advances
were effectively quashed in South America.
32
See Matias Spektor, Equivocal Engagement: Kissinger, Silveira and the Politics of US Brazil Relations
(1969 1983). Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 2006, 57 69 and Harmer, Allendes Chile, 99100.
33
Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP), 30 November 1970, enclosure, Airgram, Ambassador
William Rountree to Department of State, 19 January 1971, box 2136/RG59/NARA.
34
Handwritten Note, Kissinger, on Memorandum, Nachmanoff and Kennedy to Kissinger, 5 December
1970, box H050, National Security Council Institutional Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project,
National Archives II, College Park, Maryland [Hereafter: NSCIF/NPMP]. Although Medici was invited in
early 1971, Medici finally visited in December.
35
White House Tape, Nixon, Kissinger and Haldeman, 11 June 1971, doc.139, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969 1976, Vol. E-10: Documents on American Republics, 1969 1972 [Hereafter: FRUS,
1969 1976: E 10].
668
T. Harmer
Believing Nixon was not paying sufficient attention to Latin America, the Medici regime
therefore targeted US administration officials to persuade Washington to follow Brasilias
lead or, at the very least, to think of Brazil as a serious partner. In November 1970, Brazils
foreign minister, Mario Gibson Barbosa, told the United States ambassador, William
Rountree, that he realized that [the] US was far more important to Brazil than Brazil was
to [the] US. Nevertheless, he regarded Brazils success as [a] large, dynamic, and successful
country with [an] economy based on [a] free enterprise system, and serving as an
important counter [weight] to trends in certain other Latin American countries, to be
important to [the] US and [the] free world.36 Then, in early February, Gibson Barbosa
stressed the potential for US cooperation when he raised further concerns about new
trends in the Southern Cone region directly with US secretary of state, William Rogers, in
Washington. Specifically, he underlined Allendes impact on governments in Bolivia, and
Peru, and Uruguay, the last of which particularly concerned Brazil because of marked
leftist gains in the run up to the countrys elections. Gibson Barbosa urged the United
States to work with Brazil to meet the threats posed by these developments . . . (1) to
counter the Chilean situation; (2) to help rebuild friendship for the United States which
has waned in certain sectors in Brazil.37 Around the same time, one Brazilian vice admiral
spoke to Rountree, at length and almost emotionally about the prospects for US-Brazilian
military cooperation and dangerous potentialities in Latin America. (He highlighted
Chile, other Andean states, and Uruguay for particular attention).38
Overall, then, the Brazilians and US policymakers had similar views about the
growing urgency of combating left-wing gains in the Southern Cone. Yet, the United
States increasing focus on Brazil revolved almost exclusively around what was
happening in Chile while the Brazilians centred on a much broader range of regional
developments. Although Brasilia and Washington largely went about pursuing their
concerns in an uncoordinated way, this did not stop them from talking about the
possibility of cooperating with each other more effectively in the future. To the
contrary, the more the Nixon administration learned about Brazilian intervention in
other South American countries, the more it reached out to the Medici government to
improve bilateral ties and explore avenues for burden sharing when it came to fighting
the Cold War. As a result, the Brazilians had more leverage to exert pressure on the
United States regarding what they perceived as being important.
Waging the Cold War in South America
President Medici had the opportunity to discuss Latin American affairs directly with
Nixon when he visited Washington in December 1971. There, he shared information
36
Record of Conversation, Rountree and Gibson Barbosa, 12 November 1970, Telegram, AmEmbassy
Brasilia to SecState, 12 November 1970, doc.129/FRUS, 19691976: E 10.
37
Memorandum of Conversation, William Rogers, Charles Meyer, Robert W. Dean, Gibson Barbosa and
Celso Diniz, 1 February 1971, box 2134/RG59/NARA.
38
Record of Conversation, Rountree and Admiral Figueiredo, c.14 January, Sao Paulo, Telegram,
Rountree to SecState, 14 January 1971, box 1697/RG59/NARA.
Cold War History
669
on Brazils role in ensuring the defeat of Frente Amplio and its involvement in the
coup against Bolivias Torres in August 1971.39 He also told Nixon that the Brazilians
were in contact with Chilean military officers, and that Brasilia was working towards
the overthrow of Allende. However, Medici underlined the continuing urgency of
Cold War ideological struggle in the region. We should not lose sight of the situation
in Latin America which could blow up at any time, Medici warned his US
counterpart.40
In this context, the Brazilian presidents conceptualization of the Cold War in the
Americas is interesting. In meetings with Nixon, Medici was recorded as saying that
he did not believe that the Soviets or the Chinese were interested in giving any
assistance to these countries communist movements; they felt that communism
would come all by itself because of the misery and poverty in these countries. The
implication of this observation was that the Cold War conflict in Latin America was
an internal, regional variant of a bigger global ideological struggle as opposed to
one theatre of a superpower struggle.41 If this were the case, its solutions also lay in
the region and not in on-going superpower negotiations or the US opening to
China. Indeed, throughout his conversations in Washington, Medici appears to
have been willing the Nixon administration to treat Latin America as a separate
problem, distinct from broader global concerns, and requiring special, urgent
attention.
Crucially, Medici believed that recent counter-revolutionary victories were
fragile. Even though Frente Amplio had been defeated, he warned that the left had
gained a larger percentage of the vote when compared to previous elections in
Uruguay. He also suggested that Bolivias new military government, led by General
Hugo Banzer, was in desperate straits if it failed, Bolivia would then fall into the
arms of the Communists and become another Cuba or Chile. In addition, Medici
raised the issue of US funding for his own countrys military. As he lamented, the
Brazilian armed forces were a third of the size of Italys despite Brazil having double
Italys population as well as serious problems to deal with in neighbouring
countries.
39
It is still unclear how far the United States was involved in supporting the Bolivian coup. A recently
declassified document at the Nixon Presidential Library suggests that Washington had information coup
plotting was underway three weeks before it was launched. See Memorandum from Dell Bragan, 3 August
1971, folder 1, Situation Room Cable Summary, 8/1/71 9/30/71, box 387, NSC Files, Subject Files, http://
www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/jul11.php. On possible involvement, see also Harmer,
Allendes Chile, 125..
40
All quotations relating to Nixon-Medici meetings in Washington are taken from Memorandums of
Conversation, Medici, Nixon, and Vernon Walters, 11.30a.m, the Presidents Office, 7 December 1971 and
Medici, Nixon and Walters, 10am the Presidents Office, 9 December 1971, docs.141 and 143/FRUS, 1969
1976: E-10.
41
It is interesting to note that Brazilian delegates had long since argued that the communist threat in
Latin America was primarily an internal, regional issue. See Joseph Smith, Brazil and the United States:
Convergence and Divergence (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 2010), 137, 187.
670
T. Harmer
Nixon appears to have been very taken by Medicis arguments and his insistence
that Brasilia and Washington coordinate their efforts to roll back left-wing gains.
As he put it, there were many things that Brazil as a South American country could do
that the US could not. The CIA also summarized that President Nixon took
great interest in this proposal and promised to assist Brazil when and wherever
possible.42 This was particularly so in the case of Chile where Nixon told Medici how
important it was to work closely. If money were required or other discreet aid, Nixon
continued, we might be able to make it available . . . we must try and prevent new
Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends. To facilitate
coordination, both presidents agreed to a special direct channel of communication via
Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa and US National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger.43
However, the precise purpose of this channel was ambiguous and no agreement as
to who should do what either in Chile or elsewhere in Latin America was reached.
When Medici enthusiastically suggested it could be used as a way of Brazil and the
United States helping the million Cuban exiles throughout the Americas to
overthrow Castro, Nixon agreed but offered no commitment. In fact, both presidents
tended to talk past each other when it came to practicable plans for future
collaboration. On the one hand, the Brazilian clearly wanted concrete assurances of
support and assistance while, on the other hand, Nixon wanted to offload the
continent on to someone else in line with the Nixon Doctrine he had announced in
1969 of sharing foreign policy burdens with key regional allies.44 As Nixon privately
told Rogers, he wished the General were running the whole continent.45 He then
conveyed a similar sentiment in public when he toasted Medicis good heath at a
farewell banquet. Where Brazil goes, Latin America will follow, he proclaimed.
Toasts, flattery, and special channels of communication were nevertheless not
enough as far as Medici was concerned. Instead, the Brazilians continued to want
greater US involvement in South Americas Cold War battle. Following up on his
meeting in Washington, Medici had written to Nixon in March 1972 warning that
Political chaos, or the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Bolivia, would
entail I would not hesitate to say for South America as a whole, consequences far
more serious, dangerous and explosive than the Cuban problem, due to the geostrategic position of Bolivia. He had then urged Nixon once again to help support
General Hugo Banzers regime using Bolivian exiles stationed in Chile.46
42
Memorandum, Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cushman) to Kissinger, 29 December 1971,

doc.145/FRUS, 1969 1976: E 10.
43
Memorandum of Conversation, Medici, Nixon and Walters, 9 December 1971.
44
ibid. On the Nixon Doctrine, see Robert S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign
Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969 1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
45
Telephone Conversations, Nixon and William Rogers, 7 December 1971, Conversation 16:36, and
Telephone Conversation, Nixon and John Connally, 8 December 1971, Conversation 16:44, White House
Tapes, NPMP
46
Letter, Medici to Nixon, 27 April 1972 as quoted in Spektor, Equivocal Engagement, 101.
Cold War History
671
Simultaneously, the US embassy in Brasilia backed up Medicis plea: The rapid and
efficient Brazilian assistance to [the] Banzer government in its early days reflected not
only concern over [an] active security threat GOB felt Torres government posed, but
also genuine enthusiasm for and sense of affinity with Banzer government. The
Brazilians now expected the United States to step up to the mark and carry the bulk of
the load when it now came to economic and budgetary assistance.47
Brazilian pressure must have had some effect. In reply to Medicis letter, Nixon had
sent assurances that the United States was helping Bolivia in a very substantial
manner and the US pledged $20 million to Banzers government. The United States
defence secretary, Melvin Laird, also publicly used the prospect of Chilean support to
anti-Banzer forces to justify increased US military assistance to Bolivia in 1972 even
though Washington had no precise or compelling evidence to justify it.48 Yet, when the
US treasury secretary, John Connally, visited Brazil in June of that year, Medici took
the opportunity of Nixons envoys presence in Brasilia to insist on more assistance.
As Connally reported, Medici had told him that Bolivia was a permanent worry to
Brazil, that Brazil was assisting Bolivia as best she could but that the US must play a
major role in supporting Bolivia or else that nation would fall to the QTE other END
QTE side. He also expressed his certainty that Cuba and Chile were aiding subversion
in Bolivia.49
When Connally landed in La Paz, he then received direct pleas from President
Banzer for more assistance as well. In response, the Secretary emphasized that the US
had already offered Bolivia a substantial loan and made clear that Washington would
prefer La Paz to first use this loan wisely and follow advice on devaluing the Bolivian
peso before the Nixon administration handed out yet more assistance. However, he
also promised to see what he could do to limit conditions on US loans so as to make
the Bolivian governments task of consolidating its hold over the country easier.50
By late 1972, the Medici government seems to have been satisfied with US attention to
Bolivia and the Southern Cone as a whole. During Banzers first year in power, US aid to
Bolivia had increased by 600 percent.51 Banzers position also appeared more secure.
When Gibson Barbosa met Secretary of State Rogers in September, he noted that the
United States was doing much more than before to help Bolivia and similarly reflected
on the much improved situation in Uruguay. Back in June, the Brazilian president had
told Connally that the countrys new government had taken hold very well and was
47
Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 7 March 1972, doc.147/FRUS, 1969 1976: E-10.
Telex, Letelier to MRE, 8 June 1972, Telex R./EEUU/1972/AMRE. On lack of evidence, see Options
Paper, Department of State, Next Steps Options on Chile, 4 April 1972, enclosure, Memorandum, William
Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972, box H064/NSCIF/NPMP.
49
Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Medici, et al., 8 June 1972, Telegram, Amembassy Brasilia to
SecState, 17 June 1972, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 19581976, lot 720373, box 135/RG59/NARA.
50
Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Banzer, et al., 13 June 1972, Telegram, AmEmbassy La Paz to
SecState, 23 June 1972, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 19581976, lot 720373, box 135/RG59/NARA.
51
Kenneth Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership (Athens: The University of
Georgia Press, 1999), 165 66.
48
672
T. Harmer
manifesting a strong hand with respect to the terrorist problem.52 Now, three months
later, Gibson Barbosa celebrated the fact that the leadership of the urban guerrilla group,
the Tupamaros, had virtually disappeared following a government crackdown. (By the
end of 1972, Uruguays civilian-military regime had taken 2600 prisoners, while many
left-wing groups went into exile.) The Foreign Minister also relayed news of a $20
million Brazilian loan to Montevideo and told Rogers that Argentina was assisting the
Uruguayan government as well. As Gibson Barbosa put it, the Southern Cones
revolutionary snowball had been reversed. The net was also tightening around
Allendes peaceful democratic road to socialism in Chile. Indeed, like others before him,
Gibson Barbosa now commented that Chile increasingly resembled Joao Goularts final
days before the Brazilian coup of 1964.53
Birds of a feather?
As it turned out, Brazilian optimism regarding the imminence of Allendes
overthrow in September 1972 proved premature. Allende survived another full year
and Brazil somewhat surprisingly provided Chile with credits in the intervening
period.54 In mid-1973, Brazilian television and newspapers nevertheless increasingly
began showing Chilean images of a truckers strike, violent clashes, and long queues
for scarce commodity products. Following a failed coup attempt against Salvador
Allende on 29 June 1973, headlines in Brazil yet again also asked whether Allende
was nearing the end.55 Reporting back home, Brazils ambassador in Chile
commented at length on the worsening crisis in Chile.56 Within the diplomatic
community in Santiago, he also made no secret of his anti-Allende stance, speaking
openly against the president to other ambassadors and proposing cooperative
planning, inter-embassy coordination, and joint efforts as a means of overthrowing
the government. As the US ambassador in Santiago at the time later concluded, he
52
Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Medici et al., 8 June 1972.

Memorandum of Conversation, Rogers and Barbosa, 29 September 1972, Waldorf Hotel, Telegram,
USMission, UN to SecState, 6 October 1972, box 2130/RG59/NARA and Gaspari, Ditadura Derrotada, 349
51. On serious Brazilian concerns regarding the Tupamaro threat and the security situation in Uruguay, see
Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 7 March 1972, doc.147/FRUS, 1969 1976: Vol.E-10.
54
By September 1973, Brazil had offered $30 million in credits and bilateral trade between Chile and
Brazil had increased. This is puzzling given what we know about Brazilian efforts to encourage a coup
against him. However, it must be viewed in terms of Brazils interests in expanding economic influence in
Latin America during the same period and should be contrasted with the much higher offers that were
provided to Chile after the coup (not to mention Brazils active support for Banzer in Bolivia during the
same period). See Fermandois, Mundo y Fin de Mundo, 365 and Joaqun Fermandois, Chile y El Mundo
1970 1973: La Poltica Exterior del Gobierno de la Unidad Popular y el Sistema Internacional (Santiago:
Ediciones Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1985).
55
O Estado de Sao Paulo, 9 September 1973 as quoted in Oficio, Stein to Senor Ministro, 13 September
1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.
56
For the ambassadors general observations about Chiles crisis in 1973, see Carlos F. Domnguez Avila,
A batalha pero Chile revisitada: um estudo com fontes brasileiras. Unpublished paper.
53
Cold War History
673
had no real doubt the Brazilians were actively supporting and encouraging
military plotting in Chile.57
In Washington, US policymakers continued to embrace the idea of Brazilian
involvement in the country. As an interagency group on Chile suggested on 8
September 1973, contact with Brazil might encourage the Chilean military to take
over and run the country and could reduce potential pressure on the United States to
provide assistance to coup plotters. If Chilean military leaders asked for easily
identifiable US equipment i.e. helicopters etc. after overthrowing Allende, the
Interagency Group proposed, Washington would first seek to encourage support from
other Latin American countries Brazil.58
In the weeks leading up to the coup, the Brazilians had already provided Allendes
opposition with intelligence, advice, and assistance. As the CIA reported at the end of
1972, Chilean opposition groups were receiving economic assistance and weapons
such as machine guns and hand-grenades . . . from Brazil.59 Crucially, Chilean naval
plotters also requested and received reassurances that Peru would not take advantage
of a coup to invade Chile and recapture lands lost during the War of the Pacific in the
nineteenth century.60 Members of the Rio de Janeiro-based think tank, the Institute of
Research and Social Studies (IPES), served as advisors to Allendes opponents. There is
also evidence to suggest that Brazilian groups provided money to the right-wing
paramilitary organization Patria y Libertad.61 It was not just the far right that looked to
Brazil either. As Washingtons former ambassador to Brazil later recalled, Chiles
centrist ex-president, Eduardo Frei, had visited him in Washington and told him that
Chile needed a Brazilian solution.62 Chile in the months before 11 September 1973
certainly seemed to follow a pattern established by Brazil in 1964: private sector groups
were funding opposition parties and paramilitaries, womens groups were playing a
central role in anti-government protests while the right-wing media were
exaggeratedly denouncing foreign subversion and proclaiming that a left-wing plot
was poised to destroy Chilean democracy.63 The question ahead was whether these
similarities would culminate in a Brazilian-style military coup.
The answer, of course, came on 11 September 1973. On that day, at around 10 in
the morning, the Chilean embassy in Brasilia started to receive questions about what
57
Davis, Last Two Years, 331 32. See also Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 92 93 and Harmer, Allendes
Chile, 228.
58
Chile Contingency Paper: Possible Military Action, Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile,
enclosure, Memorandum, Pickering to Scowcroft, 8 September 1973, box 2196/RG59/NARA.
59
Memorandum, Directorate of Intelligence, 2 November 1972, Chile Declassification Project,
Freedom Of Information Act Reading Room, Department of State, CIA Documents, online at: http://foia.
state.gov/SearchColls/CIA.asp
60
Patricia Arancibia Claval, ed., Conversando con Roberto Kelly V.: Recuerdos de una Vida (Santiago:
Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2005), 144 47.
61
Pereira, Political In(Justice), 93.
62
Frei as recalled by Lincoln Gorden. Authors interview with Lincoln Gordon, 2 May 2005, Washington D.C.
63
On parallels, see Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil 1961 1969,
(Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1990) and Pereira, Political In(Justice), 93 94.
674
T. Harmer
was going on. However, it had very little information to share with reporters
gathering outside. While the Jornal do Brasil announced the victory of the Military
Movement for National Liberation along with news of an almost certain reapproximation of relations with Chile, the Brazilian government also kept quiet
about its official reaction for a full two days.64 Then, on 13 September, things began
to move. Chiles ambassador, Raul Retting, resigned his post leaving Ronaldo Stein
in charge and it was then that Stein officially requested Brazilian recognition of the
new military regime.
Brazils delay in responding to Stein appears to have had more to do with false
news reports that Chilean officers loyal to Allende were advancing on Santiago than
doubts about the Chilean junta. As Stein waited, Gibson Barbosa was personally
studying reports from Chile and hesitating to offer recognition until the situation
was clear. It was only when President Medici telephoned the foreign minister from
Sao Paulo and personally instructed him to speed up recognition that Stein was
recalled to the Foreign Ministry. Despite normally waiting for confirmation that a
new government was fully in control, Stein was told that Brazil was making an
exception in the case of Chile. To accelerate the process, Brazils ambassador in
Santiago was simultaneously arriving at Chiles foreign ministry to deliver news of
Brasilias recognition. As a concrete manifestation of this support, two Brazilian air
force jets carrying 20 tons of medical aid also took off immediately that night for
Santiago after being on standby all day.65
In the weeks that followed, Brazils ambassador in Santiago, Antonio Castro da Camara
Canto, came to be known by some as the fifth member of the [Chilean] junta on account
of his close relationship with the regime. As he helped round up Brazilian exiles resident in
Chile with the assistance of Chiles ministry of defence, Brasilia offered to supply the junta
with 40,000 tons of sugar, Brazilian buses arrived in Santiago, and the Banco do Brasil in
Santiago provided the new regime with $5 million credit. Such levels of support would
have been unthinkable before the coup, Chilean diplomats observed; Brazilian
government functionaries were quite clearly under high-level instructions to respond
quickly to requests from Santiago and were doing so with habitual affection.66
Then, at the end of October, a Chilean economic delegation arrived in Brazil led by the
new head of Chiles central bank, General Eduardo Cano, and Orlando Saenz, an advisor
on economic affairs at the Chilean foreign ministry. In the course of their meetings with
members of Brazils central bank, foreign ministry officials, and Brazils finance minister,
the Chileans requested immediate lines of credit worth $100 million in hard currency and
a further $150 million to purchase consumer goods and capital, as well as raising the
possibility of renegotiating Chiles debt with Brazil (worth $9 million). Although the
delegation did not receive all it asked for, the Brazilians nevertheless offered Chile $50
64
Oficio Stein to Senor Ministro, 13 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.

Oficio, Stein to Senor Ministro, 27 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.
66
On the Camara Cantos role, see Pereira, Political In(Justice), 92, 94. On Brazilian assistance, see Oficio,
Stein to Senor Ministro, 27 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.
65
Cold War History
675
million in hard currency to be paid back over 3 years at 1.5% interest starting in 1976, $35
million to purchase Brazilian goods (expanded from the $22 million credit already offered
to the Allende government but never used), $50 million on behalf of the Carteira de
Comercio Exterior do Banco de Brazil (CACEX) to buy durable consumer goods (topping
up $10 million offered to Chile prior to the coup), and a further unspecified credit to
Chiles armed forces arranged separately.67 According to a secret CIA briefing, it appears as
if these figures also increased over the following month, amounting to a total of $442
million in combined assistance from Brazil and Argentina by the end of November. It is
difficult to know how much of this came from Brazil, but, overall, the CIA estimated that
$200 million of the combined figure was for capital goods and a further $50 million
(presumably Brazils donation of hard currency) would be for direct balance of payment
relief. Together with inherited assorted credit lines from Allendes period in office, $171
million in short-term credits from US and Canadian banks with prospects for a further
$75 million from them, the CIA noted that Chile would be able to meet its external
requirements amounting to $720 million in the year ahead.68
Henceforth, General Pinochets visit to Brasilia for the presidential inauguration of
Ernesto Geisel in March 1974 his first international trip publicly demonstrated the
new alliance between both countries. While in Brasilia, Pinochet not only discussed
prospects for strengthening bilateral political, cultural, and economic relations with Geisel,
but he also had the opportunity to meet at length with Paraguays Alfredo Stroessner,
Bolivias Hugo Banzer, and the person who was by now the figurehead of Uruguays rightwing dictatorship, Jose Maria Bordaberry. Brazil seemed to have become the centre of a
new anti-communist international that it had a significant influence in putting together
or, as press reports at the time put it, a new anti-Marxist axis.69
Ideological sympathy translated into practical collaboration between Brazil and
Chile against their left-wing opponents. Thanks to Brazilian diplomatic presence in
Soviet bloc countries (something that the Chileans no longer had after the coup),
Brazils foreign ministry passed secret information to Santiago about Chilean exiles
and anti-dictatorship activities in the East.70 In August 1975, the two countries
intelligence services then agreed to cooperate in tracking down their countries exiles
across Europe by respectively dividing operations in Portugal and Spain up between
them.71 Manuel Contreras, the head of Chiles notorious national intelligence agency
67
Oficio, Stein to Senor Ministro, Visita de Mison Economica, 29 October 1973, Oficios Conf./
Brasil/1973/AMRE. In July 1974, Chile also successfully renegotiated its debt payments with Brazil for 1973
and 1974. See Oficio, Cubillos to Senor Ministro, 29 July 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE.
68
Briefing Paper, The Current State of Chiles Economy, attachment, Memorandum, Chief, South
America Branch, OER, to Chief, OCI/WH/SAW, 21 November 1973, CREST.
69
Oficio, Embajador Cubillos, EmbaChile Brasilia to Senor Ministro, 22 March 1974, Oficios Conf./
Brasil/1974/AMRE. See also Fermandois, Mundo y fin de mundo, 408.
70
Oficio, Cubillos, EmbaChile Brasilia to Senor Ministro, 1 August 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/
AMRE.
71
Enrique Montero Marx, Subsecretario del Interior, Chile, to Don Joao Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo,
Jefe de Servic o Nacional de Informac oes, Brasil, Unificacion de las actividades de Inteligencia en la
676
T. Harmer
set up after the coup, the DINA, has also publicly recalled that Chilean military
personnel would frequently travel to Brazil to receive instruction and training in
counterinsurgency techniques.72 Meanwhile, the Brazilians assisted with publication
and distribution of Chilean books favourable to the coup and its leaders intentions.73
Nevertheless, below the surface, strains very quickly emerged. One source of tension
was Chiles position regarding Brazils bitter dispute with Argentina at the UN over
control of the Parana River and the waters leading down to the Rio de la Plata basin.
When the Chilean junta had appointed a new ambassador to Brazil and he presented
his credentials to Gibson Barbosa in December 1973, the latter made it quite clear that
Brazil expected something in return for its recent support for Chile. After expressing
sympathy for Chiles battle against international critics he said that the Brazilians
were in the same trench when it came to fighting off hostility at the United Nations
he asked for assurances that Chile would alter a previous vote on the question of shared
natural resources at the UN General Assembly directly related to the Parana dispute. I
want to be very frank with you, ambassador, Gibson Barbosa underlined, this problem
is vital for Brazil and our future policy towards Chile will be conditional on the
position that you adopt. He did not want to change Brazils intimate collaboration
with Chile, he went on, but he would have to if Chile did not change its vote and
support Brazil (instead of Argentina). As Chiles new ambassador, Hernan Cubillos,
wrote home, Gibson Barbosa had clearly laid Brazils cards on the table: Brazils
goodwill was now apparently dependent on Chiles support.74 That the Chileans
rejected Gibson Barbosas plea did not therefore bode well for the relationship.
Following Geisels inauguration, a gulf also began to appear between Brasilia and
Santiago in terms of the way in which both viewed the urgency and methods to be used
in fighting ideological enemies. To be sure, Brazils intelligence forces continued, to
cooperate with the Chileans when it came to tracking down Brazilian exiles abroad
and offering training in counter-insurgency techniques. However, upon assuming the
presidency of Brazil, Ernesto Geisel also embarked on a policy of abertura or opening
at home and abroad. In Brazil, this meant a relaxation of censorship, the end of
political detentions, restrictions on the dictatorships intelligence apparatuses,
and the prospect of elections for federal states and parliament. Abroad, it also
Footnote 71 continued
Peninsula Iberica. Establece a continuacion, commando territorial unificado, entre Chile y Brasil, 21
August 1975, as cited in McSherry, Predatory States, 90 92, 93 94.
72
Marie-Monique Robin, Escuadrones de la Muerte: La Escuela Francesa, documentary film, (2003).
73
Oficios, Cubillos to Senor Ministro (DINEX), 7 November 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/
Brasil/1974/AMRE.
74
Record of Conversation, Gibson Barboza and Hernan Cubillos, 7 December 1973, in Oficio, Cubillos
to Senor Ministro, 7 December 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. On the importance that the
highest authorities in Brazil were paying to the Chilean vote on this question, see also Oficio, Cubillos to
Senor Ministry, 30 November 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. As Cubillos wrote home, Brazils
position was quite clearly a minority one (37 African countries and the majority of Asian countries were
voting against it) but only Chile and Peru fully supported Argentinas position within Latin America and
41 countries (including Uruguay) had previously abstained.
Cold War History
677
meant the diversification of relations across ideological divides, re-establishment of

relations with China, the recognition of Angolas first independent government,
the Marxist MPLA, and improved relations with Western Europe all in the name of
increasing Brazils autonomy and sovereignty particularly vis-a`-vis the United
States.75 Watching from Santiago, however, the Chilean dictatorship grew
disenchanted with Geisels abertura and growing ties to the socialist world as it
moved towards a radical hard line posture in domestic and foreign affairs.76 As one
Chilean foreign ministry official put it, Brazils new orientation was making it
inconvenient for it to join Chile in an ideological crusade against international
Marxism and Soviet imperialism as fully as the military regime in Santiago would have
liked.77
Indeed, Chiles obsessive anti-communist agenda combined with Geisels
reorientation of the Brazilian dictatorship meant that Santiago became increasingly
suspicious of Brasilia. In August 1974, Chilean representatives warned that the
Brazilian media had become curiously infiltrated with left-wing tendencies.78 Chiles
military regime also increasingly believed that the nationalist revolutionary
government of Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru was on the verge of invading with
direct encouragement from the Soviet Union and the Cubans, and that the Brazilians
were not showing enough support. True, Brasilias military leaders said that they
viewed Cuban and Soviet support for Peru seriously, but Brazils foreign ministry
astutely made it clear that it thought a Peruvian strike would be madness and that
Lima quite clearly understood that it had lost any opportunity after the coup to take
advantage of Chilean vulnerability. Chiles ambassador in Brasilia also reported that
although there were apparent Brazilian efforts to appease Chilean worries, significant
steps were nevertheless still being made by Brazil to improve ties with Peru and that
these seemed to be taking priority. As Brazils foreign minister told Cubillos, the Geisel
regime believed it was important to maintain a presence in Peru in spite of ideological
differences. This was yet one more demonstration of Brazils new responsible
pragmatism in international affairs and a clear move towards boosting the chances of
Brasilias trade and development of raw material extraction with Lima, Chiles
ambassador wrote back to Santiago.79
As Cubillos argued in April 1974, From a political-economic point of view, Brazil
has become aware of its importance, of its manifest destiny within hemispheric
politics, in its preparation . . . to transform itself into a world power. As a result, it was
75
Spektor, Equivocal Engagement, 134, 135 36, 158.

Oficio, Cubillos to Senor Ministro, 24 September 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/
AMRE.
77
Memorandum Confidencial de la Cancilleria Chilena [Distributed by Centro de Informaciones
Comite Chileno de Solidaridad con la Resistencia Antifascista], 9 December 1974, Document 5, Folder 3,
Box 2, Fondo Orlando Letelier, Archivo Nacional, Santiago, Chile.
78
Oficio, Cubillos, to Senor Ministro, 1 August 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE
79
Oficio, Cubillos to Senor Ministro, 31 October 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/
AMRE.
76
678
T. Harmer
now acting cautiously, which was consequently placing it further and further away
from Chiles Cold War outlook.80 Cubillos was right. Having spent the best part of a
decade combating internal enemies and hunting Brazilian opponents to the military
regime, Brasilia now increasingly perceived itself to be above Cold War crusades and
unsophisticated Chilean Cold Warriors, becoming critical of the way in which the
government in Santiago handled its ideological battles abroad. According to Brazilian
foreign ministry officials, the Chilean juntas representatives were certainly not playing
their cards at the United Nations very well. Rather than brilliant polemicists . . . with a
very poor capacity for dialogue, Brazilian diplomats advised their Chilean
counterparts at the end of 1974, that Chile should have sent able negotiators to
the UN General Assembly who could explain and convince other delegates as
opposed to alienating them. As it was, the Brazilians believed that Santiagos approach
to international diplomacy was extremely aggressive and counterproductive.81
Moreover, in late 1974 and 1975, Brazil no longer seemed as predisposed to help
economically or financially as it had been immediately after the coup. To be sure,
following the Chilean coup, bilateral trade between the two countries had doubled;
Chile bought six Brazilian aircraft and Brazil became the Chileans main market for
copper.82 However, the US ambassador in Brasilia, John H. Crimmins, observed that
the Chileans were frustrated with Brazil. Geisels regime was generally sympathetic
but it was wary of getting too close to Chiles fanatical dictatorship, especially as the
Chileans seemed extremely sensitive and unresponsive when Brasilia suggested that
Santiago should work on enhancing its international image in the area of human
rights.83 By 1975, US diplomats also had to admit that Brazilian assistance had turned
out to be rather more limited and minor than the Chileans had initially expected.84
These changes in the Brazilian-Chilean relationship happened gradually and were
the result of shifts within Brazil. However, they were also the result of Chiles extreme
form of anti- communist authoritarian rule. Chiles regime after 1973 initially looked
very much like Brazils dictatorship. But as one external observer noted two years later,
there was a major difference: the level of oppression . . . Chiles military junta has not
only utilized the experience of Brazil but leapfrogged the early experimental stages of
the Brazilian process.85
As well as murdering and torturing many more of its opponents, Chiles
dictatorship also gave less of a role to civilians than its Brazilian counterpart, its
repression was less judicialized, and it was more committed to radically changing
Chiles economy.86 Although the Chilean and Brazilian militaries both adopted the
National Security Doctrine and proclaimed they were fighting communism in the
80
Oficio, Cubillos to Senor Ministro, 5 April 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE.

Oficio, Stein to Senor Ministro, 27 December 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE.
82
Spektor, Equivocal Engagement, 235 36.
83
Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to AmEmbassy Santiago, 11 April 1975, DOS/CFP.
84
Electronic Telegrams, AmEmbassy Santiago to SecState, 27 March and 17 April 1975, DOS/CFP.
85
MacEoin, Struggle For Dignity, 194 99. See also Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 92.
86
Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 94, 92.
81
Cold War History
679
name of Western Civilization and Catholicism, both also pursued national agendas as
they set about articulating their own approach to domestic and international contexts.
In the process, they drifted apart. In the longer term, these differences meant that Chile
began gravitating more naturally to more similar regimes in Uruguay, Paraguay and
after 1976, Argentina, which would make up the core members of Operation Condor.
Meanwhile, Brazil supported other crusades at a distance, believing its own Cold War
battles to have largely been won by the mid-1970s.
In late 1975, two months before Brazilian representatives attended the opening
meeting of Operation Condor as observers, Geisels foreign minister, Antonio Azeredo
da Silveira, spoke in Sao Paulo, of Brazils hopes for the region. As the US embassy in
Brazil recorded the foreign minister as saying, Brazil hoped that the internal politics of
each country [in Latin America] will develop by peaceful means and with a minimum
of radicalization and violence in order that the indispensable climate of cooperation
and orderly progress of the region not be disturbed. Brazil . . . refuses to interfere in
the internal affairs of its neighbors because of ethical convictions and knowledge of
how illusory the equilibrium resulting from external pressure is.87 A year earlier,
Cubillos had already acknowledged that within the global framework of Brazils new
foreign behaviour, there is a progressive political detente in which ideological
differences (ecumenism) have lost their validity.88 Or as Geisel put it in March 1975,
Brazil was now practicing a sober and realistic policy free from the fatalism of
automatic or preconceived alignments.89
Conclusion
Once Brazils diplomatic, intelligence, and military archives are fully open there is
much more to learn about Brazils intervention in the Southern Cone, the BrazilianChilean relationship after 11 September 1973 and Brasilias relations with other Cold
Warriors in the region. Even so, the ample evidence that we have today from Chilean
and US sources is already significant in helping us to disentangle the story of Brazils
Cold War and the heterogeneous nature of the global Cold War by the mid-1970s. So
why has Brasilias role in Chile, Bolivia or Uruguay not received more scrutiny before?
True, in the early 1970s, the Allende government and the Cubans published stories in
official publications about Brazils sub- imperialism.90 But beyond this they largely
failed to pay enough attention to Brazils role in hemispheric affairs or to try to
counter it. Although the Chilean ambassador in Brasilia was pleading with the Chilean
foreign ministry to regard Brazil as a serious concern in 1971 and the Brazilian
87
Silveira as quoted in Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 19 August 1975, DOS/CFP.
To date, there are no details of who exactly attended the first Condor meeting.
88
Oficio, Cubillos to Senor Ministro, 29 October 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/
AMRE.
89
Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 7 March 1975, DOS/CFP
90
See for example Tricontinental Bulletin, No.69, December 1971.
680
T. Harmer
ambassador did little to hide his hostility to the Allende government within the Latin
American diplomatic community in Santiago they were both relatively ignored.
Moreover, in numerous interviews either with Cuban intelligence officials operating in
Chile at the time and members of the MIR, I have raised the question of Brazils threat
to the UP government and received the same reaction: Brazil was simply not on their
radar.91 Indeed, to the Chilean left, Brazils military regime was always perceived as a
potential enemy but a tertiary one when compared to the United States or Chiles more
traditional enemies: Argentina or Peru. By their calculations at the time, Brazils
military leaders were also very often regarded as Washingtons puppets portrayed
quite literally in left-wing caricatures of the time as Uncle Sams performing gorillas in
military uniform. Accordingly, it was thought that Brazil could be controlled by the
United States, which was considered to be both the source of all hostility ranged
against Allendes left-wing government and the key to neutralizing it. The Chilean left
and their Cuban allies therefore never seem to have seriously looked at the possibility
that Brazilian military leaders might be acting autonomously in Bolivia or Uruguay, or
for that matter Chile. Nor, indeed, does it seem that they fully appreciated the model
that Brazil provided for coup plotters as they prepared at once to overthrow Allendes
peaceful democratic road to socialism and a long-standing liberal Chilean tradition of
constitutional democracy.
And yet, it was not US style democracy that Chiles armed forces wanted to emulate,
but Brazils authoritarian regime. At least initially the identification between military
dictatorships was obvious. Given the Brazilian military regimes ideological leanings, its
response to Allendes election and encouragement of a coup had been logical. Yet the
evolution of the relationship between Brasilia and Santiago, formalized on 13
September 1973, indicates that, just as there were many different types of left-wing
groups in Latin America, there were also different degrees of anti-communism. The
shifting ties between Santiago and Brasilia closely resembled patterns in other parts of
the world during the early-to- mid-1970s. From Latin America to Europe, Africa and
Asia, the Cold War appeared to be fragmenting as different groups took on its cause and
fought it, or distanced themselves from it, in their own idiosyncratic ways. That the
United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a process of detente encouraged this
fragmentation offering space for regional leaders in the global South to take
ownership of the struggle more so than previously. But the process also reflected the
growing independence of emerging powers in the Third World like Brazil, which sought
to carve out separate identities for themselves and expand their global role.
By the mid-1970s, Brazils military regime felt more able to open up and diversify its
foreign relations in this way. After being in power for a decade, it had consolidated its
position and severely weakened opponents to the regime, meaning that it was also less
preoccupied with fighting communism than Chiles obsessive new military leaders.
91
See for example authors interviews with Ulises Estrada, 19 April 2011, Havana, Cuba; Andres Pascal
Allende, 7 April 2010, Santiago, Chile; and Luis Fernandez Ona and Felix Huerta, 23 March 2010, Santiago,
Chile.
Cold War History
681
Having set the tone for the way in which the Cold War played out in the Southern
Cone in the 1970s, the Brazilians were therefore out of step with their followers in the
region. As Matias Spektor has argued, in the eyes of many Brazilians, the Cold War
had come to an end sometime in the 1970s. This was a period when the tiny
revolutionary Left lost momentum and greater social participation in public life
pushed the ruling military out of power, slowly but surely.92
Brazils intervention in the Southern Cone to fight the Cold War in the early 1970s
was therefore something of a last crusade. As soon as it triumphed it was replaced with
a new strategy and the baton passed to new devotees of the National Security Doctrine
and authoritarianism. However, Brasilias period of interventionism in the Southern
Cone should not be eclipsed by the murderous crimes of the dictatorships that
emerged in the mid-1970s. Moreover, as peoples throughout Latin America
Brazilians included struggle to come to terms with the legacies of right-wing
dictatorships and seek justice for past crimes committed, they should look not only to
their domestic records but also to their international roles. The Brazilian dictatorships
body count is relatively low when compared to Chile or Argentina, but it was abroad
that it had the most devastating impact on the intensification of the Cold War both
through its example, its interference in other countries domestic politics, and its
support for counter-revolutionary coups. Brazils experience in and after 1964 was a
game changer that shaped the way in which the ideological battles of the 1970s were
conceptualized and fought thereafter.
92
Matias Spektor, Brazilian Assessments of the End of the Cold War, 231.

Brazil's Cold War in The Southern Cone 1970-1975 - Tanya Harmer

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Brazil's Cold War in The Southern Cone 1970-1975 - Tanya Harmer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This article was downloaded by: [200.87.157.

Cold War History